Trope Theory

The master thesis deals with finding Faustian motives, allegories, ideas, metaphors, and other tropes in Oscar Wilde’s novel The Picture of Dorian Gray. Christopher Marlowe’s Tragical History of the Life and Death of Doctor Faustus is taken as a representative of the Faust legend and it provides us with the plot and characters from the myth. The approaches used in this parallel study are from the point of view of hedonism, aestheticism, morality, and the theory of pleasure and pain as sovereign masters. Wilde’s eccentric life and attitude towards art were that of an aesthete, exalting l’art pour l’art movement, and this position is obvious in his writing. Therefore, biographical and historical criticisms are applied which is important to understand the novel completely. Apart from the most obvious theme of selling one’s soul to the devil which is present in both works, the characters in Wilde’s novel are also reminiscent of those in Marlowe’s play. Both Faustus and Gray want to break free from earthly limitations and are consequently punished for overreaching and exploiting the newly-gained powers. They both experience constant battle between good and evil within their souls but commit to sin in the end. Also, they are pure hedonists and aesthetes, devoted to always experiencing new sensations, but the pleasure is interrupted by sudden outbursts of pain and fear which prevent them from complete enjoyment. The reader will also see who possible demonic figures in Wilde’s novel are and what kind of influence they have on Gray. Finally, since the two stories could be considered as variations of morality plays, we will see what lessons they provide us with. In the end, this paper gives answers to questions such as to what degree the novel and the play are similar and what the characters from The Tragical History of the Life and Death of Doctor Faustus and The Picture of Dorian Gray have in common.
Key words: C. Marlowe, Faustus, Oscar Wilde, Dorian Gray, Faustian legend

It is often said that Scotus and Ockham made significant contributions to the debate about universals and individuation. I argue that no clear view of their theories about properties has emerged. On the contrary, there are deep ambiguities and technical confusions in both the primary and secondary literature. In this paper, I try to outline some of the more important ambiguities and confusions in as clear a way as I can.

n this thesis, we aim at contributing to the theory of conceptual modeling and ontology representation. Our main objective here is to provide ontological foundations for the most fundamental concepts in conceptual modeling. These foundations comprise a number of ontological theories, which are built on established work on philosophical ontology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of language and linguistics. Together these theories amount to a system of categories and formal relations known as a foundational ontology

A trope is the transfer of a word from its usual meaning to a different one, justified by a relation of similitude, or of another kind, between the two meanings. Early modern students of grammar and rhetoric memorized the tropes and learned how to identify and use each of them through the use of widely reprinted ancient and contemporary manuals of rhetoric, as well as publications dealing exclusively with tropes, such as those by Despauterius, Mosellanus and Susenbrotus. In practical terms, tropes stood out as crucial ingredients of the ornament of style, and as such they were central to the way literate individuals would speak and, especially, write. Furthermore, from a theoretical standpoint, tropes were a catalyst for crucial developments in early modern linguistic and aesthetic thought. On the one hand, they provided a window to the mechanisms through which language works, opening as they did a distinction between literal and figurative meaning. On the other, tropes (and especially metaphor) attracted great attention as the locus of coalescence between cognition and pleasure and became, therefore, touchstones for the development of a theory of the beautiful.

A standard interpretation of Plato’s metaphysics holds that sensible particulars are copies of Forms. Such particulars are fairly independent, like Aristotelian substances. I argue that this is incorrect: Platonic particulars are not Form images but aggregates of Form images, which are property-instances (tropes). Timaeus 49e-50a focuses on “this-suches” (toiauta) and even goes so far as to claim that they compose other things. I argue that Form images are this-suches, which are tropes. I also examine the geometrical account, showing that the geometrical constituents of the elements are also Form images. Thus everything in the sensible world is composed of tropes.

This book pursues the question: In what way, if any, does natural language allow for reference to abstract objects? What distinguishes its approach from ordinary language philosophy is the way it makes systematic use of contemporary research in linguistic semantics as well as syntax and explores a much greater range of data and linguistic generalizations than are generally taken into account in philosophy. This book thus explores “descriptive metaphysics” (as opposed to “revisionary metaphysics”) in a fully systematic way,to use Stawson’s terms. The result is an ontological picture that differs greatly from the one taken for granted by philosophers as regards natural language.

