Transportation Corridors

The report presents an analysis of the impact that international freight traffic barriers have on logistics, transit potential, and development of transport corridors traversing EAEU member states. Restrictions discussed in this report include infrastructural (transport and logistical infrastructure), border/customs-related, and administrative/legal barriers. The authors also provide the recommendations regarding removal of barriers that hamper international freight traffic along the China-EAEU-EU axis.

In the light of the implications of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for Greater Eurasia and, in particular, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) countries, this paper assesses the prospects of seven actual and potential trans-Eurasian overland transport corridors. Based on the analysis of trade flows, railway tariffs, existing restrictions and individual routes' potential efficiency, the most promising overland China-EU and China-EAEU transport corridors and their prospective goods nomenclatures are identified. China-EAEU-EU transit is interpreted as the 'story of the container'. The principal interests of EAEU countries in developing BRI transport corridors are identified, as are the opportunities that involvement in China's BRI affords for the promotion of a substantial transit business and, most importantly, better regional and interregional connectivity within both the EAEU and Greater Eurasia.

This article compares Turkey and Ukraine’s motivations behind their participation in interregional connectivity projects. Specifically the issue of connectivity between the Black Sea and the Caspian regions was explored. Their policies towards trans-Caspian connectivity present an opportunity to assess a room for cooperation between two countries that are potential competitors regarding transit routes. In this sense, the article analyzes the countries’ perceptions of their interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the recent activities along the trans-Caspian route, the countries’ interaction with the outside great powers, and finally their cooperation with the regional countries of adjacent regions. This case also presents an opportunity to explore motivations of the participants of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Developments in freight transport and transport infrastructure have a strong influence on economic growth. The Baltic States have recently undergone a transformation from planned economies to market orientation. The interest in the Baltic States originates from their importance as new markets within the European Union, and their transit function for trade with Russia. Rising trade volumes and increasing freight transport are forecasted in the near term for the region. This study aims at developing an understanding of the regulatory, structural and developmental conditions and trends affecting the transport infrastructure in a region in economic transition, namely the Baltic States, in the light of its current economic development. Comparisons are made with Buchhofer’s [Buchhofer, E., 1995. Transport infrastructure in the Baltic States during the transformation to market economies. Journal of Transport Geography 3(1), 69–75] assessment of transport infrastructure in the Baltic States in the early years of transformation to market economies.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of cost escalation in transportation infrastructure projects. Based on a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth US$90 billion and representing different project types, geographical regions, and historical periods, it is found with overwhelming statistical significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether such projects should be built are highly and systematically misleading. Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic misrepresentation, that is, lying. The policy implications are clear: legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts.

Megaproject Planning and Management: Essential Readings contains the seminal articles from the growing body of research on megaproject planning and management along with an original introduction by the editor, Bent Flyvbjerg. The leading and most cited authority in the field, Flyvbjerg has used crowdsourcing and 25 years of experience to cherry-pick from several hundred articles and books the writings that define the field. This volume will be an indispensable source for those wishing to speak with authority about how megaprojects are prepared, delivered, and fought over. The target audience is students, academics, practitioners, and media pundits alike, as well as communities affected by megaprojects.

Back cover text: Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon of megaprojects. It is a fascinating account of how the promoters of multi-billion dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get projects approved and built. It shows, in unusual depth, how the formula for approval is an unhealthy cocktail of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects. This results in projects that are extremely risky, but where the risk is concealed from MPs, taxpayers and investors. The authors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions drawing on theory, experience and hard, scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations and five continents that illustrate the book. Accessibly written, it will be the standard reference for students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians and interested citizens for many years to come.

The article first describes characteristics of major infrastructure projects. Second, it documents a much neglected topic in economics: that ex ante estimates of costs and benefits are often very different from actual ex post costs and benefits. For large infrastructure projects the consequences are cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and the systematic underestimation of risks. Third, implications for cost–benefit analysis are described, including that such analysis is not to be trusted for major infrastructure projects. Fourth, the article uncovers the causes of this state of affairs in terms of perverse incentives that encourage promoters to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits in the business cases for their projects. But the projects that are made to look best on paper are the projects that amass the highest cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in reality. The article depicts this situation as ‘survival of the unfittest’. Fifth, the article sets out to explain how the problem may be solved, with a view to arriving at more efficient and more democratic projects, and avoiding the scandals that often accompany major infrastructure investments. Finally, the article identifies current trends in major infrastructure development. It is argued that a rapid increase in stimulus spending, combined with more investments in emerging economies, combined with more spending on information technology is catapulting infrastructure investment from the frying pan into the fire.

