Legal interpretation

Nel rigido quadro sistematico implicato dal principio di legalità durante i secoli XIX e XX, molteplici sono stati gli itinerari teorici svolti intorno al problema del rapporto tra diritto e società e sul come concepire, tramite la giurisprudenza, dinamiche di manifestazione del diritto autonome dalla mediazione del potere politico. Il saggio si propone di considerare percezioni della questione su due terreni chiave. Il primo è quello rappresentato dal dibattito sull’interpretazione del diritto, che, soprattutto nel periodo a cavallo dei due secoli, esprime una varietà di orientamenti favorevoli rivalutazione del ruolo del giurista. Il secondo terreno è quello dei profili sistematici della giurisdizione che, in diverse realtà nazionali (qui vengono considerati i casi della Francia, della Germania e dell’Italia), tendono ad essere ripensati per favorire una valorizzazione del momento giurisprudenziale. Anche su questi terreni però le declinazioni del discorso sembrano restare condizionate dal persistere di un orizzonte precomprensivo di tipo monistico. Le pagine conclusive del saggio, nel seguire la parabola di tale impostazione, portano l’attenzione sui caratteri del diritto giurisprudenziale nella fase attuale; si intende con ciò valutare se, in uno scenario europeo ormai connotato da un quadro ordinamentale pluralistico, può essere rinvenuta nell’autonomia del diritto una nuova prospettiva di senso.

Це пояснюється тим, що кримінологічна експертиза нормативно-правових актів охоплює більш широке коло питань, оскільки її основним завданням є оцінювання можливих кримінальних наслідків реалізації нормативно-правових актів в різних сферах життя суспільства.

In this paper, we expose the legal theories underlying two important classes of Legal Core Ontologies and show how these ontologies inherit both limitations and benefits (such as explanatory power) of their underlying theories. We do that with the help of a real case study in which we have normative omission and collision of principles. We use this case study to conduct an ontological analysis of the support for judicial decision-making in LKIF-Core (representing Kelsen’s Pure Theory of the Law) and UFO-L (representing Robert Alexy’s Theory of Constitutional Rights). We show that UFO-L is able to articulate the semantics of the content of judicial decisions by making explicit the individual’s legal positions that are raised in argumentation along a legal process. The same cannot be said of LKIF-Core that is based on the Kelsenian stance and focuses on the representation of general norms (norm types) and subsumption of facts to these norms.

У статті досліджується розвиток стандартів прав людини, гарантованих Європейською конвенцією з прав людини, крізь призму європейського праворозуміння. Автор аналізує рішення Європейського суду з прав людини щодо тлумачення та ефективного забезпечення прав і основних свобод людини, а також практику їх застосування в Україні. Key words: human rights, dynamic interpretation, consensus, autonomous interpretation,margin of appreciation, principle of proportionality.

У статті досліджуються питання, пов’язані з особливостями тлумачення і застосування статті 3 Європейської конвенції з прав людини у практиці Європейського суду з прав людини. Зокрема, проаналізовано зміст статті 3, визначено, що необхідно розуміти під поняттями катування, нелюдське чи таке, що принижує гідність, поводження або покарання. Розкрито матеріальні і процесуальні аспекти порушень заборони катувань, а також позитивні і негативні зобов’язання держави щодо ефективного забезпечення і захисту відповідного права. Проаналізовано стандарти належної оцінки жорстокого поводження та основні аспекти юридичної кваліфікації певної форми поганого поводження як катування. Зазначено процесуальні гарантії, які повинні бути забезпечені кожній особі на досудовій стадії розслідування, недотримання яких спричиняє порушення статті 3 Конвенції.
Key words: torture, inhuman treatment or punishment, degrading treatment/punishment, effective investigation, medical examination, substantive violation, procedural violation.

