Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo : The breach of
International Law or legitimate action to response
effectively and morally
Muharem Shtavica
13/05/2017
Marmara University
ISTANBUL
1
1. Introduction
Kosovo had indeed passed a period of unexpected conditions where humanity and the
meaning of freedom had lost all the values. In the thirteenth century, famous politician
Thomas Aquinas had asserted the idea of humanitarian intervention if that sovereign state
maltreats and oppresses its citizens.From this context, the idea has been a key principal that
justifies the military intervention with the objective to defend human rights and save their
lives.
It is true that the military intervention in one sovereign state is not in congruence with the
Article I (IV) of the UN Charter, but this does not mean that it is illegitimate or caused
out of enmity or revenge.On the contrary, it is something imposed in order to stop the
atrocities and the loss of people.Noam Chomsky states; “The New Interventionism” was
hailed by intellectual opinion and legal scholars who proclaimed a new era in world affairs
in which the “enlightened states” will at last be able to use force where they “believe it to
be just” discarding “the restrictive old rules” and obeying “modern notions of justice” that
they fashion.”1
Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, did not encroach the international law, because it
protected the civilians, and beyond this, assisted for the amity and prosperity among all
living communities.We have to acknowledge that NATO did not intervene in Kosovo
without a reason.Before the military action was to be taken , there were several United
Nations resolutions enacted by the Security Council which unfortunately did not succeed
in bringing stability in the country.The international intervention on Kosovo issue was a
must as former U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke stated ; ‘’ My advice and position
on Kosovo, from the beginning of my involvement in the spring of 1998 on, was basically
that the Serbs and the Albanians would never be able to settle their problems unless there
was an outside international security presence on the ground.” 2 Furthermore, the NATO
intervention in Kosovo was supported by many most democratic countries in the west,
leading United States of America, United Kingdom , France , Germany etc.
1
Noam.Chomsky, The New Military Humanism LESSONS FROM KOSOVO, (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 4.
“FRONTLINE Interviews Richard Holbrooke”, Frontline PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html.
2
2
It is important to be emphasized that, before NATO intervened in Kosovo there were
several precursor elements that instigated this humanitarian action. Such as ; Kosovar
Albanian student demonstrations in 1981 as government fell short of satisfying basic
conditions in dormitory. Suppression of autonomy by Slobodan Milosevic regime in 1989,
granted to Kosovo by former Yugoslavian
leader Josip Broz Tito. Consequently,
dissatisfied with this brutal policy of Milosevic, another protests erupted massively
organized by Prishtina University students
and Trepca miners. Intensified
conflict
between the Serbian forces and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was another problem
where International Security Forces demanded to be solved peacefully by negotiations.
And last but not least, The massacre of 15th January, 1999, in the village of Reçak where
Serbian paramilitary forces killed by the most cruel way 42 Kosovar Albanian civilians
and 12 KLA soldiers.This was to be considered as the peak of Milosevic vandalism. The
eyewitness of this massacre was also the former head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo
William Voker. In inter alia he asserts; "All that I have seen can be described as a massacre
or a crime against humanity. On this occasion, I'm not hesitating to accuse Serbian security
forces, who should tell the names of those involved in the operation, who gave the warrant
and finally, as much as possible, we demand that within twenty four hours
The
International War Crimes Tribunal will come to investigate this animal offense. "3Yet, On
this occasion, Serbian forces have violated the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Article III of this Convention decides
decisively: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”4 Article IV of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948
notes : “Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or
private individuals.”5
Remzije J. Zekolli, “Masakra e Reçakut është Terrorizëm Shtetëror,‘‘ Gazeta Botapress , January 15, 2016 ,
http://botapress.info/masakra-e-recakut-eshte-terrorizem-shtetror/ ( accessed May 13, 2017).
4
“European Convention on Human Rights: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms” Rome : 1950 .
5
“Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 9 December 1948”, United Nations Document : January 31, 1947.
3
3
Knowing the fact that the participant and one of the representatives of these international
conventions was Yugoslavia itself, violation and encroachment of these articles during
Milosevic leadership was the greatest blunder and irremissible
shame of
him.
