Right-Wing Extremism

To contribute to studies of contemporary anti-fascism, the goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the governmental, corporate and activist institutions and tactics that aim to resist the far-right mobilization and recruitment processes. Focusing on the United States, this chapter highlights efforts by actors within the political sphere (e.g. the American State’s repressive and judicial apparatuses), the economic sphere (e.g. the corporate news, entertainment and high-tech industries) and civic sphere (e.g. Left anti-fascist activism) to resist the far right. While efforts by State and corporate actors to take on and take down white supremacist individuals and hate groups are positive and needed, it is important to consider the political possibilities and limits of these challenges to the far right.Racial capitalism and a largely white ruling class persists in the United States, and so the institutional sources and practices of far-right resistance must be critically examined with regard to that social context (Burden-Stelly 2020; Issar 2020; Rahman 2020; Roediger 2017, 2019; Taylor 2016; Virdee 2019). To this end, the first section contextualizes American racial capitalism, the role of the State and political parties in propping up this system and the enduring power of a mostly white and male American ruling class. Following this, the second and third sections identify some U.S. State and corporate sources of opposition to the white supremacist far right, and assess the politics of these within a country whose ‘mainstream’ political and economic institutions have long been enmeshed with the system of racial capitalism and white supremacy. For a potentially emancipatory source of resistance to the far right and to the system of racial capitalism that emboldens it, the third section looks to broad-based left anti-fascist activism.

From the very beginning, the armed conflict that broke out in the Donbass in the spring of 2014 drew in right-wing radicals, on the Ukrainian as well as on the Russian side. Organised ultra-nationalist groups and individual activists established their own units of volunteers or joined existing ones.

The ideology, political traditions and general track record of these right-wing extremists meant that it was both natural and inevitable that they would take an active part in the conflict. Yet the role of right-wing radicals on both sides has on the whole been exaggerated in the media and in public discussion. This article demonstrates that Russia’s use of right-wing radicals on the side of the “separatists” in Donetsk and Lugansk provinces had greater military and political repercussions than the involvement of Ukrainian far-right groups in the “anti-terrorist operation”. The general course of the conflict, meanwhile, caused the importance of far right-groups on both sides to decline.

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

In Brasilien spielt der Prozess des Nation-Buildings eine zentrale Rolle. Von der 'Rassendemokratie' über das 'Land der Zukunft' bis zum 'Land für Alle'-die Bemühungen das riesige Land mit seiner sehr heterogenen Bevölkerung zu vereinen, fanden unter den verschiedensten, symbolisch aufgeladenen Parolen statt. Diese Konzepte prägen Brasiliens nationale Identität bis heute und bestimmen oft die Wahrnehmung der großen sozio-ökonomischen Differenzen im Land. Im Oktober 2018 wurde, nach einer lang anhaltenden wirtschaftlichen und politischen Krise sowie einem rücksichtslosen Präsidentschaftswahlkampf, mit Jair Bolsonaro ein rechtsextremer Populist zum neuen Präsidenten Brasiliens gewählt. Unter dem Motto ‚Brasilien über alles, Gott über allen' versprach er in Zukunft für die Mehrheit der Brasilianer*innen zu regieren und nicht für die Minderheiten, wie es bis jetzt der Fall gewesen sei. Dabei werden unterschiedliche Gruppen, wie LGTB-Aktivist*innen, Feminist*innen und Sozialist*innen, immer wieder explizit in das Zentrum seiner Kritik gestellt. Diese müssten sich von nun an entweder der Mehrheit beugen oder sie würden aus dem Land verschwinden. In der Präsentation wird dieses rechtspopulistische Nation-Building anhand von Reden, Werbespots und Infomaterial aus dem Präsidentschaftswahlkampf analysiert. Das Material wird dabei auf seine Ausschlüsse, Grenzziehungen und diskursiven Bezüge hin untersucht, sodass ein Bild der von Bolsonaro angestrebten Gesellschaftsordnung entsteht. Dabei wird auch immer wieder auf Differenzen und Gemeinsamkeiten zu rechten populistischen Bewegungen in Europa und den USA hingewiesen. Dies erlaubt ein differenzierteres Bild des globalen Rechtspopulismus zu zeichnen, die Entwicklungen in Brasilien auch in transnationale Zusammenhänge einzuordnen und eurozentristische Annahmen zu hinterfragen.

