Imre Lakatos

Pentru a analiza conceptele de euristica și toleranță metodologică dezvoltate de Lakatos, m-am concentrat pe secțiunea ”Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes”, publicată pentru prima dată ca articol în 1970 și apoi în cartea The methodology of scientific research programmes, Volume I (Lakatos 1978). Am analizat, în acest text, exemplificarea autorului pentru programul de cercetare al emisiei de lumină (în fizica cuantică timpurie) al lui Bohr. O exemplificare detaliată a conceptelor este prezentată de Lakatos în secțiunea ”Newton's effect on scientific standards” din aceeași carte. De asemenea, am făcut dese referiri la cartea Proofs and Refutations (Lakatos 1976) publicată de Lakatos în 1976, în care expune viziunea sa euristică printr-o aplicare directă la evoluția matematicii, și am apelat și la articole ale altor autori pentru analiza celor două concepte în viziunea lui Lakatos.

Cuvinte cheie: Imre Lakatos, euristica, toleranța metodologică

CUPRINS

Abstract
1 Prezentarea generală
   1.1 Falsificaţionismul dogmatic (sau naturalist)
   1.2 Falsificarea metodologică
   1.3 Falsificaţionismul metodologic sofisticat
2 Toleranţa metodologică
3 Euristica
   3.1 Euristica negativă: "nucleul dur” al programului
   3.2 Euristica pozitivă: "centura de protecţie" a programului
   3.3 Bohr: un exemplu de program de cercetare
   3.4 Proofs and Refutations
4 Concluzii
Bibliografie

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.35405.28649

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In the fam iliar pattern o f the first thirteen volum es o f The L ib ra ry o f L ivin g P h ilo so p h e rs, this volum e on Karl Popper offers the m ost com prehensive and definitive study o f his thought by thirty-five d is tinguished contem porary scholars o f Europe and A m erica, a com plete Bibliography o f Sir K arl's writings (to date), careful and detailed R eplies by Popper to his critics, and finally P opper's o n ly philosophical A utobiography, in which he relates how and why he cam e to the conclusions in his thinking by which he has becom e known w orldw ide. Sir Karl h im self has spent years o f indefatigable labors writing his A utobiography and his R eplies, in which he responds in detail to the criticism s and evaluations o f his philosophy made by his critics and his disciples. The volum e is a notable addition to this im portant series, and the Open Court Publishing C om pany considers it a privilege and an honor to be able to present this volum e to the philosophers and scien tists o f the world.

Preuves et Réfutations est écrit comme une série de dialogues socratiques entre un groupe d'étudiants discutant de la démonstration des caractéristiques d'Euler définies pour les polyèdres. Le livre explique de nombreuses idées logiques importantes, mettant l'accent sur l'idée d'heuristique positive. Le livre comprend deux annexes. Dans le premier, Lakatos donne des exemples du processus heuristique de la découverte mathématique en particulier et du processus scientifique en général. Deuxièmement, il oppose les approches déductives et heuristiques et propose des analyses heuristiques des concepts « preuves ».
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20798.31042

String theory's status as a popular theory without any empirical support has prompted a philosophical assessment by Johansson and Matsubara, who emphasise a Lakatosian analysis. They determine that string theory is a degenerating research programme, but refrain from offering normative guidance for deciding between string theory and its potential rivals. I argue that their assessment is premature, on Lakatosian grounds, and propose an adjustment to Lakatos's framework that sharpens their philosophical analysis and provides an account of scientific progress for theories that have theoretical virtues, but lack experimental testability. My proposed framework hybridizes Lakatosian research programmes with Laudan's pragmatic problem-solving account of progressiveness. This modified framework alleviates many of the criticisms levied against Lakatosian assessments. The merger presents the best of both worlds, providing research programmes with norms for pursuit and acceptance, while retaining their continuity and useful degree of specificity. This new hybrid framework is then used to take initial steps towards assessing string theory's pursuit-worthiness.

1) Introduzione: gli interessi giovanili di Popper per la matematica e per la didattica; 2) Le critiche all'induzione e il problema della demarcazione tra scienza e metafisica; 3) Il progresso scientifico attraverso congetture, corroborazioni e confutazioni; 4) Il ruolo della matematica fra scienza e metafisica; 5) La teoria dei tre mondi e la natura degli oggetti matematici; 6) Perchè i calcoli della matematica si applicano alla realtà?

