European institutions

Agenda-setting in the EU takes place in two ways: ‘from above’through high-level political institutions urging EU action, and ‘from below’through policy experts formulating specific proposals in low-level groups andworking parties. This article formulates a theoretical framework for understanding the differences between these two processes. Moreover, it shows how they may inter-act and become intertwined in the course of actual agenda-setting processes. Theutility of the approach is demonstrated in two contrasting case studies: one of EU anti-smoking policy and one of EU anti-bioterrorism policy.

The many faces of the European Council make it a core component of the institutional machinery maintaining relations between the EU and third countries, including Turkey. This chapter identifies the European Council’s roles as the EU’s ‘master of enlargement’, ‘external voice and crisis manager’, and ‘agenda and direction setter’ as its three primary functions that drive the EU–Turkey relationship. The central focus of the chapter is the evolution of the European Council in framing relations with a candidate country—or what many now call a ‘strategic partner’—and the identification of the critical turning points and shifts in the central functions, internal dynamics, and preferences of this key institution. The findings indicate a growing trend toward a more conflictual, relatively hostile relationship between the European Council and Turkey as a result of diverging geopolitical interests—especially in the Eastern Mediterranean—and normative considerations. Furthermore, the analysis reveals an expanding impact of bilateral issues and member states’ individual preferences on the European Council’s role as a driver of EU–Turkey relations. Still, with their powers, the Heads of State or Government are likely to remain a key driver of the future trajectory of the relationship, demonstrating an increased interest in ‘thinking outside of the accession box’ and in framing a relationship model that would safeguard EU–Turkey relations amidst growing disagreements with Ankara.

The European Union is at a make-or-break moment. The current crisis could be beneficial or detrimental for its future. We revisit Schmitter’s model of crisis-induced decision-making cycles (1970) and critically discuss why the current crisis might not be as benign as originally thought.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has become an official institution of the European Union (EU). According to the Treaty, it should provide the Union with ‘impetus’ and ‘general political directions and priorities’. The explicit exclusion of any legislative functions seems to demarcate its role clearly from that of the European Commission, which retains the formal monopoly over legislative initiative. However, Treaty provisions have not prevented the European Council and its President from informally setting the agenda in a detailed way, often creating tension with the Commission. By looking into three high profile cases – the energy climate package, economic governance reform and Schengen reform – through the prism of two theoretical approaches – the principal agent model and ‘joint agenda setting’ approach – this article explores patterns of interactions between the two institutions in legislative agenda setting and shows that the relationship can be best defined in terms of ‘competitive cooperation’.

The economic crisis showed the weaknesses of the institutional system of the European Union, raising questions about its shape. The article aims to determine whether internal structures of the EU institutions and their modes of operation are chances or barriers for effective treaty implementation and the ability of institutions to face unexpected, difficult situations. The article focuses both on the formal structure of the institutions and their human resources. The article aims to conclude if the crisis may give impetus to a significant improvement in the EU institutional system.

Kryzys uwypuklił szereg słabości systemu instytucjonalnego Unii, stając się okazją do ponownej refleksji nad jego kształtem. Artykuł jest próbą zmierzenia się z pytaniem, na ile sposób organizacji wewnętrznej i tryb działania instytucji unijnych stanowi szansę, a na ile – barierę dla efektywnego realizowania celów sformułowanych w traktatach oraz reagowania na bieżące, często trudne i zaskakujące wyzwania. W artykule, oprócz analizy formalnych układów wewnątrzinstytucjonalnych, uwzględniona jest również płaszczyzna personalna. Ważnym pytaniem jest, czy kryzys może przyczynić się do gruntownej naprawy systemu instytucjonalnego UE.

The outcome of the Brexit referendum is the apex of a long history of Euro-British relationships characterised by two opposing but coexisting stereotypes. On the one hand, England appears as the freedom-seeking nation resisting restrictive collective policies imposed by a totalitarian EU regime of faceless Brussels bureaucrats. On the other hand, England seems to resurrect its imperialistic superiority against the purported democracy and horizontality of European institutions. Adopting the notion of “cultural intimacy”—with which Michael Herzfeld analyzes the mutual engagement of contrasting positions in political and administrative practices—this paper addresses the equally stereotypical images of an indifferent, inhuman European bureaucracy and of an insular, cynical Great Britain in the works of Malcolm Bradbury and Tim Parks. Be it the allegedly liberal yet nationalistic stance of Thatcherist anti-Europeanism in Bradbury, or the British disaffection with the purported identitarian and cultural levelling within the common borders of the Schengen area and of the single currency, both authors’ symbolic constructions of European institutions and of British Euroscepticism are built as cultural entanglements of these two realities, and show the need to overcome the reductive conception of Europe as a failed super-state.

