Joint Military Operations

Arguably one of the first joint operations in U.S. military history, the campaign to capture Vicksburg in July 1863 became the key to defeating the Confederacy. The campaign displayed the tenacity of U.S. General Ulysses S. Grant in accomplishing his military objective. Beginning in the fall of 1862, Grant moved South from Memphis with the intention of attacking Vicksburg by land from the North. When his supply base was captured by the enemy, Grant turned to possibility of ferrying his army south along the Mississippi river, with, again, the intent to attack and take the city on land from the North. Grant spent the entire winter of 1862-63 trying to get his forces into position to attack, but on 1 May 1863, Grant, Sherman and Admiral David Porter rode horseback to survey Haines Bluff north of Vicksburg. At that point it became obvious that a land attack would fail against well-positioned Confederate defenses. Grant then turned to Porter, who was not under Grant's command, but who had become a respected friend and asked if the Navy could run the battery gauntlet in front of Vicksburg and deliver his troops to the south where they could disembark and attack by land. Porter agreed and the fall of Vicksburg on 4 July 1863 is the historical turning point in the War Between the States. This paper uses only the original national archive records to reconstruct the campaign and finds false Grant's later claim, made in his memoirs, that his actions with this forces north of Vicksburg during the winter months were simply to 'keep the troops occupied." But rather than detracting from the brilliance of Grant's, his actions foretold the tenacity that would take him, a year later to end the war in front of Richmond.

Bilateral and multilateral planning is a valuable activity that, if done well, strengthens the military-to-military relationship and operational synergy between nations. The combatant commander sits at the intersection of policy, strategy, and military operations, and is charged the daunting task of balancing ends, ways, means, and risk with reality of what is truly possible; bridging theory and practice. Concept plans are one mechanism at their disposal to develop prudent responses to possible contingencies, which, if they came to pass, would severely damage to national interests and the interests of global partners. The development of a U.S.-only concept plan can take many months, if not years to fully complete. When the commander decides to expand the planning aperture to the bilateral or multilateral level, the complexities increase exponentially. A bilateral and multilateral plan is by far the most difficult to develop because of the numerous stakeholders involved and their many interests. However, if planners able to form a comprehensive military-to-military plan with a partner nation that clarifies a common mission and intent, the benefits far outweigh the costs. This article details why bilateral and multilateral planning is important, the legal and doctrinal context, an applied process for planning, and major lessons learned at the combatant command level.

A presente tese em por objetivo ilustrar como se dá o modelo conjunto - uma estrutura que compreende institucionalização, educação militar conjunta, assim como operações conjuntas, de modo a engajar as três forças singulares – por meio de uma abordagem híbrida, composta tanto pela discussão teórica e empírica quanto pela possibilidade de aplicação. Tomando por exemplo o caso britânico, o qual apresenta pioneirismo especialmente na educação militar conjunta, a construção da abordagem utilizada na presente tese perpassa por uma revisão compreensiva das abordagens sobre mudança organizacional e inovação militar, buscando demonstrar os limites das abordagens lineares e propondo uma abordagem sistêmica, demonstrando seu potencial de análise na visualização do processo de jointery e do modelo conjunto per se. Neste sentido, a teoria complexa e a estrutura de fractais são apresentadas como alternativa e, por meio de estudo de caso e process-tracing, buscou-se iluminar os parâmetros gerais para o estabelecimento do modelo conjunto dentro do espectro da Gestão de Defesa, tendo como produto um mecanismo de diagnóstico dos desafios nesta seara aplicável ao caso brasileiro. A tese de divide em cinco capítulos, os quais podem ser separados em ambientação, estudo de caso e aplicação da abordagem teórica inferida. Na ambientação, apresentam-se os antecedentes das operações conjuntas em termos de emprego, formação e suas respectivas intermitências, além de um quadro analítico prévio a respeito do Brasil em termos geopolíticos e de prospecção. No estudo de caso, aprofundam-se as análises acerca do caso britânico e dos fundamentos do jointery em sua raiz institucional, conduzindo às forças motrizes do processo e aos parâmetros gerais. Por fim, aplica-se o quadro diagnóstico ao caso brasileiro em termos de inferência de lições a serem aprendidas no recente laboratório de experiências instaurado nesta seara e, especialmente, como meio de condução ao princípio apregoado para esta modalidade de operações, o da interoperabilidade, demonstrando os desafios de gestão que se apresentam para este objetivo. Logo, visando agregar ao debate corrente de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais e de Estudos de Segurança e Defesa uma perspectiva diferenciada em termos de abordagem teórica e análise ao elencar uma abordagem híbrida visando diagnosticar os desafios de gestão correntes e propondo uma agenda de pesquisas para as operações conjuntas no Brasil, questão recente e passível de amplo debate.