Sumario: I. Ética en la función judicial.-II. El consecuencialismo y la interpretación previsora de la Constitución.-III. Utilización de la interpretación previsora I. Ética en la función judicial Un enunciado ético es aquel que contiene alguna de las siguientes expresiones o sus sinónimos: "es deseable que", "es el deber moral", "es reprensible", "es moralmente admirable" o las negación de los mismos (1). La teoría ética trata de responder ciertas cuestiones sobre estos enunciados. Presenta tres niveles de análisis: 1) La ética crítica o metaética teoriza sobre la justificación o defensa de principios éticos. También se ocupa del significado de los enunciados éticos (2). Entiende sobre la naturaleza de los juicios morales y el razonamiento moral (3). 2) La ética normativa responde acerca de cuáles enunciados éticos son válidos y porqué (4). Se refiere a lo que debe entenderse por lo correcto y lo bueno. 3) La ética aplicada es la utilización de la ética normativa en un área específica. La función judicial es un campo en el cual se concretan determinadas reglas éticas-que implican una o más éticas aplicadas-. Estas vienen condicionadas directamente por la ética normativa que se adopta a través del ordenamiento jurídico. Las teorías éticas que dominan la filosofía moral actual son tres. Dos son éticas del deber y una del carácter. Las éticas del deber establecen un conjunto de conductas que debemos practicar. Son el deontologismo y el consecuencialismo. La ética del carácter no establece un catálogo de conductas a seguir, sino que pretende que el sujeto desarrolle un determinado carácter virtuoso. La ética del carácter debe ser descartada para aplicarse a la función judicial ya que el ordenamiento jurídico no habilita que se justifiquen resoluciones judiciales en razón de las cualidades morales del juez, sino por circunstancias externas a él. El deontologismo (del griego deon, "deber") entiende que existen ciertas conductas que son correctas y otras incorrectas, independientemente de las consecuencias de las mismas en el caso concreto (5). Se prioriza lo correcto sobre lo bueno. No cualquier conducta que maximice o persiga lo bueno es moralmente aceptable. Los medios empleados son más importantes que el fin perseguido. Haciendo una simplificación, un deontologista podría decir que el fin no justifica los medios. Por el contrario, el consecuencialismo tiene una estructura teleológica (del griego telos, "fin"). Los que adscriben al consecuencialismo niegan que existan tipos de actos correctos o incorrectos en sí mismos. Para calificar moralmente a los actos se debe tener en cuenta el fin que persiguen. Lo bueno es conceptualizado independientemente de lo correcto y lo correcto es, en definitiva, lo que maximiza lo bueno (6). Existe una preponderancia de lo bueno respecto de lo correcto. El sistema jurídico en la República Argentina claramente se inclina por una ética deontologista (7). Lo que se le pide al juez al momento de emitir sus resoluciones es que las mismas sean conforme a derecho. Esta regla se encuentra explicitada, en lo que se refiere al fuero federal, en el art. 21 de la ley 48, que determina que los tribunales nacionales, en el ejercicio de sus funciones, procederán aplicando la Constitución Nacional, las leyes de la Nación, los tratados con naciones extranjeras, las leyes provinciales y los principios del derecho de gentes, según lo exijan los casos sometidos a su decisión. El juez debe aplicar el derecho independientemente de las consecuencias de su resolución. No se le pide que haga un cálculo consecuencialista sobre los resultados de la aplicación de la ley. Estas consideraciones-sobre los efectos de la realización del derecho-son hechas por el constituyente y el legislador. El juez debe respetar los derechos que tengan los individuos más allá de las consideraciones teleológicas. Así, si para la paz social fuera más beneficioso que un agitador no expresara sus opiniones públicamente el juez de todas maneras debe respectar su derecho a la libre expresión. II. El consecuencialismo y la interpretación previsora de la Constitución De todas maneras, la ética consecuencialista tiene cabida en la función judicial (8). En este trabajo no desarrollaré todos los casos en que se puede llegar a utilizar; me limitaré a un supuesto, relacionado con la interpretación constitucional. Para aplicar la Constitución, como cualquier ley, se requiera previamente interpretarla. La exégesis jurídica implica una operación cognoscitiva por la cual se desentraña el sentido de una o más normas. Implica determinar su verdadero alcance (9). Interpretar la Constitución tiene características que la diferencian de la interpretación de otras normas jurídicas. Es uno de los temas más conflictivos en doctrina. Lo cual es lógico teniendo en cuenta que interpretar la Constitución es el paso previo a aplicarla. Quien imponga su interpretación dirá cuáles son los alcances de la Constitución y de todo el ordenamiento jurídico (10), influyendo en la vida

The main aim of this article is to discuss the essence and distinctive features of the margin of appreciation doctrine in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. In accordance with Protocol No. 14, all Council of Europe member States have an obligation to apply a margin of appreciation. It is worth mentioning that in the text of the Convention and in the preparatory work there is no such term as «margin of appreciation». Nevertheless, this doctrine is well established in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights (in the case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom etc.). The guarantees enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights are a minimum standard. The European Court of Human Rights doesn’t define, how exactly the States must secure these rights. Thus, the member States enjoy the margins of appreciation, that is, the national authorities are better placed to settle a dispute than the Strasbourg institutions (so-called the better position rationale)....

When parties conclude a contract, there is a glimmer of consensus and when that contract is reduced to writing, at least in the English tradition, elaborate terms are crafted with much care and precision from established precedents and the skilled use of language to reflect the agreement reached by the parties. But the glimmer of consensus obscures the fact that there can hardly ever be complete agreement on every minute detail of the contract and no matter how carefully or with how much elaboration a contract is drafted, the ideal of a perfect contract remains eternally beyond the reach of the drafter. No matter how clearly the parties express themselves and no matter how well drafted a contract may be, it is never beyond the realm of possibility that the contract may yet contain some omission. There are various reasons why an omission may occur: Unforeseen circumstances may arise; circumstances change; parties change; needs change; conflicts of interest are ever present. Whatever the reason, omissions arise with sufficient frequency to warrant the existence of legal rules which explain in which circumstances a court may supply an omission. This is often done by the implication of certain unexpressed terms in a contract. The aim with this analysis is to consider the various kinds of unexpressed terms that can be implied in a contract from a comparative perspective against the backdrop of the judgment of the England and Wales Court of Appeals (Civil Division) in Baker Tilly (a firm) v Makar ([2010] EWCA Civ 1411).