Julkaistu alunperin teoksessa Kuhmonen, P. & Sillman, S. (toim.) Jaettu janaääretön raja, Jyväskylä 1998, s. 156-167. Kasvatusfilosofisessa indoktrinaation teoriassa nojataan yleisesti sellaiseen rationaalisen ajattelun käsitykseen, jonka mukaan luonnontiede ja tieteellinen ajattelu ovat paras mitta rationaalisuudelle. Tiede ja erityisesti luonnontiede ovat kuitenkin varsin kummallinen malli rationaaliselle ajattelulle. Tiedehän koostuu joukosta konventioita, joita sitten vaihdetaan toisiin sopimuksiin, kun on riittävän epämukavaa pitää kiinni aikaisemmista konventioista . Thomas Kuhn ja Karl Popper olivat kummatkin samaa mieltä siitä, että tieteellisessä metodologiassa on kysymys konventioista, mutta siitä huolimatta pitivät tiedettä rationaalisena projektina. Kuhnin ja Popperin vastakkaiset näkemyksien vastakkaisuus on hyvin esimerkillistä ja maksaa vaivan tutustua Kuhn-Popperakselilla pyörineeseen keskusteluun tieteellisen ajattelun rationaalisuudesta.

I. LAKATOS 6 7. The Problem of Content Revisited. (a) The naivet6 of the naive conjecture. (b) Induction as the basis of the method of proofs and refutations. (c) Deductive guessing versus naive guessing. (d) Increasing content by deductive guessing. (e) Logical versus heuristic counterexamples. g 8. Concept-formation. (a) Refutation by concept-stretching. A reappraisal of monsterbarring-and of the concepts of error and refutation. (b) Proof-generated versus naive concepts. Theoretical versus naive classification. (c) Logical and heuristic refutations revisited. (d) Theoretical versus naive concept-stretching. Continuous versus critical growth. ? 9. How Criticism may turn Mathematical Truth into Logical Truth. (a) Unlimited concept-stretching destroys meaning and truth. (b) Mitigated concept-stretching may turn mathematical truth into logical truth.

Os ensaios aqui reunidos pretendem servir de introdução ao tema da mudança conceitual. Partindo de uma perspectiva que busca vincular aspectos epistemológicos e hermenêuticos da mudança conceitual, são apresentadas e discutidas questões centrais da Epistemologia e da História da Ciência, considerando especialmente algumas das contribuições mais significativas da Filosofia atual, representadas por Ludwick Fleck, Norwood Russell Hanson, Thomas S. Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Jean Piaget, Paul K. Feyerabend, Theodor Adorno, Alfred Schütz, Jürgen Habermas, Hans Geor Gadamer e Richard Bernstein.

The weak and strong atheoretical theses. The two main problems of classical empiricism: inductive justification and inductive method. The one main problem of neoclassical empiricism: weak inductive justification (degree of confirmation). (a) Carnap abandons the Jeffreys-Keynes postulate. Qualified (b) The weak atlieoretical thesis : confirmation theory without (c) The conflation of the weak and the strong atheoretical (d) The interconnection between the weak and strong atheo-(e) A Carnapian logic of discovery. quotients. (a) Are degrees of evidential support probabilities ? (b) Are 'degrees of rational belief' degrees of evidential support or are they rational betting quotients Z (c) Are rational betting quotients probabilities ?

The methodology of scientific research programmes is a collection of papers published over time expressing a radical review of Popper's demarcation criterion between science and non-science, leading to a new theory of scientific rationality. Volume I address aspects of the philosophy of science, and volume II contains works on the philosophy of mathematics. For a science historian, the reconstruction proposed by Lakatos is attractive and explains the evolution of science to a level that has not been achieved before. The basic evaluation unit proposed by Lakatos is the research programme, and especially the dynamics of these programmes.
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31605.01767

