Secularism in Turkey

This paper sheds light on the role of evolutionary ideas in
the making of Turkish nationalism during the Kemalist era
(1923–1938). By so doing, it aims to challenge some of the
dominant historiographical viewpoints as to the nature of
Turkish nationalism. One is related to the Kemalist elites'
predisposition towards the so-called “scientism” seen as
one of the bases for nationalism. We intend to turn upside–
down the relation between the Kemalists' use of science
and Turkish nationalism. Second, we problematize the “culturalist”
origins of Turkish nationalism arguing that the
seemingly “culturalist” reflections of the time were, indeed,
materialist formulations based on the science of the times.
We discuss in this respect the Kemalist elites' use of evolutionary
ideas. By synthesizing the ways in which these elites
employed evolutionary ideas in the fields of history, language,
geography, anthropology, biology, eugenics, and
pedagogy, we aim to understand the specific nature of
Turkish nationalism before 1945. This secular nationalism
conceived culture as having materialist bases and differed
fundamentally from the culturalist varieties of Turkish
nationalism coloured by Islam in the post-1945 era. Furthermore,
the paper empirically enriches the complex and
entangled story of evolutionary ideas in the early Turkish
Republic.

Over the past two decades in France, much public attention has been given to French-Muslim’s supposed inability to assimilate to French standards. The issue of Muslim females veiling in France has ‘unveiled’ much about the issues of assimilation, civilization, and modernization.  With its particular form of secularism, laïcité, France has repeatedly disallowed the wearing of the veil in its “sacred” public spheres in order to protect the strict separation of Church and State and thereby guarantee French Republican ideals. Yet, French Muslim girls and women continue to challenge the state and seek permission to wear the veil at school and university.  From the same time, a similar issue with veiling erupted in Turkey, another strict laïklik Republic with a Muslim majority population. By examining the history of laïcité/laiklik in both France and Turkey over the last century and the headscarf dispute in both countries with respective minority and majority Muslim populations, the research reveals how this particular form of secularism is limited in its ability to provide the populations of both countries with the Republican ideals it seeks to achieve. Modernity presents a clear schism between past and present; civilized and uncivilized. It focuses on culture and cultivation, which stemmed from the Enlightenment, intellectualism and nationalism, and extended to social customs and manners, language and manner of speaking, household dynamics, and dress codes. The root of the problem lies within the conception of modernity, which is slowly evolving into a more inclusive and less polar definition. This definition will hopefully provide both a motivation and fashion for updating and modernizing the century old concept of laïcité/laiklik so that it may be less exclusive and discriminatory while maintaining the protection of both the state and its citizens, particularly its female citizens, who reveal the face of modernity.

ABSTRACT


This dissertation undertakes a critical scrutiny of Orhan Pamuk’s Snow (2004) and Other Colours (2007), texts that majorly grapple with contemporary Turkey’s socio-political issues. I have tried to demonstrate the modes in which Pamuk frames the competing political claims of secularism and Islam—key concepts in Turkey as well as our contemporary world—with a view to deciphering its implications for our times.

Literature, as is well-known by now, can no longer be regarded as an apolitical business without any stakes in the world. It is partisan—ideological and committed to power structures, with its particular agendas—and an active participant in hegemonic constructions. Literary and cultural representations are struggles for power and meaning, and texts are sites where these struggles are carried out. Pamuk’s writings are located on a site where Islam and secularism confront each other in particular ways. Moreover, Orhan Pamuk is a writer who addresses a global audience, a fact he himself is quite aware of. The award of the Nobel Prize for literature (2006) is not an insignificant factor in Pamuk’s receptivity throughout the global reading world as a voice of authority interpreting issues involving categories such as Islam, secularism, etc. Given these factors, it important to read his texts for their ideological underpinnings and to comprehend the importance of such understandings for contemporary resonances. I have read Snow and Other Colours in order to lay out the liberal-secular ideology the texts are premised on, especially with regard to Islam, even as they make claims to be dialogic and polyphonic. I largely drew upon some recent scholarship on secularism in order to problematize Pamuk’s valorization of liberal secularism and his take on Islam.

The “Introduction” of this dissertation entitled“Contexualizing Orhan Pamuk: Secularism, Islam, Global Geopolitics” begins by making a case for my contextualized, political reading of the texts in question. It sets the work of Pamuk against the larger secularism-Islam interface so as to pull into perspective the problem in question.

