Housing Co-Ops in Peri-Urban Harare
Housing Co-Ops in Peri-Urban Harare
Housing Co-Ops in Peri-Urban Harare
Introduction
More than one million people in Zimbabwe constitute the country’s urban housing backlog as
of 2004.1 The government launched Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Restore Order) in
2005, to get rid of illegal structures that had mushroomed in urban areas.2 The government
action reduced the amount of illegal housing stock but increased the housing backlog. This
exercise made the Zimbabwe African National Union government (ZANU PF) unpopular at
home and abroad. To regain support, the government subsequently responded with Operation
Garikayi/Hlalani Kuhle (Operation Live Well), by constructing housing units to accommodate the
victims of Operation Murambatsvina.3 The latter initiative failed to close the gap, and with the
economic crisis peaking in 2008, the housing backlog grew rapidly.
Due to the government’s failure to deliver urban public housing, the demand for low-cost
housing in the country’s peri-urban areas increased. Housing cooperatives grew rapidly in the
peri-urban areas as government acquired land near urban areas to resettle those affected by
Innocent Chirisa is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Rural and Urban Planning at the University of
Zimbabwe. His areas of research focus have been urban informality, peri-urban dynamics, gender and
development, place stewardship, housing, urban governance, social protection, and planning advocacy.
Marilyn Gaza is an MPhil Student in the Department of Rural a Urban Planning at the University of
Zimbabwe.
Elmond Bandauko is an Honors Graduate in the Department of Rural and Urban Planning at the
University of Zimbabwe (UZ) in Harare. His research interests have been urban management practice,
urban policy, land management, housing, spatial governance, and urban informality.
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38 | Chirisa, Gaza and Bandauko
crises and challenges, urbanites strive to form groups and associations as avenues to participate
in urban settlement development.
Housing cooperatives have emerged as one form of associations used by the urbanites to
participate in human settlement development. Cooperatives in Zimbabwe increased in
popularity in the 1980s when the government strictly pursued the communist-socialist agenda,
which defined the country in its first decade of independence (1980-1990). With increased rural
to urban migration and the failure of state housing schemes in urban centers, housing
cooperatives increased their prominence in towns and cities.
With the adoption of neoliberal market reforms in the 1990s under the Economic Structural
Adjustment Program (ESAP), the state removed subsidies and all forms of public support to the
citizens. Another dimension of state retrenchment was that the national housing fund for
public-sector housing shrank. Discussing the influence of the economic performance and
decisions by households to stay or move away from the city, Potts stresses how economic
structural adjustment conditions in most of Africa restricted households regarding the initial
decisions to stay in cities. In the context of Zimbabwe Potts states:
What people would like to do and what they actually do are often different—
their choices are constrained. The interaction of these shifting forces means that
there are also shifts in the relative prevalence of different types of migrants who
might be more usefully divided into four groups: characterized as willing
stayers, reluctant stayers, willing leavers and reluctant leavers.8
This categorization of the migrants under pressing socio-economic conditions is important
as it shapes the type of spatial pattern of living that emerges ultimately, which determines the
manner the inhabitants behave in space.
In addition to the decline in public support for housing during this period of structural
adjustment, the formal channels of housing provision had their own shortcomings. Usually the
formal channels were so stringent that they would blockade efforts by the public. The formal
procedures were overly cumbersome and bureaucratic.
To counter the bureaucratic bottlenecks, communities and groups have formed informal
groups in the form of burial societies, women’s groups, and youth groups.9 These informal
groups tend to enhance popular participation, especially of low-income households trying to
cushion themselves against the vagaries of state and market failures, which include inadequate
housing provision. The failure of formal service delivery systems has given rise to the
resurgence of societies and cooperatives. Cooperatives had been common across Africa since
the 1970s. However, by the 1990s, cooperatives had declined and seemed to be relics of prior
statist policies. By the 2000s, however, local cooperative organizations re-emerged as an
instrumental way of dealing with the problem of housing and land tenure, particularly among
the residents of peri-urban areas. In these housing cooperatives, community members pooled
their resources together as a way of dealing with their own challenges.
Housing cooperatives have adopted an incremental approach, as they are not able to pool
sufficient resources at one time. The incremental approach to housing development emerged as
an alternative to the traditional housing development model, which emphasizes providing full
infrastructure and services before housing construction and habitation. This incremental
approach allows for ”parallel development,” as people settle in the presence of basic services
like water and sanitation, with roads and electricity provided later. Macro-economic hardships
compromised the ability of people to service land in totality. Thus under such conditions, the
incremental approach was advocated.
