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The TESEV FOUNDATION

Christopher Brewin

'At the table or on the menu?' –

the European Union and Turkey's accession process

Introduction
While European Union attitudes on a possible Turkish accession are the subject of these
reflections, the title is taken from President Turgut Özal. He used to tell those close to
him that Turkey will either be at the table in Europe as a full member or it will find itself
on the menu (Makovsky, 1999, 92). The Turkish perspective encapsulated in both parts
of this aphorism also provides a good starting point for West and East Europeans
interested in what is at stake.
Full membership is today more important than it was when Turgut Özal revived Turkish
ambitions to join the European Communities. Foreign Minister İsmail Cem frequently
tells us that membership of the European Union is one of the two priorities of Turkey. At
the same time, Turkish spokesmen like to hint that, if this legitimate ambition is denied,
Turkey has more alternatives than in Özal's time and than are presently available to
Central and East European states. Today's variant of President Özal's option of an
American road to Westernisation is that of regional 'strategic partner' to the United States.
The Americans no longer subsidise the Turkish army, but they do appreciate Turkey's
potential role in the Caspian, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and with Israel. Four different
options are implicit in İsmail Cem's responses to the EU denial of Turkish candidacy at
its 1997 Luxembourg Council. By visiting Moscow, he made the point that Turkey might
work with Russia as a fellow-outsider or, contrariwise, confront the Russian federation
over Caspian oil and the Caucasus. Cem also spoke of Turkey as the 'bridge' between
Europe and Asia, a veiled reference both to Prime Minister Erbakan's enthusiasm for the
conservative Organisation of Islamic countries and to a more radical Islamic solidarity.
 2

Yet another model in fashion with both Nationalist and Islamic leaders is Japan. This
evokes analogies with interwar Japan's aggressive strategy after it felt it had not been
treated as an equal. Finally, it would have been unthinkable for Özal's ambassador to
London to suggest an alternative to Atatürk's commitment to Turkey's borders, the
foundation of 'Peace Abroad'. On 12 June, 2001, Ambassador Korkmaz Haktanır gave a
speech in Northern Cyprus that floated the future possibility of a new Union of Turkish
Republics, which might include 'others' besides Turkey and the TRNC.
As for a lesser status within the EU than that of membership, being on the menu is not
attractive. Turks of all persuasions do not want to be an agenda item to be discussed by
others already at, or joining, the table. WEU Associate status, membership of the
Customs Union, signing up to Conventions that might protect dissident minorities, are
only acceptable so long as they contribute to realizing the objective of equal membership.
Cem said on 6 July 1998, 'We are tired of having a special status in our relations with the
EU' (Anadolu Agency, 8 July 1998). He was willing to attend the European Conference
in 2000 after the EU had recognized Turkey's candidacy, not when it was proferred in
1997 as a substitute for candidacy.
Before looking at the relationship between the EU and Turkey during and after the Nice
summit of EU leaders, it is useful to set out the terms of the Helsinki summit's agreement
that it was up to Turkey as a sovereign state to reform itself in line with the conditions
demanded of all candidates for membership. In December 1999, Cem was one of the
Turkish leaders who accepted the assurances offered by Javier Solana, Günther
Verheugen, and Jaako Blomberg. Greece and Sweden had withdrawn the objections that
they had maintained at their previous summit in Cologne to German insistence that a
multicultural Europe could not discriminate against Turkey on geographic, historical or
religious grounds (IEP, 2001, 23). Mr Bülent Ecevit's letter to Chancellor Schröder of
May 26, 1999 had agreed that Turkey 'must first fulfill the general accession criteria set
down in 1993 in the Copenhagen EU summit and meet the obligations in the Amsterdam
Treaty of 1997 before negotiations can begin' (Steinbach, 2001). If this quotation is
accurate, this level of conditionality is more demanding than for other candidates. In
their case, negotiations started before they were judged to have fully met the criteria set
out at Copenhagen and Madrid. Moreover, the Amsterdam treaty had strengthened
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Member States' obligations towards the environment and human rights. Nevertheless,
Helsinki opened the door for eventual full membership negotiations in good faith, and an
immediate process of EU aid, advice, and the joint setting of timetabled objectives in an
Accession Partnership modeled on that of other candidates for membership. The EU had
moved on from seeking a stable relationship with Turkey short of membership (Brewin,
2000, 18).
This paper discusses some aspects of the Turkish accession process from the perspective
of the European Union. PART ONE focuses on three issues that disturbed elite and
public opinion in Turkey during the Member States negotiations over the Nice treaty of
December 2000. It seeks to explain why Turkey was the only candidate not assigned
votes in the Council and seats in the European Parliament in the future enlarged Union,
and why Turkey was excluded from the decision-making process for the EU Rapid
Reaction Force despite its substantial offer of 5000 troops. Thirdly, it explains why
Cyprus became included in the short-term aims of the framework Association
Partnership, despite assurances that discussion between the EU and Turkey on this
sensitive matter should for the immediate future be outside the public domain.
PART TWO focuses on the lack of urgency over Turkish membership shown by the
Commission, Parliament, Member State delegations and think-tanks. It is not enough to
say that European public opinion has become hostile to enlargement in general and to
Turkey in particular. The fact that Germany was unpopular with its neighbours did not
prevent elites signing the treaties of Paris and Rome, and building a new Community on
the basis of a permissive public opinion that wanted peace between Germany and its
neighbours to take institutional form. Nor is it enough to say that the list of economic,
political and administrative problems to be overcome by Turkey is so long that serious
work on Turkish accession can wait until Turkey has reformed itself. Greece, Spain and
Portugal became members well before they could demonstrate a good record in human
rights, in administrative efficiency and economic competitiveness, and without first
solving their disputes over Gibraltar and Cyprus.
PART THREE develops this theme by arguing against the consensus that the
conditionality which has been successful in transforming Central and Eastern Europe can
also be successful in the case of Turkey. The CONCLUSION reviews the policy options
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for the EU by categorizing them according to their proposed timing. They may be
summarized as
1) Membership never, due to Cyprus dispute.
2) Membership later, once Turkey meets all the conditions, with or without a new interim
Observer status in the Council.
3) Membership early, with long derogations.