Rapid construction of new ‘transport corridors’ across the SADC region is supposed to facilitate the free flow of commodities, tourism and investment between ‘valuable places’ in Southern Africa and global markets. Since the opening of a road bridge across the Zambezi in 2004, Katima Mulilo has become a busy stopover point along the Trans Caprivi Corridor (TCC), which links the Copperbelt of Zambia with Namibia’s sea port of Walvis Bay. The new transport route has at last fulfilled the colonial dream that motivated the Anglo-German exchange of territory, which originally established the ‘access corridor to the Zambezi’ in 1890. Katima’s current investment boom seems to give substance to the SWAPO government’s official agenda of ‘bringing development’ to Caprivi, nearly a decade after an armed insurgency attempted its secession. But beyond the apparent success story, Katima Mulilo’s boom is illustrative of a broader reconfiguration of the nature of
state sovereignty, engendered by two distinct but interrelated processes. One of these processes changes the nature of state sovereignty from ‘above’. The TCC is a space for global business and transnational governance over which the Namibian state authorities have de facto limited sovereignty. The other process changes state sovereignty from ‘below’. It is manifest in the flourishing of illegal business activities in the Namibia- Zambia borderland, sprawling shanty towns and other societal phenomena that challenge SWAPO’s idealised development agenda. The combined dynamics of opportunity for more- or-less legal private gain, on the one hand, and looming societal instability that
accompany Katima Mulilo’s current boom, on the other, continue the historical pattern of Caprivi as a site that threatens to colonise the centre of the state from its territorial and social margins.

As megaprojects have become ubiquitous, their real benefits and costs have come under increased scrutiny. We interviewed Bent Flyvbjerg, who has extensively studied megaproject development. Flyvbjerg has found systematic problems in the development process: by intentionally misrepresenting information and deliberately disregarding risks, proponents instigate projects that result in fewer benefits and higher costs than promised.

The Supplementary Green Book Guidance on Optimism Bias (HM Treasury 2003) with reference to the Review of Large Public Procurement in the UK (Mott MacDonald 2002) notes that there is a demonstrated, systematic, tendency for project appraisers to be overly optimistic and that to redress this tendency appraisers should make explicit, empirically based adjustments to the estimates of a project’s costs, benefits, and duration. HM Treasury recommends that these adjustments be based on data from past projects or similar projects elsewhere, and adjusted for the unique characteristics of the project in hand. In the absence of a more specific evidence base, HM Treasury has encouraged departments to collect data to inform future estimates of optimism, and in the meantime use the best available data. In response to this, the Department for Transport (henceforth DfT), has contracted Bent Flyvbjerg in association with COWI to undertake the consultancy assignment "Procedures for dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning". The present Guidance Document is the result of this assignment.

"Over budget, over time, over and over again" appears to be an appropriate slogan for large, complex infrastructure projects. This article explains why cost, benefits, and time forecasts for such projects are systematically over-optimistic in the planning phase. The underlying reasons for forecasting errors are grouped into three categories: delusions or honest mistakes; deceptions or strategic manipulation of information or processes; or bad luck. Delusion and deception have each been addressed in the management literature before, but here they are jointly considered for the first time. They are specifically applied to infrastructure problems in a manner that allows both academics and practitioners to understand and implement the suggested corrective procedures. The article provides a framework for analyzing the relative explanatory power of delusion and deception. It also suggests a simplified framework for analyzing the complex principal-agent relationships that are involved in the approval and construction of large infrastructure projects, which can be used to improve forecasts. Finally, the article illustrates reference class forecasting, an outside view de-biasing technique that has proven successful in overcoming both delusion and deception in private and public investment decisions.