Notwithstanding, after numerous attempts to persuade Milosevic to stop genocide against
civilians, the international leaders have set the Rambouillet Agreement in France as the last
chance of diplomatic settlement, which was held on 23 February until 18 March 1999.
President Milosevic refuses to sign the peace agreement with the Albanian side. So, on
March 24, 1999 , NATO takes action to punish him with the air bombing.
Rebecca R Moore argues; “This war gave human rights precedence over rights of
states.”6With this statement she identifies the NATO’s license and respect of international
law in order to stop mass killings and also puts civilian rights prominence before the
protection of the sovereignty of states.
Additionally, in this case study I will try to examine and find out the adequate answer
regarding my research question ; Whether the NATO’s action was in accordance with
Humanitarian International Law. If approved, what were the reasons behind it. Also, I will
further stipulate the arguments and debates that most eminent scholars and state leaders
have argued about this issue.
Rebecca R Moore , NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World, ( London : Praeger,
2007) , 48.
6
4
2. Subject
NATO intervention in Kosovo has been one of the most contestable issues among political
analysts and many scholars, which raised the question whether this military action was on the
right place and time to response. UK Defence Minister George Robertson stated ; “We are in no
doubt that NATO is acting within international law. Our legal justification rests upon the accepted
principle that force may be used in extreme circumstances to avert humanitarian catastrophe”7. In
October 1998 The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UKFCO) gave its opinion as to the
legality of military intervention in Kosovo; UKFCO stated that the interventions in Bosnia and
Somalia indicated , “Security Council authorization to use force for humanitarian purposes is now
widely accepted”. And that ‘’force can also be justified on the grounds of overwhelming
humanitarian necessity without a UN Security Council Resolution.”8Delivering his speech at
United Nations General Assambly in 1999, and again in 2000, Secretary General-Kofi Annan
emphasized ; “…if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty,
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human
rights that affect every precept of our common humanity ? “ 9 The precedence of using NATO
military force in Kosovo stems from the critics of United States towards UN peace enforcement
missions which failed to act responsively, thus NATO should not limit itself to UN- mandated
military action. The Alliance should be prepared to act without authorization by the UN Security
Council, if necessary.10No doubt that the regime forces of Slobodan Milosevic did break the
Human International Law, by torturing and killing the civilians , bad treatment of prisoners of war
, raping women and children.11 Chapter I , Article III (I) of the Geneva Conventions states : “
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid
down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
Aidan Hehr, “ NATO’s “Humanitarian Intervention” in Kosovo : Legal Precedent or Aberration ?” , Journal of
Human Rights 8:245–264, no. 8 ( 2009) : 3 .
8
Ibid .,
9
“The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” , The Responsibility to
Protect , 9.
10
Clara Portela, “Humanitarian Intervention, NATO and International Law: Can the Institution of Humanitarian
Intervention Justify Unauthorized Action “, Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security (BITS), (December
2000) .
11
See “My Father was Burned Alive”: Testimonies from Kosovo Refugees, Edited by Sevdije Ahmeti, William
Joseph Buckley ( Cambridge , William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2000) , 36-42.
7
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cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the
following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above-mentioned persons: a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;d) the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”
Articles 49 and 50 imposes penal sanctions for breaches of the Convention, in particular for “grave
breaches”. Taking this article as an undeniable evidence , Serbian Government has never been
punished by International Law for doing these crimes to civilians and prisoners.Yet, the only one
response to stop this macabre act was to bomb Milosevic by air raids .Certainly after the end of
the war International Court of the Hague Tribunal had convicted these criminals of the war but not
sufficiently and by limited means.
To understand better what caused this intervention taking place, we need to know that before the
bombing , according to NATO resources there were some 2000 people killed just in a year before
the intervention and about hundreds of thousands displaced as refuges internally, and settled also
elsewhere in neighbor Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro. This humanitarian catastrophe was
mainly attributed to Yugoslav police forces and the target were Kosovar Albanians. 12By the time
of the peace accord of June 3, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
reported 671,500 refugees beyond the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in
addition to 70,000 in Montenegro and 75,000 who went to other countries.13Consider if NATO
intervention would not take place, the number of the victims and the refugees expelled from their
homes would be higher. UN Special Representative for Kosovo Bernard Kouchner repeatedly
stated that : “Kosovo is the laboratory of a new international right”.14
To illustrate more broadly about the legitimization of International Humanitarian Intervention, let
me cite some articles written in the Charter of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In the Basic
Noam Chomsky, “The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo”, (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 16.
