Nuclear - Iaea - Trs433

Technical Reports SeriEs No.
433
Upgrading of
Near Surface Repositories
for Radioactive Waste
UPGRADING OF
NEAR SURFACE REPOSITORIES
FOR RADIOACTIVE WASTE
The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
AFGHANISTAN GREECE PAKISTAN

ALBANIA GUATEMALA PANAMA
ALGERIA HAITI PARAGUAY
ANGOLA HOLY SEE PERU
ARGENTINA HONDURAS PHILIPPINES
ARMENIA HUNGARY POLAND
AUSTRALIA ICELAND PORTUGAL
AUSTRIA INDIA QATAR
AZERBAIJAN INDONESIA REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
BANGLADESH IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA
BELARUS IRAQ RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BELGIUM IRELAND SAUDI ARABIA
BENIN ISRAEL SENEGAL
BOLIVIA ITALY SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA JAMAICA SEYCHELLES
BOTSWANA JAPAN SIERRA LEONE
BRAZIL JORDAN SINGAPORE
BULGARIA KAZAKHSTAN SLOVAKIA
BURKINA FASO KENYA SLOVENIA
CAMEROON KOREA, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
CANADA KUWAIT SPAIN
CENTRAL AFRICAN KYRGYZSTAN SRI LANKA
REPUBLIC LATVIA SUDAN
CHILE LEBANON SWEDEN
CHINA LIBERIA SWITZERLAND
COLOMBIA LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
COSTA RICA LIECHTENSTEIN TAJIKISTAN
CÔTE D’IVOIRE LITHUANIA THAILAND
CROATIA LUXEMBOURG THE FORMER YUGOSLAV
CUBA MADAGASCAR REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
CYPRUS MALAYSIA TUNISIA
CZECH REPUBLIC MALI TURKEY
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC MALTA UGANDA
OF THE CONGO MARSHALL ISLANDS UKRAINE
DENMARK MAURITANIA UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MAURITIUS UNITED KINGDOM OF
ECUADOR MEXICO GREAT BRITAIN AND
EGYPT MONACO NORTHERN IRELAND
EL SALVADOR MONGOLIA UNITED REPUBLIC
ERITREA MOROCCO OF TANZANIA
ESTONIA MYANMAR UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ETHIOPIA NAMIBIA URUGUAY
FINLAND NETHERLANDS UZBEKISTAN
FRANCE NEW ZEALAND VENEZUELA
GABON NICARAGUA VIETNAM
GEORGIA NIGER YEMEN
GERMANY NIGERIA ZAMBIA
GHANA NORWAY ZIMBABWE
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the IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957.
The Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and
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TECHNICAL REPORTS SERIES No. 433
UPGRADING OF
NEAR SURFACE REPOSITORIES
FOR RADIOACTIVE WASTE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA, 2005
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STI/DOC/010/433
IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Upgrading of near surface repositories for radioactive waste. — Vienna :

International Atomic Energy Agency, 2005.
p. ; 24 cm. — (Technical reports series, ISSN 0074-1914 ; no. 433)
STI/DOC/010/433
ISBN 92–0–112704–9
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Radioactive waste disposal. 2. Overview of near surface disposal

systems. 3. Radioactive waste disposal in the ground. 4. Radiation —
Safety measures. I. International Atomic Energy Agency. II. Technical
reports series (International Atomic Energy Agency) ; 433.
IAEAL 05–00409
FOREWORD
Providing guidance on the disposal of radioactive waste constitutes an

important and integral component of the IAEA programme on radioactive
waste management. Low and intermediate level waste (LILW), even though it
contains a small fraction of the total activity of all radioactive waste produced
globally, represents more than 90% of the total volume of radioactive waste.
Most of the radioactive waste produced in many developing Member States is
primarily LILW. The IAEA has received many requests from Member States
for technical assistance in the safe management of low and intermediate level
radioactive waste. As a result, a number of activities have been initiated by the
IAEA to assist Member States in the disposal of LILW, focusing on both
technology and safety aspects.
Many existing disposal facilities were developed and began operation
long before current regulatory requirements took effect or more recent site
suitability guidance, technological advances, safety assessment methodologies
and quality assurance systems became available. National laws, regulations and
disposal methods have evolved and improved with time. Various Member
States have ongoing programmes both to upgrade these facilities and/or to
develop new near surface disposal facilities.
Recently, a binding international regime for radioactive waste
management was established through Article 12 of the Joint Convention on the
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management. This article states that “each contracting party shall in due course
take the appropriate steps to review the results of past practices in order to
determine whether any intervention is needed for reasons of radiation
protection”. It is anticipated that the Joint Convention will result in safety
reassessments of certain repositories and that corrective actions will be pursued
based on these assessments.
Upgrading measures are being implemented or planned at a number of
disposal facilities in numerous countries. Examples range from adoption of new
waste acceptance criteria and container specifications to building additional
engineered barriers, installing hydrogeological cut-off walls, improving cover
systems, waste retrieval and other measures. Extensive experience and
information are therefore available on actions that may be employed to
upgrade disposal facilities. This publication draws on such international
experience.
The objective of this publication is to provide guidance to Member States
with near surface disposal facilities on approaches and technologies that can be
used to: (a) identify potential corrective action needs; (b) assess options and
select appropriate corrective actions; and (c) plan and implement the corrective
actions selected to enhance repository performance and safety both before and
after closure.
This report considers a variety of circumstances that may require
potential upgrading measures to be assessed or implemented at near surface
disposal facilities. The circumstances leading to the corrective actions, or the
corrective actions themselves, may be of either a technical or non-technical
nature. Methodologies that can be employed to implement effective solutions
to problems are discussed, including assessment of alternative options prior to
selecting corrective actions and the planning, implementation and verification
of the specific measures adopted. Examples are provided of approaches and
technologies that may be used to improve repository performance and safety.
Information is also provided on experience in various Member States in
upgrading disposal facilities.
It is anticipated that this publication will be useful to scientists, engineers,
managers and others involved in assessing and improving the performance of
near surface repositories and related regulatory compliance, as well as public
acceptance issues. The lessons learned from the application and evaluation of
corrective actions may also be relevant to the development of new repositories
or facilities that require additional disposal capacity.
This report was developed with the help of consultants and through a
Technical Committee meeting in Budapest in August 2003. The IAEA officer
responsible for this publication was R. Dayal of the Division of Nuclear Fuel
Cycle and Waste Technology.
EDITORIAL NOTE
Although great care has been taken to maintain the accuracy of information
contained in this publication, neither the IAEA nor its Member States assume any
responsibility for consequences which may arise from its use.
The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any
judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal status of such countries or territories,
of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries.
The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated
as registered) does not imply any intention to infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be
construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA.
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2. Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. OVERVIEW OF NEAR SURFACE DISPOSAL SYSTEMS . . . . . 5
2.1. Multiple barrier concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.2. Disposal systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Repository development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4. Monitoring and surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5. Safety assessment methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1. Initiating events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3.2. Examples of initiating events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.1. Change in regulatory standards and requirements . . . . 15
3.2.2. Releases predicted to exceed, or exceeding, standards . . 16
3.2.3. Stakeholder concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3. Identification of root causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4. Identification of potential corrective actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.5. Assessment of options and selection of corrective actions . . . . 20
3.6. Development of a corrective action plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.7. Implementation of the corrective action plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.8. Verification of corrective action objectives having been met . . . 28
4. EXAMPLES OF CORRECTIVE ACTION APPROACHES

AND TECHNOLOGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1. Engineered features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

4.1.1. Repair or installation of surface caps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1.2. Installation of vertical hydraulic conduits . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.3. Installation of cut-off walls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2. Waste retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3. In situ waste stabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.4. Water collection and extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
APPENDIX: EXAMPLES OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

IMPLEMENTED AT REPOSITORIES IN
MEMBER STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. BACKGROUND
Large volumes of low and intermediate level waste (LILW), containing a

wide range of radionuclides, are produced in the nuclear industry from
activities such as research, uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor
operations, isotope production and fuel reprocessing. In countries with
operating nuclear power plants, fuel cycle waste represents a large fraction of
the overall volume of waste generated. These wastes include ion exchange
resins, concentrates from liquid waste treatment by chemical processes or
evaporation, contaminated equipment, tools and rags, and workers’ protective
clothing. Decommissioning of nuclear facilities is another major source of
LILW. Examples include contaminated concrete, reactor components, building
debris, pipes, wiring, contaminated tools, protective clothing, etc. It is generally
estimated that up to 95% of the total volume of radioactive waste generated in
reactor decommissioning can be categorized as LILW.
Medical and research applications of radioisotopes are common
worldwide. These activities generate solid radioactive wastes such as laboratory
media and glass, syringes, plastic bottles, paper and rags, animal carcasses,
contaminated blood and liquid wastes (e.g. organic solvents and liquid scintil-
lation media). Disused radioactive sources are generated by medical, research
and industrial applications.
Recognition of the potential impact of radioactive waste on human health
and the environment has led to the development of national and international
standards and guidelines for radiation protection and radioactive waste
management including disposal [1–11]. These standards and guidelines are
based on scientific and technical knowledge gained worldwide from many years
of experience in research, development and operation of radioactive waste
management facilities [12–45].
The IAEA defines disposal as the emplacement of waste in a repository
with no intention of retrieving it in the future. Disposal is different from
storage, which implies an intention to retrieve the waste in the future [46].
The IAEA Radioactive Waste Safety Standards (RADWASS)
classification system [27] provides a generic approach to radioactive waste
management and identifies suitable disposal options for different waste
categories, based on their specific characteristics. For example, geological
disposal is required for high level waste (HLW), spent fuel and certain long
lived radioactive waste. Near surface disposal is a suitable option for short lived
LILW, i.e. waste containing mainly radionuclides that will decay to
1
radiologically insignificant levels within a few centuries. Limited quantities of
long lived radionuclides may be accepted for near surface disposal [29, 30]. In
the past, however, significant volumes of longer lived and relatively high
activity waste were placed in near surface repositories.
Safety assessments are used to derive both generic and site specific waste
acceptance criteria (WAC) [30] to identify acceptable waste characteristics,
place limits on concentrations and inventories of radionuclides in the waste and
potentially in the repository as a whole, and to specify waste form or package
requirements.
Near surface disposal of radioactive waste has been carried out for more
than 50 years. There are more than 80 near surface repositories around the
world [26]. Other near surface facilities previously defined as ‘storage facilities’
are considered in this publication to be disposal facilities since the intention to
retrieve the waste was not clearly established and they are similar, both in
design and operation, to many existing disposal facilities.
The majority of near surface repositories place waste in disposal units
located close to the ground surface. Disposal units are either excavated below
the original ground level (e.g. earth trenches or concrete cells) or built above
the original ground level (e.g. mounds and concrete structures). In either case,
after operations, the disposal units are generally isolated from the surrounding
environment by an engineered cover system several metres thick. Cover
systems may comprise multiple layers designed to limit moisture infiltration
and control biotic intrusion (e.g. plant roots or burrowing animals). Barriers to
impede human intrusion may also be included. Near surface disposal also
includes emplacement of waste in rock cavities or other disposal units (e.g.
boreholes) at depths of up to several tens of metres. Repositories of this type
exist in some Member States.
Many of these repositories were developed and began operations long
before current regulatory requirements took effect or more recent site
suitability guidance, technological advances, safety assessment methodologies
and quality assurance systems became available. National laws, regulations and
disposal methods have evolved and improved with time. Various Member
States have ongoing programmes both to upgrade these facilities and/or to
develop new near surface disposal facilities.
The term ‘corrective action’, as used in this publication, comprises all
activities and measures undertaken to:
(a) Achieve compliance with modified regulatory requirements;

(b) Rectify an existing unsafe condition;
(c) Prevent an unsafe condition from occurring in the future;
(d) Respond to societal demands.
2
A binding international regime for radioactive waste management has
been established through Article 12 of the Joint Convention on the Safety of
Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
[3]. This article states that “each contracting party shall in due course take the
appropriate steps to review the results of past practices in order to determine
whether any intervention is needed for reasons of radiation protection”. It is
anticipated that the Joint Convention will result in safety reassessments of
certain repositories and that corrective actions will be pursued based on these
assessments.
While specific regulatory requirements and approval processes vary
among Member States, regulatory oversight is an integral component of the
corrective action planning and implementation process. In addition to
regulatory body involvement, members of the local community, local
government officials, non-governmental organizations, the general public and
others may be involved in the corrective action process. Experience indicates
that stakeholder interest may be an important consideration in the planning
and implementation of corrective action. Many Member States have addressed
this by planning and implementing stakeholder involvement programmes as
part of the overall corrective action process. Examples of stakeholder
involvement activities include interaction with existing or specially formed
local community groups, public meetings, tours of the disposal facility, distri-
bution of information material and press releases, public document repositories
and Internet sites.
Quality management systems (QMSs) also play a role in the process.
These programmes vary from country to country and have undergone
substantial changes in recent years, reflecting increased adoption of ISO 9000
and ISO 14000 approaches [47]. Components of QMS programmes generally
include controls for management organization, design, procurement,
procedures and processes, documentation, inventory, inspections, tests,
equipment calibration improvements in the event of non-conformance, and
audits.
Upgrading measures are already being implemented or planned at a
number of disposal facilities in numerous countries. Examples range from
adoption of new WAC and container specifications to building of additional
engineered barriers, installing hydrologeological cut-off walls, improving cover
systems, waste retrieval and other measures. Extensive experience and
information is therefore available on actions that may be employed to upgrade
disposal facilities. This publication draws on such international experience.
3
1.2. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this publication is to provide guidance to Member States

with near surface disposal facilities on approaches and technologies that can be
used to:
(a) Identify potential corrective action needs;

(b) Assess options and select appropriate corrective actions;
(c) Plan and implement those corrective actions selected to enhance
repository performance and safety both before and after closure.
It is anticipated that this publication will be useful to scientists, engineers,

managers and others involved in assessing and improving the performance of
near surface repositories, related regulatory compliance and public acceptance
issues. The lessons learned from the application and evaluation of corrective
actions may also be relevant in the development of new repositories or facilities
that require additional disposal capacity.
1.3. SCOPE
In the context of this publication, the terms repository or disposal facility

include facilities defined as such in the IAEA Radioactive Waste Management
Glossary [46], and facilities that may have been designated as storage facilities
but where the intent for future retrieval of the waste was not clearly
established.
This publication discusses potential initiating events for considering or
undertaking corrective actions. These events may include inadequate repository
performance, evolving regulatory and legislative requirements, technological
developments, societal concerns and other factors. Methodologies that can be
employed to implement effective solutions to problems are discussed, including
assessment of alternative options prior to selecting corrective actions, and the
planning, implementation and verification of the specific measures adopted.
Examples are provided of approaches and technologies that may be used to
improve repository performance and safety. The appendix provides information on
experience in various Member States on the upgrading of disposal facilities.
The scope of this publication includes near surface disposal facilities for
low and intermediate level radioactive waste, including borehole facilities, rock
cavity repositories and other near surface or deeper confinement facilities.
Technical and non-technical issues for both operational and post-closure
repository phases are covered. Disposal facilities for uranium mining and
4
milling waste are beyond its scope. Similarly, this publication does not address
remediation of contaminated sites unrelated to near surface disposal, or
facilities designed specifically for discharge of radioactive liquids.
1.4. STRUCTURE
Section 2 provides an overview of near surface disposal system concepts

and components. This includes short descriptions of different disposal system
components, the stages in the development of a repository, and related
monitoring and surveillance activities. Section 3 discusses the conceptual
framework and sequence of the steps involved in the planning and
application of corrective actions to near surface repositories. Section 4
describes examples of corrective action approaches and technologies.
Section 5 summarizes the overall conclusions of the report. Case studies
involving corrective actions planned or carried out in various Member States
are presented in the appendix.
2. OVERVIEW OF NEAR SURFACE DISPOSAL SYSTEMS
This section gives an overview of disposal system concepts and

components. It also summarizes the main phases of the repository development
process, site monitoring and surveillance, and the use of safety assessment
methodology.
The disposal system includes the near field and the surrounding
geological media. The near field consists of the waste, engineered barriers
(including waste form and containers) and the adjacent geological media
disturbed by excavation and other construction and operational activities.
The natural barrier system consists of the geological media hosting the
repository and any other geological formations contributing to waste isolation.
The biosphere is that part of the environment inhabited by living
organisms. Radionuclides released from the repository or through the
geological barriers may be diluted, retarded or concentrated before causing
any radiological impacts to humans and other species. The purpose of a
disposal facility is to limit radiological impacts to acceptable levels.
Experience with safety assessments of existing near surface repositories
shows that the radiological impact of near surface repositories is generally
linked to radionuclides that are long lived and/or highly mobile. However,
5
radiological impacts involving short lived, high activity radionuclides may be a
significant factor in both operational exposure and inadvertent human
intrusion scenarios.
2.1. MULTIPLE BARRIER CONCEPT
The primary safety related objective of near surface disposal is to provide

effective isolation of the wastes from the surrounding environment. Achieving
this objective generally requires that disposal facilities be sited, designed,
constructed, operated, closed and maintained to prevent or control the release
of radionuclides to acceptable levels. In order to ensure that the disposal
system is robust, a multiple barrier concept which utilizes the properties of the
waste form, engineered barriers and the site’s natural barriers to prevent or
restrict the release of the radionuclides from the facility [31, 32] is generally
selected. The relative contributions of the various barriers to the overall safety
of the disposal facility will depend upon the characteristics of the waste, the site
conditions and the disposal system concept, and will vary with time.
2.2. DISPOSAL SYSTEMS
This section discusses basic concepts and components of near surface

disposal systems. Additional information is provided in Refs [31–45].
Selection of a particular repository design depends on many factors,
including national radioactive waste management policies, waste characteristics
and inventories, available site characteristics, climate conditions, technology
and resource availability. Two main methods have been used for near surface
disposal: shallow facilities close to the ground surface, or deeper facilities.
Shallow facilities consist of disposal units located either above (e.g.
mounds) or below (e.g. lined or unlined trenches, vaults, boreholes, bunkers)
the original ground surface. The cover over the waste is typically several metres
thick and may consist of multiple layers engineered to limit moisture infil-
tration, control biotic intrusion and promote vegetation growth. Deeper
confinement facilities allow waste to be emplaced in rock cavities or deep
boreholes. The thickness of the soil and/or rock above the waste can be up to
several tens of metres. These depths contrast with geological repositories for
long lived radioactive wastes, where the wastes are emplaced at depths of
hundreds of metres.
Near surface facilities are generally located above the water table.
However, local conditions may allow or require the disposal modules to be
6
constructed in the saturated zone. In both cases, the disposal units need to be
designed and constructed to limit the flow of water into the repository and
subsequent radionuclide migration. Major disposal system components
generally include the following:
— The waste form;

— The waste container;
— Any additional engineered barriers;
— The natural barrier system.
The waste form may involve a solid matrix in which radionuclides are
immobilized through treatment and/or conditioning prior to packaging. Some
wastes may not be conditioned, in which case the waste form will consist of the
originally contaminated material (e.g. paper, glassware, plastic, wood, animal
carcasses), possibly in a compacted form to reduce void space. Different types
of materials can be used to stabilize waste, e.g. cement [37], bitumen and
polymers. Combustible wastes such as contaminated clothing, plastics, paper,
wood and other organic matter may be incinerated and the ashes incorporated
in a solid matrix [38].
The waste package, which consists of the waste form and container, may
be designed to meet requirements for handling, transport, storage and disposal
[31, 37–43]. Alternatively, waste may be transferred to different containers
prior to disposal. To limit the release of radionuclides and other contaminants,
some packages include additional features such as absorbents and
impermeable liners. Concrete, polymer coated concrete, carbon steel, high
density polyethylene and other engineered materials are also used for
containers. Gas vents may be necessary if the disposal units incorporate
impermeable barriers. The integrity of waste packages is important if they
represent an engineered barrier or source of structural stability that is
important to the safety case, and/or the ability to retrieve the waste is
considered.
Additional engineered systems may consist of structural walls, solid or
free draining backfill materials placed around the waste packages, chemical
additives, low permeability soil or synthetic liners and covers. Depending on
the disposal concept, these may be supplemented by other engineered
components, including leachate collection and drainage systems, and
impermeable subsurface cut-off walls. To ensure that the engineered barrier
system is robust enough to perform as specified in the design, materials can be
used that will maintain their function and integrity under anticipated repository
conditions for the required period of time.
7
2.3. REPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT
The three main repository development phases are pre-operational,

operational and post-closure [40, 44]. The pre-operational phase includes
development of the disposal system concept, siting and design, licensing and
construction. The operational phase includes waste emplacement and
subsequent repository closure. The post-closure phase comprises maintenance
and institutional control activities following repository closure. Activities
related to each of these phases are described below.
The pre-operational phase begins with a conceptual design and siting
stage. It starts with the development of the initial disposal concept, based on
the nature and estimated quantity of waste requiring disposal, regulatory
requirements, site availability and environmental constraints, availability of
resources, waste transport routes, cost, and societal considerations.
Construction of the repository may be phased to provide additional disposal
capacity for waste received over time at the facility.
The operational phase generally comprises commissioning, waste receipt
and emplacement, backfilling, covering of disposal units, operational
monitoring and surveillance, and closure. Emplacement of waste comprises
both the physical placement in the repository and subsequent management
until that part of the repository is covered or sealed. The repository may have a
number of units progressively constructed and used for disposal. As soon as a
particular part of the repository is filled to capacity, the voids around the waste
packages may be backfilled. It may also be necessary to protect that part of the
repository with a temporary cover to limit infiltration of water and provide
radiation shielding prior to closure.
The operational period of the repository generally lasts up to some tens
of years. Closure begins after waste emplacement operations have been
completed. Closure is generally carried out in accordance with an approved
plan that includes an updated safety assessment and a description of the institu-
tional controls intended for the post-closure phase. Typically, a final cover
system is emplaced to:
(a) Control erosion and ensure the physical integrity of the repository;
(b) Minimize infiltration of water;
(c) Control plant, animal or human intrusion, which is particularly important
for shallow or above ground disposal units, since the waste is emplaced
relatively close to the surface.
The post-closure phase includes institutional controls as an integral part

of the overall waste isolation system. The controls may include both active and
8
passive measures. Active institutional controls comprise maintenance,
monitoring and surveillance of the disposal site. These generally include:
(1) Cover system inspection and any needed repairs;

(2) Environmental monitoring;
(3) Maintenance of fences, signs and other physical components.
These active controls are conducted for periods ranging from several
decades to a few hundred years. Ongoing monitoring and surveillance data can
also be used to update safety assessments, as discussed in Section 2.5.
Passive measures may include disposal unit and site markers, land use and
other legal restrictions, and archived records of waste inventories and their
location within the repository. The purpose of passive controls is to preserve
relevant operational records and reduce the likelihood of the wastes being
disturbed. Provisions for ensuring that funds will be available for the post-
closure phase are also important. Figure 1 shows the phases of the repository’s
life cycle, including the key activities during each phase.
2.4. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE
Monitoring is the continuous or periodic observation and measurement

of radiological, environmental, engineered barrier performance and other
relevant parameters. Surveillance consists of periodic inspections to verify that
structures, systems and components relevant to the safety of the repository
continue to function or are in a state of readiness to perform their functions.
Monitoring and surveillance of existing disposal sites has provided valuable
data on the performance of near surface disposal facilities and can contribute
significantly to the upgrading of repositories.
Environmental monitoring covers a broad range of media, including
atmosphere, surface and groundwater, soils, and plant and animal species that
may be part of the food chain or indicators of radionuclide releases.
Groundwater and vadose (unsaturated) zone monitoring may provide an early
warning of the potential release of contaminants, including mobile
radionuclides.
Pre-operational site environmental monitoring involves the collection of
data, particularly those expected to vary seasonally or with time, to charac-
terize the site and define ambient conditions. These data are used in initial
safety assessments and engineered barrier design, evaluation of potential
impacts due to construction, and identification of preferential water flow
9
Establishment of
waste management
framework
Pre-
operational
phase Evaluation and characterization
of waste inventory
Disposal concept selection
Assessment of safety and environmental impacts

Siting and site characterization
Approval, licensing and regulatory oversight
Repository design
Monitoring and surveillance
Waste acceptance criteria
Monitoring and surveillance

Construction
Operation
Opera-
tional
phase
Closure
Post-
closure Post-closure
phase
FIG. 1. Life cycle phases and activities of a near surface repository.
pathways. They may also serve as a benchmark for the testing of safety
assessment models. The data also provide the necessary baseline for
comparison with measurements taken during repository operation and
following closure.
10
Monitoring during the operational phase is intended to confirm facility
performance and provide data to refine assessment of repository impacts on
the surrounding environment. Visual inspections and physical surveillance of
disposal unit covers may be conducted to determine if their integrity has been
compromised by erosion, cracking, subsidence, action of burrowing animals or
deep rooted plants, and other processes. The covers may also be monitored to
detect increases in water content or infiltration phenomena.
Technical requirements for monitoring during the post-closure phase are
not expected to differ significantly from those during the operational phase.
However, additional monitoring may be required to ensure the performance of
cover systems and any other barriers installed at the time of closure.
Monitoring frequency generally decreases with time after closure if the
repository performs as expected.
Post-closure surveillance may include inspection of the repository cover,
surface drains and monitoring systems. In addition, disposal facilities with
leachate collection systems and drains may require additional surveillance.
Fences and warning signs prohibiting access to the site may also need to be
maintained. Periodic inspections will help ensure that land use restrictions and
prohibitions are complied with.
2.5. SAFETY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
In line with internationally agreed upon principles of radioactive waste

management, the safety of near surface disposal facilities needs to be ensured
during all stages of their life cycle.
In 1997, the IAEA launched a Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on
Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal
Facilities (ISAM) [48]. The main outcome of the project, completed in 2000,
was the development of a harmonized, iterative methodology (ISAM method-
ology) for carrying out post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal
facilities. The methodology has since gained widespread acceptance and is to be
published in a series of reports dealing with scenario development, modelling
and confidence building, together with three documented test cases for vault,
borehole and radon-type disposal facilities. Upon completion of the ISAM
project, a need was recognized to further apply the ISAM methodology to a
range of practical issues.
Accordingly, the IAEA organized a follow-up CRP on Application of
Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Radioactive Waste
Disposal Facilities (ASAM) [49], built on the experience gained with the ISAM
11
programme. This effort places special emphasis on application of the ISAM
methodology to problems of topical interest, to:
(a) Explore practical application of the ISAM methodology to a range of

near surface disposal facilities for a number of purposes, e.g. design
concepts, safety reassessment and upgrading of existing facilities;
(b) Develop practical approaches to assist regulators, operating organiza-
tions and other specialists reviewing safety assessments.
The emphasis of the ASAM project is on evaluating the post-closure

safety of radioactive waste disposal facilities. Where appropriate, operational
safety may also be assessed. The ASAM programme is also intended to provide
information and recommendations on:
(1) Development of an approach and methodology to assist in the selection

of corrective action alternatives;
(2) Development of an approach to balancing radiological and non-radio-
logical risks;
(3) Comparison of different options for corrective actions to assist in decision
making for future repository development.
3. CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESS
As stated in Section 1, corrective actions may be undertaken for one or

more of the following reasons:
(1) Compliance with regulatory requirements;