PART ONE
1a) The Nice Summit: institutions for an enlarged European Union
At Amsterdam the Member States had failed to agree how they would in future be
represented in the Council, the Parliament and the Commission. At Nice the French
Presidency succeeded in winning agreement on how votes in the Council and seats in the
Parliament would be distributed, as set out in the table below. As for the appointment of
Commissioners by Member States, it is of relevance to Turkey that after 2005 the larger
states will lose their right to appoint two Commissioners. Once the Union has 27
members, a rotation system 'reflecting the demographic and geographic range' will reduce
the number of Commissioners to less than the number of states. A limit of 350 members
caps the Committee of the Regions and also the Economic and Social Committee. In an
EU of 27 members each of these two Committees will comprise 344 representatives. The
admission of Turkey will require a redistribution.
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Dr Best's table showing shares of population, Council votes and seats in the Parliament

Population Present Future Present Future

vote vote seats seats
Germany 82.0 17.0% 10 11.5% 29 8.4% 99 15.8% 99 13.5%
UK 59.2 12.3% 10 11.5% 29 8.4% 87 13.9% 72 9.8%
France 59.0 12.3% 10 11.5% 29 8.4% 87 13.9% 72 9.8%
Italy 57.6 12.0% 10 11.5% 29 8.4% 87 13.9% 72 9.8%
Spain 39.4 8.2% 8 9.2% 27 7.8% 64 10.2% 50 6.8%
Poland 38.7 27 7.8% 50 6.8%
Romania 22.5 4.7% 14 4.1% 33 4.5%
Netherlands 15.8 3.3% 5 5.7% 13 3.8% 31 5.0% 25 3.4%
Greece 10.5 2.2% 5 5.7% 12 3.5% 25 4.0% 22 3.0%
Czech Rep. 10.3 2.1% 12 3.5% 20 2.7%
Belgium 10.2 2.1% 5 5.7% 12 3.5% 25 4.0% 22 3.0%
Hungary 10.1 2.1% 12 3.5% 20 2.7%
Portugal 10.0 2.1% 5 5.7% 12 3.5% 25 4.0% 22 3.0%
Sweden 8.9 1.8% 4 4.6% 10 2.9% 22 3.5% 18 2.5%
Bulgaria 8.2 1.7% 10 2.9% 17 2.3%
Austria 8.1 1.7% 4 4.6% 10 2.9% 21 3.4% 17 2.3%
Slovakia 5.4 1.1% 7 2.0% 13 1.8%
Denmark 5.3 1.1% 3 3.4% 7 2.0% 16 2.6% 13 1.8%
Finland 5.2 1.1% 3 3.4% 7 2.0% 16 2.6% 13 1.8%
Ireland 3.7 0.8% 3 3.4% 7 2.0% 15 2.4% 12 1.6%
Lithuania 3.7 0.8% 7 2.0% 12 1.6%
Latvia 2.4 0.5% 4 1.2% 8 1.1%
Slovenia 2.0 0.4% 4 1.2% 7 1.0%
Estonia 1.4 0.3% 4 1.2% 6 0.8%
Cyprus 0.8 0.2% 4 1.2% 6 0.8%
Luxembourg 0.4 0.1% 2 2.3% 4 1.2% 6 1.0% 6 0.8%
Malta 0.4 0.1% 3 0.9% 5 0.7%
TOTAL 481.2 87 345 626 732