Reviews:
"In Moltmanns work, linguistic, metaphysical and more general philosophical insight and theory are expertly woven together in an exceptionally original and rewarding way. This book is essential reading for philosophers, linguists and cognitive scientists." - Mark Sainsbury, University of Texas at Austin

"This book is important for its hypotheses and conclusions, but even more so for its methodology: Moltmanns thorough and careful examination of linguistic (and crosslinguistic) data has raised so-called descriptive metaphysics, the analysis of the categories of being implicitly recognized by ordinary language and commonsense thought, to a new level." - John P Burgess, Princeton University

This article explores female agency and the healing role of women in medievalist fiction on Alfred the Great. Alfredian fanfiction written during the pandemic mixes neo-medieval elements with current themes and preoccupations, such as illness, pain, solitude, hope, female agency, and border crossings. The fan authors have constructed a 21st century "neo-medieval-based culture" that mirrors events in current society.

Since the period of Scholastic supremacy, Realism had been the most accepted approach to philosophy, but only until another medieval philosopher by the name of William Ockham turned the tables on ontology. Seemingly similar to what Aristotle did against his teacher, Plato, Ockham's arguments served as counters to his contemporary thinkers. The dispute lies in Realism's Universal properties, where x is exemplified by both Y and Z, which, in principle, turn out to be of the same kind. The problem revolves around whether x is a single property shared by two or more objects or if it is an individual exemplification. Ockham argued that multiple exemplifications of Universals were complicated, leading to the belief that ontology was inaccessible.

This paper explores Ockham's counter-argument, considered to be the most tenable position from the 20th century onwards. However, from the writer's point of view, Ockham's Trope Nominalism was not a total rejection of Realism, unlike other forms of Nominalism. Thus, the conclusion is that his ontology is a Neo-Realism, inviting thinkers to a simpler access to identity. The writer also discusses the significance of spatiotemporal, a cognitive property of the perceiver rather than the object perceived, which sets limits to properties that are fundamentally opposed to Realism. Additionally, it proves individual existence grounded in individual properties or tropes, serving as publicly displayed warrants.

Stephen E. Lahey, in his 1998 article entitled "William Ockham and Trope Nominalism," dismantles the ontologist behind the simplification of properties, presenting an argument against the universal exemplification of Realism. Ockham, influenced by Aristotle, became successful with his ontological contention, leaving an impression on the writer regarding how he made philosophy more accessible. Although Ockham's ideas did not successfully influence the majority during medieval times, as proven by the growth of religion, his name created a significant impact during the 20th century onwards, making his philosophy vital and fresh. (TN shortened for Trope Nominalism in the following sections.)

According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, it is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to unveil the very foundations of science.
The present collection of essays brings together both strands of interest. It elucidates the ontological profile of dispositionalism by exploring its ontological commitments, and it discusses these from the perspective of the philosophy of science. The essays are written by both proponents of dispositionalism and sceptics so as to initiate an open-minded, constructive dialogue.

likom ng karakter ni V ang mga katangian na sa isang pangkulturang merkadong petiburges ay sa isang malaking margin tiyak na papatok. Paano natin ito nasabi? Ang mga katangian ni V -indibidwal na pagkilos para sa radikal na hustisyang personal at panlipunan, ang maunlad na kamalayang pampulitika buhat ng pansariling karanasan sa mga pagmamalabis ng Norsefire Party sa kanyang mga kapwa Briton, ang maskara ng anonimidad na tinitiyak ang pananatili nito bilang isang pribadong mamamayan, bukod pa rito ang mga superheroic na kapangyarihan na isang pantasyang super-human -ay mas pinapaigting ng pagbibigay katuwiran sa mga aksyon nya bilang marapat at naaayon sa konteksto. Ang kontekstong ito ay ang signipikasyon ng isang lipunang salat, bangkarote, at lubos na kabaligtaran ng lahat ng kanais-nais sa tunay na mundo: sa madaling salita, signipikasyon ng distopya. Ang normalisadong konseptong ito ay bunga ng juxtaposition ng distopya (distopia) laban sa isang motibong pwersa sa istorya na magbibigay ng mga katangiang kabaligtaran nito -sa gayon, si V ay isang naayong imahen para sa isang protagonista, isang hero. Kitangkita ang pagpatok ng imahen ni V labas sa dalawang dimensyon ng screen sa sinehan at telebisyon.

