Methodological Naturalism

Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo mostrar que 1) la teoría de la evolución es ontológicamente neutral en el debate entre naturalismo metafísico y teísmo y 2) que es consistente sostener en conjunto el naturalismo metodológico y el teísmo. Para ello, examinaré en primer lugar el argumento de Plantinga que intenta mostrar que hay consistencia entre teísmo y evolución y que, por el contrario, hay inconsistencia entre la teoría de la evolución y el naturalismo (tanto metodológico como metafísico). Me interesa aceptar la primera parte del argumento de Plantinga, pero rechazar la segunda. Defiendo que el argumento de Plantinga es válido si y sólo si se supone una teoría de la verdad por correspondencia. A continuación, argumento que si se reemplaza dicha noción por la concepción pragmatista de la verdad de James, es posible concluir 1 y 2.

Abstract: This paper aims to show that: 1) theory of evolution is ontologically neutral inside debate about metaphysical naturalism and theism; and 2) that it is consistent to hold simultaneously methodological naturalism and theism. In order to achieve this, I will first examine Plantinga's argument that tries to show that there is consistency between theism and evolution, but, on the contrary, there is inconsistency between theory of evolution and (methodological and metaphysical) naturalism. I accept the first part of this argument, but I reject the second part. I will defend that Plantiga's argument is valid if and only if it is supposed a theory of truth by correspondence. Finally, I will argue that if such notion is replaced by James's pragmatist conception of truth, it is possible conclude 1 and 2.

Some New Testament scholars argue that as historians, they must reject all miracle reports a priori. When asked to justify this view, the scholars usually appeal to some of the following philosophical claims:

1) Miracles are incompatible with our natural scientific knowledge.

2) Even though miracles are theoretically possible, we can never be rationally justified in believing that a reported miracle actually happened (Hume’s argument).

3) Miracles entail the existence of a supernatural realm, and the supernatural (God) cannot be the object of scientific or scholarly knowledge or study.

I argue that there are no good reasons to believe any of these claims, which should be regarded as “myths”. The first claim confuses science with a controversial philosophical theory – naturalism. The second claim is undermined by the devastating philosophical criticism that has been directed at Hume’s anti-miracle argument. The third claim entails that philosophers of religion who debate theistic arguments are wasting their time, since no theistic argument can ever succeed. It is very unclear, however, how anybody could possibly know that no theistic argument can ever succeed.

All three myths are exemplified in a recent book by Cecilia Wassén and Tobias Hägerland: Den okände Jesus: Berättelsen om en profet som misslyckades (The Unknown Jesus: The Story of a Prophet Who Failed). Taking this work as my point of departure, I discuss the myths with reference to a wider horizon of Swedish and international Jesus research. I also suggest a more reasonable framework for dealing with miracle reports in the context of historical scholarship.

Theistic Evolution is a multi-author work written from the Intelligent Design (ID) perspective, and the contributors are almost a ‘Who’s Who’ of the ID movement. Philosopher of science Stephen Meyer opens with a scientific and philosophical introduction, in which he defines theistic evolution (TE) and argues for its problematic nature. Then, systematic theologian Wayne Grudem gives a biblical and theological introduction, highlighting the incompatibility of TE with the biblical account of creation and with important biblical doctrines. The rest of the book is divided into three sections. Section I (pp.79–543) offers a scientific critique of TE, Section II focuses on philosophy (pp.545–779) and Section III on biblical and theological matters (pp.781–972). The book concludes with a general index and Scripture index. In reviewing a book of this scope and depth it is not possible to comment on every chapter, but I will endeavor to pick out some notable highlights.

Methodological naturalism is usually regarded as compatible with a range of religious commitments on the part of scientific practitioners and it is typically assumed that methodological naturalism does not imply metaphysical naturalism. Against this, it has been argued that the cumulative success of the sciences, conducted in conformity with the principle of methodological naturalism, actually provides compelling evidence for the truth of metaphysical naturalism. In this paper I assess the argument for naturalism from the history of science and suggest that it is deficient in a number of ways. There may be reasons for adopting naturalism, but the history of science is not the place to look for them.