Download at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3539823

American law clerks often draft opinions for their judges. Yet American legal culture is remarkably diffident about that simple fact. The role that law clerks play in drafting opinions is not a secret. Far from it. But it might qualify to be somewhere in the outer vicinity of being an “open secret.” And it continues to be controversial.

This essay explores a set of questions about opinion-writing by law clerks. The first major question is meta-normative. The goal is not to decide whether the practice of law clerks drafting opinions is proper or improper, but why it is occluded and controversial in the first place. Specifically, why is there so much more diffidence and doubt about the role of law clerks than about the work of aides in the other branches of government such as Presidential speechwriters and Congressional staff?

The second question is hermeneutic. Should the fact that judges might not always draft their own opinions lead us to read and interpret those opinions differently, especially when we draw conclusions about the “jurisprudence” of this or that judge or Justice or the way that legal doctrines often seem to be shaped by longstanding, dialectical, debates among judges or Justices?

The discussion of both questions tries to shed some light on broader constitutional and jurisprudential questions, including the distinctly metonymic relationship between the “President” and the rest of the Executive Branch and the complicated connections between judicial reasoning, the exercise of judicial authority, and the identity of the individual judge.

This essay was written as part of symposium marking the hundredth anniversary of the formal institution of Supreme Court law clerks.

The interrelatedness between computer systems, networks, code, and traditional law and legal frameworks continues to pose a number of important and vexed questions. This report will consider one area of the relationship: legal recognition of distributed ledger technology (DLT) or blockchain applications. Specifically, registers appended to blockchains (thereby creating “blockchain registries”), and “smart contracts” executed on blockchains

The book edited by Verena and myself is dedicated to the theoretical problems concerning ratio legis. In the contexts of legal interpretation and legal reasoning, the two most important intellectual tools employed by lawyers, ratio legis would seem to offer an extremely powerful argument. Declaring the ratio legis of a statute can lead to a u-turn argumentation throughout the lifespan of the statute itself – in parliament, or in practice during court sessions, when it is tested against the constitution.
Though the ratio legis argument is widely used, much about it warrants further investigation. On the general philosophical map there are many overlapping areas that concern different approaches to human rationality and to the problems of practical reasoning. Particular problems with ratio legis arise in connection with different perspectives on legal philosophy and theory, especially in terms of the methods that lawyers use for legal interpretation and argumentation. These problems can be further subdivided into particular aspects of activities undertaken by lawyers and officials who use the ratio legis in their work, and the underlying theories. In short, this book examines what ratio legis is, what it could be, and its practical implications.

The theme running through this analysis is the medium, rather than the content, is the most important aspect of communication and command.

The paper thinks of law through the lens of communication theory and cybernetics.

Law is perceived as a word describing different social instances with specific social rules, and organised into discrete production formats which shape the dynamics of argument and change in the field.

The paper is published as a book chapter in Backstage Practices of Transnational Law, edited by Lianne Boer and Sofia Stolk.

https://www.routledge.com/Backstage-Practices-of-Transnational-Law/Boer-Stolk/p/book/9780367086572

Cet article expose le canon interprétatif standard dans l’Allemagne d’aujourd’hui.
L’analyse conceptuelle placée au début permettra d’éclaircir une terminologie méthodologiques très souvent confuse en différenciant les arguments, les méthodes et les système (école) interprétatives.
Ensuite on va focaliser l’attention sur les évolutions ayant jalonnée l’établissement du canon interprétatif actuel. Il s’agit d’un débat doctrinaire développé au cours de XIX et XX siècles entre courants méthodologiques concurrents comme l’école subjective (exégèse évoluée), l’école objective (Kohler) et l’école historique objective (Interessenjurisprudenz de von Heck).
Dans la partie finale l’analyse déconstruit le canon interprétatif l’actuel on Allemagne. On obtient ainsi un aperçu d’un système méthodologique qui est  parmi le plus avancés dans le monde d’aujourd’hui.

Ronald Dworkin and Duncan Kennedy represent arguably two opposing poles in legal theory. This paper offers a novel frame for reading their respective legal theories which reconceptualizes the traditional way in which they were opposed, and new ways to compare them, to understand their commonalities and their differences.

