Religious Extremism

شكل خبر انسحاب المملكة المغربية من القمة الإفريقية العربية التي انعقدت آخر شهر نوفمبر الماضي
في مالابو عاصمة غينيا الاستوائية موضوعا أثار اهتمام كثير من المراقبين ووسائل الإعلام الإفريقية
والدولية التي عزت هذا التصرف إلى اعتراض المغرب على ما أبداه الاتحاد الإفريقي برمته من
تمسك قوي بمبادئه التأسيسية ومرافعته الصريحة عن عضوية الجمهورية الصحراوية في المنتدى
الإفريقي. وقد ألقى الموقف المغربي هذا بظلال من الشكوك على النوايا الحقيقية من وراء طلب
المغرب الانضمام )وليس "العودة" أو "الرجوع" كما ي قال أحيان ا على غير صواب( إلى الاتحاد
الإفريقي، كما أظهر من جديد خريطة الاصطفافات والتحالفات الاستراتيجية التي يستقوي بها المغرب
ماديا ومعنويا في سياسته الجديدة تجاه القارة الإفريقية وفي كل ما له صلة بالملفات الحيوية الأخرى
بالنسبة له. فمن المعلوم أن انسحاب المغرب من القمة المذكورة صاحبه انسحاب مجموعة من الدول
العربية التي تنتمي إلى "النادي الملكي" الخليجي ومن يدور في فلكه وعلى رأسه المملكة العربية
السعودية.

My point of departure is Edward Said’s brilliant masterpiece ‘Orientalism’ (Said, 2003). I will summarise, although precisely, Said’s critique of Orientalism and will focus on the consequences of his conclusions about the fate of Islam after Orientalism that have compelled me to re-tell the story of Islam and Muslim subjectivity in a different manner. I will map the important anti-orientalist attempts influenced by Said’s work, in terms of conceptual schemas by picking up one or two representative figures that represent a particular conceptual scheme, and will then go on to offer an alternative narrative. I will try to show how Islam as Master
Signifier' (Sayyid, 1997) retroactively constitutes subjectivity, through political action of Islamists. The account will end by looking at the link between Islam and Islamism by employing the categories of ‘Availability’ and ‘Reliability’ developed by Laclau (1990).

In this article, the term "radicalisation" is discussed as a process that appears to be a defensive and reactionary response of various individuals suffering from social, economic, and political forms of exclusion, subordination, alienation, humiliation, and isolation. To that effect, the article challenges the mainstream understanding of radicalisation. In doing so, the work concentrates on the elaboration of reactionary radicalisation processes of self-identified Muslim youth and self-identified native youth residing in Europe. The main reason behind the selection of these two groups is the assumption that both groups are co-radicalizing each other in the contemporary world that is defined by the ascendance of a civilizational political discourse since the war in the Balkans in the 1990s. Based on the findings of in-depth interviews conducted with youngsters from both groups in Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the work demonstrates that the main drivers of the radicalisation processes of these two groups cannot be explicated through the reproduction of civilizational, cultural, and religious differences. Instead, the drivers of radicalisation for both groups are very identical as they are both socioeconomically , politically, and psychologically deprived of certain elements constrained by the flows of globalization and dominant forms of neo-liberal governance.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the War on Terror that has arisen in their wake have left an indelible imprint on contemporary cinema, as has the manner in which they have been covered in the media. Such is equally true of films that are set in the ancient world, and this article takes Alejandro Amenábar's film Agora as a case study for considering how 9/11 has impacted visualizations of antiquity in popular cinema. How the images and stereotypes of the War on Terror are grafted onto antiquity is considered through a discussion of the film's depiction of pagans, Christians, and Jews, respectively, and particular scenes are analyzed as emblemizing the director's political leanings and distinctly contemporary filmic approach.