Ibid ., 17.
14
Clara Portela, “Humanitarian Intervention, NATO and International Law: Can the Institution of Humanitarian
Intervention Justify Unauthorized Action “, Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security (BITS), (December
2000), 14.
12
13
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Principles (1) A. and B. of R2P it is defined as : “State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the
primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population
is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency,repression or state failure, and
the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention
yields to the international responsibility to protect.”15In other words , if we look upon the UN
Charter, Article 24(1) indicates ; “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”
16
Yugoslavia had been among first
countries to sign the UN Charter in 1945 in San Francisco, and its former leader Tito enjoyed a
great esteem to be loyal for such a treaty.But when changing the authority , Milosevic ruined and
encroached every kind of humanity which spurred the international powers to take measures.
Milosevic’s apartheid policy has not been able to defend equal rights for all citizens living in
Kosovo. On the contrary , he denied to respond efficiently to prevent further escalating situation.
The Article 3.2 in the Charter of R2P commands that : … all sovereign state leaders are ordered
to prevent deadly conflict and other forms of man-made catastrophe. A firm national
commitmments to ensuring fair treatment and fair opportunities for all citizens.Slobodan
Milosevic not only wasn’t competent to prevent the deadly conflict, but on the contrary, he was
the main cause of this havoc.Notwithstanding, International Community has used the last resort
preceding the military intervention in order Milosevic to back up and get rid off such grudge and
fierce hostility against Kosovar Albanians, but without any effect.One might say that
the
Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo shed more flames in the region. This would be a worthless
accusation , since the situation in the country had transgressed all human values. Secretary-General
of NATO Javier Solana argues; “To take military action against Belgrade was a decision we did
not enter into lightly.We knew , before beginning the air campaign, how difficult it would be.We
knew that Yugoslavia would use our efforts as an excuse to step up its repression of the Kosovar
Albanians.We knew the air campaign relationship with Russia was likely to suffer.And , last but
not least, NATO would be charged by some with taking international law into its own
“The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” , The Responsibility to
Protect : Core Principles (BASIC PRINCIPLES 1) .
16
“Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice” , San Francisco : 1945.
15
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hands.”17Yet, despite these potential risks and drawbacks, Solana claims that they acted positively
for three reasons: First and foremost, NATO acted to stop the humanitarian tragedy. One of the
lessons of Bosnia was that acting earlier might have been less costly in the end.International
Community learned this lesson and wouldn’t like to repeat the same mistake.Second,
Humanitarian Intevention acted to break the political deadlock which stagnated without
solution.All political and economic means were exhausted before NATO reverted to military
action.President Milosevic was indifferent to sign the Rambouillet agreement and made it clear
that he had no interest in political solution.Finally, Humanitarian Intervention acted to prevent a
further destabilization in the Balkans.Kosovo has been the last castle of bloody wars in the former
Yugoslavia.Briefly, if Belgrade’s policy of deliberate displacement of the Kosovo Albanians
would not have been energetically opposed,the result would be more instability and bloodshed.18
Furthermore, North Atlantic Council statement of April 12, 1999 , confirmed that NATO had five
goals: 1) air strikes should continue until Milosevic agrees to end violence and repression on civil
people; 2) Milosevic is obliged to withdraw all military, police and paramilitary forces from
Kosovo ; 3) he has to sign an agreement for settlement of international military presence; 4) he has
to agree for return of all refugees safely and unhampered from humanitarian aid organizations; 5)
provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of Rambouillet Accords.19
As stated above, NATO belligerent forces started bombarding Yugoslavia in March , 1999 without
any authorization of UN Security Council. However, since the maintanace of peace and security
is one of the core principles of UN Charter (Chapter VII Articles 39-42) , the Independent
International Comission on Kosovo claim that ; “NATO intervention in Kosovo was not legal but
legitimate”. The Comission proves that the intervention was illegal because it did not meet the
UN Charter criterion. Furthermore, the fact that the majority Kosovar Albanian population was
under Serbian repression legitimizes what would otherwise be perceived an “illegal” military
intervention.20Besides, the concern of International Law considerations , Kosovo issue was the
pivotal debate among most preminent leaders in the world. The primary impetus for NATO to take
action in Kosovo was to stop the growing human carnage and avert it towards the solution through
17
Javier Solana, Fresh Cause for Hope at the Opening of the New Century, ed. William Joseph Buckley (
Cambridge , William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2000), 217-220.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid .
20
Dajena Kumbaro , “The Kosovo Crisis in an International Law Perspective: Self-Determination , Territorial
Integrity and the NATO Intervention” ,For NATO – Office of Information and Press ( June 2001) , 49-56.
8
peaceful and dialogue means. The US position about the Kosovo conflict was expressed by
President Bill Clinton in the address to KFOR troops in Macedonia in June 1999 : “It is not free
of danger; it will not be free of difficulty. There will be some days you wish you were somewhere
else. But never forget, if we can do this here and if we can then say to the people of the world,
whether you live in Africa or central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent
civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background, or their
religion, and it's within our power to stop it, we will stop it.” 21According to US Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright : “Acting under Chapter 7, the Security Council adopted three resolutions ;
1160, 1199, and 1203 , imposing mandatory obligations on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) ; and these obligations the FRY has flagrantly ignored. So, NATO actions are being taken
within this framework, and we continue to believe that NATO’s actions are justified and necessary
to stop the violence.”22US Secretary of State also argued that the behavior of Serb forces in
Kosovo was a breach of the Geneva Conventions , the Charter of Human Rights.She contended
that these treaties provided an alternative source of legitimisation of NATO action. 23In his essay
written on August 13, 1999, Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed out : “At the time
of NATO’s decision to take enforcement action without seeking explicit Security Council
authorization , my response was twofold: I identified the Security Council as having the primary
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.With equal emphasis, I also stated
that it was the rejection of a political settlement by the Yugoslav authorities that made this action
necessary , and that indeed, there “ are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit
of peace.”24 The international press has been everywhere focused on this alarming situation in
Kosovo.In addition,members of the International Conference and great powers leaders had no
choice but to response effectively. UK former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook claimed; “The first
reason why we took action was that we were aware of the atrocities that had been carried out and
we had the means to intervene,but this is not the only reason. Our confidence in our peace and
security depends on the credibility of NATO.Last October, NATO guaranteed the cease-fire that
President Milosevic signed.He has comprehensively shattered that cease-fire.What possible
21
Woolley, John ., and Peters, Gerhard., William J. Clinton: Remarks to Kosovo International Security Force
Troops in Skopje, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57770 ( June 22, 1999).
22
Portela, supra at 5 .
23
Ibid., 6.
24
Kofi Annan, The Effectiveness of the International Rule of Law in Maintaining International Peace and Security,
ed. William Joseph Buckley, ( Cambridge , William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2000), 222.
9
credibility would NATO have next time that our security was challenged if we did not honour that
guarantee? The consequences of NATO inaction would be far worse than the result of NATO
action… Not to have acted , when we knew the atrocities that were being committed , would have
made us complicit in their repression.” 25The use of force by the United Nations in order to stop
violence and atrocities after the end of World War II was also the main goal whereby the Charter
of the United Nations was formed. If we take a look at the preamble of the UN Charter it is
affirmed: “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life
in larger freedom..”26 Clearly, the legitimacy of using air or land forces is mentioned in Article 42
itself, saying that if economic sanctions do not have the effect of preventing violence affecting
international stability and peace, such action may include blockade, demonstrations or use of force
by air, sea or land.
Humanitarian intervention in Kosovo is not an obscure phenomenon. It is neither the first nor the
last humanitarian intervention. General custom of humanitarian intervention existed since the 19th
century. French intervention in Syria in 1860-1861 , to stop massacres of Christian minority was
a legitimate humanitarian intervention. Advocates of such interventions adduces also the British ,
French and Russian intervention in Greece (1827-1830), Russian intervention in Turkey (187778), and the Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian intervention in Macedonia (1903) as legal operations.