This article examines the debates surrounding the Regulation 1303/2013 on structural funds, arguing that the rules adopted in the midst of the eurozone crisis to strengthen the governance of the euro area had spill-over effects on cohesion policy. It shows how, in the fast-burning phase of the crisis (2010–2013), some actors pushed forward the idea of suspending structural funds in case of non-compliance with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, making funding conditional on Member States' compliance with the rules of the new economic governance, and how, after the entry into force of this Regulation, in the slow-burning phase of the crisis (from 2013 onwards), a greater number of actors has been calling for a more flexible interpretation of the rules. To explain the disruption between t1 and t2, the article examines the change in the power relations between and within institutions and the change in ideas.

This article helps to better understand the role orientations of the Central European Members of the European Parliament, the factors that influence their strategies, and the relationship between their roles and activities. Based on the results of a quantitative survey research with MEPs from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in the 2009-2014 term, I argue that it is possible to explain the political roles of MEPs by their attitudes towards politics and policy, and the territorial focus of representation (European vs. national level). Due to the internal mechanisms of the EP and its position in the multi-level governance system of European politics, these two dimensions represent dilemmas that all MEPs face, when it comes to the efficient use of their scarce resources: time and energy. This study demonstrates that socio-demographic factors, attitudes and political socialization all have an influence on what roles MEPs choose. The time spent in the EP, age, previous political experience, party affiliation, left-right self-definition and career ambitions are all important factors that can explain the political behavior of MEPs. The Central European MEPs' focus on politics vs. policy and the European vs. national political arena have different roots, and different variables explain them. Orientation towards politics and policy largely depends on previous political experience and future career ambitions. Focus on the European or the national level is best explained by age, party affiliation and left-right self-definition.

http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/44987
The present study combines practical experience with the implementation of Union law 'on the ground' with an academic approach. It intends to facilitate the interpretation of the fundamental values mentioned in Article 2 TEU and their main enforcement mechanism, Article 7 TEU, by putting them in a historical and comparative context. Both prove the importance of 'homogeneity-provisions' and their enforcement but also illustrate how rarely similar clauses have been used in other multilayer systems. From a practical perspective, the study shows the dilemma the Commission faces when confronted with the question whether to commence a formal procedure under Article 7 TEU. It has two options: either it opens the formal procedure or not. In the first scenario the initiative either finds the necessary majority in the Council/ European (Commission 'gets it right') or it does not (Commission would be overdoing it, " false positive "). In the second scenario, it could happen that the necessary majorities for Article 7 TEU could have been obtained (" false negative "). The present study gives examples for all three outcomes (Weimar, Wallace and Vienna) and illustrates their consequences. It also shows alternative ways for the enforcement of the Fundamental Values protected by Article 2 TEU such as the infringement procedure under Article 258 TEU.
http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/44987

The chapter intends to discuss if there exist a common European media approach to the role and the responsibilities of the EU, at least at the level of the quality and business press.
Some cross-national divergences in how media represent EU are already notorious and incontrovertible. A difference between UK and all the other countries has been repeatedly stressed by most research on the topic. But are contrasts limited only to UK or do involve also other countries? And do such contrasts, if they exist, allow us to argue that EU is still a part of the media domestic political framework? Or, on the contrary, cross-national differences pale in comparison with the emergence of a common representation of Europe? And is the citizens’ view of Europe somehow linked or does it contradict national media coverage? The chapter will try to answer such questions by illustrating and discussing: a) how the European press has described and interpreted the role of the European institutions, i.e. the EU and the ECB; b) how the European press has made predictions on possible consequences of the crisis, in particular about the reinforcement of the EU role; c) how popular trust in the effectiveness of EU -measured through the Eurobarometer data- is consistent with the emerging trends in the media coverage.

In the post-Soviet states of today globalization is taking place predominantly to the West’s values for human rights and fundamental freedoms. This process is being driven by such interna- tional organizations as the European Union, Council of Europe and OSCE, which operate here prima- rily as human-rights protectors. Th organizations have exerted significant pressure on the authori- ties in the countries in this study, especially Azerbaijan, Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine. The media reforms that international bodies are influencing in these countries are generally leading towards a more robust model for independent journalism. The concept of free- dom of mass information is reviving, state broadcasters are being turned into public-service, and other changes are taking place.

