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Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo.pdf

2017

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The paper examines the moral and legal grounds for NATO's humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, arguing that despite its conflict with certain UN Charter provisions, the intervention was justified to protect human rights and restore peace. It highlights the historical context of humanitarian intervention, the failure of previous diplomatic efforts, and the arguments made by various political figures to support the intervention. The paper also critiques the legal ramifications for Serbia's actions and discusses the broader implications for international law and humanitarian principles.

Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo : The breach of International Law or legitimate action to response effectively and morally Muharem Shtavica 13/05/2017 Marmara University ISTANBUL 1 1. Introduction Kosovo had indeed passed a period of unexpected conditions where humanity and the meaning of freedom had lost all the values. In the thirteenth century, famous politician Thomas Aquinas had asserted the idea of humanitarian intervention if that sovereign state maltreats and oppresses its citizens.From this context, the idea has been a key principal that justifies the military intervention with the objective to defend human rights and save their lives. It is true that the military intervention in one sovereign state is not in congruence with the Article I (IV) of the UN Charter, but this does not mean that it is illegitimate or caused out of enmity or revenge.On the contrary, it is something imposed in order to stop the atrocities and the loss of people.Noam Chomsky states; “The New Interventionism” was hailed by intellectual opinion and legal scholars who proclaimed a new era in world affairs in which the “enlightened states” will at last be able to use force where they “believe it to be just” discarding “the restrictive old rules” and obeying “modern notions of justice” that they fashion.”1 Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, did not encroach the international law, because it protected the civilians, and beyond this, assisted for the amity and prosperity among all living communities.We have to acknowledge that NATO did not intervene in Kosovo without a reason.Before the military action was to be taken , there were several United Nations resolutions enacted by the Security Council which unfortunately did not succeed in bringing stability in the country.The international intervention on Kosovo issue was a must as former U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke stated ; ‘’ My advice and position on Kosovo, from the beginning of my involvement in the spring of 1998 on, was basically that the Serbs and the Albanians would never be able to settle their problems unless there was an outside international security presence on the ground.” 2 Furthermore, the NATO intervention in Kosovo was supported by many most democratic countries in the west, leading United States of America, United Kingdom , France , Germany etc. 1 Noam.Chomsky, The New Military Humanism LESSONS FROM KOSOVO, (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 4. “FRONTLINE Interviews Richard Holbrooke”, Frontline PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html. 2 2 It is important to be emphasized that, before NATO intervened in Kosovo there were several precursor elements that instigated this humanitarian action. Such as ; Kosovar Albanian student demonstrations in 1981 as government fell short of satisfying basic conditions in dormitory. Suppression of autonomy by Slobodan Milosevic regime in 1989, granted to Kosovo by former Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz Tito. Consequently, dissatisfied with this brutal policy of Milosevic, another protests erupted massively organized by Prishtina University students and Trepca miners. Intensified conflict between the Serbian forces and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was another problem where International Security Forces demanded to be solved peacefully by negotiations. And last but not least, The massacre of 15th January, 1999, in the village of Reçak where Serbian paramilitary forces killed by the most cruel way 42 Kosovar Albanian civilians and 12 KLA soldiers.This was to be considered as the peak of Milosevic vandalism. The eyewitness of this massacre was also the former head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo William Voker. In inter alia he asserts; "All that I have seen can be described as a massacre or a crime against humanity. On this occasion, I'm not hesitating to accuse Serbian security forces, who should tell the names of those involved in the operation, who gave the warrant and finally, as much as possible, we demand that within twenty four hours The International War Crimes Tribunal will come to investigate this animal offense. "3Yet, On this occasion, Serbian forces have violated the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Article III of this Convention decides decisively: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”4 Article IV of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948 notes : “Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”5 Remzije J. Zekolli, “Masakra e Reçakut është Terrorizëm Shtetëror,‘‘ Gazeta Botapress , January 15, 2016 , http://botapress.info/masakra-e-recakut-eshte-terrorizem-shtetror/ ( accessed May 13, 2017). 