While Dworkin is taken to be a champion of a theory of rights, he is also associated with a certain theory of interpretation which holds that even in hard cases judges have limited discretion and a right answer to every legal question we might reasonably encounter. Kennedy, in contrast, seems to disagree with Dworkin in every conceivable respect such as the nature of law and legal reasoning, the role of right, the relation of law to its outsides (politics/ideology), thus questioning the objectivity and neutrality of legal reasoning, and he seems to be advocating what could be termed as a “radical indeterminacy” thesis.

The paper attempts reading Dworkin and Kennedy alongside each other, rather than in opposition, and so it deploys two interrelated strategies to establish such frame. One is concerned softening what appear to be rigid opposition through scrutinizing their writings, whereas the other takes stock of the common themes, presuppositions, images of law, and sensibilities that both share either explicitly or implicitly. This double strategy reveals the arguments that are attributed to them and which they themselves deny they are making. To that end, the paper unveils an unacknowledged shift toward phenomenology in legal theory that took place in the last few decades.

TODO DISCURSO, CIENTÍFICO, LEGAL, LITERARIO O FILOSÓFICO ENCUENTRA SUS LÍMITES EN LA INTERPRETACIÓN. SIN EMBARGO, LA INTERPRETACIÓN TIENE QUE TENER SUS MÉTODOS, SU PLAN: NO TODA INTERPRETACIÓN ES VÁLIDA. EN EN CASO DE LA INTERPRETACIÓN DE LA LEY EN EL DERECHO, LOS EFECTOS DE LA INTERPRETACIÓN RESULTAN MUCHO MÁS VISIBLES QUE, POR EJEMPLO, EN EL CASO DE UNA LECTURA DE LA FENOMENOLOGÍA DEL ESPÍRITU DE HEGEL. EN ESTA OPORTUNIDAD ANDRÉS ROSSETTI ESCRIBE SOBRE LA IMPORTANCIA Y LA ACTUALIDAD DEL ROL DE CARLOS NINO EN LA INTERPRETACIÓN DEL DERECHO.

Flexibility of international transport, which is a driver of all unification projects in transport law does not necessarily depend on the creation of a single act. There is already a duality of international orders in rail transport within Europe and Asia. One is governed by the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF), the other is ruled by two international agreements: the Agreement on International Passenger Transport by Rail (SMPS) and the Agreement on the International Goods Transport by Rail (SMGS). The idea that only a single act shall provide flexibility and incentives for business and trade seems to be anachronistic in the era of polycentric legal orders. International rail transport deserves flexible legal solutions, which can be achieved in other, more adequate ways, also applicable to situations, when different legal regimes govern rail transport contract. Poland is among the border countries that have legal experience in cooperating within both the international legal regimes: COTIF and SMGS/SMPS, and now dealing with the overlapping rules of international conventions and the European law. Whether a single step forward—to one international rail convention, Unified Railway Law (URL)—is a good move, shall be judged in the light of the present legal experience, bearing in mind the ongoing process of decodification of private law.

Quiero argumentar contra la idea, muy difundida en la literatura, según la cual la interpretación consiste "determinar el significado" de las disposiciones legales. Niego que este entendimiento de la interpretación jurídica sea provechoso para la filosofía del derecho.

The chapter explores the historical background to plurilingual treaty-making as well as the practice of the PCIJ and ICJ to the interpretation of plurilingual treaties. The chapter includes a detailed examination of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties and the effect of this article on ICJ practice.

İşçi lehine yorum ilkesinin incelenmesi için öncelikle iş hukukunda yoruma esas ilke ve amaçların ortaya konulması gerekir. Bunlar, aynı zamanda iş hukukunun amaçlarını oluşturan işçinin korunması, ekonomik ve sosyal dengenin sağlanması ve esnekliğin sağlanmasıdır.

Bu amaçlar ışığında işçi lehine yorum ilkesi, aynı konuda birden fazla düzenlemenin varlığı ya da bir düzenlemenin anlamının muğlak olması hâlinde, işçinin lehine olan düzenlemenin ya da anlamın uygulanması gerektiğini ifade etmektedir. Bu yorum ilkesi, amaca uygun yorumun özel bir görünüm biçimi olarak ortaya çıkmış olmakla birlikte, artık ondan bağımsız, ayrı bir ilke niteliği kazanmıştır. İşçi lehine yorum, teorik temelini zayıf tarafın korunması teorisinden alır. Kural olarak kanunların yorumlanması için kullanılmakla birlikte, sözleşmelerin yorumlanması için de kullanılabileceği kabul edilmelidir. Son olarak, işçi lehine yorumun uygulanması için; lafzi yorum, amaçsal yorum, tarihî yorum, sistematik yorum gibi kanunların yorumunda tüm yorum yöntemleri ya da güven teorisi veya düzenleyen aleyhine yorum gibi sözleşmelerin yorum yöntemleri tüketildikten sonra hâla bir sonuca varılamaması, son çare olarak işçi lehine olan sonuca ulaşılması gerekir.