satisfy induction and the Peano axioms, including recursive axioms for addition and multiplication. In fact G0del has shown that whatever additional axioms we impose, axioms for subtraction or exponentiation, or what you will, then (provided the axioms are consistent) it is always possible to find a model of the axioms, that is, an interpretation, which is different from the intended interpretation. Frege's standpoint is essentially summed up in his observation that you cannot create the number zero simply by laying down axioms for operations with an oval drawn on paper with a pen. For him, the number zero is a concept, a logical entity, as much a real object as anything apprehended by the senses is real, an object which mathematicians recognise but do not create. Accepting for the moment Frege's criticism of the formal axiomatic method, let us see what he offered in its place. Like the formalists he criticised, Frege himself built up an axiomatic system-one of the most carefully constructed and subtly discriminating systems that had yet been devised, but in Frege's system predicate, not number, is the fundamental concept and number is defined in terms of one-to-one related classes (a class being the extension of a predicate). In this way Frege sought to wed his formal concept of number to the real world, since he could prove for instance that a class like (a, b, c) contains three numbers. But unless ' class' is taken to have a fixed significance over and above that which the formalism gives to it, Frege's system is as much subject to GOdel's theorem as any other formalism, and Frege's object is not achieved. The classes of an axiomatic system are no more real objects, in the ordinary sense of the word, than are the numbers of an axiomatic system. Frege's definition of number in terms of classes is a purely technical device, of value and importance in constructing arithmetic in a particular type of axiom system, but no more than that. It is perhaps interesting to observe that the notion of one-to-one correspondence, a notion that has been introduced into mathematics only comparatively

L’obiettivo dell’articolo che segue è quello di riesumare il “problema della
demarcazione”, deceduto per mano di Larry Laudan nel 1983. In esso si procederà attraverso
l’analisi della filosofia della scienza di Imre Lakatos, che rappresenta la più matura conciliazione tra
il fallibilismo dell’impresa scientifica e la razionalità demarcativa. Recepire le tendenze intellettuali
dei filosofi della scienza, interpretarle, prendere le cose migliori, e proporre una filosofia della
scienza superiore: ecco la ricetta filosofica di Lakatos. Egli incarna il giusto mezzo tra dogmatismo
e scetticismo: posizione privilegiata di chi intende salvare i fenomeni riproponendo il pensiero di
un’unità razionale della scienza in un periodo storico sostanzialmente anarchico.

l'induzione è ingiustificata. Ogni tentativo di giustificare il principio d'induzione dall'esperienza sarà circolare oppure se si introdurrà un principio di ordine superiore si cadrà in un regresso all'infinito. La terza possibilità ossia accettarlo a priori, somiglia ad un atto di fede. Obiettivo: fondare la conoscenza scientifica in un altro modo. È impossibile stabilire la verità di una generalizzazione ma è possibile stabilirne la falsità. Asimmetria tra verificazione e falsificazione: per quante osservazioni confermanti di una teoria siano state fatte è possibile che la prossima la falsifichi -basta un'osservazione contraria per falsificare. Il falsificazionismo è il modus tollens, ossia confutazione delle ipotesi attraverso la negazione delle conseguenze da esse implicate. ((p→q)&−q)→−p dove p=teoria e q=dato osservativo. Dissolto il problema dell'induzione.

Bilim, Hume’a göre tümevarımsal ve irrasyonel, Carnap’a göre tümevarımsal ve rasyonel, Popper’a göre tümevarımsal olmayan ve rasyonel, Kuhn’a göre paradigma değişmesine neden olan krizlerle gelişir. Lakatos doğrulamacılığın çökmesinin yarattığı umutsuzluğun yanlışlamacılığı belirlediğini ardından tek rasyonalitenin yanlışlamacılık olduğu kanısının aynı sonuca maruz kaldığını düşünür.

Article on Lakatos coauthored with Alan Musgrave and currently available on the SEP.  I am responsible for the introduction and for §§ 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 3.2, 3.3, 3.6, 3.7 and 4, and Alan is the chief author of §§ 3.1 and 3.4. Sections 1.3,  3.3 and 3.5 represent joint work. As an intended Encyclopedia entry, a large part of the paper is devoted to a critical exposition of Lakatos’s big ideas in the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of science, but we also address his Hungarian career and the relationship between the Stalinist revolutionary that he once was and the methodologist of science that he subsequently became.  How much of the Hungarian young Hegelian persisted in the post-Popperian philosopher? How much was the philosophy (and indeed the politics) of the later Lakatos a reaction against his earlier self? Did Lakatos remain a closet disciple of Lukács, despite denouncing him in 1947 for his ‘Weimarism’ (that is, his rather relaxed agenda for implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat)? We conclude with Feyerabend’s criticisms of Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes, to which, as their correspondence makes clear, Lakatos himself had no answer. Please note: Alan does not agree with me about Lakatos’s paraconsistent proclivities.

