Gulf Arab States

Abstract:
Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for Award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY.

The root causes of the GCC's employment problems are interlocked – a system of national education that has largely not been competitive or well aligned with the needs of modern industry, a culture of citizens conditioned to a protective government, a public sector that is overstaffed and inefficient, and counterproductive policies in areas such as immigration and social welfare. It is also reflected in the highly distorted labour market in the region, founded on a socio-ethnic duality. In some respects the labour market is rigid, with pronounced differences in the wages for non-nationals and nationals. In other aspects it is flexible as current laws make it very easy to import or deport foreigners based on hiring/firing. This is also why“unemployment” is a national issue, for if and when a foreigner‟s work visa is terminated, he or she is obliged to return to the home country.
In the final analysis  –
• At the GCC level, the dissertation research disproves the hypothesis that growing numbers of GCC nationals have entered the private sector due to workforce nationalisation programmes, replacing foreign labour.
• The second hypothesis has been validated in that the growing mismatch between available local labour and the labour market requirements has undermined the success of Emiratisation.
• Finally, the failure of Emiratisation has been concluded while validating the hypothesis that Indian labour migration to the UAE has been vigorous despite Emiratisation.

The Arab world stretches from the Indian Ocean in the
East to the Atlantic Ocean in the West. Twenty Arab
countries occupy the southern and eastern shores of the
Mediterranean and border the Red Sea.
It is an area of historical importance, as it is the birthplace
of the world’s three Abrahamic religions. For centuries, the
region was a hub of groundbreaking science. It is of
contemporary strategic importance owing to its location
and a wealth of subterranean natural resources, essentially
in the form of oil and natural gas – 32% of the world’s
known natural gas reserves are to be found in the region –
as well as phosphate: Morocco alone possesses more than
half of the world’s reserves.
The region encompasses remarkable cultural similarities as
well as highly distinct political and economic systems with a
heterogeneous social fabric. Its peoples share a commonality
of language, history and religion but their societies are at
variance in terms of natural wealth, governance, currency,
traditions and socio-economic systems.
The period since the UNESCO Science Report 2005
appeared has been one of mixed fortunes for Arab
countries. The region has witnessed continuing political
upheaval and military conflict in the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank, Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan. The oil-exporting
Arab states of Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have enjoyed a
short-lived downpour of revenue resulting from the hike
in international oil prices to a peak of more than US$ 140 a
barrel in July 2008. Conversely, oil-importing countries
such as Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco have faced fiscal
difficulties due to their mounting national energy bills, a
situation compounded by the associated rise in the cost of
imported food commodities.
The subsequent plummet in oil prices, which fell to about
US$ 40 by the end of 2008 before recovering slightly in
2009, has brought this exceptional situation to an end.
It has also highlighted the volatility of oil prices and the
need for Arab oil-exporting countries to diversify their
economies in future.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the same period also
witnessed renewed interest on the part of many Arab
countries in reinvigorating science and technology (S&T)
and higher education, with the launch of a number of topdown
initiatives to support education and research. Some
of these will be highlighted in the present chapter. A
handful of countries have also approved plans to allocate
more resources to research and development (R&D),
among them Egypt, Tunisia and Qatar.
The current global economic recession may not affect
Arab states in the immediate term, as the banking sector
in the majority of Arab states is highly regulated and only
loosely linked to international money markets. However,
the economic fallout will ultimately be felt by all,
negatively affecting foreign direct investment flowing into
Arab countries and real estate markets. This will cause a
slowdown in economic growth and a rise in
unemployment in the region. Arab countries reliant on
exporting goods and services to the USA and European
Union (EU) and those that normally receive aid from these
quarters may suffer. Even before the economic recession
emerged in the last quarter of 2008, unemployment in the
Arab world was higher than in any other part of the world,
at around 12%. Young job-seekers constitute over 40% of
the region’s unemployed (UNESCWA, 2007).
Despite the international economic uncertainty, Arab
states will have no choice but to stimulate science,
technology and innovation (STI), together with the
education sector, if only to overcome some lingering
problems like food, water and energy insecurity. Arab
countries can also learn from the remarkable socioeconomic
progress of countries such as Brazil, China,
India, Malaysia and Mexico, due in part to S&T.

he severe scarcity of freshwater in the Arabian Peninsula has forced the GCC countries to turn to the sea for a solution, rather than to other countries, near or far. They have chosen to desalinate seawater and ground water in order to ensure their supply, largely as a result of their geo-climatic and geopolitical settings. The hydrological reasons are self-evident, but the geopolitical considerations are the focus of this chapter. It will investigate the geopolitics of water scarcity in the Middle East, with a particular focus on what it means for the Gulf states. It will also discuss the political and security risks of reliance on desalination plants and on water imports.