(2) Prevention of an unsafe condition;
(3) Rectification of an unsafe condition;
(4) Response to societal demands.
This section provides information on the corrective action process, which

includes definition of the initiating event, root cause analysis, potential
corrective action identification and assessment, preferred action planning and
implementation, and confirmation of effectiveness. There are many examples
of successful repository development, but inadequate repository performance
has also occurred, particularly in older repositories developed before
substantial experience and international guidance were available. Examples of
12
initiating events that could necessitate corrective actions are provided in the
appendix, in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4, and in Refs [44, 45, 50–63].
Corrective actions may have different objectives, depending on the status
of the disposal facility. Specific actions may be undertaken to:
(a) Achieve regulatory compliance;

(b) Respond to an accident or incident;
(c) Permit continuing operation;
(d) Improve current operational practices;
(e) Apply new technological developments;
(f) Expand disposal capacity;
(g) Restart disposal facility operations following a suspension;
(h) Prepare for final closure of the facility;
(i) Improve the performance of a previously closed facility;
(j) Address public and other stakeholder concerns.
Guidance on approaches to safety and dose assessment is provided in

Refs [4, 11, 64].
A systematic process, such as that illustrated in Fig. 2, may be followed to
ensure that appropriate corrective actions are identified and effectively imple-
mented. The process illustrated is generic and may require modification to
address each specific situation. The implementation process for each step may
also vary. For many of the steps, the process may be iterative.
3.1. INITIATING EVENTS
Initiating events are defined as circumstances at a specific repository that

may require corrective actions. For disposal facilities, the initial design and
operational procedures may have been considered adequate for the protection
of human health and the environment, but circumstances may have developed
during the operational and/or post-closure stages that necessitate corrective
actions.
While not mutually exclusive, initiating events may generally be grouped
into the following categories:
(a) Changes in regulatory standards and requirements:

— Changes in international standards and practices;
— Member State regulatory changes, e.g. new regulatory and/or
legislative requirements, including repository design requirements;
13
Define initiating
event(s)
Identify root cause(s)
Identify potential
corrective actions
Assess options and

select preferred
corrective action(s)
Develop a corrective
action plan
Implement the
corrective action plan
Verify that corrective

action objectives have
been met
FIG. 2. The corrective action process.
14
— Repository specific requirements, e.g. new WAC, waste form or
packaging requirements, a new source of waste requiring disposal;
— Fundamental changes in government policy leading to regulatory
changes.
(b) Releases or operational exposures predicted to exceed safety standards:
— Safety system failures;
— Revised/new safety assessment results;
— Environmental monitoring results;
— Results of physical inspections;
— Premature degradation or failure of engineered barriers;
— Incomplete or inaccurate waste inventory information;
— Inadequate waste form and/or container specifications;
— Changes in physical environment;
— Independent audit or peer review findings.
(c) Actual releases or operational exposures that exceed safety standards:
— Environmental monitoring results;
— Radiation exposure;
— Accidents and incidents.
(d) Non-compliance with existing requirements:
— Operational practices;
— Post-closure care;
— Inadequate QMSs;
— Generator waste packaging or characterization.
(e) Stakeholder concerns.
3.2. EXAMPLES OF INITIATING EVENTS
Examples are provided below to illustrate the nature of various initiating

events. The appendix gives examples of corrective actions carried out at
specific repositories in response to various initiating events.
3.2.1. Change in regulatory standards and requirements
3.2.1.1. New QMS requirements
Many existing disposal facilities were initially designed, constructed and

operated without an extensive QMS plan or procedures. The application of
enhanced quality assurance processes to historical repository design, operations
and safety assessments may indicate deficiencies requiring corrective action.
Deficiencies may also extend to waste generator practices affecting repository
15
performance (e.g. waste characterization, waste form or containers). Concerns
may also arise regarding waste inventory documentation and other record
keeping needs [47, 65].
3.2.1.2. New WAC for disposal
A key issue in the management of a disposal facility is the placing of

limitations on the waste materials and contaminants accepted for disposal. This
issue is addressed in most countries by the specification of WAC, identifying
the types and classifications of waste that may be accepted. The WAC may
reflect both generic requirements, such as those discussed in the IAEA
guidance [28], and site specific restrictions. The WAC may also include specific
concentration limits for certain radionuclides, with higher limits applying if the
waste is conditioned and/or placed in engineered packages offering long term
containment.
The WAC are generally based on current disposal regulations. If these
change, the WAC may also change and may exclude wastes previously
permitted for disposal, such as long lived and/or high activity LILW. This may
require improved containment or removal of wastes disposed of in the past that
do not comply with the new WAC. In most countries, for example, the
regulations relating to chemical and radiological risks have evolved over the
past 20 or so years. Hazardous chemicals previously permitted for disposal in
the same facilities with radioactive waste have now been banned from disposal
in certain repositories.
3.2.1.3. Fundamental change in government policy
Changes in government policy in certain Member States may cause a

major change in waste management philosophy. For example, retrievable
storage instead of disposal may be required. Alternatively, mined cavern or
borehole disposal may replace near surface or above ground disposal. In such
cases, significant changes to existing repositories or closure may be required by
regulation.
3.2.2. Releases predicted to exceed, or exceeding, standards
3.2.2.1. Contaminants outside the containment barriers
If routine monitoring has detected elevated or unexpected levels of waste

derived contaminants outside the containment barriers, this may indicate the
failure of a safety system component.
16
3.2.2.2. Deterioration of waste packages
If unacceptable deterioration of the waste packages is observed, the

impacts of package degradation may need to be assessed in relation to future
safety performance of the facility and future waste form and packaging require-
ments. Potential impacts include disposal cap subsidence, increased infiltration
of liquids if the deteriorating packages contain substantial void space, and
accelerated release and transport of waste constituents. Waste package retriev-
ability may also be adversely affected.
3.2.2.3. Gas generation and release
In a near surface disposal facility, there is a potential for generation of

gases, particularly hydrogen, carbon dioxide and methane. Waste contained in
impermeable barriers may need to include provisions for the venting of gases
to ensure that gas pressurization within the isolation barriers does not occur
[66–69]. Such venting may occur through natural processes (e.g. diffusion
through a soil cover). If such venting does not take place or the proper design
features have not been incorporated, the safety systems may be compromised.
3.2.2.4. Defective leachate collection system
Some near surface facilities include a leachate management system to

remove leachate. The collected leachate may then be treated and discharged,
or conditioned on-site. Defects such as clogged collection pipes or drainage
layers, or inoperative leachate removal pumps, may compromise the safety
system.
3.2.2.5. Clogging of drains
Drains may be employed in disposal facilities to ensure free drainage of

infiltrating moisture away from the zone of waste emplacement. At such
facilities, the clogging of drains may lead to retention of large volumes of water
in contact with disposed wastes.
3.2.2.6. Changes to geomorphological or hydrological features
Physical changes to geomorphological or hydrological features of the site,

such as changes in the direction or volume of water flow, erosion or seismic
activity, could produce an immediate release of contaminants or affect long
17
term performance and safety. This is particularly true where geomorphological
or hydrogeological changes may have affected the groundwater pathway.
If there is reason to believe that the geomorphological or hydrological
features have changed, e.g. by large scale construction work near the disposal
facility, a revised safety assessment may be necessary to determine whether the
modified groundwater pathway will affect disposal facility performance.
3.2.2.7. Accidents and incidents
Accidents and incidents, such as the dispersion of radioactive materials

from a dropped or crushed waste package, failure to detect a damaged waste
package prior to emplacement, a fire created by the disposal of unsegregated
wastes or other unplanned events, may necessitate both immediate response
and changes in ongoing practices to prevent their re-occurrence.
3.2.2.8. Safety assessment results
Improved safety assessment methodologies can be an initiating event for

corrective actions if the results indicate that the repository will not meet
current safety standards.
3.2.3. Stakeholder concerns
Expressions of public concern, based on perceived inadequacies in

repository performance, the nature or extent of local benefits, or lack of
confidence in the regulatory process, may initiate actions to increase
community acceptance.
3.3. IDENTIFICATION OF ROOT CAUSES
A primary requirement for determining how to manage a problem is to

focus on the underlying or root cause, and not only on the symptoms of the
problem. Actions that do not address root causes may well lead to ineffective
corrective actions. The root cause analysis may be relatively straightforward,
especially early in the operational phase when most of the disposal system
components are accessible and substantial amounts of waste have not yet been
emplaced. For other problems, including those noticed during monitoring of
previously capped disposal units or during the post-closure phase, extensive
investigations may be needed to determine the root cause. Root cause analysis
may be a useful tool for this exercise.
18
The first step in the identification of root causes is the assembly and
analysis of existing information and the identification of information gaps that
need to be addressed. The following example illustrates the importance of
determining root causes. Elevated concentrations of radionuclides in
groundwater may be caused by a variety of factors, e.g. inadequate waste form
or packaging, excessive ingress of water into the repository, receipt of wastes
that exceed the WAC limits, the presence of chelating agents, failure of a
drainage or leachate collection system, or a combination of factors. Until the
root cause or causes are specifically identified, the selection of corrective
actions is unlikely to be optimized.
Safety assessment methodologies provide important tools for identifying
root causes. If a safety analysis already exists, it can be used to compare
predicted results against actual experience to help determine if a given
repository component, e.g. waste package integrity or cover system effec-
tiveness, is the source of the problem. If a safety assessment is not prepared,
internationally accepted safety assessment methodologies [6, 48, 49] are
available to guide this process.
There may be situations where existing information is insufficient to
determine the root cause and further investigations are necessary. These
information gaps may include:
(a) Baseline site characterization;

(b) Changes over time to site or repository conditions;
(c) Records on the types and amounts of waste emplaced in the repository;
(d) Knowledge of the physical and chemical characteristics of waste forms
and related degradation;
(e) Knowledge of the performance of engineered barriers utilized in the
repository;
(f) Extent of water ingress and egress;
(g) Environmental monitoring data for all relevant media.
If the issue is non-technical in nature, determining the underlying cause of

the problem can be particularly challenging. For example, local community
concern regarding the repository may be evident, but the specific reason or
reasons for this concern may not be well understood. It is also possible that
different stakeholders may have different concerns and opinions, requiring
different solutions.
19
3.4. IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
A wide range of corrective actions may apply to a specific initiating event.

It is advisable not to prematurely select an option or rule out potentially viable
alternatives before an analysis of their advantages and disadvantages has been
carried out. A list of corrective action alternatives can be identified by taking
advantage of the substantial body of knowledge available through the
published literature and the experience of other Member States, in
combination with information specific to the repository requiring corrective
action. Examples of corrective actions are listed in Table 1 and are described
further in the appendix.
3.5. ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS AND SELECTION OF CORRECTIVE

ACTIONS
The assessment and selection of a preferred corrective action is a complex

process involving diverse inputs and factors. These inputs may be grouped
under four broad categories: safety/regulatory, cost, practicability, and
technology.
Once a list of potential corrective action alternatives is developed, a
preliminary screening step may be used to eliminate clearly unacceptable
options. There are many ways of assessing and selecting a preferred corrective
action or actions. Most methods use some form of decision making process, as
illustrated in a general way in Fig. 3. Such methods typically consider both
qualitative and quantitative factors.
A number of disciplines are typically involved in the evaluation process,
including, but not limited to: engineering; health physics; earth, physical and
biological sciences; cost estimation; cost–benefit analysis; public policy;
regulatory and legal affairs.
Whatever process is chosen, it is advisable that the process be thoroughly
documented as a means of establishing a decision record and explaining the
approach taken to regulatory bodies and interested stakeholders. This record
can also be preserved to assist in future corrective action evaluations.
Corrective actions capable of being implemented using existing and
proven technologies offer advantages. If these do not exist, a research and
development programme may be required.
20
Potential corrective actions
Technology input
Safety/environmental
regulatory input Technology availability
and practicality
Sufficiency for attaining
near-term compliance State of development
(proven, developmental or
Sufficiency for attaining conceptual?)
long-term compliance
Compatibility with other
Time requirements for attaining repository components
compliance
Regulatory approval and

timing uncertainties
Analyse and prioritize
Potential for regulatory changes alternatives
based on emerging national or
international standards
Implementability input
Timeliness of solution
Availability of funding,
personnel and other
Cost Input required resources
Comparative estimates Stakeholder acceptance
Reliability of estimates
Identify preferred
corrective action(s)
FIG. 3. Example of a decision making approach for selection of corrective actions.
The evaluation of corrective action alternatives generally includes risk

estimates for both workers and members of the public. Trade-offs may apply
between public risks and worker risks. In addition, risks to the environment
may also need to be factored into the assessment of corrective action
alternatives [8, 64].
21
TABLE 1. EXAMPLES OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Corrective action objective Initiating event Possible corrective actions
Achieve compliance with New repository Determine compliance

changed regulatory performance standards based on updated safety
requirements issued assessments
Implement any measures
required to achieve
compliance
New or revised WAC Impose revised waste
adopted by repository classification requirements
on generators and update
waste inspection procedures
at the repository
National regulations issued Implement an action plan to
requiring a new repository phase out old technology
concept and initiate a process to
develop a replacement
repository
Rectify an existing unsafe Worker doses exceed safety Immediately institute
condition standards due to inadequate shielding and improve waste
procedures for handling handling procedures to
high activity shipments reduce doses to acceptable
levels
Groundwater Immediately protect the
contamination detected in public by providing
local drinking water supply alternative drinking water
in excess of regulatory Institute root cause analysis
standards
Incompatible wastes cause a Revise operating procedures
fire, releasing unsafe levels to ensure separation of
of airborne contaminants incompatible wastes during
receipt and emplacement
Prevent an unsafe Worker doses trending Audit operational activities
condition from occurring higher than normal ranges and change procedures as
in the future appropriate to reduce doses
to normal ranges
22
TABLE 1. EXAMPLES OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (cont.)
Groundwater Determine significance

contamination detected at based on updated safety
levels higher than predicted assessment and evaluate
by the safety assessment monitoring programme
sufficiency
Design and install a clay or
grout cut-off wall to control
migration and enhance
attenuation of contaminants
Improve WAC and related
QMS to exclude free liquids
or uncontained chelating
agents
Install a cap to limit
infiltration, and expand
buffer zone to allow for
monitored natural
attenuation
Failure of drainage system Remove, redesign and
surrounding buried waste replace drainage system
Saturation of buried waste Lower water table, and/or
due to water table rise introduce engineering
measures to prevent re-
occurrence
Saturation of buried waste Improve structural integrity
due to cover failure from of waste form and/or
waste subsidence packaging
Inject supplementary grout
backfill to fill voids
Repair covers
Saturation of buried waste Employ smaller trenches or
during the operational progressively develop
phase trenches to minimize
exposure of waste to
precipitation prior to cap
installation
23
Lack of WAC has led to the Determine significance

disposal of unsegregated based on safety assessment
long lived, short lived, high Establish suitable WAC or
activity, hazardous emplacement procedures
chemical, chelating agents, Retrieve and segregate
and other waste types wastes, reprocess and
repackage if necessary
Gases resulting from Determine significance
decomposition or corrosion based on updated safety
lead to airborne assessment
radionuclide releases at Revise WAC to exclude gas
levels higher than predicted generating materials, e.g.
by the safety assessment wood, organic material,
untreated biological waste
Respond to societal Repository developed in Retrieve waste and relocate
demands the path of projected the repository
population growth
High degree of public Enhance communications
concern that the repository programme to provide
is unsafe information and obtain input
from the public on a regular
basis
Achieve compliance with New repository Determine compliance
changed regulatory performance standards based on updated safety
requirements issued assessments
Implement any measures
required to achieve
compliance
New or revised WAC Impose revised waste
adopted by repository classification requirements
on generators and update
waste inspection procedures
at the repository
National regulations issued Implement an action plan to
requiring a new repository phase out old technology
concept and initiate a process to
develop a replacement
repository
24
Rectify an existing unsafe Worker doses exceed safety Immediately institute

condition standards due to inadequate shielding and improve waste
procedures for handling handling procedures to
high activity shipments reduce doses to acceptable
levels
Groundwater Immediately protect the
contamination detected in public by providing
local drinking water supply alternative drinking water
in excess of regulatory Institute root cause analysis
standards
Incompatible wastes cause a Revise operating procedures
fire, releasing unsafe levels to ensure separation of
of airborne contaminants incompatible wastes during
receipt and emplacement
Prevent an unsafe Worker doses trending Audit operational activities
condition from occurring higher than normal ranges and change procedures as
in the future appropriate to reduce doses
to normal ranges
Groundwater Determine significance
contamination detected at based on updated safety
levels higher than predicted assessment and evaluate
by the safety assessment monitoring programme
sufficiency
Design and install a clay or
grout cut-off wall to control
migration and enhance
attenuation of contaminants
Improve WAC and related
QMS to exclude free liquids
or uncontained chelating
agents
Install a cap to limit
infiltration, and expand
buffer zone to allow for
monitored natural
attenuation
25
The potential effect of a particular approach on the performance of other
aspects of the disposal system is an important consideration. As an example,
additional barriers may influence the performance of the entire repository,
resulting in changes to licence conditions, including possible changes (increases
or decreases) in waste acceptance limits. Also, the addition of barriers may
reduce disposal space. Conversely, waste retrieval may increase available
capacity.
The availability of resources, as well as the funds to secure the resources,
should also be taken into account in prioritizing the various corrective action
options. This may be a major challenge in undertaking the upgrading of reposi-
tories. In certain cases, there may be insufficient funds, trained personnel or
available technologies to undertake a preferred alternative. Determining
resource availability at an early stage in the decision making process can avoid
unnecessary delays and redirection of efforts. A cost–benefit analysis may be
undertaken to identify the lifetime cost of the improvements, including
purchase, maintenance and decommissioning (where relevant).
In general, when deciding on a corrective action strategy, the practical
limitations associated with its implementation should be considered. This could
lead to other, less complex or less costly but effective, options being chosen. For
example, the relatively high cost of robotics technology and the difficulties of
deploying qualified personnel have limited their use in repositories.
In many Member States the operation of a repository involves consul-
tation with the public, with emphasis on the local community. Existing facilities
might not be acceptable to particular stakeholders for a variety of reasons. In
this case, corrective actions may involve efforts to better communicate with the
public [70]. Public input on alternatives may be useful in the prioritization and
selection of corrective actions.
Following careful analysis of initiating events and impact significances, no
further action may be indicated. These analyses may indicate that reliance on
natural processes, including sorption, retardation (physical, chemical and
biological) and radioactive decay, will adequately mitigate the impacts. With
this option, increased monitoring and ongoing safety assessments may be
necessary to demonstrate that natural processes are indeed reducing
contaminant concentrations to acceptable levels.
3.6. DEVELOPMENT OF A CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
Once the preferred option has been selected, a planning process is

generally established to implement the selected option. The plan needs to
26
define the sequence of processes and procedures to be followed while imple-
menting the corrective actions. This includes:
(a) Comprehensive identification of all the activities needed to develop the

plan;
(b) The schedule and critical path for delivery;
(c) Identification of critical interfaces (task linkages);
(d) Resources required(personnel, skills, infrastructure and materials);
(e) Financial requirements and sources of funding;
(f) Risks to the plan delivery and risk mitigation plan;
(g) A communications plan for relevant stakeholders;
(h) A QMS.
A detailed schedule of activities is needed to ensure that the timing for

completion of the various activities is well defined, realistic and understood by
all participants in the process, and that timing sequences and critical path task
linkages are identified and managed.
The resources required need to be identified and a plan implemented for
securing them on a timely basis. The cost of all activities needs to be thoroughly
evaluated to develop a realistic budget to ensure timely delivery within funding
limits.
Risks to delivering the plan need to be analysed and documented, with
mitigation and contingency plans to control the risks. A major risk for many
projects at disposal waste facilities is the ability to secure timely regulatory
approvals.
A communications plan may be prepared that identifies the stakeholders
of the process and the communications plan for each stakeholder group. A
continuous process may minimize disruptions of the process and delays caused
by a lack of timely and relevant information.
3.7. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
Corrective action activities are generally carried out in accordance with

an adopted corrective action plan and in coordination with the regulatory
organizations responsible for oversight of the facility. Milestones with
scheduled completion and inspection dates established during the planning
phase may be used to track progress.
Specific instructions provided to those performing the work help ensure
proper quality control. These instructions typically address responsibilities,
work scope and procedures to be followed in performing each task.
27
3.8. VERIFICATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION OBJECTIVES
HAVING BEEN MET
Indicators and performance measures are typically defined to provide a

basis for confirming that the corrective actions have accomplished their
intended purpose. Repository conditions, prior to implementation of corrective
actions, provide a basis against which the effectiveness of the corrective actions
can be assessed.
Typical indicators of the effectiveness of corrective actions may include
reduced radionuclide concentrations, less leachate production, stable trench
cover contours (indicating reduced or stabilized subsidence), reduced site
boundary radiation levels, or reduced radiological contamination in the
surrounding environment.
In certain cases, confirmation of the effectiveness of corrective action
may be difficult to determine in the short term. For example, the effectiveness
of reductions in the disposed inventories of long lived radionuclides is best
evaluated based on monitoring and safety assessments conducted over time,
rather than immediate physical measurements. In the case of public
involvement programmes, the measures of effectiveness will generally be
subjective in nature.
A formalized QMS provides a basis for developing and documenting
reliable information for regulators and stakeholders. This generally includes
controls on organization, design, procurement, procedures and processes,
documentation, inventory, inspections, tests, equipment calibration, improve-
ments in the event of non-conformance, audits, and continuous improvement.
A communications plan established during the planning phase can provide a
useful tool for the transfer of information on the progress of work to the
various stakeholders.
Documentation is recommended to provide a complete record of the
effectiveness of the corrective actions. The verification activities may be
confirmed by independent organizations, audits and peer review in addition to
the required regulatory body reviews and approvals.
4. EXAMPLES OF CORRECTIVE ACTION APPROACHES

AND TECHNOLOGIES
The lessons learned from managing the initiating events described above,
as well as others, have led to the adoption of improved approaches and
28
technologies for the near surface disposal of radioactive waste. General
information on this topic is provided in this section. Case studies from Member
States are given in the appendix.
4.1. ENGINEERED FEATURES
Engineered features are human made elements incorporated in the

design of the disposal system to more effectively isolate the waste from the
biosphere. This broad definition includes waste form, containers, backfill and
buffer material, concrete boreholes or vaults, trench liners, covers, drainage
control, leachate collection and removal, gas venting and any other feature
designed to improve repository performance. The actual need for engineered
features is dictated by site and waste specific considerations and safety
assessment results. Some examples of the use of engineered features are
provided below.
4.1.1. Repair or installation of surface caps
In some older disposal facilities, disposal units were not adequately

covered, resulting in excessive infiltration and accumulation of rainwater. This
water accumulation caused degradation of waste containers and subsequent
leaching of radionuclides out of the repository. Erosion and burrowing animal
intrusion at some repository sites have also occurred as a result of inadequate
covering of the emplaced waste. This also has the potential for mobilizing
radionuclides into the surrounding environment.
Surface caps, comprising both natural (e.g. clay) and human made
materials (e.g. concrete, geomembranes, bitumen), have been emplaced to
control water infiltration, provide intrusion resistance, control gaseous
emissions, reduce erosion and attenuate radiation. Multilayered caps may
contain an upper vegetative layer, a protective layer to prevent erosion and
animal burrowing, a drainage layer, and a hydraulic barrier or low permeability
layer. The layer thickness, permeability and materials chosen reflect specific
site requirements and performance objectives. The design of surface caps
generally takes settling and weathering effects into account [45].
If the corrective action requires reduced infiltration, the installation of
asphalt and concrete caps may prove effective in the short term. In the longer
term they are subject to degradation by weathering, cracking and subsidence.
Cap repairs, sometimes extensive in nature, have also been necessary
at sites experiencing both operational and post-closure subsidence due to
degradation of waste packages and localized subsurface settlement.
29
Re-vegetation intended to minimize infiltration and control erosion may require
periodic reseeding and/or watering to establish the intended plant cover.
4.1.2. Installation of vertical hydraulic conduits
Disposal systems located in earth materials containing layers of variable

permeability may experience saturation, even if located above the water table
and protected by effective covers. This has been observed following periods of
heavy rainfall, when temporary saturation occurs in the layers overlying less
permeable strata. Horizontally migrating water in temporary, perched aquifers
or saturated zones may be intercepted by vertical, high permeability drainage
systems that divert horizontally flowing water away from the repository.
Hydraulic conduits of this type, generally consisting of gravel or crushed rock,
may be constructed during operations or after closure of the disposal units.
Installations of this type, undertaken after waste has been emplaced, may raise
worker exposure if there is a potential to unearth buried high activity, high dose
wastes.
4.1.3. Installation of cut-off walls
Cut-off walls may be used to direct upgradient groundwater away from

the repository or to channel contaminated water from the repository to a
collection and treatment system. The intended effect in both cases is reduction
in the potential for radionuclide migration from the repository.
Cut-off walls may be effective for restricting the lateral migration of
contaminants and controlling water infiltration into the repository. The
potential effectiveness of cut-off walls depends on a number of factors,
including the physical characteristics of the soil (e.g. homogeneity, permeability
and porosity) and the depths of both waste and groundwater. A cut-off wall
may comprise a trench backfilled with clay, or a cement based grout curtain
formed by pressure injection through pipes or augers. As with vertical conduits,
the excavations required to install a cut-off wall may unearth buried wastes.
4.2. WASTE RETRIEVAL
In some Member States, radioactive wastes have been retrieved from

storage/disposal facilities and repackaged for subsequent disposal either at the
same site or at another repository. Retrieval may also be a corrective action
option in cases where sealed sources containing long lived or high activity
radionuclides or other problematic wastes have been placed in shallow
30
boreholes or other near surface repositories. Actual experience with waste
retrieval is limited.
Conceptually, retrieval techniques may be straightforward if the waste
remains well containerized and has not been immobilized in a medium such as
concrete. If the waste is not packaged or existing packages have substantially
degraded, removal and subsequent repackaging may be difficult. If the waste
has been immobilized in bitumen or cement or has been grouted in situ, cutting
and drilling equipment may be required. In cases of high dose rate package
removal, the use of shielding and mirrors may be used in combination with
remote handling and/or overpacking to limit worker dose.
Improved waste characterization and/or volume reduction may be
included as part of the retrieval process prior to redisposal. Upgrades to the
disposal facility, e.g. repair or placement of additional engineered barriers or
drainage systems, may also be carried out following waste retrieval. Volume
reduction, e.g. compaction or incineration, provides a denser waste form and
therefore allows more efficient use of available disposal space at the time of
redisposal. Improved waste characterization may provide valuable information
for updating safety assessments to improve predictions of future facility
performance, or detect the presence of free liquids or other wastes within the
containers that would not meet the acceptance criteria for final disposal.
In the case of borehole facilities, removal of the entire borehole unit,
including the waste, has been accomplished by Ontario Power Generation in
Canada by:
(a) Overcoring the borehole;