United Nations was formed to accomplish two principle goals: 1) to prevent the use of force as a
means of settling disputes and, 2) to protect universal human rights. These two core principles
often contradicts when force is used to enforce human rights standards. We know that ‘’self
defence’’ concept mentioned in UN Charter Article 51 is indeed undeniable. But human rights are
so valuable that even the sanctity of “sovereignty” should not serve as a blockade to their
protection. Morality of humanitarian intervention is in many ways unquestionable. The ultimate
Daniel H. Joyner, “The Kosovo Intervention : Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm,” European
Journal of International Law , 2002, 599.
26
“Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice” , Preamble, San Francisco :
1945.
25
10
justification of the existence of states is the protection and enforcement of the natural rights of the
citizens, a government that engages in substantial violations of human rights betrays the very
purpose of which it exists and so forfeits not only its domestic legitimacy but its international
legitimacy as well.Therefore, sovereignty can only be justified as long as the basic right to life is
preserved.In this sense sovereignty is limited. United Nations Charter definitely stresses the
importance of human rights… as human rights have grown in importance in international law, it
is no longer possible to rightly claim that human rights abuses within the borders of a sovereign
state are solely the “internal” affair of that state.Proponents of humanitarian intervention argues
that UN has endorsed the notion that sovereignty is secondary in importance to the basic human
right to life.27 Secondly, if Article 2 (4) of the United Nations prohibits forced intervention in a
sovereign state, this only applies if the independence and territory of that state are violated. In this
case, NATO intervention has been legitimate because it did not aim to occupy the Yugoslavian or
Serbian territory, but rather it has prevented a human catastrophe and can never be blemished as
unlawful.Furthermore, NATO’s action was legal because it had assisted in liberating the people
from long-lasting brutal mass killings and presecution conducted by Milosevic regime. 28As
mentioned above ,intervention in Kosovo should not be seen as something alien. In the postCharter era of the UN there were several humanitarian actions taken on such as ; Israel’s
intervention in Uganda during the Entebbe raid whereby it gathered widespread acceptance.
India’s intervention in East Pakistan in 1973.Tanzanian intervention into Uganda in 19781979.The only justification of Tanzanian’s intervention into Uganda was to take back it’s lost
territory and to topple down the Idi Amin brutal dictatorship which caused death of estimated
300.000 people.So, they responded by humanitarian manner.29
As a criteria for humanitarian intervention to be legal there are four factors that needs to be
fulfilled.First, the intervening side must be in possession of credible crisis evidence.Second, the
evidence must show that gross human rights are violated in large scale.Third, the intervening part
must have exhausted all last resort to change the situation in table. And the last one, the victims of
the human rights abuses must not oppose the intervening forces. 30 Based on these criteria we can
John J. Merriam , “Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention,” EBSCO Publishing , Vol.33:111 (2002) :
114-122.
28
Ibid .
29
Ibid,124.
30
Ibid., 126.
27
11
conclude that the Kosovo case has fulfilled all of the aforementioned facts. Well known scholars
of international law, such as Grotious, Vatteli, Oppenheim, Le Furi, Rousseaui, Verdrosi and so
on, support the right of humanitarian intervention, and in some cases, when one or more states
jointly use force in order to stop the maltreatments another state does against its citizens, as such
acts are considered brutal, infringe upon human dignity, and insult the family of nations, most
scholars consider it to be legal intervention. Some neo-scholars think that humanitarian
intervention, besides being legal, has to be quick in order to stop massive infringements of basic
human rights. Such scholars add that this is the only way to stop apartheid, genocide, ecocide,
deaths as a result of hunger, all being occurrences that shock the international community.31Other
group of proponents claim that the humanitarian intervention should be collective because the
unity of states can response effectively against any kind of infingements. Humanitarian
intervention does not need to be licensed by Security Council authorization.Yet, the humanitarian
intervention can be authorized by regional organizations as well.32However, when human rights
and liberties are infringed and forms of repression and genocide rises, then the principle of state
sovereignty ends.33Moreover, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo has to be acknowledged as an
undisputed issue.Since the last resort to halt Slobodan Milosevic from crimes against humanity
was the use of force.His obstinate mission to continue maltreatment and killings against Kosovar
Albanians was envisaged even by UN Security Council , NATO and so on. Richard Holbrooke,
during his last meeting with former President Milosevic in Belgrade in March 1999 to persuade
him accepting the peace agreement describes the event like this; “I said, "Do you know what will
happen when I leave today , unless you change your attitude, if you do not agree to talk and accept
Rambouillet as a basis for talks?" He said, "Yes, you will bomb us". 34So, he acted cold-blooded
and he was indifferent about the crimes he was doing.Also, ex-Supreme Allied Commander
Europe of NATO General Wesley K. Clark during his paying visit to Belgrade showed to
Milosevic some photographs indicating a massacre of Albanians done by Serbian security forces
in the Kosovo village of Reçak, but he disdainfully denied such a thing claiming that ; “This was
31
Nusret Pllana, Nato Intervention in Kosova , trans. Alban Rafuna ( Prishtina: AAB RIINVEST UNIVERSITY,
2011), 211.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid., 212.