The Great Depression, which began as the Wall Street Crash in 1929, effectively bankrupted the Weimar republic, contributing to the agenda of extremist political parties and causing the collapse of the democratic government. The Great Depression was caused by excessive reliance on foreign denominated debt and the inability to pay such debt created significant social issues such as unemployment and poverty, contributing to the cause of radical parties and eventually allowing the Nazi Party to end democracy by establishing autocratic rule.

Môj príspevok v zborníku (od str. 12) z konferencie na tému:
Vychovávajú dezinformačné a konšpiračné médiá Kotlebových voličov?

Od zvolenia 14 poslancov za stranu Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko do NR SR v marci 2016 sa v odbornej verejnosti i medzi laikmi viedli diskusie o príčinách a dôvodoch vzostupu popularity tejto kontroverznej strany a jej hlavného predstaviteľa. Niektorí uvádzali
ako hlavný dôvod teóriu tzv. frustrovaného voliča, iní krízu tradičných politických strán či úspešnú prácu v teréne a mobilizáciu stúpencov tejto strany.

Viacerí analytici zaznamenali nadpriemerne vysokú aktivitu a viditeľnosť tejto strany v sociálnych médiách, kde je ich mediálny výtlak rádovo vyšší než miera skutočných sympatií voličov. Pomerne málo pozornosti však bolo venované fenoménu prepojení a vzájomných sympatií
a kontaktov medzi tzv. dezinformačnými médiami (často nesprávne nazývanými alternatívne médiá) a extrémistickými politickými subjektmi.

An essay about the impact of the religious right and the "Recovered" movement upon Alcoholics Anonymous and the inherently reactionary nature of the Fellowship.
https://www.poeticdiversity.org/main/prose-fea.php?nameCode=LarissaShmailo&date=2019-04-01

Richard Wolin is Distinguished Professor of History, Political Science and Comparative Literature at the CUNY Graduate Center. He is been Professeur Invité at the University of Paris-X (Nanterre) and the University of Nantes. Among his books, which have been translated into ten languages, are:Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas and Herbert Marcuse, The Seduction of Unreason: the Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postermodernism, and The Wind From the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution and the Legacy of the 1960s, which was listed by the Financial Times as one of the best books of 2012. He frequently writes on intellectual and political themes for the New Republic, the Nation, and Dissent.

[English follows]
Ce chapitre pose la question du degré de rupture ou de continuité entre les mouvements de l'extrême droite contemporaine et le fascisme historique. Pour ce faire, nous commençons par retracer la matrice idéologique d'un groupe d'extrême droite québécois -- la Fédération des Québécois de souche -- à partir de l'analyse des principales catégories d'acteurs prises pour cibles dans les articles du magazine Le Harfang, publié par l'organisation depuis 2012. Nous analysons ensuite la manière dont ces catégories s'articulent ensemble pour former un cadre qui structure une certaine vision du monde  et motive l'action politique (ce que nous appelons la « matrice idéologique »). Cet exercice nous permet, dans une troisième partie, d'établir des liens clairs entre la matrice idéologique de l'extrême droite contemporaine et celle de groupes ultra-nationalistes et ultra-conservateurs, proches du fascisme, actifs au Québec dans les années 1930. En somme, nous constatons qu'en tant que mouvement et système de pensée, l’extrême droite contemporaine  présente davantage de points communs avec l’extrême droite historique que ce qu'on pourrait parfois être amené à penser.
Lien vers l'ouvrage complet: http://classiques.uqac.ca/contemporains/helly_denise/Retablir_l_ordre_peur_mefiance_haine/Retablir_l_ordre.html