(b) Removing the soil in the annular space between the borehole and the
overcoring drill (with shielding to afford worker protection);
(c) Filling the annular space with concrete;
(d) Removing the borehole intact to another storage facility.
4.3. IN SITU WASTE STABILIZATION
A repository may be upgraded by provision of additional containment or

direct in situ stabilization of the waste if the waste packages no longer provide
satisfactory containment.
In situ stabilization of the waste may be undertaken in relatively old
disposal facilities in which waste containers have corroded or collapsed, or
where the waste has been disposed of without appropriate consolidation or
packaging. In situ injection of grouts may be used to encase the wastes in a
monolithic structure, thereby minimizing contact between water and waste.
31
Consideration needs to be given to possible adverse interaction between waste
constituents and grouting material. For example, the presence of certain
organic compounds could inhibit the setting of cement based grout.
4.4. WATER COLLECTION AND EXTRACTION
Certain disposal practices have resulted in migration of radionuclides

from the disposal facility to the nearby biosphere. Typical mechanisms include
transport of radionuclides by groundwater with subsequent contamination of
surface waters.
In such cases, conventional pumping systems may be used to extract
contaminated groundwater. A good understanding of regional hydrogeological
flow patterns will help ensure effective design and placement of the extraction well
or wells and optimization of the pumping rates required for effective control.
Other water collection and extraction technologies include buried
conduit pipes equipped with pumping equipment and below grade trenches to
direct and collect contaminated shallow groundwater by gravity flow. These
technologies can be used as means to intercept up-gradient infiltrating water or
a plume of contamination.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This report considers a variety of circumstances that may require

corrective actions to be assessed or implemented at near surface disposal
facilities. In the context of this publication, the term ‘disposal facility’ includes
those facilities defined as such in the IAEA Glossary, and those facilities that
may have been designated as storage facilities but where the intent for future
retrieval of the waste was not clearly established or specified. The circum-
stances leading to the corrective actions, or the corrective actions themselves,
may be of either a technical or a non-technical nature.
A systematic process is advisable to help ensure effective planning and
implementation of the corrective actions. The steps involved in the process
reflect such standard project management practices as identification of
activities, scheduling, controlling interfaces, managing resources, financial and
progress tracking, risk identification and management, and communications.
A wide variety of corrective actions is available to remedy near surface
disposal facility performance deficiencies and related regulatory and
32
stakeholder issues. Extensive literature and international experience exists to
provide guidance in the selection of corrective actions appropriate for
application to specific repositories.
(a) Corrective actions may be undertaken to achieve one or more of the

following objectives:
— Comply with new regulatory requirements;
— Rectify an existing unsafe condition;
— Prevent an unsafe condition from occurring in the future;
— Respond to societal demands.
(b) The corrective action process involves the following sequential steps:
— Defining the initiating event(s);
— Identifying root causes;
— Identifying potential corrective actions;
— Assessing options and selecting the preferred corrective actions(s);
— Developing the corrective action plan;
— Implementing the plan;
— Verifying the effectiveness of the corrective action(s) implemented.
(c) Initiating events may be grouped into the following general categories:
— Changes in regulatory standards and requirements;
— Releases or operational exposures predicted to exceed standards;
— Actual releases or operational exposures exceeding standards;
— Non-compliance with existing requirements;
— Stakeholder concerns.
(d) The assessment and selection of a preferred corrective action is a complex
process involving diverse inputs, considerations and factors. These inputs
may be grouped under four broad categories:
— Safety/regulatory;
— Technological;
— Practicability;
— Cost considerations.
33
Appendix
EXAMPLES OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED AT

REPOSITORIES IN MEMBER STATES
This appendix provides examples of near surface repositories which at

some time have been considered to require corrective actions, and the specific
approaches used to implement such actions. The list is not exhaustive but
should allow an appreciation of the types of actions that were implemented and
of their efficacy.
A.1. BELARUS: ACHIEVING SAFETY AT RADON TYPE WASTE

DISPOSAL FACILITIES
A.1.1. Introduction
The major issues that Belarus has confronted over the past decade in the
area of radioactive waste management are addressed in Articles 12 and 28 of
Ref. [3] and linked to upgrading of the Ekores National Radioactive Waste
Disposal Facility, which belongs to the class of ‘RADON’ type facilities. (These
facilities are so named because their designs were based on the same concept as
that of the two central facilities near Moscow and St. Petersburg operated by
the Scientific and Industrial Association RADON).
Safety issues which may raise stakeholders’ anxiety for most of the
existing RADON type facilities are related to their three key features:
(1) The facilities contain extra fractions of a emitters and long lived b and g
emitters in the near surface repositories;
(2) The question of safety of their borehole repositories for spent sealed
sources has not been settled;
(3) They are located in the vicinity of densely populated localities.
Owing to the above considerations and especially to the long lived nature
of the waste disposed of at the facilities, any measures taken to upgrade their
operational conditions and safety may, in terms of public reaction, result in
effects opposite to what is expected. Belarus met with such a situation when
implementing its national project for upgrading and rebuilding the Ekores
facility. After four years of relatively successful activities, work under the
project was stopped because of great public pressure. Following many
35
discussions at different levels, an advanced reconstruction strategy for Ekores
has been developed and further efforts have been made to modernize the
relevant technical solutions.
A.1.2. Reasons and objectives of the Ekores facility rehabilitation
A.1.2.1. Background
The Ekores facility was commissioned in 1964 in the vicinity of Minsk, a

city with a population of approximately 2 million, and was intended for LILW
storage/disposal [71]. The site comprises 2 older (historic) concrete lined
trenches, each 4 m deep, and 2 subsurface reinforced second generation
concrete vaults, each 3 m deep, filled with solid waste. The 2 trenches and one
of the vaults are closed and the operating vault is 75% full.
There are also four ‘old’ borehole repositories (so-called ‘wells’) with S
shaped loading channels for ‘free’ disposal of spent sealed radioactive sources
(SSRSs). In July 2003, free SSRSs in wells were immobilized into a lead matrix
in situ, using the technology developed by RADON [72].
A.1.2.2. Initial approach
Taking into account that the Ekores site had no waste segregation or
waste processing procedure, no equipment for unloading containers with SSRS,
no premises or facilities for the decontamination of vehicles and equipment,
and no monitoring boreholes, the necessity of upgrading the facility was
recognized immediately after a new regulatory regime had been established in
Belarus. A national project for reconstruction of the Ekores facility was
launched in late 1997. The project covered:
(a) Upgrading of the existing structures (garage, decontamination unit,

fence);
(b) Construction of 3 new structures (building for SSRS disposal, building for
waste predisposal treatment, vault for solid waste disposal);
(c) Introduction of more advanced technologies for the safe handling of solid
and liquid LILW.
The IAEA supported this national activity by providing Ekores staff with
the relevant training, expertise and equipment support.
36
A.1.2.3. Reasons for the development of an advanced approach
IAEA support contributed greatly to the evaluation of potential hazards

posed by the Ekores site [73]. In particular, safety assessment showed that:
(a) First generation trenches contain waste with a concentration of

transuranic radionuclides in excess of 4000 Bq/g;
(b) Irradiated fuel from the research reactor containing about 2 kg of
uranium (in 10 stainless steel containers) is buried in the now closed
vault;
(c) Owing to the migration of the radioisotopes 14C, 36Cl, 60Co, 3H, 239Pu,
226
Ra, 90Sr and 238U from the Ekores repositories, contamination of
groundwater within the supervised area may exceed the limits for
drinking water;
(d) The long lived radionuclides 239Pu, 226Ra, 241Am and 232Th represent a
danger for future generations, as long lived radiotoxic isotopes may
contaminate the aquifers in the near future.
In view of public concern over the disposal of long lived radionuclides

near Minsk, funding for the reconstruction was suspended and an advanced
strategy for its reconstruction has been developed. This strategy is described
below.
A.1.3. Advanced strategy for reconstruction of the Ekores facility
The advanced strategy states that the Ekores facility is regarded as a

facility for long term storage of waste, not for disposal. All the wastes at the
Ekores vaults should be identified, conditioned, packaged and labelled to
ensure that the conditioned waste packages meet the most stringent safety
requirements for waste storage and transport. There is a requirement to revise
the national project by amending it with a section concerning the development
of procedures for retrieval of waste from the existing repositories. The
retrieved waste is to be sorted and conditioned into acceptable transport
packages using the same technologies as those to be implemented for new
incoming wastes. The main goal of the reconstruction is to provide a flexible
means of relocating long lived waste to a new disposal/storage repository. The
programme for siting a new repository is now in the approval process by the
Government.
As for fissile material which is present in the vault, it is proposed that in
the course of retrieval operations the intact containers should be removed and
transported to an approved storage facility for fissile material. It is anticipated
37
that international experts will conduct the safety assessment and develop a
detailed plan for the appropriate management of this type of waste.
A.1.3.1. Strategy for managing solid radioactive waste
Solid radioactive waste requiring treatment and storage at the Ekores site
will come from 2 sources, new incoming wastes and those arising from waste
retrieval operations. Compactable wastes will be placed into mild steel 200 L
drums and each drum will be compacted, capped with grout and consigned for
storage. Non-compactable wastes will be placed in a 200 L drum during sorting,
then directly grouted in situ and consigned for storage.
The packages of treated SRW will be temporarily placed in approved
surface storage until the vault is empty. The surface of the vault should then be
decontaminated, monitored and subjected to a structural survey. After being
repaired it should be used for continued storage of the drums of cemented
waste.
A new building for waste sorting, treatment and packaging is planned. A
site drainage system, decontamination centre, laboratory and administrative
block are also included in the project.
A.1.3.2. Strategy for management of spent radioactive sources
To enhance the safety and security of SSRSs in the old wells and to
facilitate their subsequent retrieval, sources have been immobilized in metal
matrices in situ. The strategy for new incoming sources is to separate them into
different types, then store them in a retrievable manner. A new building for the
long term storage of SSRSs has been constructed. It has been equipped with 11
modernized borehole repositories.
A.1.3.3. Modernized borehole repositories for retrievable SSRS storage
The typical design of RADON borehole SSRS repositories has been

modernized in order to provide the possibility of retrieving SSRSs according to
the new reconstruction concept. To achieving this, a loading channel of the well
consists of 3 sections [74]. The bottom and top parts of the sections are
designed to ensure their butt joint connection when in operation, and discon-
nection in case retrieval is required. The weight of each section is about 3 t and
the weight of the underground reservoir fully filled with conditioned SSRSs is
2.2 t, meaning that a standard crane mechanism can be used for reservoir
retrieval. The modernized borehole repositories are intended for storage of
38
short lived SSRS which have half-lives of less than 30 years, mainly 60Co, 137Cs
and 90Sr/90Y.
Sources with very long half-lives of much more than 30 years are mainly
‘smoke detector’ type sources containing 239Pu and 241Am, both of which can
be handled without b/g shielding. Special borehole facilities have been
constructed for storage of these SSRSs [74].
A.1.4. Conclusions
The experience of Belarus outlined above has demonstrated that ìmaking

all reasonable improvements in order to upgrade the safety of existing
RADON type facilities may prove to be a much more complex task than had
initially been expected. Some issues remain, mainly concerning:
(a) Public perception of the presence of extra fractions of a emitters in near

surface repositories;
(b) Technical procedures for safe retrieval and sorting of waste;
(c) Selection of a solution to achieve safety of the existing RADON design
wells;
(d) Long term safety considerations — the existing facilities should be
upgraded so as not to create future problems.
A.2. BULGARIA: NOVI HAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE REPOSITORY
A.2.1. Novi Han radioactive waste repository
A.2.1.1. Background
The Novi Han radioactive waste repository is the only national

radioactive waste disposal site in Bulgaria. It is located in Losen mountain,
6.5 km from the small village of Novi Han and 35 km from the capital, Sofia.
The repository accepts radioactive waste generated from nuclear applications
in industry, medicine, research and education. The facility was constructed
according to a modified Soviet design (type TP-4891). Its construction licence
was issued in 1959 and that for commissioning in 1964. The repository was
specially built for the needs of the IRT-2000 research reactor operated by the
Institute of Physics and other academic and medical facilities.
In 1959, the Government appointed the Physical Institute of the
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, whose successor is now the Institute for
39
11 8 9
10
11
FIG. 4. Layout of facilities and buildings at Novi Han (1: trench for solid wastes, 2: vault
for biological wastes, 3: vault for solid wastes, 4: storage, 5: sump water storage tanks, 6:
vault for sealed sources, 7: monitoring boreholes, 8: garage, 9: radiochemical laboratories,
10: auto channel, 11: administration builidings).
Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), as the central authority for
the collection and disposal of radioactive waste from nuclear applications.
A.2.1.2. Description of the Novi Han repository
The Novi Han repository site covers an area of 4.25 ha.1 The site is
divided into two areas separated by a fence (Fig. 4). One area contains the
administrative buildings, garage and maintenance shops. The other contains the
disposal facilities, radiochemical laboratory and decontamination station.
The repository consists of several different disposal vaults:
(1) A concrete vault for low and intermediate level solid wastes, which
consists of 3 separate cells with a total volume of 237 m3;
(2) A concrete vault for biological wastes with a volume of 80 m3;
(3) Four steel tanks for storage of low level liquid wastes with a total volume
of 48 m3;
(4) A special 1 m3 concrete vault for spent sealed sources;
(5) A concrete trench for solid waste, which consists of 7 separate units with
a total volume of 200 m3.
1
1 ha = 1.00 × 104 m2.
40
The disposal vault for spent sealed sources is full. The vaults for solid and
biological waste and the engineered trench still have capacity for disposal of
additional waste.
All the disposal vaults are engineered disposal structures (Figs 5–7)
constructed of reinforced concrete with stainless steel linings, additional brick
walls and asphalt insulation. The vaults are underground, with only the roofs
above ground level. The four steel tanks for liquid waste are located in a
reinforced concrete underground room. The reinforced concrete vault for
spent sources is a cylinder 5.5 m below the surface. Heavy concrete and 5 lead
slabs placed between the disposal vault and the ground surface provide
protection from radiation. The engineered trench was constructed in 1984 and
is the only facility with a drainage system.
All disposal units are near surface engineered multibarrier disposal
facilities. Barriers to retard migration of radionuclides from the disposal vaults
to the environment include reinforced concrete, stainless steel lining, hydro
insulation and the site’s natural geological barrier (clayey phyllite schists). The
waste form itself is not considered to be a barrier.
2800
4–4
1000 1200
Ground
~1800
3500
~1200
level
1730 2500 1600
3500
15700
3400
4942
00
444
12
3600
Bitumen
00
Reinforced concrete
10
cover
300 mm
Brick wall
120 mm Bitumen
20 mm
2800
Stainless steel
4 mm
1730 2900 1600
5830
FIG. 5. Disposal vault for solid waste.
41
Disposal vault for biological waste
2–2
800 ¥ 800 850 ¥ 850
2
1500
Ground
250
level
1700
500
1450 2000 1700 1700 1500
1700
8350
2000
850
Bitumen
Reinforced concrete
cover
300 mm
1450
1000
2 Brick wall
120 mm Bitumen
20 mm
1700 1700
Stainless
4000 steel, 4 mm
FIG. 6. Disposal vault for biological waste.
FIG. 7. Engineered trench for solid waste.
42
A.2.1.3. Waste acceptance criteria
Waste acceptance criteria follow Regulation No. 7 of the Committee on

the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes on Collection, Treatment,
Storage, Transport and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in the Territory of the
Republic of Bulgaria [75]. They take into account:
(a) Origin:
(i) Radioactive wastes from industry, medicine, agriculture and
scientific research are accepted for storage or disposal.
(ii) Wastes from the uranium mining and milling industry and the
Kozloduy nuclear power plant are not accepted.
(b) Activity and radionuclide inventory:
(i) Solid and solidified low and intermediate level short lived wastes are
accepted.
(ii) Limits for α activity for solid and solidified LILWs:
— Average activity of α radionuclides for a facility is limited to
370 MBq/t;
— Specific α activity is limited to 3.7 GBq/t;
— Specific α activity for single package solid waste is limited to
0.19 GBq/t;
— Limits of 226Ra and 232Th for single package solidified waste: up
to 3.7 MBq/t 226Ra and 1.1 MBq/t 232Th;
— Limits of 226Ra and 232Th for single package solid waste: up to
3.7 MBq/t for 226Ra and 232Th;
— In special cases the disposal of radioactive waste with specific α
activity from 3.7 to 18.6 GBq/t might be permitted.
(iii) Very short lived wastes (half-life <15 d) are not accepted for
disposal.
(c) Waste form restrictions:
(i) Waste that contains free liquids is prohibited.
(ii) Flammable and explosive wastes are prohibited.
(iii) Liquid wastes are accepted after neutralization to pH7.0.
(iv) Biological waste must be treated with formalyne and solidified with
gypsum in plastic waste packages.
A.2.1.4. Current situation at the Novi Han repository
The Novi Han repository has been in operation for more than 30 years
without an accident or release of radioactivity to the environment, but also
without investment for upgrading. As a consequence the Committee on the
43
Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes temporarily suspended
repository operation in 1994. In 1995 INRNE initiated a programme to
upgrade the repository and developed an implementation plan. Activities are
supported by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the Committee on the Use of
Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, the International Atomic Energy
Agency with Model Technical Project BUL/4/005 on Increasing Safety of Novi
Han Repository from 1997–2000, and the Bulgarian Government with
financing from the State budget in 1998 and subsequently from the State fund
for Safety and Storage of Radioactive Waste.
A.2.2. Activities for increasing the safety of the Novi Han repository
IAEA Model Technical Project BUL/4/005 on Increasing Safety of the

Novi Han Repository contributed the following to the upgrading process:
(a) Expert missions to evaluate possible options for improvement, safety

assessment, evaluation of monitoring systems, evaluation of radiological
monitoring and control practices, management of high level spent sealed
sources, selection of treatment and conditioning processes, above ground
storage facility design and quality assurance;
(b) Training of personnel and a scientific visit to a RADON facility in the
Russian Federation;
(c) Procurement of Super Low Lever Liquid Scintillation Analyzer software
for safety assessment, technical documentation on low and intermediate
level waste processing and storage, processing and storage of spent
sources, and data management.
The main tasks and achievements of the programme are discussed below.
A.2.2.1. Identification of radionuclide inventory
The radionuclide inventory of the Novi Han repository, as well as the

inventory of each separate disposal vault, were identified based on existing
documentation for the period of operation of the repository. Spent sealed
sources, listed in Table 2, represent the majority of the waste disposed of [76].
The activity disposed of in the vaults for solid waste, biological waste and
the trench is low compared with the disposal vault for sealed sources, because
the waste is low level and generated mainly from scientific research. Contami-
nated materials from some incidents, including soil with a low contamination
level, are disposed of in the trench. The activities are 8.05 × 1012 Bq, 1.91 ×
1011 Bq and 1.28 × 1012 Bq, respectively. The activities of the vaults for solid
44
TABLE 2. RADIONUCLIDE INVENTORY OF THE DISPOSAL VAULT
FOR SEALED SOURCES
Activity Activity
Radionuclide Radionuclide
(Bq) (Bq)
192
Ir 1.37 × 105 144
Ce 2.12 × 102
60
Co 1.46 × 1013 106
Ru 7.84 × 105
137
Cs 1.12 × 1013 55
Fe 1.14 × 109
90 11 85
Sr 1.13 × 10 Kr 7.67 × 1010
226
Ra 5.96 × 1011 75
Se 2.11 × 102
170
Tm 5.48 × 105 147
Pm 1.01 × 108
204
Tl 2.39 × 109 239
Pu 1.82 × 1011
65 4 241
Zn 2.79 × 10 Am 2.41 × 1010
109
Cd 1.80 × 107 3
H 1.70 × 1010
waste, biological waste, and the trench are shown in Figs 8–10. The inventory of
the trench is made up mainly of radionuclides of Cs, Co and Sr. In addition, a
total of 3 mg of 239Pu from contaminated equipment, protective material, etc., is
disposed of in the trench.
239
Pu
0.65%
85Kr
241Am 60Co
0.10%
0.06% 18.92%
90Sr
0.15%
226Ra
0.77%
137Cs
79.34%
192
0.005% others: Ir, 170Tm, 204TI, 65Zn, 109Cd, 144Ce, 106Ru, 55Fe, 75Se, 147Pm, 3H
FIG. 8. Radionuclide inventory of the disposal vault for spent sealed sources.
45
55Fe
1%
60Co
19%
3H
4%
137Cs
90Sr 58%
11%
204Tl 14C 134Cs
1% 5% 1%
others (44Ce, 65Zn, 106Ru (0.37%))
FIG. 9. Radionuclide inventory of the disposal vault for solid waste.
A.2.2.2. Characterization of the disposal vaults
According to the original design, the lifetime of the repository was to be

ten years. Only the disposal vault for spent sealed sources is now full. The
underground parts of the disposal facilities are in good condition and no water
is to be found in the disposal structures. Leakage of radionuclides outside the
vaults has not been observed.
others
3H
14C
1%
7%
8%
90Sr
11%
60Co
137Cs
8% 134 Cs
64%
1%
others (54Mn, 65Zn, 144Ce, 106Ru)
FIG. 10. Radionuclide inventory of the disposal vault for biological waste.
46
A.2.2.3. Characterization of the site
The Geological Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences has

conducted a geological survey of the Novi Han repository site [77]. The study
included characterization of the meteorology; the lithostratigraphy of Losen
mountain (based on existing records of deep drillings); lithology of the site
(based on 3 shallow investigation boreholes from 15–25 m deep, 2 of them in
the second area of the Novi Han repository and the third outside the fence, as
well as on existing data from 6 boreholes, 250–790 m deep, drilled in an area
80–1500 m from the site); tectonics and hydrogeological settings. A phyllite
schist formation with a variable thickness from 300–500 to more than 800 m
underlies the repository site.
According to the geological investigations, there is no evidence of
hazardous atmospheric phenomena. The repository site is not endangered by
flooding and gully erosion. There are no landslides or rock falls in the
repository region which could be an eventual hazard and there are no
conditions for the evolution of such processes. The geological strata have safe
bearing capacity, providing a safe suitable foundation base for the disposal
vaults. The repository area is not endangered by subsidence or significant
settlement of the soil base. Additional investigations are necessary to clarify
the complex tectonic structure.
The rocks in the region represent a low water bearing and low permeable
formation. Their permeability is higher in the tectonic, strongly fissured and
faulted zones and in the upper weathered layer. The groundwater is recharged
by precipitation only. A regular aquifer has not been formed. An unstable
water table of shallow groundwater at a varying depth from the surface (from
6–7 m to 15–17 m) is found in the shallow boreholes in the repository area. The
hydrogeological conditions are complex. Additional site investigations are
planned to provide data for the safety assessment and for the construction of
new facilities on the site.
A.2.2.4. Safety assessment
The radiological consequences were determined for relevant scenarios,

selected from a comprehensive list of features, events and processes developed
for the Novi Han repository [78, 79]. The main scenarios are leaching, Pu
capsules and intrusion (construction and residence). Results were obtained for
the entire repository and for individual disposal vaults. The peak doses are lower
than 1 mSv/a. Based on the results for the intrusion scenario, an institutional
control period of 300 years is proposed.
47
A.2.2.5. Upgrading of the monitoring and control system
The activities include 2 interconnected tasks, environmental monitoring

and radiation protection. The environmental monitoring programme covers
the repository site, the restricted area and the supervised area. Based on
monitoring during 30 years of operation and site characterization, the
monitoring programme was expanded [80]. Monitoring of water sources
(monitoring boreholes, permanent and seasonal springs, surface running
waters, drinking, household and irrigation water), soil, sediments, vegetation,
food and air is undertaken. Analytical methods include gross b, gross a, g
spectrometry, liquid scintillation measurement of 14C and 3H, 90Sr and 239Pu,
direct measurement of the dose rate, permanent measurement of
g background, automatic measurement of g background in situ and
g spectrometry. The radiation protection programme covers the dosimetric
checking of personnel and control over the technological processes in order to
ensure the safety of operators.
A.2.2.6. Option study and conceptual design of a new waste processing and
storage facility
The option study is aimed at selecting treatment and conditioning