e libertà fondamentali nei rapporti fra privati" Volume III -Atti del Convegno IV Effettività e Drittwirkung: idee a confronto Composizione: Media Print s.r.l. -Livorno Stampa: Media Print s.r.l. -Livorno Le fotocopie per uso personale del lettore possono essere effettuate nei limiti del 15% di ciascun volume/ fascicolo di periodico dietro pagamento alla SIAE del compenso previsto dall'art. 68, commi 4 e 5, della legge 22 aprile 1941, n. 633. Le fotocopie effettuate per finalità di carattere professionale, economico o commerciale o comunque per uso diverso da quello personale possono essere effettuate a seguito di specifica autorizzazione rilasciata da CLE-ARedi, Centro Licenze e Autorizzazioni per le Riproduzioni Editoriali, Corso di Porta Romana 108, 20122 Milano, e-mail autorizzazioni@clearedi.org e sito web www.clearedi.org.

La Corte di cassazione italiana consolida l’orientamento sull’interpretazione
della superficie utile che oggettivamente consente l’accesso all’agevolazione
c.d. prima casa e conferma i precedenti giurisprudenziali sui limiti all’analogia e all’interpretazione
estensiva in materia di agevolazioni ed esenzioni tributarie. Si tratta di posizioni rigorose
che male si conciliano con l’attuale complessità delle fonti dell’ordinamento, senza alcuna
eccezione per la materia tributaria, rispetto alla quale la completezza del sistema sembra più un
risultato dell’interpretazione che un dato da cui muovere ogni considerazione.

Deviations from the common intentions of the parties in contract interpretation is sometimes attributed to “an appetite for benefiting whichever of the parties is perceived to be in a weaker bargaining position”. In this paper I argue that there is more reasonable explanation (justification) for at least some of these deviations. The contra proferentem doctrine is an information-forcing rule that can promote optimal completeness and clarity in contracts. Whether the contract is standardized or not, other things being the same, the risk of ambiguity in contractual language should be borne by the party who could more cheaply avoid it, and that is usually the party who selected or drafted the clause rather than the party to whom it was presented. On the other hand, it is argued that interpretative presumptions are ill-suited for ambitious policy purposes.
To download the paper please follow the link to SSRN.

THE TRIAL COURT,  JUDGE LON E. FARRIS  FROM THE 31ST VIRGINIA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (JUDGE FARRIS OR TRIAL COURT), ERRED WHEN JUDGE FARRIS APPEARED WITHOUT AUTHORITY ON MARCH 8, 2022, PRESIDED OVER PRETRIAL MATTERS, AND ENTERED AN ORDER TO DISMISS DANIEL'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT, JUDGE LON E. FARRIS, ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CIRCUIT COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO HOLD A JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS HAD ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT UNDER THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT CITED IN THE UNDERLYING CASE ON APPEAL.

PL: W jaki sposób język ima się wagi Temidy? Odpowiadająca na to pytanie należy przede wszystkim stwierdzić, że w systemach prawnych, w których dominującą postacią – w jakiej normy prawne funkcjonują w społeczeństwie - jest tzw. prawo stanowione, cały porządek prawny osadzony jest na tekście. W teoriach kultury za „tekst” uznaje się pewne zjawisko językowe, wielozdaniowe, które stanowi pewną całość informacyjną.
Tekst w domenie prawa  pojawia się jako fundamentalne zagadnienie w dwóch momentach „bytowania” prawa: przy jego tworzeniu, czyli w procesie stanowienia prawa, i przy jego aplikacji do praktyki życia społecznego, czyli w procesie stosowania prawa. O ile w przedmiocie legislacji problem języka polega na zapisaniu norm prawnych – a tym samym woli prawotwórczej ustawodawcy – w postaci zbioru konkretnych wyrażeń językowych, o tyle w procesie stosowania prawa należy z owego zbioru wyrażeń (którym jest właśnie tekst prawa) wydobyć na potrzebę danego stanu faktycznego normę prawną jednostkowego zastosowania (w przypadku sądownictwa powszechnego i administracyjnego) albo odczytać normę generalną na potrzebę kontroli konstytucyjnej (w przypadku sądownictwa konstytucyjnego). Przy czym procesy te nie są swoimi prostymi odwróceniami. Modelowo ustawodawca tworzy normy prawne i jednocześnie zapisuje je w oparciu o zasady "przyzwoitek" legislacji (tak przynajmniej przedstawi się stan idealny). Tym samym powołuje jednocześnie do istnienia dwa byty: normę prawną i jej zapis – tekst prawa. Podmiot stosujący prawa ma do czynienia z dwoma istniejącymi już bytami - normą prawną i tekstem prawnym - z tym, że bezpośrednio poznaje tylko to drugie. Jego zdaniem jest odnaleźć przy pomocy tekstu prawnego normę prawną.
W niniejszym szkicu skoncentruję się na procesie stosowania prawa. Zaprezentowana analiza jest zrelatywizowana do polskiego systemu prawa i polskiej kultury prawnej.