When there is an economic downturn, cities are forced to develop a strategy to revitalize. Increasing the transfer of high technology into the marketplace stimulates the economy. High tech industries are industries that include relatively high percentages of scientific and technical workers, or industries that make relatively large expenditures in research and development. "[I]n difficult economic times, political stakeholders in the technology transfer process usually view success in economic impact terms, and often from short-term and parochial perspectives - how many jobs in my state next year?" Examples include expansion of the suburban space economy in the 1980s that produced new commercial landscapes in Maryland, Virginia and Washington D.C. in the form of high-tech corridors along limited access highways. These corridors were designed using private mixed-use development master plans.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of traffic forecasts in transportation infrastructure projects. The sample used is the largest of its kind, covering 210 projects in 14 nations worth U.S.$59 billion. The study shows with very high statistical significance that forecasters generally do a poor job of estimating the demand for transportation infrastructure projects. For 9 out of 10 rail projects, passenger forecasts are overestimated; the average overestimation is 106%. For half of all road projects, the difference between actual and forecasted traffic is more than ±20%. The result is substantial financial risks, which are typically ignored or downplayed by planners and decision makers to the detriment of social and economic welfare. Our data also show that forecasts have not become more accurate over the 30-year period studied, despite claims to the contrary by forecasters. The causes of inaccuracy in forecasts are different for rail and road projects, with political causes playing a larger role for rail than for road. The cure is transparency, accountability, and new forecasting methods. The challenge is to change the governance structures for forecasting and project development. Our article shows how planners may help achieve this.

Do different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns? This apparently simple question is at the heart of research at the University of Oxford aimed at understanding the characteristics of megaprojects, particularly in terms of how they are established, run and concluded. In this study, we set out to investigate cost overruns in the Olympic Games. To do so, we examined the costs of the Games over half a century, including both summer and winter Olympics. We looked at the evolution of final reported costs and compared these to the costs established in the Games bids, submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) up to seven years before the Games occurred. In so doing we established the largest dataset of its kind, and documented for the first time in a consistent fashion the costs and cost overruns for the Olympic Games, from 1960 to 2012. We discovered that the Games stand out in two distinct ways compared to other megaprojects: (1) The Games overrun with 100 per cent consistency. No other type of megaproject is this consistent regarding cost overrun. Other project types are typically on budget from time to time, but not the Olympics. (2) With an average cost overrun in real terms of 179 per cent – and 324 per cent in nominal terms – overruns in the Games have historically been significantly larger than for other types of megaprojects, including infrastructure, construction, ICT, and dams. The data thus show that for a city and nation to decide to host the Olympic Games is to take on one of the most financially risky type of megaproject that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril. For the London 2012 Games, we find that: (1) With sports-related real costs currently estimated at USD14.8 billion, London is on track to become the most costly Olympics ever. (2) With a projected cost overrun of 101 per cent in real terms, overrun for London is below the historical average for the Games, but not significantly so. (3) The London cost overrun is, however, significantly higher than overruns for recent Games since 1999. London therefore is reversing a positive trend of falling cost overruns for the Games.

As megaprojects have become ubiquitous, their real benefits and costs have come under increased scrutiny. We interviewed Bent Flyvbjerg, who has extensively studied megaproject development. Flyvbjerg has found systematic problems in the development process: by intentionally misrepresenting information and deliberately disregarding risks, proponents instigate projects that result in fewer benefits and higher costs than promised.

L'Union européenne a lourdement financé dans les années 1980, l'extension des réseaux routiers d'Afrique subsaharienne parmi lesquels les corridors nord-camerounais. Leur mise en place répondait, pour ce qui est de l'Afrique centrale, à un besoin de désenclavement et d'intégration sous-régionale entre les pays de la CEMAC. Bien que ces axes routiers aient accompagné l'accélération des échanges marchands et des mobilités en général, ils ont également amélioré les échanges transversaux entre la côte maritime et les pays enclavés. Il reste néanmoins des « trous » dans l'espace où l'interconnexion avec le local n'est pas achevée malgré une diversification croissante des économies rurales animées par des bourgs et relayées par des marchés ruraux périodiques (Ninot, 2005). Cet article ambitionne de montrer que, si ces projets d'infrastructures nord-camerounais ont contribué à l'édification des territoires nationaux, ils sont loin d'être un outil d'intégration économique des campagnes traversées. La méthodologie comprend une démarche empirique de calcul d'indices d'accessibilité géographique et potentielle des localités, l'exploitation des bases de données institutionnelles et des enquêtes biographiques auprès d'acteurs clefs. Il en ressort que ces corridors marginalisent des zones aux potentialités économiques variées, avec comme conséquence une concentration quasi-linéaire des activités économiques le long des grands axes prioritaires au Nord-Cameroun.