This essay examines Darwin’s positiva (or positive) use of theology in the first edition of the Origin of Species in three steps. First, the essay analyzes the Origin’s theological language about God’s accessibility, honesty, methods of creating, relationship to natural laws, and lack of responsibility for natural suffering; the essay contends that Darwin utilized positiva theology in order to help justify (and inform) descent with modification and to attack special creation. Second, the essay offers critical analysis of this theology, drawing in part on Darwin’s mature ruminations to suggest that, from an epistemic point of view, the Origin’s positiva theology manifests several internal tensions. Finally, the essay reflects on the relative epistemic importance of positiva theology in the Origin’s overall case for evolution. The essay concludes that this theology served as a handmaiden and accomplice to Darwin’s science.

Peter L. Berger famously argued that any scientific inquiry into religious matters must be “methodologically atheistic.” But methodological atheism performs no proper normative function in the academic study of religion; it fabricates, trivializes, and renders inexplicable religious experience; it is not neutral or objective; and the argument for its normativity improperly legitimates a secular worldview. Furthermore, the argument for the normativity of methodological agnosticism suffers some of the same flaws and has distinctive flaws of its own, including hindering scholars from articulating good reasons to believe that certain religious experiences are delusions and, in its global variety, self-referential incoherence.

Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that the naturalist who accepts evolutionary theory has a defeater for all of her beliefs, including her belief in naturalism and evolution. Hence, he says, naturalism, when conjoined with evolution, is self-defeating and cannot be rationally accepted. This is known as the evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN). However, Tyler Wunder (Religious Studies 51:391-399, 2015) has recently shown that if the EAAN is framed in terms of objective probability and theism is assumed to be non-contingent, then either theism is necessarily false or the EAAN is unsound. Neither option is attractive to the proponent of the EAAN. Perry Hendricks (Religious Studies 1-5, 2018) has responded to Wunder's criticism, showing that the EAAN can be salvaged and, indeed, strengthened, by framing it in terms not of naturalism (N), but of a proposition that is entailed by N that is also consistent with theism. We will show that once Hendricks' solution to Wunder's objection is accepted, a puzzle ensues: if the EAAN provides the naturalist with a defeater for all of her beliefs, then an extension of it appears to provide God with a defeater for all of his beliefs. After bringing out this puzzle, we suggest several ways in which the proponent of the EAAN might solve it, but also show some potential weaknesses in these purported solutions. Whether the solutions to the puzzle that we consider ultimately succeed is unclear to us. (Translation: the authors disagree. One author thinks that the solutions (or, at least, some of them) that we consider do solve the puzzle while the other author does not.) However, it is clear to us that this is an issue that proponents of the EAAN need to address.

Methodological naturalism, the exclusion of the supernatural from the natural sciences, has drawn critique from both proponents of Intelligent Design and some philosophical naturalists who argue that the methods of science can also be used to evaluate supernatural claims. One principal objection to methodological naturalism has been what I call the truth seeking objection. In this article I develop an understanding of methodological naturalism capable of answering the truth seeking objection. I further also argue that methodological naturalism as a convention of science can be best defended by abandoning scientism. In this way methodological naturalism can be reconnected to the original theistic context in which it was first developed.

This essay analyzes Theodosius Dobzhansky’s famous article, ‘‘Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution,’’ in which he presents some of his best arguments for evolution. I contend that all of Dobzhansky’s arguments hinge upon sectarian claims about God’s nature, actions, purposes, or duties. Moreover, Dobzhansky’s theology manifests several tensions, both in the epistemic justification of his theological claims and in their collective coherence. I note that other prominent biologists—such as Mayr, Dawkins, Eldredge, Ayala, de Beer, Futuyma, and Gould—also use theology-laden arguments. I recommend increased analysis of the justification, complexity, and coherence of this theology.