4 “European Convention on Human Rights: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” Rome : 1950 . 5 “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948”, United Nations Document : January 31, 1947. 3 3 Knowing the fact that the participant and one of the representatives of these international conventions was Yugoslavia itself, violation and encroachment of these articles during Milosevic leadership was the greatest blunder and irremissible shame of him. Notwithstanding, after numerous attempts to persuade Milosevic to stop genocide against civilians, the international leaders have set the Rambouillet Agreement in France as the last chance of diplomatic settlement, which was held on 23 February until 18 March 1999. President Milosevic refuses to sign the peace agreement with the Albanian side. So, on March 24, 1999 , NATO takes action to punish him with the air bombing. Rebecca R Moore argues; “This war gave human rights precedence over rights of states.”6With this statement she identifies the NATO’s license and respect of international law in order to stop mass killings and also puts civilian rights prominence before the protection of the sovereignty of states. Additionally, in this case study I will try to examine and find out the adequate answer regarding my research question ; Whether the NATO’s action was in accordance with Humanitarian International Law. If approved, what were the reasons behind it. Also, I will further stipulate the arguments and debates that most eminent scholars and state leaders have argued about this issue. Rebecca R Moore , NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World, ( London : Praeger, 2007) , 48. 6 4 2. Subject NATO intervention in Kosovo has been one of the most contestable issues among political analysts and many scholars, which raised the question whether this military action was on the right place and time to response. UK Defence Minister George Robertson stated ; “We are in no doubt that NATO is acting within international law. Our legal justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme circumstances to avert humanitarian catastrophe”7. In October 1998 The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UKFCO) gave its opinion as to the legality of military intervention in Kosovo; UKFCO stated that the interventions in Bosnia and Somalia indicated , “Security Council authorization to use force for humanitarian purposes is now widely accepted”. And that ‘’force can also be justified on the grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity without a UN Security Council Resolution.”8Delivering his speech at United Nations General Assambly in 1999, and again in 2000, Secretary General-Kofi Annan emphasized ; “…if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity ? “ 9 The precedence of using NATO military force in Kosovo stems from the critics of United States towards UN peace enforcement missions which failed to act responsively, thus NATO should not limit itself to UN- mandated military action. The Alliance should be prepared to act without authorization by the UN Security Council, if necessary.10No doubt that the regime forces of Slobodan Milosevic did break the Human International Law, by torturing and killing the civilians , bad treatment of prisoners of war , raping women and children.11 Chapter I , Article III (I) of the Geneva Conventions states : “ Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other Aidan Hehr, “ NATO’s “Humanitarian Intervention” in Kosovo : Legal Precedent or Aberration ?” , Journal of Human Rights 8:245–264, no. 8 ( 2009) : 3 . 8 Ibid ., 9 “The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” , The Responsibility to Protect , 9. 10 Clara Portela, “Humanitarian Intervention, NATO and International Law: Can the Institution of Humanitarian Intervention Justify Unauthorized Action “, Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security (BITS), (December 2000) . 11 See “My Father was Burned Alive”: Testimonies from Kosovo Refugees, Edited by Sevdije Ahmeti, William Joseph Buckley ( Cambridge , William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2000) , 36-42. 7 5 cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Articles 49 and 50 imposes penal sanctions for breaches of the Convention, in particular for “grave breaches”. Taking this article as an undeniable evidence , Serbian Government has never been punished by International Law for doing these crimes to civilians and prisoners.Yet, the only one response to stop this macabre act was to bomb Milosevic by air raids .Certainly after the end of the war International Court of the Hague Tribunal had convicted these criminals of the war but not sufficiently and by limited means. To understand better what caused this intervention taking place, we need to know that before the bombing , according to NATO resources there were some 2000 people killed just in a year before the intervention and about hundreds of thousands displaced as refuges internally, and settled also elsewhere in neighbor Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro. This humanitarian catastrophe was mainly attributed to Yugoslav police forces and the target were Kosovar Albanians. 