Abstract: The article consists of a brief biographical account of Immanuel Kant’s life and career, followed by a discussion of his basic philosophy, and a brief discussion of his pivotal point in the history of Rhetoric and Communicology. A major figure in the European Enlightenment period of Philosophy, his Collected Writings were first published in 1900 constituting 29 volumes. He wrote three major works that are foundational to the development of Western philosophy and the human sciences. Often just referred to as the “Three Critiques” informally, the First, the Second, and the Third. These are respectively: The Critique of Pure Reason focused on issues in logic, The Critique of Practical Reason relating ethical guide- lines, and The Critique of Judgment exploring issues of aesthetics. He is most famous for his philosophy of transcendental idealism. This version of idealism argues that in logic statements are analytic (subject and predicate are the same; no new information) or synthetic (predicate differs from the subject; new information is constituted). He further argues that statements are a priori (before experience) or a posteriori (a result of experience). Models of rhetoric (tropic logic), phenomenolo- gical methodology, and the contemporary Perspectives Model of interpersonal communicology are included as the Kantian legacy in the US. Notes provide a guide to edition and philological issues in the Kantian corpus, especially for the hermeneutics of Vorstellung (‘presentation’) versus Darstellung (‘representation’).
Keywords: aesthetics, chiasm, ethics, communicology, idealism, phenomenology, rhetoric, tropes

We should not call stuffs anything at all; we should only name suches (tropes). This-redness is a such, namely, such as to always be red, wherever and whenever it is. It is distinct from that-redness, which is a distinct trope. What we normally think of as things turn out to be bundles of tropes; e.g., a red circle is a bundle of this-redness and thiscircularity. Tropes are bundled when they are co-located; thisredness and this-circularity are in the same place. An electron, then, would be a bundle of a negative charge trope, a mass trope, and a spin trope.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate what ontology serves as the most compelling in relation to the ongoing problem of material constitution. Like any investigation, my aim is to establish a simple, explanatory, coherent theory that covers as much ground as possible. Does the trope-nominalist have the solution? Perhaps Brentanian reism can resolve this ontological enigma? Do we simply take the Ockhamist ideal by postulating as few kinds of fundamental entities as possible, accepting the single- category ontology, simplicitier? At a glance this certainly seems like the attractive solution, but such ‘solutions’ should be resisted - it is certainly not as simple as one might suppose. Ockham’s razor doesn’t explicitly stipulate one-category ontologies as the most favorable; what is salient here is the phrase “as few entities as possible.” One-category ontologies may indeed have insurmountable hurdles, which could pose as a motivation for us to reject the theory and seek alternative solutions. I shall investigate these considerations by examining the traditional notion of substance and accident, which will be examined in light of one pivotal assumption: there are tropes, and that these are the most fundamental metaphysical entities.

This paper employs discursive constructivism to delineate four rhetorical paradigms of nationalist discourse and to compare their potential for conflict. It proposes a four-fold typology which sees the intuitive tropes of antithesis and simile, and the counterintuitive metaphor and irony as structuring principles for national self-images. These are four modes of constructing a cultural deixis, that is, a relationship between national self and its cultural other. The paper argues that the frequency and magnitude of nationalistic conflicts may be minimized by the steady and widespread counter-enculturation of the non-conflictual discourses of analogical (simile-based), metaphoric, and ironic nationalisms. This argument is illustrated with examples from modern and recent Romanian history, but may be taken to epitomize the condition of most postcommunist European nations.