В статье определены основные проблемы присутствия России на Южном Кавказе посредством исторического и ретроспективного анализа. Выявлена геополитическая составляющая внешней политики России в отношении к региону, начиная с XVIIвека. Проанализирована конфигурация основных политических сил на Южном Кавказе, а также дана оценка влияния России на политические и экономические процессы в регионе в настоящее время. Показаны основные географические, геоэкономические и другие преимущества Южного Кавказа. В частности, оценен транзитный потенциал региона. Определены слабые стороны российской геополитики в отношении Южного Кавказа, даны некоторые рекомендации.

Back cover text: This book aims to enlarge the understanding of decision-making on mega-projects and suggest recommendations for a more effective, efficient and democratic approach. Authors from different scientific disciplines address various aspects of the decision-making process, such as management characteristics and cost-benefit analysis, planning and innovation and competition and institutions. The subject matter is highly diverse, but certain questions remain at the forefront. For example, how do we deal with protracted preparation processes, how do we tackle risks and uncertainties, and how can we best divide the risks and responsibilities among the private and public players throughout the different phases of the project? - Presenting a state-of-the-art overview, based on experiences and visions of authors from Europe and North America, this unique book will be of interest to practitioners of large-scale project management, politicians, public officials and private organisations involved in mega-project decision-making. It will also appeal to researchers, consultants and students dealing with substantial engineering projects, complex systems, project management and transport infrastructure.

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large infrastructure projects. First, it identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure development pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is massive cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, the paper explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and funding. This results in the "survival of the unfittest," where often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, the paper presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large infrastructure projects, with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance structures, the latter being more important.

Risk, including economic risk, is increasingly a concern for public policy and management. The possibility of dealing effectively with risk is hampered, however, by lack of a sound empirical basis for risk assessment and management. This article demonstrates the general point for cost and demand risks in urban rail projects. The article presents empirical evidence that allow valid economic risk assessment and management of urban rail projects, including benchmarking of individual or groups of projects. Benchmarking of the Copenhagen Metro is presented as a case in point. The approach developed is proposed as a model for other types of policies and projects in order to improve economic and financial risk assessment and management in policy and planning.

“Bioregion”, a term coined by Peter Berg in 1977, was improved by Alberto Magnaghi, who defined it as the space for developing new relationships of coexistence between the inhabitants-producers and the territory of a region. Therefore, bioregion is a tool for rethinking regional planning, no longer as the sum of different sectorial planning exercises but as a “transdisciplinary planning” approach that considers all of a territory’s aspects.  This approach is related to EU policies for Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) and the protection of maritime and coastal areas.
This paper presents a case study on the coastal areas of Lazio Region which have a great many natural areas but which is also one of the most anthropized areas in the region. Indeed, due to the rising population, many interventions in the coastal areas resulted in the transformation of natural zones into urban areas. One effect has been urban sprawl and the related lack of capillarity of the public transport network. The result was that many ecosystems and natural areas were fragmented, losing their biodiversity. 
With a view to reconnecting these fragmented areas, this paper discusses a new regional scenario based on enhancing the linkages between land transport networks and the maritime gateway. In this scenario, railway corridors would stimulate a new organisation for the region’s settlements by representing not only the network connecting the bioregion’s cities and towns but also the cornerstones for the environmental regeneration of the coastal areas.

Out-of-control information technology (IT) projects have ended the careers of top managers, such as EADS CEO Noël Forgeard and Levi Strauss’ CIO David Bergen. Moreover, IT projects have brought down whole companies, like Kmart in the US and Auto Windscreen in the UK. Software and other IT is now such an integral part of most business processes and products that CEOs must know their IT risks, which are typically substantial – and overlooked. The analysis of a sample of 1,471 IT projects showed that the average cost overrun was 27% — but that figure masks a far more alarming “fat tail” risk.  Fully one in six of the projects in the sample was a Black Swan, with a cost overrun of 200%, on average, and a schedule overrun of almost 70%. This highlights the true pitfall of IT change initiatives: It’s not that they’re particularly prone to high cost overruns on average – it is that there are a disproportionate number of Black Swans. By focusing on averages instead of the more damaging outliers, most managers and consultants have been missing the real risk in doing IT. In conclusion, the article outlines ideas as to what can be done to avoid Black Swans.

