Strategic Consultancy

La comunicación global constituye una disciplina tan cambiante como compleja en el marco de la realidad internacional, tanto por la globalización, como por las interdependencias creadas entre los actores de la sociedad internacional. Además, la creciente utilización de las TIC ha venido a revolucionar la comunicación internacional de siglo XXI. Ya no responde solo a la que aparece en los medios de comunicación, sino que también es la que emana de otros actores de la sociedad internacional: como los estados, las organizaciones internacionales, las empresas trasnacionales, o las ONG, entre otros. En una disciplina transversal y multisectorial, que interconecta lo global con lo local, lo regional y lo nacional, tienen dimensión internacional: unas elecciones (victoria de Trump en EE.UU.); un atentado (Nueva York, Madrid, Londres, París, Bruselas o Estambul); un referéndum nacional (Paz en Colombia; Brexit en Reino Unido, Constitucional en Italia); una catástrofe (tsunami en Tailandia), una guerra civil (Siria), una decisión de una multinacional (deslocalización en Tercer Mundo lucrándose del trabajo infantil); una estrategia de marca territorio o de comunicación (Marca España y UE), o un simple partido de fútbol (la final del último Mundial entre Argentina y Alemania). Multisectorialidad, transversalidad y TIC suponen un desafío, no solo para comunicadores o/y periodistas internacionales, sino también para juristas, politólogos, sociólogos, estudiosos o el público general interesado en Asuntos Internacionales.

Jorge Tuñón es actualmente profesor de la Universidad Carlos III y experto científico externo de la Comisión y del Parlamento Europeo, además de colaborar con Consultoras en Asuntos Públicos y Escuelas de Negocios. Obtuvo su Doctorado Europeo (Premio Extraordinario y reconocimiento del Comité de las Regiones) tras licenciarse en Derecho, Periodismo y Ciencias Políticas. Ha sido profesor invitado en distintas universidades europeas y americanas, incluido el Colegio de Europa en Brujas (Bélgica) y publica y da conferencias en inglés, castellano, francés e italiano.  Además de abogado, traductor y consultor para diferentes administraciones regionales, tiene experiencia como periodista en diversos medios de comunicación y ha trabajado para el Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública (España) y la Comisión Europea.
✉ jorge.tunon.navarro@gmail.com;  https://www.linkedin.com/in/jorgetunon;  @JorgeTunonMAD

This is a general layout course outline that we at Harmony Advisory Services use for Training and Seminars in the field of Business Management. For further detail you can contact Tinovimba Mhlanga at the following:
+263773566458
mhlangatinovimba@gmail.com

Günümüzde küçük işletmeler, orta ölçekli işletmeler ve/veya büyük ölçekli işletmeler küresel yapıdaki değişime ayak uydurabilmek, sürdürebilirliklerini sağlayabilmek ve rakipleri ile rekabet edebilmek için çeşitli stratejiler belirlemekte ve bu stratejilere göre hedeflerine ulaşmayı planlamaktadır. Bu firmaların değişen ve gelişen çevre ve yönetim şartlarını takip etmeleri ve firmada uygulanabilirliğinin değerlendirilmesi noktasında devam eden iş akışı içerisinde yetersiz kalmaktadırlar. Yönetim danışmanları tam bu noktada firmalara yol gösterici rolünü oynamaktadır.
Yapılan bu çalışma içerisinde, yönetim tarihi ve gelişimi, danışmanlık tarihi ve gelişimi ve yönetim ve danışmanlık ilişkisi açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Üç farklı kaynaktan 2017 yılının en iyi yönetim danışmanlık firmaları araştırılmış olup, analiz yapılarak 36 firma belirlenmiş ve Hindistan kökenli sadece bir firma Asya-Pasifik kıtasını temsil ettiği görülmüştür. 36 firma arasında Amerika ve Avrupa firmalarının fazla olması nedeni ile kültürel olarak Amerika, Almanya, Türkiye ve Hindistan karşılaştırılmıştır. Diğer yandan Türkiye ve Hindistan arasındaki rekabetçilik, ekonomik ve yenilikçilik kriterleri değerlendirilmiş olup, benzerlikler ve farklılıklar ortaya konmuştur. TATA Danışmanlık Hizmeti firması incelenmiş olup, riskleri ve bu risklere karşı aldıkları/alacakları kontrol ve iyileştirme faaliyetleri ortaya konmuştur. Tüm bu veriler birleştirilerek, Türkiye yönetim danışmanlık firmaları için kullanılacak yönetim danışmanlık modeli önermesi yapılmıştır. Bu çalışmada ikincil kaynaklar üzerinden araştırma yapılmıştır.