In light of the advancements in the cognitive science and evolutionary psychology of religion in the past two decades, scientists and philosophers have begun to reflect on the theological and atheological implications of naturalistic—and in particular, evolutionary—explanations of religious belief and behaviour. However, there is often philosophical naïvete on the part of the scientists, and scientific naïvete on the part of the philosophers. The aim of this paper is to draw from these recent contributions, point out some common pitfalls and important insights, and suggest a way forward. This proposal avoids the genetic fallacy as well as misunderstandings about the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to religious belief. In the end, it may well be that the cognitive science of religion is atheologically and theologically ambiguous; traditional philosophers of religion on both sides of the debate still have work to do.

This essay argues that philosophical naturalists who draw epistemic support from science for their worldview ought to set aside methodological naturalism in certain historical sciences. When linked to methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism opens itself to several problems. Specifically, when joined with methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism can never be scientifically disconfirmed but will nearly always be confirmed, no matter what the empirical evidence. Theistic-friendly “God hypotheses,” on the other hand, can never be scientifically confirmed—again, no matter what the evidence—but are routinely said to be disconfirmed. Methodological naturalism not only leads to this self-serving dynamic, but does not appear to serve a meaningful epistemic purpose in the contest between philosophical naturalism and theism and so, for these reasons, ought to be set aside.

Although scholars have paid careful attention to the naturalistic content of the Origin, less focus has been given to Darwin’s strategic deployment of methodological naturalism in the volume. A close inspection shows that he did not use methodological naturalism statically in the six editions of the Origin; instead, he strategically and progressively invoked methodological naturalism in the six editions of the Origin in order to enhance the persuasiveness of his theory and to marginalize special creation from the scientific discussion. In particular, Darwin’s explicit use of methodological naturalism in later editions of the Origin was animated less by epistemic reasons and more by expedient ones. Thus, while Darwin personally may have had sound epistemic grounds for methodological naturalism, his increasing deployment of the method in the Origin seems to have been mainly for the purpose of winning converts to his theory and ostracizing special creation rather than making a strong empirical and philosophical case per se for his position.

This is a critical, but sympathetic, examination of the manifesto for naturalized metaphysics that forms the first chapter of James Ladyman and Don Ross's 2006 book, Every Thing Must Go, but it has wider implications than this description suggests.

In this article, I clarify and deepen my criticism of methodological naturalism in biblical studies and other historical disciplines. Responding to Tobias Hägerland's and Cecilia Wassén's defense of this methodological paradigm, I make three main points. First, I argue that while methodological naturalism might be a reasonable posture in the natural sciences, the same is not the case in historical studies. The natural sciences study nature – natural mechanisms and laws – which means that supernatural and irreducibly personal causes (such as God) fall outside their purview. When it comes to the study of history, on the other hand, nothing that has impacted human culture in the past is by definition outside of the discipline's sphere of interest. This goes for supernatural as well as natural causes. History is the study of the past, not the study of the natural. Second, I scrutinize Hägerland's and Wassén's claim that methodological naturalism cannot be abandoned because this would complicate the process of testing historical hypotheses, thereby expanding the role of subjective judgment. This line of argument is fundamentally misconceived. If supernatural explanations are possibly true, it would be patently irrational to exclude them from scholarly consideration on the ground that they would complicate the process of testing and adjudicating between hypotheses. Third, I defend N.T. Wright's argument in favor of the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus against two interrelated lines of criticism.

I develop the conjecture that “naturalism” in philosophy names not a thesis but a paradigm in something like Thomas Kuhn’s sense, i.e., a set of commitments, shared by a group of investigators, whose acceptance by the members of the group powerfully influences their day-to-day investigative practice.  I take a stab at spelling out the shared commitments that make up naturalism, and the logical and evidential relations among them.

