Arts & Social Sciences

Higher Education Institutions in all regions must submit to internal and external evaluations carried out with transparency, carried out by independent experts. In the CEAACES evaluation model, research is included as one of the most important processes within university management. An evaluation was carried out at the University of Guayaquil in 2013, being evaluated in category “D”. The scientific production of the FCM was 2%, it ranked last in all the criteria, and it did not meet the requirements for accreditation, due to the tiny percentage that was maintained. Users' perception regarding scientific production is very important for the faculty of medical sciences.

Translators work with both the most concrete forms of meaning, like phonemes, words and structures, and the most abstract forms of meaning, like contexts, cultures and ideologies. These meanings are negotiated in translation with the aid of one or more theories. Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) is a linguistic theory that views language as a medium to create meanings in context (Eggins, 2004, p. 327). Because meanings and contexts are the tools of the translator’s trade, SFL seems to offer an appropriate bridge between the two, relating linguistic meanings to their wider context. Considering this potential, I decided to further explore SFL in translation, applying an SFL analysis to the English translation of an Argentine novel, Rayuela (Hopscotch). I chose this specific literary work for personal and academic reasons. In the personal sphere, its author, Julio Córtazar, is one of the greatest Spanish-­speaking writers. He has been widely translated and is known for his rebellious, unconventional use of language. I felt curious to see how this was handled in English. In the academic sphere, I intend to determine whether SFL could provide objective insights into literary translation.
In this article, I shall argue that SFL can indeed offer an effective comprehensive theoretical framework to help render meanings embedded in a source text into a target text. Firstly, I will briefly introduce SFL, its main concepts and founder, together with some translation scholars who have used it. Secondly, I will describe some criticisms to SFL, followed by its more positive applications in the practice and assessment of translation. I will later demonstrate how SFL may be applied to some excerpts of Hopscotch. Finally, I will conclude with some final remarks about applying SFL in translation.

During my practice as a translating student and professional translator, I based many of my choices on what sounded “more faithful or natural”. Therefore, I changed or moved things around very much based on subjective impressions, giving reasons such as “it's not what it says in the source text (ST)”, “it has a stronger connotation in the ST”, or “it sounds better.” I knew something was not right when giving these explanations to myself, to colleagues or even clients. So I tried to supplement them with grammar or corpus-based examples whenever I could, considering the translation context and users. And yet something was still missing. When I was introduced to Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), I slowly started seeing the gears of a big machine at work. I started noticing ways to ground my choices in a stable, systematic theory.  For the purpose of this article, I studied an editorial on a policy about asylum seekers who arrive in Australia by boat, originally written in English and translated into Spanish. The translation was hypothetically to be published on the Spanish-speaking community news website LatinHub (www.latinhub.com.au) in Australia. In the following sections, I will firstly introduce the theoretical concepts of Theme and Interpersonal Metafunction, then present some particular translation choices and apply the concepts of Theme and Interpersonal meanings to improve those choices in a revised version. Finally, I will discuss some benefits and draw a conclusion.

Medical interpreting is one of the traditional pillars in community interpreting. However, discourse-­based research into medical interpreting is still young. It was only during the last fifteen years that social, health and linguistic researchers have shifted their attention to how discourse is constructed in interpreted medical encounters (Pöchhacker & Shlesinger, 2005). In these authors’ introductory paper, one can see how research into medical interpreted discourse has advanced from a mere linguistic focus to broader social aspects. One can also identify how previous conclusions, limitations or approaches influence subsequent ones. Discourse research first concentrated on the traditional memes of accuracy and completeness, which led to the study of deviations. Later on, it focused on the clinical significance of these deviations, which caused a consequent shift onto participants’ roles and expectations. Soon, researchers realised they also needed to look at interpreted interaction through intercultural lenses and turned back to the interpreter’s (in)visible and cultural roles, to finally explore the institutional framework. My main interest here is discourse in authentic ad hoc interpreter-­mediated medical encounters described in the literature, distinguishing between linguistic markers and coordinating indicators, coupled with some influential social factors. A brief comparison with professional interpreters’ use of discourse will be sketched afterwards in order to see what less felicitous discourse features, if any, are observed in professional interpreting. Finally, some training implications and improvement areas are discussed.