processes based on existing information on the different waste streams,
regulatory requirements and best practices [81]. The conceptual design for a
new waste processing and storage facility is taken into account in the feasibility
study for reconstruction and modernization of the repository [82].
A.2.2.7. Direct measures for improvement of safety
The improvement measures were financed by the 1998 State budget and
subsequently by the State Fund for Safety and Storage of Radioactive Waste.
They cover the recommendations of the regulators as well as technological
needs, and a new organizational structure that includes quality assurance. Some
of the important activities are the following:
(a) Repair and improvement of the existing disposal vaults (Fig. 11). This
includes repair of the concrete in the above-ground parts of the disposal
facilities, new hydro-insulation and new lids, as shown in Fig. 12 for the
disposal vault for biological waste. A new heavy protective cover was
installed over the disposal vault for spent sealed sources (Fig. 13).
48
FIG. 11. Disposal vault for solid waste before improvement.
FIG. 12. Disposal vault for solid waste after improvement.
49
FIG. 13. Improvement of the disposal facility for spent sealed sources.
(b) Repair and improvement of the building; complete refurbishment of the

electricity supply and reserve electricity supply, water supply, specialized
sump water collection and ventilation systems, and decontamination
facility.
(c) Improvement of the fire fighting system and the physical protection.
(d) Improvement of security and personnel access control.
(e) Improvement of the infrastructure.
(f) Reliable communications and new transport vehicles for personnel and
for the transport of radioactive waste.
A.2.3. Conclusions and further developments
Work accomplished to date has improved safety and allowed transport of

radioactive waste stored in Sofia to Novi Han for temporary above ground
storage. INRNE will apply for relicensing of the facility. Further development
will cover construction of a facility for long term storage/disposal of spent
sealed sources. An above ground storage facility might be constructed. A
possible long term solution is the utilization of a deep shaft at Gabra for
construction of a monitored disposal facility.
50
A.3. CANADA: CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED IN THE
WASTE MANAGEMENT AREAS OF CHALK RIVER
LABORATORIES
A.3.1. Background
This section discusses some of the corrective actions that have been
carried out in response to initiating events associated with the waste
management areas at the Chalk River Laboratories.
Chalk River Laboratories was established in 1944 by Atomic Energy of
Canada Ltd (AECL), a corporation that is owned by the Government of
Canada. Operations at the Chalk River Laboratories site began in the autumn
of 1944. Over the years, Chalk River Laboratories has served the needs of basic
research, radioisotope production, and research and development in support of
AECL’s CANDU heavy water reactor. The facilities provide storage for
radioactive wastes arising from the operation of research and development
facilities at Chalk River Laboratories, isotope processing operations, prototype
CANDU reactors, hospitals, universities and industries across Canada.
Chalk River Laboratories are located in the Province of Ontario on the
southern shore of the Ottawa River, 160 km northwest of Ottawa. The Chalk
River Laboratories site is typical of its immediate surroundings — a mixture of
exposed bedrock, glacial till, fluvial gravel and sand, small lakes and marshes.
Elevations vary from the level of the Ottawa River to 120 m above the river
level. The Ottawa River is the dominant drainage feature in the area.
Canada does not currently have any near surface disposal facilities for
radioactive waste. However, some storage practices were undertaken decades
ago at AECL sites with no specific plans to retrieve the waste at a future time,
and thus the associated facilities meet the definition of a repository as given in
Section 1.3. As a result, some of the experience gained in addressing issues
surrounding the waste management areas is relevant to the topic of the
application of corrective actions to near surface disposal facilities for
radioactive waste.
A.3.2. Waste management areas
The information below provides a brief description of the larger waste

management areas with radiological inventories on the Chalk River Laboratories
site that have been subjected to corrective actions.
51
A.3.2.1. Waste management area A
The first emplacement of radioactive waste at Chalk River Laboratories

took place in 1946 into what is now referred to as waste management area A.
These emplacements took the form of direct disposal of solids and liquids to
excavated trenches in the sand overburden.
A.3.2.2. Liquid dispersal area
This area contains seepage pits that went into operation in 1953 to receive
active liquids from various laboratories and facilities associated with reactor
operations. The seepage pits (reactor pits 1 and 2, and the chemical pit) are
located on a small dune, in an area bounded on the east and south by wetlands
and by waste management area A to the west.
A.3.2.3. Waste management area B
This was established in 1953 to succeed waste management area A as the

site for solid waste management. It contains a wide variety of waste burial
structures, such as unlined sand trenches, concrete monoliths containing
solidified liquid wastes, asphalt lined trenches, concrete bunkers and tile holes
for high level wastes. Tile holes are below grade concrete pipes set vertically on
a poured concrete base; some of the tile holes have a steel lining.
A.3.2.4. Waste tank farm
This was built to store high and intermediate level liquid wastes in tanks
that are housed in stainless steel lined concrete bunkers. Water level sensors in
the concrete bunkers, which are tested periodically, are wired to alarms at
response centres in the inner area.
A.3.2.5. Waste management area C
This is a sand trench facility that went into service in 1963 to receive
LLWs with hazardous lifetimes of less than 150 years and wastes that cannot be
confirmed to be uncontaminated. Some of the older trenches at waste
management area C have been covered with an impermeable membrane of
high density polyethylene (HDPE).
52
A.3.2.6. Waste management area F
This was established in 1976 to store contaminated soils and slags

containing low levels of 226Ra, uranium and arsenic. Emplacement was
completed in 1979 and the site is now considered closed.
A.3.3. Initiating events
In the past at Chalk River Laboratories, radioactive waste was placed in

non-engineered waste management facilities, as well as in asphalt trenches and
concrete bunkers. Unique ‘one of a kind’ wastes were encased in such materials
as concrete and bitumen. In the intervening years, environmental monitoring
and inspections have revealed the presence of radioactive contamination in
both groundwater and surface water, and the fact that the structures used to
contain radioactive wastes were either failing or had not been built as indicated
in records.
A.3.4. Corrective actions
A.3.4.1. Installation of surface caps
Waste management area C: In those cases where wastes were placed in

unlined sand trenches, the groundwater contamination is due in large part to
advection. To mitigate this situation, some of the older trenches have been
covered with an impermeable membrane of HDPE. Subsequent monitoring of
both groundwater and surface water has shown an appreciable reduction in the
levels of such radionuclides as tritium as a consequence of this corrective
action.
A.3.4.2. Monitoring and assessment
Waste management area F: In the establishment of waste management

area F a layer of clay was placed as a cap to reduce the flow of water through
the waste body. However, subsequent drying of the clay layer has led to
cracking, and the efficacy of this cap has been markedly reduced. The
corrective actions to date have largely served to enhance our knowledge of the
behaviour of the contaminants in order to determine if and when additional
corrective actions will be required. The results of monitoring and assessment
have shown that the contaminants are migrating very slowly and that it will be
decades before local surface water is affected.
53
A.3.4.3. Installation of cut-off walls and sorbing barriers
As noted above, the use of non-engineered waste management facilities

at Chalk River Laboratories has led to several plumes of contamination. In one
case, wall and curtain technology has been employed to direct the plume of
contaminated groundwater through a bed of clinoptilolite to adsorb such
species as 90Sr. The concentration of 90Sr prior to passing through the adsorbing
medium is approximately 85 Bq/L, and after passing through the clinoptilolite
bed the 90Sr levels are approximately 0.6 Bq/L, which is well below the
Canadian drinking water standard of 5 Bq/L. Given the sorptive capacity of the
clinoptilolite bed, together with the half-life of 90Sr, there may be no
requirement to retrieve the sorbing medium. Similar technology is being
considered for application to other plumes.
A.3.4.4. Water collection and extraction
In the case of other plumes it has been possible to install a series of inter-
ception wells to pump the contaminated water to the surface for subsequent
treatment. In these cases the levels of 90Sr in the untreated water can be as high
as several thousands of Bq/L, while after treatment they are at a level of
approximately 10–20 Bq/L.
A.3.4.5. Retrieval
To an increasing extent, problematic wastes are being retrieved for

processing and/or repackaging. The retrieval and processing technology varies
considerably based on the nature and condition of the waste.
In the case of stored liquid wastes, efforts are now under way to retrieve
liquid wastes from more than 20 tanks, some of which are more than 40 years
old. The intention is to retrieve the liquid wastes, blend and consolidate them in
new tanks and then ultimately solidify the liquids using, for example, vitrifi-
cation technology.
A project to retrieve old research reactor fuels that have undergone
significant corrosion due to exposure to water has also recently been initiated.
The current plan is to retrieve those fuels which are predominantly made of
uranium metal, dry and repackage the fuel, and then store it in a dry state until
a disposal facility for used nuclear fuel is available.
Other retrieval operations have been and are focusing on a diverse range
of wastes including:
(a) Hazardous chemicals encased in large concrete monoliths;
54
(b) Drums of contaminated solvents;
(c) Abandoned research equipment;
(d) Reactor parts that were buried following a reactor accident in 1952;
(e) Contents of some early unlined trenches;
(f) Localized areas of contaminated soils.
A.4. CZECH REPUBLIC: UPGRADING OF EXISTING REPOSITORIES
A.4.1. Introduction
In the Czech Republic, radioactive wastes are disposed of in the reposi-

tories at Dukovany, Richard near Litoměřice and Bratrství in Jáchymov. The
repositories had previously been operated by private operating organizations.
Dukovany was commissioned in 1985 and operated by ČEZ plc (the nuclear
power plant operating organization); Richard was commissioned in 1964 and
its last operating organization was ARAO; Bratrství was commissioned in 1975
and its last operating organization was also ARAO. Their management has
been transferred to a State organization, the Radioactive Waste Repository
Authority (RAWRA), which is now responsible for the safe operation of all
repositories. WAC have been changed several times during repository
operation as the safety requirements have been improved.
A.4.2. Dukovany
A.4.2.1. Description of the facility
The Dukovany repository was designed for the management of low and
medium level radioactive waste generated by nuclear power plants. It is the
largest and most modern of all the repositories in the Czech Republic, situated
within the area of the Dukovany nuclear power plant in the community of
Rouchovany.
Four rows of 28 concrete vaults (each 17.3 × 5.3 × 5.4 m) have been built
to dispose of all operational and decommissioning wastes from the Dukovany
and Temelín nuclear power plants. The vault walls and floor are made of
monolithic 10 cm reinforced concrete integrated with another waterproof layer
of 10 cm asphalt-polypropylene concrete. Eight vaults have been filled with
bituminized, cemented or supercompacted wastes. Wastes are accepted in
200 L drums. These drums are filled in 6 layers, so approximately 1600 drums
can be disposed of in 1 vault. Empty space in the vault is filled with concrete
and the vault is protected against rainwater.
55
The total volume of the disposal rooms is 55 000 m3 (about 180 000
drums). This is sufficient for disposal of all the low and medium level waste
from both power plants, even in the case of a prolongation of their planned
lifetimes by 10 years (to 40 years).
A.4.2.2. Planned activity
Because of its modern design, no upgrade is planned. Some improve-

ments have been made in the arrangement of the drums, increasing the capacity
of the vault from 1200 to 1600 drums.
Current plans are divided into 2 main fields:
(1) Protection of the vault construction against wear (concrete carbonization,

etc.);
(2) Improvement of the waste packages.
A.4.2.3. Protection of the vault construction against negative effects of weather
Maintenance of the repository construction must continue throughout its

operating period, which will extend decades into the future. The vault
construction is exposed to the negative influence of rainwater leakage through
improper seals in the ceiling panels. Carbonization of the concrete can also
cause long term damage to the construction.
To deal with these problems the possibility of protecting 2 rows of the
vault by construction of a temporary roof is being studied. To protect the rest of
the vaults the use of modern conservation materials for water insulation is
being studied.
A.4.2.4. Waste packages
The supercompaction campaign did not achieve sufficient volume

reduction. The waste producer is looking for a new overpack to enable more
efficient use of the disposal volume. A possible option may be the adaptation of
the entire vault to accept raw supercompacted drums.
A.4.3. Richard
The Richard repository is situated in a former limestone mine. The

disposal chambers and corridors are situated in a thin (3–5 m) layer of
56
limestone. This layer is insulated from the top and bottom by a wide (30–60 m)
stratum of water impermeable claystone. During the conversion of the mine for
disposal purposes it was necessary to reinforce some parts with concrete and to
construct a drainage system for any water which might eventually reach the
mine.
The total volume of the repository exceeds 16 000 m3, and its disposal
capacity is approximately half that volume. The temperature in the repository
is a practically constant 10°C. Since 1964 radioactive waste from non-power
applications (institutional waste) has been disposed of there.
The WAC have been changed several times since 1964. Very simple waste
packages were used in the early years of the repository’s operation. The first
waste was disposed of in 60 L zinc coated drums, which were placed in 100 L
drums, which in turn were inserted into 200 L drums. The space between the
drums was filled with concrete, forming a 5 cm thick concrete barrier. The wall
of the outer drum was coated on both sides with zinc and the outside was
covered with a thin layer of bitumen paint. The drums were placed in prepared
chambers which had been formed during the mining phase.
A.4.3.2. Maintenance and refurbishment
The repository has been operating for almost 40 years without accident,
but requires systematic maintenance in the following main areas:
(a) Mine construction (conservation of underlying constructions, mine entry,

ventilation, lights, electricity supply);
(b) Surface area reconstruction and upgrading (new administration building,
new fences, reconstruction of hot cells and operations building, road
surface, etc.);
(c) Radiation protection (measurement devices, monitoring programme,
control area regime (including hygienic room));
(d) Records (records of disposed waste).
A.4.3.3. Records
The changes in the requirements for records of disposed wastes are

similar to changes in WAC. Previously only dose rate and main radionuclide
listings were sufficient, but the level of detail has been increased. The current
system collects detailed radionuclide composition, waste tracking data, and
waste conditioning, chemical and other important data. Since 2000 the exact
unit location has been recorded for each disposed waste unit. The new system is
Internet based but hardcopies of the records are kept as well. Research into
57
historical records is being carried out to combine historical and contemporary
data.
A.4.3.4. Upgrading filled chambers
The closure of one or more disposal chambers filled, in particular, with

historical waste would enable RAWRA to:
(a) Improve the safety of the disposal of LLW packages in the Richard
repository;
(b) Improve radiation protection of personnel;
(c) Demonstrate the feasibility of a safe closure of the repository;
(d) Establish a programme to evaluate the long term behaviour of the
backfill material and sealed waste packages for verification and
validation of the data necessary for the safety assessment of the
repository.
Realization of the project is expected to reduce the operational expenses

connected with management of the historical waste.
After evaluation of the results of the project, RAWRA plans to adopt the
concept of step by step closure of the disposal chambers at the Richard
repository after they have been filled with the waste packages. This concept has
been adopted and approved by the State Office of Nuclear Safety at the
Dukovany repository, where the waste in the disposal vault is sealed with
concrete grout immediately after the vault has been filled with waste packages.
The experience from sealing one or more disposal chambers at the
Richard repository will allow RAWRA to realize a similar project at the
Bratrství repository, where the situation is similar and corrective actions also
need to be taken.
A.4.3.5. Consideration of new chambers
Waste producers are not satisfied with the current waste package model
(a 100 L drum inside a 200 L drum) because of the increasing need for fragmen-
tation of some kinds of solid waste. The repository contains 2 empty
unprepared chambers. These chambers can be adapted for disposal use,
including creation of a special space for large dimensioned waste.
58
A.4.4. Bratrství
The Bratrství repository is designed for the disposal of waste containing

natural radionuclides. It was constructed by adaptation of a mining shaft,
during which 5 disposal chambers were created. The facility was put into
operation in 1974.
A.4.4.2. Consideration of safety improvements
The situation at the Bratrství repository is similar to that at Richard.

Detailed research on historical waste records has identified great uncertainties
in nuclide inventory. Safety analyses have shown that the repository is and will
continue to be safe but that one chamber of the repository should be checked
with the aim of decreasing uncertainty. This may include picking out disposed
historical waste, analysing it and disposing of it again.
A.5. EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPEAN COMMISSION STUDIES AND

PROJECTS IN THE FIELD OF LOW LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
IN COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
A.5.1. Background
European Commission studies and projects in the nuclear sector are

financed through a number of programmes and managed by various technical
services in the Commission. These programmes can be broadly categorized as
follows:
(a) The PHARE Nuclear Safety Programme, managed by the Task Force for
Nuclear Issues (TFNI) of DG-Enlargement, which provided funding for
projects in the then EU candidate countries in Central and Eastern
Europe. Following the accession of the majority of these countries in 2004
there are no further PHARE annual programmes and the TFNI, along
with DG-Enlargement, will be disbanded.
(b) The Euratom Research Framework Programme, managed by DG-
Research (Unit JO4).
(c) The so-called ‘B7 budget line Co-operation Programme’ that until the
end of 2000 was managed by the Nuclear Safety Policy Unit (then in DG-
Environment). Following the reorganization of the Commission’s
59
services, this budget line has been discontinued. The management of the
ongoing projects was transferred to TFNI (with technical support from
DG-Energy and Transport).
(d) The Tacis Programme, managed by the Europe Aid Co-operation Office
and DG-External Relations, which provides funding for projects in the
Russian Federation and the countries of the former Soviet Union.
Although these programmes are not concerned exclusively with

radioactive waste, several individual projects involve waste issues, specifically
low level waste.
A.5.2. PHARE programme
Over the course of the PHARE Nuclear Safety Programme there were
numerous projects in the field of LLW within the EU candidate countries. A
useful, though not definitive, guide to projects before 1999 can be found in
Commission Report EUR 19154. This report can be downloaded from DG-
Energy and Transport’s ‘Nuclear Issues’ web site:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/nuclear/pdf/radwaste_in_ceec.pdf.
As a result of the reorganization of the Commission's services in 2000, no
PHARE multicountry programme was launched that year. TFNI restarted the
nuclear safety programming activities in 2001. However, one project of interest
was implemented during the intervening period: Project -006-RO/PHARE-
SCR/A6-01, Preparatory Measures for the Long-term Safety Assessment of the
Low Level Radioactive Waste Repository Baita Bihor, Romania (completed in
September 2001).
In the past, availability of PHARE reports depended on the express
agreement of the beneficiary. Although this condition is now more relaxed,
reports are not routinely made available on-line in the same way as the ‘B7
budget line’ reports.
A.5.2.1. 2001 programme
Starting with the 2001 programme, a decentralized approach to PHARE

tendering and implementation has been applied. This brings the nuclear safety
programme in line with other PHARE assistance programmes, but has resulted
in additional delays in the tendering and contracting procedures. The financial
disbursements for these projects were only authorized until the end of 2004.
Projects that have relevance in the LLW field are:
60
(a) Solution for closure of a chamber in the Richard repository, Czech
Republic (CZ 01.14.03);
(b) Reconstruction of the hot cell at the Richard repository, Czech Republic
(CZ 01.14.04);
(c) Evaluation of waste retrieval and disposal options at the Püspökszilágy
radioactive waste treatment and disposal facility, Hungary (HU 01.11.02);
(d) Design of an additional waste disposal vault and integral storage facility
for long lived waste at Baldone, Latvia (LE 01.09.01);
(e) Improvement of storage conditions and closure of the national
radioactive waste repository at Rózan, Poland (PL 01.13.01).
The following projects from the 2002 programme are relevant in the LLW
field. In view of the delays imposed by the tendering and contracting
procedures, these projects were not expected to get under way much before the
end of 2003.
(a) Supply of equipment for characterization of institutional radioactive

waste and development of the technical design for a waste processing and
storage facility, Bulgaria (632.01.01);
(b) Realization of closure of a chamber in the Richard repository as input for
establishing a safety case, Czech Republic (632.02.04);
(c) Providing free storage/disposal space in the Püspökszilágy repository,
Hungary (632.04.03);
(d) Safety Assessment and upgrading of the Maisiagala repository, Lithuania
(632.06.01);
(e) Preliminary safety analysis report for the Baita Bihor low level
radioactive waste repository, Romania (632.08.01) (follow-up to Project
-006-RO/PHARE-SCR/A6-01);
(f) Characterization of institutional low and intermediate level radioactive
waste currently stored in a central facility, Slovenia (632.10.03).
The 2003 programme was the last annual programme, although in the
case of Bulgaria and Romania, further funding was to have been made
available in the years 2004–2006.
61
A.5.3. Euratom framework programme
Most of the research projects in the field of radioactive waste launched

under the fifth Euratom Framework Programme were concerned with high
level waste issues. Nonetheless, the work that has been undertaken within this
programme could be of general interest to anyone in the radwaste sector. A
complete summary of the various research conducted within the programme
can be found in the following publication: Nuclear Fission and Radiation
Protection Projects Selected for Funding 1999–2001, which is available at
http://www.cordis.lu/fp5-euratom/src/lib_docs.htm.
The first call for proposals for the sixth Framework Programme has now
taken place. However, the emphasis of this programme is on issues essentially
related to geological disposal.
A.5.4. ‘B7-line’ Co-operation Programme
Most of the information related to this programme can be obtained by

consulting the reports page of DG-Energy and Transport’s ‘Nuclear Issues’
web site: http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/nuclear/index_en.html/.
From this page, final reports can be accessed and downloaded. Most of
the relevant studies are to be found under the heading ‘Radioactive Waste’.
The principal reports in the LLW field are:
● EUR 19260: Use of the Existing Buildings of the Püspökszilágy

Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disposal Facility for Temporary
Storage of Radioactive Wastes (Hungary);
● EUR 19842: Management of Spent Sealed Radioactive Sources in
Central and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland
and Slovenia);
● EUE 20052: Feasibility Study of a Waste Assay System and the Possibility
of Volume Reduction at the Püspökszilágy RWTDF (Hungary);
● EUR 20053: Assessment of the Proposed Design of a New Spent Sealed
Radioactive Sources Storage Facility at Novi Han (Bulgaria);
● EUR 20054: Long-term Safety Analysis of Baldone Radioactive Waste
Repository and Updating of Waste Acceptance Criteria (Latvia);
● EUR 20654: Management of Spent Sealed Radioactive Sources in
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia;
● EUR 20655: Detailed description of a New Management System for
Solid, Short-lived Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste at
Ignalina NPP (Lithuania).
62
● EUR 20656: Assessment and Upgrading of the Novi Han Monitoring
System (Bulgaria).
Finally, the fifth Situation Report on radioactive waste management in

the enlarged European Union can also now be downloaded from the above
web page — the report reference is EUR 20653. For the first time, the Situation
Report also covers the then candidate countries in Central and Eastern
Europe.
A.5.5. Tacis programme
Limited details of the Tacis programme can be accessed via the following
web page on the Commission’s Europa web site:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/nuclear_safety/intro.
However, there are probably very few projects that are relevant to the
LLW sector. The only one perhaps of any significance is described briefly on
the following web page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/examples.htm.
A.6. FRANCE: IMPROVEMENTT MEASURES IMPLEMENTED AT

THE CENTRE DE LA MANCHE
A.6.1. Background
The French repository at the Centre de la Manche was the first near
surface disposal facility in France. It underwent numerous operational
improvements from 1969 to 1994. For example, WAC were introduced in 1979
after a number of operating years with a very simple set of proper disposal
requirements and conditions. The long term safety objectives have been contin-
uously improved and were formalized in 1985 in the ‘Basic Safety Rules’.
A.6.2. Disposal units
Initially and according to its activity, the waste, packaged in various forms
(drums, etc.), was either buried in earth trenches (Fig. 14) or placed in concrete
lined trenches. Rainwater was collected in a sump located at the downgradient
end of each trench, and then conveyed to a retention tank. Depending on its
activity it was either sent to the adjacent Sainte-Hélène River or discharged
into the sea via the COGEMA installations. After one year of operation, the
earth trenches were deemed unsafe and abandoned. Use of the concrete lined
63
FIG. 14. Creation of the Centre de la Manche, 1969 (courtesy of ANDRA).
trenches continued for some years. These trenches were subdivided into cells
by concrete walls, and waste packages placed within the cells were stabilized
with sand (Fig. 14).
Following the discovery of water in one of these trenches in 1972, the
sand was replaced with cement to guarantee better sealing of the structure. The
construction of the structures, which represented the second barrier, was also
improved. The earth trenches, which had been built in 1969, were dismantled,
with the exception of one still in existence today. Waste packages were
retrieved, reconditioned and disposed of in other disposal units.
Starting in 1975, ‘platforms’, consisting of levelled soil covered with a
layer of local materials and a bitumen emulsion, were put into operation,
replacing the earth trenches. These platforms were equipped with water drains.
The waste packages were stacked on the platforms to form mounds. To
guarantee overall mechanical strength and to facilitate disposal operations, the
framework of the structures was built of concrete blocks containing the waste
arranged stepwise on the edge of the structure. Metallic drums were placed in
these compartments, covered with a plastic sheet and a layer of soil. The voids
between the packages were filled with gravel. The plastic sheet was later
eliminated in favour of a layer of gravel and soil.
64
After 1981, platforms made of reinforced concrete became the standard
disposal structures for the repository. These structures were built to withstand
earthquakes and to collect rainwater efficiently. The concrete trenches were
also abandoned and replaced with monoliths comprised of prefabricated
reinforced concrete bins or concrete blocks. Monoliths were used to enhance
protection of the waste package, depending on the type and activity of the
radionuclides contained in it. They were built on the platform structures. A
lower level consisted of a raft foundation on which the monoliths containing
the waste packages were positioned. A second raft was placed on the monoliths
supporting the waste packages arranged in a mound. Following a tritium leak,
the water collection system was modified in 1980 to separately collect rainwater
and infiltration water percolating around the waste packages. To prevent line
breakage and to avoid the use of pumps, which were liable to failure, a separate
underground gravity water recovery system was built in 1982.
A.6.3. Tritium leak incident
In 1976, the Sainte-Hélène River adjacent to the centre was contaminated

with tritium at values that were high yet below the regulatory limit. The
structures responsible for the tritium leak were old concreted trenches in which
the waste was immobilized by sand. These concreted trenches were opened,
modified and rebuilt. The faulty packages were retrieved and reconditioned in
special drums. Acceptance thresholds for tritiated waste were then reduced and
inspections conducted at the generators. This incident nevertheless left a trace
that persists today in the groundwater table and in the streams around the
Centre.
A.6.4. Long term safety and waste inventory
During the 25 years of operation of the Centre de la Manche, from 1969

to 1994, long term safety principles have been gradually developed and
consolidated.
These principles were reflected in the Fundamental Safety Rules that
serve as reference for the WAC. Safety relies not only on the containment
barriers but also on the control over the activity of the waste packages received
and over the radiological inventory of the disposal facility. The information is
provided through delivery documentation that has been registered in a compu-
terized system since 1985. For the previous period, the inventory of disposed
packages and the assessment of their activity were derived from the entire set
of operational data or, in the absence of sufficient information, from
65
FIG. 15. Tumulus of concrete packages and metal boxes at the Centre de la Manche
(courtesy of ANDRA).
simulations based on delivery analogies as well as on the knowledge of waste

contamination and activation processes (Fig. 15).
This safety objective necessitates the required package information to be
submitted systematically upon delivery. These statements have benefited from
the technological advances and were input into a computerized system in 1985,
allowing for the waste packages to be followed from their production site up to
their final placement in the disposal modules. This mechanism has been applied
at the Centre de l’Aube since that facility was commissioned in 1992.
The Centre de la Manche’s operating organization has created significant
documentation by keeping the whole set of waste delivery slips, and has
archived delivery registers as well as disposal registers and maps. All of these
data have been used to develop the facility’s inventory, showing both the exact
location of the packages in the different disposal modules and their activity
(Fig. 15). Data collected between 1969 and 1985 have been consolidated with
those entered electronically after 1985.
However, the activity of some packages had to be determined by
simulation, a method that could only be used with a good knowledge of the
waste generating facilities. Coupled with the computerized tool, competence of
66
the disposal facility’s operating organization in activity assessment techniques
and knowledge of the contamination or activation processes are necessary for
good inventory control. A commission appointed in 1996 by the French
Government to assess the situation at the Centre de la Manche audited this
approach and encouraged the Agence Nationale pour la Gestion des Déchets
Radioactifs (ANDRA) in its efforts, ruling that the reconstituted inventory
should meet the needs of the safety analysis.
By the end of its operation in 1994 the repository, with an area of
600 × 300 m, had accepted 527 214 m3 of waste. When disposal activities were
terminated, a final cover was constructed to divert rainwater away from the
repository. The cover consists of a bitumen membrane and several layers of
earth and sand (Fig. 16).
A.6.5. Corrective actions taken before the institutional control period
ANDRA filed an application in September 1994 for authorization to

begin the institutional control period. The safety authority felt that the
application for authorization to begin the institutional control period should be
submitted to a public inquiry. The inquiry commission gathered the opinions of
the population and, in February 1996, issued a favourable opinion on the
FIG. 16. Aerial view of the Centre de la Manche. A multilayer, non-permeable cover
protects the waste disposal area (courtesy of ANDRA).
67
transition of the Centre de la Manche to the institutional control period. Subse-
quently, after complaints were filed against ANDRA by ecological associations
for water pollution and violations of the regulations, the Government decided
to set up a second evaluation commission in February 1996. This commission
was asked to evaluate the situation concerning the Centre de la Manche
disposal facility and to express its opinion on the impact of the Centre on the
environment.
The Government made the commission’s conclusions public in July 1996.
The commission concluded that if the intended measures were taken, the
Centre would present no significant health risk for the local population. The
commission also found the absence of a local and department-wide ‘cancer
register’ to be anomalous from the health standpoint. Its conclusions were
primarily as follows:
(a) The cap adds a vital safety factor to the installation.