The Yemen, is the birth place and hub for a number of monotheistic religious convictions . In its North West region, just 243 kilometers away from San'aa, the official capital of the Republic of Yemen , lies a spiritual center, a holy metropolis known as Saa'da  .
It is to Zaidi Islam as Qum is to Shia Islam and Mecca is to Sunni Islam. It is where the scholars dwell, to read, learn and teach their disciples to carry on the doctrine and preserve the faith throughout history.
It is here that the Houthi phenomenon first appeared.
This study focuses on the very beginnings of Houthism as a phenomenon, it's source and affiliations. It is but the first part of a series of papers that will delve into the movement as it expands over time.

The search for security by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states makes them interested not only in global options with their traditional allies but also in other potential opportunities, such as an engagement with China. Seeking options, of course, does not assume abandoning established ties, nor does it assume major power confrontation over involvement in Gulf politics. Rather, it aims to minimize GCC vulnerabilities that have the potential to emerge from a lack of alliance options. It is timely, therefore, to ponder the potential China has to contribute to the security of the GCC. China-GCC relations have been growing steadily, especially in this decade. Formal relations, which are mostly bilaterally-structured between individual GCC states and China, are mostly focused on the realms of economy and trade. Discussions of military and security relations are underdeveloped; nevertheless, in the past few years, the phrase ‘strategic partnership’ has been used by both sides to signal interests in something more than the purely economic. Such discussions come at a time when GCC leaders are trying to grasp the full long-term implications of America’s global politics vis-à-vis China and other major powers, its ‘pivot to Asia’, as well as its Gulf policies (especially towards Iran). Moreover, discussions about GCC-China ties are occurring in the midst of an increase in China’s global political profile. Questions which arise from this are: Can China be a security partner, and how? And what would a ‘strategic partnership’ entail? Asking if China is a viable security partner for GCC states has two dimensions: GCC security preferences and perceptions of what could China offer, and Chinese willingness and capacity to be a partner. This chapter is dedicated to interrogating the former.

In trying to think through the potential for GCC-China security ties and the shape they can take, the chapter starts with an investigation of how the relationship has been understood in official communications from the GCC side; it tries to unpack the many meanings of a “strategic partnership.” After which it investigates security issues of concern to the GCC and tries to see how GCC decision makers see China’s position on them. Building on the understanding that geographic proximity correlates positively with security concerns/threats, the chapter looks at three “geographic dimensions” in identifying such security issues: the GCC neighborhood, the Middle East, and the global system. The writer then examines what China’s position has been in regards to these concerns with the aim of understanding where mutual grounds and compatible preferences exist on which further security ties could be built.

Four preliminary findings can be summarized. First, political and security-related coordination lags behind trade and business deals. Second, China and the GCC states have interests in securing energy and trade routes such as in the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Gulf, and the Red Sea; here the GCC seems to be interested in more Chinese initiatives in security-seeking. Third, China and the GCC have incompatibilities on issues such as intra-Gulf relations, Iran, Israel, and overall partisan support. Fourth, the GCC states and China assess their options towards each other on the backdrop of a complex canvas of ties both have with the United States; GCC states see a strategic partnership in the security field as a long-term commitment, not as a transaction. Thus, while tactical changes in China-GCC relations are occurring, a strategic shift does not appear in the making.

(English follows)

Mariage et famille dans le Golfe arabe : vers un bouleversement politique ?

