Personal Identity

The central focus of this paper is the notion that the home can provide a locale in which people can work at attaining a sense of ontological security in a world that at times is experienced as threatening and uncontrollable. The paper builds on and develops the ideas of Giddens and Saunders on ontological security and seeks to break down and operationalise the concept and explore it through a set of empirical data drawn from interviews with a group of older New Zealand home owners. The extent to which home and home life meets the conditions for the maintenance of ontological security is assessed through an exploration of home as the site of constancy in the social and material environment; home as a spatial context in which the day to day routines of human existence are performed; home as a site free from the surveillance that is part of the contemporary world which allows for a sense of control that is missing in other locales; and home as a secure base around which identities are...

This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will.  Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain.  I consider alternative interpretations of how “conscious free will” might operate by Libet and by Mangan and respond to doubts about the extent to which the operations of mind are revealed in consciousness, raised by Claxton and Bouratinos. In reconciling commonsense attributions of freedom and responsibility with the findings of science, preconscious free will can be shown to have practical consequences for adjudications in law.

Catharine Trotter Cockburn is best known for her _Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay of Human Understanding_ (1702). However very little has been said about Trotter’s treatment of Locke’s metaphysical commitments therein. In this paper I give a brief description of the history of Trotter’s _Defence_. Thereafter I focus on two (of the many) objections to which Trotter responds on Locke’s behalf: 1) the objection that Locke has not proved the soul immortal, and 2) the objection that Locke’s view leads to the absurd consequence that our souls are in constant flux. I argue that Trotter offers a compelling response to both of these charges. This is not only because of what Trotter explicitly claims in the _Defence_, but also because the _Defence_ invites and encourages the reader to return to Locke’s text. I then argue that in Trotter we find additional insights and clarifications once we move past the two objections I just mentioned, and on to the related topic of personal identity.  In this short paper I am not able to offer a full explication or evaluation of Trotter’s treatment of Locke’s metaphysical commitments. I am, however, able to show that this aspect of Trotter’s _Defence_ warrants careful consideration and further study.

This paper provides an initial, multidimensional map of the complex relationships among consciousness, mind, brain and the external world in a way that follows both the contours of everyday experience and the findings of science. It then demonstrates how this reflexive monist map can be used to evaluate the utility and resolve some of the oppositions of the many other “isms” that currently populate consciousness studies. While no conventional, one-dimensional “ism” such as physicalism can do justice to this web of relationships, physicalism, functionalism, dualism, neutral monism, and dual-aspect monism can all be seen to provide useful ways of understanding different aspects of the relationships among consciousness, mind, brain and the external world when these are viewed in either a first- or a third-person way from within this web of relationships by sentient creatures such as ourselves. For example, physicalism and functionalism provide a useful understanding of consciousness, mind, brain and external world when viewed from a third-person perspective, while neutral monism provides a useful way of understanding first- versus third-person views of external phenomena. On the other hand, dual-aspect monism provides a useful way of understanding first- versus third-person views of mind, including Eastern versus Western views of mind.  Dual-aspect monism also provides a useful understanding of the “unconscious ground of being” that gives rise to, supports and embeds all these observable phenomena. For an integrated understanding one needs to understand how these phenomena and relationships combine into an integrated whole.

This entry examines Locke's notion of persons and, in particular, his thesis that personal identity is constituted by consciousness. It presents an overview over the most influential readings of this thesis and discusses the most debated interpretative questions and problems about it. I argue that, though Locke's theory of personal identity includes a tension which, ultimately, cannot be resolved, it is nonetheless well-placed to achieve the ethical-theological aim Locke pursues in discussing personal identity.

The book is devoted to the analysis of ethno-linguistic and socio-cultural foundations of the identity of Dagestanis. The author discribres
particularities of  ethno-linguistic situation in the Mountainous and Lowland districts of Dageston, the influence of migration, urbanization, ethnic mixations on the cultural and language identity,  as well as the correlation of ethnic and religious identitues,  forms of actualization of ethnic and civil  consciousness,  ethnic stereotypes and other components of consciousness of Dagestanis. Special attention is paid to the problem of preserving the language diversity and cultural identity of the peoples of Dagestan.The book is intended for anthropologists, historians, philologists.
culture and a wide range of readers interested in Etnea-
takovymi and ethno-cultural problems.