Documento de análisis del proceso estratégico, de gestión y tecnológico del despliegue de procesos y de BPM. Se incluyen factores críticos de éxito, casos de éxito y de fracaso, buenas y malas prácticas, y casos en Ecuador. Se destaca la importancia de que BPM es una disciplina de alta gestión empresarial que es parte de alto management y no es solamente una moda, un software o un BPR (Business Process Re-engineering) que intenta levantar y modelar procesos, BPM, sobre todo, introducirá innovación y mejora continua en el ADN de la empresa

The philosophical position referred to as critical rationalism (CR) is potentially important to OR because it holds out the possibility of supporting OR’s claim to offer managers a scientifically ‘rational’ approach. However, as developed by Karl Popper, and subsequently extended by David Miller, CR can only support
practice (deciding what to do, how to act) in a very limited way; concentrating on the critical application of deductive logic, the crucial role of subjective judgements in making technical and moral choices are ignored or are at least left underdeveloped. By reflecting on the way that managers, engineers, administrators and other professionals take decisions in practice, three strategies are identified for handling the inevitable subjectivity in practical decision-making. It is argued that these three strategies can be understood as attempts to emulate the scientific process of achieving intersubjective consensus, a process inherent in CR. The perspective developed in the paper provides practitioners with a way of understanding their clients’ approach to decision-making and holds out the possibility of making coherent the claim that they are offering advice on how to apply a scientific approach to decision-making; it presents academics with some philosophical challenges and some new avenues for research.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of cost escalation in transportation infrastructure projects. Based on a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth US$90 billion and representing different project types, geographical regions, and historical periods, it is found with overwhelming statistical significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether such projects should be built are highly and systematically misleading. Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic misrepresentation, that is, lying. The policy implications are clear: legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts.

Megaproject Planning and Management: Essential Readings contains the seminal articles from the growing body of research on megaproject planning and management along with an original introduction by the editor, Bent Flyvbjerg. The leading and most cited authority in the field, Flyvbjerg has used crowdsourcing and 25 years of experience to cherry-pick from several hundred articles and books the writings that define the field. This volume will be an indispensable source for those wishing to speak with authority about how megaprojects are prepared, delivered, and fought over. The target audience is students, academics, practitioners, and media pundits alike, as well as communities affected by megaprojects.

The overarching question of this article is how can we develop a critical understanding of the social place of highways and automobility in the case of a non-capitalist European context such as socialist Albania? Socialism was a period of modernisation for Albania. Part of this modernisation project was the production of a modern built environment, especially infrastructures and urban spaces. Within this context during socialism thousands of miles of new roads were constructed in the country. The remarkably limited use of roads, combined with their systematic building and maintenance, kept this infrastructure’s materiality in a relatively good condition for many decades. Since the early 1990s, though, the end of the regime has signified a period of booming mobility and automobility. Postsocialism and the wider context of neoliberalism have been marked by state withdrawal from many of its previous roles, and the maintenance of basic infrastructures has become increasingly dependent on international aid. Nevertheless, the roads are currently being socially reappropriated and reconfigured, as people embrace automobility, which was a very limited practice during socialism. This article explores the kind of socio-material relationships that road construction and the roads themselves generated in socialist Albania and how these
are linked to postsocialist spatial practices.

Back cover text: Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon of megaprojects. It is a fascinating account of how the promoters of multi-billion dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get projects approved and built. It shows, in unusual depth, how the formula for approval is an unhealthy cocktail of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects. This results in projects that are extremely risky, but where the risk is concealed from MPs, taxpayers and investors. The authors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions drawing on theory, experience and hard, scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations and five continents that illustrate the book. Accessibly written, it will be the standard reference for students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians and interested citizens for many years to come.