Depuis la fin des années 1970, la nuptialité a connu des transformations importantes dans tous les pays arabes, dont les plus significatives sont l’augmentation de l’âge moyen au premier mariage et l’émergence du célibat féminin. Les États du Golfe, étudiés dans cet article, n’échappent pas à cette évolution. Or, le mariage dans le monde arabe, rite de passage à l’âge adulte, est aussi le lieu de la reproduction des institutions : le mariage est donc une question politique. Après une présentation des évolutions récentes de la nuptialité dans les six pays du Golfe, l’article analyse l’impact de ces mutations sur les dynamiques sociales caractérisant cette région (les contraintes socio-économiques posées au choix du conjoint, les relations entre sexes et entre générations, l’évolution des structures familiales). Les données montrent que sont partout défiés l’idéal arabe du mariage précoce et universel, la domination masculine et celle des aînés. En conséquence, cette évolution des comportements sociodémographiques pourrait également menacer les pouvoirs autoritaires et « néopatriarcaux » de la région. Une analyse des débats populaires et politiques menés sur la question du mariage en Arabie saoudite montre en effet que celle-ci est instrumentalisée dans le processus de réforme sociopolitique en cours dans le royaume, afin de contrer l’emprise de certains acteurs sur le champ social.

Mots clés : nuptialité ; mariage ; divorce ; famille ; structures familiales, démographie politique ; politique démographique ; politique sociale ; pays du Golfe ; Arabie Saoudite ; Koweït ; Émirats arabes unis ; Oman ; Qatar ; Bahreïn.

Marriage and Family in the Arab Gulf States: Towards a Political Transition?

Since the end of the 1970’s, marriage patterns have undergone tremendous changes in every Arab country. Most significant among them are the increase in the age at first marriage and the emergence of female celibacy, as experienced in the Arab Gulf. Yet, marriage in the Arab world is a rite of passage to adulthood, as well as an essential element in the process of reproducing sociopolitical institutions. This gives the marriage issue a political outreach which is the topic of the paper. After describing recent changes in the marriage patterns experienced in the six Arab Gulf States over the last four decades, the paper analyses the impact of such changes on the social dynamics characterizing the region (socioeconomic constraints put to marrying and spouse’ choice; male-female and intergenerational relationships; the evolution of family structures). Data emphasize that everywhere in the region, the ideal of early and universal marriages, as well as males’ and elders’ domination are fading. Therefore, the evolution of socio-demographic behaviors may challenge authoritarian and “neopatriarcal” powers in the region. As the matter of facts, the analysis of popular and political debates tackling the marriage issue in Saudi Arabia shows that the topic is instrumentalised within the reform process ongoing in the Kingdom, in order to counter the influence of some political forces.

Keywords: marriage; divorce; family; family structures; political demography; demographic policy; social policy; Gulf States; Saudi Arabia; Kuwait; United Arab Emirates; Oman; Qatar; Bahrain.

استضاف المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات، يوم الأربعاء 9 آب/ أغسطس 2017، نخبة من الباحثين والمختصين القطريين ناقشوا الجوانب والآثار الاقتصادية والقانونية والسياسية المترتبة على الأزمة الخليجية التي تفجرت في 5 حزيران/ يونيو 2017 بإعلان ثلاث دول خليجية ومصر قطع علاقاتها الدبلوماسية مع قطر، وفرض حصار جوي وبري وبحري عليها. وشارك في الندوة كلٌ من الدكتور خالد الخاطر الخبير في السياسة النقدية وعلم الاقتصاد السياسي، والدكتور محمد الخليفي عميد كلية القانون بجامعة قطر، والدكتور ماجد الأنصاري أستاذ علم الاجتماع السياسي بجامعة قطر.

This paper explores how Dubai’s 50-year charter aligns the emirate’s development trajectory with the expansionist economic policies of Asian economies – particularly those of China. Through a comprehensive analysis of the charter’s components, the paper argues that Dubai’s charter embeds the emirate’s economic strategy within China’s global infrastructure developments and investments. The paper begins with a contextualization of the current state of economic cooperation between Dubai and China before analyzing how the 50-year charter builds on these foundations and foreshadows the creation of new economic linkages. The work concludes by assessing how Chinese engagement with a Dubai-focused conceptualization of economic growth may affect economic and political dynamics in Abu Dhabi and the northern emirates.