Brexit has become one of the hot topics in the last few years. In June 2016, the UK voted for leaving the EU and, since then, the process has been going on. For the first time in the EU history, a member state has started a process for leaving the EU. Many researchers focused on this topic and its possible impacts on the European Union (EU). In this study, the effect of Brexit is researched in terms of English as one of the 24 official languages of the EU. Multilingualism is an important part of the language policy of the EU and the status of English has a special importance in this policy area as being both one of the official and working languages of the EU. The aim of this study is to research how this status will change after the UK leaves the EU.

This open access book explores the new complexities and ambiguities that epitomize EU-Turkey relations. With a strong focus on the developments in the last decade, the book provides full access to a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted relationship through three entry points: (1) Theories and Concepts, (2) Institutions, and (3) Policies. Part I brings together complementary and competing analytical approaches to study the evolution of EU-Turkey relations, ranging from traditional integration theories to novel concepts. Part II investigates the institutional machinery of EU-Turkey relations by analyzing the roles and perspectives of the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. Part III offers analyses of the policies most relevant for the relationship: enlargement policy, trade and macroeconomic policies, foreign and security policy, migration and asylum policies, and energy policy. In Part IV, the volume closes with a systematic survey of the conditions under which cooperative trends in EU-Turkey relations could be (re)invigorated. The systematic setup and the balanced combination of distinguished experts from EU- and Turkey-based institutions make this book a fundamental reading for students, researchers, lecturers, and practitioners of EU-Turkey relations, European integration and Turkish foreign policy.

The primary goal of this book is to trace the European Commission’s strategies of dealing with the politicisation of EU legislation. In a case study on President Jean-Claude Juncker's term of office, the authors of this volume analyse how the EU Commission set and advanced certain political priorities between 2014 and 2019. The analysis focuses on the ten political priorities which the Juncker Commission retained in all of its annual work programmes from its inception onwards, starting with its self-proclaimed role as a ‘political commission’. However, this study’s assessment of the ‘politicisation’ of integration policy is ambiguous: On the one hand, the Juncker Commission deliberately adopted politicised issues and tried to use them as opportunities for political leadership as well as to hone its own institutional profile. On the other hand, controversies and crises repeatedly forced the EU Commission to resort to damage control.

