Islamism

For decades, Turkish Islamists have failed to attract the votes of large sections of society and remained marginal. As a result of this failure to come to power, and due to domestic and international constraints and windows of opportunities, they have declared that they have jettisoned Islamism. Many Turkish Muslims whose religious disposition was shaped by the pluralistic urban Ottoman experience and small-town Anatolian traditionalism, and by the contesting currents of cosmopolitan pluralism and rural social conservatism, voted in favour of these former Islamists who have become " Muslim Democrats ". This paper elaborates on the genealogy of Turkish Islamists and their political trajectories and argues that when the forces and constraints of domestic and external social, political and economic conditions disappeared and the opportunities derived from being Muslim Democrats no longer existed, the former Islamists easily returned to their original ideology, showing that despite assertions to the contrary their respect for democracy and pluralism had not truly been internalised. This paper also aims to demonstrate that similar to other authoritarian populists, Erdoganists perceive the state and its leader as more important than anything else and as being above everything else, which has culminated in a personality cult and sanctification of the state. As long as Turkey's economy continued to boom, almost everyone was happy that Turkey could readily market the " Muslim Democrats " story to the whole world for a long period as a major success story, or as an " exemplary Muslim country " or " model ". Yet, Middle Eastern elites and Western forces got carried away and learnt the hard way just how naive their view was in perhaps the first great transformation movement of the twenty-first century – the Arab Spring. Likewise, the Turkish Spring turned all too quickly towards autumn and then winter.

‘[A] valid concept of “Islam” must denote and connote all possible “Islams,” whether abstract or “real,” mental or social’ (104)... Ahmed seeks to avoid two major pitfalls: (1) making Islam into a static essence or a category within an essentialist framework – such as proscription/prescription, ‘religion’,‘civilization’, ‘culture’, ‘orthodoxy’, etc., and (2) rendering Islam into a totally incoherent concept by conceding that there are as many islams as there are communities or individuals. Ahmed’s thesis (presented in Chapter 5) is that Islam is best conceptualized as a process of meaning-making or hermeneutical engagement in which the human agent engages with the Divine Revelation granted to Muhammad in one or more of this Revelation’s hierarchical dimensions – Pre-Text, Text, and Con-Text – in order to constitute meaning for himself."

The Syrian Salafi armed group Ahrar al-Sham epitomises the most prominent case of politicisation. By 2014, Ahrar al-Sham was the leading insurgent group in Syria, with the largest number of soldiers, presence throughout Syrian opposition-held areas, and relatively strong ties with foreign countries including Turkey and Qatar. Ahrar al-Sham explicitly rejected al-Qaida’s legacy and developed a more inclusive approach to other groups and the population. This chapter traces the group’s emergence and development to demonstrate how pre-war developments and a de-centralised alliance-based expansion underpinned its politicisation over the years. This case study also contends that politicisation was sustained by the group’s internal institutionalisation, which ultimately explains its successes and failures during the conflict. This chapter is based on extensive field research interviews in Turkey and north-west Syria in 2019 with an array of leaders and members of Ahrar al-Sham, armed opposition groups, and independent Syrian Islamists.