34
Tim Judah , Kosova: Luftë dhe Hakmarrje ( Prishtinë : Koha Print , 2002), 275.
12
not a massacre.This was staged.These people were terrorist.” Perhaps, could a massacred children,
mutilated elders and raped women be called terrorist ?!
Despite the numerous tendencies during the Dayton Peace Agreement, Kosovar Albanian
delegation was neglected and omitted from the agenda which latter reflected in fatality. Had the
Kosovo issue be taken in consideration, if not completely at least the armed conflict would end
and less blood would be shed.Subsequently,there would be no need for the NATO intervention.
Kosovo Albanian’s main political leader Dr. Ibrahim Rugova when meeting in the oval office on
May 27, 1998 addressing to Mr. Bill Clinton said; “Without direct American intervention, Kosovo
was headed for all-out war.We will not allow another Bosnia to happen in Kosovo.” 35Nonetheless,
as mentioned above Milosevic was determined to go his own way using abusive language against
innocent people slandering them as terrorist.General Wesley K.Clark warned him that NATO is
''going to start telling me to move aircraft'' if Serbia did not live up to its agreement. ''You are a
war criminal to be threatening Serbia,'' Milosevic replied.On January 28, 1999, NATO allies
claimed that they were ready to use force and Britain and France promised to send troops to enforce
peace settlement. Two days later, after Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary General, said
that the threat of force was justified to get the Serbs to the bargaining table, the allies decided they
had justification enough under international law to authorize air strikes against Yugoslavia if it did
not agree to negotiate a settlement.
36
The Rambouillet Peace Agreement was the last hope to
impose solution between two sides but Milosevic did not even attend the meeting.To sum it up,
Milosevic was the key factor to decide whether his country and NATO would go to war. ''It was
Milosevic who deliberately and consciously chose to trigger the bombing of his own country,''
Richard Holbrooke said.37
Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner , “Crisis in the Balkans: The Road to War—A special report .; How a
President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War,” The New York Times , April 18, 1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/18/world/crisis-balkans-road-war-special-report-president-distracted-scandalentered.html (accessed May 13, 2017).
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
35
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3. Theoretical Part
In order to understand the impact of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, in this part of
the article I will try to explain the ideas of the two major contradictory IR theories , realism
and liberalism.Well-known classical realist Hans J.Morgenthau argues ; all human beings
have their will to power.The power-seeking human nature creates a situation where
statesmen struggle for power over other states.He further examines; “‘Politics is a struggle
for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal
and the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determine the technique of
political action.”38Also, with regard to intervention Morgenthau claims that we must
intervene where our national interest requires it and where our power gives a chance to
succeed.While neoclassical realists emphasize human nature in the center, neorealism
focuses on an anarchic international system in which there is no central authority that
governs international politics.Kenneth Waltz, preeminent scholar of neorealism
demonstrates that in a self-help international system, foreign policy of state is determined
based on its national interest.States are continuously
constrained to take care of
themselves no one can take care of the system.39Whatsoever, classical neorealism focuses
on power-seeking human nature whereas neorealism focuses on an anarchic international
system.Despite their different directions, both subdivisions crystalize state’s national
interests and their will of increasing power.
Contrary to realists who focus on state as major actor, liberalists concerns on the protection
of human rights.Classical liberals maintain that human beings possess fundamental natural
rights to liberty. Liberalism resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions,
recognizable by certain characteristics such as individual freedom, political participation,
private property, and equality of opportunity that all liberal democratic societies, by
definition, share to some degree.40Another core premise of liberals is that states can
38
Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (Great
Clarendon Street: Oxford University Press, 2013) , 66.