Les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 et la guerre au terrorisme qui s'en est suivie ont laissé une empreinte indélébile sur le cinéma contemporain, de même que la manière dont ces événements ont été couverts dans les médias. Cette constatation vaut égale-ment pour les films qui se déroulent dans l'ancien monde. À partir du film Agora d'Alejandro Amenábar, cet article se propose d'évaluer comment le 11 septembre a influencé les représentations de l'Antiquité dans le cinéma populaire. La manière dont les images et les stéréotypes de la guerre au terrorisme ont été appliqués à l'Antiquité est considérée au moyen d'une discussion sur les représentations respec-tives des païens, des chrétiens et des juifs dans le film. Certaines scènes sont aussi analysées comme étant représentatives des tendances politiques du réalisateur, ainsi que de l'approche filmique clairement contemporaine.

Современные традиции лютеран Санкт-Петербурга весьма разнообразны, несмотря на общую историю Реформации, начавшуюся в Германии в 1517 г. Сегодня все реже вспоминают историю, хотя в церкви,
не имеющей границ в привычном нам времени, нет истории, линейного развития, она существует в вечности, и то, что состоялось 500 лет
назад или ранее, – такая же реальность сегодня, о которой проповедуется и опыт которой используется в повседневной жизни церкви.
По мнению А.М.  Прилуцкого, терминологическая небрежность,
алогизм и отсутствие минимальной историко-теологической компетентности свойствення современным неопротестантам-харизматам.
Однако в данной статье рассматривается традиционная церковь.
Кто не знает историю Реформации, тот не поймет ее богословия.

This book explores the moral psychology of devotion. In the first part of the book, I provide I analysis of devotion; an examination of its motivational role; and an explanation of its connection to a distinctive form of valuing, in which certain values are seen as inviolable and are rendered invulnerable to the typical effects of justificatory reflection. In the second part of the book, I assess the ethical significance of devotion, arguing that certain forms of ethically praiseworthy relationships require devotion. In the third part, I examine how devotion can easily devolve into pathological forms. I focus on fanaticism, arguing that devotion can arise from a particular form of psychological fragility that is linked to group violence. I further argue that this form of fragility can be stoked by group resentment, and that certain social groups can thus be fanatical in the sense that they encourage the emergence of individual fanatics. In the final part of the book, I ask whether there are ways of preserving some of the beneficial features of devotion while avoiding their pathologies. I investigate whether we can be devoted through irony; through affirmation; and through what I call the "Deepening Move." Each of these stances preserves a degree of flexibility and openness in the object of devotion; each one tries to preserve a form of wholehearted devotion despite this openness. (The attached file contains the introductory chapter. Email or message me if you'd like a draft of the entire book.)

Since the Arab Spring and the widely emergence of the IS (Islamic State), ISIS and Daesh in Syria and Iraq, Malaysians as other their counterparts no longer feel secure. Being less secure, Malaysia has to take few steps in order to avoid any religious extremism internally or externally.  Malaysia has had a long history of religious extremism, particularly after the post-Islamic Resurgence era. As a multi-racial and multi-religious country, Malaysia faces three groups of religious extremists, namely, inter-religious extremists (between Muslims and non-Muslims), co-Muslim extremists (between Muslims and Muslims) and inter-individual (religious) and public extremists. Malaysian government has introduced few steps in order to counter religious extremism. They are deradicalisation programs, preventive law, rehabilitation programs and toolkit to educate against extremism. The country has been successfully countered the local religious extremism especially among the Muslims.

This joint report by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point offers a preliminary survey and analysis of one of the largest known online repositories of Islamic State materials in order to increase understanding of how violent extremist groups and their supporters manage, preserve, and protect information relevant to their cause. Seemingly managed by sympathizers of the Islamic State, the large cache of digital files, here nicknamed the “Cloud Caliphate,” provides researchers, policymakers, and counterterrorism practitioners additional insights into how and why groups and their adherents maintain archives of such material.