Im Jahr 2017 äußerte sich die antirassistische muslimische Aktivistin Linda Sarsour zum Antisemitismus in den USA wie folgt: "While anti-Semitism is something that impacts Jewish Americans, it's different than anti-black racism or Islamophobia because it's not systemic." (Sarsour 2017). 2 Der Soziologe Balàzs Berkovits kommentierte dies kritisch: "Here, Sarsour implies that first, it is not a collective or structural phenomenon, but the sum of scattered individual acts, and second […], that anti-Semitic attacks carried out by other minorities […] cannot be significant, for those are not the actions of the dominant (white) groups, who determine the permanence of structural racism." (Berkovits 2018, 89) Sarsours Aussage ist dabei nur eine Variante in einem ganzen Spektrum von Antisemitismusverharmlosungen, die aus dem Diskurs des akademischen Antirassismus in den politischen Aktivismus eingedrungen sind. Begriffliche Eskamotierung des Antisemitismus, Relativierung des Holocaust, Dethematisierung des Judenhasses der ‚Anderen' und Feindschaft gegen Israel bilden einen systematischen Zusammenhang in diesem Diskurs. 3 Leider handelt es 1 Bei diesem Text handelt es sich um die korrigierte, überarbeitete und erweiterte Version von Elbe 2021a. 2 Vgl. dagegen die FBI-Zahlen über sog. Hassverbrechen, die von religiösen Vorurteilen motiviert sind. Sie weisen für die Jahre 2010-2018 zwischen 67% und 58% antijüdische Verbrechen auf, während die gegen Muslime begangenen von 12% auf 24% gestiegen und wieder auf 14% gesunken sind (darauf folgen dann ca. 10% antichristliche Taten) (vgl. FBI 2010, 2017, 2018, 2019). Es ist natürlich problematisch, Antisemitismus unter das Label eines religiösen Vorurteils zu subsumieren und diese Zahlen sind auch nicht mehr als ein erster Anhaltspunkt, um weiter zu fragen, ob Antisemitismus nicht vielleicht doch noch ‚systemische' Ursachen und Aspekte haben könnte. 3 Alain Finkielkraut hat bereits 1989 anlässlich der "postkoloniale[n] Verteidigungsstrategie" (Gerber 2021a, 217) der Anwälte des Nazi-Täters Klaus Barbie auf den ideologischen Komplex hingewiesen, der die Verharmlosung des Antisemitismus als innerweißer "Familienzwist" (Finkielkraut 1989b, 51), die Einebnung der Differenzen zwischen Shoah und Kolonialverbrechen, die Behauptung, die Erinnerung an den Holocaust "blockiere" "die Erinnerung der Welt" (56) an die Kolonialmassaker und die Dämonisierung Israels als ‚wahrhaft rassistischer' Staat beinhaltet (vgl. ebd., 64).

Mode of publication: Worldwide periodical, published annually every December Note to contributors: YILLIK: Annual of Istanbul Studies accepts submissions in English and Turkish. Articles should conform to the usage of The Chicago Manual of Style (CMOS), 17th edition, and to the style guides published on the journal's website. Articles in Turkish conform to a customized CMOS style available at the website. Research articles are subject to review by two anonymous reviewers and the editorial board. All other submissions are reviewed by the editorial board.

FRIDE is an independent think-tank based in Madrid, focused on issues related to democracy and human rights; peace and security; and humanitarian action and development. FRIDE attempts to influence policy-making and inform public opinion, through its research in these areas.

Bu araştırma 1990’lı yıllarda İslamcıların temelde kapitalizme, özelde ise hem dönemin iktisadi gündemine, hem de bir dizi iktisadi kavrama ve olguya bakışlarını ele almaktadır. Türkiye’de 1980 yılında öne çıkan 24 Ocak ve 12 Eylül tarihleri beraberinde önemli değişim ve dönüşümleri meydana getirmiştir. Bu değişimlerin ve dönüşümlerin muhafazakâr bir parti ve lider öncülüğünde gerçekleşmesi meseleyi din - dindarlar, İslam - İslamcılar bağlamında önemli hale getirmektedir. Özellikle 1990’lı yıllardan itibaren yükselişe geçen İslamcılık da mezkûr dönüşümden etkilenmiştir. İslamcılığın siyasal ve toplumsal yükselişinin yanı sıra iktisadi yükselişi, İslam-iktisat ilişkisinin ve bu ilişkinin alt başlıklarının mesele haline gelmesine sebep olmuştur. O dönemde İslamcıların kapitalizm bağlamında sermaye, piyasa, bankacılık, faiz, girişimcilik, özelleştirme, gümrük birliği, tekelleşme, liberalizm, kültür, ahlâk, tabakalaşma ve eşitsizlik gibi kavramların dergilerde tartıştığı görülmektedir.
Türkiye’de İslamcılık hareketi 2. Meşrutiyet döneminden itibaren ortaya çıkışıyla birlikte daima temel olarak dergiler üzerinden varlığını sürdürmüş, gelişimini sağlamıştır. Bu çalışmada da 1990’lı yıllar boyunca yayın yapmış İslamcı dergilerden Çerçeve, Haksöz, İktisat ve İş Dünyası ve İzlenim’in bağlamı ele alınıp İslamcıların kapitalizme ve kapitalizmden doğan bir dizi olgu ve meseleye bakışları incelenmiştir.