12By the time of the peace accord of June 3, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported 671,500 refugees beyond the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in addition to 70,000 in Montenegro and 75,000 who went to other countries.13Consider if NATO intervention would not take place, the number of the victims and the refugees expelled from their homes would be higher. UN Special Representative for Kosovo Bernard Kouchner repeatedly stated that : “Kosovo is the laboratory of a new international right”.14 To illustrate more broadly about the legitimization of International Humanitarian Intervention, let me cite some articles written in the Charter of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In the Basic Noam Chomsky, “The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo”, (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 16. Ibid ., 17. 14 Clara Portela, “Humanitarian Intervention, NATO and International Law: Can the Institution of Humanitarian Intervention Justify Unauthorized Action “, Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security (BITS), (December 2000), 14. 12 13 6 Principles (1) A. and B. of R2P it is defined as : “State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency,repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.”15In other words , if we look upon the UN Charter, Article 24(1) indicates ; “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” 16 Yugoslavia had been among first countries to sign the UN Charter in 1945 in San Francisco, and its former leader Tito enjoyed a great esteem to be loyal for such a treaty.But when changing the authority , Milosevic ruined and encroached every kind of humanity which spurred the international powers to take measures. Milosevic’s apartheid policy has not been able to defend equal rights for all citizens living in Kosovo. On the contrary , he denied to respond efficiently to prevent further escalating situation. The Article 3.2 in the Charter of R2P commands that : … all sovereign state leaders are ordered to prevent deadly conflict and other forms of man-made catastrophe. A firm national commitmments to ensuring fair treatment and fair opportunities for all citizens.Slobodan Milosevic not only wasn’t competent to prevent the deadly conflict, but on the contrary, he was the main cause of this havoc.Notwithstanding, International Community has used the last resort preceding the military intervention in order Milosevic to back up and get rid off such grudge and fierce hostility against Kosovar Albanians, but without any effect.One might say that the Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo shed more flames in the region. This would be a worthless accusation , since the situation in the country had transgressed all human values. Secretary-General of NATO Javier Solana argues; “To take military action against Belgrade was a decision we did not enter into lightly.We knew , before beginning the air campaign, how difficult it would be.We knew that Yugoslavia would use our efforts as an excuse to step up its repression of the Kosovar Albanians.We knew the air campaign relationship with Russia was likely to suffer.And , last but not least, NATO would be charged by some with taking international law into its own “The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” , The Responsibility to Protect : Core Principles (BASIC PRINCIPLES 1) . 16 “Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice” , San Francisco : 1945. 15 7 hands.”17Yet, despite these potential risks and drawbacks, Solana claims that they acted positively for three reasons: First and foremost, NATO acted to stop the humanitarian tragedy. One of the lessons of Bosnia was that acting earlier might have been less costly in the end.International Community learned this lesson and wouldn’t like to repeat the same mistake.Second, Humanitarian Intevention acted to break the political deadlock which stagnated without solution.All political and economic means were exhausted before NATO reverted to military action.President Milosevic was indifferent to sign the Rambouillet agreement and made it clear that he had no interest in political solution.Finally, Humanitarian Intervention acted to prevent a further destabilization in the Balkans.Kosovo has been the last castle of bloody wars in the former Yugoslavia.Briefly, if Belgrade’s policy of deliberate displacement of the Kosovo Albanians would not have been energetically opposed,the result would be more instability and bloodshed.18 Furthermore, North Atlantic Council statement of April 12, 1999 , confirmed that NATO had five goals: 1) air strikes should continue until Milosevic agrees to end violence and repression on civil people; 2) Milosevic is obliged to withdraw all military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo ; 3) he has to sign an agreement for settlement of international military presence; 4) he has to agree for return of all refugees safely and unhampered from humanitarian aid organizations; 5) provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of Rambouillet Accords.19 As stated above, NATO belligerent forces started bombarding Yugoslavia in March , 1999 without any authorization of UN Security Council. However, since the maintanace of peace and security