The article first describes characteristics of major infrastructure projects. Second, it documents a much neglected topic in economics: that ex ante estimates of costs and benefits are often very different from actual ex post costs and benefits. For large infrastructure projects the consequences are cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and the systematic underestimation of risks. Third, implications for cost–benefit analysis are described, including that such analysis is not to be trusted for major infrastructure projects. Fourth, the article uncovers the causes of this state of affairs in terms of perverse incentives that encourage promoters to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits in the business cases for their projects. But the projects that are made to look best on paper are the projects that amass the highest cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in reality. The article depicts this situation as ‘survival of the unfittest’. Fifth, the article sets out to explain how the problem may be solved, with a view to arriving at more efficient and more democratic projects, and avoiding the scandals that often accompany major infrastructure investments. Finally, the article identifies current trends in major infrastructure development. It is argued that a rapid increase in stimulus spending, combined with more investments in emerging economies, combined with more spending on information technology is catapulting infrastructure investment from the frying pan into the fire.

As megaprojects have become ubiquitous, their real benefits and costs have come under increased scrutiny. We interviewed Bent Flyvbjerg, who has extensively studied megaproject development. Flyvbjerg has found systematic problems in the development process: by intentionally misrepresenting information and deliberately disregarding risks, proponents instigate projects that result in fewer benefits and higher costs than promised.

The Supplementary Green Book Guidance on Optimism Bias (HM Treasury 2003) with reference to the Review of Large Public Procurement in the UK (Mott MacDonald 2002) notes that there is a demonstrated, systematic, tendency for project appraisers to be overly optimistic and that to redress this tendency appraisers should make explicit, empirically based adjustments to the estimates of a project’s costs, benefits, and duration. HM Treasury recommends that these adjustments be based on data from past projects or similar projects elsewhere, and adjusted for the unique characteristics of the project in hand. In the absence of a more specific evidence base, HM Treasury has encouraged departments to collect data to inform future estimates of optimism, and in the meantime use the best available data. In response to this, the Department for Transport (henceforth DfT), has contracted Bent Flyvbjerg in association with COWI to undertake the consultancy assignment "Procedures for dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning". The present Guidance Document is the result of this assignment.

"Over budget, over time, over and over again" appears to be an appropriate slogan for large, complex infrastructure projects. This article explains why cost, benefits, and time forecasts for such projects are systematically over-optimistic in the planning phase. The underlying reasons for forecasting errors are grouped into three categories: delusions or honest mistakes; deceptions or strategic manipulation of information or processes; or bad luck. Delusion and deception have each been addressed in the management literature before, but here they are jointly considered for the first time. They are specifically applied to infrastructure problems in a manner that allows both academics and practitioners to understand and implement the suggested corrective procedures. The article provides a framework for analyzing the relative explanatory power of delusion and deception. It also suggests a simplified framework for analyzing the complex principal-agent relationships that are involved in the approval and construction of large infrastructure projects, which can be used to improve forecasts. Finally, the article illustrates reference class forecasting, an outside view de-biasing technique that has proven successful in overcoming both delusion and deception in private and public investment decisions.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of traffic forecasts in transportation infrastructure projects. The sample used is the largest of its kind, covering 210 projects in 14 nations worth U.S.$59 billion. The study shows with very high statistical significance that forecasters generally do a poor job of estimating the demand for transportation infrastructure projects. For 9 out of 10 rail projects, passenger forecasts are overestimated; the average overestimation is 106%. For half of all road projects, the difference between actual and forecasted traffic is more than ±20%. The result is substantial financial risks, which are typically ignored or downplayed by planners and decision makers to the detriment of social and economic welfare. Our data also show that forecasts have not become more accurate over the 30-year period studied, despite claims to the contrary by forecasters. The causes of inaccuracy in forecasts are different for rail and road projects, with political causes playing a larger role for rail than for road. The cure is transparency, accountability, and new forecasting methods. The challenge is to change the governance structures for forecasting and project development. Our article shows how planners may help achieve this.