(b) The waste inventory compiled by ANDRA is satisfactory.
(c) Heterogeneities associated with long lived alpha emitters exist in the
facility and predate Basic Safety Rule RFS I.2. The work necessary to
eliminate these hot spots results in greater risks to the public and the
environment than maintaining the status quo.
(d) The site cannot be opened to unrestricted use for 300 years. The heteroge-
neity of the structures would lead to subsidence. Areas containing long
lived radioelements would lead to exposures in cases of intrusion and
destruction of packages. Radon would be released due to the presence of
radium bearing waste, and this radionuclide could accumulate in the
subsoil of a dwelling built on the site. A chemical risk exists due to heavy
metals present in the facility, particularly lead.
(e) It is unwise to make any assumptions about the evolution of society and
its structure after a few centuries. In recognition of this, transfer of the
facility to future generations who might or might not be willing to assume
responsibility for it is discouraged. As a consequence, the commission
proposed the formation of a new organization for the institutional control
period, with responsibilities that include developing a design for a final
cap to guarantee passive safety of the facility. The Centre will also have to
be placed in a state such that it would not present any significant risk to
the environment and the population if it were to be suddenly abandoned.
(f) The memory of the site should be preserved and necessary measures
should be taken to limit the types of structures or equipment that can be
installed. It was also felt that the site should remain subject to the require-
ments of public interest.
68
(g) The public had expressed the feeling that they had been disregarded in
the decisions concerning the Centre. For example, the installation of the
cap was carried out without consulting the public. The commission
proposed the formation of an information and monitoring commission,
composed of ANDRA and representatives of the local population and
the ministries concerned, which would be informed and would express its
opinion on the decisions to be taken.
In June 1998, ANDRA sent the supervisory ministries a new preliminary

report concerning the transition to the institutional control period, taking into
account the commission’s conclusions. The review of the inventory was
completed, including the provision of information about missing data, and the
impact of the facility was reassessed from the radiological and chemical
standpoint.
ANDRA then proposed phased institutional control divided into three
periods. The first period would be one of highly active surveillance, to last
about five years and intended in particular to assess the satisfactory operation
of the present cap. The second period would be one of active surveillance, to
last between 50 and 100 years. ANDRA’s presence at the centre is necessary to
ensure monitoring and maintenance, as well as environmental surveillance. Its
task will be to confirm that any change in the cap does not compromise its
ability to meet the requirements and to investigate any further arrangements
needed for its strengthening. The third period will be one of passive
surveillance, during which ANDRA will conduct reduced surveillance of the
Centre and its environment, but during which time the complete abandonment
of the Centre will not result in any unacceptable consequences to the
environment. The transition to this period can only take place after verification
of certain assumptions about the behaviour of the Centre over the long term,
and the possible implementation of technical improvements aimed at supple-
menting the present containment systems with other passive systems which are
simple and reliable over the very long term.
In December 1998, in response to the questions of ecological associations,
the safety authority examined the preliminary report for transition to the insti-
tutional control period, which takes into account the conclusions of the report
of the evaluation commission named by the Government [83]. The application
for a permit to create a new basic nuclear installation was submitted to a new
public inquiry in 1999. It was intended that the Centre would enter the highly
active institutional control period in the year 2003.
The results of the studies to investigate the behaviour of the facility and
particularly its cap will be communicated periodically to the information and
monitoring commission. This commission was formed in December 1996 and
69
includes representatives of the administration, the operating organization,
elected representatives, ecological associations and the agricultural sector.
Armed with full knowledge of the facts, it can make a statement about the
operation of the centre and its future, and will also be able to advise the local
population with complete openness.
A.7. HUNGARY: CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PLANNING OF

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AT THE PÜSPÖKSZILÁGY
NEAR SURFACE REPOSITORY
A.7.1. Introduction
The Püspökszilágy repository was sited in 1971 and designed and commis-
sioned in 1976 according to the international guidelines in effect at that time. In
1983 the site was licensed to dispose of solid low level radioactive waste from
the Paks nuclear power plant until the expected opening of the power station’s
own disposal facility. Shipments from the nuclear power plant continued until 1996.
The site was expanded in the late 1980s. The Hungarian Geological
Survey, one of the authorities participating in the licensing procedure, has not
consented to issue a permanent licence for the new vaults. The new vault
expansion has, however, been granted a limited operating licence.
To date, approximately 4970 m3 of solid and solidified waste have been
emplaced. 1580 m3 came from the Paks nuclear power plant, which took up
some 2500 m3 of repository volume in the disposal site. About 3000 m3 have
been sealed and temporarily covered. More than 80% of the disposed waste is
classified as LLW. The current total activity emplaced is approximately
1000 TBq. More than 80 isotopes are accepted by the facility for storage or
disposal. The main radioisotopes in the waste disposed of are 3H, 14C, 60Co, 90Sr,
99
Tc, 137Cs, 192Ir, 226Ra,238/239Pu and 241Am.
The currently remaining unused capacity at the site has been reduced to
30 m3. This is sufficient to accommodate the annual volume of waste shipped
from non-power generation activities in the next years.
A number of safety assessments of the site have recently been
undertaken. The main conclusions of these assessments were that with
appropriate management action and reductions in performance uncertainties it
is likely that a future post-closure safety case can be developed, demonstrating
compliance with relevant regulatory requirements. To achieve this, certain
improvements were recommended. Based on the findings of the safety
assessment, consideration is given to possibly retrieving certain waste types
from the vaults and putting them into interim storage pending final disposal in
70
a geological repository. Allowing for disposal of further wastes by providing
free capacity within the existing facility is also under evaluation. A key
objective of the planned corrective actions is to ensure that the facility provides
appropriate long term performance.
A.7.2. Description of the facility
The disposal site is located on the ridge of a hill near Püspökszilágy

village. The facility is a typical shallow land, near surface engineered type
repository with concrete vaults and shallow (6 m) boreholes (Fig. 17).
The disposal units are categorized into 4 classes, referred to as A, B, C and
D. The A type disposal system consists of the original 48 vaults, with 70 m3
capacity each and the expansion, 6 vaults with 140 m3 capacity each, plus 12
vaults with a capacity of 70 m3 (Fig. 18).
The solid waste is presently packaged into drums (formerly into plastic
bags). Spent sealed sources are received from waste generators in shielding
containers. Solid waste placed in plastic bags by the producers is repackaged
into drums at the facility. Liquid waste is absorbed in siliceous marl or solidified
with cement. At the beginning of the site operation, both unconditioned and
FIG. 17. The disposal site at Püspökszilágy.
71
63 m
166 m 31 m
6.6 m 6.6 m
‘A’ vault ‘A’ vault
40 m
‘A’ vault depths = 6.0 m
‘A’ vault ‘A’ vault 6.6 m
6.6 m
Major dimensions above are ± 2m
FIG. 18. Layout and dimensions of A type vaults.
conditioned wastes, packaged in plastic bags or metal drums, were placed in

layers in the vault and each vault was backfilled with concrete. A few years ago
the authorities required retrievability of the newly emplaced waste pending
confirmation of post-closure safety. Since that time no backfilling has taken
place. Two vaults have already been sealed and temporarily covered.
The B type disposal system consists of 16 boreholes, each with a diameter
of 40 mm, and 16 boreholes with a diameter of 100 mm each. The boreholes are
stainless steel lined and 6 m long, located inside a concrete monolith structure.
The boreholes are used for the disposal of high activity wastes. These wastes
come from isotope users and are regarded as high level waste based on the
Hungarian National Standard for the Classification of Radioactive Wastes
(HLW: dose rate at the surface is higher than 10 mGy/h). High activity gamma
sources are usually put into a special disposal container (because of its shape it
is called a ‘disposal torpedo’) and sealed. Gamma sources having no surface
contamination are not packaged for disposal, but lead containers are used for
transport. Alpha and beta sources have to be packaged into polyethylene
casings. Gamma sources are not conditioned prior to disposal in boreholes.
Usually twice a year the boreholes are partially filled with cement grout up to
the level of the sources.
The D type disposal system consists of four 6 m long boreholes, each with
a diameter of 200 mm. These disposal boreholes are designed to accomodate
the longer lived (half-life longer than 5 years) spent sealed sources.
A particular feature of the site is that neither the original licence nor
licensing of the expansion specified WAC. For this reason, high activity sources
and sources consisting of long half-life and alpha emitting materials have also
been disposed of in vaults. There were two important exemptions. Radium
sources (needles, capsules, etc.) from medical applications had been collected
and stored at the National Institute of Oncology. In the early years, the
72
Püspökszilágy repository accepted 238Pu and 239Pu sources for disposal. These
two cases were found to comply with safeguards requirements, but these
practices have been terminated and Pu sources are now collected and stored at
the Institute of Isotopes.
The lack of defined WAC means that, other than external dose rate, an
acceptable standard is not established against which the type of waste received
can be judged to be in conformance or not. The operating organization of the
facility recognized that inconsistencies existed in the records of waste histori-
cally stored at the site.
A.7.3. Refurbishment activities
The repository has operated for more than 30 years without accident or
significant release of radioactivity to the environment, but also without any
investment for upgrading. As a consequence, the equipment has become
obsolete and the physical conditions of the operating systems have degraded.
In 1998 the new operating organization of the facility, the Public Agency for
Radioactive Waste Management (PURAM), started a systematic programme
to upgrade repository safety. During 1998 and 2002 the safety re-evaluation of
the repository was the primary focus, in parallel with some basic modernization
and refurbishment measures.
One of PURAM’s objectives has been to upgrade the physical state of the
facility and to provide better conditions for future operation. The main areas of
upgrading are the following:
(a) Physical protection (new fence system, new access control, new security
equipment);
(b) Radiation protection (replacement of obsolete measuring devices,
enhancement of environmental monitoring);
(c) Data acquisition (new data recording system, waste characterization
capability, new meteorological station);
(d) Transport (new transport vehicles and containers).
Repair and improvement of buildings, refurbishment of the electrical

system and water supply, specialized sump water collection and ventilation
systems, a decontamination facility and improvement of the fire fighting system
will complete the modernization activities. The other main upgrading objective
is to prepare for conversion of the existing treatment building into a centralized
interim storage facility for institutional radioactive waste not suitable for near
surface disposal. The building was designed in the 1970s to treat and condition
raw low and intermediate level radioactive wastes (liquid and solid) from
73
isotope applications, but remained unused. The centralized interim storage
facility can also be used for storage should a need arise to receive a large
amount of waste at the repository site pending later disposal.
A.7.4. Safety concerns
The safety of the facility has not previously been the subject of a compre-
hensive assessment. When the temporary licence of the expanded part of the
repository expired in December 2000, the regulatory body required a compre-
hensive safety assessment as a condition for issuing the permanent licence.
Two safety analyses were completed to answer the questions of whether
the site would remain safe in the future, or if corrective measures were needed
[84, 85]. To support the safety assessment, an uncemented and a cemented
compartment in an A type vault were opened in March 2000 to check on the
condition of the engineered barriers and the disposed wastes. The basic
objective of the investigations was to evaluate the condition of the disposed
wastes as well as the condition of the more than 20 year old concrete and metal
structures. The vaults were found to be dry, and the vaults, cap and wastes were
found to be in good condition with little apparent degradation of either
concrete or waste packaging. When the investigations were finished, the
compartments were closed and sealed.
Based on the safety assessments it was concluded that the same level of
operational and environmental safety can be expected up to the end of passive
institutional control of the site. The facility as a whole is suitable for safe
disposal of low and intermediate level short lived waste. Beyond the passive
institutional control period, mostly because of the significant amount of long
lived components still disposed of (14C, 226Ra, 232Th, 234,235,238U, 239Pu and
241
Am), inadvertent human intrusion (or any other scenario resulting in
exposure to waste after deterioration of concrete barriers) could exceed both
the dose constraint and the dose limit. Consequently, the Püspökszilágy
repository is considered to be unsuitable for some of the long lived waste
formerly emplaced there [86].
Key recommendations relating to the future management of the site were
as follows:
(a) Certain long lived waste and high activity spent sources should be
removed from the facility.
(b) The repository cap should be redesigned.
(c) Long term settlement within the vaults should be minimized. At an
appropriate time, the vaults should be completely backfilled.
74
(d) Steps should be taken to minimize the chances of future human intrusion
by recording information about the facility and by providing an extensive
period of administrative control following repository closure.
International recommendations (e.g. from the ICRP and IAEA)

addressing exposure from past practices call for obligatory intervention above
100 mSv/a, and a more optimized (efforts and compliance) intervention when
doses of between 10 and 100 mSv/a are observed. The basis for optimization is
the real dose associated with intervention activities versus reduction of the
potential dose in the future. Such an optimization has not yet been performed
in Hungary.
A.7.5. Identification and evaluation of the the corrective action options
Further work is planned to resolve these issues with the objective of

providing full assurance of post-closure safety. This further work is likely to
involve changes in the characteristics of the facility, updating of closure plans
and enhancements of the methods used to evaluate potential post-closure
radiological impacts [87].
In covering this work, Hungary has been relying on external assistance
and collaboration. Aside from Hungary’s part and IAEA support (Technical
Cooperation Project HUN/4/015), the third ‘pillar’ of the technical cooperation
in the safety enhancement programme is the European Union’s PHARE
project. The aim of the PHARE project is to decide on the most appropriate
method of safety upgrading [88].
Due to the large number of parameters involved, an optimized inter-
vention programme will be established on the basis of a feasibility study.
Decisions reached concerning the favoured waste management option will be
of interest to a number of stakeholders. Implementation will involve the
commitment of substantial sums of money. It is therefore important that the
decision is well developed. This will be enhanced by application of a formal
multi-attribute analysis approach (Fig. 19).
As well as conducting an options assessment to identify the preferred
waste management options, it is necessary to determine how to implement the
preferred option. The implementation plan will be used as the basis for
defining an equipment list and a timeline.
The feasibility work will provide a view as to the best option for the
management of all of the waste currently disposed of at the site (except the
spent sources in the B and D boreholes, which will be dealt with separately).
75
Occupational
Ease of implementation
exposure
Worker doses Engineering Availability of
Schedule
(normal practicability funding
operations and
accidents)
Safety issues
Cost
Cost of
Regulatory implementation
requirements
Project risk
Estimate of
radiological
impact of the
repository Increase in
Multi-attribute analysis disposal volume
Benefits owing
Potential to better use of
environmental the disposal
impacts during facility
operations
Identification of
preferred option
and key
decision factors
Review and
evaluation
FIG. 19. The multi-attribute analysis approach.
Recommendations on the most effective options will be accompanied by

explanations of why the specific option is preferred. This will provide a good
basis for discussion with interested stakeholders. The overall outcome will be a
plan that provides for improvement of the long term safety of the facility, while
76
at the same time allowing for more effective use of the available disposal
volume.
The following corrective action options are being considered in the
feasibility study:
(a) Minimum intervention: This option will most probably result in little or
no change in the environmental impact to the surrounding area in the
short term. The vaults and wastes have been found to be dry and in good
condition, indicating that there is little or no leaching of water into the
vaults. In the longer term it is expected that the cement and bitumen
sealing the vaults will degrade, allowing water to leach in and subse-
quently allowing contaminants to leach into surrounding soils. Local
communities will be affected by an increased traffic burden on the roads,
noise and dust generation. When the repository reaches capacity (in
about two years) it will be necessary to construct a new repository to cope
with subsequent waste generation.
(b) Administrative approaches: This option is similar to option (a) except
that there will be an increase in administrative control to help ensure that
the site is recorded as unsuitable for building after closure and reduce the
likelihood of future intrusion into the waste. When the vaults reach
capacity a new repository will need to be constructed to cope with any
subsequent waste.
(c) Better isolation through construction of an improved cap: This option,
along with options (a) and (b), will allow wastes to be deposited at
Püspökszilágy for another two years but will involve further development
work, including grouting voids within vaults and construction of a multi-
layered cap with clay and impermeable membranes. Construction of a clay
cap has many positive environmental impacts. These include minimi-
zation of exposure on the surface of the waste facility; prevention of
vertical infiltration of water into wastes that would create contaminated
leachate; control of gas emissions from underlying waste and creation of a
land surface that can support vegetation and/or be used for other
purposes. However, the cap will consume large quantities of clay
(depleting national resources), increase traffic levels, fuel consumption
and air pollution, and may destroy flora and fauna in the clay source area.
This option will also result in the need for a new repository when the
current facility reaches capacity.
(d) Better isolation through construction of an improved cap and installation
of curtain walls: This option will entail similar environmental impacts to
option (c), but will have additional impacts due to the construction of a
77
curtain wall. The curtain wall will be a major construction project using
substantial amounts of energy, cement and other construction materials.
(e) Removal of readily identifiable sources from easily accessible vaults: The
environmental impacts of this option will be mainly radiological.
However, the removed sources will likely be contaminated with non-
radioactive contaminants and will require appropriate disposal
elsewhere, generating additional environmental impacts.
(f) Removal of readily identifiable sources from all vaults: The radioactive
sources will likely be contaminated with non-radioactive contaminants
and will require alternative disposal. It is also expected that small
quantities of cement rubble will be generated from source recovery. The
cement rubble, however, will be deposited back into the vaults as it is
likely to be contaminated. The voids will then be filled using large
quantities of cement.
(g) Removal of all sources from easily accessible vaults: This option will have
a largely radiological impact. However, the removed sources will likely be
contaminated with non-radioactive contaminants which will also require
disposal at another facility. This option will involve an increase in cement
use during the grouting phase.
(h) Removal of all sources from all vaults: This option involves greater
intrusive work into the vaults, and therefore it is expected that there will
be larger volumes of cement waste, dust produced and resources used
(energy, water, etc.).
The options for management of waste generated in the future are:
(1) Storage at source pending disposal at Püspökszilágy: The environmental

impacts of this option are comparable to options (e)–(h) above with
regard to the removal of sources, waste sorting, grouting and capping.
However, additional environmental impacts may be incurred by the
temporary storage of wastes. A temporary storage facility will have to be
constructed which will ensure that waste containers are stored safely. This
will reduce the likelihood of accidents through human activities, e.g.
dropped loads, spills. A monitoring and measuring regime will also be
necessary until the wastes are disposed of. Wastes already stored in the
Püspökszilágy vaults will be sorted, creating space for additional wastes
and extending the lifetime of the repository.
(2) Storage at source pending disposal elsewhere: This option will involve
construction of a temporary storage facility at the source of generation
to house wastes awaiting disposal at a new repository. The temporary
facility will have to ensure that the waste containers are stored safely,
78
TABLE 3. CRITERIA AND SCORING
79
Favourable Intermediate Unfavourable Unacceptable
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
1 Dose to Not credible for any One or more workers might One or more workers likely Breach of regulatory
operators worker to approach approach regulatory limits, but to approach legal limits – limit likely for one or
regulatory limits action to constrain doses action to constrain worker more workers
unlikely to be necessary doses probably necessary
Individual dose 0.1 mSv/a < individual dose 5 mSv/a < individual dose Individual dose
< 0.1 mSv/a <5 mSv/a <20 mSv/a >20 mSv/a
2 Dose to the Not credible for any Dose to members of the Dose to members of
public member of the public to public may approach the public may
approach regulatory limits regulatory limits under exceed regulatory
under any circumstances accident conditions limit under accident
conditions
3 Non-radiological Risks to workers Risks to workers comparable Risks equivalent to those in Risks comparable to
risks to workers comparable to those in low to those in low risk industry, moderate risk industry but high risk industry:
risk industry and easily but significant effort required requiring significant >10–3/a
managed to ensure that this is the case management effort to
ensure they are controlled
4 Non-radiological Risks to the public similar Risks to the public similar to Risks to the public similar Risks to the public
risks to the public to those generated by low those generated by low risk to those generated by significant
risk industry and easily industry, but significant effort moderate risk industry but
controlled required to ensure that this is requiring significant
the case management effort to
ensure they are controlled
TABLE 3. CRITERIA AND SCORING (cont.)
80
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
5 Post-closure Substantial improvement Some improvement on current Performance similar to Performance worse
performance on current performance performance current performance than current
performance
6 Non-radiological No significant impact Moderate impact Significant impact Impact unlikely to be
environmental acceptable under
impact Hungarian conditions
7 Engineering Uses established Some development work or Significant development High chance of
feasibility and technology and methods use of novel technologies and work required on failure
project risk with minimal chance of the some chance of project failing technology and significant
project failing to meet to meet objectives chance that the project will
objectives fail to meet objectives
8 Timescale for No credible uncertainty Some chance of time overrun, Chance of time overrun — Cannot be
implementation could lead to option being but probability and probability and/or implemented on the
implemented later than consequences minor consequence significant required timescale
required
9 Socio-political No significant socio- Some concerns possible Concerns likely
acceptability political concerns expected
TABLE 3. CRITERIA AND SCORING (cont.)
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
10 Potential for Can accommodate at least Some risks of failing to Only a fraction of the next No further arisings
allowing 25 years of arisings at accommodate at least 25 years 25 years of arisings can be can be
disposals at current projections; no of arisings at current accommodated within accommodated
Püspökszilágy significant risks to this projections Puspokszilágy
beyond those outcome
allowed
by current
arrangements
81
reducing the likelihood of accidents through human activities. Storage
of waste containers in this manner will require monitoring and
measuring regimes.
(3) Storage at Püspökszilágy pending disposal at Püspökszilágy: This option
involves the temporary storage of waste at Püspökszilágy before it is
deposited in the vaults. The original waste in the vaults will be subject to
retrieval and better packaging methods, creating more space for
additional wastes and extending the lifetime of the repository. However,
the sources that have been removed from the vaults will have to be
disposed of in a more suitable facility elsewhere and will require the
construction of a new repository.
(4) Storage at Püspökszilágy pending disposal elsewhere: This option would
involve the transport of wastes from the source to the Püspökszilágy site,
temporary storage there, and then transport to a new repository. The
criteria against which options are scored will allow options to be distin-
guished in a useful way and help ensure that all important issues are
addressed (Table 3). Options are assigned a score between 0 and 10, with
increasing numerical scores representing increased favourability. An
option scoring zero against any criterion is regarded as unacceptable
either because:
— It is unacceptable in principle (for example because it breaches

Hungarian law);
— It is unacceptable as a stand-alone option (for example, it may not
allow further disposal at Püspökszilágy, but might offer desirable
improvements in post-closure performance if coupled with another
alternative).
One of the options was to have been selected by the end of 2004.
A.7.6. Summary
The Püspökszilágy repository is considered to be unsuitable for certain

wastes formerly emplaced in it. Based on recent safety assessments, a
judgement has been made that long term safety of the Püspökszilágy repository
may be ensured, but only with some technical and administrative modifications
to the facility.
In 1998, Hungary started a systematic programme to upgrade the
repository. During 1998 and 2002, the safety re-evaluation was the primary
focus, together with some basic modernization and refurbishment measures
82
(replacement of the obsolete equipment, supplementary site investigations, re-
inventory, near-field and far-field studies).
In 2003, a project was launched to select the most appropriate methods
for enhancing safety and to prepare for corrective actions. Important elements
of this phase include construction of the central interim storage facility,
inventory re-evaluation, a feasibility study, a detailed work programme, licence
preparations and application for international assistance. The final step is the
implementation of safety upgrading measures based on the selected option.
For any proposed intervention, the benefits (in terms of risk or dose
averted) should be balanced against cost. In addition to the work on safety
reassessments, it is necessary to develop short term and long term plans for
providing disposal and storage capacity for all the waste types currently
disposed of at the site.
According to PURAM’s plan, the repository will be operational for an
additional 40–50 years, receiving radioactive wastes from non-nuclear power
plant waste producers. By the end of this period a deep geologic repository
should be available to receive those long lived wastes temporarily stored in the
Püspökszilágy facility that are not amenable to disposal in a near surface
repository. Bearing this approach in mind, measures will first be taken to
provide additional disposal capacity at the site.
A.8. LATVIA: RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROGRAMME
A.8.1. History and magnitude of the use of radiation sources in Latvia
In 1959 it was decided to build a radioactive waste repository in Baldone.