Modern Türk düşüncesinde ortaya konan İslamcılık çalışmalarında İslamcı düşüncenin sınıflandırması meselesi önemli problemlerden biri olmuştur. Genellikle modernleşmeyle olan ilişkinin niteliği ekseninde siyasî saiklerle şekillenen tasnifler, İslamcılığı da belli kalıplara hapsetmiş, bu durum modernleşme devri ve İslamcılık düşüncesinin anlaşılmasının önündeki önemli engellerden birini teşkil etmiştir. Yapılan tasniflerin tarihi vakıaya değil de belli bir siyasi programı kabul edip etmeme durumuna göre şekillendirilmesi, modernleşme devrinde ulus olarak inşa edilen Türklüğün de İslamcılıktan ayrılmasına neden olmuş, böylece Türk İslamcılığı düşüncenin üretildiği coğrafya ve dili ifade edecek kadar daralmış bir hale gelmiştir. Bu çalışma Türk İslamcılığını, İslamlaşma devrinden itibaren ortaya çıkan tarih tecrübesi ve bu tecrübe ekseninde inşa edilen gelenek ekseninde değerlendirmeyi ve bu gelenek dışında ortaya çıkan İslamcılık söylemlerini de gene bu geleneğin ötekiyi anlama ve ifade etme şekli doğrultusunda sınıflandırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde hali hazırda literatürde bulunan sınıflandırmalar genel olarak ortaya konmuş, ikinci bölümde Türklüğün ne olduğu tasavvuf, Sünnilik ve cihat kavramları üzerinden tartışılarak Türk İslamcılığının bahsi geçen gelenekle rabıtası incelenmiştir. Ayrıca çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde modernleşmenin imkanlarını geleneği problem haline getirmekte bulan İslamcılık düşüncesi, Divan-ı Lügat’it Türk’te, Türk’ün ötekisini ifade eden “tat” kavramı doğrultusunda tetkik edilmiştir. Üçüncü ve dördüncü bölümde ise bu tasnifin örneklenmesi amacıyla, Türk İslamcılığını temsil eden Mehmet Akif Ersoy ve Tat İslamcılığın mümessili Şemseddin Günaltay’ın düşüncelerini inşa ettikleri kaynaklar, din ve tekniğe taalluk eden fikriyatları tetkik edilmiş ve çalışma sonuç bölümü ile hitama erdirilmiştir.

İran Devrimi (1979) sosyal bilimler literatüründe “İslamî devrim” adıyla anılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, İslamî devrim kavramı, İran Devrimi örneğiyle ilişkili olarak ele alınmaktadır. İlk olarak devrim nedir sorusu etrafındaki tartışmalara göz atılmış ve kavramın hem sosyal bilimler literatüründe hem de İslam kaynaklarında nasıl geçtiğine bakılmıştır. Bu tartışmalardan hareketle İslamî devrimin tarifi yapıldıktan sonra, İran Devrimi hem bir süreklilik hem de kopuş olarak anlamlandırılmıştır. İslamî Devrim, Allah’ın el-Adl isminin bir yansıması olarak adaletin er ya da geç tecelli edeceği inancına referans verirken, aynı zamanda modernite tecrübesinin etkisiyle halkın kendi hayatının öznesi olduğu düşüncesiyle iç içe yorumlanmıştır. 20. yüzyılın bu açıdan bakıldığında en özgün ani ve köklü değişim örneği olan İran Devrimi, silinmez bir iz bırakmıştır.

İran Devrimi dünyada olduğu gibi Türkiye'de de İslamcı hareketler üzerinde büyük bir etki yaratmıştır. Bu etkinin bu çalışmada ele alınan kısmı devrimden günümüze kadar Türkiye'de çeşitli düzeylerde etkili olan "İrancı" İslamcılık olacaktır. "İrancı" İslamcılık, din, toplum ve siyasetin Türkiye'de kesiştiği ve birbirini etkilediği önemli alanlardan birisidir. Çalışmada "İrancı" İslamcı siyasal akımların Türkiye'de ana akım İslamcılık ile olan farkları ve hareket içerisinde bulunan figürler ile yapılan görüşmelerden hareketle bu akımın ortaya çıkışı ve ortak temaları tartışılacaktır. Çalışma, Türkiye-İran ilişkilerine farklı bir boyut katması ve iki ülkenin karşılıklı birbirlerini etkilemeleri konusunda Türkiye-İran ilişkilerini çalışan literatür tarafından henüz değinilmemiş bir alanı ele alması hasebiyle literatüre önemli bir katkı sunma iddiasındadır.

