Management Overview

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2.

MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW

Accidents involving fires and explosions have occurred since flammable


liquids or gases began to be used broadly as fuels for industrial and consumer
purposes. Summaries of such accidents are given by Davenport (1977), Strehlow
and Baker (1976), Lees (1980), and Lenoir and Davenport (1993). Among the
types of accidents that can occur with flammable gases or liquids are a BLEVE,
flash fire, and VCE, depending on the circumstances .
Industrial fires and explosions are neither infrequent nor inconsequential.
According to Marsh (2007), twenty-three major industrial explosion and fire
accidents were reported worldwide in 2006. These explosions directly resulted in
over 67 fatalities and 394 injuries. Of these, chemical plants accounted for 24
fatalities and 56 injuries, with 22 fatalities and 29 injuries occurring in a single
accident in China. In addition, vandalism of fuel pipelines accounted for another
336 fatalities and 124 injuries. Combined accident and vandalism property
damage losses totaled $259 million.
This book explores the consequences of accidental releases of flammable
materials and provides practical means of estimating the consequences of fire and
explosion hazards, knowledge that is essential for proper process safety
management of an industrial facility. Ignition of flammable materials can produce
thermal and blast overpressure hazards, the strength of which increases with the
combustion energy of the material involved and how quickly that energy is
released and dissipated. This book also explores explosion hazards not associated
with an accidental release of flammable materials, such as failure of a pressure
vessel, with and without liquid content that flashes to vapor. With a clear
understanding of the threats posed by these hazards, personnel can be located and
buildings can be designed to provide an appropriate level of protection. For
example, overpredicting the potential loads on an occupied building may prompt
unnecessary and costly structural upgrades, while underpredicting these loads may
leave buildings and persons inside them vulnerable.
The likelihood of such occurrences can be reduced by appropriate process
design and reliability engineering that meets or exceeds established industry
standards and practices. These practices include well-designed pressure relief and
blowdown systems, adequate maintenance and inspection programs, and
management of human factors in system design. In addition, and perhaps most

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4 GUIDELINES FOR VCE, PV BURST, BLEVE AND FF HAZARDS

important to the success of risk management efforts, the full support of


responsible management is required.
Mathematical models for calculating the consequences of such events can be
employed to support mitigation efforts. Mitigating measures may include
reduction of inventory; reduction of vessel volumes; isolation and
depressurization systems, modification of plant siting and layout, including
location and reinforcement of control rooms; strengthening of vessels; and
improved mechanical integrity.
Knowledge of the consequences of flash fires, VCEs, PVBs, and BLEVEs has
grown significantly in recent years as a result of international study and research
efforts, and continuing incidents. Insights gained regarding the generation of
overpressure, radiation, and fragmentation has resulted in the development of
reasonably descriptive models for calculating the effects of these phenomena.
The remainder of this chapter provides brief descriptions of flash fires, VCEs,
PVBs, and BLEVEs. Several examples of flash fires and explosions are provided
that illustrate how these events occur under relevant conditions, highlighting the
serious consequences of such events and the need for predicting their
consequences. Chapter 3 of this book provides more detailed review of case
histories for all of these event types.

2.1. FLASH FIRES

A flash fire is the combustion of a flammable gas/air mixture that produces


relatively short term thermal hazards with negligible overpressure (blast wave).
As an example, consider the real case of a tractor-semitrailer carrying liquid
propane that overturned near Lynchburg, Virginia, in 1972. That accident caused
the tank to fail, allowing approximately 15 m3 (4,000 gallons) of liquid propane to
escape. The resulting propane vapor cloud extended at least 120 m (400 ft) from
the truck prior to ignition. Upon ignition, a flash fire occurred followed by a
fireball. The fireball engulfed and killed the truck driver and others outside of the
fireball received serious burns. This case history is described in more detail in
Section 3.2.2.