The United States asks its military service members to do much more than fight the nation’s wars; it asks them to build trust with numerous stakeholders in complex and dynamic environment. The literature indicates that parties in conflict situations can employ confidence-building measures to move incrementally closer toward conflict resolution. This study applied a qualitative grounded theory methodology to investigate confidence-building from the experiences of service members recently deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq and created a theoretical model that future service members could apply in similar circumstances. The Operational Leadership Experiences Database contains interviews of service members (N = 2,515) with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. The researcher conducted an analysis of these interviews to create a theoretical model (N = 67), triangulated this model with findings from relevant literature, and then further validated this theoretical model through interviews with subject matter experts (N = 10). The findings indicate that through understanding context and applying physical, communication, and relationship confidence-building measures over time, service members can build trust with key stakeholders. The potential implications of this research are that service members in Afghanistan can directly apply these lessons through 2014 and have a valid model to build relationships when deployed to other conflict environments in the future.

Abstract: This paper discusses the emerging ways, means, and ends of offensive information Warfare (IW). IW is seen as being conducted in a distinctly unique dimension, however, inextricably linked to time, space, and physical force. The context of major geo-social transformation from the proliferation and convergence of powerful information technologies is shown as an underlying theme for change in joint military operations. The nature of IW is viewed as interwoven in a highly interactive geo-social-technical tapestry -- including various layers of organized conflict ("war organisms"), represented by an overall system of functional subsystems (physical, mental, spirit). The relationships among physical force, information, and will are deemed essential to leveraging information for appropriate and useful operational effects. The nature of IW and the relationships among the functional subsystems are presented as creating potential for a new level of warfare synergy. Controlling an "information continuum of information--knowledge--capability is seen as the key to generating information-based military power. New potential high value target sets are revealed that demand unique understanding and orientation--including a full development of IW beyond the current military interpretation as Command & Control Warfare (C2W). A comprehensive view of offensive IW is presented in terms of target development, weaponeering, military options, and organizing for action.

The paper argues that as an emerging maritime power in the maritime-configured Indo-Pacific region, India would need to make a more pronounced contribution to humanitarian response beyond its sovereign territorial confines, in various contingencies ranging from disaster-relief and UN peacekeeping to civilian evacuation, and from counter-piracy to search and rescue. This is essential for India, not only to ensure the safety of its own citizens, their property and their means of livelihood, but also to meet its normative commitment as a major power, and to project its image as a responsible power and fulfil its broader geopolitical and foreign policy objectives at the regional and global levels.

In this direction, recent trends are encouraging. There seems to be a palpable increase in India’s Out of Area (OOA) humanitarian response, enabled largely by the Indian armed forces, including the Indian Coast Guard. However, India’s approach may need to be driven by more articulate doctrines at various levels of authority. This would lead to a more deliberate national and maritime strategies, and thus a more holistic and synergetic approach.

In this context, the paper undertakes an appraisal of India’s current approach at three levels – national, joint-Service and Service level, and recommends ‘course-corrections’ with regard to the doctrine, organisation and capability aspects. It seeks to endorse its recommendations by examining the case of China, which is contemporary emerging maritime power in the Indo-Pacific region.

