Research Forum

Photo: Bamahane website

IDF Strategy Documents, 2002-2018:

On Processes, Chiefs of Staff, and the IDF
Meir Finkel
Writing and releasing strategy documents has become a norm in the IDF in the
last two decades; most were published internally within the military. This article
presents the contents of the documents published from 2002 to 2018, focusing
on several questions: Why were they published; what needs do they address?
What was the process of developing the knowledge, and what staff work was
required to prepare each document? How was the Chief of Staff involved in this
process? What are the main changes from previous documents? After presenting
the documents, the article considers the increasing frequency of updates, the
purpose of each document as seen by the Chief of Staff, and the influence of
the document on the IDF as part of the “open discourse space” between the IDF
and the political echelon. The article is a preliminary comparative study of this
developing phenomenon in the IDF, giving an important glimpse into the General
Staff processes.
Keywords: IDF strategy documents, Chief of Staff, learning processes, political-military discourse, civil-
military relations
4 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 4 | October 2020

Introduction control; and the capabilities to be developed

The IDF Strategy document prepared and through force design. Documents of this kind
published by Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot in do not include a detailed analysis of a specific
August 2015 made waves in the media and enemy or a specific response to that enemy.
brought this type of document to public They present what the IDF calls “operational
attention. Eisenkot released the document in concepts,” in effect, the IDF strategies employed
order to increase the transparency between in the different arenas (for example, dealing with
the IDF, the political echelon, and the public, Iranian activity in the north). These concepts
and to encourage the political echelon to relate utilize the terminology and processes described
to the ideas expressed in it as a response of in the strategy documents with reference to a
sorts to the absence of official national security defined operational problem, and propose a
documents. Eisenkot’s document was the fourth concrete response that is developed pursuant
of this type since 2002. This article describes to war plans or routine security campaign plans.
the four documents (in fact five, since Eisenkot Compared to the past, when such concepts
updated the document in 2018) with the focus were not put into writing and the outcome
on the following questions: of the thinking process was a plan that in
a. What was the reason for release, i.e., what most cases was not implemented, in recent
needs did this document address? years the IDF has produced more and more
b. What type of process and what staff work was conceptual documents. These documents
involved to develop the knowledge required are based on in-depth thinking and provide
for its preparation, and how was the Chief a systemic analysis and definition of the
of Staff involved? context in which the concept was developed,
c. What were the main changes introduced in so that it can be challenged and adapted as
each document? the context changes. It is therefore surprising
that the IDF strategy documents are not actually
strategy documents in the familiar sense of a
In recent years the IDF has produced more and
targeted response to a military challenge in
more conceptual documents. These documents
a concrete context, requiring a new strategy
are based on in-depth thinking and provide a
when the problem or the context changes, but
systemic analysis and definition of the context in
rather descriptions of the concepts that help
which the concept was developed, so that it can be
challenged and adapted as the context changes. to develop these strategies. For this reason,
the document titles often include the words
“operational concept” together with the word
Each document is described separately with “strategy” (the problematic name for these
reference to these questions, followed by a documents resembles the problem with the
discussion of the broader theme: What does this term “chief of staff,” referring to the person
series of documents tell us about the IDF as an who is actually commander of the IDF and not
organization, and what role do they play in what head of the staff).
the literature calls “the open discourse space” The second common denominator is the
between the different echelons of Israeli society. opening statement that in view of the ever-
The various documents share a number of changing reality, it will be necessary to review
features. The first is their structure, consisting and update the documents regularly. Another
of the following elements: clarification of the shared feature is that all the strategy documents
threats in the strategic environment; principles are intended to show changes and learning in
of IDF approaches to action in the face of these the IDF and present their products, particularly
threats; the basic organization of command and in areas such as the range of threats to be faced
 Meir Finkel | IDF Strategy Documents, 2002-2018: On Processes, Chiefs of Staff, and the IDF 5