There has been a well-documented 'cultural turn' in social theory. This takes two forms: the 'epistemological' case in which culture is seen as universally constitutive of social relations and identities; and the 'historical' case in which culture is seen as playing an unprecedented role in constituting social relations and identities in contemporary society. In this paper I take it that both cases overlap in studies of contemporary society and that the stronger case is justified. I argue that a model of cultural politics is necessary to fully develop the impetus of the 'cultural turn' away from structural determinism, and that relations between the state and society should no longer be taken as the central focus of political sociology. I propose that the understanding of politics developed by Foucault in his later work on power and domination can provide the basis of a 'cultural turn' in political sociology. Finally, I offer some suggestions about how those working in the field of political sociology are already beginning to develop the theme of cultural politics -albeit without naming it as such -and how this might be extended.

Identities, people’s subjectively construed understandings of who they were, are, and desire to become, are implicated in, and thus key to understanding and explaining, almost everything that happens  in and around organizations. The research contribution that this review paper makes is threefold. First, it analyses the often employed but rarely systematically explored concept identity work, and argues that it is one metaphor among many that may be useful in the analysis of professional and more generally work identities. Second, it focuses on five fundamental, inter-connected debates in contemporary identities research centred on notions of choice, stability, coherence, positivity, and authenticity. Third, it outlines the roles that the concept identity work may play in bridging levels of analysis and disciplinary boundaries, and sketches some possible future identities-focused ideas for further research. Under-specification has meant that ‘identity’ has not always fulfilled its analytical promise in either theoretical explorations of identities issues or in empirical studies of identities in practice; and it is to these ends that this paper seeks to contribute.

The keeping of dogs and cats as household pets is prevalent throughout the United States. Individuals define and express their personal identities in part through customizing their personal repertoires of possessions, which includes pets. The actual symbolic meanings given to dogs and cats are numerous and vary with individual interpretation, yet there are certain themes that repeat themselves. Dogs tend

This research develops a scale to assess branded product meanings, including quality, values, personal identity, and traditions. Using data gathered in the U.S. and three emerging markets (Romania, Ukraine, and Russia), we demonstrate a valid and reliable measure that exhibits cross-national measurement invariance.

Philosophically, the most interesting objection to the reliance on advance directives to guide treatment decisions for formerly competent patients is the argument from the loss of personal identity. Starting with a psychological continuity theory of personal identity, the argument concludes that the very conditions that bring an advance directive into play may destroy the conditions necessary for personal identity, and so undercut the authority of the directive. In this article, I concede that if the purpose of a theory of personal identity is to provide an answer to the question What is it for a person to persist over time?, then reflection on personal identity poses a potentially serious threat to the moral authority of advance directives. However, as Marya Schechtman observes, questions about how a single person persists through change are not what most of us are interested in when we think about who a person is. Rather, we are interested in what it means to say that a particular...

To cite this Article Aresti, Andreas, Eatough, Virginia and Brooks-Gordon, Belinda(2010) 'Doing time after time: an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of reformed ex-prisoners' experiences of self-change, identity and career opportunities', Psychology, Crime & Law, 16: 3, 169-190 To link to this Article:

In the last few decades there has been a lively debate on the problem of the self both in phenomenological and analytical circles. Among authors that endorse an experiential or minimal notion of the self, the main point of contention has been the diachronic identity problem, i.e. the question whether the experiential self retains its identity through time and, if so, to what extent. In this paper I begin with a brief exposition of two prominent notions of the experiential self, those elaborated by Dan Zahavi and Galen Strawson, followed by a comparison of the two authors' views on diachronic identity. After highlighting what I believe to be certain ambiguities and weaknesses in Zahavi's criticism of Strawson, I argue for a clear and explicit distinction between two different notions of identity, namely those of weak and strong diachronic identity. Finally, I question to what extent Zahavi's notion of the minimal self might be helpful in addressing problems of personal identity, arguing that his own proposal-that of combining the minimal self with other, more complex models (such as the narrative self)-is fraught with certain methodological difficulties.

