Pakistan-Russian Relations: A Glance over History

By Zeeshan Fida
 On Opposite Sides of the Cold War

• Although the frame itself was ideological, it was mainly as a geopolitical contest
that Soviet policies were perceived in South Asia.

• It did not go unnoticed in Pakistan that the Soviet Union under Stalin initially
displayed an indifferent attitude towards the emergence of India and Pakistan in
1947.

• It regarded their independence as “illusory,” indeed, as a part of British policy to

“divide and rule” in order to perpetuate its control over India by creating two
hostile states and acting as arbiter between them.
• Nationalist leaders in the two countries were seen as “stooges of
British imperialism.”

• The creation of Pakistan was considered even worse than that of India
because of the religious rationale of the independence movement.
• It was against the backdrop of the unfolding Cold War that the Soviet
Union, when the U.S. invited Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to
visit in 1949, immediately extended an invitation to Moscow to Pakistan’s
Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan—even though Pakistan at that time had not
even established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

• However, Liaqat Ali Khan chose to go to Washington instead of Moscow,

possibly using the Soviet invitation as a bargaining chip to extract an
invitation from the U.S.

• This incident created deep mistrust between the Soviet Union and
Pakistan.
• Pakistan joined the U.S. sponsored alliances of SEATO (1954) and
CENTO (1955), which were aimed at the containment of communism,
and it eventually become “the most allied ally” of the United States in
Asia.

• The main purpose of the Pakistani decision-makers was to seek

military assistance against India, which was four times larger and
perceived as Pakistan’s principal security threat because of the
unresolved dispute over Kashmir.
• Soviet-Indian relations were further strengthened during the 1960s,
when India became a leading country in the Non-Aligned Movement.

• The Soviet Union gave its strong support to India on the Kashmir issue
and twice used its veto in the UN Security Council in India’s favor.

• It also began to cultivate its relations with Afghanistan and extended

its support for the issue of Pashtunistan, which had developed into a
border issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
• Soviet-Pakistani relations hit rock bottom when a U.S. U-2 plane
(flown from Peshawar in Pakistan for espionage purposes) was shot
down by the Soviets in 1960 and Premier Nikita Khrushchev
subsequently threatened to annihilate Peshawar with rockets.

• Anxious over the threats issuing from the Soviet Union and also
increasingly disenchanted with the U.S. for courting India (as U.S.-
India relations were intensified in the wake of the Sino-Indian war of
1962), Pakistan moved to normalize its relations with the Soviet Union
and to strengthen further its relationship with China.
• It signed an agreement on oil trade with the Soviet Union (1960) as
well as a boundary agreement with China (1963).

• In April 1965, Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan visited Moscow and,

one year later in the wake of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, the
Soviet Union successfully mediated between the warring parties at
Tashkent.
• When the political crisis in East Pakistan (which led to another India-
Pakistan war in 1971 and resulted in the birth of Bangladesh) started
brewing, the Soviet Union again moved closer to India.

• Pakistan’s role in bringing rapprochement between Washington and

Beijing by arranging Henry Kissinger’s (then President Richard Nixon’s
National Security Advisor) secret trip to China further alienated Moscow
from Islamabad.

• These developments eventually led to the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty of

1971, which extended Moscow’s full support to India during the Indo
Pakistani war of that year.
• Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited the Soviet Union in 1972,
and again in 1974, in an attempt to normalize the relationship between
Pakistan and the Soviet Union.

• Pakistan withdrew from U.S.-sponsored military alliances and adopted a non-

aligned foreign policy.

• It started to play an active role in the Non-Aligned Movement and more

vigorously espoused Third World causes in international forums.

• By taking these measures, Pakistan adopted a course designed to distance

itself from the West and to move closer to both China and Russia.
• The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 led
Pakistan once again to seek the support of the U.S. and Western
countries.

• The containment of communism—the “red menace”—now became

the focus of its policies.