Source:EIPASCOPE 2001/1, p.4

Turkey is the only candidate country omitted from this table of the EU27 (15 Member
States plus the 12 candidates negotiating treaties of accession). According to the French
Presidency, leaving Turkey out did not constitute discrimination. Switzerland and
Norway were also excluded, and they are the most popular candidates in EU polls. All
three countries were excluded from the calculations because none of them for different
reasons are currently negotiating accession treaties. Therefore no decisions were yet
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needed on their future votes in the Council, and the number of seats to which they would
be entitled in the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the
Regional Committee.
Turkey's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were invited on the same basis as other
candidates to Nice for the opening dinner and the group photograph. The same courtesy
was extended to Switzerland, also called a candidate country in the Council's press
release. Turkey, unlike neutral Switzerland, accepted the invitation to the European
Conference held at ministerial level on 27 November and at head of state level on 7
December.
It is true that the omission of Turkey could have been avoided by using general formulae
applicable to all potential members. If Europe were to give itself a bicameral federal
Constitution, the sovereignty principle might be recognized by a formula giving each
state the same number of votes irrespective of size. The democratic principle might be
met by a formula relating seats in a House of Representatives to size of population.
However, in the EU as it is, the Parliament has never been sufficiently powerful to satisfy
the democratic principle; consequently the distribution of votes in the Council has always
been based on a rough and ready compromise between statehood and the democratic
principle that the numbers of citizens must somehow count. Therefore, it can reasonably
be said that the procedure of according votes and seats to named countries was that used
in the treaty of Rome and all subsequent accession treaties.
Another example of a possible formula is that of the double-majority formula, whereby
legislation would be approved by a specified majority of states so long as the majority
represented a majority of the European Union's population. At Nice the smaller states
rejected this formula precisely because it favoured the larger states.
The source of the problem is that each state has a veto on new treaties. Luxembourg
would not give up its six MEPs for a hypothetical prospect of accommodating Turkey
one day. The French Presidency itself used its power of veto so that a France of
59millions retains parity in the Council with the new Germany of 82 million citizens. For
Turkey the implications can be read both positively and negatively. Positively, after
accession it can expect the same number of votes as the other large states; negatively, its
greater population will not entitle Turkey to more votes than France. At Nice, Germany
 7

agreed to be compensated by retaining all its present 99 seats in the Parliament, which in
turn meant an immediate breach of the 700-member ceiling established as recently as
May 2000 when the treaty of Amsterdam came into force. Negotiations at the highest
level were so difficult that the conference was extended for an extra day; a special
Franco-German summit had to be called to assuage German bitterness at the outcome.
Another aspect of the use of precedent was the exclusion of all candidate countries from
the discussion even though what was being decided would affect them. In this respect
Turkey was treated no differently than the others. However this exclusion from
participation affected Turkey more than those other candidates that could rely on ties of
kinship or religion or geography with a particular Member State. A Declaration at Nice
promised a more inclusive procedure for the future: all candidate states will be associated
with the process in ways to be determined in December 2001 at Laeken. At the next IGC
in 2004, accession states will participate as of right, presumably with the right to speak
but not vote or veto. However, this provision underlined a new discrimination in favour
of those states close to accession. At the Gothenberg summit in June 2001, the future
timetable envisages that accession states will comprise ten states with a total population
of 75 million in the first wave (Verheugen, 2001). That leaves out Turkey, Romania and
Bulgaria, with a combined population of 95 million.
By avoiding the difficulty of accommodating Europe's second most populous country, the
EU 15 aroused Turkish sensitivity about European 'sincerity'. Narrowly construing the
'future us' to mean only those candidates in negotiations implied that Member States did
not envisage Turkish accession in the foreseeable future. In Turkey this perception
contributed to the delay in the adoption of the Turkish National Programme from
December 2000 to March 2001, and probably emasculated its content. The same charge
of discrimination against Turkey became associated with the second major achievement
of the French Presidency at Nice, the development of an EU military decision-making
capacity, a subject of particular significance for the Turkish army, the second largest in
Europe.

1b) The treaty of Nice: Common European Security and Defence Policy
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Article 25 of the treaty of Nice established a Political and Security Committee composed
of national officials at ambassadorial level from the EU15. The Member States appointed
Javier Solana as chairman by common consent, the same procedure they use to appoint
the President of the Commission. The PSC has responsibility for the Common European
Security and Defence Policy: in any situation where Washington decides not to commit
American troops, the PSC can autonomously deploy European troops. This built on the
agreement at the 1999 Helsinki Council to create a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 men
by 2003. The Nice treaty repeated the offer of 'dialogue, consultation and cooperation'
with European non-member states made at the June 2000 Council at Santa Maria da
Feira. In mid-November, 2000, the 15 Member States, plus the twelve accession
candidates, plus Turkey, Norway and Iceland as members of NATO, (EU + 15) met at a
Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels. Fourteen Member States of the EU,
(with Denmark opting out), offered 100,000 military personnel, enabling rotation of
troops during the year of commitment. The German total was 13,500 and the UK 12,500.
Turkey committed itself to 5000 troops, the biggest contribution from outside the EU
(Terriff et al, 2001, 4). The Nice summit gave military chiefs of the EU15 six months to
establish a Military Committee and an EU military staff in the Avenue Cortenburg to
prepare sufficient resources, including resources assigned to NATO. However, the EU15
were determined that only Member States would decide the aims of any peacekeeping
operation, assign national assets and appoint commanders. The treaty of Rome makes no
provision for 'observer' status, perhaps in order to preclude American requests for the
right to participate. (By unanimous approval of the members, outsiders such as
Norwegians on Schengen matters, or Turks on Balkan matters, can be invited to attend
any discussion. They have no right to attend unless invited.)
This determination sidelined the six European members of NATO who were not
members of the European Union. Their discomfiture was all the greater because the
creation of these new EU institutions necessarily devalued the role assigned since 1991 to
the Western European Union. As Associate Members of WEU these six had the right to
participate in WEU Council discussions and operations (15 +6). Turkey had several
reasons for being more dismayed than, say, Norway. It was one of the two European
countries to increase its military expenditure after 1989, the other being Greece. It had a
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long-term commitment to increasing the flexibility and firepower of its forces. Its
geographical position made it a likely participant in all but two of the 22 areas deemed
sensitive by the WEU. It had reason to think that neutral EU countries like Sweden and
Ireland, and future member states like Cyprus, would join Greece in excluding Turkey
from operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. When the Belgian Presidency offered
reassurance to Ankara in November 2001, Greece publicly expressed dissent (AA News,
30 November). Turkey was uneasy about the possible role of British bases in Cyprus in
the training and deployment of a European force. Turkish sensitivity was enhanced by its
experience of Anglo-Saxon decision-making in the Gulf War, where it found itself faced
with a costly embargo and unwelcome incursions of Kurdish refugees.
In defending what it saw as its national interests, Turkey had a lever in its legal powers of
veto over assigning NATO assets for use by the Rapid Reaction Force, powers reiterated
at the 1999 April summit in Washington. The former Director of Chatham House, Sir
Timothy Garden complained that 'Turkey is playing its NATO veto card early as part of
its somewhat contradictory strategy towards EU membership' (Garden, 2001, 7). Some
American hawks supported Turkish concern at the implicit decoupling from NATO, the
duplication of resources, and the discrimination against powerful members of NATO.
The European states in the EU and in NATO treated Turkish objections as serious but not
critical. They were unable to reach a consensus that over this issue they could allow
Turkey the right to participate in the preparatory work and in future decision-making.
The continuation of Anglo-Saxon bombing of Iraq, the French Assembly resolution on
Armenia, and Greece's claims to jurisdiction over their territorial waters contributed to
dissatisfaction in Turkey. On 18 January 2001 the Anatolian News Agency cited 'serious
frictions over NATO' in explaining the postponement of President Chirac's projected
visit. The Franco-German TIGRE helicopter was dropped from Turkey's rearmament
programme; on 11 February Alcatel and Matro Marconi were banned for a year from
tendering on Turkish projects. The Chief of Staff cancelled his visits to France. Turkey
rejected a Dutch compromise in March and British proposals in June (Tocci, 2001,p.12).
At a military seminar on 11 January 2001, General Nahit Senogul said that no EU
country supported Turkey's membership in the EU, and some were always included in
activities against Turkey (Cumhuriyet). General Halil Simsek said that 'Turkey has not
 10