Problem sebstva je bil v zadnjih letih deležen precejšnje pozornosti tako v fenomenoloških kot analitičnih krogih. Med avtorji, ki zagovarjajo izkustveni oz. minimalni pojem sebstva, se je kot temeljna ost spora izkazalo vprašanje diahrone identitete, tj. vprašanje, ali in v kolikšni meri izkustveno sebstvo ohranja svojo identiteto skozi čas. Pričujoči članek najprej na kratko predstavi dve prominentni pojmovanji izkustvenega sebstva, ki ju zagovarjata Dan Zahavi in Galen Strawson, nato pa ponudi primerjavo stališč obeh avtorjev o diahroni identiteti. Po kratkem orisu določenih nejasnosti in pomanjkljivosti v Zahavijevi kritiki Strawsona ponudimo nekaj razlogov za jasno in eksplicitno razlikovanje med dvema različnima vrstama identitete, in sicer med šibko in močno diahrono identiteto. V zadnjem delu članka obravnavamo vprašanje, v kolikšni meri je Zahavijev pojem minimalnega sebstva relevanten za probleme osebne identitete, pri čemer zastopamo stališče, da je njegov lastni predlog-namreč kombiniranje minimalnega sebstva z drugimi, kompleksnejšimi modeli (kot je narativno sebstvo)-metodološko problematičen.

1. The relation between attachment styles and fear of personal death was assessed. We classified a sample of Israeli undergraduate students into secure, ambivalent, and avoidant attachment groups and assessed the extent of, and the meaning attached to, overt fear of personal death as well as the extent of fear at a low level of awareness. Ambivalent subjects exhibited stronger overt fear of death than did secure and avoidant subjects, and both ambivalent and avoidant subjects showed stronger fear of death at a ...

Las redes sociales son utilizadas cada vez mas por jovenes tanto para socializar como para compartir ideas y distintas fuentes de informacion. Esta investigacion analiza los usos habituales de diversas redes y explora la hipotesis de que el concepto que los jovenes tienen sobre ellos mismos condiciona el uso de las redes, a partir de una muestra representativa de estudiantes universitarios espanoles. Los resultados apuntan a que el concepto de identidad personal en el entorno digital tiene una correlacion significativa con alguno de los usos habituales y con el genero del usuario.

This study was designed to identify African American early adolescents’ subjective meanings of African American women’s sexuality through an examination of Stephens and Phillips’ (2003) sexual images—the Diva, Gold Digger, Freak, Dyke, Gangster Bitch, Sister Savior, Earth Mother, and Baby Mama. These eight sexual images both inform and reflect beliefs about African American women’s physical attractiveness. Interpersonal relationship decision making processes also were influenced by these conceptual frameworks of African American women’s sexuality. Findings from this study are important given the tendency of previous researchers to ignore race and intraethnic variations in studies of beliefs about attitudes toward sexuality.

The starting point of the present work is the intuition that it is conceivable that I was a different
person than the one that I am, i.e. that it is conceivable that “I” would have existed even if the person that
I am had not, and vice-versa. The implication of this intuition as regards the nature of ourselves (of the
“I”), the possible relation between subjects of experience and persons, and the problem of personal
identity are explored.
The first chapter illustrates and explicates the basic intuition in more detail. The second chapter
offers an analysis of experience, a closer look at its content and the ways brain states can relate to
experience. The third chapter aims to elucidate that in virtue of which a person is (or could be) me, that is,
the “mineness” of experience. Utilizing the concepts from the previous chapters, chapters four and five
give further depth to the key question of this work ‒ i.e. why am I the person that I am? Whereas the
earlier chapters seek to explain how to understand this question so that it is not trivial, to cast light on the
concepts behind the words, the two penultimate chapters identify the assumptions we have about
ourselves, i.e. the common assumptions about which people one actually is (which experiences are mine),
and why, point out some of their problematic implications, and sketch a few alternative solutions. The
final chapter tackles the problem of personal identity, starting from the understanding that subjectivity,
i.e. the mineness of experience, is crucial to what we are.

keywords: subject of experience, mineness of experience, primary self-consciousness, pre-reflective selfawareness,
person, personal identity.

Gilbert and colleagues’ study ('I miss being me: Phenomenological effects of Deep Brain Stimulation') adds much needed data on what patients actually experience regarding changes of the self following DBS treatment. Out of the same motivation to gain a better understanding of patients’ experiences, we conducted in-depth interviews with 18 Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder patients on their general experiences (De Haan et al 2013, De Haan et al 2015) and on their experiences regarding personality changes specifically (De Haan et al 2017). We found that most patients felt that they had become more themselves (13) or that they had not changed (4). Only one patient felt less herself. The title of this paper and the terminology of self-estrangement suggests that Gilbert and colleagues found the opposite. Do patients with Parkinson's Disease experience more self-estrangement following DBS than OCD patients?