En las páginas siguientes se tratarán los aspectos centrales del debate sobre los derechos humanos. La pregunta que lo articula es acerca de la posibilidad y racionalidad de un discurso jurídico sobre los derechos humanos. Lo haremos partiendo de un dato de la realidad imposible de soslayar: la presencia de los derechos en las leyes y en las sentencias de cualquier fuero y jurisdicción. Afirmada la realidad de los derechos y la pretensión de racionalidad de su discurso, se recorrerán cuatro temas: el concepto, el catálogo, la interpretación y el fundamento de los derechos. Se trata de los elementos básicos que debe contener toda teoría de los derechos humanos que tenga pretensión de comprehensividad (una enumeración algo más amplia en Martínez-Pujalte y De Domingo 2011, 2). En cada uno de los temas se procurará presentar las opiniones fundamentales, sin renunciar por ello a un juicio crítico. Hablaremos, por eso, de " amenazas " a la viabilidad de una teoría consistente de los derechos. Esas amenazas pueden ser expresadas muy sintéticamente del siguiente modo: respecto de la interpretación, la amenaza es el conflictivismo; con relación al catálogo, el peligro es una inflación de derechos; el fundamento se enfrenta a dos riesgos: el de reducirlo al binomio autonomía-consenso, por un lado, o el de la elusión de su planteamiento, por otro; el concepto, por último, se enfrenta a la amenaza de un doble reductivismo: un racionalismo que sepulte las legítimas diferencias y un particularismo que anule la universalidad. Una amenaza más general proviene del hecho de que el atractivo retórico de los derechos conduce a que con no poca frecuencia sean empleados de modo retorcido por razones ideológicas (sobre esto, Glendon 1999, 171).

In the first part of the paper, which comprises three sections, I analyse three themes that emerge from Brian Leiter’s Naturalizing Jurisprudence. In particular, I consider the following three theses defended in this book: (i) American Legal Realism is a kind of avant la lettre philosophical naturalism applied to the study of legal adjudication; (ii) (American) Legal Realism is not only compatible with, but in fact presupposes, an exclusive version of legal positivism; and (iii) moral objectivism is not compatible with a “realistic” general theory of law (and adjudication).

In the first section, I discuss thesis (i) in light of the argument that the two characteristic features of American Legal Realism – the search for an empirical epistemology and a predictive theory – are derived from philosophical naturalism and pragmatism. In the second section, I discuss thesis (ii) by engaging with two arguments. First, that, as a type of legal positivism, a “realistic” theory offers the best explanation of the cases in which more than one correct answer is available to the court. Second, that by focusing on the causes that determine legal decisions, American Legal Realism shares some methodological theses with “Continental” Legal Realism. In the third section, I discuss thesis (iii) in light of Leiter’s critique of Dworkin’s legal philosophy.

On the basis of my discussion of theses (i), (ii), and (iii), the second part of the paper analyses the difficulties faced by the naturalistic project vis-à-vis the analysis of the problem of demarcating law from morality, as recently presented by Leiter in his The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism (2011).

The purpose of the second part of the paper is to find a possible way out of the stalemate inherent in Leiter’s naturalistic project. I submit that a possible way out consists in distinguishing between the substantive and the epistemic aspect of the problem of the demarcation of law and morality. In so far as the arguments offered in the second part of my paper are not affected by the problems in demarcating science from pseudo-science (as discussed in the first part of the paper), I conclude that the naturalistic project in jurisprudence remains a solid and fruitful one.

Кондуров В.Е., Тимошина Е.В. «Тирания ценностей» в конституционном и наднациональном правосудии // Санкт-
петербургский Государственный Университет, 19-21 ноября 2020 г. Материалы конференции / Отв.ред. В.Ю. Перов – СПб.: ООО «Сборка», 2020. С. 51-52. (P. 51-52)

XII международная конференция «Теоретическая и прикладная этика: Традиции и перспективы – 2020. Философия. Этика. Практика».
(http://philosophy.spbu.ru/2652/15963)

XII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS: TRADITIONS AND PROSPECTS – 2020. PHILOSOPHY. ETHICS. PRACTICS

Conference papers
St. Petersburg, Russia
November 19–21, 2020

Text in English:

“Tyranny of Values” in Constitutional and Supranational Justice
Kondurov V.E., Timoshina E.V.

Viacheslav E. Kondurov – Researcher, Teacher-Researcher, Lecturer of the Theory and History of State and Law Department at Saint Petersburg State University.
Elena V. Timoshina – Doctor of Law, Professor of the Theory and History of State and Law Department at Saint Petersburg State University.

