Strategy and Military Operations

ABSTRACT in English (résumé en français ci-après): "Specialization vs versatility. The Rangers during Operation 'Torch', 8 November 1942"
When the Rangers were formed in June 1942, the intent was to let pass in this battalion, successively, a large number of soldiers, in order to train them thoroughly and to give them combat experience, with a British mentoring, in small scale raids against the Axis forces. The trained and experienced soldiers would then be returned to their former units and, back in the United States, could usefully support the training of other soldiers lacking combat experience, especially in amphibious operations.

The project of operation "Torch", the allied invasion of North Africa (thus the opening of a second front in Europe against the Axis forces), did change the destination of the Rangers. The participation of a large number of American troops to this operation would allow giving them directly a combat experience, therefore diminishing the Rangers' expected usefulness as future seasoned instructors. The mission of the 1st battalion of Rangers changed then towards a particular unit, designed to conduct "special" operations, like the British commandos.

It is particularly relevant to study the action of the Rangers in Arzew, because this type of engagement did fully match the training they received during the previous months. Assessing the fundamental points that allowed a victory is easier, all the more so as it was the first engagement of the war for the Rangers as a unit.

This article makes it possible to put into perspective the vocation of the so-called "special" troops. It illustrates the tension between the specialization and the versatility of Special Forces.

RESUME en français :
"Spécialisation vs polyvalence. L’opération ‘Torch’ des rangers, 8 novembre 1942"
Quand les "rangers" furent mis sur pied en juin 1942, l’objectif était de faire passer par ce bataillon, successivement, un grand nombre de soldats, de façon à leur faire suivre un entraînement poussé, et à leur faire acquérir de l’expérience au combat, à l’école des Britanniques, au cours de raids ponctuels contre les forces de l’Axe. Les soldats ainsi entraînés et expérimentés seraient reversés dans leurs unités d’origine et, revenus aux Etats-Unis, pourraient contribuer utilement à l’instruction des autres soldats, qui manquaient, eux, d’expérience au combat, particulièrement pour les opérations amphibies.

Le projet de l’opération "Torch", et de l’invasion de l’Afrique du Nord par les Alliés (donc, l’ouverture d’un deuxième front en Europe face aux forces de l’Axe), changèrent la destination des rangers. La participation en grand nombre de troupes américaines à cette opération permettait de leur donner directement une expérience de combat, diminuant de fait l’utilité escomptée des rangers comme futurs instructeurs expérimentés. La vocation du 1er bataillon de rangers évolua alors dans le sens d’une troupe particulière, destinée à accomplir des opérations "spéciales", sur le modèle des commandos britanniques.

Etudier l’action des rangers à Arzew est particulièrement pertinent, parce que le type d’engagement fut dans le droit fil de l'instruction qu’ils avaient suivie pendant les mois qui avaient précédé. Il est plus facile de juger ainsi les points fondamentaux qui ont permis la victoire, d'autant que ce fut le premier engagement de ces rangers dans la guerre en tant qu'unité. Cet article permet de mettre en perspective la vocation des troupes dites "spéciales". Il illustre la tension entre spécialisation et polyvalence des forces spéciales.

ATTENTION : certaines phrases de cet article ont été changées par l'équipe éditoriale de la revue sans mon autorisation, d'où, parfois, une grammaire fautive.

Since Russia annexed the Crimea in 2014, the West has become increasingly concerned about Putin's assertive rhetoric and posturing. In this article, the author argues that NATO's unease is largely misplaced; far from being a force to be reckoned with, the Russian Federation is a hollow force.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies hold great promise for facilitating military decisions, minimizing human causalities and enhancing the combat potential of forces. This is especially true in a wartime environment, when data availability is high, decision periods are short, and decision effectiveness is an absolute necessity. This two-part article focuses on development and fielding of LAWS against the backdrop of rapid advances in the field of AI, and its relevance to the Indian security scenario. This first part reviews the status of AI technology, gives a broad overview of the possible military applications of this technology and brings out the main legal and ethical issues involved in the current ongoing debate on development of LAWS.

Abstract strategy games such as Chess are a proven method for increasing intellect, critical thought and development of the military mind. As the Army embraces emerging methodologies such as blended learning, simulation, online study and academic blogs, it would be prudent to maintain equilibrium with traditional approaches. Military commanders must possess the ability to face unanticipated circumstance and react with considered purpose, intent and boldness. Playing chess on a regular basis develops imagination and creativity, encourages initiative, decisive action and provides familiarity with making decisions under pressure; without the risk or resource expenditure required by other methods. Crucially, time in uniform does not inevitably result in professional competence. Therefore, intellect must be intentionally nurtured and desirable traits, encouraged. Chess is not war – but it can be used as a mechanism to develop many of the traits desirable in a commander; decision-making, creativity, patience, vision and adaption. Playing chess will not directly produce a genius of either academics or war, nor can it act as preparation for the rigours and complexities of the modern battlespace.