Chapter One, “Turkey: The Making Of A Socio-Political Arena” laid out the socio-political history of Turkey in the twentieth century so as to provide a window to the primary world Pamuk is engaging with. I elaborate on the contours of secularization that has been implemented in Turkey. The chapter dealt with the emergence of “political Islam”/ “Islamism” as an oppositional discourse to the hegemonic secularist discursive practices on Islam. It traced certain significant historical developments in terms of the Islamist-secularist confrontation in Turkey.

Chapter Two, “Secularism(S): Critiques, Disjunctions, And Utopias in Orhan Pamuk,” unpacks Pamuk’s take on secularisms. Drawing on some recent scholarship on secularism, the chapter critiques liberal secularism as a political principle as well as  hegemonic discourse / ideology / worldview which permeates multiple discourses and circumscribes understandings of the very category of “the human.” It makes the case that advocacy of pluralism through a championing of liberal secularism defeats its very objective.

Chapter Three, “Muslim Women’s Headscarf, Islamism and the Islamic Other” explores the issues attending liberal-secular readings of politics under the banner of Islam and the polemical question of the Muslim women’s headscarf / hijab in the light of Pamuk’s self-avowed wish to know and engage the Islamic Other.

The “Conclusion” pulls together the various threads explored in the chapters. It examines the implications of the critical analyses done in the chapters for our times, where liberal secularism is a hegemonic ideology / discourse/world view. My close reading of Orhan Pamuk’s select texts underscores the need for a critical distance from and a vigilance against the effects of the naturalization of the liberal-secular in all aspects of being in the world, something which our embattled times cry out for.

Turkey has witnessed a proliferation of Islamic television channels since the liberalization of broadcasting in the 1990s. The programming of these TV channels was initially distinctly theological in character, with shows focusing on the doctrinal, scriptural, and ritualistic aspects of Islam. More recently, however, they have started producing family-friendly entertainment programs as well as shows aimed at “strengthening the family.” Islamic broadcasters intend their family-focused programming as civil initiatives against what they see as the increasing corrosion of the “moral fabric of the family” and devaluation of “family values” in contemporary Turkish society. In these TV shows, audiences are provided with guidance and techniques that would help them cultivate ethical dispositions, knowledge, and skills so that they could assume autonomy and responsibility for administering their families more effectively. Islamic broadcasters explicitly identify their role as assisting the state in  fighting social problems through their programming. Moreover, the discourses and sensibilities promoted on television articulate with the biopolitical concerns of the nation-state and the emerging rationalities of governance. While Islamic television professionals’ self-ascribed mission to “strengthen the family” emerges from a religiously inspired moral imperative to provide service, it simultaneously indicates their internalization of neoliberal rationalities of governance that promote the responsibilization of non-governmental actors for providing social services as well as that of individuals for supporting and caring for their family members. [Keywords: Islam, television, media, family, family values, secularism, neoliberalism, Turkey]

You can download the paper at: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/670934

This study discusses the position of Alevi identity and Alevi community with regard to the Turkish national identity-building project. There was a partial compatibility between the Kemalist objective of laicization and nation building and the Alevi practice and understanding of a ‘local’ version of ‘Turkish Islam’. Besides these compatibilities, Alevis faced the challenges of nation-building and homogenization policies, which involved homogenization in ethnic, religious and sectarian domains. Kurmanji- and Zazaki-speaking ethnically Kurdish/Zaza Alevis of Eastern Anatolia had a different experience during the project of centralization and ethnic homogenization, in comparison to Turkish-speaking Turcoman Alevis. This different experience still is a source of division among Alevi communities.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00263206.2013.798309#tabModule

This paper argues that international human rights law is inadequate in understanding the complexities of Muslim women’s headcoverings and that it has failed to protect Muslim women from prohibitive and punitive measures of the liberal State. Through a review of the relevant cases from the European Court of Human Rights as well as a review of prohibitive laws from Muslim-majority Turkey, the paper argues that international human rights law is prejudiced to say the least, and, heeding Janet Halley’s advice, needs to take a break from feminism in order to fully protect Muslim women’s dignity as defined by Muslim women themselves.