been accepted as a full member of the EU because it is a Muslim country.' Turkey should
stand by its national commitments to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
1c) The Turkish Accession Partnership and Cyprus
The letter from the Finnish Presidency delivered to Ankara during the Helsinki summit is
not in the public domain. The Anatolian Agency of 20 July 2001 reports Mr Ecevit as
saying that the three EU representatives
'saw how sensitive we were about some foreign issues and national matters…they
flew to Ankara by a private plane at midnight and said words which meant they
would not make us uneasy about these issues.'
It seems that the Turkish leaders agreed to discuss Cyprus in private, but that this issue
would not be included among the short-term aims to be included in the Accession
Partnership. Turkish sensitivity on Cyprus can be gauged by the fact that in November
2001, the National Assembly held its tenth secret session devoted to Cyprus. Mr Ecevit
was himself Prime Minister in 1974 when Turkish troops landed in Cyprus, thereby in his
view solving the problem. At the time of writing, in November 2001, both the EU and
Turkey have apparently hardened their positions over Cyprus. The Commission
President, Mr Prodi, has paid a visit to Nicosia to announce that the Republic of Cyprus
will be first in line for accession. Mr Cem threatened that the Turkish response will be
radical. Mr Ecevit spoke of integration into Turkey, or an autonomous status for Northern
Cyprus within Turkey. It is difficult to see how Turkey could remain a member of the
Customs Union after carrying through another Cypriot 'change of borders without
consent of all parties'. Like Japan in the thirties, a Turkey forced back on nationalist self-
reliance might well become expansionist on behalf of Turks or Moslems outside its
present frontiers. Commissioner Verheugen hoped that Turkey will not pay a higher
price than in the past for its support of Northern Cyprus (AA News, 18 November,2001),
but it is more likely that Turkey's political and military leaders will rely on patriotic
support for the Turks of Northern Cyprus, risking business interests in Europe, and the
distant prospect of EU membership.
To return to the Turkish perception of European bad faith over Cyprus during the French
Presidency, the institutions of Council, Commission and Parliament all have grounds for
claiming that they met their obligations by overcoming internal dissent to produce the
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Accession Partnership envisaged at the Helsinki summit. Internal dissent over Turkey's
place in Europe was most obvious in the Parliament. The Morillon Report tabled on 19
October 2000 is a composite of tepid praise and fierce criticism. It pre-empts two of
Turkey's stronger cards by claiming that 'geopolitical and strategic considerations must
not be decisive in negotiations'. It draws attention to democratization, human rights and
the situation of minorities. It criticizes some of Turkey's actions, such as the bombing of
Kenkador in August 2000. The text lists two dozen demands, including support for the
Armenian minority and the withdrawal of occupation forces from Cyprus. The
explanatory statement includes the claim that it is 'for the European Parliament to tell the
Turkish people that there are, today, at least three conditions for accession which Turkey
must meet…on the rights and obligations of minorities, ..Cyprus…reducing the influence
of the Turkish army in the drawing up of political decisions'. The Seppänen report of 17
October on extending European Investment Bank financing to Turkey concludes that 'the
consolidation of democracy and human rights' will have to be reflected in EIB financing.
Yet, despite the unusual antipathy for a candidate exposed in such remarks, on 14
February, 2001 the Parliament did adopt the Swoboda Report accepting the Framework
Regulation establishing the legal basis of the Accession Partnership.
The Commission, for its part upgraded its Turkey desk. When it reluctantly acceded to
Turkey's request that Alain Servantie be removed for writing to the PKK, it appointed
Michael Leigh at the higher level of deputy Director-General. The Commission's third
'Regular Report' on Turkey issued in 2000 combined toughness with tact. Much of the
summary is harsh: 'Turkey still does not meet the political Copenhagen criteria…The
economic, social and cultural rights situation has not improved…' Yet the Commission
avoided confrontation with Mr Ecevit's government over Cyprus. In the main body of the
report (1.3), negotiations under the aegis of the UN were reported in factual terms. The
issue was omitted completely from the summary; thus the Cyprus issue was also omitted
from the summaries reproduced in the Commission's manual on enlargement, Strategy
Paper 2000. In line with the Presidency promise to Mr Ecevit, and after discussion with
Ankara, progress on the Cyprus issue was not included among the short-term objectives
of the draft framework regulation sent to the Council on 26 July. When Greece proposed
to add a clause on Cyprus, the Commission asked the Member States to delete the
 12