In sum, popular participation in the informal sector urban development has seen the
growth of slums or informal settlements normally characterized by tenure insecurity and
inadequate infrastructure and services like water and sanitation. The next sections provide
analysis of the research findings.
of Caledonia are also people from Porta Farm. Porta Farm was a holding camp for squatters in
Harare.
and yet others being beneficiaries who got land for housing by default having originally been
seeking land for farming and then taking advantage of the ‘wind’ of the fast-track land
resettlement program.
The diversity of the people in Caledonia affects the parameters of community participation.
The area has loosely arranged and fragmented housing cooperatives. Consequently, the habitat
is still largely “ill-developed.” For example, 70 percent of the structures were of a temporary
nature made from sun burnt bricks, plastic, and timber boards. This is in contrast to Nehanda
where finished housing structures were already in place. The absence of a development
animator, a development agent to provide technical expertise as is the case with UDCORP in
Harare South, organizing housing development partly explains this. In the absence of a strong
development agent in an area, participation by community members is minimal. A
development agent is required to provide technical advice or support for sustainable housing
projects.
Whitecliffe
Whitecliffe was once a farm, owned by a white farmer (the late Sammy Levy) under the Zvimba
Rural District Council. Whitecliffe exhibits apparent housing developmental chaos. Such chaos
is associated with the fast-track land reform program (FTLRP), which the government
embarked upon in 2001.10 Residents in the area argued that during the period of the farm
invasions, Sammy Levy tried to change the name of the farm by incorporating Edgar Pfugari
into its ownership. Unfortunately, the deal was unsuccessful. The reason for selling the farm
was to turn it into a residential area. Some land invaders took over certain sections of the farm
under the name Tongogara Housing Cooperative.
Whitecliffe farm also houses Operation Garikayi/Hahlani Kuhle (OGHK) houses. These
houses were constructed using the 2004 Housing Standards and have been developed on an
incremental basis, without water, sewer and related utilities in place. One female participant in
Whitecliffe observed that:
I blame the government’s policy for the mess we are in as this place was well
planned. It was going to be one of the most beautiful places, I tell you. However,
jambanja [haphazard land invasions] came, hijacked and messed the entire town
planning goal for the area. The developer was not faithful as well. He was only
concerned pocketing money but never considered water and sewer
infrastructure. The responsible authorities must impel the private developer to
re-consider health standards for a settlement lest we contract cholera, dysentery
and typhoid here. The majority of blacks who are in private development are
corrupt, self-enriching, unscrupulous and inconsiderate to the laid down
building standards.
The foregoing quotation reveals the foiled capacity of a formal development initiative
whose plans failed as chaos “dictated” by the state crept in. When state action (or inaction)
comes in, not all private initiatives will stand. The people who participated in the jambanja and
then embarked on housing development took advantage of the state’s position of ”riding on the
chaos for political advantage.”
Whitecliffe contains OGHK houses and is a case of “inadequate housing” given the absence
of proper sanitation, water and roads facilities. In effect, when the government realized that it
could not shoulder the burden alone, it then invited private companies to help. But, due to the
restrained economy (for more than a decade) they could not then do much. The ailing economy
and souring relations between the Zimbabwean government and the international community
short-circuited the network between government and the private sector in providing adequate
housing for Whitecliffe OGHK houses. In the miasma, the local utility companies, specifically
the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority and building societies, have not been able to aid the
situation.
Southlea Park
Southlea Park is located in Harare South and is predominantly a consortium-based housing
arrangement between working-class people and their employers. Membership of the
consortium include up to fifty-four private companies that guarantee their workers for land
acquisition and support for building. In Southlea Park, chiefly work-based beneficiaries have
increasing disposable income and can afford to build their own houses over a short to medium-
term period. The chief determinant for housing development is income.
The Urban Development Corporation (UDCORP), a state-run agency and an arm of the
Ministry of Local Government, National Housing and Public Works, is spearheading the
development project offering project management and technical services. For Southlea Park, the
inhabitants had to move into the settlement only after certain minimum conditions (provision of
basic infrastructure especially water and sanitation) had been met. In this arrangement,
UDCORP prepared the project plan, which it reviews on a regular basis to check if development
is on track of the stipulated provisions. A UDCORP officer describes the Southlea Park
development: “The project is being implemented in phases, beginning with those ideas [we
deem] easier to handle, for example, water and sewer reticulation. We started with major roads,
the fifteen and twenty-meter roads.... They applied for a Parallel Development Permit. The City
of Harare gave some conditions about water and accessibility. Only paid-up beneficiaries are
already on site, have built temporary structures, and are in the process of putting up permanent
structures. They have also established a primary and a secondary school. The secondary school
is now operational.”