Operation of the repository began in 1962, applying the technology and
standards which were valid all over the Soviet Union at that time.
Since then, the Baldone repository has been regularly adapted and
modernized, the last major development being construction of a new
treatment/storage facility, which has been in operation since 1995.
In Latvia, radioactive wastes are produced by four main groups of
activities: research, medical practice, various industrial activities and, until
1994, activities of the Soviet armed forces.
The former Soviet Union made extensive use of lighthouses powered
with radionuclide thermoelectric generators (RTGs). These are still used by the
Russian Federation. Such generators contain thermocouples that convert the
decay heat from a radioactive substance to electricity. Nine such lighthouses,
containing of the order of a few hundred PBq of 90Sr, were located in Latvian
83
waters. These lighthouses are no longer a problem as the RTGs have all been
returned to the Russian Federation.
As a military centre in the Baltic region under the former Soviet Union,
Latvia received relatively large quantities of radioactive waste for disposal at
Baldone, compared to the amounts of waste delivered to the corresponding
facilities in Estonia and Lithuania.
In many cases it is difficult to clearly separate defence related applica-
tions of radioactive materials from civilian applications in Latvia.
A.8.2. Radioactive waste management
Since the beginning of the 1960s the radioactive waste produced in Latvia
has been collected and transported to the central storage/treatment/disposal
facility at Baldone, which is operated by the State enterprise RADONs.
Decommissioning waste from the Salaspils research reactor is being
temporarily stored on-site.
A new radioactive waste management agency, RAPA, has been estab-
lished. Its main tasks are radioactive waste management and decommissioning
of the Salaspils research reactor.
A.8.2.1. Basic design of the Baldone repository
The storage and disposal vaults of the Baldone repository are constructed
close to the top of a small hill with soft slopes, about 60 m above the level of the
Baltic Sea. The waste handling part of the facility is shown in Fig. 20 and
includes 7 vaults. They are concrete underground vaults with capacities from 40
to 200 m3 (Table 4). As the vaults for solid waste have been filled up, a new
1200 m3 vault has been built and has been in use since the end of 1995.
Figure 20 shows the entire fenced-in area. Waste is received from the
main road shown at the lower left corner. Near this entrance is the adminis-
tration building. There is a long access road to the place where the waste is
stored.
Solid waste was generally placed in the concrete vaults without condi-
tioning. When a waste layer reached a thickness of about 1.5 m, the voids were
filled with mortar using ordinary construction cement. A similar process was
used for biological waste. In these cases, however, the waste was first sterilized
and then embedded in gypsum before final disposal. Spent sealed sources were
disposed of in their industrial shielding containers. It was not until the mid-
1980s that such sources were conditioned, that is, removed from their original
containers and placed together with several other sources in lead containers,
84
FIG. 20. Storage/disposal vaults at the Baldone repository.
TABLE 4. BASIC INFORMATION ON VAULTS AT THE BALDONE

REPOSITORY
Vault Proportion of
Volume (m3) Operating period
number radwaste (%)
1 200 50 October 1962 – June 1973

3 200 80 May 1973 – November 1986
4 40 90 May 1974 – November 1988
5 40 85 June 1987 – September 1991
6 200 70 May 1988 – August 1996
7 1200 In use December 1996 to present
85
any voids being filled with molten lead. In this way the volume of the waste was
reduced and long term storage safety was improved.
Before 1985 all liquid waste was stored in the stainless steel tank.
Thereafter, according to new regulations all of the stored liquid waste was
treated and the secondary solid waste disposed of. Treatment of the liquid
waste took place in 1988 and the processing equipment was later removed.
Since then, liquid waste has been stored only through the winter. In all other
seasons such waste is solidified with cement and used as mortar for the condi-
tioning of solid waste.
Since 1995, when vault 7 was put into operation, and until recently, all
radioactive waste has been conditioned and stored in transportable containers,
either steel drums or concrete containers. Now a new concept, based on IAEA
recommendations for near surface waste disposal, has been adopted and is in
use.
A.8.2.2. Radioactive waste inventory
It is clear that a number of questions exist about the completeness and

correctness of the data, especially for the older shipments of waste for which
only partial information is available. The quality of the data is also much better
for the sealed sources, which represent most of the radioactivity, than for other
waste.
In 1991 a computer based database was developed and all the data
previously accumulated in handwritten records were progressively transferred
into it. The database is still being completed and developed. However, the
inventory of each disposal/storage unit can be seen at any time. Information on
the individual vaults is given in Table 4. The radioactivity of the main long lived
isotopes in the disposal vaults, of which more than 1010 Bq were present in the
vaults in January 2003, is given in Table 5.
A.8.3. EU DG-Environment project — Consortium d’assistance

opérationnelle aux pays d’Europe de l’Est (CASSIOPEE)
activities in Latvia
The main objective of the project was to provide advice to the Latvian
authorities on the safety enhancements needed and WAC for the near surface
radioactive waste disposal facilities of the Baldone repository. The project
included the following activities:
(a) Examination of the current status of the management of radioactive

waste in Latvia in general, and at the Baldone repository in particular.
86
TABLE 5. RADIOACTIVITY OF LONG LIVED
ISOTOPES IN THE DISPOSAL VAULTS OF
THE BALDONE REPOSITORY
Total activity
Radionuclide
(Bq)
Vault 1
3
H 5.7E10
232
U 5.9E10
228
Th 6E10
238
Pu 1.3E11
60
Co 2.5E11
14
C 4.6E11
210
Pb 5.9E11
226
Ra 8E11
90
Sr 1.6E12
137
Cs 2.3E12
Total 6.23E12
Vault 3
147
Pm 1.1E10
239
Pu 1.5E10
22
Na 4.6E10
226
Ra 8.3E10
40
K 8.8E10
55
Fe 9.3E10
241
Am 2.3E11
60
Co 3.6E11
14
C 1E12
210
Pb 1E12
26
Al 1.1E12
238
Pu 1.3E12
3
H 1.8E13
63
Ni 9.5E12
137
Cs 5.8E13
Total 9.31E13
87
TABLE 5. RADIOACTIVITY OF LONG LIVED
ISOTOPES IN THE DISPOSAL VAULTS OF
THE BALDONE REPOSITORY (cont.)
Total activity
Radionuclide
(Bq)
Vault 4
63
Ni 1.91E10
3
H 3.62E10
238
Pu 9.96E10
241
Am 1.15E11
60
Co 2.10E11
14
C 3.13E11
90
Sr 4.91E11
137
Cs 1.95E12
Total 3.26E12
Vault 5
63
Ni 1.91E10
3
H 2.65E10
14
C 3.31E10
Total 1.05E11
Vault 6
239
Pu 1.06E10
152
Eu 2.44E10
147
Pm 2.53E10
14
C 3.57E10
204
Tl 5.86E10
210
Pb 6.32E10
226
Ra 2.62E11
241
Am 3.16E11
238
Pu 1.14E12
90
Sr 1.15E12
3
H 6.32E12
60
Co 6.98E12
Total 3.61E13
88
(b) Long term safety analysis of the Baldone repository, including:
— Radiological safety in the operational phase, including the planned
increase of capacity for disposal and long term storage;
— Radiological analysis for the post-closure period;
— Environmental impact assessment (non-radiological components).
(c) Recommendations for future updating of radioactive WAC.
(d) Recommendations for safety upgrades, if necessary, to the facility.
According to the conclusions of the CASSIOPEE analysis:
(1) The status of the Baldone repository in the short term is not a matter of
concern;
(2) Radioactive waste is stored under sufficiently safe conditions, and in
normal circumstances no significant migration of radioactive substances
into the environment or impact on nearby residents is foreseen;
(3) In general, radioactive waste management creates a comparatively low
level of risk;
(4) Regarding forthcoming needs for intervention, the resulting doses after
30 years without a cover justify the installation of a cover for the closure
period of the repository.
Current plans for building new waste storage facilities in Latvia have
been elaborated on the basis of recommendations derived from a long term
safety analysis of the Baldone repository performed by CASSIOPEE from
2001 to 2002:
(i) Building of a dedicated long term storage facility for spent sealed sources
and long lived waste;
(ii) Modification of the design of the disposal vaults to correspond to the best
practices in other countries.
The anticipated radiological impact of the new vault no. 8 has been
evaluated in the framework of the CASSIOPEE analysis, including applicable
criteria, conditions, input data, hypotheses and recommended corrective
measures.
89
A.9. LITHUANIA: THE MAIŠIAGALA REPOSITORY
A.9.1. Background
The radioactive research, medical and institutional wastes from Lithuania

and the Kaliningrad district were disposed in the Maišiagala repository, which
is currently managed by the Radioactive Waste Management Agency (RATA).
The repository is situated about 35 km northwest of Vilnius, the capital of
Lithuania. It was built in 1963 on the top of a sandy hill. The eastern side of the
hill ends in a swampy lowland by a steep slope. The volume of the repository is
about 200 m3. The dimensions of the monolithic reinforced concrete vault are 5
m × 15 m × 3 m, the thickness of the sidewalls is about 0.25 m and the thickness
of the bottom is about 0.2 m. The side walls are covered from inside and outside
with 0.02 m thick cement and sodium aluminate coatings. From outside they
were also covered with 2 layers of hot bitumen. The bottom of the vault is
covered with bitumen and 2 layers of rubberoid. Figure 21 gives a schematic
view of the repository.
The repository consists of 6 sections which were filled sequentially during
its operating period. Each section was filled with radioactive waste in a random
manner. Disused radioactive sources embedded in biological shielding were
buried together with their shielding. Sources without shielding were buried in 2
stainless steel containers. As of 20 November 2001 the total activity of buried
radioactive nuclides was 3.42 × 1015 Bq.
FIG. 21. Schematic view of the Maišiagala repository.
90
In the course of burial, radioactive waste was constantly interlaid with
concrete. When the disposal facility was closed in 1988, only three-fifths of its
volume were filled. The empty two-fifths of the vault were filled with concrete,
then sand, then with concrete (0.01 m), hot bitumen and 0.05 m asphalt layers.
Monolithic concrete that was covered with bitumen and a 0.05 m thick layer of
asphalt closed the vault. A sand layer, the thickness of which was not less than
1.2 m, formed the cap.
A.9.2. Radiological situation
Four wells near the repository (one on each side of the repository) and
4 wells in the anticipated direction of groundwater flow were drilled to control
the radiological situation around the repository. The groundwater level was
about 5 m below the repository bottom and had never been higher than 1.5 m
below the repository bottom. The content of radionuclides and their activities
were investigated in the water probes from each well once per quarter.
More than 95% of the total activity in the repository is from tritium. The
maximum volume of 3H activity in the wells in the year of measurement is
shown in Fig. 22.
The total b activity was measured, showing the presence of the natural
radionuclides 214Pb, 214Bi and 40K in the groundwater. A very low activity of the
65 410
70 000
60 000
Volume activity (Bq)
50 000
40 000
30 000 23 900 22 530

17 230
20 000
5 950 7 580 5 500
10 000 2 210
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
FIG. 22. Maximum volume of 3H activity in the control wells at Maišiagala.
91
137
Cs isotope was found at times. Measurements performed after the radio-
chemical analysis of samples showed that 239,240Pu and 90Sr activities in all the
samples were almost the same and did not exceed the background values.
A.9.3. Safety assessment
In 1998, SKB performed an assessment of the long term safety of the

Maišiagala repository [89]. The conclusions and recommendations of the SKB
study are as follows:
(a) Storage building: Assessment of the existing structure has shown that
it is not designed and constructed to a defined set of criteria to serve as
a long term disposal facility. Documentation of the materials used is
insufficient to evaluate the facility. The current status of the facility is
not known.
(b) Safety of long and short term storage: There are no indications that the
waste currently stored presents an environmental problem in the short
term. The doses from reference wells will exceed 1 mSv/a during the first
several hundred years. Doses will result mainly from release of 3H and
137
Cs.
(c) Recommendation: Both waste retrieval and construction of additional
surface barrier concepts were examined. It was concluded that both
concepts are possible, but the retrieval option is more cost effective.
A.9.4. Upgrading of the repository
A.9.4.1. Background
RATA is in charge of the Maišiagala site and has initiated a new project
for upgrading the repository.
The initiating event for upgrading of the repository had already been
mentioned in the conclusions of the SKB study and changes in the regulatory
requirements. A new classification of radioactive waste was established and
requirements for disposal of LILW in a near surface repository were issued
[90].
A.9.4.2. Objectives
The objectives of the project on safety assessment and upgrading of the

Maišiagala repository are:
92
(a) Drafting of the safety analysis report;
(b) Specification of the physical protection and environmental monitoring
systems;
(c) Definition of an upgrading programme for the Maišiagala repository;
(d) Implementation of the upgrading programme.
The main results to be achieved during the project are:
(1) Establishment of the waste inventory and specification of special

software and hardware for recording radioactive waste;
(2) Preparation of a detailed territorial plan of the Maišiagala repository;
(3) Ground drilling for groundwater sampling;
(4) Investigation of the repository’s status with regard to the presence of free
water inside it;
(5) Analysis of the geological, hydrological and radiological situation of the
repository’s surroundings;
(6) Analysis of the status of the repository’s structure and its durability;
(7) Definition of an environmental monitoring programme, specification of
equipment and training of RATA staff in performing environmental
monitoring;
(8) Preparation of a safety analysis report for the existing facility;
(9) Preparation of a conceptual and detailed design for upgrading of the
repository;
(10) Preparation of a safety analysis report for the upgraded facility;
(11) Preparation of an implementation plan and cost estimate for the imple-
mentation phase;
(12) Preparation of licensing documents;
(13) Preparation of licensing documents for work related to safety improve-
ments;
(14) Specification of upgrading of the physical protection system.
The project should be implemented in the coming years.
93
A.10. NORWAY: RETRIEVAL FROM A NEAR SURFACE
REPOSITORY AT THE INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY
TECHNOLOGY, KJELLER
A.10.1. Background
The Norwegian nuclear programme was initiated in 1948 with the estab-
lishment of the Institute for Atomic Energy (known from 1980 as the Institute
for Energy Technology, IFE). IFE is an industrial foundation funded from the
national budget and from commercial research programmes [91].
Waste management was initiated by the construction of a treatment plant
in 1959 and a storage facility at the Kjeller site in 1965. The drums are standard
210 L steel drums with variable shielding and inner drums, depending on the
type and activity of the waste.
In 1970 IFE received permission from the National Institute for
Radiation Hygiene (now Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, NRPA)
to bury approximately 1000 drums of radioactive waste and 19 other waste
items in a near surface repository at Kjeller.
A.10.2. Description of the near surface repository
In 1970, all LILW generated before then was disposed of in a shallow land
disposal at the Kjeller site.
The waste drums were embedded in clay and stacked in 2 horizontal
layers. The area covered 11.5 m × 23 m. The upper layer of drums was covered
by 1.5–2 m of clay and soil with no engineered barriers. The area where the
repository was established has a slightly inclined surface. A drainage sump was
established at the lowest level at one end of the repository. The amount of
water and content of radionuclides has been measured on a regular basis [92].
A.10.3. Decision making and political process
The process of selecting a site for the disposal of low and intermediate
level radioactive waste in Norway started in 1989, when a steering committee
was appointed by the Government to investigate possible solutions for the final
disposal of all Norwegian LILW [93].
In April l994 the Norwegian Parliament decided to build a new combined
disposal and storage facility for LILW in Himdalen, approximately 30 km from
Kjeller. Decisions were also made that the waste in the old near surface
repository should be retrieved, that the waste drums containing plutonium
94
should be placed in storage at the new facility, and that the rest of the waste
should be disposed of at the new facility.
The decision was not based on technical problems with the old repository,
but on findings that shallow land disposal for this kind of waste was not up to
date in 1994. Another reason was that, with the construction of the new facility,
it was better to have all Norwegian LILW at 1 site (and in a modern facility)
than split between 2 sites.
A.10.4. Regulatory requirements
The NRPA is the official regulatory body in Norway for nuclear safety,
security and radiation protection. In 1994, the NRPA requested that IFE
propose a method of retrieving the waste packages from the repository. They
were requested to address the condition of the drums; the method to be used
for their removal, repackaging and transport; radiation protection measures
and estimated doses to the workers; how the soil close to the drums, in the
repository and surrounding area would be handled if contaminated; and identi-
fication of the ‘plutonium drums’.
IFE’s proposal was accepted by the NRPA, and in the second half of 1994
investigations were carried out. Soil samples were obtained from core drillings
in the disposal area (i.e. above the drums) and in the surrounding area. Ten
drums were retrieved to test the proposed retrieval method (lifting by hooking
a chain to the drums with the use of an excavator) and to examine the condition
of the drums. Previously, in 1993, 10 drums had been removed, so this was a
second check.
It was agreed that retrieval should not start until the new facility was in
operation and enough waste packages had been moved from the storage
facility at the Kjeller site to the Himdalen disposal facility. This approach
allowed indoor storage capacity for the retrieved and repackaged waste. Also,
the old repository was functioning well and there was no need for immediate
action.
A.10.5. Information and reporting
In June 2001, IFE organized an information meeting for the municipality,

neighbouring companies and residents, and interested groups. The NRPA also
participated. The planned work was described. During the retrieval work, IFE
sent weekly reports to the NRPA. Information was also given on IFE’s intranet
and on their web site. The work was covered in the local press (newspaper and
television). A planned information meeting at the finalization of the work was
cancelled because of lack of interest.
95
A.10.6. Retrieval work
Fencing, barriers and monitoring and surveillance systems had to be

established for the retrieval work. The area around the repository was fenced
off and classified as a controlled area. The dose rate was not meant to exceed
7.5 mSv/h at the fence. The fence had 2 openings, one for transport of drums out
of the area and one personnel entrance. To avoid contamination, the area
where the waste drums were handled was covered with a tarpaulin.
The soil was removed from above the drums in phases. Only a part of the
repository was uncovered at one time to protect the drums from unnecessary
exposure to air and rain. The drums were lifted up from the ground one by one
with the excavator and moved to a cleaning and checking position where soil
on the drum was removed (Fig. 23). This soil was collected and treated as
radioactive waste. The total amount of waste generated was two drums. The
drums were then moved into slightly larger drums. The void between the
2 drums was filled with cement. The drums were closed with a lid, moved to a
checking and monitoring place and then to the storage facility.
A.10.7. Personnel and environmental monitoring
People working inside the controlled area were classified as occupa-

tionally exposed. Individual doses were monitored using personal dosimeters
supplemented by electronic personal dosimeters (EPDs). Doses on the EPDs
were recorded every working day in the controlled area. During the retrieval
period, 14 August to 22 October, doses to 21 persons were recorded. The
maximum total dose recorded on the EPDs was 2.06 mSv.
During the excavation work, airborne releases of radioactive dust
particles were monitored. Activity was measured daily to calculate the level of
FIG. 23. Retrieval of waste drums at the Kjeller site.
96
contamination. The filter was changed once a week. An instrument located at
the other end of the IFE’s premises approximately 400 m away monitored
background levels. Workers frequently in contact with drums and clay were
equipped with personal air samplers. Filters in these instruments were changed
weekly and the activity on the filters was measured. Based on these daily and
weekly measurements, breathing masks were not required during the work.
The maximum committed dose from inhalation of contaminated dust was
calculated. The maximum committed dose from 137Cs was below 5 × 10–4 mSv,
from 238Pu below 5 × 10–3 mSv and from 239,240Pu less than 0.2 mSv.
Once weekly, dose rates were measured at the entrance to the controlled
area, at the IFE’s border fence, at the tent, along the walls and at a door to the
nearby building.
The dose rate in the environment depended on the number of drums
stored above ground in the controlled area. The mean dose rate was 0.19 mSv/h
[94].
A.10.8. Contamination and clearance
Retrieval of radioactive waste took place from 14 August to 22 October

2001. Clearance of the area was finished in early November 2002. Clearance
levels for contaminated clay specified by the NRPA specifically for this work
were 100 Bq/g dry weight for 137Cs, and for 239Pu + 240Pu + 241Am, 10 Bq/g dry
weight.
After a section of drums in the repository had been removed, samples of
clay from the clay bed were taken and analysed by gamma spectroscopy. All
samples were below the clearance levels and the former repository could
therefore be closed without removal of contaminated clay. The NRPA gave
permission for closure on 26 October 2001.
A.10.9. Repackaging and transport to the Himdalen facility
Major portions of the drums were difficult to identify because labels were
either difficult to read or had been destroyed by corrosion (Fig. 24). However,
the drums containing plutonium were successfully identified and 166 drums
containing plutonium were recovered, given new identification numbers, and
repacked in new 330 L stainless steel drums. The other 831 drums were
repacked in 300 L steel drums and given new identification numbers. To give
the old drums a protective layer and fix the contamination on the surfaces,
concrete was pumped into the spaces between the old drums and the new outer
drums. The drums were then cleared for transport and brought to a nearby
storage building to await transport to Himdalen.
97
The new combined disposal and storage facility for LILW in Himdalen
began operation in March 1999. The main purpose of the facility is direct
disposal of conditioned waste packages, and 25% of the facility’s present
capacity is for storage. Waste packages placed there are in a ‘disposal ready
form’ and will either be encased in concrete in the repository portion of the
facility or disposed of at another site [95].
FIG. 24. Drums recovered from the Kjeller site.
98
A.10.10. Conclusions
As a result of discussions preceding construction of the Himdalen facility,

the Norwegian Parliament decided that the contents of the shallow land
repository on the premises of IFE at Kjeller should be retrieved and
transferred to Himdalen. The repository contained 997 drums and 19 other
items of low and intermediate level radioactive waste which had been buried in
clay in 1970. Retrieval of the drums started in August 2001 and was completed
after 11 weeks of work. The NRPA, as well as the local community and media,
were kept informed throughout the process.
The waste drums were in remarkably good condition and their handling
caused no significant problems. The original drums were cemented into slightly
larger drums prior to preliminary storage at IFE and subsequent transport to
Himdalen. Radiological monitoring of the remaining clay in the hole showed
contamination far below clearance levels. The total dose received by the
involved personnel was less than 2.1 mSv. The total cost of retrieval, repacking,
internal transport and radiological and environmental control was 3.6 million
NOK, not including Himdalen related transport and disposal/storage costs.
Of the 997 drums, 166 are plutonium drums containing a total of 30 g of
239/240
Pu. These drums will be placed in the storage hall of the Himdalen facility.
A.11. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: CORRECTIVE MEASURES

FOR NEAR SURFACE DISPOSAL FACILITIES
The RADON system of specialized enterprises for collection, transport,

treatment and disposal of institutional LILW in near surface repositories was
established in the former Soviet Union in the early 1960s. The following
sections present two aspects of the upgrading of near surface facilities, the
upgrading of historical vault type repositories and matrices for borehole type
repositories with disused sealed sources.
A.11.1. Historical repositories for solid radioactive waste
Two upgrading options were always considered for vault type historical
repositories at MosNPO RADON:
(1) Complete or partial retrieval of the waste;