The core analysis breaks into seven different parts. After reviewing the likely origins of the repository, the first section describes its composition, and the second discusses evidence concerning cyber support from other online actors. Sections three through six explore specific folders within the archive, which pertain to matters concerning the Islamic State’s organizational predecessors and a range of notable leaders, ideologues, and scholars. Section seven of the report highlights a real-world case involving the use of the “Cloud Caliphate” archive by an Islamic State supporter. The report concludes with a reflective discussion that notes potential policy considerations for those tasked with confronting the Islamic State’s exploitation of information and communications technologies.

The Order, otherwise known as the Silent Brotherhood, or Bruder Schweigen, had one of the shortest but most eventful and notorious careers of the post-civil rights or fifth-era extreme Right (1970s to the 1990s). In its short lifespan (from 1983 to 1985), members of The Order were connected to numerous murders, armed robberies, and terrorist plots and were the subject of an FBI manhunt and the defendants in two major trials, including one for seditious conspiracy. Arguably, the majority of attention focused on the extreme Right during the early 1980s was due to the activities of The Order and its members. The most high-profile incident involving The Order, which attracted national attention, was the murder of talk radio disc jockey Alan Berg in Denver, Colorado. The group's notoriety is best illustrated by the fact that no less than three films were made about them: the television film Brotherhood of Murder (1999), as well as two major motion pictures by critically acclaimed directors, Betrayed (1988) by Costa-Gavras and Talk Radio (1989) by Oliver Stone. The latter two were centered on the murder of Berg, albeit loosely in the case of Betrayed.

Extremism is an ideology that is considered to be far outside mainstream attitude of society. Usually it is an attack on values’ system. We can see political, religious and ideological forms (some of them can interlace each other). I would like to discuss one page 'a kind of theory', "Where extremism can turn into the violent form?" (for instance Daesh/so-called Islamic State is the group where we can see a violent ideological approach driven by will of political changes, and inspired by fundamental beliefs).

Please comment and share your thoughts.

Au moment où l’actualité met les projecteurs sur le terrorisme islamiste, cet article apporte un éclairage sur les concepts de radicalisme, extrémisme et terrorisme qui sert à introduire un modèle intégré explicatif de l’engagement d’individus dans le processus de radicalisation à portée violente de type jihadiste. Les nuances qui en découlent peuvent inspirer (être mises à profit par) le travailleur social dans son activité quotidienne.

In 1968 a Mennonite pastor and peace worker named Edgar Metzler published a short booklet in the popular “Focal Pamphlet” series published by Herald Press – a series that includes other more widely read works by Mennonite historians and theologians like Harold S. Bender and J. Lawrence Burkholder. The brief preface on the inside cover gives some indication of its purpose and audience in the context of the American Mennonite experience during the late 1960s:

"This pamphlet is prepared to stimulate the Christian’s peace testimony. Christians need constantly to return to the Bible to discover the message of the gospel. This message must be translated into living terms by every generation. The S. F. Coffman Peace Lectures are sponsored by the Committee on Peace and Social Concerns of the Mennonite Church. They are financed by an individual who has an interest in the message of the gospel of Jesus Christ as it relates to the social needs and the international tensions of the world in which we live."

Metzler’s text is situated amidst the international tensions alluded to above, particularly racial tensions and violence in the United States during the Vietnam War era. The pamphlet is titled Let’s Talk About Extremism, but what the author means by the term “extremism” calls for explanation, some of which the author provides in the first section of the text below.

Although other pamphlets in the series were more widely read, Let’s Talk About Extremism has only been cited a few times since it was published – most recently in a survey of definitions of radicalism and extremism. The lack of scholarly or public engagement with the text in the years since it was published is a problem that I hope to remedy in this edition.