Tarihte ve Günümüzde Selefilik (sempozyum kitabı, ed. Ahmet Kavas, İstanbul: Ensar Neşr., 2014) s. 485-524.

Suudi Arabistan’ın 1970’li yıllarda dünyaya açılması ve özelde Ortadoğu’nun genelde ise yer kürenin önemli ekonomik ve siyasi güçlerinden birisi haline gelmesiyle beraber, o zamana kadar İslam aleminde kapalı ve dar muhitlerde faaliyet yürütmüş olan Selefiler, gelişen iletişim vasıtalarının ve geniş ekonomik imkanların da yardımıyla İslam düşüncesi ve siyasetinde ağırlığı olan bir pozisyona gelmeyi başarmışlardır.
Bu durum aynı zamanda kendileri gibi gelenekçi olmakla beraber “hadis” merkezli değil de fıkıh/medrese yahut tasavvuf/tekke odaklı yapılanan hareketler ile, ya da kültürel ve siyasal faaliyetler yürüten modern çehreli İslamî hareketler ile Selefiliğin yoğun etkileşime girmesini de sağlamıştır. Bilhassa Suudi tandanslı Selefilik bir taraftan bu hareketleri küresel çapta etkilemekte, diğer taraftan ise kendisi yer yer etkilenmekte, bu etkilenmeyle Selefilik kendi içinde farklılaşmakta, bu farklılıklar 1990’lı yıllarla birlikte derinleşmeye başlamakta, hem ideolojik hem de örgütsel bakımdan kendi bünyesinde zıtlaşan ama malum geleneksel inanç ve pratiklerin çoğu noktasında uzlaşan “Selefiyyeler”in oluşumunu temin etmektedir.
Bu çalışmamız söz konusu etkileşimin ve “Selefiyyeler” gerçeğinin mahiyetini bir bildiri çerçevesinde ana hatlarıyla ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.

ISBN 978-1-108-48087-1 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for ttre persistence oI accuracy of UR[* foı extemal or üird-party internet \i/ebsites referred to in this publication and does not guaıantee üat any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Hezbollah is the archetype and so far the most important and efficient of all Iranian proxy forces in the Middle East, and it demonstrates all the traits that eventually became the trademarks of Iran’s proxy networks in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and beyond. While embedding itself in the national government of Lebanon, Hezbollah receives its portfolio from Tehran and advances the agenda of the Islamist regime of Iran. While pressing the regime’s interests at the expense of the West and its regional allies through widespread terrorism and proxy warfare, Hezbollah provides Tehran with just enough plausible deniability to still appear as a somewhat “respectable actor” on the world stage.

Bahrain’s Royal Family, the Al Khalifa, has long pursued a strategy of divide and rule in order to prevent the emergence of cross-opposition coalitions, while exacerbating the country’s sectarian divide has become a critical means of ensuring regime survival. This article examines the country’s twentieth century imperial and post-independence history through the framework of divide and rule theory, providing crucial context for current events in Bahrain. It demonstrates how a divide and rule strategy is structurally embedded within the ruling family’s mode of governance, and reveals how it continues to be employed as an effective means of maintaining absolute monarchy in Bahrain.

Keywords: Bahrain, Arab Spring, Gulf Cooperation Council, divide and rule, sectarianism

The Islamic Period Museum of Iran was established, almost 16 years after the Islamic Revolution, as an addition to the previous National Museum building – the Iran Bastan, or Ancient Iran Museum – in 1996. By examining the components of state Islamism, the space of the museum and key exhibits, this paper reveals the analogous relationship between the museum and state ideology. That relationship suggests that the museum embodies fundamental ambiguities and inconsistencies inherent in Iranian state Islamism. Those ambiguities and inconsistencies are only concealed, in the museum as in the ideology, by employing traditionalist rhetoric with regard to religion and identity.