I examine and discuss in this paper Orilia’s theory of external, non-symmetrical relations, that is based on ontological roles (O-Roles). I explore several attempts to interpret O-Roles from an ontological viewpoint and I reject them because of two problems concerning the status of asymmetrical relations (to be distinguished from non-symmetrical relations simpliciter) and of exemplification as an external, non-symmetrical relation. Finally, following Heil’s and Lowe’s characterization of modes as particular properties that ontologically depend on their “bearers”, I introduce relational modes in order to define a new solution to the problems of the ontological status of both external, non-symmetrical relations and O-Roles. I also deal with five objections raised by Fraser MacBride against relational modes and O-Roles and I elaborate an analysis of the relations of being to the left of and being to the right of.

In a series of publications, we have proposed a foundational system of ontological categories which has been successfully used to evaluate and im- prove the quality of conceptual modeling grammars and models. In this article, we continue this work by using this foundational ontology to provide real-world semantics and sound modeling guidelines for one of the most fundamental (and yet one of the most problematic) constructs in conceptual modeling, namely, the relationship type. In addition, we systematically compare our approach with a classical ontological treatment of this construct in the literature, provided by the BWW framework.

In a first part, I defend that formal semantics can be used as a guide to ontological commitment. Thus, if one endorses an ontological view O and wants to interpret a formal language L, a thorough understanding of the relation between semantics and ontology will help us to construct a semantics for L in such a way that its ontological commitment will be in perfect accordance with O. Basically, that is what I call constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. In the rest of the paper, I develop rigorously and put into practice such a method, especially concerning the interpretation of second-order quantification.
I will define the notion of ontological framework: it is a set-theoretical structure from which one can construct semantics whose ontological commitments correspond exactly to a given ontological view. I will define five ontological frameworks corresponding respectively to: (i) predicate nominalism, (ii) resemblance nominalism, (iii) armstrongian realism, (iv) platonic realism, and (v) tropism.
In those different frameworks, I will construct different semantics for first-order and second-order languages. Notably I will present different kinds of nominalist semantics for second-order languages, thus showing how we can quantify over properties and relations while being ontologically committed only to individuals. More generally I will show in what extent those semantics differ from each other; it will make clear how the disagreements between the ontological views extend from ontology to logic, and how metaphysical questions can be correctly treated, in those semantics, as simple questions of logic.

Identity has been one of the many problems attempting to be solved by most disciplines. With various interpretations from a wide range of studies, not just philosophy, the author sets metaphysical findings to provide valid arguments in the justification of transgender as trans-identity. The need for argumentation over the problem of transgender is rooted in the scholastic trace.' The medieval age was the century of scholastic occupation; however, its echo is a continuous and pervasive sound that deafens even the most contemporary typical thinkers. Since it has a marginalizing idea or bias as expressed by traditionalists, it then necessitates a metaphysical treatment to support transgender identity. Those who insist so much on 'what identity should be' or 'what a person should be' are the 'typical thinkers' whose reliance on scholastic trace sets them apart from the community. It may not be a literal relegation or a force in the physical sense, but rather a confirmation bias.

Realism was one approach to answering the problem, provided by the theological teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, as well as the religious leaders of the church, G.E. Moore on naturalism; and David Enoch on pursuing the ' moral truth' from disagreements. However, the author concedes that although the former concepts could help with the issue, the counters of Aristotle, William of Ockham, and D.C. Williams, along with the rest of the contemporary tropists, may better provide more valid and reasonable findings.

This paper posits that trope theory has a tenable position to debunk the baffling 'problem of universals' and provides a valid explanation to best address the current issue. Along with this, it caters to the implication of the trope of moral liability, which unfolds the assumption that if homosexuality leads the person to have better moral liability, then gender, whether man or gay, woman or lesbian, transgender or transsexual, is no longer debatable.

The paper discusses some formal difficulties concerning the theory of universals of Trope-Only ontologies, from which the formal theory of predication advanced by Trope-Only theorists seems to be irremediably affected. It is impossible to lay out a successful defense of a Trope-Only theory without Russellian types, but such types are ontologically inconsistent with tropes' nominalism. Historically, Tropists' first way to avoid the problem is appealing to the supervenience claim, which however falls on its terms and, thus, fails as a ground for a solution to the higher-order or 'type' problem. A later solution involves the invariance of primitive equivalence relations in order to make universals ontologically innocuous. However, I argue that this latter solution fails to meet the requirements imposed an ontologically unbiased nominalist attitude. So, this paper discusses how Trope-Only theories alter standard formal moves in Nominalism, and also is interested in clarifying further the formal assumptions for these problems.