Despite the fact that Southlea Park is a consortium-engineered development, it is following
an approach where the blueprint plan for the site under development is first set and then
construction follows the plan in phases. The case of Southlea Park shows how the presence of a
strong quasi-government entity is a step towards ordered housing and settlement development.
The mere presence of a statutory body in the name of UDCORP has gone a long way in
covering the gaps of uncertainty produced by the incremental approach adopted at Southlea
Park.
The formation of a consortium is clear evidence of strong networking among employers
seeking to provide shelter to their employees. And, yet, the consortium remains a relatively
loose network of employers. Instead, the workers are participating with verve, fighting for their
own cause to battle homelessness, with their employers paying a peripheral guarantor role.
Thus, the workers have pride in effectively participating to change their destiny.
Hatcliffe
Hatcliffe, located north of Harare City Centre, has many housing cooperatives. This is clear
evidence of social groups consolidating their standing by producing a shared political identity.
Most of the members of these cooperatives were victims of Operation Murambatsvina. When
the operation was unleashed, some of them had built state of the art houses from their life’s
savings. Operation Murambatsvina resulted in the destruction of all of these illegal
developments.
For over six years, Chimutsa had been watching the environment and had become a
housing cooperative member. For him, the environment is now more conducive to start
building. Chimutsa’s cooperative had been hampered by uncertainty but now they felt they
could go ahead and start building because they had now been fully recognized by the
government. The lingering memories of Murambatsvina had hampered the cooperatives from
resuscitating developments, as they did not want to fall victim again should such a similar
government operation get launched. But, now the members felt more confident because the
same government that had pulled their houses down before had now given them permission to
build houses and then later undertake road construction. The permission to build was probably
a political move by the government to gain popularity and support. However, only those with a
steady flow of income from either formal employment or entrepreneurship were ready to build.
Nevertheless, there are other issues now. As one resident explained, “You see we are coming
from a crisis [economic crisis] and only those who are employed or engaging seriously in self-
employment activities and earning significant money, are building.”
The chairperson of a Housing Cooperative in Hatcliffe tries, as much as possible to indicate
that his cooperative is working flat out to involve his work with local government. His use of
the term ”us” in his narrative is revealing: “We are working with the local government. When I
say local government, I mean Harare City Council and us, actively involved with each other to
have this settlement completely serviced…. We are doing everything possible to ensure
formalization of the settlement. What they are saying, we have no way but to follow if we are
going to have a good place to live in, free from disease outbreaks. It is difficult but good for us
at the end.” From this statement, it is evident that housing cooperatives in the peri-urban areas
of Harare are making frantic efforts to ensure that they are politically recognized by the state.
They are embedded in the politics of patron-client relations. In addition, they are striving to
affiliate themselves with political parties while at the same time seeking technical legitimacy by
following the standards spelt out with the city of Harare as the local authority.
households (14.25 percent) have been in the area for a period between six and ten years. That is
a significant length of time for them to have put up structures.
TABLE 3: PERIOD SPENT IN THE PERI-URBAN HABITAT
Research Site < 1 year 1-3 years 4-6 years 6-10 years 11+ years Total
Whitecliffe 23 52 10 12 1 98
23.47 53.06 10.2 12.24 1.02 100.00
Hatcliffe 25 36 17 13 9 100
25.00 36.00 17.00 13.00 9.00 100.00
Caledonia 3 46 19 32 0 100
3.00 46.00 19.00 32.00 0.00 100.00
Harare South 30 68 4 0 0 102
29.41 66.67 3.92 0.00 0.00 100.00
Total 81 202 50 57 10 400
20.25 50.50 12.50 14.25 2.50 100.00
which the peri-urban area previously belonged, may have reluctantly released the land and
may continue to hold the area inadvertently. This creates ”bad” politics, which tend to confuse
peri-urbanites. Illustrating these dynamics, one senior local government officer said, “The peri-
urban area is a place in which there is interplay of factors on non-commitment by especially the
urban local authorities who may not be ready to develop the area and reluctance to release the
place, by especially the rural local authorities which may be losing their source of revenue. As
these forces play out, it is the common people, communities living in this area who suffer
most.” In the end, the peri- urban dwellers’ tenure security is compromised.
costly investment if one ends up pulling out of the cooperative. All of these dynamics dampen
the morale of the cooperators.
in the shortest possible time. The case of Southlea Park seems more organized given the activity
of UDCORP in the development process.