The growth of women’s participation in parliaments worldwide is still notably low and, in response, the majority of governments have introduced policy measures to redress the gender imbalance. In the United Arab Emirates, a country that recently initiated an electoral parliamentary process, elections were held in 2006 and included women as both voters and candidates for the first time. This historical juncture provides a timely opportunity for analyzing the entry of women into parliamentary life in the UAE, and to contribute to the global debate on closing the political gender gap. Based on interviews with members of the Federal National Council, surveys of the opinions of male and female candidates who participated in the UAE elections, and archival material from the election campaigns, this study investigates key themes in the nature of women’s roles in the political process. The findings of this study demonstrate commonalities between the experiences of both male and female politicians, as well as critical gender-specific  challenges.

INTRODUZIONE "Mare fra le terre", il Mediterraneo ha una storia ininterrotta quale crocevia di scambio e migrazioni, di incontro tra millenarie civiltà ma anche dei loro confl itti. È il mare delle assonanze e dei dialetti, vertiginoso turbinio di navi che inondano di mille voci diverse le terre che su di esso si affacciano, immensa distesa che collega e separa, in cicli storici sempre mutevoli, fl oride regioni e poveri territori.

Citation:
Randeree, K., Al Youha, H. (2009) Strategic Management of Performance: An Examination of Public Sector Organizations in the United Arab Emirates, The International Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Change Management, 9(4) 123-134.

This paper outlines a mechanism for the development and implementation of a strategic performance management framework within government departments in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The work also addresses corporate performance management for governmental organizations dealing with service and operations with the aim of evaluating existing performance management systems and identifying major issues and challenges affecting their implementation. This research has enabled the identification of the most appropriate systems and indicators for utilization within all
government divisions. Thus, through the use of effective performance management systems, an organization can develop performance related strategies and generate accurate and timely reports pertinent to organizational management activities. Consequently, organizational leaders and senior managers are equipped for decision-making based on proper measures, with the aim of boosting organizational efficiency and productivity.

Raisa, a twenty-two-year-old Emirati woman, was standing with her husband and friends at the valet of a popular fi ve-star hotel in Jumeirah. It was 11 p.m., and they were waiting for their cars after having had dinner at one of the hotel's restaurants. The hotel was frequented both by Emiratis and wealthy residents and tourists, but today-only in the valet area-it was different. Raisa noticed that they were surrounded by Westerners dressed in their evening wear, while she and her friends stood out in their abayas. Raisa said it was the fi rst time she had felt odd in her own country. Raisa and her friends were no strangers to socializing in spaces where they encountered people of different nationalities. Their favorite restaurants were at Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), where a minority of Emiratis and a much larger group of Westerners, Arabs, South Asians, and other elites went to socialize, dine, and/or drink at upscale places such as Zuma or BOCA. The restaurants in posh hotels and DIFC differed from the ones found in shopping malls or on the city's streets because they served alcohol, had a larger Western clientele, and were signifi cantly more exclusive. Many of these restaurants became like lounges in the evening, playing the loud music one might fi nd at a bar or nightclub. Because DIFC is known for its nightlife, some women also go there in evening wear, as they would to the hotel in Jumeirah where Raisa found them. In these spaces, Raisa and

The crisis symbolised by the withdrawal from Doha of the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Bahrain in March, 2014, was the first of its kind since the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and therefore set a precedent in terms of dispute resolution between the six member states. The disagreement that sparked the ambassadors’ withdrawal was among the most serious in recent years, and threatened to seriously undermine relations between the GCC states. The crisis certainly affected the GCC negatively at first – raising questions among member states, revealing shifts in their political agendas, and changing the balance of power in the region to some extent.
This chapter discusses causes of the crisis, and a review of its development and eventual resolution with the signing of the Riyadh Supplementary Agreement on 16 November 2014. This chapter suggests that the crisis will continue to affect the GCC in future. While the immediate crisis has passed, the loss of trust between the GCC states is likely to take some time to resolve. Nevertheless, the resolutions that emerged from the 35th GCC summit held in Doha on 9 December 2014 indicate a kind of convergence in understanding among the GCC countries on a number of regional issues. This convergence was arrived at in the context of various regional pressures on the member states and the Gulf region as a whole, stemming particularly from concerns around the emergence of the Islamic State and Iran’s nuclear programme. Finally, the chapter argues that resolution of the crisis is indicative of the maturity of the GCC states, and reflects their ability to focus on prioritising their own local interests. In the longer term, it seems likely that this maturity will enhance integration and strengthen the GCC.