amendment as Turkey was fulfilling its promise to discuss sensitive issues out of the
public eye (see AA News of 24 January 2001).
However, twelve states in the Council overrode the Commission's objections by
supporting the Greek amendment in the Accession Partnership sent to Parliament for its
assent. The clause required Turkey in the period up to the end of 2001 to
'…strongly support, in the context of [internal European] political dialogue, the
UN Secretary General's efforts to bring the process of finding a comprehensive
settlement of the Cyprus problem to a successful conclusion.'
To the Council this wording was the minimum necessary to get the Parliament's assent.
It would help protect the Greek Government from Greek electors, and reassure the Greek
Cypriot Government that the accession process with Turkey was not dissociated from the
Cyprus question. The context of political dialogue between Member States and Turkey
denuded the reference of practical effect: political dialogue is held in private and does not
require the presence of other candidate countries. The commitment to the UN process
was in line with the section on 'principles' in the Accession Partnership, which repeats
both the general clause on dispute settlement taken from Paragraph 4 of the Helsinki
Conclusions and the specific reference to Cyprus from Paragraph 9. Including the clause
was in line with the Member States' own internal consensus behind the established UN
route to a settlement between the two Cypriot communities. It is likely that progress on
Cyprus was also a condition of the financial help afforded Turkey after the two financial
crises of 2001. In legal terms, the Presidency letter of December 1999 was not part of the
Community acquis. On March 7 the Council approved the Accession Partnership
without further discussion as soon as it received the Parliament's assent.
To Mr Ecevit's government, the military members of the National Security Council, and
the Turkish press, the Council's demands on Cyprus were treated as a breach of promise.
The National Security Council in November 2000 had approved Mr Denktaş' withdrawal
from the UN talks. The Turkish government announced that it might have to reassess its
relations with the EU, thereby threatening to withdraw from the accession process. A
year later, the Commission's 2001 Opinion included a paragraph on Cyprus in its
Conclusions, citing Turkish support for Mr Denktaş' withdrawal from the UN talks.
(Commission, 2001, p.97).
 13

PART TWO
Attitudes of Member States to Turkish membership
The EU stance that membership was up to Turkey thus contributed to ambivalent
responses from Turkey's leaders for whom EU membership was supposed to be a
principal aim. The paucity in Member States of serious governmental, party, academic or
think-tank reports is itself evidence of two perceptions with respect to Turkish
membership. The first is lack of urgency, while waiting for Turkey to reform itself to
meet the Copenhagen criteria. The second is that the opportunities and problems posed by
Turkish membership are so vast and interlinked as to deter both serious reflection on the
implications, and preparations to move public opinion in the Member States. This
section discusses some of the points contained in surveys of the attitudes of the bigger
and smaller states of the EU.

2a) The Five Large States (with 8-10 Council votes)

The German political elite is committed to enlargement. When Günther Verheugen, the
German Commissioner for enlargement, suggested on 2/3 September 2000 a Europe-
wide referendum to legitimise enlargement, this was rejected in Germany lest a negative
result endanger their aim of embedding a reunified Germany in an enlarged Europe.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl thought that this aim would also be endangered by
simultaneously taking on a large, poor and Islamic country. Yet the single most
important factor in shifting the EU stance on Turkish membership was the election of
Chancellor Schröder in Germany. The German Presidency in the first half of 1999
included Turkey's candidature in the draft Conclusions of the Cologne summit. At the last
minute, this was withdrawn in the face of opposition from Greece and Sweden (IEP,
2001,15).
This substantial change for the sake of multicultural consistency nevertheless did not
amount to German sponsorship of early Turkish membership. The Christian Democrat
Union's road-map, Europa 2010 (CDU), states that 'We cannot imagine membership of
Turkey in the foreseeable future. Therefore it was a mistake to grant Turkey candidate
status now'. The Liberals (FDP) statement On Turkey of 5 November 1999 agrees that
this step was taken too early. The previous Social Democrat Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt,
 14

continued publicly to oppose Turkish membership. In German newspapers and journals,