Bu çalışmanın amacı Thomas Kuhn'un devrimsel ilerleme tasavvuruna gelen, yöntemliliği açısından en kapsamlısı olan Imre Lakatos eleştirisini belirli odaklarda incelemektir. Bu bağlamda devrimsel bir yaklaşımı bilim etkinliğine yükleyen Thomas Kuhn, bu etkinlikte tıpkı devrim sözcüğünün zihinde oluşturduğu imge gibi keskinlikleri de aynı anda bu etkinlik bünyesinde tanımlar. Onun tanımlarını konuşturursak paradigmalar bilim etkinliğini oluşturan, devrimsel yollarla değişimleri sonucunda tüm etkinliğe tâbi bilim insanlarının dünya görüşünü değiştiren bir nevi inanç sistemidir. İnanç sistemi benzetmesi Thomas Kuhn'un paradigma bünyesinde tanımladığı bağlılıkla ilişkili olmakla birlikte, bu bağlılığın kırılım noktaları inançların yarattığı kalın çizgilerle belirlenmemiş, psikolojik bir kavram olan bunalımla açıklanmıştır. Bahsi geçen noktalarda devreye giren Imre Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn'la zıt yollarda yürümese de bazı noktalara şerh düşerek bilim etkinliğinin devrimselliğini sorgular. Bu sorgular sonucunda eleştirilerini sıralayıp, 'bilimsel araştırma programı' adıyla kendi bilimsel etkinlik döngüsünü tanımlar. Bu çalışma, Thomas Kuhn'un yukarıda bahsi geçen detaylarıyla paradigmatik ilerleme tasvirinde açık kapılar bıraktığını savlamakla birlikte Imre Lakatos'un da aksine kurduğu geçişlilik mekanizmasıyla ilerlemenin önüne çıkabilecek engellerin yolunu açabileceğinin altını çizer. Son tahlilde bu tez, iki bilim felsefecisinin güçlü ve zayıf yanlarını irdeleyip, hakikate hangisinin temas edebildiğini Kopernik ve Darwin Devrimi özelinde sorgulamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Seguiremo all’inverso KUHN [1970], il cui indice generale sarà invertito. Se Kuhn dalle rivoluzioni giunge alle caratteristiche della conoscenza scientifica, dalle caratteristiche della conoscenza scientifica noi giungeremo ad accennare appena l’evento-rivoluzioni. Il perché sarà ampiamente motivato nella trattazione. Tuttavia, già da ora, occorre esplicitare quanto segue: si parla di conoscenza, e non di conoscenze scientifiche. È un distinguo epistemologico che il lettore dovrà sottolineare. E la ragione è bene esporla subito, onde evitare ambigui fraintendimenti.
Indagare sulla conoscenza, impone un’esposizione articolata e approfondita sull’attività del conoscere. Questa attività è l’oggetto di indagine. In realtà, paradossalmente, occorre ammettere che, purificando sempre più tale attività dalle incrostazioni speculative più invadenti, emergerà chiara e distinta un’esigenza teoretica: non è possibile considerare l’oggetto come oggetto puramente materiale; l’oggetto, in realtà, è un soggetto, sebbene non logicamente. L’indagine sull’attività conoscitiva è indagine sul soggetto conoscente: i due ambiti non possono essere scissi nettamente. Si apre, già nelle premesse, il conflitto fra epistemologia e le pseudoscienze, in particolare la sociologia e la psicologia. Possono quest’ultime fornire un contributo nell’analisi del progresso della conoscenza scientifica? Ancora una volta: il progresso è epistemologico-filosofico o storico-sociale? Le difficoltà maggiori, in corso d’opera, hanno condotto a queste domande, accettando la sfida kuhniana a riscrivere il suo pensiero in ordine inverso. È emersa, limpidamente, la particolarità indiscussa dell’attività scientifica: essa non è mai squisitamente individuale, tantomeno perciò solo materiale. È il singolo scienziato ad elaborare teorie e a condurre esperimenti e ad accogliere o escludere osservazioni fenomeniche. Tuttavia, il sostrato teorico e socio-psicologico che costituisce la sua attività normale, quotidiana, è più che determinante e, sorprendentemente, determinato. Occorre allora chiedersi quali elementi distinguano l’attività scientifica da altre imprese conoscitive e pratiche. Per quali vie procede questa attività: teoriche o pratiche?