Flukten fraSyria -etland iruiner, to presidenter,tre familiersskjebner» Gyldendal F FL LU UK KT T H HI IS ST TO O På mangemåter er han en eventyrer i språkets verden. Dyer er ikkeredd for åbegi seg ut idet ukjente. Likevelvet han hvorhan skal. Det ligger en rytme ibånn, og han vender alltid tilbaketil temaet. Men han forsøker aldri åvaere«viktig». Kanskje nettopp derfor er det en fornøyelse ålese ham. FREDRIK WANDRUP 1 «Det jeg egentlig ville si -Utvalgte essays 1989-2015» av Geoff Dyer AN BE FA LT ANMELDERIET BOK SAKPROSAI DAGBLADET HVER FREDAG RedigertavMarie L. Kleve, mlk@dagbladet.no Fle re anm eld els er og bok tips iDa gbl ade t Hel gea vis a Ioktober 2013 reistetosøstre itenårene fraBaerum tilSyria foråslutteseg tilD en islamskes tat. Straks den norsk-somaliskefamilien forsto alvoretisituasjonen, reistefaren etterfor å bringe dem tilbake. Dete ru tgangspunktetf or Åsne Seierstads bok,« To søstre». Derf ortelles den dramatiske historien ih eles in bredde,f or første gang. Bokae re ffektivtk omponert. Den begynner den fatale oktoberdagen jentene på 19 og 16 år forlaterlandet. Deretter kasterSeierstad blikket bakoverogforteller forhistorien tilfamilien. Døtrenes interesse forislam fortoner seg først som et ungdomsopprør,men fører etterhvert tilradikaliseringo gr eligiøs vekkelse.P åv eien spiller en radikal koranlaerer en sentral rolle.Det samme gjør den konservative bevegelsen Islam Net.

This article critically examines the role of Islamist state discourse
and policies in the Kurdish region of Turkey. Academic works on
Islamism often address settings where Islamist movements and
political parties operate as anti-colonial and oppositional entities.
However, this article discusses how Islamist ideology has become
an instrument of governmentality to maintain and legitimize colonial
rule in the Kurdish region of Turkey under the Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP). After contextualizing
the Kurdish issue as an internal colonization process
since the beginning of the Turkish Republic, the paper focuses on
the AKP period to analyse the use of an Islamic discourse of unity
and brotherhood and attempts to foster the rise of a loyal conservative
civil society among the Kurds. Thus, it argues that the
internal colonial paradigm remains fully relevant to analysis of the
Kurdish issue during the last decade and that neoliberal Islamist
governmentality should be understood as a strategy complementary
to repression, to increase popular support for the government
and marginalize opposition.

De een zijn droom is de ander zijn dood is een zoektocht naar de bruikbaarheid van utopisme als een analytisch concept binnen onderzoek naar de politieke islam. De scriptie legt zich specifiek toe op het ontrafelen van het verband tussen utopismen en het legitimeren van geweld, met behulp van het werk en denken van de belangrijkste denker van de Egyptische Moslimbroederschap, Sayyid Qutb. De politieke filosofen Karl Popper en John Rawls hadden ogenschijnlijk tegenstrijdige ideeën over het concept utopisme, maar in deze scriptie voer ik aan dat hun theorieën samen tot nieuwe inzichten kunnen leiden wat betreft de creatieve en destructieve kwaliteiten van utopisme. Met behulp van dit analytische tweespan, worden Qutbs kritiek op de status quo, zijn wens om de verwezenlijking van een islamitische wereldorde en zijn legitimering van geweld in de naam van God, onder de loep genomen en verklaard. Hieruit volgt dat Qutbs absolute overtuiging in de almacht en eenheid van God, in samenwerking met zijn idee dat de Koran een eenduidige betekenis uitdraagt, een islamitische wereldorde zowel realistisch als wenselijk maakt. Zijn hyperfocus op dit vaststaande einddoel en op de juiste weg ernaartoe, spelen een belangrijke rol in zijn goedkeuring van gebruik van geweld tegen actoren die dit proces belemmeren.