2.2. VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSIONS

A VCE is the combustion of a flammable gas/air mixture at a more rapid rate than
in a flash fire (often due to interaction of the flame with congestion and
confinement), resulting in the development of overpressure (i.e., a blast wave).
CHAPTER 2: MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW 5

One of the most well-known large VCEs occurred at the Flixborough Works in
the UK in 1974. Approximately 30,000 kg (66,000 lb) of cyclohexane was
released from a cyclohexane oxidation plant reactor and formed a large vapor
cloud. The vapor cloud was ignited roughly one minute after the release. The
flame accelerated due to the presence of significant congestion and confinement
associated with the process plant equipment and structure in the flammable vapor
cloud. The blast waves resulting from the VCE caused the main office block and
the control room to collapse. There were 28 fatalities as a result of this event, of
which 18 were in the control room. Approximately 2,000 homes in the
surrounding community were damaged. This case history is described in more
detail in Section 3.3.1.

2.3. PRESSURE VESSEL BURSTS

In a pressure vessel burst (PVB), the sudden expansion of a compressed gas


generates a blast wave that propagates outward from the source, along with
hazardous debris. The explosion at the Union Carbide chemical plant in Seadrift,
Texas in 1991 is illustrative of a PVB. The No. 1 Ethylene Oxide Redistillation
Still (ORS) was shut down for maintenance and repair several days before the
incident. The No. 1 ORS distillation column was designed for a maximum
allowable working pressure (MAWP) of 6 bars (90 psig). About one hour after
startup, it exploded. The explosion resulted from the autodecomposition of the
ethylene oxide. The pressure buildup in the No. 1 ORS reached four times the
design MAWP, causing a ductile failure. The column shell fragmented over the
upper 2/3 of its height. This case history is described in more detail in Section
3.4.2.

2.4. BLEVEs

A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) is associated with the


bursting of a pressurized vessel containing liquid above its atmospheric boiling
point. The liquid in the vessel may be flammable or non-flammable, such as in a
hot water boiler. About one-fifth of all BLEVEs occur with non-flammable
pressure-liquefied gas (Abbasi, 2007). If non-flammable, the hazard will be
primarily an overpressure event with possible vessel fragmentation. If a
flammable material is ignited, it will usually produce a fireball; a secondary effect
will be a pressure wave due to the explosively rapid vaporization of the liquid.
6 GUIDELINES FOR VCE, PV BURST, BLEVE AND FF HAZARDS

The effects of a BLEVE are illustrated by the explosion resulting from a train
derailment that occurred in Crescent City, Illinois in 1970. The train included
nine cars carrying liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). One of the LPG cars was
punctured in the derailment. Five of the LPG cars underwent BLEVEs within
four hours due to the resulting fire, with the first BLEVE occurring approximately
one hour after the derailment. Sections of the cars were propelled from the
derailment site as a result of these explosions, with one car section being thrown
over 480 m (1600 ft). Nearby buildings sustained severe damage. No fatalities
occurred, although sixty-six injuries were reported. This case history is described
in more detail in Section 3.5.3.

2.5. PREDICTION METHODOLOGIES

A variety of prediction methodologies are available for each of the hazard


types addressed in this book. They range from simplified methods that require
relatively few calculations to complex numerical models involving millions of
calculations performed on large computers. Of course, there are tradeoffs among
the various methods that can be employed. Simplified methods, as the name
implies, involve some simplifications or assumptions. More refined methods
avoid some of these simplifications and may provide more accurate and higher
resolution results, but with a commensurate higher level of input data and analysis
labor. Computational fluid dynamic (CFD) models are now available for some of
the hazard types addressed in this volume, but these are not necessarily more
accurate. A high level of expertise is required of users of CFD models.
Regardless of the model or method used, expertise is needed to properly apply the
models, and results can vary significantly with the quality of input data,
assumptions, applicability of models to the actual situations, and other factors.
Experimental data, accident case histories, and example problems are provided
in this book to assist readers in understanding the potential consequences of flash
fires, PVBs, VCEs, and BLEVEs, and to quantify results for various
circumstances. These data may serve as helpful benchmarks to assist analysts in
making consequence predictions.

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