Dentro de las llamadas “nuevas ideas” surgidas a partir de las experiencias extraídas de la Guerra de Vietnam (1955/1975), afloraron en el seno de la Fuerza Aérea de los EEUU, distintas voces y pensamientos que se encontraban poco conformes con el papel del componente aéreo en esa campaña dramática. Ellos mismos fueron quienes accedieron a puestos de liderazgo durante la 1ra Guerra del Golfo Pérsico y concibieron el empleo de los fuegos conjuntos para afectar los “sistemas” enemigos.
Es así que los amantes del poder aéreo y seguidores a ultranza de Giulio Douhet y su obra más conocida "El dominio del aire" (1921), consideraron entonces que la función más importante de la Fuerza Aérea o componente aéreo era de dirigir su capacidad y potencia destructora al corazón del adversario, para de esa forma quebrar su capacidad de lucha.
Comenzó a vislumbrarse entonces, una nueva mirada hacia el empleo de los medios militares para la resolución de una campaña. Esta mirada se fue enriqueciendo y complejizando precisamente con la aparición de nuevas amenazas en el período histórico conocido como Post Guerra Fría, y particularmente con el empleo del componente aéreo durante la Guerra en Kosovo, entre marzo y junio de 1999.
Este nuevo enfoque dio paso a la aparición de un método de planeamiento y ejecución de campañas: EBA (Effects Based Aproach – aproximación basada en efectos), EBAO (Effects Based Aproach to Operations – Aproximación a operaciones basadas en efectos) y por último a la médula de este artículo, EBO (Effects Based Operations – Operaciones basadas en efectos), que aborda al enemigo como un sistema, compuesto de subsistemas.
¿Pero, por que se cita al componente aéreo o se relaciona a éste con las operaciones basadas en efectos (OBE)?
Es que los elementos componentes de este método de planeamiento, se han mostrado como útiles a la hora de abordar problemas militares operativos sobre “sistemas cerrados”, y un ejemplo de ellos son los procesos de adquisición de blancos de superficie (targeting), el ataque a los mismos, y luego el análisis del efecto de esos ataques en los blancos, en relación al estado final deseado y a las bajas propias, también conocido como BDA (Battle Damage Assessment).
Las operaciones basadas en efectos han sido estudiadas y analizadas por numerosas FFAA del mundo, particularmente occidentales, pero poco han sido llevadas a la práctica. Las FDI (Fuerzas de Defensa Israelíes) revisaron su doctrina de nivel operacional desde 1996 hasta el 2005, adoptando las OBE como método de planeamiento y ejecución de las campañas, llevando los conceptos a las arenas de la práctica en el sur del Líbano contra Hezbollah, un enemigo convencional que empleaba la guerra de guerrillas como método de combate. Los resultados no fueron los mejores para Israel y su conducción militar.
Por otra parte, el Procedimiento de Planeamiento Conjunto (PPC)  es un método que aborda la solución del problema militar operativo (PMO) de manera lineal, con planteos y premisas lógicas y racionales, casi mecánicas. Ello, junto a otros factores, lo convierten en un método probado y eficiente para la toma de decisiones en el nivel operacional y en ambientes convencionales de la guerra. Contiene dos componentes principales:
a. Un efecto a ser producido (Efecto inmediato (EI)) o mejor modo de acción (MMA), que en términos militares se denominará objetivo seleccionado (OS).
b. Causas necesarias y suficientes para producirlo: Las operaciones eficaces.
Es por ello, que la adecuada selección del objetivo (OS) y la determinación de las operaciones eficaces, constituirán la razón fundamental del proceso de planeamiento junto con la correcta interpretación de la intención del Comandante y el empleo de las órdenes tipo misión.

This report is published in parallel with FFI-report 2019//00046 A Future Nordic Alliance?
Prerequisites and Possible Operations. That report argues against the conventional wisdom that
Nordic security and defense cooperation is destined to fail, demonstrating that Nordic security
and defense cooperation, including joint Nordic military operations, is both feasible and desirable.

This report supplements by presenting the scope for future Nordic operations in three different
scenarios: a situation in which Russia exercises coercive diplomacy towards Norway; a situation
involving a limited fait accompli; and, finally, a large Russian attack on three Nordic countries,
albeit for limited objectives. The scenarios show ways in which Nordic operations may be useful,
in situations involving varying degrees of force and of cooperation with countries outside the
Nordic region. The report demonstrates how Nordic operations are particularly relevant for the
present politico-military challenges, where a short response time, the political effects of military
support and possessing military instruments tailored to the situation become ever more important.