An overview of literature on radicalization in the Muslim diaspora in Europe finds identity crises to be a key precipitant to the process. Studies also typically focus on the manipulation of identify by violent Islamic extremist groups. This paper attempts to contribute to the discussion on the role of identity in radicalization by using social identity theory. In doing so, the article explores the formation and transformation process of social identities, and argues that the nature of community-level groups and networks may contribute to identity ‘readiness’ for radicalization. To this end, special focus is given to formally recognized Islamist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and institutions and their potential impact on Muslim religious identity in the European Muslim diaspora. Findings suggest that the more pervasive the ideology of Islamist representatives is, the more likely the normative environment in the diaspora is to be conducive to both non-violent and violent Islamic extremism.

This paper explores the difference between Islamism and Islam, and the manner in which the former evolved from the latter. It argues that the flouting of a key principle, as well as the craving to use Islam to achieve political aims, were instrumental in the transmutation of Islam into Islamism. Restoring Islam will require its de-politicization as well as a restructuring of exegesis. (3 pages)

Sungur Savran, The great challenge: Winning the working class back from ideological irredentism

Tamás Krausz, An updated, second edition of the Horthy regime in Hungary

Ewa Groszewska, The new Polish government: Anti-neoliberal but anti-left profile first

Savas Michael-Matsas, The French Spring and the crisis in Europe

Balkan Socialist Center “Christian Rakovsky” and RedMed, Against austerity, fascism, war, environmental catastrophe, and barbarism, fight for international socialism!

Burak Gürel , Islamism: A comparative-historical overview

Mustafa Kemal Coşkun, Islamism: A comparative-historical overview The class bases of political articulation: Islamism in Turkey

Özgür Öztürk, Economic background of the collapse of the Soviet Union

At its tenth national congress, Ennahda Movement Party declared that it will separate politics from preaching and transform itself into a national democratic party. This decision was perceived as an indication of the downfall of Islamism. However, tracing the ideological and organizational evolution of the Tunisian Islamist movement shows that it is highly dynamic and adaptable. Therefore, the latest developments should be perceived as a new metamorphosis of Islamism and an organizational remodeling of its movement in response to the opportunities and challenges it has faced since the Arab Spring.

English translation of review of Joseph Croitoru's book on the history of suicide bombing. The study tracks the origins of suicide attacks back to Japan's kamikaze soldiers and pilots. Their spirit was brought to the Middle East by Japanese terrorists who cooperated with Palestinian ones. This led to the still quite unknown invention of suicide bombing as a terrorist weapon already in the 1970s by secular Palestinian organisations. Only in the 1980s in Lebanon it was "islamized" and further developed.

This research make comparison between two Islamic party in Malaysia; Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and Parti Amanah Negara (AMANAH). The author argues these two political party had different Islamic ideology, which then create different understanding on how Islam should be implemented in Malaysia. PAS and AMANAH then compete to gain voters support and power during Malaysia 14th Grand Election. Surprisingly, both Islamic parties did a significant gain in the electoral. Kindly contact the authors or publisher to get full version.

Data Matrix for the article

Abstract: This article analyzes patterns of global migration during the last five years, often associated with the “European refugee crisis” since summer 2015, documented by the World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix data (BMM). Based on cross-national data, gathered and documented for this analysis, the article also provides first quantitative analyses of the predictable effects of the rising migration from the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) countries on the societies of the host countries. With around a third of the total immigrant population originating from OIC countries, the growing future Muslim presence in European politics and economics is not a fantasy but a reality. The European Union has become the world’s leading magnet of global migration, with around a fifth of global migration now flowing into the EU countries. Europe seems to have found – as yet – no coherent answer to this. It takes little imagination to realize that the expected monumental shifts in the underlying demographics of Western countries, caused by Muslim mass migration, may have very serious and even dramatic effects on the future support for the state of Israel and on its backing among the populations of the leading Western military and economic powers. The article shows that in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, rich Arab immigration-hosting countries, hitherto the main recipients of OIC migration, became more restrictive in their immigration policies, while a considerable proportion of OIC migration now turned to Europe, accelerated by the instabilities wrought by the civil war in Syria. Contrary to the assumptions of the dominant “welcome culture” in the media and the academia of most West European countries, the negative social and political consequences of this mass migration, especially for gender relations and the overall inequality dimensions, cannot be overlooked and are spelled out in this article, relying on multivariate analysis of the relevant international cross-national data.