This essay calls for an independent theory of features in object-oriented philosophy. Theories of features are in general motivated by at least two interconnected demands: 1) to explain why objects have the characteristics they have, 2) to explain how regular divisions in those characteristics can be intuited. While a theory of universal properties may be the most internally consistent means of addressing these demands, an object-oriented metaphysics needs to address them without a concept of shared features. This means that regular divisions of invariant features and our intuitions of them cannot be explained by the repetition of self-same characteristics or natural laws. They can instead be explained by the immanent repetition of similar features. However, this requires a new, radically aesthetic understanding of what it means to be similar in the first place, one in which similarity is an emergent process rather than a state of affairs existing between resembling particulars.

En philosophie première, une tradition classique héritée de Platon et d'Aristoterécemment renouvelée par D.M. Armstrong 2 -envisage deux catégories de réalité, également essentielles, mais mutuellement exclusives : les substances (ou particuliers), lesquelles sont concrètes et particulières, et les propriétés (avec les relations), lesquelles sont universelles et abstraites. Les corps matériels sont les exemples les plus répandus de particuliers concrets, et leurs caractéristiques, conçues comme étant des entités répétables, communes à plusieurs objets différents, sont les paradigmes des universaux abstraits.

This paper starts from Reid's remark that David Hume was the "greatest Metaphysician of the Age". Hume, a metaphysician? Of course. Hume was a nominalist. In this paper I argue that Hume's nominalism is a species of trope-nominalism. This paper give the metaphysical foundation for my paper on Hume's theory of perception. At the end of the paper I suggest that Hume's nominalism leads him into personal identity troubles.

Abstract. In this paper I first try to clarify the essential features of tropes and then I use the resulting analysis to cope with the problem of mental causation. As to the first step, I argue that tropes, beside being essentially particular and abstract, are simple, where such a simplicity can be considered either from a phenomenal point of view or from a structural point of view. Once this feature is spelled out, the role tropes may play in solving the problem of mental causation is evaluated. It is argued that no solution based on the determinable/determinate relation is viable without begging the question as regards the individuating conditions of the related properties. Next, it is shown that Robb’s solution, much in the spirit of Davidson’s anomalous monism, entails abandoning the assumption that tropes are essentially simple, a consequence that I find not acceptable. My conclusion is that these entities are of no help in solving the problem of mental causation, and that a universalist approach should be preferred.

After briefly tracing the emergence and persistence of the footprint trope, I then read it through (and against) an alternate ontology in order to intensify the trope’s ontological dimensions and limitations. What ways of being in the world does the footprint—and its implicit invitation to tread lightly—de/prescribe, and how does that ontology itself do rhetorical work that may in fact run counter to the sentiments of its proponents? The chapter concludes with an affirmative recovery of the footprint trope in service of a more robust environmentalism. With this chapter, I want to think more intensely about our footprints. For instance, I want to re-emphasize movement, embodiment, place and inscription, which are all sidelined or even implicitly disparaged by our particular employment of footprint. What is it to place one’s feet and to inscribe with one’s own body? In making environmentalism a question of a footprint’s size, do we lose the nuance of kind, of quality? Privileging the quantitative over the qualitative potentially undermines other available means of persuasion. I want to think about/with the footprint metaphor beyond size and measurement—not because such approaches are wrong, but because they severely limit our ability to think through the trails we make, the paths we trace as we move with/in an environment, which is something more than an already existing container.

This book is presumably a collection of essays delivered at a conference, though it's hard to say. There is no cover description and the editors' introduction, where this information might have been found, is missing from the volume (at least from my copy) in spite of being listed in the table of contents. A curious editorial slip. In fact, from an editorial perspective this book is a disaster. Not only is the format reminiscent of those camera-ready volumes that jammed our libraries in the late Eighties, when word processors began to spread and people started using them to produce entire books without knowing how to handle line spacing and hyphenation-not to mention orphans and widows, footnotes, tabs, apostrophes, etc. There are also lots of typos, English infelicities, punctuation disorders. Obviously nobody checked the page proofs. There are even formulas that were not properly converted from the original files and have been printed with the infamous boxes in place of the logical symbols. Publishing academic books in analytic philosophy is becoming increasingly difficult and not every publisher can afford serious copyediting. But charging 74 euros for such a poorly manufactured item is appalling.