• Pakistan feared the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union towards

the Indian Ocean and lent its full support to the Afghan mujahedin
against the Soviet troops.
• The Soviet Union again sought support from India and threatened to
further dismember Pakistan.

• Pakistan-Soviet Union relations remained intensely hostile until 1988,

when the Soviet Union started to withdraw its forces from
Afghanistan.

• A new phase in the relationship between the two countries was

opened when the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Russian
Federation was established in December 1991.
 Post-Cold War Overtures

• When the Soviet Union disintegrated, geo-economic competition gradually

grew more important. Simultaneously, issues related to identity, culture and
“civilization” assumed greater significance.

• During the first years of the re-born Russia, it was the Atlantic’s policy of
“looking towards the West” that dominated.

• The new Russia that emerged under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin was
more interested in becoming part of Europe than representing Asia.
• Asia was regarded as an area of low priority. In these early years,
Central Asia (as a former part of the Soviet Union) was mainly
regarded as being part of the Islamic world and as a “burden” to be
shed in the new post-Cold War era.

• In the first decade of the new Russia, South Asia assumed an even
lower priority in the eyes of Moscow’s decision-makers.

• Russia-Pakistan relations focused on the issues of terrorism,

Afghanistan and drug trafficking emanating from the region.
• The Russian government accused the Pakistani government of
sponsoring terrorism in Chechnya and the Caucasus.

• Pakistan sought to allay Russian concerns by explaining that it was

neither sponsoring nor encouraging terrorist movements in Central
Asia or in any part of the Russian Federation.

• In 2000, during the second Chechen war, Pakistan even sent the Chief
of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) General Mahmud Ahmad to
reassure Russia that the Pakistani government was not involved in any
of these activities.
• Islamabad, in turn, had hoped that the formulation of policy in the
newly established Russian Federation would set New Delhi and
Islamabad at an equidistance from Moscow.

• Strategic stability in South Asia continued to be the main concern of

Pakistan’s decision-makers, who feared that the continuity of Indo-
Russian ties, and especially the sales of sophisticated military
hardware to India, would affect the precarious military balance
between Pakistan and India.
• Immediately in 1992, the first year of the existence of the Russian
Federation, Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ahmad Ali and the Foreign
Secretary Akram Zaki visited Moscow in order to voice Pakistan’s
concerns and to allay Russian fears over Pakistan’s support of militant
insurgency in the region and even on Russian territory; and this
message was repeated when Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
visited Moscow in 1999.
• The prospects of economic cooperation were also discussed and a
joint commission to promote trade and economic cooperation
between the two countries was formed in 1999.

• Although this was regarded as a sign of a new beginning, no major

breakthrough followed that could ease the historical burden in the
relationship.
 Relations After 9/11

• Autumn 2001 became a turning point: Pakistan’s volte-face in its

policy on Afghanistan and its participation in the War on Terror
removed a major irritant between Russia and Pakistan.
• Russia had been quite uncomfortable with Pakistan’s support of the
Taliban, and all this was reversed in the wake of the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan.
• In addition to Afghanistan and the Taliban, Moscow’s interests
specifically focused on issues of terrorism, drug trafficking and the
non-proliferation of nuclear materials.
• In February 2003, Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf visited
Moscow and categorically declared that Pakistan regarded Chechnya
as Russia’s internal problem and that it had no role whatsoever in
encouraging or sponsoring Islamist networks in Central Asia or any
areas of Russia.

• Although neighboring Afghanistan was a concern in Pakistan, its main

interest in relations with Russia continued to relate to strategic
stability in South Asia and the prospects of trade and economic
cooperation between the two countries.
• Musharraf’s visit paved the way for more institutionalized cooperation
between the two countries.

• Joint Working Groups on the issues of counter-terrorism, strategic

stability, and economic and cultural cooperation were established.

• In April 2007 Mikhail Fradkov was the first Russian Prime Minister to
visit Pakistan.

• President Asif Ali Zardari visited Russia in 2011 and invited President
Vladimir Putin to Pakistan.
• Putin’s visit to Islamabad, planned for early October 2012, was
cancelled at the last moment, and the event was immediately
interpreted as a major setback in the attempts to improve relations.