Desde el principio mismo de la ciencia, existió la pregunta acerca de la naturaleza de la ciencia, y si había medios para obtener este conocimiento que parecía casi mágico, aunque no lo era. ¿Cómo podían predecirse los eclipses, y que estos ocurrieran cuando se dijo? ¿Cómo podía decirse lo que pade- cía un paciente, y cómo decir, acertadamente, su evolución?
Estas preguntas fueron respondidas de distintas maneras a lo largo del tiempo. Platón se inspiraba en las matemáticas, y su respuesta fue que provenía del mundo de las ideas, ese mundo ideal. Aristóteles, hijo de médico y biólogo él mismo, pensó que las ideas residían en este mundo, que podían abs- traerse de las cosas, y que debían formularse mediante axio- mas indudables de los que se deducían teoremas, como buen fundador de la lógica.
Deja de ser la reflexión de filósofos o científicos aislados, para darse en el seno de grupos estables que colaboran entre sí, que sobre bases comunes discuten en artículos especializados los distintos avances, en una forma que asemeja la de la propia ciencia.
Sucede en la Viena de principios de Siglo XX, en el seminario de Morics Schlick, cuando se da a conocer en el Manifiesto del Círculo de Viena, que reunía a filósofos como Carnap, Ber-
trand Russell, y científicos como Albert Einstein, cercanos al Wittgenstein del Tractatus, y a Popper, vieneses como ellos.
La metodología, la epistemología, la filosofía de la ciencia que desarrollaron inicia una tra- dición que se continúa hasta hoy, y en la que nos reconocemos. Una tradición que no es an- glosajona, como tiende a pensarse, sino profundamente centroeuropea.
Nuestra narración es la de esa aventura del pensamiento, que tiene sus propias respuestas a preguntas que poseen también su impronta.
¿Qué es la ciencia, y cuál es su estructura? ¿Cuál es su método?
¿Cómo se investiga?

In questo volume, uscito nel 2000, è avanzata l'ipotesi di una rilettura del pensiero dell'ultimo Wittgenstein alla luce della filosofia di Popper, di cui vengono presi in esame soprattutto il realismo metafisico, la teoria dei tre mondi e quella delle funzioni del linguaggio. Sulla base di un tale approccio, finora pressoché inedito nel pur sterminato panorama degli studi sui due grandi protagonisti della filosofia del 900, l'autore conduce un'indagine serrata su due piani differenti, benché teoreticamente connessi: mentre da un lato vengono analizzati quegli aspetti epistemologici che consentono un valutazione fortemente critica della svolta antropologica dell‟ultimo Wittgenstein, dall'altro viene gettata nuova luce sulla questione - recentemente molto dibattuta - dell'eredità wittgensteiniana in alcune delle posizioni tipiche della cosiddetta "epistemologia post-popperiana". La conclusione, per certi versi sorprendente, è che il ruolo giocato in un filosofo come Feyerabend dall'influenza - esplicitamente ammessa e talvolta persino ostentata - del filosofo delle "forme di vita" (interpretate come sistemi linguistico-culturali chiusi e incommensurabili), si rivela tutto sommato trascurabile rispetto a quello giocato dai residui di popperismo pur sempre presenti nelle sue concezioni più apertamente anti-popperiane.

"Dogmatismo y adoctrinamiento en educación. Consecuencias y alternativas a la obra de Thomas Kuhn". Actas del II Congreso Latinoamericano de Filosofía de la Educación, Universidad de la
República/ Asociación Latinoamericana de Filosofía de la Educación, Montevideo, 2013.