In Zimbabwe, conversion of state land to private land is a process that takes many stages
including acquisition, compensation for improvements, planning, allocation of stands, and full
payment. The Deputy Director of Physical Planning partly explains this by saying, “You must
(...) bear in mind that it’s only after everything has been planned and allocation of stands has
been done that State land then becomes private land.” In this present case, the City
administration of Harare has remained somewhat unclear in its actions putting the hopes of the
home-seekers in disarray and shattering them.
Quite a number of these low-income peri-urbanites indicated that they were uncertain of
their future. For example, Chipo in Harare South said, “We have been here since 2005 and we
do not know, whether to build or to wait. If we build and the government decides to unleash
another Murambatsvina, then we are in trouble….” In the same vein, Tagara in Hatcliffe says,
“the only thing we must build at the moment is temporary shelters. We cannot risk building
what may be razed off like what Murambatsvina did to some of our friends.” These sentiments
show the level of uncertainty that most peri-urban dwellers share. The places lack adequate
public health services exposing many to diseases like cholera and dysentery that since 2008
have been commonplace in Zimbabwe.
Despite the variations highlighted above, in all cases, we see the interplay of politics, both
in terms of internal cooperative politics and external politics. The internal politics includes
housing cooperatives ballooning their membership numbers to raise financial resources but
then failing to meet the demand of the bigger numbers. Corruption is a cancerous development
within the cooperatives much to the detriment of the trust and commitment among cooperative
members. Regarding external politics, we see cooperatives trying hard to ally or collaborate
with politicians so that they can lay a claim on the land in which they are trying to house
themselves. In most cases, tenure security is vague, creating opportunities for politicians to act
as guarantors for continuity of stay on the pieces of land. Besides, the fact that the land on
which peri-urban housing cooperatives were trying to build is under transition, having to move
from neighboring rural local authorities to Harare, there is hesitance on the part of Harare to
immediately incorporate such areas by servicing them. At the same time, some rural local
authorities reluctantly release such areas as they may have historically provided revenue
through rental contributions by the farmers. This tug-of-war between local authorities puts the
inhabitants at serious risk of tenure insecurity which may not be immediately resolved.
Conclusion
The paper has managed to unmask the key issues surrounding housing and land tenure in the
peri-urban fringes of Harare. As urbanization increased, the state has continued to provide
services to the urban dwellers, housing included. The formation of housing cooperatives is the
manifestation of the ineffectiveness of these state-sponsored, formal service delivery
mechanisms.
This study has shown a number of dimensions to the reality of political identity, networks
and participation in these cooperatives in peri-urban Harare. Belonging to a membership group,
particularly in the form of cooperatives and consortia, explains how low-income groups
enhance their sense of security in a place. Still, many of the peri-urban dwellers in the
researched sites were not familiar with the administration that they fall under, making it
impossible for them to direct with vigor their demands there. Nevertheless, most peri-urban
dwellers feel they have ”gained” by being in the areas of their residence. Tenure security is a
major battle, and fear characterizes peri-urban Harare. In trying to resolve the challenges,
individuals and cooperatives alike have to brace with the politics surrounding this matter.
Notes
1 MNHSA 2010.
2 For more on Operation Murambatsvina, see Chipungu 2011; Tibaijuka 2005; Toriro 2007.
The literal translation of murambatsvina is “to get rid of trash.”
3 See Toriro 2006.
4 All of the quoted comments in the article come from these interviews in 2011 and 2012. The
identity of the interviewees has been kept confidential, and names have been changed.
5 For definition of urbanization, Potts 2012, p. v.; for developing countries, Satterthwaite
2004.
6 Guyer, 2011, p.474.
7 Potts 2012, p.xvii.
8 Potts 2011, p.605.
9 Guyer 2011.
10 This was a haphazard seizure of white-owned farms in which land was grabbed by the
land hungry Zimbabweans. Before this, the government followed religiously the 1979
Lancaster House Agreement between the British Government and the new Government of
Zimbabwe. The Agreement stipulated that the new government could only acquire land
from the whites following a “willing-buyer-willing-seller” dictum. After 1990, this
arrangement lapsed but the government had not resettled its land-hungry populace. The
formation of MDC in 1990 prompted ZANU PF to look into the land issue as its escape gate
towards garnering votes hence the ZANU PF Government just allowed farm seizures
which it then “christened” the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FLTRP). This FLTRP
in 2000 assisted in bringing to surface a critical dimension to the deep-seated urban
housing question. As war veterans, the general landless, farm workers and the urban
homeless joined in the race of “land grabbing,” a peri-urban “chaos” arose as they began
to build houses (Moyo 1995; Murowe and Chirisa 2006; Moyo 2000, 2011).
11 Murowe and Chirisa 2006.
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