A closer look at Gilbert et al.'s data, however, reveals a very different picture: the contradictory term ‘restorative self-estrangement’ is used to refer to patients who felt they had become their old selves again. In fact, at least 15 out of 17 patients (88%) either say that they have not changed or that they have become more themselves.

In this comment, I first argue that the authors’ interpretation of their data in terms of ‘self-estrangement’ is misleading.  Secondly, I present findings from our study on two different ways in which patients understood what it means to be ‘changed as a person’; leading to different answers to describe a similar experience. I show how this may shed new light on the data presented here. I end by discussing the clinical relevance of the concepts ‘personal identity’ and ‘authenticity’.

Researchers argue that a number of assumptions have been made about the concepts of patient satisfaction and dissatisfaction that have compromised their validity. The aim of this study was to explore the meaning of ‘dissatisfaction’ with health care. Forty-one people who had experienced problems in health care were identified from a household survey of health service users. They were interviewed in depth using an unstructured schedule. A grounded theory approach was used to construct a framework inductively from their accounts. The results suggest that ‘dissatisfaction’ could not accommodate the range of feelings, beliefs and values people express when they encounter problems in health care. However, another concept, that of ‘personal identity threat’, was identified which offered additional insights into the meaning of untoward experiences in health care. This concept delineates the grounds for disappointment or dissatisfaction, and helped to capture the complexity of the feelings and views expressed. Personal identity was perceived as being challenged through experiences which were felt to be disempowering, dehumanising and devaluing. Gender, class and race differences also emerged in respondents’ perceptions of identity threat.

In his Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues from the possibility of cases of fission and/or fusion of persons that one must reject identity as what matters for personal survival. Instead Parfit concludes that what matters is “psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the right kind of cause,” or what he calls an R-relation. In this paper, I argue that, if one accepts Parfit’s conclusion, one must accept that R-relations are what matter for moral responsibility as well. Unfortunately, it seems that accepting that the R-relation is what matters for both survival and moral responsibility leads to a contradiction. My goal, however, is not merely to point out a problem in Parfit’s account. Instead, I believe that once we understand the basic intuitions which lead to this contradiction, it is clear that there is no fully satisfactory way to account for what matters with respect to survival and moral responsibility.

With the lack of attention to the attrition of child participants, loss to follow up (LTFU) holds significant implications for the health of young adults in the Pediatric HIV/AIDS Cohort Study (PHACS), a multi-center cohort study with children either perinatally infected with HIV (PHIV) or HIV-exposed uninfected (HEU). Young adults (18+) face barriers to being retained in the study, including competing time demands, geographic relocation, study fatigue, stigma, and low health literacy. Formative research, Photovoice (participatory photo elicitation), and a focus group informed the design of a web-based media strategy based on the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) to increase study engagement. Six members of the Young Adult and Adult Community Advisory Boards (CABs) were recruited via email and given Photovoice training via Prezi. Photos were taken around the theme of self-identity. A teleconference focus group facilitated reflections and salient themes for the video compilation exhibit. Themes included: 1) stereotypes, 2) layered-identities, 3) stigma, and 4) self-identity. Additional meta-themes were also codified. Media strategy recommendations included: 1) participatory media and photography, 2) digital story maps, 3) social media, and 4) content and topics. Based on the results of this project with a limited sample, participatory media like Photovoice may have a positive impact on participants at risk for LTFU by increasing study engagement. While some research supports this qualitative methodology, limitations must be considered. Future PHACS projects should incorporate a needs assessment and evaluation. Moreover, further research in this area of public health and health communication needs to continue overall.

about situated stories provide the backdrop for our major proposition, which is that situated stories are used to develop and maintain the self. We view self-development through situated stories as a lifespan process, beginning in early childhood and extending to old age, and that process is situated in a larger cultural milieu that holds expectations of what makes a healthy narrative and a healthy self. The ideas that stories and self are intimately that stories are situated (e.g., have separately received a great deal of attention in receznt years. In this article, however, we propose to integrate these two ideas and propose a process model of how situated stories help people to make connections between their experiences and their selves. Specifically, we focus on how stories, such as high points, turning points, and a favorite Easter Sunday, become part of the self.