and the principles of types of action. Most of in militaries has been widely studied and
them deal with the past and the present, and includes, among other approaches, learning
with respect to the future, it is generally a the lessons of one’s own wars, learning by
matter of continuing existing trends, and the emulating other armies, and innovation based
perceived horizon is just a few years ahead. on experimenting with developing capabilities.
The fourth common denominator is that all the (For a comprehensive review of various patterns
documents were written for the army’s internal of learning in militaries, see Finkel, 2020). Like
needs and therefore use military language, any army, the IDF has its own strategic culture,
with concepts that are not always clear to the which influences the attention given to each
political echelon or the general public (for type of learning.
example, the documents of 2015 and 2018). In the research literature on military
Moreover, the interface between the top ranks innovation, the IDF of the 1990s and 2000s
of the IDF and the political echelon with regard is described as an organization relying to a
to approval of the documents was quite limited. great extent on its own war experience, and
This was not because of IDF unwillingness to afterwards as adopting American ideas without
present them for discussion and approval, but critical examination, with a tendency to look
because of the traditional Israeli lack of official for technological solutions, a preference for
national security documents, expressing an practitioners over theorists, difficulty taking
open preference by the political echelon not to the long view due to the heavy load of routine
commit to a particular approach, but to approve security activity, and more (Adamsky, 2012, pp.
whatever the IDF presents, even if generally and 190-194). These descriptions paint a picture
in retrospect (Shelah, 2016). One could argue that contains some truth, but the reality
that there is a deliberate disconnect between during this period was far more complex (on
the politicians and the military, apparently in the process of conceptual experimentation in
order to maintain the freedom of action of the the 1990s, and the cautious nature of Israeli
former, although in recent years there have learning from the American experience in the
been calls in the political echelon to close this Iraq War, see Finkel, 2020). The sources of
gap (Shelah, 2016). learning and the learning methods used while
The final common denominator is that developing the strategy documents vary from
responsibility for preparing the document case to case and incorporate, based on the
was assigned to the Operations Branch/J3 period and its challenges, the types of learning
(Amatz), whose head was personally involved mentioned above.
in the work, while the main staff element in its From a theoretical point of view regarding the
development was the Training and Doctrine types of learning used to develop the strategy
Division (Tohad). Parts of the document were documents (analytical learning that breaks down
also prepared by the Intelligence Directorate/ problems, which is characteristic of military post-
J2 and the Planning Directorate/J5. action reviews, or holistic thinking that takes a
systemic view of problems; see Lanir, 1997; 1999),
The Strategy Documents: the IDF strategy documents were not developed
The Product of Knowledge according to the design approach, as they were
Development Processes in the IDF not intended to develop a concrete strategy
The IDF strategy documents are the product for a specific enemy or to solve a problem, but
of preliminary studies of Israel’s environment rather to build the world of military concepts
and the planned IDF response—in terms of and terminology to be used for that purpose.
force design, emphases in force employment, In recent years the IDF has made intensive use
organizational changes, and more. Learning of the design approach to develop operational
6 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 4 | October 2020

concepts regarding its enemies (for a partial list, to use military force in order to achieve political
see Finkel & Ortal, 2019) or concepts for force goals that are difficult to conceptualize—what
design. The knowledge development for writing Michael calls: “the open discourse space.” The
IDF strategy documents is closer to what is called outcome of the process is the same as in the
staff research and staff work, where the main past—directives from the politicians to the
discussion focuses on the array of concepts military—but the way these instructions are
appearing in the document; how to define the developed is different and more complex.
nature of the enemy and its patterns of action; A similar trend exists in the military echelon.
what is the IDF’s modus operandi in principle; On the one hand, several ranks must cooperate
and what are the latest and most relevant to develop shared knowledge, abandoning the
definitions of defeat, deterrence, victory, and hierarchical approach that divides them (Lanir,
so on with respect to an enemy. In fact, the IDF 1997); on the other hand, it is becoming more
strategy documents (although they contain the difficult to achieve conceptual unity with respect
word strategy) are a kind of doctrinal document to dynamic and complex challenges, requiring
that institutes “a system of interpretive terms” more dialogue between the different ranks
(Lanir, 1998) that is relevant for that period. (Finkel, 2018b). Within this complexity, and
perhaps as an inadvertent part of the response
to it, it has become necessary to prepare and
In the framework of the primacy of the political issue IDF strategy documents that enable the
echelon over the military echelon, and the General Staff to work together with the various
separation between them, it is vital to conduct
services and regional commands to develop a
a dialogue that is not the product of a simple
basic “system of interpretive terms,” for use in
hierarchical process in which the political echelon
the preparation of concrete strategies (and in
dictates tasks to the military echelon, but rather
the discourse with the political echelon).
includes a joint investigation and clarification of
the situation and the best way to use military force.
IDF Strategy Documents and their
Counterparts in the United States
In the Inter-Echelon and Britain
“Open Discourse Space” Various kinds of strategy documents have been
The complexity of military activity in recent written in the United States over the years. The
decades, particularly when dealing with Goldwater-Nichols Act (Public Law 99-433, Oct.
terror organizations, led to a recognition of 1, 1986) defines the role of the Chairman of the
the difficulty faced by armies attempting to Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of a wider reform of
propose effective military actions, and the the US Armed Forces, and stipulates inter alia
difficulty faced by political leaders attempting that the Secretary of Defense must prepare
to define clear achievements for the army (for and publish an annual report. This document
a review, see Michael, 2016 and the sources must include national security objectives and
cited). This recognition led to the understanding policies, priorities with respect to military tasks,
that in the framework of the primacy of the and the allocation of resources for the period,
political echelon over the military echelon, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the separation between them, it is vital to is required to assist the Secretary in this work
conduct a dialogue that is not the product of a (Section 153 of the Act). Since 2002, the following
simple hierarchical process in which the political documents have been anchored in legislation:
echelon dictates tasks to the military echelon, the National Security Strategy, signed by the
but rather includes a joint investigation and President; the National Defense Strategy, signed
clarification of the situation and the best way by the Secretary of Defense; and the National
 Meir Finkel | IDF Strategy Documents, 2002-2018: On Processes, Chiefs of Staff, and the IDF 7