is one of the core principles of UN Charter (Chapter VII Articles 39-42) , the Independent International Comission on Kosovo claim that ; “NATO intervention in Kosovo was not legal but legitimate”. The Comission proves that the intervention was illegal because it did not meet the UN Charter criterion. Furthermore, the fact that the majority Kosovar Albanian population was under Serbian repression legitimizes what would otherwise be perceived an “illegal” military intervention.20Besides, the concern of International Law considerations , Kosovo issue was the pivotal debate among most preminent leaders in the world. The primary impetus for NATO to take action in Kosovo was to stop the growing human carnage and avert it towards the solution through 17 Javier Solana, Fresh Cause for Hope at the Opening of the New Century, ed. William Joseph Buckley ( Cambridge , William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2000), 217-220. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid . 20 Dajena Kumbaro , “The Kosovo Crisis in an International Law Perspective: Self-Determination , Territorial Integrity and the NATO Intervention” ,For NATO – Office of Information and Press ( June 2001) , 49-56. 8 peaceful and dialogue means. The US position about the Kosovo conflict was expressed by President Bill Clinton in the address to KFOR troops in Macedonia in June 1999 : “It is not free of danger; it will not be free of difficulty. There will be some days you wish you were somewhere else. But never forget, if we can do this here and if we can then say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa or central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background, or their religion, and it's within our power to stop it, we will stop it.” 21According to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright : “Acting under Chapter 7, the Security Council adopted three resolutions ; 1160, 1199, and 1203 , imposing mandatory obligations on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) ; and these obligations the FRY has flagrantly ignored. So, NATO actions are being taken within this framework, and we continue to believe that NATO’s actions are justified and necessary to stop the violence.”22US Secretary of State also argued that the behavior of Serb forces in Kosovo was a breach of the Geneva Conventions , the Charter of Human Rights.She contended that these treaties provided an alternative source of legitimisation of NATO action. 23In his essay written on August 13, 1999, Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed out : “At the time of NATO’s decision to take enforcement action without seeking explicit Security Council authorization , my response was twofold: I identified the Security Council as having the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.With equal emphasis, I also stated that it was the rejection of a political settlement by the Yugoslav authorities that made this action necessary , and that indeed, there “ are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace.”24 The international press has been everywhere focused on this alarming situation in Kosovo.In addition,members of the International Conference and great powers leaders had no choice but to response effectively. UK former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook claimed; “The first reason why we took action was that we were aware of the atrocities that had been carried out and we had the means to intervene,but this is not the only reason. Our confidence in our peace and security depends on the credibility of NATO.Last October, NATO guaranteed the cease-fire that President Milosevic signed.He has comprehensively shattered that cease-fire.What possible 21 Woolley, John ., and Peters, Gerhard., William J. Clinton: Remarks to Kosovo International Security Force Troops in Skopje, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57770 ( June 22, 1999). 22 Portela, supra at 5 . 23 Ibid., 6. 24 Kofi Annan, The Effectiveness of the International Rule of Law in Maintaining International Peace and Security, ed. William Joseph Buckley, ( Cambridge , William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2000), 222. 9 credibility would NATO have next time that our security was challenged if we did not honour that guarantee? The consequences of NATO inaction would be far worse than the result of NATO action… Not to have acted , when we knew the atrocities that were being committed , would have made us complicit in their repression.” 25The use of force by the United Nations in order to stop violence and atrocities after the end of World War II was also the main goal whereby the Charter of the United Nations was formed. If we take a look at the preamble of the UN Charter it is affirmed: “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom..”26 Clearly, the legitimacy of using air or land forces is mentioned in Article 42 itself, saying that if economic sanctions do not have the effect of preventing violence affecting international stability and peace, such action may include blockade, demonstrations or use of force by air, sea or land. Humanitarian intervention in Kosovo is not an obscure phenomenon. It is neither the first nor the last humanitarian intervention. General custom of humanitarian intervention existed since the 19th century. French intervention