Ukraine Run All Over My Brain: The Whistler Blower
Ukraine Run All Over My Brain: The Whistler Blower
Ukraine Run All Over My Brain: The Whistler Blower
Government officials that the President of the United States is using the power of
his office to solicit interference from a foreign country in the 2020 U.S. election.
Over the past four months, more than half a dozen U.S. officials have informed
me of various facts related to this effort. The information provided herein was
relayed to me in the course of official interagency business. It is routine for U.S.
officials with responsibility for a particular regional or functional portfolio to
share such information with one another in order to inform policymaking and
analysis. Multiple White House officials with direct knowledge of the call
informed me that, after an initial exchange of pleasantries, the President used the
remainder of the call to advance his personal interests. According to the White
House officials who had direct knowledge of the call, the President pressured Mr.
Zelenskyy.
On or about 29 April, I learned from U.S. officials with direct knowledge of the
situation that Ambassador Yovanovitch had been suddenly recalled to
Washington by senior State Department officials for “consultations” and would
most likely be removed from her position.
Around the same time, I also learned from a U.S. official that “associates” of Mr.
Giuliani were trying to make contact with the incoming Zelenskyy team.
Starting in mid-May, I heard from multiple U.S. officials that they were deeply
concerned by what they viewed as Mr. Giuliani’s circumvention of national
security decision making processes to engage with Ukrainian officials and relay
messages back and forth between Kyiv and the President. These officials also told
me:
that State Department officials, including Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, had
spoken with Mr. Giuliani in an attempt to “contain the damage” to U.S. national
security; and
that Ambassadors Volker and Sondland during this time period met with
members of the new Ukrainian administration and, in addition to discussing policy
matters, sought to help Ukrainian leaders understand and respond to the differing
messages they were receiving from official U.S. channels on the one hand, and
from Mr. Giuliani on the other.
Office of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus Affairs (EUR/EE) Director Bradley A Freden
https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/person/3590671
01/1977–12/1980
Assistant US Attorney
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York
01/1972–12/1977
Attorney
01/1969–12/1972
Partner
01/1980–UNKNOWN
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/15/james-biden-bungalow-ukraine-
donor-1463645
Ukraine Desk Officer (Pol) Alesia L Sourine
ARABIAN GULF (Oct. 3 2017) U.S. Navy Airman John Washburn, from Byron
Center, Michigan, visits with his family friend, Alesia Sourine, from Grand Rapids,
Michigan, who was flown aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) as a
distinguished visitor for her role as a deputy political military affairs counselor, in
the Arabian Gulf. Nimitz is deployed in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in
support of Operation Inherent Resolve. While in this region, the ship and strike
group are conducting maritime security operations to reassure allies and partners,
preserve freedom of navigation, and maintain the free flow of commerce. (U.S.
Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Leon Wong)
Demonization and the politics of fear are widely used and perceived to be
conducive to achieving one’s objectives in international conflict. This common
notion is, however, a gross misconception. Historical accounts point to negative
and dangerous consequences to foreign policy stemming from the very
atmosphere that ‘demonization’ produces. This paper examines three such
historical cases: that of the Cuban Embargo, US policy toward Iran in lieu of the
hostage crisis, and the ongoing War on Terrorism. My analysis of the first case
focuses on how ideological mindsets and perceptions left over from the Cold War
are impairing rational policy change toward Cuba and the lifting of the US
embargo. The second case aims to demonstrate how demonizing the Iranian
leadership post the 1979 overthrow of the Shah politically backfired on US foreign
policy goals by alienating Iranian moderates and fueling anti-American sentiment
in the mainstream of Iranian politics. The third case unravels the challenges posed
by the threat of terrorism, how the US can overcome those challenges, and how
transcending the discourse of terrorism is necessary to implementing the
necessary solutions. https://twitter.com/RevolutionSyria
Senior Advisor/Chief Ukraine Desk Officer (ECON) Daniel E Hall
https://www.linkedin.com/in/katherine-croft-holt-59453b8/
Katherine Croft
Ms. Croft has over a decade of experience in the national security field, having
served in the legislative and executive branches, and in program, policy and
communications positions. In her current role with the DOE/NNSA, Ms. Croft
works on policy and management issues supporting the President’s nuclear
security agenda, including reducing the nuclear weapons stockpile and advancing
global nuclear threat reduction. In 2010, Ms. Croft joined DOE/NNSA’s Office of
Congressional Affairs, serving as the Deputy Director from 2012-2014. There she
managed NNSA strategic communications and legislative issues related to NNSA’s
budget, program activities, and nuclear security policy issues, including Senate
ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russian
Federation as well as efforts to secure nuclear material worldwide.
Ms. Croft moved to the executive branch in 2006 to the U.S. Department of
State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN). There she held
program management and foreign affairs specialist positions supporting WMD
threat reduction programs and nonproliferation and disarmament policy issues.
She helped establish State’s global Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP), which
engaged countries and partners worldwide to prevent bioterrorism. She also
served as the lead Action Officer for State’s representation at the G-8 Global
Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Ms. Croft
later served in ISN as the lead action officer for implementation of the U.S.-India
civil nuclear cooperation agreement.
She holds a BA from the University of Virginia in English Literature with a minor in
Foreign Affairs, and an MA in Security Policy Studies from the George Washington
University’s Elliot School of International Affairs. She lives with her husband in
Washington, D.C.