In short, the argument of the pamphlet is that how we think about the relationship between extreme or opposed positions – whether they are political, religious, social, or a combination of all three – matters deeply. For Metzler, ways of thinking and knowing, or what scholars call “epistemologies,” are just as important for the Christian peace witness as more visible manifestations of violence like killing or war. Whereas Metzler refers to “extremism,” today we tend to refer to the problems he addresses by using the term “polarization.” In response to these problems, Metzler calls his readers to consider how hard oppositions between liberals and conservatives are clarified when we think about not only what we think, but also how we think, and how we express what we think.

But rather than staying within the bounds of the liberal-conservative opposition, Metzler enjoins his readers to reframe their vision of extreme positions by measuring ways of thinking against a different standard, asking: “Is this way of thinking closed or open?” Drawing attention to the presence of closed-mindedness at all points on the political spectrum (a pattern recently explored by Francois Cusset), Metzler advocates for openness. Against racist, nationalist, and religious prejudices, Metzler values a kind of open-mindedness that is able to listen to the other, take in new information, and charitably engage with “extreme” perspectives. By contrast, the closed mind is reactive, reliant on questionable second-hand sources, and unable to be moved. This is not to say, however, that Metzler advocates for a kind of passive middle way that sits between extremes and attempts to remain neutral on matters of justice. Rather, Metzler helps his readers to avoid the pitfalls of both polarization and neutrality.

One further benefit of how Metzler frames his argument for openness is that he leaves open the question of how this openness is authorized or validated. For Metzler himself, it is the peaceful figure of Jesus Christ who is the model for a more open epistemology. But Metzler leaves open the possibility of taking on his perspective without confessing Christian faith. Metzler’s resistance to oversimplification, selectivity, black and white thinking, appeals to fear, authoritarianism, and so forth, are critical values that can resonate with the priorities of Christians and religious ‘nones,’ secular and confessional Mennonites, and anyone who is concerned with the problems of our shared world. For this reason, perhaps anachronistically, I would characterize Metzler’s work as “postsecular” – where “postsecular” names a way of thinking that challenges the claims to superiority made by both religions and secularities.

One final point that makes Metzler’s work important today is his critique of conspiratorial thinking. His conversation with an alienated congregation member, as described in the final pages of the pamphlet, is a model for how to openly and critically engage with those who are given to conspiratorial thinking, while seeing through the content of such arguments to the narratives of rejection and victimhood that lie beneath. In a time when conspiracy theories are becoming more influential, concomitant with a decline in public trust and trust in expertise, I think it is essential to consider Metzler’s reminder that beneath the “extreme” positions of those who believe in conspiracy theories is often a common human desire to be heard and recognized. Again, this is not to say that Metzler’s work is a resource for those who would, in the name of ‘free speech,’ give an open platform for hate (for example, the conspiracism and violence of far-right groups). Instead, his concluding comments point to the deeper social roots of present political problems, and provide practical ways of challenging violent ways of thinking.

This paper begins with a survey of historical, cultural and civilization dynamics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since ancient times, Bosnia has been at the crossroads of different cultures, civilizations, religions and traditions, which inevitably affected the creation of a unique Bosnian multicultural model. Pilarska is right in asserting that “such tradition joints the elements of the Christian and Muslim culture, creating a specific content-related and cultural borderland stemming from the Greek-Byzantine (Orthodox), Western-European (Catholic and Ottoman (Islamic) provenance”. Many critics often question this model and multicultural discontinuity. However, common socio-cultural characteristics have never disappeared because in today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina after a bloody war, multiculturalism ensures the continuation of peace, equal opportunities and mutual tolerance, civil rights and multiethnic coexistence. Actually, in the past two decades, multiculturalism contributed a lot to peace-building and state-building. Multiculturalism and interfaith dialogue can be regarded the avenues towards successful tackling of extremism and terrorism. In this regard, besides the state and state institutions, the religious communities have contributed a lot towards peace and coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Content analysis of leading newspapers clearly illustrates that all religions stand together in the face of extremism and terrorism.