Military Strategy, signed by the Chairman of In terms of process, the document presented
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The latter document areas of knowledge that developed in three
is written in the military, and by law must refer largely separate channels. The first, the “Spring
in detail to the manner in which the US armed of Youth” work done in 1998-1999 on IDF
forces respond to the main threats to national organization, was reflected in the organizational
security, as described in the documents by change known as IDF 2000 (Mofaz presented its
the President and the Secretary of Defense. essence in a short article in Maarachot, Mofaz,
American law also specifies the frequency that 1999). The second channel was a series of
documents must be updated, to whom they conceptual workshops in 1999-2000 on defining
must be submitted for approval, and more. A the challenges and the responses by type of
critical article of 2017 claims that the result is threat (the Palestinians, Syria, third circle). The
a “cacophony” of strategic documents, and the third channel was knowledge developed during
number should be reduced to prevent overlap the terms of Ehud Barak and Amnon Lipkin-
(Karlin et al., 2017). Shahak as Chiefs of Staff in the context of fighting
In Britain, several documents have been the Syrian army. The chiefs of staff guided the
written by the political echelon, under the process and discussed the material produced by
general heading of Defence Review. In 2010 it was the teams. The document was prepared by the
stipulated that such documents must be updated head of the History Department, Col. (res.) Yigal
every five years (for a survey of these documents, Eyal, and as head of the Training and Doctrine
see House of Commons Library, 2020). division, Brig. Gen. Gershon Hacohen wrote in
In Israel, on the other hand, there are no such the introduction, “This book does not amount to
official documents published by the political instructions to be followed, but rather presents
echelon. A central attempt to formulate such a the reader with a comprehensive survey of basic
document was made in 2004-2006 by the Meridor ideas, formulated in the IDF over the last four
Committee, but it was never published (Meridor years” (IDF Strategy, 2002, p. iii).
& Eldadi, 2018). In August 2018 it was announced The introduction indicates the reason for
that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had writing the document:
updated Israel’s security concept, but this was
never fully disclosed (Prime Minister’s Office, The new reality poses many additional
2018). Consequently, the military documents challenges to the IDF—challenges that
are in effect the most significant official Israeli did not form part of the traditional
security documents written by senior figures security concept shaped by David Ben
in existence. Gurion. Countries have left the circle
of hostility (Egypt, Jordan) and distant
IDF Strategy: Trends and Basic Ideas countries with extremist ideological
for Force Design and Employment regimes (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan)
under Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, have become threatening strategic
April 2002 elements; this affects the response and
This document was published four months force design, and the Palestinian issue
before the end of Shaul Mofaz’s tenure as Chief has changed from a refugee problem
of Staff, in effect a way of leaving his stamp on to a struggle with clear nationalist
the organization by documenting his work. At signs. (IDF Strategy, 2002, pp. 4-5)
a seminar in 2000, Mofaz explained that one
purpose of the document was to define a shared Consequently, the nature of the hostilities
strategic language for the IDF (IDF Strategy, has changed—limited confrontation with
2002, p. 11). the Palestinians has developed and strategic
8 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 4 | October 2020

weapons, such as ground-to-ground missiles under Mofaz (for details of the idea of AFV
and nonconventional weapons, have entered destruction, see Finkel, 2018a, pp. 159-167).
the arena. In view of these needs, the writers e. Organization of the General Staff and its
of the document focused on the following: contribution to strengthening the IDF’s
a. Definition of the threats by circles: Four ability to deal with new challenges: The
circles of confrontation were defined: the document establishes the move by Mofaz
inner circle—the home front, the Palestinians to reorganize the General Staff and other high
(countering terror, guerrilla warfare, and a level headquarters under the heading IDF
popular uprising); the first circle—the front; 2000 and included: fully dividing the Staff
the second circle—Iraq; the third circle—Iran Directorate (Agam) between the Operations
and Libya. Organizing the threats by range Directorate (Amatz) (a new body) and the
reflected the correct perception for the time, Planning Directorate (Agat); converting the
that in kinetic action, the range is the main Ground Forces Headquarters (Mafhash) to
factor that affects the type of response (IDF the Ground Forces Command (Mazi); and
Strategy, 2002, pp. 98-103). uniting the combat service support corps in
b. Limited confrontation with the Palestinians: the Technological and Logistics Directorate
A substantial part of the document (Atal) (IDF Strategy, 2002, pp. 123-125; for
was devoted to a description of the details of this move, see Finkel, 2020).
characteristics and the response—a strategic Since the organizational change in the IDF
situation assessment specific to this type of was far-reaching, perhaps the largest since
confrontation, with emphasis on the rising its inception, the document dealt at length
role of the media as a weapon in the hands of with the reasons, focusing on changes in the
the Palestinians, and on building a capacity strategic environment:
to disperse demonstrations.
c. Civil-military relations and the subject of The organizational change arose from
social cohesion are discussed at length in the obligation to improve and adapt
the document, apparently because of what operational capability (the response) to
developed regarding the withdrawal from changes in the strategic environment,
Lebanon at the start of Mofaz’s term, and to resource constraints, and to develop
particularly following the ongoing fighting capabilities (technology, weapons,
in the West Bank (and the attacks within human capabilities, and so on).…The
the State of Israel that accompanied it) (IDF biggest change in the IDF in recent
Strategy, 2002, pp. 20-25). years arose from the understanding
d. The idea of the offensive defense based on that without the change, the IDF will
standoff fire in the face of a massive Syrian have difficulty fulfilling its mission,
armored attack: At that time Syria was the and that its commanders have the
main motive for building IDF strength in terms duty of initiating a process that will
of army size and weapons purchase (but not enable the IDF to deal with future
with regard to training, which was channeled challenges. The organizational
to the struggle with the Palestinians). The change is therefore a component of
idea of offensive defense addressed the the ongoing strategic thought process
systemic destruction of armored fighting (the army as a learning organization).
vehicles (AFV) through standoff fire, in The changes in the framework of IDF
order to break an armored Syrian attack. 2000 must be examined continually in
This capability, whose development began order to monitor the army’s ability to
in the early 1990s, reached full maturity provide a response to changes in the
 Meir Finkel | IDF Strategy Documents, 2002-2018: On Processes, Chiefs of Staff, and the IDF 9