U različitim diskurzima govor o identitetu poprima različite konotacije. Na jednoj sasvim svakidašnjoj razini, koja se nerijetko izjednačava s medijskom, govor o identitetima odnosi se na socijalnu dimenziju, odnosno na onu dimenziju koja čovjeka vidljivim i vanjskim pokazateljima pozicionira unutar društvene mreže. Tako se može govoriti o etničkim, nacionalnim, rodnim i rasnim identitetima koji u svojoj mnogostrukosti izražavanja pružaju kolažnu sliku koju tzv. postmoderno društvo forsira i eksploatira. Takvi identiteti su društveno konstruirani i nazivaju se socijalnim identitetima. U svakodnevnim društveno - političkim raspravama najviše se raspravlja upravo o tom vidu identiteta, dok se osobni identitet kao apstraktni teorijski koncept ostavlja za teorijsko filozofijske analize. Ovaj rad se bavi načinom na koji se osobni identitet stvara, ragrađuje i ponovno uspostavlja unutar fikcionalnog djela. Riječ je o romanu Newyjorška trilogija američkog pisca Paula Austera, koji je kod nas prošao nezapaženo, neoprezno se svrstavajući na police knjižara pod područje krimića, pridonoseći korpusu tzv. lake književnosti. S druge strane, jasno je da bi bilo pretenciozno i pomalo pompozno Newyoršku trilogiju svrstati u područje tzv. teške književnosti , no namjera ovog rada je da pokaže neke u nas zanemarene dimenzije romana, a koje će se ponajviše ticati načina konstruiranja identiteta likova i autora; implikacijama takve konstrukcije na romanesknu strukturu te dvojničkom konstrukcijom likova.
Teorijski korpus na koji se ovaj rad naslanja i s kojim se dovodi u vezu obuhvaća raznorodne tradicije, povezujući Wittgensteinovu kasniju fazu s nekim aspektima dekonstrukcijske filozofije jezika, te pogledom na dvojništvo Renate Lachmann. Osnovna namjera rada je da se, uz pomoć poredbenog teorijskog uporišta, pokaže kako je osobni identitet u Newyjorškoj trilogiji diskurzivno utemeljen, odnosno kako je on produkt načina funkcioniranja jezika, što nudi mogućnost antiesencijalističkog utemeljenja osobnog identiteta, čime se izbjegava metafizičko utemeljenje identiteta u konačnom označitelju. Kada govorimo o antiesencijalističkom utemeljenju osobnog identiteta, valja napomenuti da se taj koncept odnosi na osobni identitet likova unutar fikcionalnog djela. Kako će se pokazati, osobni identitet likova, zbog svoje zamjenjivosti i fragmentarnosti na nivou narativa romana, ne sadrži neko čvrsto uporište u vidu stabilne biti, nekog konačnog označitelja koji mu propisuje esenciju i određuje njegovo značenje. Konkretnije, rad će se baviti načinom na koji su identiteti likova i autora konstruirani u Newyorškoj trilogiji, s posebnim osvrtom na dvojničku strukturu likova.
Newyorška trilogija sastoji se od triju kratkih romana – Stakleni grad, Duhovi, Zaključana soba -  naizgled nepovezanih, no nakon što se pročita posljednja stranica knjige, otvara se mogućnost gledanja na trilogiju kao na cjelinu sastavljenu od dijelova jedne te iste priče, s jednakim identitetnim strukturama likova.