Artículo inspirado en la tesis de maestría del autor en el que se sintetizan los más relevantes datos sobre los sistemas de construcción de caminos mayas en tiempos previos a la conquista española y testimonios de cronistas de la capacidad constructiva que permiten inferir las modalidades ancestrales,

ISSN-e 2027-9035, Nº. 11, año VI, págs. 13-35

2008. 352 pp. r150.00 (hardcover). This volume is intended to explain why major investment projects (the so-called mega-projects) often are not completed on time and cost more than originally budgeted. Drawing from experiences of European and North American countries, the book also suggests ways to avoid such failures. Although the topic is rather specific, the book is worth reading for both experts and nonexperts as infrastructure development continues to be a major key to economic expansion across the globe.g row_486 380.. 408 For those who only have a vague idea of what a mega-project is, the book begins by introducing the topic and reviewing the most important recent literature. The first part of the volume, then, provides numerous insights on the complexity of mega-projects, starting from the large number of reasons why mega-projects might fail. For example, the project might be "underdesigned," thus less costly but less robust to unforeseen developments, or it might be "overdesigned," when a large number of weaknesses and possible problems are considered in advance, and solutions are evaluated before the problem actually occurs. Overdesigned projects are more robust, less likely to fail, but are much more costly. The project might involve the use of innovative technologies that have never been applied to a similar context, and that involve more uncertain implementation costs and results. Most projects have an impact on the environment and might face opposition for example from environmentalist groups. If representative of these groups have not been directly involved in the design of the project, they might try to stop it, thus causing delays and increasing costs. Finally, because of incorrect predictions of 380 GROWTH AND CHANGE, JUNE 2009

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects. First, it identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure developments pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, it explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not those of their competition, that gain approval and funding. This results in the ‘survival of the unfittest’, in which often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, it presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance structures, the latter being more important.

A major source of risk in project management is inaccurate forecasts of project costs, demand, and other impacts. The paper presents a promising new approach to mitigating such risk, based on theories of decision making under uncertainty which won the 2002 Nobel prize in economics. First, the paper documents inaccuracy and risk in project management. Second, it explains inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Third, the theoretical basis is presented for a promising new method called "reference class forecasting," which achieves accuracy by basing forecasts on actual performance in a reference class of comparable projects and thereby bypassing both optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Fourth, the paper presents the first instance of practical reference class forecasting, which concerns cost forecasts for large transportation infrastructure projects. Finally, potentials for and barriers to reference class forecasting are assessed.

Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman must be commended for their clear identification of causes and cures to the planning fallacy in “Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives’ Decisions” (July 2003). Their look at overoptimism, anchoring, competitor neglect, and the outside view in forecasting is highly useful to executives and forecasters. However, Lovallo and Kahneman underrate one source of bias in forecasting—the deliberate “cooking” of forecasts to get ventures started. My colleagues and I call this the Machiavelli factor.

Results from the first statistically significant study of the causes of cost escalation in transport infrastructure projects are presented. The study is based on a sample of 258 rail, bridge, tunnel and road projects worth US$90 billion. The focus is on the dependence of cost escalation on: (1) the length of the project‐implementation phase, (2) the size of the project and (3) the type of project ownership. First, it was found, with very high statistical significance, that cost escalation was strongly dependent on the length of the implementation phase. The policy implications are clear: decision‐makers and planners should be highly concerned about delays and long implementation phases because they translate into risks of substantial cost escalations. Second, projects have grown larger over time, and for bridges and tunnels larger projects have larger percentage cost escalations. Finally, by comparing the cost escalation for three types of project ownership - private, state‐owned enterprise and other public ownership - it was shown that the oft‐seen claim that public ownership is problematic and private ownership effective in curbing cost escalation is an oversimplification. The type of accountability appears to matter more to cost escalation than type of ownership.

This paper explores how theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may be used to conduct quality control and due diligence in project management. First, a much-neglected issue in project management is identified, namely that the front-end estimates of costs and benefits – used in the business cases, cost-benefit analyses, and social and environmental impact assessments that typically support decisions on projects – are typically significantly different from actual ex post costs and benefits, and are therefore poor predictors of the actual value and viability of projects. Second, it is discussed how Kahneman and Tversky’s theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may help explain and remedy this situation through quality control of decisions. Third, it is described what quality control and due diligence are in the context of project management, and an eight-step procedure is outlined for due diligence based on the outside view. Fourth, the procedure is tested on a real-life, multibillion-dollar project, organized as a public-private partnership. Finally, Akerlof and Shiller’s recent discussion in economics of “firing the forecaster” is discussed together with its relevance to project management. In sum, the paper demonstrates the need, the theoretical basis, a practical methodology, and a real-life example for how to de-bias project management using quality control and due diligence based on the outside view.