Deepak Unnikrishnan’s debut text, Temporary People, attempts to explore certain vulnerabilities and anxieties of transience that accompany emigrants to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, where citizenship is not an option. By representing one of the largest Gulf diaspora in contemporary history—the Keralan emigrants or pravasis—as spectral figures and as absence-presences that signal a non-present presence in the Gulf, Unnikrishnan’s book attempts to retrieve and register their occulted histories on the Gulf landscape. In particular, this article explores how, by creating a Keralan Gulf-pravasi spectre, Unnikrishnan critically engages with a more varied version of Gulf diasporic experience and, therefore, a more complex definition of emigration itself.

Saudi oil strategy and its key role as ‘swing producer’ in the global energy market are examined by Naser al-Tamimi in chapter five. In particular, the author takes into account the strategy that Saudi Arabia adopted in the past year after the decision not to cut oil production by OPEC countries, of which it is the undisputed leader. On the one hand, changing dynamics in the global oil market – in particular increasing hydrocarbon supplies from the US, Canada, Russia and potentially Iran – are challenging Saudi Arabia’s leading position. On the other, growing domestic consumption and fuel subsidies play a role in Riyadh’s policy. By putting together the international and the domestic factor, the author ex-plains the ongoing changes in Saudi oil strategy to keep its market share and expand its role in the refining sector. He finally argues that Saudi Arabia is gradually withdrawing from its role as swing supplier and stresses that reducing its dependence on oil through economic diversification is the only choice for the kingdom.

This essay was written for the book Gulf Labor: High Culture /Hard Labor (OR books, 2015, Andrew Ross editor). It offers a brief historical sketch of artists who, in response to external, political events, chose to abandon their studio practice in order to engage in direct actions, cultural boycotts, strikes and other militant tactics. One aim of the text is to situate the activity of Gulf Labor Coalition and G.U.L.F. within a genealogy of committed art, suggesting that there is a definite continuity between present and past politicized artistic practices. But the conclusion is also made that something new is also underway in so far as the once robust cultural politics of the cold war era have now become just politics, plain and simple. And artists, who once earnestly sought to identify with workers in the 1930s and 1960s, have in fact become, despite their creative virtuosity, just one more precarious worker amongst others.

The Qatar-GCC diplomatic crisis began when three members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries namely Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain abruptly cut off diplomatic relations with Qatar in June 2017. The ‘Qatar-Gulf Crisis’ is now 10 months old, and has spread to Horn of Africa making it a hotspot for rivalry. Initially, two traditional pro-Saudi countries in the region, Sudan and Somalia, have preferred to stay neutral in the diplomatic spat and urged dialogue. This report argues that Qatar’s diplomatic presence in the region, especially in Sudan and Somalia, contributed to their neutral stance. It also contends that Turkey’s engagements in both these countries and its position in the Qatar-Gulf spat influenced their position.

School leaders sit at the fulcrum of educational reform initiatives. This is particularly the case in decentralised school systems in which schools have relatively high levels of autonomy, or decision-making rights, in relation to operational and instructional matters. However, even in less decentralised systems, school-level leaders must work in concert with district supervisors and teachers if desired reforms are to lead to changes in classroom practices and improvements in outcomes for children and young people.

This working paper for the National Endowment for Democracy/International Forum for Democratic Studies looks at the interplay among the environment (including Western/EU/US policies), domestic illiberal foces in the Western Balkans, and foreign authoritarian actors (Russia, Turkey, China, the Gulf states) in the media and public space.

Chapter 5 in Sanjay Singh (ed.), West Asia in Transition: Volume II, New Delhi: Delhi Policy Group and IDSA, 2018.