In this paper we present and compare two different ap-proaches to the notion of “relational role” and connected is-sues. Both approaches are based on the introduction of the notion of “qua-individual” and on the reification of relations. We use a classical problem in the ...

In this paper, I will be examining Aristotle's Categories and the theory of substance and predication developed therein, understood as a sustained argument against the primacy of the Platonic Forms. To follow through with this line of approach we will begin with an account of Aristotle's understanding of primary and secondary substances, as well as the reasons he gives for distinguishing between the two. With this complete, we will then be in a position to explain how the theory of predication and substance that Aristotle presents in the his Categories is indeed, at least in part, an attempt to undermine the excesses of Platonic metaphysics. We will then turn toward assessing the merit of Aristotle's arguments in order to determine their standing as a refutation of the Platonic position. Giving a definitive answer to this question will require an examination of the relation between substances and their properties (e.g., secondary substances, quality, quantity etc.), that is, whether or not the former can exist independently of the latter; as a proper understanding of this relation will prove to be the deciding factor with respect to determining the overall effectiveness of Aristotle's criticism of Plato. Finally, I will argue that the Inseparability Condition Aristotle places on primary substances and their features frees him of any commitment to the existence of "bare particulars", and that free of this charge his theory of substances constitutes a substantial advance over and refutation of Plato's theory of Forms.

This paper discusses how "either-or" thinking worked for the ancient Greeks, who had a more relativistic orientation to reality than we do today.  It explains how this cognitive strategy can be useful and productive, but only when it's not undermined by cultures with a more "oppositional camps" orientation to public knowledge.

In this paper we present and compare two different ap- proaches to the notion of “relational role” and connected is- sues. Both approaches are based on the introduction of the notion of “qua-individual” and on the reification of relations. We use a classical problem in the literature on roles, namely the counting problem, as testbed, and we show how the two approaches deal with it in a similar way. We nevertheless show that they are to be distinguished, examining several as- pects emerging from their relation with the notion of trope.

The concept of a trope (understood as an individual property and not as a figure of speech) plays an important role in contemporary analytical metaphysics. It is, however, often far from clear what the logic of this concept really is. Indeed, there are two equally important intuitions underlying the concept of trope, two intuitions that generate two quite different conceptual frameworks. According to the first intuition, a trope is a particularised property -a property taken as an individual aspect of a particular object. A trope is thus the colour of this table or the shape of this sculpture. In the light of this conception tropes are, as it were, direct abstractions from concrete individuals. According to the second intuition a trope is still such an individual (and abstract) colour or such an individual (and abstract) shape, but now it is not only abstracted from the concrete individual of which it is a trope but also taken in abstraction from the very fact that it has been abstracted this way. We can imagine that the cognitive access to these tropes is obtained by a kind of a double abstraction.

The idea that what we perceive are tropes (abstract particulars) is anythingbut new. In fact, it was one of the reasons why the ontology of tropes was postulated inthe first place. Still, the claim that we perceive tropes is invariably and purely based onpre-philosophical intuitions or, indirectly, either as a supporting argument for theadvantages of content view when compared to the relational view of experie nce, or as asupporting argument in favor of the irreducible subjective character of experience. Inthis paper, I take the content view for granted and argue in favor of what is hereinreferred to as the trope-content view of experience. My defense is a case of inference tothe best explanation. The trope-content view can meet all reasonable desiderata on theexperience and its content without assuming gaps or making the ad hoc assumption