The paper reports on both methodological and substantive findings. It presents a method for generating simplified representations for regional urban populations, their geographical sub-populations and communities. the method generates greatly simplified high-resolution socio-economic profiles of populated geographical areas from complex large census data sets.

Do different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns? This apparently simple question is at the heart of research at the University of Oxford aimed at understanding the characteristics of megaprojects, particularly in terms of how they are established, run and concluded. In this study, we set out to investigate cost overruns in the Olympic Games. To do so, we examined the costs of the Games over half a century, including both summer and winter Olympics. We looked at the evolution of final reported costs and compared these to the costs established in the Games bids, submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) up to seven years before the Games occurred. In so doing we established the largest dataset of its kind, and documented for the first time in a consistent fashion the costs and cost overruns for the Olympic Games, from 1960 to 2012. We discovered that the Games stand out in two distinct ways compared to other megaprojects: (1) The Games overrun with 100 per cent consistency. No other type of megaproject is this consistent regarding cost overrun. Other project types are typically on budget from time to time, but not the Olympics. (2) With an average cost overrun in real terms of 179 per cent – and 324 per cent in nominal terms – overruns in the Games have historically been significantly larger than for other types of megaprojects, including infrastructure, construction, ICT, and dams. The data thus show that for a city and nation to decide to host the Olympic Games is to take on one of the most financially risky type of megaproject that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril. For the London 2012 Games, we find that: (1) With sports-related real costs currently estimated at USD14.8 billion, London is on track to become the most costly Olympics ever. (2) With a projected cost overrun of 101 per cent in real terms, overrun for London is below the historical average for the Games, but not significantly so. (3) The London cost overrun is, however, significantly higher than overruns for recent Games since 1999. London therefore is reversing a positive trend of falling cost overruns for the Games.

As megaprojects have become ubiquitous, their real benefits and costs have come under increased scrutiny. We interviewed Bent Flyvbjerg, who has extensively studied megaproject development. Flyvbjerg has found systematic problems in the development process: by intentionally misrepresenting information and deliberately disregarding risks, proponents instigate projects that result in fewer benefits and higher costs than promised.

Back cover text: This book aims to enlarge the understanding of decision-making on mega-projects and suggest recommendations for a more effective, efficient and democratic approach. Authors from different scientific disciplines address various aspects of the decision-making process, such as management characteristics and cost-benefit analysis, planning and innovation and competition and institutions. The subject matter is highly diverse, but certain questions remain at the forefront. For example, how do we deal with protracted preparation processes, how do we tackle risks and uncertainties, and how can we best divide the risks and responsibilities among the private and public players throughout the different phases of the project? - Presenting a state-of-the-art overview, based on experiences and visions of authors from Europe and North America, this unique book will be of interest to practitioners of large-scale project management, politicians, public officials and private organisations involved in mega-project decision-making. It will also appeal to researchers, consultants and students dealing with substantial engineering projects, complex systems, project management and transport infrastructure.

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large infrastructure projects. First, it identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure development pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is massive cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, the paper explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and funding. This results in the "survival of the unfittest," where often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, the paper presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large infrastructure projects, with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance structures, the latter being more important.

Being a consultantis a profession that requires not only economic skills but also socialandpsychological. Especially on the field of the social and psychological skills, a consultant should be very diverse and dynamic to perform in agile situations. In order to have the ability of full fillingthe job correctly and gain satisfaction, there exist a several obstaclesthat should be taken into consideration. These obstacles can be removed when a person has the ability to translate the theory into practice.This challenge consists of three main dillema’s.

Risk, including economic risk, is increasingly a concern for public policy and management. The possibility of dealing effectively with risk is hampered, however, by lack of a sound empirical basis for risk assessment and management. This article demonstrates the general point for cost and demand risks in urban rail projects. The article presents empirical evidence that allow valid economic risk assessment and management of urban rail projects, including benchmarking of individual or groups of projects. Benchmarking of the Copenhagen Metro is presented as a case in point. The approach developed is proposed as a model for other types of policies and projects in order to improve economic and financial risk assessment and management in policy and planning.