In der gegenwärtigen Debatte wird die Frage, was wir ‚eigentlich' oder ‚wesentlich ' sind, kontrovers diskutiert. Diese Debatte ist durch zwei entgegengesetzte Standpunkte charakterisiert. Vertreter des Animalismus, wie etwa Eric T. Olson, argumentieren, dass wir wesentlich (menschliche) Tiere sind, und nur unwesentlich bzw. akzidentell Personen. 1 Unsere Persistenzbedingungen sind diejenigen eines tierischen Organismus. Wir existieren nur so lange, wie dieser Organismus lebendig ist, und mit seinem Tod endet unsere Existenz. Daraus folgt, dass unsere Persistenzbedingungen nicht an das (faktische) Vorliegen mentaler Eigenschaften wie etwa Selbstbewusstsein gebunden sind. Wir mögen zwar phasenweise personale Fähigkeiten an den Tag legen, doch insgesamt betrachtetgerade auch mit Blick auf den Anfang und das Ende unseres Lebenssind wir lebendige Organismennichts mehr, aber auch nichts weniger. Dem Animalismus entgegen steht der Konstitutionalismus ("constitutionalism" bzw. "constitution view"), als deren Hauptvertreterin Lynne Rudder Baker (1944-2017) gelten darf. Sie besagt, dass wir in erster Linie Personen, und nur in zweiter Linie Tiere sind. Genauer besagt sie, dass tierischer Organismus und Person einerseits nicht identisch sind (gegenüber der Auffassung des Animalismus), dass aber auf der anderen Seite auch nicht Körper und Person zwei ontologisch getrennt voneinander existierende Dinge darstellen (gegenüber der Ansicht eines Dualismus cartesischer Prägung). Entscheidend für den Status einer Person ist eine spezifische mentale Qualifikation, die Baker als Vermögen einer ersten-Person-Perspektive, der Subjektivität, bestimmt. Sobald ein Organismus eine erste-Person-Perspektive ausbildet, tritt eine neue Entität in Gestalt der Person auf, die nicht mit ihm identisch ist. Demnach gibt nicht die Biologie unsere Identitätsbedingungen vor, wie dies im Animalismus der Fall ist, sondern eine spezifische Ontologie der Subjektivität. Baker bringt ihre Position durch die Formel "Ontology need not follow biology" (2016, 56) auf den Punkt und führt dazu weiter aus: 1 Vgl. etwa Olson (1997) und Olson (2019). Eine leicht modifizierte Form des Animalismus vertritt neuerdings Reuter (2019). Für einen umfassenden Überblick über Positionen, Argumente und Probleme des Animalismus vgl. Blatti (2019).

Eugene Mills has recently argued that human organisms cannot begin to exist at fertilization because the evidence suggests that egg cells persist through fertilization and simply turn into zygotes. He offers two main arguments for this conclusion: that 'fertilized egg' commits no conceptual fallacy, and that on the face of it, it looks as though egg cells survive fertilization when the process is watched through a microscope. We refute these arguments and offer several reasons of our own to think that egg cells do not survive fertilization, appealing to various forms of essential-ism regarding persons, fission cases, and a detailed discussion of the biological facts relevant to fertilization and genetics. We conclude that it is plausible, therefore, that human organisms begin to exist at fertilization – or, at the very least, that there are grounds for thinking that they existed as zygotes which do not apply to the prior egg cells. While this does not entail that human persons begin to exist at this point, it nevertheless has considerable significance for this latter question.

A significant minority of Westerners believe in reincarnation, even though they do not belong to religions that teach it. What is the relationship of their belief to personal identity? In areas of the world where reincarnation is accepted, one can identify three forms of pre-natal and/or post-mortem identity: the continuing self/soul, the dissolution of the self, and family identity. Comparable concepts within the contemporary West might be labelled modern, postmodern and kin-based. The article considers three forms of evidence from Britain: everyday conversation, the personal stories to be found in Reincarnation International magazine, and an interview study of thirty adults and twenty children. It is concluded that (1) the understanding of A as the reincarnation of close family member B, found in several American and African tribes and in popular Hinduism, may be unusual in Britain; (2) in so far as people play with past identities, this cannot easily be squared with postmodern theories of the self; (3) the past identities constructed bear strong resemblance to current identities, and may be considered part of the modernist project of the self.

In this study, disagreement and humor intertwine to enrich pragmatic and cultural knowledge and display personal identity among near-native users of English in cross-cultural communication. The study adopts ethnography of communication approach to data collection and analysis. My original data consist of three hours of audio-taped interactions among a group of four female friends who come from different countries and are engaged in ordinary social conversations, reflecting on the world through language socialization. The emphasis lies on their use of teasing and disagreement as educational tools rather than conflict indicators and the implementation of these tools to maintain a strong relationship, raise cultural awareness, and gain knowledge of the world. The data show that teasing and disagreement can be used jointly not only to establish relational identity display and development but also to reaffirm a preexisting one and to elaborate on topics that lead to scope expansion and acquisition of new notions that have not been encountered previously. These conversations create an atmosphere for scaffolding and learning, not only about language but also about other cultures and other peoples’ behavior and pragmatics. Out of such socializations, new norms may evolve and new identities may emerge. Therefore, this study intends to encourage teaching L2 in natural settings where students can communicate their ideas freely without any limitations.