In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a 'reasonable optimism' about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that 'there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions'. However, Stoljar's caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17 th Century. Stoljar suggests that his claims are commonplace in philosophy departments and, indeed, the evidence I adduce constitutes an indictment of the widely shared view among professional analytic philosophers.

The danger to society is not merely that it should believe wrong things, though that is great enough; but that it should become credulous, and lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them; for then it must sink back into savagery. WK Clifford (1877/1999). … not to have tried to see through the whole apparatus of mystification-was already criminal … For being in a position to know and nevertheless shunning knowledge creates direct responsibility for the consequences-from the very beginning. Albert Speer quoted in Ellsberg (1972: 275). Intellectual and political emancipation Religious concern with eternal, transcendent metaphysical questions is undeniably remote from the mundane realities of politics, but the other-worldly subject matter need not mark deep attitudinal or epistemic differences as commonly assumed. For example in the 1 I am indebted to the following people for most insightful criticism and comments that have led to improvements in the paper:

Judging by the unabated publications,2 Woodruff Smith is certainly correct to observe “There is something dead right, and very much alive, about the cogito.” Of course, what exactly is “dead right” about it remains controversial. Recently, David Cunning4 suggests that the familiar passages in which Descartes insists on the indubitability of his existence “present an intractable problem of interpretation” since there are other texts in which he seems to allow that “I am, I exist” is open to doubt. Cunning notes “Some commentators have argued that in the light of these passages there is no coherent account to be reconstructed of Descartes’ view on the dubitability of “I am, I exist.” However, the text cited by Cunning in
the Third Meditation6 expresses Descartes’s unshakeable certainty even in the face of an omnipotent deceiver, for “he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I continue to think I am something.” Of course, this is consistent with Descartes’s account of his certainty in the Second Meditation despite the efforts of the malin génie. Above all, the device of the deceiving demon is intrinsic to the Cogito argument as the very vehicle for establishing the indubitability of Descartes’s own thought and existence. Cunning’s discussion is surprising for failing entirely to mention the Cogito argument that is generally thought to be the locus of Descartes’s certainty. In particular, Cunning’s view that Descartes holds his existence to be “just as dubitable as anything else”7 only appears plausible if we fail to appreciate the special force of the reasoning of the Cogito. Accordingly, I propose to consider how Descartes’s indubitability may be understood in terms of the special, notoriously problematic features of the Cogito argument. Above all, my reconstruction of the logic of the Cogito as a “diagonal deduction”8 permits reconciling what Howell9 describes as “the two apparently conflicting theses,” namely, the peculiar Humean elusiveness of the self and the Cartesian certainty of cogito judgments.

Chomsky's generative approach to linguistics has been debated for decades without consensus. Questions include the status of linguistics as psychology, the psychological reality of grammars, the character of tacit knowledge and the role of intuitions. I focus attention on Michael Devitt's critique of Chomskyan linguistics along the lines of earlier critiques by Quine, Searle and others. Devitt ascribes an intentional conception of grammatical knowledge that Chomsky repudiates and fails to appreciate the status of Chomsky's computational formalisms found elsewhere in cognitive science. I argue that Devitt's alternative to the psychological view-a "linguistic reality" of physical objects as the proper subject matter of linguistics-neglects the problems of tokens as opposed to types and misses the force of Chomsky's arguments against Behaviourism. Furthermore, I suggest that Devitt's case against intuitions misunderstands their standard, central role throughout perceptual psychology. Of more general interest, I argue that Devitt's position exemplifi es compelling errors concerning mental representation seen throughout cognitive science and philosophy of mind since the 17 th Century.