strategic environment. (IDF Strategy, numerous participants and a wealth of exercises

2002, pp. 28-30) and practical experiences of the various fields.
Chief of Staff Ya’alon was personally involved in
Thus, the document formalized knowledge developing the concept and spent much of his
developed during Mofaz’s tenure as Chief of time on the matter. The answer to the question
Staff about the nature of the confrontation and of why he did not publish the document lies
fighting in the Palestinian arena, the response to apparently in his approach to the process
a challenge such as the Yom Kippur War, and the of knowledge development as an ongoing
organizational changes implemented. While the learning effort, and not a process that ends
first four subjects dealt with the establishment with the release of the document. Chief of Staff
of knowledge already existing in the system Halutz was involved in the processes as part
(which was developed previously), the last of his previous jobs—Deputy Chief of Staff, and
subject, the reorganization of the General Staff, before that, head of Amatz/J3—and when he
was a new idea. took over as Chief of Staff he completed the
process. This was the only time among the cases
The IDF Operational Concept under described that development of the concept
Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, April 2006 occurred in parallel to the process of developing
Notwithstanding the name of the document, the national security concept, led by Knesset
which lacks the word “strategy,” this document Member Dan Meridor (the work led by Meridor
matches its predecessors and successors. Of the focused on the military aspects of national
various versions of IDF strategy documents, this security). The various documents contain some
is the most familiar and was discussed at length shared ideas, such as the rising importance of
in the Winograd Commission Report (Winograd home front defense and the use of standoff
Commission, 2007, pp. 268-274; Preisler-Swery, fire, at the expense of ground maneuvers and
2017; a detailed analysis of the assimilation of seizure of territory.
the concept appears in Finkel, 2020) because The contents of the document were
of its links, or attributed links, to the failures of discussed after the Second Lebanon War;
the Second Lebanon War. The document was suffice it here to mention the article by Dana
published about a year after Chief of Staff Halutz Preisler-Swery, a researcher at the Dado Center
took office, although it is based on far-reaching for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, who
work that was mainly done during the term of showed that the concept dealt with a number
his predecessor, Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon in 2004- of central ideas, some in the context of general
2005. The document was partly implemented methodology—how the IDF needs to organize
and shelved after the Second Lebanon War. and think—and some in the context of the main
In the context of process there was a enemy. Most of the ideas were new for their
development of new knowledge for the IDF time (Preisler-Swery, 2017):
in a range of fields, led by Ya’alon in a series a. The Methodological Aspect — the SOD
of positions that he held—GOC Central (System Operational Design) process
Command, Deputy Chief of Staff, and Chief at the strategic-operational levels: a
of Staff (the process was presented from a methodological process that adapts the
number of viewpoints, including by Tamari learning theory to the challenges faced by
& Kalifi, 2009; Adamsky, 2012, pp. 163-174; senior ranks.
Finkel, 2020). The process was managed by b. Definition of the command and control
the head of the Training and Doctrine Division, approach, whereby the head of the relevant
Brig. Gen. Meir Kalifi, and the head of Amatz, command also commands the campaign:
Maj. Gen. Israel Ziv. It included workshops with The new approach was based on the
10 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 4 | October 2020