in Syria in 1860-1861 , to stop massacres of Christian minority was a legitimate humanitarian intervention. Advocates of such interventions adduces also the British , French and Russian intervention in Greece (1827-1830), Russian intervention in Turkey (187778), and the Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian intervention in Macedonia (1903) as legal operations. United Nations was formed to accomplish two principle goals: 1) to prevent the use of force as a means of settling disputes and, 2) to protect universal human rights. These two core principles often contradicts when force is used to enforce human rights standards. We know that ‘’self defence’’ concept mentioned in UN Charter Article 51 is indeed undeniable. But human rights are so valuable that even the sanctity of “sovereignty” should not serve as a blockade to their protection. Morality of humanitarian intervention is in many ways unquestionable. The ultimate Daniel H. Joyner, “The Kosovo Intervention : Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm,” European Journal of International Law , 2002, 599. 26 “Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice” , Preamble, San Francisco : 1945. 25 10 justification of the existence of states is the protection and enforcement of the natural rights of the citizens, a government that engages in substantial violations of human rights betrays the very purpose of which it exists and so forfeits not only its domestic legitimacy but its international legitimacy as well.Therefore, sovereignty can only be justified as long as the basic right to life is preserved.In this sense sovereignty is limited. United Nations Charter definitely stresses the importance of human rights… as human rights have grown in importance in international law, it is no longer possible to rightly claim that human rights abuses within the borders of a sovereign state are solely the “internal” affair of that state.Proponents of humanitarian intervention argues that UN has endorsed the notion that sovereignty is secondary in importance to the basic human right to life.27 Secondly, if Article 2 (4) of the United Nations prohibits forced intervention in a sovereign state, this only applies if the independence and territory of that state are violated. In this case, NATO intervention has been legitimate because it did not aim to occupy the Yugoslavian or Serbian territory, but rather it has prevented a human catastrophe and can never be blemished as unlawful.Furthermore, NATO’s action was legal because it had assisted in liberating the people from long-lasting brutal mass killings and presecution conducted by Milosevic regime. 28As mentioned above ,intervention in Kosovo should not be seen as something alien. In the postCharter era of the UN there were several humanitarian actions taken on such as ; Israel’s intervention in Uganda during the Entebbe raid whereby it gathered widespread acceptance. India’s intervention in East Pakistan in 1973.Tanzanian intervention into Uganda in 19781979.The only justification of Tanzanian’s intervention into Uganda was to take back it’s lost territory and to topple down the Idi Amin brutal dictatorship which caused death of estimated 300.000 people.So, they responded by humanitarian manner.29 As a criteria for humanitarian intervention to be legal there are four factors that needs to be fulfilled.First, the intervening side must be in possession of credible crisis evidence.Second, the evidence must show that gross human rights are violated in large scale.Third, the intervening part must have exhausted all last resort to change the situation in table. And the last one, the victims of the human rights abuses must not oppose the intervening forces. 30 Based on these criteria we can John J. Merriam , “Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention,” EBSCO Publishing , Vol.33:111 (2002) : 114-122. 28 Ibid . 29 Ibid,124. 30 Ibid., 126. 27 11 conclude that the Kosovo case has fulfilled all of the aforementioned facts. Well known scholars of international law, such as Grotious, Vatteli, Oppenheim, Le Furi, Rousseaui, Verdrosi and so on, support the right of humanitarian intervention, and in some cases, when one or more states jointly use force in order to stop the maltreatments another state does against its citizens, as such acts are considered brutal, infringe upon human dignity, and insult the family of nations, most scholars consider it to be legal intervention. Some neo-scholars think that humanitarian intervention, besides being legal, has to be quick in order to stop massive infringements of basic human rights. Such scholars add that this is the only way to stop apartheid, genocide, ecocide, deaths as a result of hunger, all being occurrences that shock the international community.31Other group of proponents claim that the humanitarian intervention should be collective because the unity of states can response effectively against any kind of infingements. Humanitarian intervention does not need to be licensed by Security Council authorization.Yet, the humanitarian intervention can be authorized by regional organizations as well.32However, when human rights and liberties are infringed and forms of repression and genocide rises, then the principle of state sovereignty ends.33Moreover, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo has to be acknowledged as an undisputed issue.Since the last resort to halt Slobodan Milosevic from crimes against humanity was the use of force.His obstinate mission to continue maltreatment and killings against Kosovar Albanians was envisaged even by UN Security Council , NATO and so on. Richard Holbrooke, during his last meeting with former President Milosevic in Belgrade in March 1999 to persuade him accepting the peace agreement describes the event like this; “I said, "Do you know what will happen when I leave today , unless you change your attitude, if you do not agree to talk and accept Rambouillet as a basis for talks?" He said, "Yes, you will bomb us". 