The aim of this PhD thesis is to review and re-envisage the foundation and development of the European People’s Party (EPP). This Thesis is based on primary research data aiming to inspire the academic discussion on the Europarties within the European integration context. Starting from its creation and early-days period, in the 1970s, as the ‘party’ of the Christian Democratic parties from member states of the European Communities and going through the subsequent integration of political parties from Western and, later on, Eastern European countries, in the 1980s and 1990s to its status at the early 2000s.
The originally founded ‘Christian Democratic organisation’ was transformed to a political family, or a ‘network’, of centre-right parties including Christian democratic, conservative and like minded parties. We will attempt to understand why this change took place, under what reasons, dependent and independent variables, normative conditions, within the historical context. We will follow the timeline of events in the wider context of the European integration that has been underlining, historically, our subject.
Our Thesis is structured in two axes: A timeline of ten chapters on the one hand and four hypotheses that we are putting forward. We have also constructed and put in annex information that can be helpful for further research. Highlights are on Annex 8 the list of contents that we have reconstructed from the historical archive of the EPP. First we walk through the historical timeline:
In “Chapter 1: History” we start from the years preceding to the creation of the EPP. We go back to the origins of transnational party cooperation walking through to the discussions in the 1970s for launching new European party federations. We took time to explore not just the EPP historical archive (Codification IX-007-XXX) but also the EUCD archive (IX-004-XXX) and even some volumes from the NEI historical archive (IX-002-XXX) mainly to get familiar with the level of integration of the earlier organisations and historical period in the 1950s and the 1960s.
In “Chapter 2: the creation of the EPP” the reader will find presentation of historical archive accumulated from both archive documents and interviews. We aim to better understand all the aspects behind the creation of the EPP in 1976. We reveal the underlining factors cultivating the desire for a new political organisation, the map of interest of the key players and why it finally kicked off the ground in 1976.
In “Chapter 3: the enlargement of the 1980s” we move on the 1980s, the change of leadership twice in the EPP, in 1984 and 1987, the enlargement of the EPP with new parties from western Europe and the talks about opening up towards the Conservatives.
In “Chapter 4: the opening up of Eastern Europe” we discuss the opening up of the EPP towards the countries of the former Eastern block in central and eastern Europe and the major historical events of the collapse of communism and the emerging new European countries. 
In “Chapter 5: the enlargement to the conservative parties” we explore the opening up to more conservative parties in the 1990s, especially towards the 1994 enlargement, the difficult Scandinavian conservative parties.
In “Chapter: 6 Merger with the EUCD and the EDU” we follow the developments between the EPP and its sister orgsanisations. We put forward all the evidence that demonstrates the core strategy of the EPP to streamline the cooperation in the centre right into one single organisation despite the successful history and record of the EDU and the ‘parent organisation’ background of the EUCD.
In “Chapter 7: Understanding and assessing the EPP enlargement” we touch upon the Europeanisation concept, particularly in Eastern Europe and we contending that it has had different implications to different parties from different countries. Aiming to address these phenomena, we are introducing the term “inhomogenus Europeanisation” to capture this diversity of effects in the political reality of the actors involved. We are further assessing the enlargement beyond Christian Democracy in the context of its historical decline.
Finally, we are reviewing the role of the key protagonists and the German actors in particular, who from a minority position to the right side of the EPP spectrum in the 1970s and 80s it became the dominant power in the centre of the EPP from the 1990s hitherto.
In “Chapter 8: The EPP beyond 1999” we are discussing the developments in the 2000s, the years of reaping the fruits of its enlargement strategy in terms of its parliamentary and party size. After the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, where the EU moved from 15 to 27 member states the EPP continued its restructuring and repositioning. In every single country of the EU enlargement, the EPP had already acquired the most important center-right political party in its ranks.
In “Chapter 9: Europarties and European integration” we are discussing the role of European parties within the European Union institutions and decision making. We are also discussing the widely debated concept of politicization of the Union from the perspective of European parties. This discussion is relevant today in the period of the ongoing financial trouble in the Eurozone and how the crisis has affected the role of the European parties.

Finally, in “Chapter 10: Summary and end remarks” we are putting together the findings from our research findings and secondary sources reading and drawing conclusions on our topic.

The second axis of this work, running parallel to the Timeline, is to contemplate four hypotheses. Each one of them has come out of the primary research for the historical period involved, while it does revisit aspects of what we know today.
The first hypothesis focuses on the foundation period in the 1970s where we will present evidence that the EPP was not founded as a loose federation of parties that would evolve over time and parallel to the gradual integration of the European institutions. Insofar the European Communities did evolve gradually from the mid-1970s to the early 2000s following Treaty reform that delegated more and more powers and competences to the Community level, there is a broader understanding that the EPP followed a similar pattern of integration. We are challenging this universal idea with facts and figures from the historical archive that are probably brought about for the first time.
The second hypothesis is related to the enlargement of the EPP towards non-Christian democratic parties. We will present that the original idea was not to enlarge to parties from other, albeit neighboring, political traditions. Instead, the original expectation was that these parties would adopt, would adhere to Christian Democracy. The idea of enlargement did not exist in the EPP culture and language during its early days in the 1980s and even early 1990s! Surprising or not, prospective members cooperated with this attitude and declared their adherence to the Christian Democratic ideals, regardless of their differing political culture and diverging national context. This applies to parties from both western and eastern Europe.
The third hypothesis reveals the strategy of the EPP towards its enlargement during the 1980s and 1990s, in particular as regards the emerging of new democracies in the central and eastern parts of Europe after the collapse of Communism. Opposite to what we knew up to now the EPP designed and implemented an active policy of proliferation of Christian Democracy towards the new countries and invested significant human and material resources in this direction. We have had very little information before about this but the evidence we bring in is strong and sound. Given that Christian Democracy was already in decline in western Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s this hypothesis says a lot about the culture and the internal dynamics of the EPP. The strategy originated and was inspired by the case of Spain in the late 1980s with the creation of the Partido Popular. Following Spain, the most difficult case of the British Conservatives was explored with a long-lasting project that took over two years to complete with the 1992 agreement between the EPP group and the European Democratic Group in the European Parliament. From the early 1990s, a large project of going east was deployed towards the new democracies.
Last but not least, our fourth hypothesis contemplates the comparative perspective of the EPP today with its early days. Contrary to what is widely accepted, even from skeptics, the EPP today is not more integrated than it was in the early days. The small number of members, the high degree of ideological cohesion and the core ideals of Christian Democracy were the three key factors that, aggregated together, created a highly integrated status. Especially given the broader loose integration of the European Communities. This hypothesis can have significant implications that challenge traditional theories' content about the progress of integration.