В работе на основе результатов социологического исследования
представлен комплексный анализ общественного мнения по проблемам секьюритизации терроризма и религиозного экстремизма в современных Казахстане и Кыргызстане. Работа выполнена в рамках проекта Корпоративного фонда «Международный благотворительный фонд «Altyn Kyran» и Казахстанского института стратегических исследований (КИСИ) при Президенте Республики Казахстан по поддержке молодых исследователей «Казахстан в Центральной Азии».
Издание адресовано исследователям, преподавателям и студентам социально-гуманитарных факультетов, специализирующимся в области международных отношений, политологии, социологии, религиоведения, а также служащим госучреждений, работающим в соответствующих сферах.

This provides an overview of the 1.5M ERC Starting Grant on the Epistemology and Ethics of fundamentalism that was recently awarded to me. I aim to carry out the research from 2020 to 2025 in the Philosophy Department (Faculty of Humanities) and the Faculty of Religion & Theology at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

The madrasa and extremism interrelationship is a twenty-first-century discourse. It grabbed international limelight after terrorists struck United States on September 11, 2001, in one of the most audacious attacks ever leaving around 3000 people dead. The resultant outrage brought international attention to the Muslim lands with Muslim lives being scrutinized and categorized as the “other.” The Islamic educational institutions like madrasas came under intense international scrutiny being variously accused as perpetuating and nurturing “antiwestern” attitudes among the peoples leading to radicalism in Muslim lands. It was the Taliban fighter holding a Kalashnikov in Afghanistan as United States invaded that country subsequently in October 2001 that became a defining portrait of a Muslim “other” in the western mainstream media. The media trail of the madrasas conveniently overlooked the multiple socio-economic functions that these schools play in a Muslim public sphere by providing impoverished peoples’ basic education and instead created a false imagery of all the madrasas being dens of terrorists, factories of terror along with a host of other accusations. Since the discourse of putative links between madrasas and extremism started from South Asia towards the end of cold war, this chapter, therefore, makes an attempt to provide a holistic account of these schools by locating them in the socio-religious spaces of Muslims, dissecting what these teach in their curriculum and then deliberate on the interrelationship, if any, between madrasas and extremism.

This paper discusses controversies on freedom of expression and the arts, focusing on Islam and Muslim sensibilities. Drawing from historical examples, the perception of visual arts, and music in the Islamic tradition, it attempts to shed light upon incidents such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks and the intentional destruction of cultural heritage by extremists in Mali, Syria and Iraq in the case of global-scale controversies. After examining the concepts of blasphemy (sabb), apostasy (ridda) and idolatry (shirk) in Islamic law, it considers the legitimacy of legal claims related to blasphemous expressions from an international law perspective. The paper distinguishes between violent and non-violent claims, and argues that freedom of expression should prevail in all cases involving blasphemy and offenses to sensibilities. It also takes the view, however, that this solution is not necessarily a sustainable one. Empowering cultural rights as a whole, rather than seeking to resolve a fictitious conflict between rights, seems to be a more effective pathway to address complex issues involving religious extremism and hate speech.