operational level in the IDF, which the issues for implementation—SOD; effects-based
concept identified as the focus of influence, operations; and the regional command as the
headed by the “operator.” This level is a campaign “operator” meant to implement
separate intermediate layer that connects the first two elements—where each was at
the strategic level with the tactical level, and a different stage of maturity in the IDF, was
its task is to bridge the gap between abstract apparently the main source of the challenge
strategic ideas and concrete military action. of introducing the concept and the fact that it
c. Effects-Based Operations were developed was not utilized in the Second Lebanon War. It is
in the United States and adopted by the also possible that the IDF of that time lacked a
IDF, despite some criticism. The concept culture of implementing innovative ideas from
is intended to achieve decision through a above and intellectual criticism from below, to
focused attack on various centers of gravity examine, challenge, and offer concepts that
in the enemy’s system, creating effects that stimulate fruitful tensions.
will lead to a strategic victory. The need for a new document in this case
d. Jointness: An organizational concept that lay in the new ideas developed in the IDF after
was developed in order to enlarge the range studying how the United States Army functioned
of options and the abilities to take relevant in the Iraq War in 2003, and the development of
and effective action in the face of existing systemic thinking, which began as a response
and emerging challenges, and in particular to the complexity of the challenges in the West
to create the needed integration of forces Bank and was later applied to all IDF modus
(military and non-military) to ensure the operandi (Finkel, 2020).
suitability and optimal utilization of the force
at any given time. IDF Strategy under Chief of Staff
e. With respect to specific enemies: a decisive Benny Gantz, October 2013
end to the limited and ongoing confrontation This document was published in late 2013,
with the Palestinians, operational level fire almost three years after Gantz took over as
to decide hostilities with countries, instead Chief of Staff, well into the civil war in Syria, and
of maneuvers to capture territory ( perceived during the negotiations on a nuclear deal with
as a burden because of the guerrilla warfare Iran. In terms of process, work on the document
IDF forces will have to face). began during the term of Chief of Staff Gabi
Some of the changes mentioned above— Ashkenazi and continued under Gantz, with
with emphasis on military language, the the actual writing done by the Dado Center in
ability of heads of regional commands to the Operations Branch/J3 (Amatz), and later
command the campaign, and the element of handled personally by the head of Amatz, Maj.
fire—were criticized in the Winograd Report Gen. Yoav Har Even.
(Winograd Commission, 2008, pp. 268-275). An Gantz underwent a personal learning
important fact for understanding the difficulties process during his tenure (which was not by
of developing and introducing the concept means of the General Staff work or workshops),
was the attempt—as defined by Itai Brun, the results of which were published in an August
commander of the Dado Center after the war, 2013 document called “IDF 2025—Vision and
who investigated the concept, and Preisler- Directions for Action.” The insights he gained
Swery (2017)—to include in the document from his personal learning process fed the
a broad and varied array of elements. Each strategy document published in October 2013—
element was at a different stage of development there was no process of developing knowledge
and practical experience (Finkel, 2020). The through workshops, expert teams, and so on.
close link between the three most complex Gantz approved the document at a number of
 Meir Finkel | IDF Strategy Documents, 2002-2018: On Processes, Chiefs of Staff, and the IDF 11

General Staff discussions. Unlike its predecessor, campaign between wars in routine times is
this document was not intended to innovate to damage the enemy’s attempts to build
but to reflect the existing situation, and thus strength, to create deterrence and better
formed a platform for shared language rather conditions for operations and wars, and to
than guidance for force employment or design create the potential to delay high-intensity
(Har Even, 2020).1 use of the force (in emergencies [see above]
Four main new subjects appeared in the and wars)” (IDF Strategy, 2013, p. 29). The
concept: principles of CBW force employment were
a. Conceptualization of three IDF operational later defined.
modus operandi—“emergency situation” c. In the framework of operations whose
was added to the “routine” and “wartime” purpose is a decisive victory, significant
situations defined by his predecessor emphasis was given to the need for action
Ashkenazi. The need for this new category in operational depth. Based on this insight,
arose from Operation Pillar of Defense in Gantz set up a Depth Command in early 2012.
Gaza (2012), which was neither a routine d. Cyber: Throughout the document there is
situation nor officially a war, but was a emphasis on the threats in cyberspace that
situation that might develop from the demand increased protection, as well as the
“campaign between wars” (CBW): need to make maximum use of this space for
intelligence and attack. The document does
The use of force in a state of emergency not deal with the General Staff organizational
includes operations characterized changes required in this regard.
by high-intensity use of military The need for a new document arose when
force. As a rule these operations are the operational concept of 2006 was suspended
restricted to one arena or one front. following the Second Lebanon War. One of the
The disruption to routine life on the main objectives of the Operations Directorate
home front will be limited as far as in the period following the war was to update
possible. The rationale for using force the operational concept. Apparently the General
in an emergency includes retaliation, Staff work was not completed under Chief of
(significant) damage to the enemy’s Staff Ashkenazi due to the general trend in the
force development, and renewal of IDF of “back to basics,” which characterized
deterrence. (IDF Strategy, 2013, p. 22) his term of office and was correct at the time
(Finkel, 2018, pp. 122-142). This trend postponed
For the purpose of emergency action, a changes of various kinds, some that developed
“deterrent operation” was defined: “The under Ashkenazi, and others that were initiated
logic underlying the idea of deterrence by Gantz. The strategy document under Gantz
is to ‘persuade’ the enemy that the price formalized the knowledge that was developed
and/or the risk of a particular course of in those years (2006-2012).
action that it might choose is greater than
any foreseeable benefit to be gained from IDF Strategy under Chief of Staff
that action” (IDF Strategy, 2013, p. 27). This Gadi Eisenkot, August 2015/January
type of operation was not presented as a 2018
substitute for decisive operations, but as The IDF Strategy document issued by Chief of
an additional type of operation suitable for Staff Eisenkot in 2015 includes “the strategy for
emergencies. force employment…focusing on the common
b. Definition of a new pattern of action—CBW: elements of the various operational arenas in
“The rationale for force employment in the which the conflict is against a sub-state enemy
12 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 4 | October 2020