There have been a number of attempts to comprehend mainstream (bourgeois) economics as a Lakatosian research program, or as a set of competing research programs.  In contrast, the extent to which the Marxian study of capitalism can be interpreted from this perspective has hardly been explored.  In the following sections some provisional steps in this direction will be taken.  I shall first introduce a reading of Marx's Capital that emphasizes the systematic dialectic of economic categories unifying that work.  I shall then ask whether we can arrive at a better understanding of Marx's systematic dialectic through considering how it contributes to a scientific research program in Lakatos's sense of the term.
(From New Investigations of Marx’s Method, Martha Campbell, ed., Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1997 (176-98).)

El objetivo de esta investigación es determinar la influencia específica de los núcleos especulativos de la filosofía del Pseudo Dionisio Areopagita en las renovaciones arquitectónicas de la iglesia abacial de Saint Denis en la época del abad Suger, a mediados del siglo doce.
En el capítulo I se estudia el desarrollo de la noción de lo gótico, particularmente en relación con la arquitectura, así como sus más significativas variaciones históricas en la literatura históricoartística, para establecer un marco conceptual para nuestra investigación.
El capítulo II se consagra a reconstruir el contexto histórico de la aparición de los escritos del Pseudo Dionisio Areopagita y a determinar los contenidos filosóficos y teológicos del Corpus Dionisiacum (CD). Se estudian, también, la identificación del Pseudo Dionisio con el discípulo de san Pablo mencionado en el Nuevo Testamento y la hagiografía de san Dionisio, santo patrón de Francia y de la abadía de Suger, especialmente la vida del santo escrita por Hilduino, abad de Saint Denis, en la cual se consolidó la crasis de estos tres dionisios.
En el capítulo III se exponen la vida y el pensamiento del abad Suger de Saint Denis respecto de su proyecto de una nacionalidad francesa a partir de la dinastía de los Capetos, la íntima relación del abad con la dirección del reino y su administración de la abadía de Saint Denis, en la cual se enmarcan las intervenciones en la iglesia abacial.
Por último, en el capítulo IV se examinan las renovaciones arquitectónicas de la Abadía Real de Saint Denis realizadas en la época del abad Suger y se determina la influencia de la filosofía del Pseudo Dionisio Areopagita en las formas arquitectónicas y en la iconografía figurativa de dichas renovaciones.
[The aim of this research is to determine the specific influence of the speculative cores of the philosophy of the Pseudo-Dionysius in the architectural renovation of the Abbey Church of Saint Denis in times of Abbot Suger in the mid-twelfth century.
The first Chapter studies the development of the notion of the Gothic, particularly in relation to architecture as well at its most significant historical changes in art historical literature, to establish a conceptual framework for this research.
The second Chapter is devoted to the reconstruction of the historical context in which the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius surface, as well as to determine the philosophical and theological content of the Corpus Dionisiacum (CD). It also studies the identification of the Pseudo-Dionysius with
the disciple of Paul mentioned in the New Testament and the hagiography of Saint Denis, patron saint of France and of Suger’s abbey, especially the life of the saint written by Hilduin, Abbot of Saint Denis, in which the fusion of these three Dionysius was consolidated.
The third Chapter presents the life and thought of Abbot Suger of Saint Denis regarding his project of a French nationality with the Capetian dynasty as its foundation, the abbot’s intimate relationship with the direction of the kingdom and his management of the Abbey of Saint Denis, in which the renovations of the abbey church are an integral part.
Finally, the fourth Chapter studies the architectural renovation of the Royal Abbey of Saint Denis made at times of Abbot Suger, and the influence of the philosophy of the Pseudo-Dionysius in the architectural forms and the figurative iconography of these renovations is determined.]

Rationality and irrationality of the scientific method: considerations on Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. Starting from the general meaning of the terms "rational" and "irrational", as we find them in the dictionary, we will first try to understand what rationality is and what it means to say that a speech or an action is "rational"; secondly, we will try to understand if it is possible to identify in the twentieth-century epistemological debate a "rational" method for science, in the face of the thesis of incommensurability proposed by Kuhn and in particular of the Feyerabendian idea that anything can be good, and of the subdivision of research, operated by Lakatos, into progressive and regressive research programs.