Extremism and ISIS in East Asia
Three religious, political and military phenomena of Wahhabism, the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS have been recently linked to each other in such a complex way that it is difficult to separate one from another. It seems that these three movements have acted in one direction, in various forms and with different roles over the years so far. The religious movement of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab before any connection with the policy of King Abdulaziz, was known as a religious reformist movement or a "revision" in its era. And perhaps it could be said that someone like Mohammed Rashid Bin Mohammed Bin Ali Reza Qalmuni, the owner of Al-Manar magazine, has significantly affected Hassan al Bana’s opinion, the Muslim Brotherhood founder. Rashid Reza is the most famous character of the movement known as the Salafiyah. He has always appreciated Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabism sect, and has known him as a revisionist and reformer of his era. Thus, it is seen that the Wahhabism religious movement, before getting any political attitudes from the Saudi leaders, could have a profound impact on the Muslim Brotherhood. Also, the differences in the political scene of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in recent years had more political implications, and intellectually deep ties have been existed between these two streams of thought. But over the time, the Muslim Brotherhood gained a new independent identity of Wahhabism that will be discussed in next parts of this chapter. ISIS; however, cannot be considered as a direct product of Wahhabism, rather the same role Wahhabism has played to shape the Muslim Brotherhood in the history, the Muslim Brotherhood has played in shaping ISIS. But as there are substantial differences between Wahhabism, Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood, there are also differences between ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood. So in answer to this question that with which event ISIS religious legitimacy has been linked, it must be said that at the outset the Muslim Brotherhood has played a greater role in the development of intellectual and religious legitimacy than Wahhabism; however, Wahhabism in its original form, beyond the political scope of Al-e-Saud, has involved in the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of a Salafi movement. With the alliance of more than forty countries, including America and Saudi Arabia against ISIS, most of the criticisms have been against Wahhabism in organizing ISIS and prior to that against the al-Qaeda, and less attention has been paid to the role of the Muslim Brotherhood. Wahhabism was a religious phenomenon rooted in ideas of Salafi persons like Ibn Rajab Hanbali, Ibn Qudamah, Ibn Taymiyyah and even the law jurist Ibn Abi al-Eizz al-Damishgi and has been considered a purely religious movement before binding with Aal Saud. But by the presence of King Abdul Aziz, this religious movement was at the forefront of advertising programs of the government so that Wahhabism was linked with the purposes and aims of the Aal Saud and has been used as a military tool for the government but not a secret organization in the past centuries rather than a merely religious movement. This military movement of Wahhabism continued up to 1929 i.e., King Abdulaziz victory over the rebellion of “Ikhawan Man ata' Allah” army. This army assisted the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz, during 1924-1925 and the Hijaz Hashemi was renamed to Saudi Arabia. The troops of “Ikhawan Man ata' Allah” wanted to continue their conquest in Iraq as a jihad for Allah and to kill the pagans while King Abdulaziz forbade them to attack the tribes of Najd and Iraq, but the “Ikhawan Man ata' Allah” army with the leadership of Faisal bin Sultan Duwaish, Sultan bin Bajad and Zidan Bin Haslin decided to continue to fight in the Hijaz al-Artawiyah region to keep the faith and kill the pagans. In 1929, the army was defeated at the Battle of Rouzah Sabalah and King Abdul Aziz decimated the “Brotherhood” group after benefiting from its militarily helps, a movement witnessed in Egypt and Iraq in recent days. The religious movement of Salafism affected Wahhabism, likewise Wahhabism influenced the Muslim Brotherhood and the later one put an effect on ISIS, but each of these military, political and religious movements have disagreements with each other that I am going to briefly mention here. Wahhabism movement was originated from Salafi, an advocate of Salaf-i-Salih and fights against heresy, so every Wahhabi is a Salafi and not vice versa, as in religions such as Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki and even Shafi'i (the examples are seen in Malaysia and Indonesia) there is a Salafiyah with a religious identity, but they are not necessarily Wahhabi. The Muslim Brotherhood movement is a political movement with secret organizations, while Salafism and Wahhabism are non-secret religious, intellectual movements, and Wahhabism in its political form does obvious activities sponsored by Saudi Arabia. One of the differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabism is the Islamic Caliphate, and the history has witnessed Wahhabis fights against the Ottoman Caliphate, while ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood agree in shaping the Islamic Caliphate, and Doctor Wajdi Ghanim as one of the religious leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood claims on his Facebook page that the aims of all the fighters is to make an Islamic government and he expresses his regret not to be present in the group of ISIS terrorists in Iraq. Regarding suicide bombing operations, there is also a disagreement between the Wahhabi and the Muslim Brotherhood scholars because the Brotherhood leaders in recent years have introduced these types of operations as legitimate ones while the Wahhabi scholars have disagreed with this practice at least for the sake of keeping up the appearance.