In the study of language, intuition has played a central role in two quite different ways to be examined here. In the generative tradition of linguistics inaugurated by Chomsky (1957, 1965), intuitive judgments have been the key source of evidence for the construction of theories or grammars. Such intuitive judgments include whether a linguistic itemsounds good or would be used, or whether it is preferable to another item or feels related to another. This highly controversial source of empirical data is the subject of Part 1 of the present chapter. In contrast (and the topic of Part 2), the study of language among philosophers, particularly “semantics,” has relied on intuition in a significantly different manner as part of the broader philosophical method of thought experiments and conceptual analysis. This method of philosophical inquiry has enjoyed a wide consensus, although it has recently become controversial because of empirical, experimental inquiries into intuition judgments.

versies concerning the nature of`ideas" which have persisted not just for thirty years butsince the seventeenth century. In this recent re-enactment,Pylyshyn has played Arnauld (1683) against Kosslyn'sMalebranche (1712) See Slezak (1992, 1995, 2002).Of course, Pylyshyn is not vindicated merely because hewas anticipated by Descartes and Arnauld. The strikinghistorical parallels suggest that the fundamental problems atstake do not arise in any

Jerry Fodor (1985) has joked that philosophers have always been prone to eccentric worries such as an anxiety about the existence of tables and chairs, but with the issue of mental representation they have found a problem that is real and crucial for progress in the cognitive sciences. However, given Fodor's 'methodological solipsism' of computational symbols and their 'formality condition', Jackendoff (1992) has facetiously asked "Why, if our understanding has no direct access to the real world, aren't we always bumping into things?" It is no accident that Jackendoff's parody recalls Samuel Johnson's famous retort to Berkeley's "ingenious sophistry" by kicking a stone. There is an acute irony in the fact that cognitive science has simply rediscovered the philosophers' traditional worry about tables and chairs. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Fodor's latest book Hume Variations endorses the classical Empiricist 'idea' idea of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. The paper explores Fodor's concept of ideas as mental objects in relation to its historical antecedents.

Richard Jeffrey (1983) has said that Newcomb's Problem may be seen as a rock on which Bayesianism must founder. Despite a vast literature of great technical subtlety and complexity, no solution has emerged. Most recently, Jeffrey (2004) renounced his earlier position and no longer regards Newcomb's problem as a genuine decision problem at all. Rather, Jeffrey suggests, "Newcomb problems are like Escher's famous staircase on which an unbroken ascent takes you back where you started." Jeffrey's analogy is apt for a puzzle whose specific logical features can be precisely articulated. I offer a novel analysis of the problem going beyond mere analogy to reveal the source of its persistent intractability. In the spirit of Jeffrey's analogy, I propose that the central problem has arisen from the misguided attempt to reconcile the impossible science-fictional features of the story with a plausible causal analysis and, therefore, the contest between causal and evidential decision theories is misconceived. As the analogy with Escher figures suggests, Newcomb's Problem is an instance of a compelling cognitive illusion whose underlying mechanism is proposed here.

Lucas has argued that it follows from Godel's Theorem that the mind cannot be a machine or represented by any formal system. Although this notorious argument against the mechanism thesis has received considerable attention in the literature, it has not been decisively rebutted, even though mechanism is generally thought to be the only plausible view of the mind. In this paper I offer an analysis of Lucas's argument which shows that it derives its persuasiveness from a subtle confusion. In particular, I examine Benacerraf's reconstruction of Lucas's argument, thereby permitting a precise re-statement of my own analysis and reinforcement of my conclusions regarding Lucas's mistake. This examination of Benacerraf's reconstruction permits us to evaluate certain radical and highly paradoxical conclusions concerning empirical psychology which Benacerraf draws, and this, in turn, permits us to consider certain suggestive implications for the mind which may, after all, follow from Gddel's Theorem. Rtsumt J.R. Lucas a dkrivt du thtoreme de Godel la conclusion que I'esprit ne peut pas &re une machine ou @tre reprtsenti: par un systtme formel. Bien que cet argument ctltbre contre la these du mtcanisme ait tveillt un intkrCt considkrable dans la littkrature, il n'a pas t t t rkfutt de faqon dtcisive, mtme si I'opinion gtntrale prtvaut que le mtcanisme est la seule conception possible de I'esprit. Dans cet article, je propose une analyse du raisonnement de Lucas qui montre que sa force persuasive provient d'une subtile confusion. En particulier, j'examine la reconstruction, par Benacerraf, de la dtmonstration de Lucas, ce qui me permet de prtciser ma propre analyse et de confirmer mes conclusions quant tt I'erreur de Lucas. Cet examen de la reconstruction de Benacerraf nous fournit I'occasion de discuter certaines conclusions radicales et hautement paradoxales qu'il en tire concernant la psychologie exptrimentale et nous conduit tt certaines implications suggestives concernant I'esprit et qui pourraient finalement dtcouler du thkortme de Gddel.