Methodological naturalism has been defended on both intrinsic and pragmatic grounds. Both of these defenses agree that methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which the scientist ought to eschew talk of causally efficacious disembodied minds. I argue that this is the wrong interpretation of methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism does not constrain the theories that scientists may conjecture, but how those theories may be justified. On this view, methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which supernatural methods of justification, such as faith, are eschewed.

Zamierzam pokazać, że słynny rozdział O cudach z Badań dotyczących rozumu ludzkiego Dawida Hume’a zawiera zasadę metodologiczną, która umożliwia rozwiązanie pewnej trudności współczesnego naturalizmu ontologicznego.
Twierdzę, że Hume’owska zasada umożliwia wytyczenie pojęciowej granicy między wyjaśnieniem naturalistycznym danego zjawiska a wyjaśnieniem supranaturalistycznym czy antynaturalistycznym. Ta granica pokrywa się też, moim zdaniem, z granicą między umiarkowanym redukcjonizmem a antyredukcjonizmem metodologicznym.

This essay examines Darwin's positiva (or positive) use of theology in the first edition of the Origin of Species in three steps. First, the essay analyses the Origin's theological language about God's accessibility, honesty, methods of creating, relationship to natural laws and lack of responsibility for natural suffering; the essay contends that Darwin utilized positiva theology in order to help justify (and inform) descent with modification and to attack special creation. Second, the essay offers critical analysis of this theology, drawing in part on Darwin's mature ruminations to suggest that, from an epistemic point of view, the Origin's positiva theology manifests several internal tensions. Finally, the essay reflects on the relative epistemic importance of positiva theology in the Origin's overall case for evolution. The essay concludes that this theology served as a handmaiden and accomplice to Darwin's science.

Methodological naturalism is a limited pragmatic method which gives way, most of the time, to philosophical naturalism. Our description of philosophical naturalism will emphasize the plurality of its kinds. These considerations will bring up  to the conclusion that methodological naturalism takes us far, yet still not far enough.
Methodological naturalism is one of the tools that scientists use to overcome problems created by personal beliefs. Therefore, adopting such a methodological naturalism is relevant and pragmatic. Our conviction is that such a pragmatic position leads inevitably to philosophical questions and thus to philosophical naturalism.
Philosophical naturalism involves several kinds, according to the ontological and epistemological dimensions involved. We will describe here three principal kinds of philosophical naturalism. If they are all totally compatible with scientific inquiry, it is not the case with their relation to religious belief.
Methodological naturalism is certainly a useful tool, but it seemed important to us to go a step further and consider that everyone has a philosophical or religious position rooted in a preexisting worldview. This worldview commands the engagement with a kind of philosophical naturalism and thus the possibility or not to take into account religious beliefs. Three case study are presented in order to illustrate this assertion.

ABSTRACT The objective of this study is to discuss the methodology and ontology of general jurisprudence, whose aim is to elucidate the ontological nature of the Law, considering a defense of the naturalized jurisprudence. In opposition to the conceptual approach prevalent in contemporary legal theory, focusing about conceptual analysis and resource to intuitions, some theoreticians have accept empirical approaches that resource to sociological and anthropological insights to advance our understanding about the nature of Law. Among these empirical approaches, there is the defense of the naturalization of the general jurisprudence by Brian Leiter, discussing the Quine’s methodological naturalism whose point is the continuity between philosophy and science.  The naturalized jurisprudence is founded on the resource to the conceptual schemas that are presupposed by our best scientific theories about the social human behavior for advancing the discussion about the real nature of Law. The criticism against these naturalized methodology and the limits of the Leiter’s version for naturalized jurisprudence are discussed and, in order for answer and/or account these objections, I propose a modified version of naturalized jurisprudence that it is more robust than the Leiter’s one, because it begins from less controversial premises and it conforms to contemporary analytic metaphysics and social ontology.