Consultancy provides the academic with experience which can provide a rich source of research material. In practice attempts to combine consultancy and research can be frustrating. In general consultants and academics differ in their motivations, outlook and behaviour. For a consulting assignment to act as a research vehicle, many different approaches can be adopted and a wide variety of subject matter can be the focus of attention. In the paper these issues are explored in relation to the author's experience in conducting an information systems project at an Australian iron ore mine. Consultants lack an explicit philosophy to provide coherence to their practice: pragmatism may be sufficient but the possibilities of a post-modernist stance are intriguing. For academics who wish to engage in consultancy the challenge is to understand and perform the role of the consultant beyond the constraints of their academic beliefs and behaviours.

I provide variety of academic and educational consulting services. I am also pedagogically certified and I have worked across many universities and schools in the world. I am open to opportunities if you want to restructure your academic institution or your secondary school for increasing your educational efficiency. You can also catch the 21st century with the latest techniques to improve your educational institution.

I have provided academic and pedagogic advice to high schools ,secondary schools, junior colleges and to universities for advancement of their educational programs and I have helped in their academic restructuring. My latest restructuring project was as Parchill Educational Institutions Academic Advisor (UK). Also I am Academic Content Consultant to OPEN UNIVERSITY and to MUST University.

Feel free to contact me at drguven@live.com for free consultation. I will first do a feasibility analysis of your educational institution and then I will give you an action plan with valiant points for increasing your educational and pedagogic efficiency. I will also guide throughout your restructuring phase until the necessary objectives are achieved.

Out-of-control information technology (IT) projects have ended the careers of top managers, such as EADS CEO Noël Forgeard and Levi Strauss’ CIO David Bergen. Moreover, IT projects have brought down whole companies, like Kmart in the US and Auto Windscreen in the UK. Software and other IT is now such an integral part of most business processes and products that CEOs must know their IT risks, which are typically substantial – and overlooked. The analysis of a sample of 1,471 IT projects showed that the average cost overrun was 27% — but that figure masks a far more alarming “fat tail” risk.  Fully one in six of the projects in the sample was a Black Swan, with a cost overrun of 200%, on average, and a schedule overrun of almost 70%. This highlights the true pitfall of IT change initiatives: It’s not that they’re particularly prone to high cost overruns on average – it is that there are a disproportionate number of Black Swans. By focusing on averages instead of the more damaging outliers, most managers and consultants have been missing the real risk in doing IT. In conclusion, the article outlines ideas as to what can be done to avoid Black Swans.

This working paper focuses on the plans to construct a skyscraper in St Petersburg, Russia, known originally as Gazprom-City and recently renamed into Okhta Center, and on the controversy that developed around these plans. The paper uses the skyscraper debates as a lens to discuss a particular “aesthetic politics” of St Petersburg, the meaning of “world cities” and “global architecture” in Russian and international contexts, post-Soviet forms of political and corporate governance, the mobilization of civic opposition to such projects and the ability of such urban protests to translate into a more unified and politically oriented opposition than has been possible in other contexts in Russia.

2008. 352 pp. r150.00 (hardcover). This volume is intended to explain why major investment projects (the so-called mega-projects) often are not completed on time and cost more than originally budgeted. Drawing from experiences of European and North American countries, the book also suggests ways to avoid such failures. Although the topic is rather specific, the book is worth reading for both experts and nonexperts as infrastructure development continues to be a major key to economic expansion across the globe.g row_486 380.. 408 For those who only have a vague idea of what a mega-project is, the book begins by introducing the topic and reviewing the most important recent literature. The first part of the volume, then, provides numerous insights on the complexity of mega-projects, starting from the large number of reasons why mega-projects might fail. For example, the project might be "underdesigned," thus less costly but less robust to unforeseen developments, or it might be "overdesigned," when a large number of weaknesses and possible problems are considered in advance, and solutions are evaluated before the problem actually occurs. Overdesigned projects are more robust, less likely to fail, but are much more costly. The project might involve the use of innovative technologies that have never been applied to a similar context, and that involve more uncertain implementation costs and results. Most projects have an impact on the environment and might face opposition for example from environmentalist groups. If representative of these groups have not been directly involved in the design of the project, they might try to stop it, thus causing delays and increasing costs. Finally, because of incorrect predictions of 380 GROWTH AND CHANGE, JUNE 2009