Tras atravesar su crisis más profunda, los líderes europeos disponen de cerca de un año,
hasta la celebración de las elecciones europeas de mayo de 2019, para poner en marcha
algunas de las propuestas planteadas para reformar las instituciones y democratizar la
Unión Europea. El presente artículo trata de explicar las causas y consecuencias de la
deriva intergubernamental sufrida en la última década para, posteriormente, analizar y
valorar las propuestas planteadas para su reforma, en particular, la elección indirecta del
presidente de la Comisión, la reducción del número de comisarios, la doble Presidencia de la Comisión y el Consejo Europeo, y la elaboración de listas transnacionales.

This chapter scrutinises how the EU deals with crisis in the quality of democracy (QD) in Member States, and how it seeks to safeguard
European values at the supranational level. I argue that the past and current debates on the power of the EU to safeguard its common values at the supranational level are an illustration of the tensions that the establishment of the EU as a political regime engenders between and among EU and domestic actors. As a reminder, in the context of the
revision of the treaties in the 1990s, the EU sought to reduce its democratic deficit. However, the institutional framework put forward in the 1990s revealed the weak anchors of EU’s input, output and throughput legitimacy in dealing with the rule of law at the European level.
Against this backdrop, the overarching aim of the chapter is to show how,
over time, the EU institutional actors sought to strengthen the input, output and throughput legitimacy of the institutional framework designed to prevent and sanction non-compliance with European values in general and the rule of law in particular. Input legitimacy is related to the question: Who can determine the existence of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ (the prevention mechanism), and who can determine that there is a ‘serious and persistent breach of the common values’ (the penalty mechanism)? Throughput legitimacy is a way to see how to determine the existence of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ (the prevention mechanism’) and how to determine that there is a ‘serious and persistent breach of the common values’ (the sanction mechanism). Output legitimacy refers to the final decision to sanction Member States’ non-compliance
with the EU’s values.

Parlamentarna kontrola bezbednosne politike EU jedno je od ključnih pitanja institucionalnog sistema EU. Kako su nacionalni parlament država članica i Evropski parlament uključeni u proces razvoja i sprovođenja bezbednosne politike EU? Autorka primećuje da postoji "dvostruki demokratski deficit" u institucionalnom sistemu EU, kako na nivou nacionalnih parlamenata, tako i na nivou Evropskog parlamenta. Razvoj spoljne i bezbednosne politike EU počiva na međuvladinoj saradnji , i uloga Evropskog parlamenta je ograničena u toj oblasti, ali ona nije nadomeštena aktivnim učešćem nacionalnih parlamenata u demokratskoj kontroli ove politike. Odredbe Lisabonskog ugovora donose neke novine, koje, međutim, suštinski ne menjaju stvari. Članak će biti podeljen u dva dela. U prvom delu, autorka će analizirati ulogu Evropskog parlamenta u procesu demokratske kontrole bezbednosne politike EU, dok će drugi deo rada biti posvećen ulozi i ograničenjima nacionalnih parlamenata, Autorka zaključuje da postoji paradoks u institucionalnom sistemu EU, jer spoljna i bezbednosna politika EU ima za cilj da promoviše razvoj i jačanje demokratije i pravne države, dok  istovremeno postoji dvostruki demokratski deficit u procesu parlamentarne kontrole ove politike EU.



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Looking for the way out of the current systemic crisis the European Union may transit in line with four scenario: “less Europe”, “more Europe” “consolidating Europe” and “flexible integration”. What are pro & contra of every scenario? What would it mean for Russia?

This case comment focuses on the recent decision Gauweiler and others v Deutscher Bundestag, in which the Court of Justice of the European Union upheld the Outright Monetary Transaction Programme of the European Central Bank.
3 Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo (2015)

The evolution of European citizenship reflects the limits and potential of European integration. Building on the analytical distinction between citizenship as status and citizenship as practice, this paper analyzes how conscientious objectors in Turkey enact themselves as European citizens as they pursue the right of conscientious objection. The European-level political activism of Turkey’s conscientious objectors include litigation at the European Court of Human Rights and contacts established with European institutions, such as the European Commission and Parliament, and with like-minded European activists. Because this European-level political activism is also embedded in a discourse of Europeanness, it amounts to the practice of European citizenship in the absence of formal status. The paper invites a rethinking of European citizenship in ways that include such practices by non-EU citizen political actors and a reflection on their implications of their practices on European citizenship.