RESUMO A presente dissertação tem por objetivo discutir a metodologia da Teoria Geral do Direito, cujo objetivo é elucidar a natureza ontológica do Direito, desde a perspectiva de uma Teoria Naturalizada do Direito. Em contraste com a abordagem conceitual predominante na Teoria Geral do Direito, que foca na análise conceitual e no recurso às intuições, alguns teóricos têm endossado uma abordagem empírica que recorre a insights sociológicos e antropológicos para avançar nosso entendimento sobre a natureza do Direito. Entre essas abordagens empíricas, destaca-se a proposta de Brian Leiter de naturalização da teoria jurídica, a partir do naturalismo metodológico de Quine, que favorece a continuidade entre a filosofia e as ciências. A Teoria Naturalizada do Direito baseia-se no recurso aos esquemas conceituais que são pressupostos pelas melhores teorias científicas sobre o comportamento social humano para avançar a discussão sobre a real natureza do Direito. Examinam-se as objeções levantadas contra essa metodologia, bem como os limites da versão de Leiter para a teoria jurídica naturalizada, propondo-se uma versão modificada mais robusta da Teoria Naturalizada do Direito, a qual parte de premissas menos controversas e que fica mais em linha com a metafísica analítica e a ontologia social contemporâneas.

A critical study of Michael Rea's, World without design: the ontological consequences of naturalism.  It is an improved version of my paper, "Rea On Naturalism" in Philo, 2004, revised in light of Rea's comments on the earlier paper.  The discussion focuses on Rea’s case for three of his theses: that naturalism must be viewed as a ‘research programme’; that naturalism ‘cannot be adopted on the basis of evidence’, as he puts it; and that naturalists cannot be justified in accepting
realism about material objects.

In this paper, an evolutionary multiverse argument against naturalism (EMAAN) is presented: E1. In an evolutionary multiverse, phenomena have variable evolutionary ages. E2. After some time T, the development of the empirical sciences will be evolutionarily conserved. E3. The phenomena with an evolutionary age above T are methodologically supernatural. Entities are classified according to whether they are (1) physical and spatiotemporal, (2) causally efficacious, and (3) either observed by or explanatorily necessary for the empirical sciences. While the conjunction of (1) and (2) is taken to be sufficient for existence in reality, the negation of (3) defines methodological supernaturalness. EMAAN uses a generalization of evolutionary theory, namely cosmological natural selection, to argue that phenomena evolve that fulfill conditions (1) and (2), but not (3). This shows that methodologically supernatural phenomena have a clear epistemology according to a theory that is grounded in the commitments of naturalism. Supernatural phenomena are not observed by the empirical sciences because the empirical sciences themselves are supernaturally guided and predestined to develop according to an evolutionarily conserved plan. In spite of this scientific plan, there is room for afterlives and supernaturality in the everyday experience.

It has become standard practice for scientists to avoid the possibility of references to God by adopting methodological naturalism: a method that requires scientists qua scientists to assume that the natural world can only be explained by natural phenomena. In this essay, I critique the Christian commitment to this method, arguing that a Christian’s practices should always reflect her belief that the universe is created and sustained by the triune God. This leads me to contend that the Christian should adopt a theologically humble approach to the sciences (instead of methodological naturalism), with which she humbly acknowledges that special divine action is not discernible by empirical science. To further my critique, I consider three ways in which the practice of methodological naturalism can be problematic for Christianity.
For a copy, drop me an email at abt3@st-andrews.ac.uk

The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications flowing from adopting methodological naturalism in science, with special emphasis on the relation between science and religion. Methodological naturalism, denying supernatural and teleological explanations, influences the content of scientific theories, and in practice leads to vision of science as compatible with ontological naturalism and in opposition to theism. Ontological naturalism in turn justifies the acceptance of methodological naturalism as the best method to know the reality. If we accept realistic interpretation of scientific theories, then methodological naturalism conflicts science with religion. Theistic evolution does not seem to be a proper way to reconcile Darwinism and methodological naturalism with theism. Many of such propositions are boiled down to deism. Although evolution can be interpreted theistically, it is not the way in which majority of modern scientists and respectable scientific institutions unders...