The theses were prepared within the framework of the scientific project № 18-011-01195 “Validity and efficacy of law: theoretical models and strategies of judicial argumentation”, supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research.

In the last half-century, interpretation of the constitution as a system of values has become dominant both in legal doctrine and in the policy of interpreting “high justice” institutions (constitutional, supreme and supranational courts). In judicial practice, this idea was first formulated by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in the famous “The Lüth Case” (1958). The origins of this conversion of legal norms and principles into values, with the aim of facilitating their judicial weighing, are linked to the antipositivism of G. Radbruch, the neotomism of G. Düring and the integration of R. Smend.
However, the genesis of the “value” approach and its expansion from philosophy to jurisprudence and court practice has been little studied. How, when and why has there been a loss of understanding of the deontological nature of legal norms and legal principles, their transformation into voluntaristic - an act of judicial interpretation – values to be established and the transformation of institutions of constitutional and supranational justice into bodies for their establishment and promotion, often very aggressive? The “emancipation of values” in justice is linked to the discrediting concepts of the legislator and the law: first, the “will of the legislator” was demythologized as the purpose of judicial interpretation and the basis of the rule of law, followed by the law itself, which in a pluralistic society has become an empty form that reinforces the momentary compromise of opposing forces. Thus, under the slogan of “the rule of law”, the legislator and, subsequently, the law were discredited, and the notion of objectivity and fairness became associated with judges and their discretion not bound by the law that had lost credibility.
The law was seen as a reason for the judge to willfully construct its meaning – a meaning that was absent in the law before the act of judicial “interpretation”. In the rhetorical approach, the interpretation of the law is replaced by the construction of a system of arguments designed to convince the “audience” of the correctness of the decision taken. Paradoxically, the emancipation of the judiciary, its power to create general rules and the voluntarisation of interpretation were under the slogan of “rule of law”, which was justified by the voluntaristic origin of the law, while ignoring the fact that the court's decision also has a volitional character. On the contrary, “judicial law” was thought of as something objectively and “spontaneously” arising, while the wilful nature as well as the secret procedure for issuing a judicial act were ignored.
The idea of law as an instrument for the protection of values in conjunction with the idea of free judicial rule-making, the most radical version of which was legal realism – “justice without law”, was the reason for the radical pragmatisation of law, the end of which was the method of “weighing” values and the proportionality test. The latter would not have been possible without the expansion of the logic of values into legal reality.
Carl Schmitt and his students, Ernst Forsthoff and Ernst-Wolfgang Bökenförde, tried to project radical criticism of this approach. From the point of view of Schmitt, who follows Heidegger here, the value discourse is an ersatz of lost metaphysics, implying the reduction of different categories (goods, rights, ideals, etc.) into a single field of values, which makes it possible to compare them, convert them, hierarchy and thus ad hoc removal of “higher” values – “lower” ones. The German lawyer calls this mechanism “the tyranny of values” and the direct application of the value system by the courts is aggressive ideology and even terror. In addition to criticism, his students emphasized that value discourse has turned law enforcement into a policy of interpretation, stripped the constitution of the properties of a legal act, and in a pluralistic society, a court that appeals to values essentially makes an ideological decision in favor of a particular value system by removing the other. In this way, the courts make decisions on competing rights, which are based on fluctuating consents defined by those who dominate discussions about social values.

El  presente  texto trata  sobre  cuatro  conceptos jurídicos  de participación ciudadana  en  materia  ambiental.  Los  cuatro  conceptos propuestos  son:  el  formal  procedimental;  el  sustantivo  procesal; como  un  derecho  político  especificado,  y;  como  principio jurídico. Estos  cuatro  conceptos  existen  simultáneamente,  pese  a  aparecer en  diferentes momentos, siendo recogidos por la jurisprudencia tanto en su sentido formal procedimental y como principio jurídico.

What marked forensic linguistics as unique is its young age compared to other disciplines. Here we review and collected 88 articles that strongly related to Forensic Linguistic (FL) from time to time. These articles help to reveal from its conceptualization in 1968 to its fame in 1988, how it responds to the great diversity of people, and what form it may take in the future. A literature-based analysis as library research in nature helps in defining the FL issue and manage to see in the early stages was simply concerned about the use of language in legal cases. As society continues to change FL has linked with so many other disciplines besides law. Therefore the definition of this discipline may also transform. Presently, FL no longer limits itself to the particular social setting of a courtroom but could be applied to the virtual world or cyberspace influences users negatively and dynamically developed. There is a line of proof that FL will be used to prevent and predict the social settings between citizens who could easily be not law-abiding as they seem. Shortly, the use of FL will be much more accessible to individuals through artificial intelligence (AI). Moreover, individuals will no longer need to hire experts and be able to use FL with freely available artificial intelligence (AI).