• Moscow sent foreign minister Lavrov to assure Pakistan that the visit
had been merely postponed because of scheduling issues.

• High-level visits of both Pakistani and Russian military and civil

officials continued throughout 2013 and after.
• General Ashfaq Kayani, the commander-in-chief of Pakistan’s army, visited
Moscow twice and Russian military and Air Chiefs paid visits to Islamabad.
However, this did not signal any breakthrough in the relations between
Russia and Pakistan.

• Pakistan facilitated Russia’s entry into the Organization of Islamic

Conference (OIC).

• Russia reciprocated by helping Pakistan to gain observer-status (and later

in 2014 to start accession procedures to full membership) in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO).
• Russia also agreed to the re-export of 150 engines of JF-17 planes from
China to Pakistan and helped Pakistan in launching a communication
satellite, Badar 11.

• Russia has also signed a memorandum of understanding on the

upgrading of a major steel mill in Pakistan.

• It has expressed interest in the new strategic energy pipelines, of which

the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India gas pipeline (TAPI) and
the Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline (IPI) are major examples.
• All this has meant that Russia’s annual trade with Pakistan has grown
to half a billion dollars.

• Simultaneously, Russia has left relations with Islamabad in the cold by

continuing to sell highly sophisticated military hardware to India and
by supporting India’s case for a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council.
• It is against the background of a long period of “no breakthrough”
that the visit of Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu in Islamabad on
November 21, 2014, and the signing of a deal on military cooperation
were hailed as a “milestone development” by Pakistan’s Ministry of
Defense.
• The agreement provides for the exchange of information on politico-
military issues, cooperation in promoting international security, an
intensification of counter-terrorism and arms-control activities, the
strengthening of collaboration in various military fields, and sharing
experiences in peace- keeping operations. Joint efforts in fighting
international terrorism and drug trafficking were also discussed.
• Reportedly, Russia gave its “political approval” to a deal to sell twenty
MI- 35 helicopters to Pakistan.

• The significance ascribed to this new opening in Pakistan illustrates

the great importance attached to cooperation in the military sector in
this country. These developments also show how change in Pakistan-
Russia relations reflects wider changes in world politics.
• Since 2014, the deterioration of Russia’s relations with Western states
because of the crisis in Ukraine and the economic sanctions posed
against it have alienated Russia from the Western liberal world order.
 The Russia-Pakistan Rapprochement

• RUSSIA'S MOTIVES

• Russia's interest in Pakistan today can be primarily attributed to the latter's strategic
location next to Afghanistan and, by extension, Central Asia.

• Though the two countries do not share borders, they share the same geopolitical
space.

• Russia has long regarded Pakistan as the 'troublemaker' in the region because of its
alleged patronage of terrorist networks.
• One of its objectives is therefore to convince Pakistan to moderate
the Taliban and to subdue radical Islamic forces within Pakistan.

• It believes that Pakistan has the capacity to considerably rein in the

Taliban and other Islamic militant movements in the region, which it
sees as critical for its own security.
• Moreover, as Pakistan is a large and influential Muslim country and
Russia has a large Muslim population of its own, Moscow sees benefit
in improved bilateral relations.

• Russia regards Pakistan to be a necessary part of any long-term

solution in Afghanistan; it is key to a stable Afghanistan.
• With China endorsing a Pakistani role in deciding Afghanistan's future,
Russia sees little scope for opposing Pakistan's role in Afghanistan.

• Further, with the drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan beginning

in December 2014, Russia hopes to create strategic space for itself in
the region.

• Russia's turn towards Pakistan also finds a fit with its own pivot to
Asia, through which it wants to play a bigger role in the Indo- Pacific
region.
• Russia hopes that improving ties with Pakistan gives it leverage at two
levels.

• One, it will obtain an advantage on issues of terrorism and on Afghanistan

by building better relations with Islamabad.