I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences. (G.E. Moore, 1942, p. 14) Peter Carruthers has made a vigorous attempt to defend the admittedly unfashionable doctrine that we think 'in' language, despite its displacement by something like Fodor's 'language of thought'. The idea that we think in language has considerable intuitive persuasiveness, but I suggest that this is not the force of good argument and evidence, but a familiar kind of introspective illusion. In this regard, the question of language and thought derives a more general interest, since the illusion is independently familiar from other notorious disputes in cognitive science such as the 'imagery debate'.

In particular, the more complete exposition of the diagonal reconstruction shows that, besides its textual advantages, it has the philosophical virtue of capturing the independent anti-materialist intuitions of T. Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review 83, 4 (1974): 435-50, and others that have nothing to do with Descartes, just as we might expect-along the lines of K. Gunderson, "Asymmetries and Mind-Body Perplexities," Minnesotta Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. M. Radner and S. Winokur (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970) 4.

Robert Cummins [(1996) Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT, p. 1] has characterized the vexed problem of mental representation as "the topic in the philosophy of mind for some time now." This remark is something of an understatement. The same topic was central to the famous controversy between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld in the 17th century and remained central to the entire philosophical tradition of "ideas" in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. However, the scholarly, exegetical literature has almost no overlap with that of contemporary cognitive science. I show that the recurrence of certain deep perplexities about the mind is a systematic and pervasive pattern arising not only throughout history, but also in a number of independent domains today such as debates over visual imagery, symbolic systems and others. Such historical and contemporary convergences suggest that the fundamental issues cannot arise essentially from the theoretical guise they take in any particular case. … if men had been born blind philosophy would be more perfect, because it would lack many false assumptions that have been taken from the sense of sight. (Galileo Galilei, 1610) Mental representation: "the topic for some time now" Robert Cummins (1996, p. 1) has recently characterized the vexed problem of mental representation as "the topic in the philosophy of mind for some time now." However, this remark is something of an understatement. In fact, the same topic was central to the famous controversy between Antoine Arnauld and Nicolas Malebranche in the 17th century, and also central to the entire philosophical tradition of "ideas" in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. This pattern of recurrence is a striking fact. However, the cognitive science literature has almost no overlap with that of the history of early modern philosophy. This mutual neglect is remarkable in view of the intimate connection of their concerns. I am concerned here to reveal something of the rich and mutually illuminating connections between these disjoint literatures. In principle, such mutual illumination can make a valuable and perhaps novel contribution both to contemporary cognitive science and also to the scholarship of early modern philosophy. The possibility of mutual bene t is even

The recent republication of David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery in a second edition provides an occasion to reappraise the celebrated work which launched the so-called Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. This work embodies the general outlook and foundational principles in a way that is still characteristic of its descendents. Above all, the recent republication of Bloor's original book is evidence of the continuing interest and importance of the work, but it also provides the clearest evidence of the shortcomings of the enterprise. The arguments presented in the bulk of the book have received relatively little attention by comparison with the principal tenets enunciated in the first few pages. Accordingly, a detailed examination is made of these original arguments which were so influential in establishing the sociology of scientific knowledge. A close analysis reveals their seemingly unnoticed vacuity, as well as a vast discrepancy between the ...