Turkish membership is discussed on a 'for and against' basis that would never be applied
to the Czech Republic. An example is Internationale Politik of March 16, 2001 in which
Udo Steinbach makes the case that Helsinki put right the mistake at Luxembourg, while
Peter Scholl-Latour argues that Turkish membership would mean a catastrophic loss of
identity for both the European Union and Turkey. However, Udo Steinbach bases his
advocacy on mutual interests, especially in security. This relegates the case for Turkey's
European identity to a pragmatic argument that Turkey's membership will make the EU
more attractive to Muslim countries outside Europe, and to some but not all the Muslims
presently largely unrepresented in the EU institutions. He does not argue that Turks
should at last enjoy their legal right to free movement in Europe according to the
timetable established in the 1970 Additional Protocol.
France has been much less keen on enlargement to the East, perhaps out of concern for
its taxpayers and farming interests. While insisting on a substantial increase in funding
for Mediterranean non-members, including Turkey, France has not proposed opening up
the Customs Union to Turkish agriculture. In line with Mme Mitterand's campaign for
human rights in Turkey, the French Minister for European Affairs on 3 October, 2000
told the European Parliament that Turkey has to meet the Copenhagen criteria before the
opening of negotiations. Insufficient respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
was an 'obstacle' to Turkish accession. The passage through the French Assembly of a
resolution condemning the massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman empire showed how
widespread anti-Turkish feeling is in France. Arabs and Kurds in France have shown
little Islamic solidarity with Turkey. Since the enlargement to Greece, Paris has
demanded that candidate countries first demonstrate the administrative capacity to
implement the acquis. During its EU Presidency, France was keen to begin the screening
process to establish the compatibility of Turkish legislation with the Community acquis.
In Britain, the Labour Party is ideologically suspicious of what it sees as Turkish
militarism. Defence circles have not invoked Turkey's usefulness to a European Rapid
Reaction Force. Human rights organizations keep cases of Turkish mistreatment of
journalists and of Kurds in the public eye. The Cyprus issue is disproportionately
important in the United Kingdom because of the sovereign bases, British tourists and
 15

residents. All political parties seek the votes of the large number of Cypriots in London.
The Government of Cyprus is an active member of the Commonwealth. The UK advice
to Turkish Cypriots to agree a settlement before accession has been called by Özdem
Sanberk 'a tacit admission that the countries of Western Europe expect the Greek
Cypriots to go for all-out confrontation once they are inside the Union' (Turkish Daily
News, 21 February, 2001).
Italy has been the most optimistic supporter of early membership and, through Signor
Dini, the most understanding of Turkey's case that there are two administrations in
Cyprus. However, Greek sensitivities as a fellow Member are taken seriously, and
membership for Croatia has greater priority than Turkey. Italy has not made an issue of
protecting its own Mediterranean producers, and has favoured active participation in
promoting clearly established reforms in Turkey.
Spain has discretely followed a similar line, while taking the lead in protecting the level
of existing cohesion funds it receives from Brussels, a level of funding which is
incompatible with enlargement to Turkey.

2b) The Ten Smaller States - with 2-5 Council votes

Of the smaller EU states, the most remarkable change in attitude towards Turkey between
the Councils of Luxembourg and Helsinki has been made by Greece. After experiencing
unexpected isolation during the near-war over Imia/Kardak, Greece became more
accommodating in the EU Council of Ministers. During the Kosovo crisis, the
government accepted the constraints of international cooperation, repressing popular
sympathy with Orthodox countries under attack. In the wake of Öcalan's capture, George
Papandreou replaced Theodoros Pangalos as foreign minister. The Cyprus and Aegean
issues became obstacles to neighbourly relations rather than grounds for a 'no
appeasement' policy. The Turkish candidature was not an issue in the Greek election
campaign of April 2000. In early 2001, Greek experts held a series of practical meetings
with their Turkish counterparts on how to prepare for membership negotiations.
Ambassador Agathocles on August 3, 2001 told the European Policy Centre that 'Greece
was actually Turkey's biggest advocate'. Both countries have a more detailed
understanding of the Balkans than do Scandinavians. However, Greek determination that
 16