(such as Hezbollah and Hamas organizations)” absent. (Foreign Affairs and Defense
(IDF Strategy, 2015, p. 7). It was written for Committee, 2017, p. 6)
internal purposes, such as the General Staff
framework for operational concepts to be Whatever the case, in view of the importance of
developed by the regional commands that the matter, Chief of Staff Eisenkot did everything
were deemed very important by Eisenkot, in his power to encourage a professional
but was used in an unusual way compared to dialogue between the military and the political
its predecessors for the purpose of an open echelon on this subject.
dialogue with the political echelon. The reason The process of knowledge development
for this novel use apparently lies in Eisenkot’s took the form of staff work coordinated by
experience of the interface between the the head of Amatz, Maj. Gen. Yoav Har Even,
politicians and the military when he served as and with the help of the Dado Center, and its
the Prime Minister’s Military Secretary and then content was influenced by two elements: an
as the head of Amatz in the Second Lebanon analysis of Operation Protective Edge (2014)
War. The Gideon multi-year plan, which was and the personal learning process experienced
based on his strategy document, stressed the by Eisenkot before he became Chief of Staff.
development of the IDF’s ability to act against The results were published in March 2015 (a
Hamas and Hezbollah, although at the time month after he took office) in a document called
of the publication of the strategy and the “Core Messages to IDF Commanders,” which
preparation of the Gideon Plan, Prime Minister stated that there was “a need for a joint and
Netanyahu stated that the main threat to Israel thorough clarification of ‘IDF strategy and the
was from Iran. A special report of the Knesset operational concept,’ with a discussion of the
Sub-Committee on the Security Concept stated: basic ideas arising from it” (Office of the Chief
of Staff, 2015). The General Staff discussed the
“Gideon” was designed “from outcomes of the work at a two-day workshop
the bottom up” by and within the in late March 2015, and the decisions of the
IDF: and this was with no written, Chief of Staff guided the continuation of the
approved, and published national work. The document was presented to Defense
security concept, and for most if Minister Ya’alon in July 2015 (Har Even, 2020).
not all of the process, even without The main issues highlighted in this document
preliminary instruction from the were:
political echelon. This could lead to a a. The focus on the “first circle”—Hezbollah
return of the failures from the previous and Hamas: This focus is a change from
campaigns, both in terms of a missing previous documents, which defined the
critical mass of real capabilities, and range of hostilities but did not define any
because of the danger that an army order of priorities.
that was built and prepared for its b. Within the first circle—focus on a war
mission with one rationale may be scenario: The classified version of the
required to act according to another document included quantitative aspects
rationale. Meanwhile the congruence of the range of action of the ground forces
necessary in today’s operations and the scope of targets that the Air Force
between instructions from the was required to attack (here too it differs
political echelon and the willingness to from previous documents that were more
implement them, and the operational general): “The ability to activate effective
plans and consequent force design, is Operational-Level fire (air, land, and sea) is
required in all war arenas, at full strength,
 Meir Finkel | IDF Strategy Documents, 2002-2018: On Processes, Chiefs of Staff, and the IDF 13

at any time, with an output of thousands of of cooperation” and coordination that

targets for a single day of fighting, and for the IDF develops. The second concerns
the rest of the time—the ability to generate force employment, and defines two
and attack hundreds of targets per day” (IDF main approaches—decision, and
Strategy, 2015, p. 40). prevention and influence, based
c. Engagement with the cyber domain — on the understanding that these
broader in comparison with the document approaches reflect ideas on how to
from the Gantz era, defining the need for deal with threats, and that there is
“establishing a cyber arm which will serve reciprocity between them. Third, the
as a principal command, subordinate to the document also expresses the growing
Chief of the General Staff, for operations importance of the campaign between
and force buildup of the IDF cyberspace wars (CBW) and of other efforts, such
capabilities. It will be in charge for planning as the cyber and cognitive (information
and implementing the cyber domain operations) efforts, in addition to the
campaign” (IDF Strategy, 2015, p. 42). The continued effort of reinforcing joint
arm was not established, but there were a ground maneuver capability. (IDF
number of organizational processes in this Strategy, 2018, p. 3)
area, including the establishment of the
Cyber Defense Division in the C4I Directorate Behind the IDF Strategy Documents:
(which later became C4I and Cyber Defense Reflections on the IDF
Directorate). It appears that the various documents are not
d. Following international reports of IDF actions products of personal caprices by the respective
in Gaza, the subject of the struggle over Chiefs of Staff (i.e., a document intended is to
the legitimacy of IDF actions occupied a leave the imprint of the new Chief of Staff by
relatively large part of the document, with replacing his predecessor’s document, or to
details of measures the IDF must use in order introduce his changes as soon as he enters
to maintain this legitimacy (IDF Strategy, office). Mofaz published the document at the
2015, pp. 29-30). end of his tenure; Ya’alon, who worked on
Following Eisenkot’s decision that the developing the concept throughout his term
IDF Strategy required updating in view of of office, did not complete it and the document
developments, a new version was issued in was published under his successor, Halutz;
January 2018. The updates were the product of Ashkenazi did not publish a strategy document;
staff work led by the head of the Training and Gantz published the document halfway through
Doctrine division, Brig. Gen. Motti Baruch, and his term, while Eisenkot published two versions
were discussed by the head of Amatz, Maj. Gen. of the document during his term—a year after
Nitzan Alon, and the Chief of Staff himself. In taking office and about a year before leaving.
the foreword, the Chief of Staff wrote: Presumably the Chiefs of Staff felt a genuine
need to explain to the IDF—a large and complex
This document updates the IDF organization—a number of developing aspects:
Strategy of 2015, in view of changes the conceptualization of enemies and conflicts;
affecting several aspects. One concerns the reasons for organizational changes;
the way in which the IDF analyzes the directions in the central force design issues,
strategic environment and threats. and so on.
These were divided between the Second, in recent years, in addition to the IDF
“complex of conflicts” that the IDF strategy documents, more and more operational
must confront, alongside the “complex concept documents have been written, serving
14 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 4 | October 2020