Prendendo le mosse dal significato generale dei termini "razionale" e "irrazionale", così come li troviamo nel dizionario, cercheremo in primo luogo di capire cosa sia la razionalità e cosa significhi affermare che un discorso o un'azione sia "razionale"; in secondo luogo cercheremo di comprendere se sia possibile individuare nel dibattito epistemologico novecentesco un metodo "razionale" per la scienza, a fronte della tesi dell'incommensurabilità proposta da Kuhn e in particolare dell'idea feyerabendiana per cui qualsiasi cosa può andar bene, e della suddivisione della ricerca, operata da Lakatos, in programmi di ricerca progressivi e regressivi.

Adam Dyrda (Uniwersytet Jagielloński) O wielu twarzach pozytywizmu, oraz o tym, dlaczego świadczą one raczej o rozwoju tej teorii, niż o jej degeneracji. Czyż nie jest... zarozumiałością narzucanie najbardziej rozwiniętym naukom jakiejkolwiek a priori filozofii nauki? 1

Bilimin ne olduğunun belirlenmesi ve bilimi sözde bilimlerden ya da bilimsel olmayan alanlardan ayırt edecek ölçütün tespit edilmesine yönelik tartışmalar bilim felsefesinde sınır çizme sorunu olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu sorun bilim felsefesinde çok uzun süredir çözülemeyen önemli bir konudur. Bilimin sınırlarının çizilmemesi durumunda potansiyel olarak zararlı faaliyetler bilimin uygulama alanına girebilir. Bu nedenle sınır çizme sorununun önemi ve kanıta dayalı uygulamalarla ilişkisi tartışılan bir konu olmaya devam etmektedir. Alternatif olarak iyileştirici dokunuş olarak bilinen terapötik dokunuş, 1979 yılında Kunz ve Kreiger tarafından geliştirilmiş, vücuttaki enerji noktalarına dokunularak uygulanan tamamlayıcı/alternatif bir tedavi yöntemidir. Hastalar ve sağlık profesyonelleri günümüzün sağlık sisteminde mevcut olan sınırlı kaynakların mümkün olan en etkin, güvenli ve verimli kullanıldığına dair güvence vermek istemektedirler. Bu nedenle tıbbi ve hemşirelik uygulama kararlarının mevcut en iyi kanıtlara dayanması gerektiği belirtilmektedir. Bu çalışmada sınır çizme sorununun, tamamlayıcı bir tedavi yöntemi olan terapötik dokunuş içeren sağlık bakım uygulamalarına nasıl uygulanabileceği Popper, Kuhn ve Lakatos gibi üç filozofun bakış açısından incelenmiş ve tartışılmıştır. Yapılan incelemede hemşirelik uygulamalarında kullanılan terapötik dokunuş, Popper'a göre, tamamen sözde bir bilimdir ve reddedilmesi gerekir. Kuhn'a göre, bu disiplinin önce paradigmasını oluşturup ardından normal bir bilim dönemi geliştirmeye ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Lakatos'a göre, terapötik dokunuş geçici olarak sözde olduğu halde gelecekte bir gelişim göstererek bilimsellik değeri kazanabilir. Sonuç olarak, sınırlandırma sorununa yönelik ileri sürülen çözümlerin güçlü ve zayıf yönleri vardır, bu bakımdan seçenekleri sadece bir bilim tipiyle sınırlamak yerine, sorunun önemine bağlı olarak karar verilmesi gerektiği düşünülmektedir.

in which a complete proof is given of a non-standard analysis version of Cauchy's "the6rem". I am indebted to Cleave for sharing with me his photocopy of Lakatos' manuscript, at a time when it was not readily available to the general public. Readers interested in Lakatos' work should also look at the recent collection, "Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, "Vol. 39 of the Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, edited by R.S. Cohen et al., D. Reidel Publishers. The essays by Worrall, Berkson, and Marchi are of particular interest. In relation to the article below (history of calculus in the light of non-standard analysis) the main reference is, of course, 151 the last chapter of Robinson's famous treatise;there are also Cleave's article, an article by H.J.M. Bos, "Differentials, higher-order differentials and the derivative in the Leibnizian Calculus," Archives for History of Exact Sciences, Vol. 14, 1974-75, and a forthcoming article in Historia Mathematica, "Cauchy and the infinitely small," by Gordon M. Fisher. Of related interest is the article by H. Mehrtens, "T.S. Kuhn's theories and mathematics," Historia Mathematica, 3 (1976) 297-320.