How did a prehistoric artifact discovered in 1935 become the symbol for secularism in Modern Turkey? This story traces the meanings embedded in the rise and fall of the so-called Hittite Sun across the twentieth and into the twenty-first century.

Religion has played an important if under-studied role in the series of protests that have swept the globe over the last several years. During the Occupy Wall Street, Arab Spring and Euromaidan protests, religious actors played a legitimizing role and at times even directly participated in the protests. In contrast, during the Gezi Park protests that took place in Istanbul during the summer of 2013, official religious actors were peripheral. Instead, these protests produced the unique phenomenon of lay persons utilizing religion as an instrument of protest. In this paper, I will outline the historical events that shape the political use of religion in Turkey and explain the use of religious symbols and actions by both the protesters and the Turkish government. Focusing on three specific examples of the public performance of religion during the protests, I will argue that performances symbolized the protester's rejection of both the old Secularist and present Neo-Conservative Turkish state. I will also explain how the Turkish government sought to protect its claim to represent authentic Turkish Islam by seeking to paint the protestors as sacrilegious.

This paper analyzes the political incentives of Kulturkampf and the implementation of secularization in imperial Prussia and republican Turkey. A game-theoretic model defining Kulturkampf as a static game between priests and the executive is proposed. The willingness of priests to accept the government’s offer and be transformed into bureaucratic experts varies. Individualist priests are easier to recruit as they care more about their personal welfare than social distribution by the church, whereas the reverse holds for collectivist priests. Nevertheless, the long-run success of the Kulturkampf depends on the effective recruitment of collectivist priests and their entry into formal politics in favor of the executive.

En 1996-7997, poar la premièrefois, un parti <isbmiste > est au pouuoir en Turquie, er cette période a înltnu ttne gueffe sanr nerci entre /et < /aiListet > kéna/ittet et /a t réaclion nligieuse >, qui tbst conclae par une inîerention de l'arrnée, et a deriné dau la uie politique un rcmblant de bipnlaité dlnt la laicité serait le plan dt tliuage. Mais le bourdonnement des manifestations de rut'ace peat réuéler detfssuru plus nnplexes. L'une d'e//et renuoie à la téléologie kénalisn ; son anafin permet tle uoir iomment-chaque camp /'a inaoquée oa relournée afn de disrediter nn adaersaire en tentant de /e repousser dans t'til (parré réuolu>. Une autre condaitplusprér'i$nent au concepr de kicité, qui estplu un éuénenent discanf qae l'objet d'an débat defond. Enfn letfrares se cheuauchent, îe Lî1irent, elles n'ont pas toutes la même importance et je poserai la question de la Éalité mâme d'une ,t/pture entre la période Refablol et wllet qui lbnt précédée et suiuie.

Reference to my narrations about my connections with the Turkish secular-military establishment in the mid 90s, to my rejection of all Greek analysts and 'specialists' on Turkey and the Middle East, and to my interpretations of the Turkish sociopolitical life and elite
https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2017/04/05/%CF%8C%CF%84%CE%B1%CE%BD-%CE%BF-%CE%BA%CE%B9%CE%BB%CE%B9%CF%84%CF%83%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%AC%CF%81%CE%BF%CE%B3%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%85-%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9%CF%8E%CE%BD%CE%B5%CE%B9-%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%BD/

Secularism, in the most general sense, is the separation of religion and state affairs. This phenomenon emerges as an important concept regarding the reflection of beliefs on state governance forms. Hence to understand the place of secularism in Turkey's constitutional-legal order, it is directly related to closely examine the worldview that power in a way to stand out. With the proclamation of the Republic, the understanding of secularism adopted in terms of the administration-religion relationship is based on the Continental Europe model of secularism. This model has strict, oppressive and religious exclusionary effects. Since the AK Party government period, the Anglo-Saxon model of secularism has started to dominate the administration. The Anglo-Saxon model, on the other hand, has pluralistic, liberal and non-exclusionary features. These ideological changes taking place in Turkey, has also influenced the field of education. Governments' perception of secularism had brought to the agenda the Imam Hatip Schools and Theology Faculties, which provide vocational education especially in the field of religion. In this study, the perception of secularism during the AK Party government, which came to power in 2002, and the effects of its practices on Imam Hatip Schools and Theology Faculties were examined. The research has a qualitative pattern. The data were collected based on the document analysis technique. Data analysis was carried out in four stages:
search, scanning, compilation and interpretation.