""Den „Vater aller WahIkampfmanager in der Bundesrepublik“ nannte ihn Peter Radunski. Harry Walter, Jahrgang '29, hat rund 90 Wahlkämpfe hinter sich. Als Stratege und Werbechef für die SPD in Bundes-, Landtags-, Kommunal- und Europawahlen seit 1969. Auch für Sozialdemokraten im Ausland – in der Türkei. in Kenia, Israel, Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica und Portugal.
Zunächst raste er als Fotoreporter durch das Nachkriegs-Berlin, ging dann an die Werbefachschule und hörte nebenbei an der Freien Universität. Seine Abschlussarbeit über den Wahlkampf '57 schickte er an die SPD nach Bonn. Keine Antwort. Erst als die Kreativdampfwalze aus der Werbebranche 1969 die SPD-Agentur ARE Kommunikation übernahm, wurde Walter zum Full-Service-Wahlkampfprofi für Themen, Technik, Abwicklung und Finanzen.
SPD-General Peter Glotz wollte den Oldtimer 1982 nicht mehr. 1987 und 1990 holte man ihn, mittlerweile im Ausland hochgeschätzt, für kleinere Aufträge zurück. Nach den Wahlkämpfen in NRW und Mecklenburg-Vorpommem 1994 will er sich zur Ruhe setzen.
Mit der OZ sprach die lebende Legende über Wahlkampf, Geld, Plebiszite, Politprofis und die Oma mit der Plastiktüte. Und was der „Bauchmensch“ Harry Walter gegen „politologisch und soziologisch geschulte Eierköppe“ hat.
""

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects. First, it identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure developments pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, it explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not those of their competition, that gain approval and funding. This results in the ‘survival of the unfittest’, in which often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, it presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance structures, the latter being more important.

Because of the prominent position of urban rail in reducing urban transport-related problems, such as congestion and air pollution, insights into the costs of possible new urban rail projects is very relevant for those involved with cost estimations, policy makers, cost-benefit analysts, and other target groups. Knowledge of the differences in costs per kilometre, including explanations of differences and their breakdowns is currently lacking in the literature. This paper aims to provide a first stage insight into how cost per kilometre varies across urban rail projects. The methodology applied is a simple cost comparison across projects where the data collected are comparable. We conclude that capital costs per route-kilometre of urban rail vary highly between projects. Looking at European projects and excluding outliers, the total capital costs per route-kilometre (including stations and rolling stock) lie mainly between US$50-100 million (2002 prices). Including US projects, the range is US$50-150 million. The main reasons for the high variation in the route-kilometre costs are differences between projects as regards the ratio of underground to above-ground construction, ground conditions, station spacing, type of rolling stock, environmental and safety constraints and labour costs. We warn, however, that the observations used to reach the conclusions are too few to obtain results with statistical significance. Our results must therefore be seen as a first step towards collecting more data so that a more succinct statistical analysis can be conducted. Another conclusion is therefore that this area has future research potential.

A major source of risk in project management is inaccurate forecasts of project costs, demand, and other impacts. The paper presents a promising new approach to mitigating such risk, based on theories of decision making under uncertainty which won the 2002 Nobel prize in economics. First, the paper documents inaccuracy and risk in project management. Second, it explains inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Third, the theoretical basis is presented for a promising new method called "reference class forecasting," which achieves accuracy by basing forecasts on actual performance in a reference class of comparable projects and thereby bypassing both optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Fourth, the paper presents the first instance of practical reference class forecasting, which concerns cost forecasts for large transportation infrastructure projects. Finally, potentials for and barriers to reference class forecasting are assessed.