Der Ursprung der Zentralortforschung ist in der Dissertation des Geographen Christaller 1 zu sehen. Seine Zielsetzung war es, zu erklären, warum Städte an bestimmten Orten entstehen und warum sie genau an dieser Stelle eine bestimmte Größe aufweisen. Hierzu löste er sich vom Stadtbegriff, der schon damals mit zahlreichen Konnotationen belastet war, und führte den Begriff des Zentralortes ein. Der Kern seiner Theorie besteht letztlich in der Definition des Zentralortbegriffs. Zentrale Orte besitzen einen Bedeutungsüberschuss, den sie durch ein ihnen zugeordnetes Umfeld, das Christaller Ergänzungsgebiet nennt und das diese Orte mit zentralen Gütern versorgt, erlangen. Während wir in der Archäologie unter Gütern in der Regel Waren verstehen, sind Güter bei Christaller entsprechend den Wirtschaftswissenschaften definiert. Christaller bezieht insbesondere Dienstleistungen mit ein, aber nicht nur der dritte, sondern alle Wirtschaftssektoren liefern letztlich Güter. Seit Denecke 2 und Gringmuth-Dallmer 3 spricht man in der Archäologie daher von zentralen Funktionen. In dieser Formulierung ist ein Zentralort dadurch gegeben, dass er zentrale Funktionen für ein Gebiet erfüllt, das wir Territorium nennen wollen. Christaller geht jedoch davon aus, das jedes Gut respektive jede Funktion eine eigene Reichweite aufweist und damit letztlich ein eigenes Territorium besitzt. Damit berücksichtigt Christaller in gewisser Weise parallele Raumkonzepte.

An important feature of today's Croatian territory is its position at the historical junctions of Northern and Southern Europe, as well as Pannonia, i.e. the Danubian region and the Mediterranean. The determinants of Croatia as an Adriatic and Central European, i.e. Danube country, are the basis of the process of valorisation of its spatial advantages. The position on the Adriatic front and the Danube Basin backbone significantly determines the maritime and continental significance of the position of the Croatian area. The expansion of the gravitational Danube spatial zone of traffic and economic influence will certainly be contributed by the corridors that pass through Croatia and open the Danube Basin towards the Mediterranean on the Croatian Adriatic front-the geographical source of Croatian national power. The Danubian-Adriatic orientation is a condition in which the Adriatic-Ionian Road and Corridor X, as a link between Western Europe and the Black Sea and Middle East, make the area of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina a transit ring and an intersection at the gates of Southeast Europe. Thus, the Republic of Croatia, as a member of NATO and the EU, is an important factor in geographical and transport integration, but also in the security and geopolitical stabilization of neighbouring countries in Southeast Europe. Serbia's latest geographical and traffic projects integrated into regional transport projects under Russian-Turkish geopolitical influence make the Baltic-Adriatic-Black Sea zone sensitive security wise, and push the territory of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina into geographical and traffic regional shadow and marginalization and directly affect their overall development and security.

En los análisis sobre las alternativas geopolíticas que se han desarrollado en las últimas décadas en América Latina, se ha dado mucha atención a las diferencias de modelos políticos y económicos entre el regionalismo neoliberal y el regionalismo posneoliberal o contrahegemónico, impulsado por los llamados gobiernos progresistas. Sólo recientemente han ido emergiendo algunas críticas centradas en el neoextractivismo que, entre otras cosas, han señalado la continuidad entre dichos modelos. Sin embargo, esa crítica sigue menospreciando la importancia de la infraestructura logística como factor fundamental del desarrollo capitalista regional. Un ejemplo es representado por el plan “Iniciativa para la Integración Regional de Sudamérica” (IIRSA), que incluye 10 corredores y casi 600 proyectos, sobre todo carreteros. Planteado en el año 2000 por el entonces presidente de Brasil Henrique Cardoso, la IIRSA ha vinculado a todos los países de Sudamérica y ha permanecido durante los diferentes ciclos hegemónicos en la región, volviéndose cada vez más central entre los planes de integración regional.
Retomando una reciente literatura académica alrededor de la logística, de su genealogía, sus discursos y sus dispositivos en el plano del gobierno y de la gobernanza, este artículo trata de destacar el surgimiento de la IIRSA en el cuadro del crecimiento generalizado de grandes planes infraestructurales alrededor del mundo, por la exigencia del capital de recuperar, a través de la aceleración del ciclo de circulación de commodities, la tendencia a maximizar la ganancia en el ciclo normal de acumulación. Todo esto pone la logística