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This chapter raises the question of the degree of rupture or continuity between movements of the contemporary far right and historical fascism. To do this, we begin by retracing the ideological matrix of an extreme right group - the Fédération des Québécois de souche - through the analysis of the main categories of actors targeted in the pages of their magazine. We then analyze how these categories articulate together to constitue a framework that sustain a certain ontology that motivates political action (what we call the "ideological matrix" ). This exercise allows us, in a third part, to establish clear links between the ideological matrix of the contemporary far right and that of ultra-nationalist and ultra-conservative groups, close to fascism, active in Quebec in the 1930s. In short, we find that as a movement and system of thought, the contemporary far right may have more in common with historic fascism than we might sometimes be led to believe.
Follow the link for the full version of the book: http://classiques.uqac.ca/contemporains/helly_denise/Retablir_l_ordre_peur_mefiance_haine/Retablir_l_ordre.html

In the week I took writing this review, Beirut, Paris and Bamako were attacked by terrorists claiming to act in the name of Islam. In the days following the attacks, a mosque was burnt down in Canada and multiple European countries recorded a spike in hate crime against Muslims, as far-right organizations continued to mobilize crowds across the continent. Radicalization has become a central issue...

Unpublished Interview of Michael von der Goltz and Alfons Sassen
About international arms trade, his brother Willem Sassen, Ecuador. Bits of the interview were used in 'Nazis to the Core, the Sassen brothers and their anti Bolshevik Crusade in Latin America' (Publisher Aspekt 2015)

Over the last decade, the main area of sustained populist growth has been Western Europe, with populist movements reaching new heights in countries such as France, Italy, Austria and Holland. Twenty-First Century Populism analyses this phenomenon by looking at the conditions facilitating the emergence and success of populism in specific national contexts and then examining why populism has flourished or floundered in those countries. The book also discusses the degree to which populism has affected mainstream politics in Western Europe and examines the inter-relationship between populism, political parties, the media and democracy. Containing chapters by a series of country experts and renowned political scientists from across the continent, this volume is the first to offer an in-depth account of the reasons behind the populist wave in twenty-first century Europe.

http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/TwentyFirst-Century-Populism/?K=9780230013490

Twenty years after the 9/11 attacks, stereotypes that associate Muslims with terrorism go far beyond depictions in newspapers and television. Recent research raises the alarm about rampant Islamophobia in digital spaces, particularly far-right groups’ use of disinformation and other manipulation tactics to vilify Muslims and their faith.

In this article, the term "radicalisation" is discussed as a process that appears to be a defensive and reactionary response of various individuals suffering from social, economic, and political forms of exclusion, subordination, alienation, humiliation, and isolation. To that effect, the article challenges the mainstream understanding of radicalisation. In doing so, the work concentrates on the elaboration of reactionary radicalisation processes of self-identified Muslim youth and self-identified native youth residing in Europe. The main reason behind the selection of these two groups is the assumption that both groups are co-radicalizing each other in the contemporary world that is defined by the ascendance of a civilizational political discourse since the war in the Balkans in the 1990s. Based on the findings of in-depth interviews conducted with youngsters from both groups in Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the work demonstrates that the main drivers of the radicalisation processes of these two groups cannot be explicated through the reproduction of civilizational, cultural, and religious differences. Instead, the drivers of radicalisation for both groups are very identical as they are both socioeconomically , politically, and psychologically deprived of certain elements constrained by the flows of globalization and dominant forms of neo-liberal governance.

Die vorliegende Studie zu Reichsbürgern und Selbstverwaltern, die durch Straftaten oder Ordnungswidrigkeiten öffentlich aufgefallen sind, basiert auf einer systematischen Presserecherche aller deutschsprachigen
Medien in der Bundesrepublik zwischen 2003 und 2018. Es wurden insgesamt 1.070 Ordnungswidrigkeiten und Straftaten in 730 relevanten Ereignissen mit 487 Personen aus der Reichsbürgerbewegung (RBB) erfasst und ausgewertet.

La critique de l’Union européenne constitue une ligne doctrinale stable du programme du FN depuis la fin des années 1980. La nouvelle équipe de direction menée par Marine Le Pen inscrit ainsi son opposition à Bruxelles dans une continuité avec l’héritage du passé. Ce discours de dénonciation s’est néanmoins durci ces dernières années, à partir de la revendication d’une sortie de l’euro notamment. Or ce durcissement peut également être réinscrit dans une continuité de pratiques au sein du FN. Il vient pérenniser des usages de l’arène européenne et de sa critique comme outils de la lutte politique nationale mis en place par les dirigeants du FN depuis vingt ans. En restant radicale, la critique frontiste de l’Europe s’adapte à un nouveau contexte au sein du système partisan pour continuer à permettre aux acteurs FN de gagner à la fois en visibilité, en crédibilité et en distinction, ainsi qu’à maintenir la cohésion au sein du parti.