Abstrakt Artykuł omawia działania 38. Ugdy Cahalu dowodzonej przez gen. bryg. Arie-la Szarona podczas wojny sześciodniowej. Opisuje przebieg działań tego związ-ku taktycznego oraz rolę jego dowódcy w osiągnięciu zwycięstwa nad egipską 12. BP i 6. DZmech. Bitwa, która rozegrała się na Synaju w dniach 5-8 czerwca 1967 roku, jest cały czas jednym z wyróżniających się przykładów prowadzenia mobilnych operacji zaczepnych. W przypadku 38. Ugdy dochodzi jeszcze aspekt planowania i przeprowadzenia działań połączonych, w których wojska pancerne, powietrznodesantowe, artyleria i piechota osiągnęły wysoki stopień synergii. Zaowocowało to szybkim zwycięstwem i niskimi stratami własnymi Izraelczyków.

Abstract. This article addresses operations of the 38th Ugdah commanded by Brig. Gen. Ariel Sharon during Six-Day War. It describes the course of events and role of the division commander in defeating the Egyptian 12th Infantry Brigade as well as part of the 6th Mechanized Division. The battle that took place on the Sinai from 5th to 8th June 1967 is still one of the great examples of mobile armored operations. In the case of the 38th Ugdah there is one more dimension that needs to be explained i.e. planning and executing of combined operation that included tanks, paratroops, artillery, and infantry which succeeded in reaching high level of synergy. This resulted in quick victory with minimal losses for Israelis.

This is an abridged version of a case
study prepared by the Joint Center for Operational
Analysis (JCOA) for use by joint and Service military
education institutions. It was conceived to allow
instructors and students to examine the formation of
a joint task force headquarters (JTF HQ) from several
perspectives and levels of analysis.

This research examines the Indonesian military (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/ABRI) operations during the Indonesian - Malaysian Konfrontasi (1963-67). The Indonesian government executed the politics of Konfrontasi in order to oppose a plan of Malaysian administration to extend The Federation concept, which embraced Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. In a move against this proposal, President Sukarno announced Dwikora Operation aimed at crushing the Malaysia federation. However, the ABRI did not support confrontation policy wholeheartedly. This research seeks to address the question of why the Dwikora Operation failed. The study employs a qualitative historical analysis by using a case study as research strategy. The Indonesian military archives are used as the main sources to explain and analyse the Dwikora Operation. By using interdisciplinary approach, this article critically evaluates how the political element in the military operation will affect the implementation of the operation. This analysis concludes that the failure of the ABRI's operation during the Konfrontasi is mainly affected by a certain level of military rivalry.

Keywords: Konfrontasi; Dwikora Operation; ABRI; Suharto; Sukarno; disunity of command

This paper has been presented at the 9th EuroSEAS Conference at Oxford University (16-18 August 2017).

It's published in The Indonesian Quarterly, 46(4), 2018: 344-362.

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) concept addressed how to quickly and effectively stand-up a JTF to respond to contingencies. The history of the SJFHQ concept shows the continuing tradeoff between assigning adequate numbers of people and resources to prepare for unknowable future crises and the effi cient employment of public funds to accomplish tasks that are more easily predicted.

This paper is an analysis of Afghan public optimism about the present and future as it has been affected by ISAF military operations. Analysis of provinces and regions is provided, associated with military operations of matching geographic scope. Monthly data collection beginning in early 2005 is used to track the consistency of the rebound phenomenon in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's media environment, standard of living and the nature of Taliban and ISAF strategic communications may be causative themes for this phenomenon, among others. They are explored in the paper. Conclusions are drawn regarding short-term and long-term impact of ISAF kinetic and non-kinetic military operations on winning and maintaining the support of the Afghan people.

This is about the joint military operation after 11 March 2011 when more than 100,000 personell from the Japanese Self-Defense Forces rapidly responded to the Great East Japan Disaster. This study looks specifically into the immediate response to save people after the tsunami and how the Self-Defence Forces responded and interacted with civilian authories. The study discuss and lists several issues regarding military support in disaster relief such as; the neccessity of conducting joint military-civilian exercises before an actual distaster; integration between military and civilian command and control; and how to recieve support from foreign military (the US).

In this paper, the author studies the so-called Multi-Domain Operations, which is a relatively new term in military science. The study focuses on the origin, definition and elements of multi-domain operations. Since the terminology is developing – at least changing – quite fast from multi-domain battle across multi-domain operations to all-domain operations besides terms like cross-domain operations/effects, this emerging process need to be studied. The author examines if this term describes a new approach of warfare or it is an old concept in a new guise.