I gabinetti non sono figure organizzative peculiari della Commissione europea. Uffici di staff o di diretta collaborazione dei rappresentanti politici sono presenti negli apparati amministrativi di molti ordinamenti statali. Come quelli, anche i gabinetti della Commissione si collocano al punto di intersezione tra politica e amministrazione: da una parte, forniscono assistenza ai responsabili politici che sono chiamati ad assistere (i commissari); dall’altra, trasmettono gli indirizzi alle direzioni generali e ne verificano l’attuazione. Conseguentemente, il loro ruolo è caratterizzato da una accentuata tensione tra le attribuzioni di carattere politico, spettanti ai commissari, e le attribuzioni di carattere amministrativo, spettanti ai direttori generali e agli uffici da essi guidati. A questa si aggiunge una seconda tensione, che è invece tipica dei gabinetti della Commissione: essi sono canali di rappresentanza degli interessi nazionali e, al contempo, uffici chiamati a curare l’interesse dell’istituzione sovranazionale cui appartengono.
Muovendo da questa constatazione, l’indagine persegue un duplice obiettivo. Il primo è analizzare l’organizzazione ed il funzionamento dei gabinetti della Commissione europea, per accertare se i gabinetti comunitari vivano in funzione dei commissari (cioè della politica) o, piuttosto, degli apparati da essi guidati (cioè dell’amministrazione); inoltre, se essi operino in funzione della collegialità (sovranazionale) o, invece, dei governi (nazionali).
Il secondo obiettivo è esaminare l’evoluzione del sistema dei gabinetti in relazione al percorso istituzionale compiuto dalla Commissione. A tal fine, si analizza, per un verso, l’impatto dei gabinetti sul funzionamento interno della Commissione (l’attenzione è rivolta, in particolare, ai gabinetti presidenziali del ventennio 1985-2004); per altro verso, l’impatto che le trasformazioni della Commissione (da «amministrazione di missione» ad «amministrazione di gestione» e, quindi, ad «hub» di reti transgovernative) hanno prodotto sull’evoluzione del ruolo dei gabinetti.

According to Functionalist theory sovereign states are not the only agents of social changes. Through its expansion waves, the EU has operated as an agent of social changes and democratization within national environments. The economic crisis in the EU sets challenges to functionalist theory and the ability of institutions to support national constitutional order and operate within the Treaty-based order

This article focuses on the role of regional institutions and political practices in strengthening multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Particular attention is devoted to coordination between Brazil and Argentina with a view to forging a "South American position" vis-à-vis the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC). Empirical evidence suggests that informal arrangements between the two countries were capable of involving other South American leaders and promoting the exchange of information among different groups of states, most notably during the 2006 BTWC review conference. This paper also sheds light on the identification of specific features that allow for increasing visibility and actorness of regional powers in promoting universality of MSRs, as well as the limitations faced by these players.

Que la Unión Europea es actualmente una organización supranacional dirigida por los estados que la forman es una obviedad. Sin embargo, no es menos cierto que muchas de las regiones que integran esos estados llevan un cuarto de siglo intentando influir en las decisiones que se toman en Bruselas, y que desde 1992, con motivo del Tratado de Maastricht, tienen reconocida una cierta participación dentro del proceso decisional europeo. De un tiempo a esta parte, las regiones se han concienciado de que su acción exterior o paradiplomacia a escala europea no es una entelequia sino una realidad. Que no pueden esperar a que Europa venga hasta ellas, sino que deben activarse hacia Bruselas, si quieren participar y beneficiarse de las decisiones europeas. Por ello, desde hace más de tres lustros vienen perfeccionando sus cauces, más o menos formales, de interacción con las instituciones de Bruselas. La participación (directa o mediada a través de sus estados) en el Consejo de Ministros de la UE, en la Comisión Europea, en el Comité de las Regiones, en las asociaciones interregionales, o la disposición de delegaciones en Bruselas, son, como veremos, los mecanismos más decisivos, que definen actualmente las muy diferentes estrategias regionales a escala europea.