Author argues for the thesis that – contrary to the opinion of thinkers holding a materialistic worldview – some kind of naturalism in natural science is compatible with Christian faith. It is methodological naturalism which prescribes scholars to explain natural phenomena solely in terms of natural causes (excluding the possibility of invoking the action of supernatural beings, such as God). According to the author, properly understood naturalism is not leading to any worldview conclusions, because it is only a method of pursuing natural science. Those who claim otherwise or who ignore philosophical subtleties (identifying methodological naturalism with metaphysical naturalism) are trying to use the authority of science for the realization of their own ideological agendas. Both of these approaches distort science and faith. However, the successes of science governed by the methodological naturalism do not present danger for the Christian truth, because scientific and religious claims concern issues of entirely different nature.

Paul de Vries argumentuje na rzecz tezy, że – wbrew opinii myślicieli o światopoglądzie materialistycznym – pewien rodzaj naturalizmu w naukach przyrodniczych da się uzgodnić z wiarą chrześcijańską. Jest to naturalizm metodologiczny, który nakazuje uczonym wyjaśniać zjawiska przyrodnicze wyłącznie za pomocą czynników naturalnych (co wyklucza możliwość powoływania się na działanie istot nadprzyrodzonych, takich jak Bóg). Zdaniem Autora właściwie pojmowany naturalizm nie prowadzi do żadnych wniosków światopoglądowych, ponieważ jest jedynie metodą uprawiania nauk przyrodniczych. Ci, którzy twierdzą inaczej lub nie zważają na filozoficzne subtelności (utożsamiając naturalizm metodologiczny z naturalizmem metafizycznym), usiłują wykorzystać autorytet nauki do realizacji swoich programów ideologicznych. Oba te ujęcia zniekształcają obraz nie tylko nauki, ale i wiary. Jednak sukcesy nauki, jakie odnosi ona dzięki kierowaniu się naturalizmem metodologicznym, nie zagrażają prawdzie chrześcijańskiej, ponieważ twierdzenia naukowe i religijne dotyczą kwestii, których natura jest całkowicie odmienna.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications flowing from adopting methodological naturalism in science, with special emphasis on the relation between science and religion. Methodological naturalism, denying supernatural and teleological explanations, influences the content of scientific theories, and in practice leads to vision of science as compatible with ontological naturalism and in opposition to theism. Ontological naturalism in turn justifies the acceptance of methodological naturalism as the best method to know the reality. If we accept realistic interpretation of scientific theories, then methodological naturalism conflicts science with religion. Theistic evolution does not seem to be a proper way to reconcile Darwinism and methodological naturalism with theism. Many of such propositions are boiled down to deism. Although evolution can be interpreted theistically, it is not the way in which majority of modern scientists and respectable scientific institutions unders...

This is chapter 1 of “A Buddha Land in This World” (Punctum, 2022). It explains the books aim: developing a philosophy that (1) is radically naturalist, (in a roughly Quinean or pragmatist sense); (2) is politically radical in the sense that it rejects neoliberal capitalism and the hegemony of psychopathy; (3) is recognizably and defensibly Buddhist; and (4) is radical in the sense of being uncompromising, rigorous, and consistent. Additionally, this chapter discusses variants of naturalism and explains the (more or less Quinean) metholodological naturalism that serves as the book’s backbone.
The complete book is available here: https://www.academia.edu/76418949