This chapter examines aspects of Saudi foreign policy, in particular how the Kingdom views and addresses the changes in the region, the challenges it faces, and the strengths and limitations of its approach. It also discusses the Saudi-Iran geopolitical rivalry, and looks at the Saudi involvement in the proxy conflicts in Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. Another aspect the paper addresses is whether there is an emerging Saudi-Egypt-Turkey-Qatar axis.

This is a discussion paper for the inter-regional knowledge sharing forum on "Good practices and lessons learned on promoting international cooperation and partnerships to realize a fair migration agenda for migrant domestic workers in Africa, the Arab States and Asia." The forum aims to promote: (i) the sharing of good practices and innovations for protecting domestic workers; (ii) priority-setting and consensus-building between countries of origin on issues related to the protection of migrant domestic workers; and, (iii) priority-setting and consensus-building between countries of origin and countries of destination.

The data from recent excavations in the Oman peninsula, especially in the Ja’alan and the Jebel Qara (Sultanate of
Oman) enable us better to refine certain cultural entities and to define new ones, to help determine the chronology of a part of the late prehistory of south-eastern Arabia. To begin with, the “empty quarter of the early Holocene” is half
full: “Fasad facies” characterizes one of the earliest Holocene hunter-gatherers occupation in Oman (8000–7500 BC).
Today we possess data from several stratified sites, enabling definition of two quite distinct Neolithic techno-facies,
which appear in succession: the trihedral points facies between 6500 and 4500 BC, and the facies of  the points with diamond-shaped section between 4500 and about 3800–3700 BC.

The Arab Gulf States are the largest hosts of international branch campuses globally. By increasing higher education capacity in the Arab Gulf States by over 30,000 places, foreign institutions have, through various forms of transnational provision, increased significantly the accessibility of higher education to young people living in these countries. However, critics of transnational higher education have suggested that it can be seen as the new neocolonialism, which benefits the providers much more than the receivers. This study aims to identify the stakeholders that might benefit from transnational higher education in the Arab Gulf States, and to examine the extent to which those stakeholders are actually benefiting from it. It was found that transnational higher education is playing a large role in the economic, cultural and social development of the Arab Gulf States.

In the increasingly globalized context of the UAE, women’s leadership
development programs have become high on the agenda of government,
academic and private sector organizations. Accordingly, the UAE
is an interesting location to examine the growth in women’s leadership
development programs and to better understand their evolution, goals and impacts. These programs vary greatly in levels of impact, some providing models to follow and continue building upon and others offering a learning opportunity on what works and what doesn’t in the UAE particularly and the region more generally. With a roundtable discussion on women’s leadership development as a backdrop,
which brought together experts from three key sectors (private, public,
academic), this policy brief reevaluates women’s leadership development programs in the UAE. Through a diversity of perspectives, important questions regarding women’s leadership development are posed with the ultimate goal to present key recommendations to policy makers in the UAE about how to improve and strengthen such programs.

In this essay, essay, I explore an educational approach which aims to address the thinking/feeling binary in a university context. I start with describing my complex insider-outsider status in the US academy shaped by varying axes of privilege and disadvantage unique to my positionality at an American “global network” university in the Gulf region. I then present a case study of critical pedagogy to teach gender studies in the Gulf using three processes: deep listening, embodied reading, and self tracing and share illustrations of these. Finally, I share my reflections about the relationship between knowledge production and teaching and argue that decolonial pedagogy is a form of research and practice.