This report will consist in analyzing the internal and external environment of Peopleplus, planning out implementations based on recommendations.
In part 1, it will be used RBV framework to analyze the Peopleplus’ internal environment and the PESTEL to understand the macro trends in the UK training and education industry. In this section, it will be also approached the leadership and communication strategy in the company, the culture, the strategic position in the sector and the Peopleplus client’s needs.
In part 2, according to the previous analysis, recommendations will be issued so the company can avoid the main threats in the industry, taking also advantage of the main opportunities generated by external factors. After this, following the recommendations, the focus will be in the implementation of the author’s advises englobing also some leadership and communication strategies that can be keys in the success of those implementations.
Finally, in the section 4 of the report, the author will critically reflect according to the Gibbs’ reflective module (figure 2) on the Consultancy module learning experience, enhancing the positive and negative considerations. Furthermore, during the report, the Case Study and Simon Rouse will be referred as “CS”.

Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman must be commended for their clear identification of causes and cures to the planning fallacy in “Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives’ Decisions” (July 2003). Their look at overoptimism, anchoring, competitor neglect, and the outside view in forecasting is highly useful to executives and forecasters. However, Lovallo and Kahneman underrate one source of bias in forecasting—the deliberate “cooking” of forecasts to get ventures started. My colleagues and I call this the Machiavelli factor.

Results from the first statistically significant study of the causes of cost escalation in transport infrastructure projects are presented. The study is based on a sample of 258 rail, bridge, tunnel and road projects worth US$90 billion. The focus is on the dependence of cost escalation on: (1) the length of the project‐implementation phase, (2) the size of the project and (3) the type of project ownership. First, it was found, with very high statistical significance, that cost escalation was strongly dependent on the length of the implementation phase. The policy implications are clear: decision‐makers and planners should be highly concerned about delays and long implementation phases because they translate into risks of substantial cost escalations. Second, projects have grown larger over time, and for bridges and tunnels larger projects have larger percentage cost escalations. Finally, by comparing the cost escalation for three types of project ownership - private, state‐owned enterprise and other public ownership - it was shown that the oft‐seen claim that public ownership is problematic and private ownership effective in curbing cost escalation is an oversimplification. The type of accountability appears to matter more to cost escalation than type of ownership.

This paper explores how theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may be used to conduct quality control and due diligence in project management. First, a much-neglected issue in project management is identified, namely that the front-end estimates of costs and benefits – used in the business cases, cost-benefit analyses, and social and environmental impact assessments that typically support decisions on projects – are typically significantly different from actual ex post costs and benefits, and are therefore poor predictors of the actual value and viability of projects. Second, it is discussed how Kahneman and Tversky’s theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may help explain and remedy this situation through quality control of decisions. Third, it is described what quality control and due diligence are in the context of project management, and an eight-step procedure is outlined for due diligence based on the outside view. Fourth, the procedure is tested on a real-life, multibillion-dollar project, organized as a public-private partnership. Finally, Akerlof and Shiller’s recent discussion in economics of “firing the forecaster” is discussed together with its relevance to project management. In sum, the paper demonstrates the need, the theoretical basis, a practical methodology, and a real-life example for how to de-bias project management using quality control and due diligence based on the outside view.

Consultants play a unique role as knowledge brokers in a scientific community. In the accelerating demand for knowledge-based practices, consulting has not only turned into a flourishing profession, it has also served as an effective strategy for academics to demonstrate practical implications of their work through spreading innovative ideas and promoting the use of knowledge for industry, policy and development practices. As a result, consulting has become an area of research in its own right in such fields as business and management, information and technology, and health studies or healthcare. In tourism, nonetheless, research on consultancy as knowledge brokering has been particularly limited. This article presents a general review and critique on consulting as knowledge brokering, and highlights issues, perspectives and implications for future research on this subject in the potentially largest origin and destination in world tourism.