34So, he acted cold-blooded and he was indifferent about the crimes he was doing.Also, ex-Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO General Wesley K. Clark during his paying visit to Belgrade showed to Milosevic some photographs indicating a massacre of Albanians done by Serbian security forces in the Kosovo village of Reçak, but he disdainfully denied such a thing claiming that ; “This was 31 Nusret Pllana, Nato Intervention in Kosova , trans. Alban Rafuna ( Prishtina: AAB RIINVEST UNIVERSITY, 2011), 211. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., 212. 34 Tim Judah , Kosova: Luftë dhe Hakmarrje ( Prishtinë : Koha Print , 2002), 275. 12 not a massacre.This was staged.These people were terrorist.” Perhaps, could a massacred children, mutilated elders and raped women be called terrorist ?! Despite the numerous tendencies during the Dayton Peace Agreement, Kosovar Albanian delegation was neglected and omitted from the agenda which latter reflected in fatality. Had the Kosovo issue be taken in consideration, if not completely at least the armed conflict would end and less blood would be shed.Subsequently,there would be no need for the NATO intervention. Kosovo Albanian’s main political leader Dr. Ibrahim Rugova when meeting in the oval office on May 27, 1998 addressing to Mr. Bill Clinton said; “Without direct American intervention, Kosovo was headed for all-out war.We will not allow another Bosnia to happen in Kosovo.” 35Nonetheless, as mentioned above Milosevic was determined to go his own way using abusive language against innocent people slandering them as terrorist.General Wesley K.Clark warned him that NATO is ''going to start telling me to move aircraft'' if Serbia did not live up to its agreement. ''You are a war criminal to be threatening Serbia,'' Milosevic replied.On January 28, 1999, NATO allies claimed that they were ready to use force and Britain and France promised to send troops to enforce peace settlement. Two days later, after Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary General, said that the threat of force was justified to get the Serbs to the bargaining table, the allies decided they had justification enough under international law to authorize air strikes against Yugoslavia if it did not agree to negotiate a settlement. 36 The Rambouillet Peace Agreement was the last hope to impose solution between two sides but Milosevic did not even attend the meeting.To sum it up, Milosevic was the key factor to decide whether his country and NATO would go to war. ''It was Milosevic who deliberately and consciously chose to trigger the bombing of his own country,'' Richard Holbrooke said.37 Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner , “Crisis in the Balkans: The Road to War—A special report .; How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War,” The New York Times , April 18, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/18/world/crisis-balkans-road-war-special-report-president-distracted-scandalentered.html (accessed May 13, 2017). 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 35 13 3. Theoretical Part In order to understand the impact of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, in this part of the article I will try to explain the ideas of the two major contradictory IR theories , realism and liberalism.Well-known classical realist Hans J.Morgenthau argues ; all human beings have their will to power.The power-seeking human nature creates a situation where statesmen struggle for power over other states.He further examines; “‘Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action.”38Also, with regard to intervention Morgenthau claims that we must intervene where our national interest requires it and where our power gives a chance to succeed.While neoclassical realists emphasize human nature in the center, neorealism focuses on an anarchic international system in which there is no central authority that governs international politics.Kenneth Waltz, preeminent scholar of neorealism demonstrates that in a self-help international system, foreign policy of state is determined based on its national interest.States are continuously constrained to take care of themselves no one can take care of the system.39Whatsoever, classical neorealism focuses on power-seeking human nature whereas neorealism focuses on an anarchic international system.Despite their different directions, both subdivisions crystalize state’s national interests and their will of increasing power. Contrary to realists who focus on state as major actor, liberalists concerns on the protection of human rights.Classical liberals maintain that human beings possess fundamental natural rights to liberty. Liberalism resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics such as individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity that all liberal democratic societies, by definition, share to some degree.40Another core premise of liberals is that states can 38 Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (Great Clarendon Street: Oxford University Press, 2013) , 66. 