In this comprehensive work on theories of rationality, Leslie Allan builds on the seminal insights of Imre Lakatos. Allan begins by critically reviewing Lakatos' theory of rationality (MSRP) and his meta-theory of rationality (MHRP) and suggesting improvements to his scheme. Allan's main task is developing a theory of rationality that avoids Lakatos' Achilles' heel; the presupposition that science is a rational enterprise. To achieve this, he attempts to draw out from the general demands of an objectivist epistemology the various criteria of dependence and independence applying to evidence-statements. He concludes by considering two serious objections to his framework.

Con il presente lavoro si conclude la mia esperienza formativa nell'ambito del TFA (tirocinio formativo attivo), un corso finalizzato a qualificare e valorizzare la professione docente attraverso l'acquisizione di competenze disciplinari, psico-pedagogiche e metodologiche-didattiche.

The books’ goal is to answer the question: Do the weaknesses of value-free economics imply the need for a paradigm shift? The author synthesizes criticisms from different perspectives (descriptive and methodological). Special attention is paid to choices over time, because in this area value-free economics has the most problems. In that context, the enriched concept of multiple self is proposed and investigated. However, it is not enough to present the criticisms towards value-free economics. For scientists, a bad paradigm is better than no paradigm. Therefore, the author considers whether value-based economics with normative approaches such as economics of happiness, capability approach, libertarian paternalism, and the concept of multiple self can be the alternative paradigm for value-free economics. This book is essential reading to everyone interested in the current state of economics as a discipline.

Monsters lurk within mathematical as well as literary haunts. I propose to trace some pathways between these two monstrous habitats. I start from Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s influential account of monster culture and explore how well mathematical monsters fit each of his seven theses (Cohen 1996). The mathematical monsters I discuss are drawn primarily from three distinct but overlapping domains. I will describe these in much greater detail as they arise below, but here is a brief preview. Firstly, late nineteenth-century mathematicians made numerous unsettling discoveries that threatened their understanding of their own discipline and challenged their intuitions. The great French mathematician Henri Poincaré characterised these anomalies as ‘monsters’, a name that stuck. Secondly, the twentieth-century philosopher Imre Lakatos composed a seminal work on the nature of mathematical proof, in which monsters play a conspicuous role (Lakatos 1976). He reconstructs the emergence during the nineteenth century of a proof of the Euler Conjecture, which ascribes a certain property to polyhedra. Lakatos coined such terms as ‘monster-barring’ and ‘monster-adjusting’ to describe strategies for dealing with entities whose properties seem to falsify the conjecture. Thirdly, and most recently, mathematicians dubbed the largest of the so-called sporadic groups ‘the Monster’, because of its vast size and uncanny properties, and because its existence was suspected long before it could be confirmed.

La méthodologie des programmes de recherche scientifique est une collection d'articles publiés au fil du temps, exprimant une révision radicale du critère de démarcation de Popper entre science et non-science, conduisant à une nouvelle théorie de la rationalité scientifique. Le volume I aborde des aspects de la philosophie des sciences et le volume II contient des travaux sur la philosophie des mathématiques. Pour un historien des sciences, la reconstruction proposée par Lakatos est attrayante et explique l’évolution de la science à un niveau jamais atteint auparavant. L'unité d'évaluation de base proposée par Lakatos est le programme de recherche.
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22465.92006

Le principali questioni della filosofia della scienza affrontate attraverso brevi riflessioni sulla tesi di Duhem e il falsificazionismo di Popper, sulla proposta eterodossa di Lakatos e e la visione della storia ed evoluzione della scienza di Kuhn.

In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere, is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve.

This essay is to be understood as a preliminary attempt to apply a deductive epistemology to art. The locus classicus for this study is Karl Popper's 'Logik der Forschung' (translated as 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery', 1959).The reader unacquainted with this philosophy may well consider my account to be just so much verbiage. I can only hope that I have succeeded in bringing certain ideas to his [sic] attention, to further the spirit of criticism. I certainly do not pretend to have presented a closed case.

(Essay written in 1978 when I was an undergraduate in Peterhouse, Cambridge, as an entry to Sir Geoffrey Ellis's Essay Prize. The prize was not awarded, but I received an 'honourable mention'. At this time Peterhouse was an all-male college and the teaching of the history of art was very conservative, as were college politics in general. I was being deliberately provocative.)