Despite the United States' ongoing transition from the Middle East toward the Pacific, Africa remains strategically important to U.S. interests. During the current restricted fiscal environment, all components of the U.S. government should focus their efforts to those areas most critical to the nation's vital interestssecurity and prosperity. In Africa, it all begins with Nigeria. Nigeria is critical to ensure U.S. prosperity and security for two key reasons: economic interests and regional influence. Nigeria's massive population, growing economy, and wealth of natural resources provide a vast opportunity for expanded economic cooperation. Economic prosperity will not grow without security; therefore, improving security in a deliberate manner is critical. To effectively execute this, the U.S. should: refocus strategic communication; conduct bilateral planning; increase partnership capacity; establish an intelligence and information fusion center; enhance counter-terrorism force capability; and develop a regional training center of excellence. During the current of age of fiscal austerity, the U.S. is armed with limited resources to commit toward intractable issues on the African continent. It is time for the U.S. to condense its focus in Africa in order to ensure its security and prosperity; and focus on Nigeria as the partner of choice.

The MSSP consists of books, articles, doctrine, fi lms, lectures, and practical application exercises to help educate maneuver leaders about the nature and character of war, as well as their responsibilities to prepare their Soldiers for combat, lead them in battle, and accomplish the mission. The intent is to enhance understanding of the complex interaction between war and politics and to improve the effectiveness of maneuver leaders in complex environments and in combat against determined, adaptive enemies. Visit the program's website at www.benning.army.mil/mssp.

Joint Military Operation (JMO) is a very complex problem where many parties are involved to accomplish the planned mission. In a sustain mission that needs a full attention and may be running for a long period, there are possibilities that the commanding officer and his supporting staffs as well as the field commanders become exhausted and this situation can affect the mission’s objective accomplishment. In this paper we address the utilization of the concept of Multiagent Collaborative Computation (MCC) in JMO planning and execution. The multiagent will be applied to replace all JMO’s supporters such as the sensors, the field commanders to commanding officer’s staffs that will be collaborating to obtain comprehensive information to the commanding officer as the basis for quick and accurate decision-making in order to accomplish the mission successfully.  The knowledge of the comprehensive information will be obtained by using Observation Multi-Time Arwin-Adang-Aciek-Sembiring (OMA3S) information-inferencing fusion method.  A simple scenario of a JMO mission will be delivered to show how these paradigm and method work together

This open access handbook is a major reference work in the field of Military Sciences. Its main purpose is to inform and enlighten those dealing with the military on the role and contributions of science in describing, understanding and explaining military life, knowledge and doings. The handbook provides a comprehensive thematic introduction to various sub-fields of Military Sciences.

The handbook serves a broad audience in various capacities; academics studying the military and the broader defense and security sector, students at military and civilian schools preparing for service in the military, the government or other occupations with linkage to the military, professionals in the armed forces, decision makers in government, contractors who work alongside the military, NGOs whose work is influenced by military operations, journalists who write on matters concerning the sphere of the military or others with a particular interest towards the military as a phenomenon, organization or system of various kinds.

The Handbook can be downloaded for free from SpringerLink:
https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-3-030-02866-4

This assessment offers commentary on key socio-cultural gains and opportunities that arose during the planning and execution of a U.S. Africa Command sponsored annual training exercise between U.S. an Moroccan military personnel.  The paper is part of a series of assessment that respond to a larger, somewhat rhetorical question, " Can the U.S. Improve Partnership through the African Lion exercise series"?

US military doctrine recognizes the centrality of narratives to conflict. It recognizes the influence of narratives in shaping decision-making and actions. However, the current military approach relegates narratives merely to a supporting communications effort. Inasmuch, the US military continues to struggle with employing information as an instrument of national power. This essay, an illustrative vignette, proposes an alternate narrative approach to military operations. It demonstrates how the military could leverage narratives to identify, understand, and influence the prevention, mitigation, or containment of conflict through collaborative and sustainable relationships.