Russia, Hungary and Poland have been at the forefront of the illiberal counter-movement to neoliberalism. However, while there is increasing knowledge about how ‘populism’ as a discursive strategy has brought illiberals to power, especially in Poland and Hungary, we know surprisingly little about the socioeconomic programme and guiding principles of illiberals. In this article, we argue first that there is such a programme and that – notwithstanding the differences between countries – it features a similar programmatic core in the three countries that took shape in conservative think tanks and guides socioeconomic policy recommendations. Second, this programmatic core is best understood not so much as populism, but as a combination of economic nationalism – subordinating the economy to national interests and to the imperative of protecting national identity – and conservatism, reorienting economic policies to serve the traditional family and undo the perceived wrongdoings of post-communist elites, in particular, privatisation. We call this core conservative developmental statism. Thus illiberalism is reducible neither to populism nor to the whims of the power-holders of the day, and in these countries it needs to be seen in a wider context in which rightwing intellectuals have been working in parallel with politicians to give illiberalism a conservative content.

(English below) Rechte Intellektuelle berufen sich oft auf Nietzsches Konzept der Sklavenmoral, um damit ihre Kritik an ‚political correctness‘ zu untermauern. Diese Verschaltung von Nietzsches Sklavenmoral und ‚PC‘-Kritik ist zutreffend, wie die systematische Analyse ihrer gemeinsamen Elemente zeigt, die zu einer Neubeschreibung von ‚PC‘-Kritik als Privilegienverteidigung führt. Im Gegensatz zur rechtsnietzscheanischen ‚PC‘-Kritik zeigt der linksnietzscheanische Begriff des privilegienkritischen ‚politischen Urteilens‘, dass Politik ein Kampf um Macht und Ansprüche ist, wobei der politische Raum und seine Diskurse immer verregelt und ein Verteilungssystem für Ressourcen und Privilegien sind. Deshalb ist es für eine emanzipatorische Position angebracht, die etablierten Normen kritisch zu hinterfragen und politische Projekte, die sie emanzipativ umschreiben wollen, zu unterstützen. Weil ‚PC‘ als emanzipatives politisches Urteilen Privilegien abbaut, ist es kein zu vermeidender Nebeneffekt, sondern ihr vernünftiger Kern, wenn Privilegierte davon eingeschränkt werden. Der Linksnietzscheanismus hilft, nicht von rechter Aggression überrascht zu werden und ihr entsprechend kämpferisch durch strikte Normsetzung zu begegnen.

Right-wing intellectuals often invoke Nietzsche's concept of slave morality to underpin their criticism of 'political correctness' ('PC'). This interconnection of Nietzsche's slave morality and 'PC' criticism is correct, as a systematic analysis of their common elements shows, which leads to a new description of 'PC' criticism as a defense of privilege. In contrast to the right-wing Nietzschean 'PC' critique, the left-wing Nietzschean concept of a privilege-critical ‘political judgement' understands politics as a struggle for power, in which the space of the political and related discourses are always already regulated and determine the conditions under which resources and privileges are distributed. Therefore, it is appropriate for an emancipatory position to critically question the established norms and to support political projects that aim to rewrite them. Because 'PC', as emancipative political judgement, dismantles privileges, its restricting of the privileged is not a side effect to be avoided but one of its reasonable core effects. Left-wing Nietzscheanism helps to avoid being surprised by right-wing aggression and to counter it vigorously by setting strict political norms.