Wer sich mit der Philosophie des Geistes beschäftigt, kommt an David Hume nicht vorbei. In seinem "Treatise of Human Nature" (1739/40) stellt er eine Konzeption von Selbst (self), Geist (mind) oder Seele (soul) vor, die einige Autoren  aufgrund ihres unverhohlenen Naturalismus enthusiastisch feiern, während andere sie als reduktionistisch zurückweisen und für die „Existenz eines nicht-humeschen Selbst“  plädieren. Ein Grund für diese geteilte Einschätzung liegt vor allem in Humes Frontstellung gegen die von René Descartes in den "Meditationes de prima philosophia" (1641) wieder belebte Substanzmetaphysik. Weil wir nach Hume nur erkennen können, was uns in unserer Wahrnehmung (perception) gegeben ist, eine Substanz aber „völlig verschieden von einer Wahrnehmung“ ist, haben wir „keine Idee von einer Substanz.“

Cordula Brand, Personale Identität oder menschliche Persistenz? Ein naturalistisches Kriterium, Paderborn: Mentis 2010, 375 S., 978 -3 -89785 -708 -7. Schon häufiger ist der Verdacht geäußert worden, in der von John Locke angestoßenen und bis heute andauernden Debatte um Personen und ihre transtemporale Identität würden verschiedene Themen und Fragestellungen miteinander vermengt, die eigentlich gar nichts oder nur wenig miteinander zu tun hätten. 1 Cordula Brand teilt diesen Eindruck (vgl. z.B. 24 ff. u. 31 ff.) und möchte mit ihrem Buch Personale Identität oder menschliche Persistenz? Ein naturalistisches Kriterium Klarheit in die verworrene Diskussion bringen. Wie der Titel der Tübinger Dissertation bereits verrät, bedeutet dies für sie in erster Linie, zwischen ‚menschlicher Persistenz' und ‚personaler Identität' zu unterscheiden. Brands Entwurf eines ‚naturalistischen Kriteriums' reagiert nicht nur auf die, wie sie meint, aus ‚Expertensicht' unleugbare Extensionsdifferenz der Begriffe ‚Mensch' und ‚Person' (vgl. insbes. 27 f.), sondern stellt überdies den Versuch dar, mit der von ‚Laien' und ‚Experten' 2 gleichermaßen vernachlässigten fundamentalen Differenz zwischen deskriptiven und normativen Fragen ‚unserer' ‚Identität' philosophisch Ernst zu machen (vgl. z.B. 25 f., 245 u. 306). Wenn ‚Person' eigentlich "ein moralisches Konzept" ist (30; vgl. auch 211 u. 306), das bestimmten Wesen "auf der Basis des Vorhandenseins bestimmter Eigenschaften bzw. Fähigkeiten" einen bestimmten "moralische[n] Status" verleiht (353), dann kann eine widerspruchsfreie Rede von ‚personaler Identität' sich nur auf die Identität des mit Personalität verknüpften moralischen Status beziehen (vgl. 320 ff.). Dagegen bleibt es dem naturalistischen Kriterium vorbehalten, die Bedingungen der synchronen wie diachronen Identität desjenigen Wesens zu spezifizieren, dem wir diesen Status im Kontext unserer Lebenswelt zunächst und zumeist zuschreiben: die Individuations-und Persistenzbedingungen des Menschen (vgl. 31 ff. sowie zusammenfassend 304). Allein ein solcher doppelter Problemzugang stellt nach Ansicht der Autorin einen Theorierahmen bereit, innerhalb dessen philosophische ‚Experteneinsichten' zur Lösung konkreter bioethischer Probleme beitragen können (vgl. 41, 324 ff., 355 f. u. den Klappentext). Wer mit der jüngeren Entwicklung der ‚Personal-identity'-Debatte ein wenig vertraut ist, wird sich unweigerlich an den Theorieentwurf von Michael Quante erinnert fühlen: Auch Quante plädiert für eine strikte Trennung normativer und deskriptiver Fragen, 3 woraus vermittelt über die Annahme, der Begriff ‚Person' sei ein nichtkonstitutives Phasensortal (also 1 Vgl. v.a. Quante (2007), zuerst 6 ff., und (2002), 17 ff. 2 Brand übernimmt diese Unterscheidung von Putnam, vgl. 12 ff. 3 Vgl. Quante (2007), 18 ff.

In this entry I offer some prefatory discursive remarks
about identity; then, owing to the dominance of psychological
theories, a brief overview of some of its
salient themes will be adumbrated; this will be followed
by a discussion on identity formation and maintenance both
in political philosophy and philosophy of education.