Istniały w filozofii Brentana okresy ontologicznej tolerancji. Mówił on wtedy o immanentnych przedmiotach myśli, treściach propozycjonalnych, przedmiotach nieistniejących oraz czasowo zmodyfikowanych a także o indywidualnych własnościach niesamodzielnych wobec swych substancji. Bytami, wobec których Brentano nie miał nigdy zrozumienia, były jednak przedmioty ogólne, które jako autentycznie identyczne mogłyby być wielokrotnie egzemplifikowane w wielu indywiduach. Tego rodzaju byty traktował Brentano zawsze jako ontologiczny absurd. W artykule niniejszym zajmiemy się późnym, reistycznym okresem filozofii Brentana, w którym odrzucił on nie tylko platońskie uniwersalia, lecz w ogóle wszystkie byty, które nie należałyby do kategorii realnych rzeczy, lecz skoncentrujemy się właśnie na technikach, za pomocą których późny Brentano usiłował uporać się z problemami dotyczącymi orzekania własności. 1. Konceptualizm i mereologia Jedną z tych technik jest konceptualistyczna nauka o ogólnym sposobie przedstawiania, która przewija się w całej filozofii Brentana i raz po raz jest przeciwstawiana platońskiej nauce o bytach ogólnych. Już w Würzburskich Wykładach z metafizyki z roku 1867 czytamy: "Rozwiązanie [problemu uniwersaliów] wypływa z właściwego ujęcia stosunku uniwersaliów do indywiduum. Jeden i ten sam byt może być przedstawiony w mniej lub bardziej określony sposób, w obu jednak przypadkach prawidłowo. Dlatego również to co przedstawione w mniej określony sposób jest realne i stanowi jedność z tym, co * Wykorzystane w artykule manuskrypty Brentana zostały mi udostępnione przez prof. G. Künga (Fryburg / Szwajcaria) oraz prof. W. Baumgartnera (Würzburg). Za finansowe wsparcie dziękuję Alexander von Humboldt-Stuiftung. 2 przedstawione w bardziej określony sposób, a w związku z tym może być o nim orzeczone." 1 Znajdujemy tu koncepcję, zgodnie z którą cała ontologiczna powaga orzekalnych o substancjach własności streszcza się w różnych sposobach, na jakie rzecz może być (prawidłowo) przedstawiona. Później, po roku 1874, gdy Brentano rozwinął swą naukę o immanantnych przedmiotach owe różne sposoby, na jakie jedna rzecz może być przedstawiona, znajdują swoją ontologiczną realizację w różnych immanentnych obiektach, jakie są zaangażowane w owe przedstawienia. Zwykle będą to obiekty niekompletne, zawierające tylko te cechy, poprzez które dana rzecz jest intencjonalnie domniemana. W manuskrypcie Abstraktion [Ps 21], z 1889 lub 1899 roku 2 czytamy np.: "Przedstawiający przyjmuje w pewnym sensie przedmiot w siebie. Dlatego mówi się przy przedstawieniu o czymś przyjętym (conceptus), o pojęciu w najszerszym sensie [...]. Jeśli przedstawiamy sobie pewien byt tak, że istnieje [odpowiedni] przedmiot w świecie zewnętrznym, wówczas ten zewnętrzny przedmiot nigdy nie zostaje przedstawiony wyczerpująco, lecz, jak to się mówi, [tylko] co do pewnych cech (Merkmale), co do innych zaś nie. W wyniku tego każdy przedmiot świata zewnętrznego może być przedmiotem różnych przedstawień. Jedno ujmuje go według tych, inne według innych cech [...]. Treściowo różne przedstawienia mają w tym przypadku ten 1 "Die Lösung ergibt sich aus der richtigen Fassung des Verhältnisses der Universalien zu dem Individuellen. Ein und dasselbe Sein kann in mehr oder minder bestimmter Weise, in beiden Fällen aber richtig, vorgestellt werden. Auch das minder bestimmt Vorgestellte ist daher real und eins mit dem bestimmter Vorgestellten und kann somit von ihm prädiziert werden.", manuskrypt Ontologie (Metaphysik) [M 96], 31896. Jest to manuskrypt wykładów wygłaszanych przez Brentana począwszy od 1867 roku w Würzburgu, a później od 1874 w Wiedniu. Jako że manuskrypt ten nie ma jednolitej własnej paginacji, cytujemy go według wspólnej numeracji obejmującej wszystkie manuskrypty archiwum Brentana. 