as the basis of war plans. Operational concepts Until the early 2000s, the IDF fought in a variety
also existed in the past, but most of them were of less intense conflicts (the War of Attrition
a kind of shared understanding that was never [1968-1970], the first intifada [1987-1991], and
put into writing. The IDF has become more others) but these were not seen as related to the
formally established in institutional terms, and core of the IDF concept, which was fairly clear—
in recent years a concept document has almost take the fighting to the enemy’s territory by the
become a condition for formulating and writing use of overwhelming force as soon as possible,
plans. This trend is similar to the increasing and defeat the enemy with air and armored
rate of updates to IDF strategy documents in warfare. In the eyes of IDF commanders, the
the last two decades, and above all it shows relative stability of the threat and the response
that the IDF is a learning organization that did not require any change to the fundamental
invests considerable resources into updating (and unwritten) concept of the use of force.
its concepts. Since the second intifada (2000-2005, and
as the threat of fighting between armies has
faded) until today, the IDF has been occupied by
In recent years, in addition to the IDF strategy different, less familiar threats, some very close
documents, more and more operational concept
to policing, others dealing with a semi-military
documents have been written, serving as the basis
enemy, and others in distant circles, and these
of war plans. Operational concepts also existed in
trends are what have led to the complexity
the past, but most of them were a kind of shared
under discussion.
understanding that was never put into writing.
Under Mofaz the IDF had to deal with new
areas, such as suicide terrorism operating
Additional reasons for the increasing within a broad-based popular uprising, and
engagement in writing concepts include various with threats from afar, while the IDF had recently
failures since the Yom Kippur War, leading to solved the problem of dealing with the swarm of
the understanding that devising plans without Syrian AFVs. Under Halutz, the IDF had already
a concept is a fundamental lapse; conceptual defeated suicide terrorism in the West Bank,
confusion deriving from the increasing withdrawn from Gaza, and tried to emulate the
complexity of warfare (in the broadest sense, United States army that was victorious in the
including CBW), and the rapid rate of change in Iraq War (2003), but missed the main problem
the geopolitical environment, requiring renewed that it encountered just after publication of the
interpretation of the situation; imitation of the strategy: the short-range rocket capabilities of
American attitude to the publication of official Hezbollah and Hamas. This threat received very
concept documents as a feature of a “serious” limited mention in the concept document, which
and well-ordered military organization (in terms focused on dealing with state armies and the
of procedure, not content); and the need for Palestinians. In the days of Chief of Staff Gantz,
an organizational “compass”—regulation of the IDF had two operations in Gaza behind it
a shared world of terms, focus on new areas (Cast Lead and Pillar of Defense), and the third,
of importance to the Chief of Staff, and so on. Protective Edge, took place after publication
The conceptual confusion reflected in the of the document. The IDF was uncomfortable
strategy documents is directly linked to the rise with the results of these operations and tried to
in the complexity of warfare as perceived in the define them as “deterrence campaigns,” which
IDF. For many years, the pattern of waging war under Eisenkot became “limited campaigns.”
did not change in principle, and was based on The political echelon shared this conceptual
fighting between a regular military force against confusion, and it led to the phenomenon
the regular military forces of Arab countries. described by Michael (2016) in the context of
 Meir Finkel | IDF Strategy Documents, 2002-2018: On Processes, Chiefs of Staff, and the IDF 15