The main aim of this study was to test the situational hypothesis of parent-peer conflict and the parent-peer linkages hypothesis with regard to parental and peer attachment and identity. The situational hypothesis predicts that parental attachment will be associated with school identity and peer attachment with relational identity. The parent-peer linkages hypothesis suggests that parental attachment influences peer attachment and through peer attachment school and relational identity. Data from a survey of 148 middle adolescents from various ethnic groups were used. The findings offer strong support for the situational hypothesis, and only limited evidence in favor of the parent-peer linkages hypothesis. In addition, systematic links were found between parent and peer trust and commitment, and parent and peer communication and exploration. Adolescents from ethnic minority groups reported higher levels of school commitment and exploration compared with indigenous Dutch adolescents. r

There is a rich body of literature on the experience of Japanese immigrants in the United States, and there are also numerous accounts of the cultural dislocation felt by American expats in Japan. But what happens when Japanese Americans, born and raised in the United States, are the ones living abroad in Japan?

Redefining Japaneseness chronicles how Japanese American migrants to Japan navigate and complicate the categories of Japanese and “foreigner.” Drawing from extensive interviews and fieldwork in the Tokyo area, Jane H. Yamashiro tracks the multiple ways these migrants strategically negotiate and interpret their daily interactions. Following a diverse group of subjects—some of only Japanese ancestry and others of mixed heritage, some fluent in Japanese and others struggling with the language, some from Hawaii and others from the US continent—her study reveals wide variations in how Japanese Americans perceive both Japaneseness and Americanness.

Making an important contribution to both Asian American studies and scholarship on transnational migration, Redefining Japaneseness critically interrogates the common assumption that people of Japanese ancestry identify as members of a global diaspora. Furthermore, through its close examination of subjects who migrate from one highly-industrialized nation to another, it dramatically expands our picture of the migrant experience.

Check out the website https://redefiningjapaneseness.com
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Watch a short interview https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B0u43MQWZAg
See a book talk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CGC3D9M6GUk&feature=youtu.be

The present study was designed to examine developmental patterns of identity status change during adolescence and young adulthood through meta-analysis. Some 124 studies appearing in PsycINFO, ERIC, Sociological Abstracts, and Dissertation Abstracts ...

We are near to being able to attempt to colonize other planets in the solar system, especially Mars. Is it a good idea? Weighing the costs and benefits is more of a philosopher's task than one might at first think, for two reasons. There are issues of incomparability, involving interests of a few largely well-off people and nations in comparison to the basic needs of many, and the interests of humanity in comparison to those of the planets and other living species. And there are issues of what we should and care about in the future of our species and its descendents, rather analogous to issues of personal identity. Does the best attitude prioritize people as they are now, with the desires and values that they have. Or is it better to prioritize intelligent beings that will exist and the perhaps superior aims that they will have? The discussion needs both a scientific background and comfort with tricky issues of value. In this book I begin with an exposition of present plans for Mars colonization and the obstacles they face. I also estimate direct monetary costs and indirect opportunity costs. I then list some of the dangers of these plans and try to evaluate their chances of providing a refuge that would evade possible fates of humanity on earth. Then, in the last chapter, I get to issues about what we should prefer for the long-term future of intelligent and other life. My discussion of these relies on a distinction between wants and values, and a deliberate suspension of the assumption that there is anything ultimate about present-day human beings. In a definitely contestable final section I argue that colonization plans as presently conceived are unlikely to achieve their ends and have a high chance of unwanted side effects.

The free will problem is defined and three solutions are discussed: no-freedom theory, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Strict determinism is often assumed in arguing for libertarianism or no-freedom theory. It assumes that the history of the universe is fixed, but modern physics admits a certain degree of randomness in the determination of events. However, this is not enough for a compatibilist position-which is favored here-since freedom is not randomness. It is the I that chooses what to do. It is argued that the core of the free will problem is what this I is. A materialist view is favored: The I is an activity of the brain. In addition to absence of external and internal compulsion, freedom involves absence of causal sufficiency of influences acting on the I. A more elaborate compatibilist view is proposed, according to which causal determination is complete when we add events occurring in the I (of which the subject is not conscious). Contrary to what several authors have argued, the onset of the readiness potential before the decision to act is no problem here. The experience of agency is incomplete and fallible, rather than illusory. Some consequences of different views about freedom for the ascription of responsibility are discussed.