Cyprus should be in the first wave of enlargement can easily translate into the view that
Turkey should have a special status as a member of a European concert rather than
becoming a full member. Greece has invoked the independence of the Greek Republic of
Cypriot to justify not exerting the same degree of pressure for the compromises on
principle needed for a settlement that it expects Turkey to exert on Turkish Cypriots.
Scandinavian public opinion strongly supports enlargement to the Baltic states. All
Scandinavian states share deeply held convictions that Turkey is too militaristic for a
democracy, is insufficiently protective of the environment, and deficient in promoting the
rights of individuals and minority groups. Understanding of the civil war in South-east
Turkey has been strongly influenced by Kurdish immigrants. Sweden joined Greece in
vetoing Turkish candidature at Cologne. During its own Presidency, Sweden avoided all
serious discussion of timetables and derogations on the ground that Turkey is not yet in
the picture. Turkey must first fulfill undertakings on human rights, beginning with the
abolition of the death penalty demanded by Gunnar Persson on 10 March, 2001. For
Finland, Turkey was a central concern of its Presidency, mediating between the EU and
the USA to make the Helsinki breakthrough by convincing Turkey that positive
developments from the EU15 depended on Turkey's own actions.
Austrian attitudes have been close to those of Germany, with a special interest in
enlargement to Slovenia. However, Austrian opposition to all immigration, to a Turkish
military role in the Balkans, and to the admission of a secular Islamic state is closer to
that of German Christian Democrats than of German Socialists.
The Irish and Portuguese governments have gone along with both the exclusion of
Turkey at Luxembourg and its inclusion at Helsinki. Ireland has a natural sympathy with
the Cypriot government because of the analogy with its Northern part seceding under the
protection of a powerful neighbour. The negative Irish vote on the Nice treaty may
indicate a desire to protect the agricultural industry from greater competition after
enlargement, a concern also to be found in Portugal.
Of the Benelux countries, Luxembourg has shown in each of its presidencies prejudice
against Turkey. As Prime Minister, and as a rapporteur in the European Parliament,
Jacques Poos has been an articulate advocate of the Greek Cypriot case, finding fault
only with their use of the Greek flag. The Netherlands have been more willing to take
 17

on board American theses of the importance of Turkey to European security.

Nevertheless questions have been asked in the Dutch Parliament about human rights in
Turkey, prison conditions in Turkey and the arrest of the three Kurdish mayors. Belgium
during its Presidency in the second half of 2001 has indicated dissatisfaction with the
'wait and see' consensus on Turkey, suggesting that a five-year limit be timetabled on
whether or not candidature should lead to the opening of negotiations.
What is missing from the above survey is any strong sense that peace between Greece
and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean has to be created.

PART THREE
An argument against Conditionality
Writing about 'the EU as a security actor', Ole Wæver expresses the consensus that
conditionality has worked. Faced with enlargement to 100+ millions in Central and
Eastern Europe, the EU made membership conditional on potential members willingly
paying the transition costs of reforming themselves. The EU is now the primary security
actor because its leverage over countries with realistic expectations of joining has both
produced internal reform and restrained nationalist foreign policies. 'Ideally,' he says, 'the
EU grows at the slowest possible speed…it has to move, but almost the slower the better'
(Wæver, 2000, p.262). The approach is characterized by lists. The Council at
Copenhagen, Madrid and Helsinki has set out ever more rigorous criteria for new
members. The Commission agrees lists of objectives with the candidates, and reports
regularly on the 'progress made by each of the candidate countries in preparing for
membership'. The Parliament has its own lists of demands based on internal compromises
between those interested in a particular candidate. Eurobarometer 53 ranks the unrealistic
conditions for new members as reported by respondents in the spring after the Helsinki
summit – respect for human rights and democracy (95%), opposition to drug trafficking
(92%), paying their share of the EU budget (83%), a level of development close to that of
Member States (76%). Turkey was the least favoured candidate, with 44% against and
30% in favour.
Despite Turkey's adoption of most of the conditions in its own National Programme,
 18

this hopeful and cheap policy of making haste slowly is unlikely to prove so successful in
the Eastern Mediterranean. The Commission's 'Opinions' on Turkey and Cyprus are
predicated on the assumption that peace in the Eastern Mediterranean already exists.
There is no suggestion that peace in the Eastern Mediterranean more resembles Franco-
German peace between successive wars than the peace of a Scandinavian security
community. The danger that Turkey's response to the accession of Cyprus might lead to
its exclusion from Europe is not discussed. One would not be able to guess from the
Commission's Opinions of November 2001 prepared for the Laeken summit that Turkey
has repeatedly since 1995 threatened to match the integration process of the Cyprus
Republic into the EU with proportional steps to integrate Northern Cyprus into Turkey.
The Commission does not focus on the danger of EU actions exacerbating a 'clash of
civilisations' over Cyprus. Turkey's regional importance in the Eastern Mediterranean,
the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Caspian and the Middle East is treated in passing.
It might be recalled that those who negotiated, signed and ratified the Treaties of Paris
and Rome had to overcome a deep-seated public hostility towards West Germany. The
primary purpose of economic unification with a profoundly unpopular country was at
least as much to institutionalise peace as to achieve prosperity. Today, the willingness of
the enlarged Germany to subsume its popular currency in the EURO, and to subsume
German enlargement in a wider enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe can best be
understood politically as reassurance to all its neighbours, and as a moral obligation to
meet an historic opportunity. A poll for INRA Politik & Sozialforschung conducted for
the Commission Delegation in Berlin during the spring of 2001 found that 68% of
German respondents thought that enlargement would secure peace, and 62% that it would
eliminate armed conflict and unite the continent. This is not to say that European public
opinion is enthusiastic about enlargement generally, or Turkish enlargement in particular.
Eurobarometer 55 conducted in the spring of 2001 found that only 21% of respondents
favoured all applicants, only five percentage points more than the proportion who
opposed every new applicant. The majority, 44%, thought that the EU should be open
only to some of those who wished to join. However, as so often in the history of
European unification, the surveys may be read as evidence of a permissive consensus that
would enable political leaders to take the kind of political risk for a liberal democratic
 19

peace which they took in constructing the Communities. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and
President Giscard d'Estaing took a similar risk in the enlargement to Greece and Spain.
To preclude the dangers of a return to fascism or a communist triumph in Southern
Europe, they offered membership and bet on foreign direct investment without
demanding first a good human rights record, a competitive economy, and evidence of
adequate administrative capacity.