• It also wishes to capitalize on the differences between the US and

Pakistan to carve out a role for itself in the region.

• Second, Russia is also of the view that building better relations with
Pakistan will partially counter any alignment between India and the US
and could help impede India from getting too close to the US.
• With India diversifying its basket of arms supplies and, in particular,
reaching out to the US and Israel as sources of advanced military
technology.
• Russia believes that it is justified in looking for new markets for its
arms and technology as it derives large revenues from its energy and
arms exports.
• Moscow is convinced that it can supply arms and military technology
to both India and Pakistan, a la France and the US.
• Russia wants a land route, which will give it access to the warm-water
ports in the Arabian Sea: Pakistan is best placed to meet such
demand. This could also open up new opportunities for the
landlocked countries of Central Asia.
• Finally, Russia's overtures to Pakistan could be part of its strategy to
develop new partnerships.

• Since the Ukraine crisis, Russia has been isolated in the international
sphere and has few friends left.

• In fact, one driving imperative of Russian foreign policy in the aftermath

of the Ukraine crisis is now to reach out to new friends and partners who
can help it challenge the West.

• Russia is also hunting for new defence and energy markets because of
sanctions and isolation by the West.
 PAKISTAN'S MOTIVES

• Pakistan, for its part, wants to build better relations with Russia to increase its
leverage with the US.

• Given the recent tensions between the US and Pakistan and between the US and
Russia, Pakistan wants to prove to the US that it has other strategic options
which might not necessarily be to the US' liking.

• It is also seeking to reduce its dependence on the US, given their differences
over Afghanistan and the US' use of drones against terrorists in Pakistan, among
other factors.
• After the US operation in 2011 to kill Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad
in Pakistan, and its subsequent attack on a Pakistani base that killed
two dozen soldiers, Pakistan's media and analysts agreed that the end
of American hegemony is near and that their country should adjust to
and exploit a G-Zero world.

• Pakistan does not want to be cornered in a situation where it is overly

allied with the US and too dependent on it.
• In fact, the growing closeness between India and the US has also
prompted Pakistan to look for new friends and partners.

• Pakistan would also like to drive a wedge in the traditional relations

between Russia and India by improving ties with Russia and by playing
on Russia's insecurities vis-a- vis India's improved relations with the US.

• It also has its eyes on obtaining military supplies and technology from
Russia, which it judges to be of much superior quality to what it
receives from either China, Turkey, or Ukraine.
• Pakistan seeks commercial gains from improved relations with Russia.
• The Lahore- Karachi pipeline, for one, will resolve some of its energy
problems. It will also help it develop its infrastructure.
• There are reports that Russia will help modernize Pakistan Steel Mills.
• Other reports indicate that Russia may also join Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan in the CASA-1000 energy project, providing Afghanistan
and Pakistan with electricity.
• Russia's natural resources and technology are an added incentive for
Pakistan in its industrialisation goals.
 THE CHINA FACTOR?

• Some analysts speculate that the overtures between Russia and

Pakistan are born out of both countries' close ties with China.

• Russia is now closer to China than to any other country because of

their converging views on global governance and strategic issues
bolstered by robust economic and military ties.

• For China, Pakistan has been its all weather friend a brother.
• Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on a recent visit to China described the
Sino-Pakistan friendship as being higher than the Himalayas and
deeper than the deepest sea in the world, and sweeter than honey.
• Thus, the current rapprochement between Moscow and Islamabad
could also have to do with China's desire to bring its two closest
partners together.
• Given the economic problems in both Russia and Pakistan, both
countries desire to benefit from Chinese investments. For instance, the
pipeline between Karachi and Lahore might require investments from
China.
• Russia also aims to benefit from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC) and is therefore willing to help in efforts to stabilize Pakistan.
• If indeed China has been prodding Russia and Pakistan to improve their
bilateral relations, the question is: What is China's endgame? Does it
hope to build a Russia-China-Pakistan bloc in Eurasia against the US and
India?