يعد تأخر الدول العربية في الانتقال الى نظم حكم ديمقراطية من أبرز التحديات التي يواجهها العرب. فخلال العقود القليلة الماضية لم تشهد هذه الدول حالة إنتقال مكتملة الى الديمقراطية. وقد تأكد ذلك من خلال مؤشرات ودراسات الديمقراطية داخل الدول العربية وخارجها, والتي منها مساهمات مشروع دراسات الديمقراطية في البلدان العربية بشكل عام وجلسات اللقاء السنوي الثامن عشر على وجه الخصوص. 
ولعل واحدة من أهم النتائج التي خرج بها اللقاء الثامن عشر للمشروع، حول أسباب تأخر الدول العربية في الانتقال الى نظم حكم ديمقراطية، هو غياب كتلة تاريخية  فاعلة في كل دولة من الدول العربية. كتلة تُؤسس تنظيماتها الداخلية والعلاقة بين أطرافها على قاعدة الديمقراطية، وتعمل أطرافها بشكل مشترك من أجل إقامة نظام حكم ديمقراطي. ومن أجل المساهمة في توضيح ما نقصده تحديدًا بمفهوم الكتلة التاريخية على قاعدة الديمقراطية تم إعداد هذه الدراسة.
وهذه الدراسة، بالتالي، ليست محاولة لتطبيق نظريات أو أطر مسبقة على الدول العربية، وإنما هي دراسة استقرائية تروم ترجمة الواقع العربي المعاش - بأبعاده المختلفة وبمخاطره المتنوعة وبإمكانات النهوض المتوفرة فيه- إلى رؤية عامة وخطط عمل مناسبة لكل حالة انتقال تُسهم في تغيير هذا الواقع. والدراسة تستفيد في هذا من مفاهيم وأفكار قدمها مفكرون وسياسيون سابقون، ومن تجارب دول مرت بأوضاع كالتي تمر بها الدول العربية اليوم. وهي تستكمل ما أنتجه مشروع دراسات الديمقراطية، منذ تأسيسه عام 1990, من دراسات وبحوث وحوارات من أجل تنمية وإعداد رؤية مشتركة لتعزيز المساعي الديمقراطية في البلدان العربية.
وتجدر الإشارة، بدايةً، إلى أن مفهوم "الكتلة التاريخية على قاعدة الديمقراطية" يشير الى مجال أضيق من مجال مصطلح الكتلة التاريخية لدى أنطونيو جرامشي ومحمد عابد الجابري وخيرالدين حسيب. فما نقصده هنا هو ائتلاف من أجل الديمقراطية بين التيارات والقوى السياسية التي تنشد التغيير السلمي وتعمل مجتمعة من أجل الانتقال الى نظام حكم ديمقراطي في دولة معينة، ملتزمة في ذلك بممارسة الديمقراطية داخلها (أي داخل تنظيمات هذه التيارات والقوى) وفيما بينها. وذلك على اعتبار أن الديمقراطية -إلى جانب كونها أحد الأهداف الوطنية الكبرى- هي أيضًا وسيلة أساسية لتحقيق بقية تلك الأهداف. إن الكتلة هي ائتلاف لقيام "حزب الشعب" من أجل المطالبة بوضع وتطبيق دستور ديمقراطي, في مقابل "حزب الحاكم" الذي يحشده الحاكم العربي من الموالين والمنافقين والمضطرين من الموظفين العموميين وبعض رجال الأعمال وغيرهم.
وتأسيسًا على ما تقدم، تحاول الدراسة سبْر أغوار الطريق المجرب تاريخيًا للانتقال إلى أنظمة الحكم الديمقراطي، وهو تكتل القوى التي تنشد التغيير السياسي، كبديل للمسارات العنيفة للتغيير مثل الانقلابات العسكرية أو الثورات أو الغزو الخارجي.  وسيتم ذلك عن طريق ضبط مفهوم "الكتلة التاريخية على قاعدة الديمقراطية" من خلال الإجابة عن خمسة أسئلة، هي:
أولاً: لماذا الدعوة إلى "كتلة تاريخية على قاعدة الديمقراطية" في كل دولة عربية؟
ثانيًا: ما الهدف من الكتلة التاريخية؟ وما الذي يمكن أن تسهم في انجازه من غايات؟
ثالثًا: مَنْ هم أطراف الكتلة؟ 
رابعًا: ما المتطلبات الأساسية لتشكيل الكتلة التاريخية؟ ولماذا هي "على قاعدة الديمقراطية"؟
خامسًا: ما المهام التي يجب على أطراف الكتلة التاريخية القيام بها حتى تتحقق أهداف الكتلة؟

This paper aims at exploring how the European Union (EU) could contribute to tackling the socio-economic challenges facing the countries of the Gulf, thus also capitalising on the opportunity to inject new stimulus into its relations with the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC). In particular, the paper argues in favour of pursuing a strategic dialogue through a new economic framework focused on addressing some of the critical issues standing in the way of development sustainability in the Gulf. A special attention is devoted to specific rising sectors that, as drivers of soft power, could impact the mutual perception across the two regions. Against this backdrop, Oman is presented as a case study as it could be a significantly fertile terrain to apply this framework and, at the same time, the country has shown to be a peculiar actor in foreign policy, one that the EU should better engage.