2 Datowanie jest niepewne. 3 sam przedmiot. (Cechy, według których przedmiot jest przyjęty w przedstawienie tworzą treść tego przedstawienia.)" 3 Koncepcja ta wprowadza jak widzimy bardzo poważną aparaturę ontologiczną. Mówi się o treściach przedstawień, czyli zgodnie z terminologią Brentana o immanantnych przedmiotach, które z kolei posiadają pewne cechy "według których" prezentowane są przedmioty zewnętrzne. Szczegóły tej koncepcji są wybitnie niejasne, a sam Brentano uznał ją po roku 1904 za nie do utrzymania. Mówienie o nieokreślonym sposobie przedstawiania funkcjonuje wtedy jako pierwotny, dalej już niedefiniowalny termin teorii. W szczególności nie da się ono wyjaśnić poprzez mówienie o strukturze pojęć, gdyż te ostatnie są w ogóle bytami fikcyjnymi. Jest to jedna z dwu ważnych dróg, na których późny Brentano usiłował uporać się z problemem własności -droga konceptualistyczna. Mówienie o własnościach tkwiących w rzeczach okazuje się w istocie okrężnym sposobem mówienia o naszych pojęciach (o ogólnch sposobach przedstawiania) oraz o prawidłowym sposobie ich stosowania. W tym sensie Brentano twierdzi wraz ze średniowiecznymi Ockhamistami, że ogólność tkwi w naszych pojęciach, a nie w rzeczach. Ktokolwiek jednak zetknął się, choćby bardzo przelotnie, z zagadnieniami sporu o uniwersalia, wie, że redukcja konceptualistyczna, jaką proponuje Brentano, nie przebiega bynajmniej gładko. Otóż jeśli chcemy zredukować nieporządane byty na rzecz pojęć -czyli sposobów domniemywania -okaże się prędko, że sposoby te musielibyśmy kwantyfikować, a zatem -w myśl znanej tezy Quine'a -uczynić z nich pewnego rodzaju przedmioty. Tego jednak nie wolno nam, w myśl późnej nauki Brentana, robić. Dla zbyt euforycznego wielbiciela późnej nauki Brentana powinno to być ostrzeżeniem, że jeśli sposoby mówienia, jakie usiło-3 "Der Vorstellende nimmt den Gegenstand in gewissem Sinne in sich auf. Daher spricht man beim Vorstellen von einem Aufgenommenen (conceptus), Begriff im weitesten Sinn [...]. Wird ein Seiendes vorgestellt -so daß ein Gegenstand in der Außenwelt besteht -so wird dieser äußere Gegenstand nie in erschöpfender Weise vorgestellt, sondern wie man sagt, nach gewissen Merkmalen, nach anderen aber nicht. Infolge davon kann jeder Gegenstand in der Außenwelt Gegenstand verschiedener Vorstellungen sein. Die eine erfaßt ihn nach diesen, die andere nach anderen Merkmalen [...]. Inhaltlich verschiedene Vorstellungen haben dann denselben Gegenstand. (Die Merkmale, nach welchen der Gegenstand in die Vorstellung aufgenommen ist, bilden ihren Inhalt.)", manuskrypt Abstraktion [Ps 21], 4.

Carrithers, Michael (ed.). 2009. Culture, rhetoric and the vicissitudes of life. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. 184 pp.Hb.: $70.00/£45.00. ISBN 978 1 84545 429 6.

What does the notion of rhetoric do to, and for, the concept of culture? The explanation of cultures too often left aside the key issue of individual agency that seems, by definition, typical of the so-called ‘rhetorical situation’: the will to make things happen, the human urge to persuade others to act. This collection of papers wisely starts with the assumption that this human need to move others – and be moved oneself – through discourse has a foundational character. ‘Rhetoric’ would not then be the idealised performance cultivated by the ancient rhetor in public venues. The notion suits well the petty details of one’s daily life (loves, routines, memories, encounters, conversations), as it equally suits responses to great emergencies and epochal crises (disease, death, war, massacre). At the end, we find people doing things with words in order to adjust the expectations of their sociocultural milieus to the predicaments they experience.