39
Kenneth N.Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Philippines:Addison-WesleyPublishing Company, Inc, 1979),
109.
40
Michael Doyle and Stefano Recchia, Stefano Recchia, http://www.stefanorecchia.net/publication_1040.html
(accessed May 13, 2017). 1434.
14
cooperate reciprocally.They admit that each state looks for personal gain, yet individuals
share some interests which can make some domestic and international cooperation
possible.In this case, according to liberals emergence of international organizations such
as United Nations is the best choice in spreading interstate cooperation.Michael Walzer, a
leading scholar of contemporary liberal internationalism argues that military intervention
can be justified as a last resort and as a means to protect civilians from human rights
violations, such as genocide and crimes against humanity.Nevertheless, he defines that
such humanitarian interventions should not be undertaken unilaterally but rather
multilaterally and under the authorization of the United Nations Security Council.Because
liberal internationalists believe that multilateralism precludes great powers from following
in national interests rather than humanitarian objectives in intervention.41Liberalism
theory, due to the fact that protects the fundamental human rights explains better the case
of Kosovo.Their motive of defending the humanitarian intervention pertains with many
arguments and characteristics.Starting with the suppression of Kosovo autonomy in 1989
by Slobodan Milosevic.Series of non-violent protests against brutal regime and tendencies
to
regain
the
autonomous
status.Serbian
ethnic
cleansing
against
Kosovar
Albanians.Failure of Council Resolution 1199 calling for cease-fire among Serbian and
Kosovo Liberation Army(KLA).Disregard of Yugoslavian forces to withdraw from
Kosovo and continuation of ethnic-cleansing. All these cited factors, legitimated NATO
to intervene after the exhaustion of all peaceful resorts.In other words, UN Security
Council, due to the principle of non-interference of sovereignty failed to respond timely
in Rwanda and Bosnia which caused hundreds of thousands casualities. Responding to UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s call for reconciling the dilemma between sovereignty and
human rights, the Canadian government took initiatives to establish the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. One of the most
remarkable achievements of the ICISS was the creation of the “responsibility to protect”
R2P.To sum it up, humanitarian intervention in Kosovo has been a turning point in
preventing further genocide and oppression against civilians.
41
Yoshida Yuki, A Theoretical Assessment of Humanitarian Intervention and R2P, http://www.eir.info/2013/01/16/from-kosovo-to-libya-theoretical-assessment-of-humanitarian-intervention-and-theresponsibility-to-protect/ (accessed May 13, 2017).
15
4. Conclusion
Surely, Kosovo has been one of the most problematic issue in political and humanitarian
agenda.However,when compared to the other failed cases such as Bosnia and Herzegovina ,
Rwanda and Somalia we should be glad that this has been saved with fewer incidents and
fatalities.All this, because of the fact that NATO has intervened timely and by the right
direction.Humanitarian intervention in one sovereign state is among most contestable matters.This
due to the fact that the two main principles of the United Nations Charter contradicts to each other,
one defending the “sovereignty” and the other “human rights, security and peace”.Nontheless,
majority of the international law scholars and other advocates when sorting out which one is more
valuable, indisputably human lives and human freedom is among most primal and sublime
things.Of course humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was not a decision to enter into light.It was
easy neither for NATO as an mediator , nor for Serbia as an objector nor for Kosovar Albanias as
victims.Yet, the vetoes coming from Russia were another obstacles hampering the process go
successful.Being in such a critical position, and taking the best determinant judgement is really
hardiness.Furthermore, international commission had no other choice but to response effectively
and morally in order to prevent this human tragedy.Massacress and genocide is
intolerable.Milosevic has violated the human values by the most cruel and barbaric means.He has
encroached and abused all international conventions which calls for freedom, human rights and
security.Thus, there should be someone to stop him otherwise he would persist in his bloodthirsty
system.In other words,humanitarian intervention in Kosovo is legitimate because it acted
according to the rules of international law.To sum it up, humanitarian intervention in Kosovo
might be authorized as legitimate due to the fact that it fulfilled all criteria to be legal.
16
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