como uno de los principios articuladores de la globalización, más allá de las diferencias políticas que puedan surgir al mando de los Estados-naciones, y conlleva consecuencias como la gestación de formas de gobierno nuevas, proclives a la producción de nuevos espacios estratégicos, como los corredores y las zonas económicas especiales.

In view of the European Union Enlargement, the Pan-European corridors it was more intensively attention especially after the stabilization and association process started in western Balkans. In the region of south east Europe, the transport strategy has been expressed for non-EU countries, notably after 1990. In the context of EU enlargement, the focus of the European Commission related with the transport was the development of Pan-European corridors, it proposed five priority axes and one of them being the South East European Axis that covers the South East European region and further near to the middle east etc. The Pan-European Corridor X was considered as a strong pillar for the national network for all the countries around and especially for these that are affected by it. Over the last decades the infrastructure is insensibly improved. In particular, the SEETO (South East European Transport Observatory), categorized the criteria to five groups connecting economic and development impact, environmental and social impact, regional interest, financial sustainability and technical standards.

В статье в исторической ретроспективе рассматривается роль транспортных коммуникаций в освоении Сибири, подчеркивается, что транспортные пути оказывали большое влияние на социальное и экономическое развитие региона, способствовали его заселению русскими и распространению русской земледельческой культуры. Особое пионерное значение имело железнодорожное строительство, в результате которого определился современный каркас сибирской транспортной системы, приобретающей все более глобальный характер и вносящей свой вклад в выстраивание мирового экономического пространства.

The article presents in the historical retrospect the role of the transportation communications in the development of Siberia, emphasizing that the transport routes had a significant effect upon the social and the economic development of the region, facilitated migration into the new territories and the spread of agriculture. Of a particular pioneer importance was the railway construction, which predetermined the modern backbone of the Siberian transportation system, acquiring the ever more global nature and making its contribution to the shaping of the global economic environment.

With the notion of 'operations of capital', focused on the interaction between the dimensions of finance, extraction and logistics, authors such as Mezzadra and Neilson have highlighted some 'underlying transformations of capitalism' that go well beyond a generic idea of neoliberalism as 'the hegemonic circulation of economic doctrines or processes of deregulation and governance'. The aim of this article is to investigate the strong articulation of finance, extraction and logistics in Latin America by focusing on the creation of new infrastructural corridors in the continent during the 'third phase' of neoliberal hegemony in the region. This article brings together elements from the so-called 'critical logistics studies' literature with a range of other theoretical perspectives, including insights from the work of David Harvey, Giovanni Arrighi, Michel Foucault and Saskia Sassen. It applies this theoretical background to the Latin American reality, drawing on regional-specific literature and general data using a trans-disciplinary perspective.

Ya en tiempos antiguos, el Danubio era una especie de corredor que estimulaba y facilitaba el desarrollo socioeconomico, el comercio y la movilidad; un canal de intercambio y civilizacion, que puede servir como ejemplo para las nuevas investigaciones y que deberia conducir a una progresion continua del destino natural del Danubio hacia Europa. El emperador romano Trajano creo una conexion directa multimodal (via de navegacion fluvial y terrestre) entre la zona septentrional del mar Adriatico y el mar Negro, que incluia el Danubio. Tal vez sea este el primer corredor europeo, cuyo extremo oriental (el valle de Acios-Carasu) constituye el precedente del canal Danubio-Mar Negro que se construiria dos milenios despues. En la actualidad, la relacion navegable entre el Mar Negro atraviesa varios paises que cuentan con redes de infraestructura de transporte desarralladas. A este respecto, es necesario promover las capacidades intermodales y multimodales del enlace Mar Negro-Mar del Norte, ...