Можно заметить интересный парадокс, те мусульмане или как минимум, люди, выступающие от имени Ислама и которые привержены экстремизму, радикальнымрелигиозным взглядам, на самом деле не знают или же не смогли постичь суть жизни Пророка Мухаммеда

Since the destruction of Israel appears to be a shared goal of some Palestinian and Islamic terrorist groups, an examination of the role Jewish terrorism played in both the creation and expansion of the state of Israel as one of the causal explanations for the current use of terrorism by Palestinian and Islamic terrorist groups is also warranted. Terrorism was used by adherents of the Jewish religion many centuries before it was ever used by Christians, Muslims and other types of religious extremists. Therefore, the focus of this essay will be on a review of peer reviewed historical literature that analyzes and discusses the case of Jewish terrorist groups, such as the Irgun and the Stern Gang, and the role played by Jewish Zionist terrorism in the creation of the state of Israel as well as the expansion of Israel’s borders since 1948. The paucity of historically accurate literature about the history of Jewish Zionist terrorism, as compared to the wealth of recent literature focused on Islamic terrorism, also shows that more research is needed on the historical roots of all of the different types of religiously inspired violent terrorism.

Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up."

The Arab Republic of Egypt has a long history of battling jihadism in the region, and as such presents an interesting case study of counter-terrorism (CT) practices in a non-Western setting. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that reduces the Egyptian state's response to the indiscriminate use of repressive measures, the current case study offers a more nuanced analysis of Egyptian state responses to terrorism that spans the country's history since its independence. Despite repressive measures constituting the backbone of Egyptian state responses to terrorism, their use is much more strategic than is often implied in the literature. As this chapter demonstrates, a comprehensive CT approach including select soft measures does exist in Egypt, albeit with the goal of maintaining regime interests, as opposed to necessarily eliminating the phenomenon. The analysis presented here suggests a symbiosis of regime longevity and existence of an extremist opposition, and that a strategy of extremism in moderation is perhaps the most prominent, underlying strategic trend that is observed across Egyptian CT state practices over the past six decades.

Though there are numerous militant organizations in Pakistan's Punjab, there is little detailed work on their activities, interests and conceptions with state and societal power centers. The paper is based on field work across the province discussing these linkages and the spread of extremist and militant organizations in the area. Some of these groups have an impact across the region.

While often associated with a liberal demographic, the increasing online visibility of rhetoric such as "snowflakes," "politically correct," "postmodern identity politics," and "cultural Marxism" demonstrates the presence of right-wing sentiments and populations in American convert Buddhism. This article situates these sentiments largely as a reaction to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives in these communities. We chart this backlash across a broad right-wing spectrum that spans from "reactionary centrism" to the alt-right. We illuminate the ways in which participants both de-legitimate DEI as political rather than Buddhist and naturalize their own position as Buddhist rather than political. Next, we show how American convert Buddhist lineages have become a site of the "culture wars," longstanding clashes between religious conservatives and progressives, that are playing out in multiple contexts across the US. Finally, we locate these reactionary right-wing forms of American Buddhism in relationship to modern and postmodern forms of global Buddhism.

Barelwis are estimated to constitute between 50%-60%of the Muslim population in Pakistan in contrast with 20%-25% Deobandis, 15% percent Shia s and 5% Salafis/Wahhabis.

The Deobandis are responsible for more than 90 % of militancy, 100 % of suicide bombings and other indiscriminate massacred in the country. Barelwis, however, are the least violent among the Muslim community, responsible for less than 1 % of militancy.

A new narrative and ideology is spreading among Barelwi Muslims which has led to the glorification of those who kill in the name of Prophet Muhammad (Peace and Blessings be upon Him) in order to “protect his honour and dignity”. 