4. Conclusion: three policy options

Since Helsinki the EU15 have regarded the question of whether Turkish candidacy will
lead to Membership as largely a matter for Turkey to decide as a sovereign state with
several options. However, West Europeans also have a stake in whether their new
multicultural identity would be enhanced by membership of a secular Moslem state, and
whether Turkish membership would promote peace and stability in the Eastern
Mediterranean as Greek membership helped in the Kosovo crisis. The outcome depends
greatly on whether they want Turkey as an equal member sooner, later, or never. These
three options are discussed in reverse order.
Permanent Non-membership
On this view, Turkey is a European power with commonalities of interest and identity
with EU states. However the differences between Turkey and the EU15, whether of
culture, or wealth, or state tradition, or foreign policy, are too great to be bridged in the
foreseeable future to make membership viable. The immediate catalyst for taking this
option might be the formal integration of North Cyprus into Turkey, with Greece and
Cyprus leading the demand not to appease a strong military power breaching the EU
inhibition against changes of frontiers that do not have the consent of the parties affected.
Another route to this option might be the suggestion of the Belgian Presidency that there
should be a review of the Turkish candidacy five years after the Helsinki summit, i.e. in
December 2004. This deadline is more likely to lead to a negative result in Brussels than
to promote speedier reform in Turkey.
Most of those holding this opinion want to establish a stable framework short of
membership. This could take the form of a bilateral agreement, as in the Customs Union,
or a multilateral framework like the European Conference, or the Common European
 20

Home. Jacques Delors wanted Russia, Turkey, and the Ukraine to be granted a special
status as neighbours of the European Union, having both bilateral and multilateral ties.
It is possible that Turkish business leaders will accept the Customs Union as a sufficient
guarantee of access to the European market, and that Turkish military leaders will
reluctantly accept participation that reproduces the rights they have enjoyed in the WEU.
But on balance it is more likely that Turkish leaders will refuse arrangements in which, as
in the Customs Union or the ESDP, Turkey permanently has to accept rules that it has
had no share in making. Non-membership therefore risks taking the less benign form
expressed in Huntington's geological metaphor of a clash of civilizations. Turkey might
become an outcast from European joint rule, as Japan was from the League of Nations. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate whether this would lead to a reversal of
alliances or wars with its many neighbours.

Postponement
The Helsinki conclusions on Turkey are much more demanding than Article 28 of the
1963 treaty of Ankara. Turkey has to make a long list of political, economic and
administrative reforms before negotiations can begin. The EU offers the advice of
consultants to help Turkey become a member 'later' but not the commitment from
Member States that would help pro-Europeans in Turkey convince their doubters. At a
time when ten candidates can expect to be in the first wave, with Roumania and Bulgaria
following in 2007, the deputy Director General responsible for enlargement told a
Turkish audience that 'it is impossible to clearly say when Turkey would start
membership negotiations' (AA News, 18 November, 2001, Michael Leigh).
One consequence of membership being so distant is that 'foreign direct investment flows
into Turkey have rarely reached $1billion in any one year, one quarter of the figure for
Poland' (Loewendahl et al,2000). Their study found that Turkey's export-led
industrialization is the most successful outside East Asia. The quality of Turkey's
educated, young labour force ranks above all 47 countries studied, with only Ireland and
Hungary coming close (Table 15). Turkey's geographic location, potential home demand,
and membership of the Customs Union are favourable to foreign investment. Yet
Turkey's failure to attract as much as Poland is only partly explicable by its governmental
 21

and monetary instability, and an administrative tradition hostile to foreign ownership of

national assets. These drawbacks apply also to a lesser extent in the case of Poland. The
important difference seems to be that Poland is assured of early membership, which
makes it more competitive in drawing from the pool of mobile capital as well as offering
more assurance of a stable political and economic future. Similarly, progress on human
rights, democratic and administrative reform is likely to be reduced in proportion as the
date for negotiations and therefore membership becomes more distant.
It may therefore be worth considering a substantial interim measure of a kind to reassure
Turkey's military, political and industrial leaders that the EU wants Turkey on board. It
might be timely to suggest a revision of the treaty of Rome to allow Turkey now the right
to send an 'Observer' to Council meetings where foreign policy, Customs Union or
immigration matters will be on the agenda. Turkey could then claim to have a voice even
if it has no vote or right to redistribution of resources. This need not imply a similar
voice for the Russian Federation until it too participates in a Customs Union or
contributes to the European Rapid Reaction Force.

Early membership with long derogations

To establish pluralist pro-Western regimes in Spain and Portugal, German and French
leaders promoted their early EU membership combined with long derogations to allow
adjustment on both sides in agriculture and fisheries. Improvement in human rights was
to be a result of, not a condition for, membership. The prospect of early membership
enabled the King of Spain to overcome those in the army, police and Church who feared
for their privileges and the future of their country. The prospect of early membership
brought the foreign direct investment that enabled the government to accept the loss of
tariff revenue and the loss of support from businessmen privileged by import substitution.
If Turkish membership would be better for Turkey and for the stability of Europe, then
the Iberian precedent might justify taking this risky option.
 22

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