How should one cope with complexity and uncertainty in mega infrastructure projects? While rational theories tend to eliminate or reduce these unruly conditions, the authors of this article are in search of a different approach to deal with the characteristics of complexity and uncertainty proactively. Three theoretical reflections are introduced to explore possible solutions: (1) the change of institutions to address the problem of excessively simple structures for making decisions on complex projects; (2) the shaping of a learning environment in order to deal with uncertainty and emergent properties; and (3) balancing the generation and the reduction of a variety of policy options in order to select a limited number of feasible options and to bridge the strategic exploration and the operational processes of decision making. Informed by this conceptual thought, concrete pathways are developed and discussed by means of a case study of the construction of a high-speed railway line in the Netherlands. This article builds on empirical research pursued in the framework of a global research program on decision making in mega infrastructure projects: the Omega Centre for the Study of Mega Projects in Transport and Development (Bartlett School of Planning at University College London). The programme is sponsored by the Volvo Research and Educational Foundations (VREF).

This report was commissioned by the client, Musgrave Group to provide new strategic directions for the company. The report begins with an overview of the company and an overview of the project to be undertaken.
The next part of the report provides a strategic analysis of the Nigerian market both from an environmental and industry perspective on behalf of the client. Furthermore, the feedback gotten from the primary research carried out is inculcated into the formulation process of strategic options for the client.
These options are then evaluated using a strategic framework and recommendations are provided to the client.

The CASE Network is a group of economic and social research centers in Poland, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Belarus. Organizations in the network regularly conduct joint research and advisory projects. The research covers a wide spectrum of economic and social issues, including economic effects of the European integration process, economic relations between the EU and CIS, monetary policy and euro-accession, innovation and competitiveness, and labour markets and social policy. The network aims to increase the range and quality of economic research and information available to policy-makers and civil society, and takes an active role in on-going debates on how to meet the economic challenges facing the EU, post-transition countries and the global economy.

The authorship of a plastic artist is granted by the tangible continuity
between the stroke and the finished work. That physical connection
smoothed the way to making the task of erasing oneself the primary
quest of modernist abstraction. Architecture followed a different
course. Its inherent mediation by and obligation to drawing, so clearly
identified by Robin Evans, has historically prevented any automatic
recognition of the author in his or her work. In recent decades, the
digitalization of the practice of architecture has ultimately diluted
any record of authorship in its forms of representation, by eliminating
the link between the design and a handwritten signature that
substantiated its legal validity. Where is the record of creativity to be
found today?

Sole authorship is more an exception than a rule in
architecture. The involvement of a variable number of partners,
collaborators, specialists, and even clients –not only in the design
but also in the decisions around how a project is to be developed
and implemented– attests to the inadequacy of narratives extolling
a grand master builder’s single authorship. Most of the short number
of highly reputed names accorded authority in the discipline are
always backed by other participants who have not been sufficiently
acknowledged and who are even more difficult to identify in today’s
environment, due to the constantly rising number of team members.

Recent studies on the adaptive reuse of built heritage
have shown that the life of buildings is always subject to change,
which may sometimes lead the original author to come into play
years later, often without the same team. Other times, political and
social circumstances different from those prevailing at the project’s
inception, the mere passage of time in buildings lasting many
generations, or even inevitable changes in ownership may entail the
development of new projects on top of the original architecture and
the appearance of new superimposed authorship.

Major museums have devoted several decades to
researching the fate of works of art from the time of their creation.
Provenance, or the life of a work of art written in retrospect, recounts
the history of its changes of ownership over time, while shedding
light on its creation, its circulation, and its present value. Translating
provenance research to architecture –constructing a history that
discerns the variability of a building’s states and its conditions of
ownership, veiled behind the sum of layers involved– may also
constitute an operative frame for accrediting authorship otherwise
relegated to oblivion.

This call for articles aims to bring together a suite of
research outcomes and critical essays which analyse historical and
contemporary case studies that may help distinguish voices and
conceptualise authorship that has been silenced or superimposed
over time. The goal is to critically ascertain the real origin of
architectural projects, to measure the extent of individual authorship
in corporate practice, to reveal the identity of other authors who may
have played an instrumental role in project gestation, and to integrate
insufficiently acknowledged contributions into a more diverse,
inclusive, and plural history of architecture.

Call: https://www.unav.edu/documents/29853/0/RA_CFP_2021.pdf
Guidelines for authors: https://revistas.unav.edu/index.php/revista-de-arquitectura/information/authors