This essay examines the historical background of the Barelwi movement and the recently popular narrative “Gustakh e Rasool ki ek hi Saza, Sir tan se Juda” and will explore the countering of this form of extremist ideology, promoting a counter narrative with the tradition of Islam.

The rise since mid-2014 of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) — a terrorist group otherwise known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic State (IS), or Daesh (after its Arabic acronym) — seems to have eclipsed other manifestations of global Islamist violence. ISIS’s notoriety is attributable to, among other things, its spectacular brutality, territorial gains, and apocalyptic ideology. ISIS intentionally employs violence as a political weapon and showcases grisly online images to cow populations under its control and convince the large viewing public of ISIS’s invincibility. Emotional trauma is purposely inflicted as feelings of fear, anger, and hopelessness spread among the masses. Escaping the attention of many is the fact that ISIS taps into sentiments that have been fostered by extremist policies of many Muslim governments and leaders themselves as an outgrowth of decades of authoritarian rule following post-colonial upheavals in many Muslim societies.

ABSTRACT
Syria, due to its history, is a multi-religious society which when given independence had each religious group clawing for power over the others. This political unrest that lasted for decades, when aided by the Arab Spring and successive military use on the citizens, incited the majority religious group into a civil war. This Crisis has attracted external parties who view the civil war as an opportunity to fulfil their religious or political goals, parties like the Islamic State (IS). Religious Extremism is the problem this study aims to tackle; how it is caused and how it motivates people into committing mass atrocities. There are not many works that look into the factors that causes the Syrian Crisis and attempts to find those similarities in the Nigerian context, this Study aims to add to that field. The Study investigated the causes of Religious extremism in order to discover how to tackle it before it becomes a crisis.
This study utilized Qualitative Research Methodology. This study used news reports, journal articles, and online articles. The Study utilizes mostly electronic materials in order to have a current look into the situation in Syria.
In the conduction of this research, it was found that Religious Extremism is rarely the cause but a tool used to justify or incite people into committing atrocities.
Religious Extremism is caused by factors which theological, cultural, psychological and political. The Islamic State’s activities are governed by a religious ideology which aims to establish an Islamic Caliphate governed by Sharia law. The Study recommended the reduction of religious identity salience by political and social leaders by preventing the use of religion in order to gain approval for political actions, this can be done through education and international movements for change.
Word Count – 295 Words

Key words: Religion, Extremism, Religious Extremism, Islamic State, Syria.

Das jährliche Standardwerk zur Religionsfreiheit 2019 und das jährliche Standardwerk zur Verfolgung von Christen 2019 in einem Wendebuch zusammen gebunden – jedes Jahrbuch beginnt auf einer Seite des Umschlages. Herausgegeben für den Arbeitskreis für Religionsfreiheit der Deutschen und Österreichischen Evangelischen Allianz und die Arbeitsgemeinschaft Religionsfreiheit der Schweizerischen Evangelischen Allianz, das Internationale Institut für Religionsfreiheit und die Internationale Gesellschaft für Menschenrechte von Thomas Schirrmacher, Max Klingberg und Martin Warnecke.

Lehava is an Israeli extreme right-wing organization dedicated to fighting intermarriage and especially preventing Arab men from courting Jewish women. This article presents the results of an ethnographic research on Lehava. The organization is examined in the context of growing Jewish ethno-nationalism in Israel and the contingent development of new urban extreme right-wing movements. The research presents an initial foray into this field. Lehava brings together traditional Mizrahim, teenagers from the margins of Haredi society, and the extreme right-wing fringes of Religious Zionism. The elements that attract members of these various groups are described, especially the patriarchal notion that religious and national honor is lost when Jewish women have sexual relations with Arab men. Lehava's positioning between extreme right-wing movements and religious organizations is explained. It is suggested that local elements including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israeli ethnic and class relations play a role in shaping this phenomenon, and that it is also comparable to similar cases occurring in the context of postcolonial national and religious struggles.