39 Kenneth N.Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Philippines:Addison-WesleyPublishing Company, Inc, 1979), 109. 40 Michael Doyle and Stefano Recchia, Stefano Recchia, http://www.stefanorecchia.net/publication_1040.html (accessed May 13, 2017). 1434. 14 cooperate reciprocally.They admit that each state looks for personal gain, yet individuals share some interests which can make some domestic and international cooperation possible.In this case, according to liberals emergence of international organizations such as United Nations is the best choice in spreading interstate cooperation.Michael Walzer, a leading scholar of contemporary liberal internationalism argues that military intervention can be justified as a last resort and as a means to protect civilians from human rights violations, such as genocide and crimes against humanity.Nevertheless, he defines that such humanitarian interventions should not be undertaken unilaterally but rather multilaterally and under the authorization of the United Nations Security Council.Because liberal internationalists believe that multilateralism precludes great powers from following in national interests rather than humanitarian objectives in intervention.41Liberalism theory, due to the fact that protects the fundamental human rights explains better the case of Kosovo.Their motive of defending the humanitarian intervention pertains with many arguments and characteristics.Starting with the suppression of Kosovo autonomy in 1989 by Slobodan Milosevic.Series of non-violent protests against brutal regime and tendencies to regain the autonomous status.Serbian ethnic cleansing against Kosovar Albanians.Failure of Council Resolution 1199 calling for cease-fire among Serbian and Kosovo Liberation Army(KLA).Disregard of Yugoslavian forces to withdraw from Kosovo and continuation of ethnic-cleansing. All these cited factors, legitimated NATO to intervene after the exhaustion of all peaceful resorts.In other words, UN Security Council, due to the principle of non-interference of sovereignty failed to respond timely in Rwanda and Bosnia which caused hundreds of thousands casualities. Responding to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s call for reconciling the dilemma between sovereignty and human rights, the Canadian government took initiatives to establish the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. One of the most remarkable achievements of the ICISS was the creation of the “responsibility to protect” R2P.To sum it up, humanitarian intervention in Kosovo has been a turning point in preventing further genocide and oppression against civilians. 41 Yoshida Yuki, A Theoretical Assessment of Humanitarian Intervention and R2P, http://www.eir.info/2013/01/16/from-kosovo-to-libya-theoretical-assessment-of-humanitarian-intervention-and-theresponsibility-to-protect/ (accessed May 13, 2017). 15 4. Conclusion Surely, Kosovo has been one of the most problematic issue in political and humanitarian agenda.However,when compared to the other failed cases such as Bosnia and Herzegovina , Rwanda and Somalia we should be glad that this has been saved with fewer incidents and fatalities.All this, because of the fact that NATO has intervened timely and by the right direction.Humanitarian intervention in one sovereign state is among most contestable matters.This due to the fact that the two main principles of the United Nations Charter contradicts to each other, one defending the “sovereignty” and the other “human rights, security and peace”.Nontheless, majority of the international law scholars and other advocates when sorting out which one is more valuable, indisputably human lives and human freedom is among most primal and sublime things.Of course humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was not a decision to enter into light.It was easy neither for NATO as an mediator , nor for Serbia as an objector nor for Kosovar Albanias as victims.Yet, the vetoes coming from Russia were another obstacles hampering the process go successful.Being in such a critical position, and taking the best determinant judgement is really hardiness.Furthermore, international commission had no other choice but to response effectively and morally in order to prevent this human tragedy.Massacress and genocide is intolerable.Milosevic has violated the human values by the most cruel and barbaric means.He has encroached and abused all international conventions which calls for freedom, human rights and security.Thus, there should be someone to stop him otherwise he would persist in his bloodthirsty system.In other words,humanitarian intervention in Kosovo is legitimate because it acted according to the rules of international law.To sum it up, humanitarian intervention in Kosovo might be authorized as legitimate due to the fact that it fulfilled all criteria to be legal. 16 Bibliography Annan, Kofi. 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