The Gulf countries have become an increasingly lucrative market for international arms trade, especially since the shrinking of Western defence budgets added fuel to the global export race in their direction. Amidst the profuse literature on security relations of the Gulf with outside powers, however, few publications aimed at explaining the incentives driving this trade beyond security motives on the part of clients, and economic determinism on the part of suppliers. This paper, which focuses on evolving trends of arms trade in Qatar and the UAE, aims at filling this gap by offering an overview of their multifaceted internal and international drivers and the way it has impacted the rules of the regional and global security game.

Qatari and Emirati defence procurement used to be a means to an end that had little to do with addressing threats they faced on their own, let alone gaining more power on the international stage. Because they were small – and young – states unable to overcome their own security dilemma, their military acquisition served other main purposes.

The author hence begins by focusing on the famous “glitter factor” implied in their arms acquisitions. She starts by giving an overview of the reactions that this importance of – sparkly – appearances in Gulf countries’ arms purchases stirs before trying and analysing the internal and international motivations behind this reality.

Then, the essay turns to all indirect ways through which arms trade in Qatar and the UAE guarantee the security and stability of the state and, above all, the regime. Pointing to multiple international and domestic political, social and strategic determinants playing out in this area, the author argues that it perfectly illustrates their multifaceted survival strategy as “Small Princes-States”.

Finally, the study turns to new dynamics of arms trade in Qatar and the UAE as a consequence of new external incentives – chief among which was the global economic context combined with the regional turmoil and its associated vacuum of power – meeting with new internal priorities. The author points to the two countries’ recent assertiveness, analyses the impact this has on the Client State – Supplying State – Industrial company triangle, and questions whether or not this can lead to new rules of the regional and global security game.

This article explores the techniques and strategies used by Ottoman authorities to control the Bedouin with a specific focus on the province of Hijaz between 1840 and 1908. Using primary sources from the Ottoman and British archives, it argues that the Ottoman Empire developed a ‘politics of negotiation’ towards the tribes in its attempt to secure cities and major pilgrimage and trade routes against tribal attack. The principal agents of the empire who made this negotiated governance possible were the amir of Mecca and the governor of Hijaz. As a result of this policy, imperial authorities had to give significant concessions to the tribes, and they thus incorporated them into the province’s imperial order. When the Ottoman economy went through a crisis, as in the 1900s, negotiated governance and order faced great problems.

This article explores how and why some national governments seek to manage and control tourist-oriented narratives about historic sites and artefacts. Discussing ethnographic research among tour guides, tourists and government representatives in Oman, the paper reveals how the country's historic sites are overwhelmingly staged and presented without historical information. Instead, history is displaced by sanitised presentations of cultural heritage, the display of which draws an "exotic veil", crafted to enchant and deflect tourist attention from politically sensitive historical events and legacies. The study examines reasons for this policy, and its implications for tourists and those working in the tourism industry. Many of Oman's tour guides and site representatives are from marginalised groupings, experiencing inequalities due to historical family, tribal and former slave status. The state-sustained exotic veil on history means that such workers are obliged to collude in denying the historical reasons for their own experiences of injustice and inequality.

Focusing on the UAE, this paper examines how Emirati men use their commonly worn kandora – a simple, long white robe – in order to represent the “Arab man.” Understanding the kandora as a “national uniform,” Emirati men claim their privileges in everyday life by wearing their dress as it signifies their nationality. However, the kandora can be traced as an intersectional garment that men furthermore utilize to embody a sense of traditionality. This is meaningful in contrast to Emirati women, who have entered the fashion market with the abaya, a long black dress for women that is considered to be “modern.” Against this backdrop, this paper argues, Emirati men follow an idea of non-fashion to embody the “pure traditional Arab man” in order to retain their male authority.