(2) Planning for and upgrading of the facility’s safety.
99
The first option requires complex design work, development of a variety
of special techniques, a system of radioactive waste management, a specific
safety assessment and possibly licensing. Only the second option is presented
here as an example of RADON’s present practice [96].
As part of the monitoring system, wells are drilled in the ground
surrounding the repository to monitor the groundwater regime, and the
chemical and radionuclide composition of the groundwater. The results of the
monitoring allow the integrity of engineering barriers to be estimated and the
corrosion resistance of the construction materials to be predicted. Analysis of
the monitoring data indirectly showed that the system of engineered barriers
does not perform to satisfaction and some corrective measures for restoration
of engineered barriers are probably needed.
To find the root cause and define effective corrective measures, it is
necessary to study the previously built and operated engineered barrier system.
The work that has been performed to evaluate near surface repositories
constructed at the MosNPO RADON site in the 1960s includes the following:
(a) Geophysics studies to determine possible degradation in the construction

and waste matrix;
(b) Exploratory boring in the waste matrix and geomedia;
(c) Sampling of the waste matrix, soil and water (if present);
(d) Gamma logging of the boreholes;
(e) Laboratory studies of the samples;
(f) Hydrogeological studies of the site and the repository.
The state of each element of the multibarrier system has been studied.
Studies of one repository have shown a disturbance of the protective soil layer,
with significant losses in the waterproof properties of the clay.
If the initial hydraulic conductivity of the clay layer was 10–8–10–9 m/d, the
samples studied had a value of 10–6 m/d. Clays of the natural barrier in the near
field were found to be water saturated. The lowering of the clay permeability
caused destruction of storage integrity. After removal of the soil layer a system
of cracks on the surface of the repository can be observed. Studies have shown
that the water flow through the cracks in the concrete may reach 10–7 m3/d per
1 m2 of the surface. Additionally, geophysics and drilling work revealed the
presence of a disturbance (fracture and cavity) in the waste matrix.
To restore impermeability of the engineered barriers, a special method of
restabilization was developed and tested at MosNPO RADON. The method is
based upon secondary grouting of previously cemented waste with special high
penetrative compositions on a cement base. Special polyfunctional additives to
increase permeability, frost and water resistance, crack resistance, biological
100
resistance, stability and strength, as well as to decrease leachability of radionu-
clides from the cement compound, are in use at MosNPO RADON. Pumping
of the grouting compounds is done through special boreholes drilled into the
repository. The method was tested in a pilot compartment of one of MosNPO
RADON’s units and then implemented at several repositories built in the early
1960s.
The results of secondary cementation were checked by repeated deter-
mination of the cement matrix (and waste) permeability. It was observed that,
as a result of the regrouting, the permeability of the waste in the
compartment decreased, reaching the permeability of host rock. The average
injection rate in practice is about 0.08 m3 of the grout solution for 1 m3 of
preliminary cemented waste form. The results obtained indicate that the
method developed for repairing near surface repository engineered barriers
can be recommended.
After the work has been done and the initial permeability of cement
matrix and waste inside the repository has been restored to the previously low
level, the next step to increase safety could be construction or reconstruction of
the final cap.
Upgrades at MosNPO RADON have achieved the following:
(1) Isolation of radioactive waste from the environment with maintenance of

the required operational qualities of the construction within the stated
period, depending on its status or throughout the entire institutional
control period;
(2) Possible fulfilment of the planned radiation monitoring activities;
(3) Possible fulfilment of the repair work required during predicted
unfavourable conditions.
As a result, a multilayer construction was designed and its parameters are

now being investigated in mathematical models from a hydrogeological and
temperature point of view to find the optimum values for the specific
conditions of the MosNPO RADON site.
A.11.2. Shallow borehole repository for disused sealed radiation sources
Sealed radiation sources are widely used in different branches of industry,

medicine, agriculture and scientific research. According to the concept which
was established in the early 1960s in the former Soviet Union, spent sources are
collected and transported to regional specialized RADON facilities. Special
transport containers with top loading and bottom discharging are used for this
purpose. Spent sealed radiation sources with short lived radionuclides are
101
disposed of in shallow ground borehole repositories at regional specialized
RADON facilities, while sources with long lived radionuclides are stored in
shielded containers pending a decision on their final disposal in a deep
geological formation.
Spent sealed radiation sources are radioactive waste that can have an
extremely high radioactivity level. For example, the specific radioactivity of a
60
Co source can be of the order of 104 Ci/kg or higher.2 Delivered to and stored
in a special facility they represent the main part of the radionuclide inventory.
In a Russian special storage facility the average radionuclide composition of
spent ionizing sources is 137Cs (40%), 60Co (25%), 90Sr (22%), 192Ir (8%) and
170
Tm (4%).
The borehole repository for spent sealed radiation sources (Fig. 25) is a
stainless steel cylindrical vessel with a diameter of 200 mm and a height of
1500 mm which is placed in a steel reinforced concrete well at a depth of 4 m.
The vessel’s walls are 5 mm thick. The stainless steel loading channel of the
repository has a curved (spiral) tube with a diameter of 108 mm × 5 mm. At the
upper part of the repository there is a carbon steel conical socket which
provides for safe discharge of the transport containers. This socket is closed
with a carbon steel lid. The concrete wall of the repository is surrounded by a
clay–cement (or clay) mixture which fills the initial construction hole in the
original soil as a seal material.
Initially typical repositories were designed for the disposal of sources
with the radioactivity corresponding to a radium equivalent of 50 000 g-eq. The
maximum dose rate on the surface of a repository near the loading channel
must not be higher than 0.82 mR/h.3 The underground reservoir is heated
radiogenically by heat generation from sources. According to the initial design
the maximum allowable temperature in the reservoir is 230°C. As a rule there
are a few borehole repositories for the disposal of spent sources at regional
specialized RADON facilities [96].
The initial repository design was developed at the end of the 1950s on the
assumption that the stainless steel underground vessel and the reinforced
concrete wall would provide enough protection against the possibility of radio-
nuclide migration into the environment. Therefore only the hazard of
irradiation of personnel was calculated in the typical design of a borehole
repository.
2
1 Ci = 3.70 × 1010 Bq.
3
1 rad = 1.00 × 10–2 Gy.
102
1300
580
1
Ø680
2
3
4000
tube
Ø1085
5
1500
Ø400
FIG. 25. Design of a typical borehole repository (dimensions in millimetres). 1: carbon

steel conical socket, 2: stainless steel loading channel, 3: steel reinforced concrete well,
4: concrete, 5: stainless steel cylindrical vessel, 6: drainage channel.
Practical use of borehole repositories showed the possibility of

accelerated corrosion of engineered barriers in powerful radiation fields
inherent to repositories containing powerful sealed sources. Investigations of
repositories showed dose rates in the underground reservoirs of up to 20 MR/h,
temperatures higher than 80oC and concentrations of radiolytic hydrogen of
3.5%. Because of the non-uniform allocation of sources in the underground
vessel the radiation fields are extremely high, even for a total radioactivity
below the repository limit (radium equivalent of 50 000 g-eq). Due to conden-
sation of water vapours on the cold walls of the loading channel, small amounts
of water were accumulated. Although this is a slow process, only a portion of
the water is accumulated in the underground reservoir during many years of
operation in dumping conditions, when there is a flow of hot air from the
103
radiogenically heated zone of the repository upward and a reverse flow of
dump air. The presence of water and powerful ionizing fields significantly
decreases the safety of the disposal of sources. Radiolysis of water and air
causes an accumulation of hydrogen, ozone and nitrogen oxides which produce
nitric acid when they come into contact with water. These processes accelerate
the corrosion of source containers [97].
The contamination of water in the underground reservoir was determined
to be as much as 106 Bq/L and there was considered to be a potential danger of
penetration into the surrounding soil, although this has not been observed in
practice. Radionuclide releases are also possible through the loading channel
by gas–aerosol phase. Therefore, free storage of powerful sealed radiation
sources in borehole repositories does not have a sufficiently high level of safety.
The technology should be improved and corrective measures for already
operating boreholes should be developed.
In order to ensure the long term safety of the disposal it was proposed
that the sources be allocated uniformly in a matrix material in the underground
reservoir. An additional barrier would be provided to protect sources against
direct contact with air and water and decrease radiation and temperature fields.
Different metals were considered for the matrix material. To facilitate
the encapsulation process and minimize the influence of high temperature on
radionuclides, metals with low melting temperature must be used. For
damaged sources this minimizes the volatilization of radionuclides in the
process of their encapsulation. For powerful sources, only metals can be
applied as matrices.
A technological scheme was developed, which provides immobilization
of sources in a metal matrix after they have been loaded into the borehole
repository. It was proposed that this scheme be used at regional specialized
RADON facilities to correct deficiencies in the initial design concept with open
storage of sources in underground reservoirs of borehole repositories. Use of
this new technology was then extended to the conditioning of sources in
interim or long term storage. The considerable reduction of radiation and
temperature fields in repositories due to the application of metal matrices
permitted an approximately six-fold increase in their capacity.
This technology includes methods of examining the repository, which
allow determination of the following parameters:
(a) Activity of the spent sources disposed of;

(b) Number of spent ionizing sources in the repository;
(c) Proportion of backfill material;
(d) Dose rate on the cap of the repository and in the bottom of the reservoir;
(e) Temperature in the reservoir;
104
(f) Presence and level of water in the reservoir;
(g) Nuclide content in the water;
(h) Contamination of the receiving component;
(i) Presence of hydrogen in the gaseous phase;
(j) General dimensions of the reservoir.
To realize this technology, MosNPO RADON developed a mobile system

which encompasses all the operations needed to encapsulate the spent ionizing
sources in a metallic matrix (Fig. 26). This mobile plant can be used for
different types of repositories [98]. Sources are encapsulated into metal
matrices directly in the underground reservoirs of repositories, allowing the
initial plan of disposal of spent sources with subsequent encapsulation to be
followed, as well as the implemention of improved technology from the very
beginning. Encapsulation technology has been in use at MosNPO RADON
since 1986. At regional specialized RADON facilities (e.g. Volgograd, Nizhniy
Novgorod, Sverdlovsk) disused sealed radiation sources with total activities of
more then 1 million Ci previously loaded into boreholes have been
immobilized since 1991 using this movable plant. Only lead and lead based
alloys are used for this purpose, lead being the most reliable matrix material.
The results of calculations for different scenarios show that the maximum
annual dose to a member of the population does not exceed (5.5–7.5) × 10–5 Sv/
a, even in the case of complete destruction of the engineered barriers and
complete flooding of the repository. This shows the high degree of safety of
borehole repositories when sources are immobilized by encapsulation in a
metal (lead) matrix. The predicted data comply with the annual dose limit
(10–4 Sv/a) used at the present time in the Russian Federation and confirm that
the operation of these repositories is safe for the population [98].
Due to its chemical properties, lead forms only insoluble compounds with
groundwater anions. The heterogeneous character of the exchange reaction
fixes the lead corrosion products near the repository. In addition, according to
the proposed approach the metallic matrix with sources would be removed and
melted for reuse after a period of time (500–1000 years). This is an additional
means of protecting the environment from potential contamination by lead
corrosion products (Fig. 26).
A.11.3. Conclusions
Over a long storage period, destruction of the integrity of the multi-

barrier system may occur in the subsurface repository, which may increase the
potential for radionuclide migration into the environment. For historical
105
2 3
FIG. 26. Immobilization technology of the MOSKIT mobile plant (1: container,
2: uploading unit, 3: MOSKIT mobile plant).
RADON type repositories the most often used corrective measure to reduce
possible contact of the waste with water is stabilization of the waste in a matrix
[99]. Special cement based grout is used for vault type repositories with solid
and solidified waste, and for borehole repositories with spent sealed radiation
sources a metal matrix is usually installed.
A.12. SOUTH AFRICA: INVESTIGATIONS AT THE VAALPUTS

NEAR SURFACE REPOSITORY
A.12.1. Background
Vaalputs is the national repository for the disposal of LILW in South

Africa. The Koeberg nuclear power plant is currently the dominant waste
generator disposing of waste at Vaalputs. Near surface trenches are utilized for
the disposal of LILW (short lived). The LLW (short lived), contained in metal
drums, and the intermediate level waste (short lived), contained in concrete
containers, is disposed of in separate trenches.
The disposal trenches at Vaalputs were designed and constructed to be
100 m long, 7.7 m deep and 20 m wide at the bottom and with sides that slope
106
Topsoil 0.5 m (average)
Copper tracer Cap compacted in 150 mm layers 2.0 m (average)
Dorbank material 0.2 m
Soil cement backfill
Concrete blocks
Dry-unscreened clay
5.2 m
Dry-screened clay
between packages
Calcrete drainage layer 0.2 m

Sump
FIG. 27. Intermediate level waste concrete drum trench.
upwards at an angle of 80o. The waste emplacement, backfilling and capping

methods were as indicated in the vertical cross-sectional diagram shown in Fig. 27.
The relatively big trenches described above were designed in anticipation
that the LILW from 4 nuclear power plants the size of Koeberg would
eventually be disposed of at Vaalputs. Because the nuclear energy programme
in South Africa did not develop as originally anticipated, together with
strategic changes at Koeberg (e.g. waste minimization techniques), the volumes
of radioactive waste shipped to Vaalputs for disposal did not materialize as
initially expected. This resulted in the trenches being left open for extended
periods of time, thereby causing prolonged exposure of the waste packages to
adverse weather conditions.
A.12.2. Initiating event: cracking of concrete containers and leaching of waste
In May 1997 it was observed that some of the exposed concrete

containers inside the disposal trench showed minor cracks and that material
containing traces of 60Co and 137Cs was leaching from these cracks, as shown in
Fig. 28.
Although the cracking phenomenon was not reported until May 1997 it
was evident that it had evolved over time, since some of the waste packages had
been emplaced in the trench as early as 1986. Cracks were observed on the rims
and sidewalls, and on the bases of the drums. Only some of the drums could be
inspected at the time as the back of the waste stack was already backfilled and
covered. It may also be possible that cracked drums that passed the receiving
inspection may have been delivered to the repository during the earlier years.
The local regulatory authority was informed of a nuclear occurrence. The
occurrence was communicated to the local public via the Vaalputs Communi-
cation Forum. The incident raised concerns in the local surrounding
107
FIG. 28. Leachate from a cracked concrete container at Vaalputs.
communities with regard to the safety of the repository, and also contributed to
negative media coverage.
A.12.3. Investigations
Several investigations were launched to determine the extent of the

release of activity from the disposal trenches. An IAEA expert team was
invited to South Africa to review the situation regarding the cracked drums and
also to communicate their findings and observations to the local community.
Results of all the investigations showed that no radioactivity had leaked into
the environment around the disposal trench.
Both the waste generator and the repository operating organization
appointed independent experts in the field of reinforced concrete to investigate
the drum cracking mechanism and to report on the findings.
108
A.12.4. Corrective actions
The following initial corrective actions were undertaken to rectify unsafe

conditions:
(a) The leachate from the containers was sealed with a durable sealant to
prevent the possibility of fixed contamination becoming available for
transport to the environment;
(b) The remaining waste packages were backfilled and covered with dry clay
to prevent further exposure to adverse weather conditions;
(c) The waste stack was sealed off with a double wall constructed of concrete
blocks;
(d) The section of the trench containing the damaged packages was
effectively isolated from the environment by capping.
From an administrative point of view, the following corrective actions

were implemented:
(1) The operating organization temporarily suspended further deliveries of

concrete waste packages to the repository;
(2) Working groups were established with the waste generator to review the
waste management process (e.g. quality assurance measures in the waste
package design, manufacturing and procurement processes, the waste
conditioning and waste packaging processes, as well as the waste package
preservation measures during storage);
(3) The WAC for Vaalputs were revised to include more stringent quality
related requirements for waste packages;
(4) Operational procedures and systems at Vaalputs were improved to
include more stringent receiving inspections and regular inspections of
waste packages with the aim of proactively identifying degrading waste
packages;
(5) Annual audits are undertaken on waste generators.
A.12.5. Regulatory requirements
Due to premature signs of deterioration of the exposed waste containers,

the national regulatory body required that the existing trenches be backfilled
and capped as soon as possible. At that stage, only 70% of the intermediate
level waste trench and 30% of the LLW trench had been filled with waste
packages. This requirement in itself implied a modification of licence require-
ments and operational procedures for the site. In addition, the national
109
regulatory body required that in future the metal LLW drums be covered
within one month and the concrete intermediate level waste containers within
two months after being emplaced in the respective trenches.
A.12.6. Improvements
The premature closure of the trenches necessitated some changes to their

original design. The main feature of the implemented changes entailed a
concrete cut-off wall, the width of each trench, at the live end of the waste
stacks. These walls effectively sealed off the waste stacks and provided a barrier
against which backfill and capping could proceed. A schematic diagram of the
vertical cross-section of this configuration is shown in Fig. 29.
To prevent the difficulties encountered with the partial closure of waste
filled sections of trenches, it is intended to utilize smaller trenches in the future
to accommodate a pre-defined number of waste packages delivered in concen-
trated consignments, and backfilling and capping of the trenches as soon as
possible after emplacement of the waste packages (Fig. 30).
A.12.7. Root cause identification
The root causes of the occurrence were identified to be a combination of

the following:
Directional
beacon
65.85 m
4m
Top soil
(0.5 m)
Trench
marker Compacted cap
(2.2 m)
Backfill between Oversized
trench wall and material (0.2 m)
containers
1m3 concrete Concrete cut-off
blocks (shoulder) (1 m 3 blocks)
Concrete drums Backfill between wall

stacked 4 high and containers
(5.2 m)
Calcrete
drainage layer
(0.2 m)
FIG. 29. Vertical cross-section through the intermediate level waste trench, indicating the
position of the cut-off wall and details of the capped section.
110
Future compacted caps
3m
3m
Disposal zones Future disposal zones
2m 20 m 5m
[Not to scale]
FIG. 30. Vertical cross-section through new LLW trenches, showing the existing disposal
zone and future extensions.
(a) Premature degradation of the waste packages due to their prolonged

exposure to the elements (e.g. thermal cycling, corrosive effects due to
corrosive elements in the soils);
(b) Insufficient quality control and enforcement of the WAC by the repos-
itory’s operating organization;
(c) Insufficient quality control measures implemented by the waste
generator;
(d) Uncertainties and lack of understanding regarding the specifications,
lifetime expectancy and performance of the concrete containers in the
repository environment (the containers and container specifications were
initially adopted from a French design);
(e) Anomalies in the waste segregation, conditioning and waste package
filling procedures.
A.13. UNITED KINGDOM: DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRIGG

LLW DISPOSAL SITE
A.13.1. Introduction
British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) owns and operates the Drigg disposal
site, which is the UK’s principal facility for the disposal of low level radioactive
waste.
This section describes the development of the Drigg site to date, in
particular the upgrading of the site in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which
111
centred around the phasing out of disposal into trenches and the introduction
of a revised waste form and disposal into engineered vaults.
A.13.2. Development of the site until the late 1980s
The Drigg site (Fig. 31) is located on the West Cumbrian coast about
0.5 km inland and some 6 km to the southeast of the Sellafield site. The total
area of the site is about 100 ha. The ground slopes gently towards the sea,
falling from about 20 m above sea level at the northeastern boundary to about
7 m above sea level on the southwestern boundary. To the east the site is
bounded by the Whitehaven to Barrow-in-Furness railway line. A small stream
flows through the site, discharging into the Irish Sea to the south of the site via
the River Irt.
The site was originally developed in 1939 as a Royal ordnance factory and
some of the surface features date from this period. Ownership of the site subse-
quently passed to the Atomic Energy Authority, which was granted planning
consent in 1957 for the disposal of LLW in the northern 40 ha of the site,
referred to as the ‘consented area’. The first certificate of authorization for
disposal of LLW was granted in 1958 under the terms of the Atomic Energy
Whitehaven–
Drigg Barrow-in-Furness
grouting railway line
facility
Interim
cap over Groundwater Consented Potential materials
Rail
trenches cut-off wall area boundary handling facility
sidings
Visitors
Leachate centre
drains
Site
Vault 8 boundary
PCM
drum store
Area for
future vaults
Remaining
magazines
Offices Marine
Construction Pipeline
and services discharge
contractors to sea
system Drigg stream
areas
PCM East-West
monitoring stream
facility
0 (m) 250
FIG. 31. Principal features of the Drigg site.
112
Act 1954, and disposal operations commenced in 1959. Responsibility for the
site was transferred to BNFL when the company was formed in 1971.
Within the consented area there is clay, typically at a depth of about 5–
8 m below ground level, which forms a low permeability base to the disposal
trenches. Since the mid-1980s, in excavated areas where the clay layer dipped
below the excavated trench base level, bentonite was rotavated into the base of
the trench in order to provide a low permeability layer and optimize leachate
drainage. The trench bases are graded and include simple drains which, in
conjunction with the underlying clay, serve to direct infiltrating rain or
groundwater to the southern end of the trenches for collection in a series of
drains. Until 1991 the collected leachate was discharged into the Drigg stream
and hence the River Irt and the Irish Sea.
Drummed, bagged and loose waste was tumble tipped into the trenches
starting from the northern end and progressively covered with at least 1 m of
backfill (1.5 m from 1988 onwards) to create a stable surface for continued
disposal operations. Disposal was conducted solely by tipping into trenches
until 1988, when vault 8 commenced operation as part of the site upgrade
discussed below. Trench 7 operations continued, however, until
commencement of operation of the LLW high force compaction (HFC) facility
at Sellafield in 1995. The total area occupied by the trenches is about 16 ha and
the total volume about 500 000 m3. Due to the effects of self-compaction in the
trenches, a total volume of loose waste of about 800 000 m3 was actually
disposed of.
On the western side of the consented area there were 10 former royal
ordnance factory storage magazines. Between 1959 and 1967 some interme-
diate level waste, known as plutonium contaminated material (PCM), was
placed in these magazines for storage. The construction of a purpose built PCM
store at the southern end of the site allowed the 5 northerly magazines, which
contained waste principally in 200 L drums, to be emptied between 1976 and
1986 and subsequently demolished. All the PCM wastes on the site are
currently being retrieved and transported to the BNFL Sellafield site as
discussed in Section A.13.3.
A.13.3. Site upgrade and current status
In 1987 a major upgrade of disposal operations at the Drigg site

commenced with the principal aims of improving waste management practices
and the efficiency of space utilization, and enhancing the visual impact of
disposal operations. The main features of the upgrade were as follows:
113
(a) Installation of a groundwater cut-off wall around the north and east sides
of the trenches and construction of an interim cap over the completed
trenches;
(b) Refurbishment and enhancement of the leachate drainage system;
(c) Phasing out of trench disposal of loose waste in favour of orderly
emplacement of compacted, containerized and grouted wastes in
engineered concrete vaults.
This section first describes the interim cap and cut-off wall associated
with the trenches and the upgrade to the leachate management system. The
basis for the revised disposal strategy and associated waste form of high force
compacted, containerized and grouted waste is then discussed, followed by a
description of vault 8. The upgrading to the new waste form of some of the
wastes initially placed in vault 8 and the retrieval of the PCM wastes currently
stored at the Drigg site are then briefly discussed.
A.13.3.1. Interim cap and cut-off wall
The interim cap over trenches 1–6 was completed in 1989 to minimize
rainwater infiltration into the trenches and hence reduce leachate volumes.
During 1995 it was extended to cover trench 7 after completion of trench
disposals (Fig. 31).
The cap comprises a 1:25 (vertical:horizontal) graded earth mound incor-
porating a low density polyethylene membrane at a depth of about 1 m. This
membrane sheds rainwater to the perimeter of the cap, where it is collected in
drains and discharges into the Drigg stream. The surface of the cap has been
seeded with grass and mixed shrubs.
Waste degradation gas is vented passively by means of 15 cm diameter
probes driven through the cap into the waste. The probes are perforated along
their length within the waste and capped to prevent rainwater ingress. They
also facilitate water level measurements and sampling for leachate and gas
composition. Periodic monitoring of cap settlement is also carried out. This
supports any maintenance required and will input to later decisions on the
precise timing of final cap construction.
Prior to installation of the interim cap, a 450 m long, 1 m wide, low perme-
ability cement/bentonite groundwater cut-off wall was installed around the
northeast corner of the site running from the northern end of trench 7 to the
northeast corner of vault 8. In 1995 the wall was subsequently extended
alongside trench 7 prior to the capping. The base of the wall is keyed into the
same clay layer that forms the base of the trenches, with a typical wall depth of
about 8 m.
114
A.13.3.2. Leachate management
Refurbishment of the leachate drainage system was completed in early

1991 to allow improved leachate monitoring and controlled discharge directly
to the Irish Sea (rather than via the Drigg stream and River Irt). Leachate from
each trench and vault 8 is routed by gravity flow through interceptor drains to a
common point and then to a set of holding tanks on the western edge of the
site, where it is held pending automated discharge. The leachate is flow propor-
tionally sampled and pumped directly to the Irish Sea through a marine outfall.
A.13.3.3. Waste form
In changing from trench to vault type disposals, BNFL considered the

range of potential options for the revised waste form. The 2 primary functional
requirements of the revised waste form in terms of post-closure safety are:
(1) Residual voidage should be low in order to minimize the potential for
significant settlement of the final cap;
(2) Loads across the base area of each container stack should as far as
practicable be uniformly distributed in order to ensure that ground
bearing pressures are not exceeded when the final cap is emplaced and to
minimize differential, uneven settlement.
Also very important in considering waste form options was the objective
of the site upgrade programme to significantly increase the projected
operational life of Drigg. In this regard, waste volume reduction and space
utilization in terms of waste packaging are the principal issues.
The chosen waste form is that based on HFC of the waste, emplacement
in 20 m3 steel International Organization for Standardization (ISO) containers
and grouting of the voidage within the ISO container to form a solid product
(Fig. 32). This waste form was selected from a comprehensive analysis of the
range of options available, taking into account the above requirements and also
considering operational aspects. Two new BNFL facilities were introduced in
the mid-1990s for production of the new waste form.
A.13.3.4. Vault 8
The first disposal vault at the Drigg site (vault 8) was introduced in 1988.
Its purpose is to:
115
FIG. 32. Fully grouted product container.
(a) Form a platform for the orderly emplacement of containerized wastes;