Italy’s national public broadcasting company (RAI — Radiotelevisione italiana S.p.A.), alleged in a documentary titled, “Fallujah, The Hidden Massacre” that the U.S. used white phosphorus as a weapon.  But did the U.S. really use it as a weapon?  Or perhaps, like any other weapon, is it possible that the use of it may have been inappropriate?  If white phosphorus was used as a weapon, was the U.S. justified in using it as such?  U.S. military leaders have already addressed this issue and contended that the use of white phosphorus during military combat operations in Iraq was authorized, just, and in compliance with laws of armed conflict.

This research examines the Indonesian military (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/ABRI) operations during the Indonesian - Malaysian Konfrontasi (1963-67). The Indonesian government executed the politics of Konfrontasi in order to oppose a plan of Malaysian administration to extend The Federation concept, which embraced Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. In a move against this proposal, President Sukarno announced Dwikora Operation aimed at crushing the Malaysia federation. However, the ABRI did not support confrontation policy wholeheartedly. This research seeks to address the question of why the Dwikora Operation failed. The study employs a qualitative historical analysis by using a case study as research strategy. The Indonesian military archives are used as the main sources to explain and analyse the Dwikora Operation. By using interdisciplinary approach, this article critically evaluates how the political element in the military operation will affect the implementation of the o...

In the Seven Years War the British defeated the French and created the most powerful empire on earth. However, from 1755-1757 British joint operations were marred by defeats to outright disasters. This monograph investigates the British ability as a learning organization to reformulate doctrine, improve their unity of effort, mass, and understanding of objective. The British formulated specific command and control over amphibious operations to ensure both the British Army and Royal Navy understood their roles and responsibilities in getting land forces to the shore and sustaining them there. This monograph investigates what US military planners can learn from the study of historical joint operations. This monograph focuses on four joint operations during the Seven Years War: Rochefort, Louisbourg, Guadeloupe, and Havana. Rochefort, a failed operation, highlights the importance lessons learned by Britain to apply later in the war. Each one of these operations highlights the ability of the British to continually improve their joint operations. The ability of the British to conduct joint operations gave them an unassailable advantage over the French.

Con motivo de esta celebración, la Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos, creada en 1975, publica esta obra que reseña la historia del Instituto, yendo incluso mucho más atrás a los orígenes primigenios de ella, cuando el Ejército dio los primeros pasos para preparar a su alto mando para enfrentar las nuevas formas de conducir la guerra y las operaciones militares; ya que al inicio de la II GM se comprendía que no era posible considerar que cada una de las instituciones, Ejército, Marina y Fuerza Aérea, obraran separadamente, sino que debían hacerlo en forma simultánea, apoyándose mutuamente para el logro del objetivo específico. Este hecho motivó al Ejército a organizar en 1939 un curso de Altos Estudios Militares para oficiales de la Institución, que deberían tener el grado de general o de coronel, bajo la tuición del Estado Mayor General del Ejército, gesto embrionario para lo que sería la futura academia.
Tomando ese hecho como punto de partida, este libro analiza en tres partes la vida de la Academia. En primer lugar, el entorno de seguridad internacional en la cual estamos insertos y la forma en que ha afectado al país, de manera de poder contextualizar los procesos y hechos que fueron dando cuerpo al desenvolvimiento del estudio de los temas relacionados con la seguridad y la defensa, y de igual forma ir relacionando el aprendizaje de estas materias a partir de esos cursos de altos estudios militares, hasta nuestra actual Institución.
Una segunda parte aborda la historia de la Academia y su tránsito a través de los años, matizado con aspectos del acontecer nacional que fueron dándole diferentes énfasis a su desarrollo académico, y una tercera, que presenta los desafíos del futuro a partir de la evolución de los conceptos de la seguridad y la defensa en un mundo lleno de incertidumbres y donde el conflicto armado pareciera que sigue siendo una forma de solución de conflictos, y desde el mundo académico, con todos los desafíos que nos presentan los nuevos modelos educacionales a los cuales el Instituto debe atenerse para mantener el sitial alcanzado al día de hoy.