This study analyses the contestation of the concept of Europe by contemporary anti-
liberal groups. The aim of this analysis is to answer the question for the motives of
these groups to choose Europe as a point of reference instead of national or regional
frames of reference. The analysis is based on conceptual history which traces changing
meanings of concepts through history, in this case the concept of Europe. The theoretical
approach builds on Koselleck's Zeitschichten and Schulz-Forberg's Raumschichten. The
temporal, spatial and normative dimensions of the concept of Europe are therefore the
main guiding categories of the analysis. In addition, Sirinelli's model of generations
serves as a hypothesis for the emergence of social movements and their durability.
As a first step, an overview over the concept of Europe and the main aspects with
regard to its temporal, spatial and normative meaning which have been attached to it is
provided. The claim of the EU as an “owner” of the concept and the role of the public
sphere in defining are furthermore discussed. As a next step, a short historical overview
outlines earlier anti-liberal movements and their conceptualisations of Europe. The analysis
focuses on two anti-liberal groups: Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation
of Europe) and the Identitarian Movement. The analysis shows that both movements
challenge the liberal concept of Europe in several ways. They point back to Christianity
as a normative basis, state that Islam is not compatible with or at least problematic within
Europe and are highly critical of immigration. Whereas Pegida has a very vague conceptualisation
of Europe and refers more to the national context, the Identitarians establish an
ideologically consistent framework of Europe which is highly essentialist and strongly
refers to earlier anti-liberal movements. The reason for referring to Europe lies in their
interest to gain and maintain credibility, defend themselves against allegations of xenophobia
and create an antagonist. The hypothesis of a political generation holds in case of
the Identitarians, but is hard to uphold in case of Pegida due to the diverse backgrounds of
their members.
The analysis shows how the EU definition of the concept of Europe is challenged
as the gap between political elites and civil society widens. Anti-liberal groups avoid
overtly xenophobic discourses and adapt ideological and aesthetic elements from the left
which makes it difficult to discern them. At the same time, rejection of the EU becomes
politically and socially established, putting the EU project at danger. New media play an
increasingly important role in spreading their messages and ideology and have become a
counter-public sphere which deserves further monitoring and analysis.

In ihren offiziellen Verlautbarungen distanziert sich die Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) mittlerweile vom Antisemitismus. Umso heftiger werden hingegen Nationalismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antifeminismus von FPÖ-Politiker_innen propagiert. Durch diese Entwicklung drängt sich nicht nur die Frage auf, inwieweit die FPÖ ihre zur Schau gestellte Haltung gegen den Antisemitismus für Zwecke einer allgemeinen Fremdenfeindlichkeit instrumentalisiert, die sich in den letzten Jahren verstärkt gegen Zugewanderte aus islamisch geprägten Gesellschaften richtet. Die damit zusammenhängende Frage ist zudem, wie es um die vorgeblich kri-tische Haltung gegenüber dem Antisemitismus von Seiten der FPÖ tatsächlich bestellt ist.

Radicalisation, extremism and terrorism take places as responses to a broader societal context of macro social and political moves, both nationally and internationally. Engaging in an extremist group makes an individual changes, because he or she creates an identity relevant to the world of the particular group he or she is involved in. This causes some to need support after they disengage in order to deradicalise and develop new social skills and identities. The complex process that follows their disengagement into the development of an alternative identity is the subject of this thesis.
Several studies focus on the conditions under which individuals involved in terrorism disengage, providing insight into exit programmes and the need for them, as well as discuss the different approaches used in a rehabilitation effort of (former) terrorists or extremists. This study moves a step further as the thesis adds insight into individuals’ disengagement and deradicalisation processes, by investigating the ways in which participation and social interaction embedded in the Swedish exit programme cause individuals to alter their identity. It thus provides a detailed analysis of the demanding psychological process, which former extremists go through, supported by the exit programme after they have left an extremist group. The study is anthropological and based on fieldwork carried out at EXIT, a Swedish organisation providing support to individuals seeking to leave the extremist right. EXIT uses former right-wing extremists as mentors, who, based on therapeutic dialogue and activities, support their mentees - right-wing extremists wanting to leave the extremist right - in developing alternative world views, ways of self-understanding and identities.

Identifying the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol as an inf lection point, this article analyzes the historical relationship between White supremacy and the US military from Reconstruction after the Civil War to the present. The article posits causes for the disproportionate number of current and former members of the military associated with White power groups and proposes steps the Department of Defense can take to combat the problems posed by the association of the US military with these groups.