(b) Maintain a free draining environment around the wastes.
Vault 8 consists of 3 bays and is approximately 175 m wide by 200–265 m

long. The average depth is about 5 m and the total capacity about 200 000 m3 of
containerized waste. This depth allows 4 high stacking of nominal half-height
ISO containers. The containers are handled in the vault by fork-lift truck.
The vault has surface water drains which collect rainwater from the
surface of the vault base slab while an under-slab drainage blanket and
perimeter drains collect groundwater from beneath and around the vault. As
with the trenches, the principal means of leachate containment is the naturally
occurring clay layer at about 5 m below ground level.
A.13.3.5. Upgrading of initial vault 8 disposals
From 1988, waste from non-Sellafield sites was placed in vault 8,

principally in either full- or half-height ISO containers. With the progressive
introduction of the revised waste form, the majority of disposals to vault 8 until
116
1995 were in need of further treatment to upgrade them to the new waste form
standard. Such wastes are called ‘backlogged wastes’.
The design of the nearly 1000 backlogged half-height ISO containers
generally did not minimize associated voidage nor provide a lid with a
groutable top surface. They have been transferred to the Drigg grouting facility,
where the lids were modified to allow in-fill grouting and the remaining short-
comings to be sufficiently overcome by limiting their positioning to the top of
container stacks in vault 8.
The full-height containers, containing predominantly drummed waste, are
being transferred to Sellafield for processing at the WAMAC facility, with the
wastes being compacted and returned to the Drigg site in half-height
containers. By 2003 the WAMAC facility had processed the wastes from about
600 of the nearly 1000 full-height backlogged ISO containers. Upgrading of the
full-height ISO backlogged LLW is planned to be complete by about 2005,
commensurate with the end of vault 8 operations.
A.13.3.6. Retrieval of PCM
The PCM wastes currently stored on the Drigg site are intermediate level
waste and are not associated with the LLW disposal facilities. These wastes
must be removed from the site, and it is BNFL policy to recover and transfer
them as soon as practicable to Sellafield for further treatment and storage.
Retrieval of crated PCM from the 5 remaining magazines commenced in 1998.
Retrieval modules have been constructed with facilities for preliminary
monitoring and packaging of the crated items in new, size specific overpacks.
Retrieved items are then transferred to a central crate monitoring facility at the
south end of the consented area so that a detailed radionuclide inventory can
be compiled prior to transfer to Sellafield in purpose-built transport containers.
Retrieval of PCM wastes from the PCM drum store is also in progress, having
commenced in 1997, also using project specific packaging, monitoring and
transport arrangements. It is planned that PCM retrieval will be fully complete
by the end of 2006, with decommissioning of all the associated facilities by
2010.
A.13.4. Conclusions
This section has described the development of the Drigg site to date.
Development has taken place from tipping of wastes into trenches to the
orderly emplacement of compacted, containerized and grouted wastes in
engineered vaults.
117
Future operational facilities will consist of a series of vaults within the
consented area. In the longer term, engineering measures associated with the
eventual closure of the site are planned to include a final cap, groundwater cut-
off wall and vertical drain.
The plans for site development will be regularly updated to reflect both
operational developments at the site and engineering and scientific develop-
ments and understanding. Engineering design work will be used to assess and
optimize potential alternative development plans. These plans will continue to
be discussed with regulatory authorities and other stakeholders.
A.14. UKRAINE: RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM PAST PRACTICES

AND SAFETY UPGRADING
Radioactive waste resulting from the utilization of ionizing radiation

sources is managed by the Ukrainian State Association RADON (UkrSA
“RADON”). This organization comes under the authority of the Ministry of
Emergencies. Special enterprises were commissioned in 1961 and 1962 to deal
with the collection, transport, storage and disposal of radioactive waste from
industrial enterprises, medical and research institutes, including spent radiation
sources (Tables 6, 7). Radioactive waste repositories located in Kiev and
Kharkov caused contamination of groundwater by tritium.
The main cause of radionuclide contamination outside the waste reposi-
tories is non-compliance with the technical requirements of engineering
structures and with the nuclear and physical requirements for radioactive waste
containing tritium. Water accumulated in the repositories results from conden-
sation or infiltration, together with fallout due to poor repository designs
developed in the 1950s. Radionuclide contamination has resulted from the
migration of unfiltered fallout, subsequent migration into the groundwater and
diffusion of radioactive waste in underlying moist soil as the result of failures in
the hydraulic isolation.
The causes of a radiation accident at the Kiev RADON location were the
following:
(a) Shortcomings in the repository’s design;

(b) Absence of a clay layer at the base of the repository;
(c) Lack of layered cementing, disposal of unsolidified radioactive waste
containing tritium;
(d) Operation of repositories over more than 40 years with no modernization
to improve operational safety.
118
TABLE 6. UkrSA RADON RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM PAST
PRACTICES AS OF 1 JANUARY 2003
Volume Mass Activity Main

Waste type Location
(m3) (kg) (Bq) Radionuclides
60
Solid low and Kiev 1 897 256 163 7.86E15 Co, 90Sr,
137
intermediate Cs, 226Ra
level 60
Dnipropetrovsk 428 1 001 143 7.04E15 Co, 90Sr,
radioactive 137
Cs, 226Ra
waste
60
Odessa 497 279 491 1.51E15 Co, 90Sr,
137
Cs, 226Ra
60
Lvov 492 1 469 733 1.133E14 Co, 90Sr,
137
Cs, 226Ra
60
Kharkov 1 321 2 269 291 3.51E14 Co, 90Sr,
137
Cs, 226Ra
60
Liquid low and Kiev 413 2.16E12 Co, 90Sr,
137
intermediate Cs, 226Ra
level 60
Dnipropetrovsk 60 5.7E10 Co, 90Sr,
radioactive 137
Cs, 226Ra
waste
60
Odessa 138 4.5E11 Co, 90Sr,
137
Cs, 226Ra
60
Kharkov 28 4.37E10 Co, 90Sr,
137
Cs, 226Ra
Spent Kiev 1.33E15

radiation
Dnipropetrovsk 1.27E14
sources
Odessa 8.41E15
Lvov 4.73E14
Kharkov 4.57E13
The primary task in the upgrading of radiation safety at the RADON

plants was the isolation of both currently operated and closed repositories from
atmospheric fallout. In light of this, on the request of the regulatory authority
at Kharkov, RADON, 2 repositories were isolated. This action focused on
preventing water infiltration and stopping tritium migration into the ground-
water. Predictions indicate that this should make practically impossible tritium
119
TABLE 7. UkrSA RADON RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
FACILITIES
Year of
Facility Main purpose Design capacity
commissioning
Kiev Storage, Solid radioactive waste: 1962

disposal 3075 m3
Liquid radioactive waste:
1000 m3
Spent radioactive sources:
4.4E6 GBq
Dnipropetrovsk Storage, Solid RW: 450 m3 1961
disposal Liquid RW: 200 m3
Spent RS: 1.8E6 GBq
Odessa Disposal Solid RW: 583 m3 1961
Liquid RW: 400 m3
Spent RS: 1.8E6 GBq
Lvov Storage, Solid RW: 1140 m3 1962
disposal Liquid RW: 200m3
Spent RS: 2.9E6 GBq
Kharkov Storage, Solid RW: 2384 m3 1962
disposal Liquid RW: 1000 m3
Spent RS: 2.2E6 GBq
contamination beyond the sanitary and protection zone in an amount that

represents a hazard for the population and the environment. A system of
monitoring wells has also been completely redeveloped to monitor
performance.
To prevent the infiltration of atmospheric fallout into repositories and
reduce tritium migration into groundwater, in August 1997 3 repositories at
Kiev RADON were covered with special roofing.
Because Kiev RADON, like other repositories, is located within a city’s
boundaries, extraction of radioactive waste from the emergency repositories
and its redisposal at a central disposal site is planned.
The following specific measures are planned:
(1) Preparation of a place for loading operations;

(2) Preparation of radioactive waste in the containers;
(3) Removal of the waterproof covering from the emergency repositories;
(4) Pumping of liquid radioactive waste from the emergency repositories;
120
(5) Extraction of solid radioactive waste;
(6) Sorting and loading of solid radioactive waste into containers;
(7) Layered cementing of solid radioactive waste;
(8) Transfer of containers to the central disposal site.
The Complex Radioactive Waste Management scientific centre (Zhovty

Vody) developed a preliminary safety analysis report entitled Design for
Minimization of the Radiation Accident Impact at Radioactive Waste Reposi-
tories 5, 6, 7 of Kiev RADON. This report analysed radiation conditions
pertaining to the disposal of on-site short lived radioactive waste and long term
storage of long lived radioactive waste to be retrieved from Kiev RADON.
The Science and Operational Issuing Enterprise STRUM has developed a
mobile remote system for solid radioactive and hazardous toxic waste
treatment and for radioactive waste unloading from the emergency disposal
facilities and its reloading into lead lined storage and transport containers.
Mobile remote system management is carried out from a remote control
installation located 500 m from the complex using a television system for obser-
vation. The mobile remote system was tested at Kiev RADON. Extraction of
the waste and its delivery to the central disposal site of the exclusion zone was
to have been realized after its commissioning.
Using hands-on experience with radioactive waste redisposal carried out
in 2000, the Makariv military radioactive waste disposal facility can be
addressed. The radioactive waste was retrieved from the disposal facility at
Makariv in compliance with the design approved by the State Nuclear
Regulatory Committee. Wastes with a volume of 6.6 m3 with an activity of
2.61 × 109 Bq were removed, put into a special container and placed in the Kiev
RADON for temporary storage.
Summary
The comprehensive programme on radioactive waste management

approved by a resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers in 2002 includes:
(a) Development of a feasibility study and designs for temporary storage of

radioactive waste in containers (2002–2005);
(b) Reconstruction of the UkrSA RADON monitoring system (2002–2005);
(c) Development of a mobile remote system for unloading solid radioactive
waste from the emergency disposal facilities and its putting it into
transport containers (2002–2005);
(d) Commissioning of the Vector complex facility in 2004;
121
(e) Extraction of radioactive waste from emergency repositories 5–7 of Kiev
RADON and its redisposal at the central disposal site (2002–2005);
(f) Retrieval of radioactive waste from disposal trenches at Kiev RADON
and redisposal in 2005.
A.15. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

UNDERTAKEN AT NEAR SURFACE DISPOSAL FACILITIES
A.15.1. Introduction
Near surface disposal of commercial low and intermediate level

radioactive waste generated by industry, nuclear power plants, and academic
and medical facilities has taken place in the USA since the early 1960s. This
experience includes repositories developed in both humid, high precipitation
regions (Barnwell, South Carolina; West Valley, New York; Maxey Flats,
Kentucky; and Sheffield, Illinois) and arid, low precipitation regions (Richland,
Washington; Beatty, Nevada; and Tooele, Utah). This discussion does not
address near surface disposal at US Department of Energy facilities which
handle LILW from the research, development and production of nuclear
weapons. The facilities in New York, Illinois and Nevada are no longer in
operation. With the exception of the Utah facility, which was developed in the
early 1990s for low activity wastes, each of these repositories has been
upgraded in various ways. These corrective actions are summarized below for
the six facilities involved.
A.15.1.1. Humid region sites
A.15.1.1.1. Barnwell, South Carolina (operating facility)
The Barnwell, South Carolina, disposal facility opened in 1971 and

continues to dispose of low and intermediate level radioactive waste in a
humid, coastal plain environment. The facility is located on State of South
Carolina owned land leased to the private company that operates the facility.
The 235 acre4 site has sufficient capacity to continue operating for several
decades at presently expected waste volumes.
The Barnwell site opened in 1982, prior to the existence of compre-
hensive US regulations, and has made improvements over time. Early
4
1 acre = 4.047 × 103 m2.
122
corrective actions included requirements for solidification of liquids, improved
isotopic analysis for ion exchange media, use of high integrity waste containers
for intermediate level wastes, and environmental monitoring. Federal
Government requirements for site suitability, waste form and classification,
packaging, segregation of wastes by waste class, structural stability for class B
and C level wastes, increased shipment manifest requirements, financial
assurance, institutional control and other features took effect in 1982. These
are set forth in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 10 CFR Part 61
regulations [100]. In those regulations, class A waste, which generally decays to
acceptable levels in 100 years or less, is considered to be low level waste. Class
B and C wastes are considered intermediate level wastes.
In 1980, increased stability of intermediate level waste forms was
required. Stability could be achieved by solidification or improved containeri-
zation. Use of high integrity containers for stabilization began in 1981. Most
containers were made of HDPE. In 1989, the NRC determined that these did
not meet long term structural stability requirements [101]. A cylindrical
concrete disposal vault was adopted to allow continued use of HDPE
containers. In 1993 a rectangular concrete vault was required for irradiated
non-fuel bearing reactor components.
South Carolina regulations changed in 1996, requiring all wastes to be
disposed of in engineered barriers. Two previous vault designs were continued
and a third rectangular design was added, primarily for disposal of class A
wastes packaged in drums and metal boxes. Large decommissioning project
components such as nuclear power plant steam generators and reactor pressure
vessels were determined to be structurally equivalent to the concrete disposal
vaults. Additional requirements included enhanced caps on all disposal
trenches and improved infiltration monitoring in class A trenches.
Three types of trenches are used at the Barnwell site. Large, open, class A
trenches are used for low dose rate wastes. Narrow, steep walled class B and C
trenches are used for disposal of intermediate dose rate containers. Long,
narrow trenches are used for the disposal of irradiated hardware with high dose
rates to minimize worker exposure.
Tritium was detected during 1978 in a monitoring well outside the
disposal trenches. As a result of this observation, the site’s operating organi-
zation increased the level of environmental characterization and monitoring
down-gradient of the disposal trenches. In 1991, tritium was found in a
groundwater monitoring well on facility property. An enhanced trench cap
using a bentonite clay mat, an HDPE geomembrane liner and soil drainage
layers was constructed over the older trenches. To date about 80 acres of the
approximately 100 acres of disposal trenches have been capped in this manner
to minimize infiltration and resulting leachate production. These measures
123
have led to adequate control of tritium concentrations outside the disposal
trenches. State controlled funds collected during operations are set aside for
closure and post-closure monitoring and maintenance.
A.15.1.1.2. Maxey Flats, Kentucky (closed facility)
The Maxey Flats, Kentucky, disposal facility opened in 1964. The facility
stopped accepting waste in 1978. During the operational phase, filled disposal
units were capped with a layer of soil. Waste package degradation and related
trench cap subsidence resulted in substantial water infiltration, inundation of
wastes and transport of radionuclides out of disposal trenches. Relatively high
annual precipitation and low permeability site soils contributed to a ‘bathtub
effect’ which resulted in large amounts of contaminated water in the trenches.
After extensive studies and experimentation, a final corrective action
programme was implemented by the Federal Government, which had shipped
the majority of waste disposed of at the facility. The work, completed and found
to be satisfactory in 2003, consisted of the following major elements:
(a) An additional 620 acres of adjacent land was purchased and fenced as a
buffer zone surrounding the 280 acre disposal facility.
(b) Leachate was pumped out of the disposal trenches, mixed on-site with
cement and other additives and poured into concrete bunkers at the site,
where it solidified.
(c) New disposal trench caps consisting of clay and a synthetic liner were
installed to minimize infiltration and leachate generation. Sumps with
data loggers were installed to monitor water levels in the capped trenches.
(d) New drainage channels with auto-samplers and flow meters were
installed around the perimeter of the facility.
The State of Kentucky undertakes long term institutional control

activities.
A.15.1.1.3. Sheffield, Illinois (closed facility)
The Sheffield, Illinois, disposal facility opened in 1966. A separate,

hazardous chemical waste site was later opened there. The radioactive waste
repository stopped accepting waste in 1978. During site closure planning,
tritium was detected migrating through extensive sand layers beneath the
disposal trenches. Carbon-14 was also detected migrating from the disposal
units at a slower rate. Trench cap subsidence, relatively high precipitation rates
and shallow groundwater contributed to off-site migration of radionuclides.
124
Tritium and 14C were found to be discharging into a small surface water body
near the site. These conditions required a series of studies and subsequent
corrective actions to properly close and stabilize the site. This work, completed
in 2001, consisted of the following:
(a) An additional 170 acres of adjacent land was purchased and fenced as
part of an expanded exclusion zone around the 20 acre site. The exclusion
zone includes the small surface water body which serves to sufficiently
dilute and impound the migrating tritium.
(b) A low permeability clay cap was installed over all trenches in 1989 to
minimize water infiltration and related leachate production and
subsurface transport of radionuclides. The cap was covered with soil and
revegetated to control erosion.
(c) Groundwater monitoring wells were installed to verify the adequacy of
these corrective actions.
Tritium concentrations have decreased steadily since installation of the

new trench cap, and are generally now at natural background level or at the
point of regulatory compliance. Post-closure monitoring and maintenance is
performed by the site’s operating organization under contract to the State of
Illinois, which is responsible for long term institutional control. Corrective
actions, primarily groundwater pumping and treatment, continue to be
performed by the former operating organization at the adjacent, now closed
chemical waste disposal facility.
A.15.1.1.4. West Valley, New York (closed facility)
The West Valley, New York, disposal facility opened in 1963 and stopped
accepting waste in 1975. The 15 acre disposal site is located within a 200 acre
area. The larger area was primarily devoted to spent fuel reprocessing and high
level liquid waste storage and vitrification.
During the early 1990s, a bentonite clay and natural soil slurry wall and
geomembrane enhanced cover were placed over 2 of the 14 disposal trenches
to minimize infiltration and water accumulation. This geomembrane cover was
extended over the entire site by 1997. These corrective actions have been
successful in controlling leachate accumulation. Environmental monitoring and
maintenance continues. Final closure and long term arrangements are subject
to additional studies by the State of New York.
125
A.15.1.2. Arid region sites
A.15.1.2.1. Hanford, Washington (operating facility)
The Hanford, Washington, disposal facility opened in 1965 and continues

to dispose of low and intermediate level radioactive waste in an arid, desert
environment. This repository is located on State leased land within the US
Department of Energy’s Hanford Reservation, a restricted area formerly used
by the national Government for nuclear weapons research and development,
that contains 2 additional near surface repositories for weapons related wastes.
A private company operates the facility under a sublease with the State.
The 100 acre commercial waste disposal site has substantial remaining capacity
and is expected to operate until approximately 2056.
The Hanford repository had been accepting waste for many years when
the NRC issued the 10 CFR Part 61 regulations in 1982. Chemical wastes
previously disposed of along with certain radioactive materials also became
subject to comprehensive but separate regulations some years after the
Hanford repository opened. These new regulatory requirements, previous
experience gained from operating the repository, and technological advances
resulted in a series of operational enhancements over time.
The first major operational improvements were adopted in 1980 when
solidification of certain ion exchange resins, segregation of wastes containing
chelating agents, use of absorbents for contained liquids and environmental
monitoring were required. A minimum burial depth was specified for high dose
rate waste packages, transuranic waste concentrations were limited, and a site
closure plan was required.
In 1982, NRC regulations introduced detailed waste form and characteri-
zation requirements, including structural stability standards for intermediate
level wastes. Stability was provided through the use of NRC approved designs
for high integrity containers including HDPE, reinforced concrete, steel alloy
and other designs intended to maintain their physical form for 300 years.
In 1986, on-site groundwater monitoring wells were installed to
supplement off-site wells. In this same timeframe, the facility stopped accepting
wood containers and chemical wastes, including liquid scintillation media.
Daily placement of soil backfill between waste containers was adopted to
minimize trench subsidence. Packaged sealed sources and other high activity
level wastes are now disposed of in modular engineered concrete barriers
offering structural stability, an additional barrier to contaminant migration, and
shielding to minimize worker exposure. These barriers were first introduced in
1987.
126
The facility stopped accepting absorbed liquids in 1999 and required all
liquids to be solidified or stabilized prior to disposal. Also in the 1990s,
additional groundwater monitoring wells were added and monitoring of
unsaturated zone soil gases was initiated. An investigation of chemical constit-
uents was also started. The data indicate limited unsaturated zone transport of
chemical substances, but no groundwater or off-site effects. Investigation of
these chemical substances is continuing to determine if corrective action is
needed. The facility performance assessment was also updated using shipment
manifest information for the site’s early years of operation.
Construction of a multi-layer disposal cap over previously filled disposal
units is expected to take place in 2005 following completion of environmental
impact studies and a further updated safety assessment. This cap is intended to
minimize infiltration, promote natural revegetation and enhance erosion
control. Government controlled funds collected during operations are set aside
to pay for final closure and post-closure monitoring and maintenance.
A.15.1.2.2. Beatty, Nevada (closed facility)
The Beatty, Nevada, disposal facility was the first commercial operation
in the USA, having opened in 1962. The 36 acre low level radioactive waste
facility closed at the end of 1992 for public policy reasons unrelated to facility
performance. An adjacent but separate 44 acre chemical waste disposal site
continues to operate on the site. The facility is located in an arid desert
environment 100 miles north of Las Vegas near the proposed Yucca Mountain
geological high level radioactive waste repository.
Like the Hanford and Barnwell repositories, the Beatty site opened
before the existence of comprehensive US regulations and adopted improve-
ments over time. These included requirements to solidify liquids, prohibition of
scintillation media, transuranic isotope concentration limits and environmental
monitoring requirements. Government mandated requirements on waste form
and packaging, structural stability for intermediate level wastes, expanded
environmental monitoring and other features of the comprehensive 1982 NRC
regulations followed. Quality assurance requirements for waste shippers using
the facility and a ban on co-disposal of chemical wastes were also instituted.
Tritium migration was detected in the unsaturated zone, but the regulatory
body determined that no corrective actions are required beyond continued
monitoring.
The approved repository closure and stabilization activities were
implemented beginning in 1993. Key features of the closure programme
included the following:
127
(a) All structures were removed and the area was surrounded with a security
fence;
(b) Drainage contours were cleared of debris and sediments and regraded;
(c) All disposal trenches were capped with an 8 ft5 layer of on-site soils,
mounded in the centre at a gentle slope and covered with a thin gravel
layer to prevent erosion and promote natural revegetation.
Post-closure monitoring and maintenance is performed by the site’s

operating organization under contract to the State of Nevada regulatory body
responsible for long term institutional control. State controlled funds collected
during operations pay for these activities.
5
1 ft = 3.048 × 10–1 m.
128
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CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW
Beyleveld, C. South African Nuclear Energy Corporation, South Africa
Bohdan, L. Nuclear Power Plant Operational Support Institute, Ukraine
Champ, D. AECL Chalk River Laboratories, Canada
Dayal, R. International Atomic Energy Agency

Faltejsek, J. Radioactive Waste Repository Authority, Czech Republic
Gera, F. Consultant, Italy
Green, T. RWE Nukem Ltd, United Kingdom
Grimwood, P. British Nuclear Fuels Ltd, United Kingdom
Guskov, A. SIA RADON, Russian Federation
Lange, B. AECL, Chalk River Laboratories, Canada
Ormai, P. Public Agency for Radioactive Waste Management, Hungary
Romano, S. American Ecology Corporation, United States of America
Rozdyalouskaya, L. Ministry for Emergencies, Belarus
Salmins, A. Radiation Safety Centre, Latvia
Sörlie, A. NRPA, Norway
Stefanova, I. Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy, Bulgaria
Vinskas, A. State Nuclear Safety Inspectorate, Lithuania
Voizard, P. Agence Nationale pour la Gestion des Déchets Radioactifs, France

Webster, S. European Union
Consultants Meetings
Vienna, Austria: 30 September – 4 October 2002; 10–14 May 2004
Technical Committee Meeting
Budapest, Hungary: 25–29 August 2003
137
Providing guidance on the disposal of radioactive waste
constitutes an important and integral component of the
IAEA programme on radioactive waste management.
Low and intermediate level waste, even though it
contains a small fraction of the total activity of all
radioactive waste produced globally, represents more
than 90% of the total volume of radioactive waste. Most
of the radioactive waste produced in many developing
Member States is primarily low and intermediate level
waste. A number of activities have been initiated by the
IAEA to assist Member States in the disposal of low and
intermediate level waste, focusing on both technology
and safety aspects. Many existing disposal facilities
were developed and began operations long before
current regulatory requirements took effect or more
recent site suitability guidance, technological
advances, safety assessment methodologies and quality
assurance systems became available. National laws,
regulations and disposal methods have evolved and
improved with time. Various Member States have
ongoing programmes both to upgrade these facilities
and/or develop new near surface disposal facilities.
Upgrading measures are being implemented or planned
at a number of disposal facilities in numerous
countries, and are described in this publication.
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA
ISBN 92–0–112704–9
ISSN 0074–1914

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Technical Reports SeriEs No.

AFGHANISTAN GREECE PAKISTAN

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Sales and Promotion Unit, Publishing Section

IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Upgrading of near surface repositories for radioactive waste. — Vienna :

1. Radioactive waste disposal. 2. Overview of near surface disposal

Providing guidance on the disposal of radioactive waste constitutes an

2. OVERVIEW OF NEAR SURFACE DISPOSAL SYSTEMS . . . . . 5

2.1. Multiple barrier concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

3. CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3.1. Initiating events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4. EXAMPLES OF CORRECTIVE ACTION APPROACHES

4.1. Engineered features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

APPENDIX: EXAMPLES OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Large volumes of low and intermediate level waste (LILW), containing a

(a) Achieve compliance with modified regulatory requirements;

The objective of this publication is to provide guidance to Member States

(a) Identify potential corrective action needs;

It is anticipated that this publication will be useful to scientists, engineers,

In the context of this publication, the terms repository or disposal facility

Section 2 provides an overview of near surface disposal system concepts

2. OVERVIEW OF NEAR SURFACE DISPOSAL SYSTEMS

This section gives an overview of disposal system concepts and

2.1. MULTIPLE BARRIER CONCEPT

The primary safety related objective of near surface disposal is to provide

2.2. DISPOSAL SYSTEMS

This section discusses basic concepts and components of near surface

— The waste form;

The three main repository development phases are pre-operational,

The post-closure phase includes institutional controls as an integral part

(1) Cover system inspection and any needed repairs;

2.4. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE

Monitoring is the continuous or periodic observation and measurement

Disposal concept selection

Assessment of safety and environmental impacts

Waste acceptance criteria

Monitoring and surveillance

FIG. 1. Life cycle phases and activities of a near surface repository.

2.5. SAFETY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

In line with internationally agreed upon principles of radioactive waste

(a) Explore practical application of the ISAM methodology to a range of

The emphasis of the ASAM project is on evaluating the post-closure

(1) Development of an approach and methodology to assist in the selection

3. CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESS

As stated in Section 1, corrective actions may be undertaken for one or

(1) Compliance with regulatory requirements;

This section provides information on the corrective action process, which

(a) Achieve regulatory compliance;

Guidance on approaches to safety and dose assessment is provided in

3.1. INITIATING EVENTS

Initiating events are defined as circumstances at a specific repository that

(a) Changes in regulatory standards and requirements:

Identify root cause(s)

Assess options and

Verify that corrective

FIG. 2. The corrective action process.

3.2. EXAMPLES OF INITIATING EVENTS

Examples are provided below to illustrate the nature of various initiating