While a significant degree of uncertainty surrounds the Taliban’s international agenda, prominent players within the Muslim Brotherhood have already signaled their unambiguous support for the group. This paper compiles those declarations of support by Muslim Brotherhood members, documenting various quotes, official statements, publications, media appearances, and more. The collection starts from the fall of Kabul and proceeds to the present, dividing quotes into two distinct categories according to their origin: 1) those made by members or groups of the global Muslim Brotherhood, and 2) those made by members or institutions specifically of the Muslim Brotherhood in
the West. On the whole, the collection below provides evidence not only of the ideological affinities shared by the Taliban and the Muslim Brotherhood, but also reveals how the Brotherhood is adapting its discourse to incorporate and accommodate new narratives of the fall of Kabul to the Taliban

The article is devoted to the analysis of non-violent elements in the anti-terrorist approach of Saudi Arabia at the present stage. The article consists of three thematic parts. First of all, the authors considered several main factors, leading to the radicalization of the partisans of political Islam. Second, they pointed out some preventive measures that could prevent the dissemination of radical ideas among the Muslim population. The final stage was the consideration of the direct deradicalization program used by Saudi Arabia against those accused of religious terrorism and extremism. The analysis, which had been made, showed that the program of deradicalization used in Saudi Arabia had demonstrated quite impressive results. Apparently, Saudi Arabia is seriously trying to play a leading role in the middle East, strengthening its position not only through military operations against Islamist radicalism, but also paying great attention to the reasons for the growth of radical convictions among the Islamist groups in the region.

In de strijd tegen Islamitisch radicalisme richten wetgevers en beleidsmakers zich meer en meer op de vraag of en hoe men niet-gewelddadige, islamistische en salafistische organisaties kan verbieden.
De ratio hierachter is dat hun zendingswerk de basis legt voor antidemocratische bewegingen en zij met een beroep op het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens trachten de rechten uit dat verdrag aan anderen te ontzeggen.  Een beroep op artikel 17 EVRM ligt dan ook voor de hand, maar is dat ook haalbaar?
In dit artikel beargumenteer ik dat een parallel kan worden getrokken tussen deze organisaties en een zaak van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens uit 1988: de zaak Kuhnen tegen Duitsland. Hierin concludeerde het Hof dat neonazi organisaties geen beroep kunnen doen op de vrijheden uit het EVRM aangezien hun activiteiten, zelfs wanneer deze geen wet breken, tot doel hebben de democratische rechtsorde teniet te doen. Ditzelfde kan worden gesteld over salafistische-islamistische organisaties. Hiermee wordt wetgevers en beleidsmakers een precedent aangereikt om het beleid jegens eerstgenoemde aan te scherpen.

This radical critique reclaims and recasts the ‘Transition Paradigm’, countering the habit of using advanced and successful democratic transitions as a template to be followed in other regions. It argues that the Arab (and broader Middle Eastern) experience has important lessons to offer, even in its failures. For example, it could help to explain the West's recent populist upsurge and other democratic reversals.

The study establishes how Salafism has been able to influence Dutch Muslim communities in the current period. Through exploratory research, fifteen ‘expert’ interviews with members from the Dutch Muslim community were conducted. They indicated several shortcomings due to having to endure interventionistic policies that have thus far failed to curb the rise in Salafist recruitment. The analysis also reveals a range of misconceptions currently held regarding the Salafism phenomenon. We argue that statements made by public political figures and the varying definitions used within governmental publications and policy decisions have caused a disproportionate focus placed upon ordinary Dutch Muslims. As a consequence, it enforces an Islamophobic perspective that diminishes the ability of Dutch Muslims to cooperate with the security services. The process of securitizing Salafism as a whole has led to the Dutch Muslim community to self-censor and self-isolate while experiencing restricted freedom of religion. The process of securitisation reframes the current understanding of Salafism as a greater societal threat.