Die Erinnerungskultur, wie sie sich seit den 1980er Jahren in (West-)Deutschland zunehmend etabliert hat und mittlerweile zu einem identitätsstiftenden und staatstragenden Moment geworden ist, steht unter dem Motto ›Erinnerung ist Erlösung‹. Der ›Schande‹, die der Nationalsozialismus über Deutschland gebracht habe, wird der Stolz auf die gelungene ›Aufarbeitung‹ entgegengesetzt. Im Lichte der wiedergewonnenen ›Ehre‹ wird dabei der kollektive Narzissmus des Nationalgefühls, der nach der Niederlage im Zweiten Weltkrieg kryptisiert worden war, restituiert. In der AfD werden nun Stimmen laut, die an diese Entwicklung anknüpfen und die weiter anhaltende Betonung der ›Schande‹ ablehnen Schlüsselbegriffe: Schuldabwehr, Erinnerungskultur, Nationalismus, Antisemitismus, Neue Rechte »Denkmal der Schande« Das Berliner Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas sei ein »Denk-mal der Schande«, wütete der Thüringer AfD-Fraktionsvorsitzende Björn Höcke. In seiner von der Parteijugend organisierten Ansprache, die an-schließend in den Medien zur ›Dresdener Rede‹ überhöht wurde, stachel-te er seine Anhängerschaft gegen die Schmach auf: 1 »Der […] Wiederaufbau der Frauenkirche war für uns Patrioten ein Hoffnungsschim-mer dafür, dass es ihn doch noch gibt, diesen kleine Funken deutschen Selbstbehaup-tungswillen. [Applaus] Aber, liebe Freunde, bis jetzt sind es nur Fassaden, die wieder entstanden sind. Bis jetzt ist unsere Geistesverfassung, unser Gemütszustand immer noch der eines total besieg-ten Volkes. Dieses Dokument ist lizenziert für Universität Wien, uf33237k.

O primeiro objetivo deste ensaio é compreender a natureza específica das fake news e da pós-verdade enquanto fenômenos com características epistêmicas e sociais. Essa compreensão faz-se sob a hipótese de que um dos fatores que as tornam fenômenos particularmente inéditos e graves é a sua relação com formas corrompidas do ceticismo e relativismo. Descritas essas formas, o segundo objetivo consiste em contrastá-las a versões saudáveis de ceticismo e relativismo, procurando mostrar sua importância ao estabelecimento de acordos morais.
Após uma discussão sobre características definidoras das fake news (seção 1), vale-se de uma descrição do conjunto de crenças de conspiracionistas e negacionistas, em que se pode encontrar uma noção vulgar de ceticismo (seção 2). O relativismo vulgar é apresentado junto a uma descrição do que seria a pós-verdade (seção 3). Em seguida, apresenta-se uma defesa de um tipo específico de relativismo e ceticismo que serve a quem procura lidar adequadamente com o conhecimento em um ambiente não dogmático (seção 4). Ao fim, responde-se a uma possível objeção oferecida por relativistas de que haveria dogmatismo na crítica consensual às fake news e à pós-verdade (seção 5).

In this chapter I provide a reflective account of my doctoral research on the electoral rise and fall of the British National Party (BNP)-a party with its ideological and organizational origins in neo-Nazism and neo-fascism. In doing so, I will offer an account of the dialectical interplay of theory, method and data. Moreover, I will throw light on the way in which my research design evolved during the course of this study, thus demonstrating the ways in which it, and the decisions taken once in 'the field', were shaped by my personal biography and sociological training, as well as a range of other institutional, political, cultural and ethical factors. In doing so, I will draw attention to the significance of whiteness and class when negotiating the contours of the local 'communicative community' (Hewitt, 2005) through three overlapping periods of data collection on my journey towards a political ethnographic study of the BNP in the outer-East London Borough of Barking and Dagenham. I then conclude with a discussion which addresses a criticism that I (and others) have faced while presenting their work in this area: namely, that there is no place for ethnographic academic research involving the far right. Drawing on Back's (2002) concept of 'active listening', I will suggest that there is an important role for anti-racist, anti-fascist activist-scholarship in a field largely dominated by white people, and often susceptible to the pitfalls of 'white logic' and 'white methods' (see Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva, 2008).