This study discusses the position of Alevi identity and the Alevi community with regard to the Kemalist national identity-building project. This well recognized project aimed to create an ethnically homogenous Turkish nation and religiously local and 'non-political' understanding and practice of a Turkish Islam that could be centrally controlled and monitored by the bureaucratic establishment. Popular Alevi narratives in early Republican history, including the period of the Milli M€ ucadele (National Struggle) (1919-46), have led to an unsettled debate about Alevi identity and its relationship with Kemalist nation-building. According to some popular narratives, Alevi citizens were an ideal fit for these projects. On the contrary, some other Alevi narratives portrayed a completely different and more controversial picture of the Alevis and their relationship with the Kemalist state establishment. It is vital to understand this relationship to see into the position of Alevi citizens visa -vis the Turkish state establishment and Sunni citizens in the contemporary context. This study takes this complicated relationship as its topic of discussion. Alevi identity politics has attracted less attention in academic and policy circles in comparison to the Kurdish issue and the secular and conservative/pro-Islamist divide in Turkey. Alevi identity-based claims such as the status of Alevi religious places, cemevis, 1 or compulsory religious education and the burgeoning literature on Alevi culture and history do not necessarily serve the comprehension of the dynamics and the fragmented nature of the Alevi issue as an identity-based problem. Most importantly, the position and relations of the Alevi community with the Kemalist state establishment during the single-party era is virtually a mystery. It would be misleading to characterize the pre-1990 2 period of Alevi identity politics as a history of complete peace and quiet marked by a lack of activism. Up until the late 1980s, Alevi identity politics were shaped in response to the major social and political processes of top-down nation building, laicization efforts of the Turkish state establishment, the processes of modernization, and urbanization and immigration starting from the late 1950s. The relatively stable political environment of the

Siyasal gündemi oldukça meşgul eden bir gündem olmasına rağmen Türkiye’de sekülerizm literatürünün gelişkin olduğunu söylemek oldukça zordur. Alanda mevcut çalışmaların da daha ziyade devlet-din ilişkileri meselesi olarak sekülerizme yaklaştıklarını belirtmek de gerekir. Bu çalışmada, 19. yüzyıl itibariyle Osmanlı modernleşmesinin bir bileşeni olarak sekülerizmin tarihsel gelişimi; daha sonra otoriter biçim alarak erken Cumhuriyet döneminde laiklik politikaları olarak karşımıza çıkan gerçeklikle beraber ele alınacak ve çok partili hayat sonrasında dinin denetim ve kontrol aracı olarak siyasallaşmasıyla sekülerizmin evrimi incelenecektir. Sekülerizmin söz konusu tarihsel gelişimi ve evrimi ise çokça yapılmadığı üzere ekonomi-politik bir çerçeveden değerlendirilecek ve değişen uluslararası-ulusal iktisadi ve siyasi gelişmelerin ışığında toplumsal sınıfların ve devlet elitlerinin kendi güçlerini yeniden üretme stratejileri bağlamında tartışılacaktır. Bu yönüyle çalışma; hem siyasal tartışmalarda hem de akademik yazında hakim olan ilerici-gerici, merkez-çevre, güçlü devlet-zayıf sivil toplum gibi ikiliklerin ötesine geçmeye çalışarak, sekülerizmin gelişimini tarihsel ve toplumsal bağlamı içerisinde eleştirel bir perspektifle okumayı önerecektir. Böylesi bir çabanın da dinin toplumsal rolü ve anlamı üzerine verilen mücadelelerin arka planında yatan siyasi ve iktisadi güç ilişkilerinin ve çıkarlarının anlamlandırılmasında önemli olduğu düşünülmektedir.

Laiklik,Turkish secularism, as it has been constructed, upheld and sustained by the Turkish state, and especially the Court, has become the mechanism through which all those who would like to see a shift in its definition and boundaries have been rendered the unacceptable and integrity-threatening other of Turkish society. I am interested in how the subjects of the law, as well as the interpreters and the sustainers of the law, perceive the Turkish concept of secularism, laiklik, and how these perceptions inform the cases before the Court.