Lo sviluppo globale dell'infrastruttura logistica a tutti i livelli sta cambiando il volto del pianeta e, secondo sempre più analisti, rappresenta a tutti gli effetti la costituzione materiale della globalizzazione, se per costituzione formale si potevano intendere i diversi trattati di libero commercio proliferati su scala planetaria all'indomani della fine della Guerra Fredda. Porti, interporti, city logistics e logistics cities, corridoi, autostrade, zone economiche speciali (ZEE), gasdotti, oleodotti, ferrovie formano sempre più l'intelaiatura delle supply chains globali, con forti ripercussioni sui tradizionali concetti con cui gli scienziati sociali degli ultimi due secoli si sono cimentati nel definire e descrivere il territorio, dalle logiche geopolitiche incentrate sullo Stato-nazione, all'imperialismo, alle categorie di centro-periferia formulate dalla teoria del cosiddetto sistema-mondo. Molte di queste problematiche sono affrontate in due testi della geografa dell'Università di Toronto Deborah Cowen. Il primo, scritto assieme al geografo marxista Neil Smith, teorico del concetto di uneaven development nel frattempo scomparso nel 2012, è un articolo apparso nel 2009 sulla rivista Antipode con il titolo "After Geopolitics? From the Geopolitical Social to Geoeconomics". A partire della definizione di "sociale geopolitico" come corollario "interno" e complemento necessario di una geopolitica spesso banalizzata come semplice scienza delle relazioni internazionali, gli autori considerano il progressivo slittare delle logiche di potere da un piano stato-centrico, fondato nella costruzione politica di un'unità tra il territorio omogeneo dello Stato-nazione e la costruzione di una società, un'economia, una cultura e una cittadinanza nazionali, e basata sulla netta separazione, nel monopolio della violenza legittima, tra la polizia per le esigenze di sicurezza interna, ed esercito vis à vis con gli altri stati nazionali, verso logiche imperiali di dominazione centrate nel mercato. Smith e Cowen, tuttavia, affermano che non si possa in alcun modo parlare di fine della geopolitica e di sostituzione netta di questa con la geoeconomia, quanto piuttosto di un riadattamento e una ridefinizione della geopolitica stessa a partire da pratiche, strategie e mentalità che forzano e mettono in discussione tanto la dimensione nazionale dei confini quanto la separazione stessa tra violenza legittima interna ed esterna dello Stato-nazione. Prendendo in analisi l'apparente risorgere "geopolitico" del nazionalismo a partire dai fatti dell'11 settembre 2001, gli autori analizzano come certe pratiche di controllo delle frontiere siano entrate in collisione con le esigenze di sicurezza del commercio internazionale delle supply chains, che ambiscono invece a creare spazi lisci tra le nazioni utili allo sviluppo senza intoppi del traffico intermodale. Allo stesso tempo, mettono in evidenza le novità della "guerra al terrorismo" come vera e propria guerra di mercato, andando ben oltre le questioni connesse al controllo dei pozzi petroliferi iracheni e considerando tanto la preponderante forza di quella che Naomi Klein (2007) ha chiamato disaster capitalism, come la ormai aperta privatizzazione della guerra dovuta alla crescente esternalizzazione del settore militare verso grandi corporations, contractors privati e truppe mercenarie, che ridefiniscono alcuni tradizionali principi della cittadinanza quali erano quelli della leva nazionale. La questione-affermano-non è solo la privatizzazione di tutto ciò che è pubblico, ma la privatizzazione dello Stato stesso. Molti di questi temi sono stati poi ripresi dalla Cowen nel libro The deadly life of logistics (2014), in cui l'autrice pone apertamente il tema della "logistica" come elemento motore e organizzatore di queste trasformazioni. Prendendo spunto proprio dalla compenetrazione reciproca tra ambito militare e commerciale che caratterizza la logistica contemporanea, l'autrice ripercorre la genealogia della logistica proprio nel suo formarsi all'interno dell'ambito militare, come principio organizzatore del rifornimento delle truppe. Considera poi l'applicazione di certi aspetti della logistica militare all'ambito commerciale con la nascita negli Stati Uniti, tra anni '50 e '60, della cosiddetta business logistics, e prende in esame quella che chiama "rivoluzione logistica" degli anni '70, che prende le mosse proprio dall'adozione a scopi commerciali del container, già adottato in ambito militare e considerato da molti l'invenzione tecnologica più importante dell'epoca della globalizzazione.