We usually tend to have numerous “do’s” and “don’ts” in our day-to-day life. After being born and raised in a family, we are used to develop or to abstain from some tendencies peculiar to our family upbringing or personality type. However, for its smooth functioning, the society needs some rules and regulations expressed through myriads of “do’s” and “don’ts” in the forms of directions and prohibitions. It was the same in case of ancient Indian society also. Professor J. D. M. Derrett argues that every legal system requires a mass of prohibitions, and it may be a source of confusion to some of the lay public (who tend to think of law rather in terms of ‘must nots’ than ‘musts’) that it has this feature in common with a concurrent system of ethics.

According to the theory of Mīmāṃsā, the directive principles (vidhi) are aimed at inspiring an individual to do something positive if he would like to see some benefits accrued to him. In contrast, by “negation” (niṣedha), an individual is also directed to refrain from performing acts that consequently bring hardship to him.

The Mīmāṃsakas identified the different shades of prohibition. They sometime interpret a prohibition as a pratiṣedha, the actual prohibition and sometime paryudāsa, the partial or modified prohibition or exception. Parisaṃkhyā (better to translate it as a ‘preclusive injunction’), on the other hand, is a typical type of injunction, which recommends something exclusively. It does not articulate any kind of prohibition explicitly; rather, implying a few special commodities unambiguously. That injunction, however, should not be regarded as a compulsory or obligatory one.

In this paper, therefore, I shall try to discuss the prohibitory injections, with special reference to Parisaṃkhyā as mentioned in the Dharmaśāstras in the light Mīmāṃsā, a unique system of rules of interpretation.

ÖZET Gerçek lehdar kavramı uluslararası vergi hukukunda genel olarak kabul görmesine ve hemen hemen tüm çifte vergilendirmeyi önleme anlaşmalarında kullanılmasına rağmen, terimin hukuki niteliğinin ne olduğu konusunda görüş birliği oluşmamıştır. OECD Model ve Birleşmiş Milletler Model Vergi Anlaşmaları 10, 11 ve 12. madde hü-kümleri çerçevesinde " gerçek lehdar " müessesesi, çifte vergilendirme anlaşmaların-da yer alan faiz, temettü ve gayri maddi haklarından doğan kazançlara ilişkin olarak geliştirilmiş bir güvenlik mekanizmasıdır. Kural olarak sözü edilen kazançlara ilişkin vergilendirme yetkisi, ödemenin yapıldığı kişinin mukim olduğu ülkeye aittir. Ancak, bu kazançlardan bazıları için gelirin doğduğu kaynak ülke de üst sınırı belli olmak üze-re vergilendirme yetkisini kullanabilmektedir. Bununla birlikte, bu üst sınırlama, ilgili ödemelerin yapıldığı diğer anlaşma devleti mukiminin ilgili gelirin gerçek lehdarı olduğu durumlarda geçerlidir. Bu bağlamda, milli mahkemeler anahtar terim olan gerçek lehdar kavramını farklı şekillerde yorumlamışlardır. Gerçek lehdar müessesesinin hukuki niteliğinin farklı yorumlanması, ilgili kazancın çifte vergilendirmesine veya hiç vergilendirilmemesine yol açmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bu durum uluslararası sermaye hareketlerini engellemekte ve devletlerin bütçelerini finansal yönden negatif etkilemektedir.

Apresentação: As decisões interpretativas, no caso a interpretação conforme a constituição, inconstitucionalidade parcial sem redução de texto (decisão manipulativa redutiva), decisão manipulativa aditiva, decisão manipulativa substitutiva estão presentes no controle de constitucionalidade brasileiro. Elas são tratadas indistintamente e um aspecto disso é linguístico: a diferença entre identificar uma regra (interpretação¹) e seguir uma regra (interpretação²). As abordagens semânticas permitem esse tipo de diferenciação, mas abordagens
pragmáticas têm maiores dificuldades. Dentro do direito, isso pode ser traduzido como a oposição entre a identificação do significado literal e do significado teleológico dos documentos normativos. Esses modelos de linguagem e de interpretação são usados de maneira indistinta na interpretação judicial no controle de constitucionalidade e especialmente nas decisões interpretativas.
Exatamente por usá-los indistintamente, os tribunais e a doutrina têm tido muita dificuldade em diferenciar interpretação conforme e decisões manipulativas. O uso desses modelos de linguagem e o respeito à diferenciação entre interpretação¹ e interpretação² também seria útil para aplicação da cláusula de reserva de plenário, pois permitiria diferenciar quando órgão fracionário está apenas identificando o que a lei determina, usando a constituição como referência, e quando deixa de aplicar a lei que determina algo inconstitucional. O presente livro se destina a tentar explicar as categorias a partir da análise da linguagem, dos modelos de tomada de decisão e da própria jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal. É uma tentativa de “desembaralhar” a confusão doutrinária e jurisprudencial a respeito das categorias, além de propor um meio de identificação mais preciso e útil.