Cultivating joint command talent and promoting realistic and complex joint training at the campaign and tactical levels is critical to the successful implementation of integrated joint operations, transformation efforts, and enhancing the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) overall combat capabilities. President Xi Jinping has stated that the shortage of talent was becoming increasingly prominent leading to the development of joint operations command personnel as a top priority.  The PLA's concept of multi-domain integrated joint operations is placing new and complex requirements on commanders and staff as well as on unit training and exercises.

This is an abridged version of a case study prepared by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) for use by joint and Service military education institutions. It was conceived to allow instructors and students to examine the formation of a joint task force headquarters (JTF HQ) from several perspectives and levels of analysis. Standing-up ISAF Joint Command Headquarters Political Context. On 27 March 2009, President Obama announced his strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating extremists in Afghanistan. 1 Shortly thereafter, on 11 May 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced that he had recommended to President Obama that GEN Stanley A. McChrystal be appointed the senior American military commander in Afghanistan, and that LTG David M. Rodriguez be appointed to a new position as deputy commander of US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), with responsibility for the day-today management of the Afghanistan counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Gates praised McChrystal and Rodriguez for their "unique skill set in counterinsurgency," and told the assembled journalists, "We have a new strategy, a new mission, and a new ambassador. I believe that new military leadership is also needed." 2 Key to the new strategy was the establishment of the IJC, a "corps-like headquarters" situated organizationally between ISAF and the regional commands (RC). On 4 August 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) approved the command structure reorganization, establishing the IJC and making its commander LTG Rodriguez. 3 The IJC was to conduct the "full spectrum of COIN operations and stability operations in support of COMISAF's campaign plan," thus freeing ISAF to focus on its strategic and theater issues, including its partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 4 Initial Considerations. In May 2009, prior to the stand-up of the IJC, LTG Rodriguez faced a broad and daunting problem without clear and formal authority. As GEN McChrystal's deputy, he had to establish daily operational command and control of the largely autonomous ISAF RCs to implement the COIN strategy; GEN McChrystal's ability to devote more of his attention to strategic issues depended upon LTG Rodriguez's success. Command and control over the RCs became Rodriguez's priority function, 5 which he conducted via "battlefi eld circulation," (i.e., visits to RCs to talk with subordinate commanders and staffs

Multinational military operations [MNMO] occur in different emanations: They might involve the concerted action of
states – (ad hoc) ‘coalitions of the willing’– participating in a joint military operation in which every state retains command
over its troops (‘national command model’) or a ‘multinational integrated command’ is established, or – in another variant
– national contingents are subjected to the lead or domination of a specific state (‘framework nation’ or ‘lead nation’
model). Furthermore such coalitions may act with the authorization of an international organization [IO] or within its institutional
setting under its lead or under the lead of one IO which might be in turn authorized by another IO. The plurality
of actors involved and the intricate web of different spheres of authority and control characterizing MNMO pose considerable
challenges in terms of ‘accountability’. This contribution is dedicated to illustrating these challenges and critically
reflecting on the specific schemes international law offers to address the ‘pluriverse’ of ‘accountability problems’ arising
when states and IOs act together militarily.
After sketching the conceptual contours of ‘accountability’ [I] as well as the specific features of MNMO that make it difficult
to hold relevant actors accountable [II], this contribution will, in its main part III, turn to rules on the ‘international
legal responsibility’ of states and IOs – a genuinely legal scheme which realizes – ‘accountability’, before offering some
final observations [IV].
It will be shown that the ‘pluriverse’ of MNMO gravitates in terms of ‘legal accountability’ around three basic sub-problems:
the ‘attribution of conduct’, the ‘attribution of responsibility’ and the allocation of secondary obligations stemming
from responsibility. With respect to these matters, the actors involved and the various overlapping spheres of control
they exercise over MNMO pose a major challenge that international legal scholarship has yet to address in a satisfactory
manner.

Human emotion is often hard to fully understand, and even more troublesome to influence or change. Soldiers must apply sound professional judgment that is appropriate for the context of the situation and based on their own experience, training, and intuition.  If soldiers understand context and apply physical, communication, and relationship measures over time to build confidence, they can succeed in winning the trust of key stake- holders, even in the most complex and challenging environments. Establishing trust is and will remain an essential function, critical to the Army’s ability to win in a complex world.