There have been persistent philosophical efforts to demarcate the province of science. Fewer attempts have been made to explore whether these demarcation strategies are consistent with the liberal promise of religious neutrality (LPRN). Within this framework, most liberal political theorists seem to agree that hypotheses suggesting supernatural agency should remain outside the purview of science by principle. In their view, this rule of methodological natu-ralism (MN) is neutral in the relevant sense, since it is silent towards ultimate questions. This paper examines whether this is so, especially when discussing the content of the science curriculum in public education. In this context, advocates of the status of Intelligent Design creationism as a scientific theory argue that MN arbitrarily dismisses a type of supernatural agency that is fundamental to several branches of theistic belief. Drawing on Thomas Nagel's position, the paper contends that MN assumes a meta-scientific position to which either god does not exist, or god does not intervene in cosmic history. To that extend, MN cannot be reconciled with LPRN. However, this conclusion does not entail that hypotheses that suggest supernatural agency must be included in the science curriculum. Creationist theories may remain excluded to the extent that they fall short of the standards that are required for a proficient scientific account. But, crucially, it will not be their religious character what keeps them out of the classroom, but a series of pseudoscientific wrongs which are non-exclusive to supernaturalistic hypotheses. The paper thus suggests the exploration of an alternative demarcation strategy , one that is consistent with LPRN.

Las semanas anteriores escribí en este espacio un par de columnas sobre (y contra) la pseudociencia y demás patrañas. Para mi sorpresa sólo recibí un par de insultos, por demás inocuos, por parte de algún psicoanalista trasnochado y uno que otro homeópata. Algunos comentarios, sin embargo, tenían que ver con el tono polémico e incendiario con el que escribí contra creencias y prácticas que muchas mujeres y hombres adoptan en su vida cotidiana. Se me pidió -y creo que con justicia- que dijera algo un tanto más positivo: algo así como: "Bueno, ya nos dijiste que esas cosas te parecen tontas, ridículas e irracionales, pero ¿en qué crees tú entonces?". Pienso que la respuesta más precisa a esa pregunta es que soy un naturalista. En primer lugar, para los naturalistas, las viejas fronteras entre las ciencias de la naturaleza y las ciencias del espíritu, entre las ciencias naturales y las ciencias sociales y las humanidades, entre metodologías cuantitativas y cualitativas, deben abolirse.

The controversy over Intelligent Design (ID) has now continued for over two decades, with no signs of ending. For its defenders, ID is revolutionary new science, and its opposition is merely ideological. For its critics, ID is both bad science and bad theology. But the polemical nature of the debate makes it difficult to understand the nature of the arguments on all sides. A balanced and deep analysis of a controversial debate, this volume argues that beliefs about the purposiveness or non-purposiveness of nature should not be based merely on science. Rather, the philosophical and theological nature of such questions should be openly acknowledged.

"This ground-breaking book epitomizes the balanced, scrupulous, and fair-handed intentions of the author. Kojonen analyzes the underlying philosophical and theological issues which structure the debate in order to lift up the strengths and weaknesses of both advocates and opponents of Intelligent Design. I highly recommend this book to theologians, philosophers, scientists and non-specialists who want to hear 'good news' about the underlying connections on a topic which far too often divides both scientific and religious communities." – Robert John Russell, the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, USA

"This is the most comprehensive, scholarly monograph on Intelligent Design to date, and Kojonen's well-balanced analysis is a welcome addition to the literature. This book is the best place for students and scholars to start if they are trying to understand the arguments surrounding ID." – Jeffrey Koperski, Saginaw Valley State University, USA

See preview at: https://www.book2look.com/embed/9781317027331

This article criticizes a view about the interpretation of human action, labeled in the text as interpretivism. This view posits a sharp separation between the natural and social sciences, to the effect that the methods of the latter cannot be applied to the former. I criticize this standpoint by reconstructing a case of educational research. As I argue, the case I analyze indicates that the arguments in support of interpretivism are contradicted by what social researchers can actually achieve. I conclude that the interpretivistic claims lack support and that the general separation claim appears as problematic.