the war on jihadi terror in the context of civil- in order to develop the principles of force
military relations. In the case of IDF strategy design and employment (something that the
documents, the focus changed over the years Operations doctrine is not intended to include
from Palestinian terror organizations in the West by virtue of its definition as a doctrine). For
Bank during the Mofaz era, to the semi-state that purpose it will be necessary to continue
terror organization Hezbollah in the Eisenkot era updating the military doctrine at the level of
(or the “terror army,” according to the definition the General Staff.
of Chief of Staff Kochavi, Lev Ram, 2019), but
they also dealt with more distant circles, and
It is also important to note what is not included
here too there is confusion, and concept and
in the IDF strategy documents. Due to their focus
achievements must be defined. This confusion
on conceptualizing the threats and current modus
illustrates the need for the “open discourse
operandi in the IDF, they do not deal with the
space” between the echelons within the army,
medium-range and long-range future.
and between them and the political echelon,
and the documents analyzed here are part of
that type of discourse that has developed in It is also important to note what is not
recent decades. included in the IDF strategy documents. Due
Another explanation for the quickening to their focus on conceptualizing the threats
pace of updated IDF strategy documents and current modus operandi in the IDF, they do
is the slow rate of update of more official not deal with the medium-range and long-range
binding documents—General Staff Doctrine – future. Ever since the document published by
Operations (the main doctrinal document in Mofaz in 2002, the IDF strategy documents have
the IDF, which defines issues such as types of not reflected concepts of the future battlefield,
war, the organization of the fighting space— of the type found for example in the US Army,
arenas, fronts, and so on, principles of processes and therefore they have not driven significant
of command and control, and so forth). It is change. They dealt largely with the present and
unnecessary to specify the conceptualization the near future, and were therefore suitable for
of the conflicts in the IDF strategy documents driving the size of the IDF in the course of the
(“the circles” in the time of Mofaz; the division multi-year plan (closing/opening units) and
into routine/emergency/war and the deterrent matters of training and ammunition stocks, and
operations of Gantz; the limited campaigns and for driving organizational changes (for example,
the campaign between the wars of Eisenkot), in the strategy document of 2015—setting up
but rather in military doctrine documents, since the Commando Brigade, organizing the field of
these definitions are used by the IDF not only cyber, and so on), but not for longer ranges. The
for conceptual guidance but also for planning engagement of Chief of Staff Kochavi with the
needs and writing orders. However, in a reality in “Operational Concept for Victory,” which gives
which this was not updated from the last version practical guidance (and not only in terms of
in 2006 until 2019 (when the updated General quantity) for force design, reflects the important
Staff Operations Doctrine was published), the introduction of a new concept. It is still too
IDF had no choice but to bridge the gap by early to analyze the implementation of the
means of the strategy documents. concept, although in terms of methodology it
The IDF strategy documents should generate was based on the design approach, and was
new concepts if necessary, but these must led personally by the Chief of Staff. It is possible
be incorporated as an agreed update of the that the Operational Concept for Victory, if
Operations doctrine. The strategy documents implemented, will resolve at least some of the
should make use of this conceptualization conceptual confusion linked to the operations
16 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 4 | October 2020

in Gaza that is reflected in the most recent IDF of his term as Chief of Staff and its contribution
strategy documents. was to the regulation of terms rather than to
force design (such as for operational depth).
The IDF Strategy Documents and Eisenkot’s document is the most focused,
their Role in the “Open Discourse with the emphasis on the response to Hezbollah
Space” and Hamas, and in the directions for force
The impact of these documents was mainly in design, most of which were implemented,
regulating and introducing the latest concepts such as extending the capability for attack by
at the time to the IDF as a whole, and in this they air fire, development of cyber capability, the
were successful. With the security challenges Commando Brigade, and more.
growing more complex (see the confusion In IDF culture, conceptual breakthroughs
described above), this matter was extremely do not usually come from written documents,
important, both to create a shared language but through an interactive process between the
within the IDF, and as the basis for developing idea and the operational and/or technological
new concepts. Since each document was experience of implementing it (Adamsky, 2012,
published in a different context with different pp. 190-194). Sometimes it happens following
purposes, it is hard to compare them vis-à- a political instruction or understanding of a
vis long term force design. The 2002 Mofaz change in the external environment, but this
document describes changes already made should not be seen as evidence of a lack of
during his tenure; the 2006 Ya’alon-Halutz conceptual innovation in the IDF, but as an
document is unusual in the scope of the changes organizational pattern that sees written
announced, although the Second Lebanon War documents as secondary to action. Writing
led to a freeze of most of the elements, except the document usually marks the end of the
for the integration that developed in the years process, and is not its catalyst. However, as
after the war. in the strategy documents themselves, there
The connection imagined by the Winograd have been changes in this area, as shown by the
Commission between the document and the Operational Concept for Victory document from
outcome of the Second Lebanon War was Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi, which summarizes
significantly greater than the actual one, since the stage of designing the concept before
the document was published a few months moving to planning and execution.
before the war and considerable parts had not
yet become IDF praxis. The idea of Effects-Based *
Operations was declared a mistake after the war, My thanks go to Maj. Gen. (res.) Yoav Har Even
although in fact elements can be seen in the and to Brig. Gen. (res.) Yoram Hamo for their
concepts that guided IDF action in operations valuable comments. Thanks also to Prof. Dima
following the Second Lebanon War; the strategy Adamsky and Dr. Dov Tamari for their excellent
document of 2015 states that the commander comments.
of a campaign is the Chief of Staff and not the
commander of the regional command; the Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Meir Finkel is currently head of
design approach apparently disappeared after research at the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary
the war, although its necessity was understood Military Thinking and was formerly head of the
and it returned as an official approach to the Center, head of the Military Combat Doctrine and
Concepts Department in the Ground Branch, and
development of concepts at the end of the Gantz
Commander of the Armored Corps in the Second
era and the start of the Eisenkot era.
Lebanon War. He holds three doctoral degrees: in
The Gantz document of 2013 was similar to
evolutionary biology, in political science, and in
that of Mofaz. It was published toward the end prehistoric archaeology. His latest book, The Chief
 Meir Finkel | IDF Strategy Documents, 2002-2018: On Processes, Chiefs of Staff, and the IDF 17

of Staff, was published in 2018, and his next book, Lanir, Z. (1997). From operational skill to systemic thinking.
The General Staff, is due to be published in 2020. Maarachot, 352-353, 2-20 [in Hebrew].
Lanir, Z. (1998). Doctrines and military “explanatory
conceptual campaigns.” Maarachot, 355, 56-59 [in
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