Este capítulo constituye una primera aproximación a las capacidades militares necesarias para operar en el dominio cognitivo, un problema que cobra mayor relevancia conforme avanzamos en la era de la información. El dominio cognitivo se encuadra habitualmente en lo que se ha denominado «espacio de las operaciones’, junto con los ámbitos terrestre, marítimo, aéreo, espacial, del espectro electromagnético y de la información. Sin embargo, a diferencia de éstos, la característica distintiva del dominio cognitivo consiste en que no es posible operar directamente en él; sólo cabe obtener determinados efectos operando en otros ámbitos. Esta particularidad queda adecuadamente articulada en los principales textos doctrinales del entorno aliado, pero podría no ser así en la doctrina conjunta española. Como consecuencia de ello, existen dificultades a la hora de identificar las capacidades y actividades militares asociadas con dicho dominio. Para desbloquear esta situación se sugiere, por un lado, implantar definitivamente el modelo aliado, en línea con los acuerdos ya suscritos por España. Por otro lado, a la hora de determinar las capacidades militares asociadas al dominio cognitivo, se propone contemplar sólo aquellas diseñadas específicamente para crear efectos en él, capacidades que normalmente operarán en el ámbito de la información.

This thesis is a comparative study on just a few of the psychological warfare outlets of two great military masterminds from Ancient Rome. It takes a look at the various aspects of the Roman military and the commanders themselves to reveal the underlying psychological components of warfare. It is a broader study that could be further delved into, and this work simply is meant to show the overwhelming influence that the Roman military had on their enemy through psychological warfare.

Gen. Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the Prussian General Staff during the Franco-Prussian War, defined Auftragstaktik as the actions a subordinate took in the absence of orders that supported the senior commander’s intent. The use of mission tactics allowed subordinate commanders like Crown Prince Frederick Karl, Gen. Konstantin von Alvensleben, and Gen. Karl von Steinmetz to interpret how best to achieve the commander’s intent based upon their understanding of the tactical situation. The Prussian use of decentralized command during the Franco-Prussian War acknowledged the risk inherent in this system of command. Despite what modern military theorists often write, Auftragstaktik and mission command are not synonymous terms. Most authors ignore the historical environment that the Prussian military operated in during the Franco-Prussian War. This study examines the influence of the Prussian concept of Auftragstaktik on the modern US Army notion of mission command as defined within the published doctrine. It utilizes archival records and pertinent published histories from the August 1870 battles on the Franco-Prussian frontier, Moltke’s 1869 Instructions for Large Unit Commanders, as well as writings from the 1980s to describe the influence of Prussian system on the modern concept of mission command.

Militancy has become the major security challenge to Pakistan. Religious, sectarian and ethnic based militancy not only proliferated in the tribal regions of Pakistan but also affected the urban centres. In order to counter the acts of militant, military operations were launched by Pakistan army. In this context, the increasing pace of militancy and counter militancy measures taken by Pakistan since 2003 had a profound influence on Pakistan's relation with Afghanistan, US and India. On the other hand, it also created some incentives and opportunities at the foreign policy and security front in the shape of aid and assistance and its coalition with US. The present study will focus on some research questions. How the issue of militancy affected Pakistan foreign policy? What incentives and constraints were developed on Pakistan's foreign policy due to counter militant measures taken by Pakistan in its tribal areas? How the issue of internal security influence the external relations of Pakistan? How the outcome of militancy and counter-militant measures affected Pakistan's foreign policy? Research suggests Pakistan should highlight its counter militancy measures in international community by media campaign, effective diplomacy at UN and speedy trial of militants in courts to give them a strong message.

Comparing current Russian military power to that of a decade ago, Russia has clearly made substantial progress in transforming its military into an efficient fighting force. Observing this achievement, it is relevant to ask: What military capability will Russia possess in another ten years?
This report provides a forecast of Russian military capability towards 2029. It is based on analyses of the Armed Forces and their fighting power, and of political and economic factors that affect the development of military capability. The study’s primary focus is on regular warfare capabilities.
The report finds that Russia’s authoritarian domestic policy and anti-Western foreign policy will continue. Recognition as a great power and establishing a sphere of interest in its neighbourhood will remain main objectives. The impressive pace of improvement of the Armed Forces in the past decade is probably not sustainable. Instead, the next ten years will consolidate previous achievements, notably the ability to launch a regional war. Strategic deterrence, primarily with nuclear forces, will remain the foremost priority. Towards 2029, Russia may only significantly increase its military capability further by sustained political support for determined policy implementation.

The Clausewitzian Center of Gravity (COG) concept is central in western military strategic thinking and serves as a core concept in military planning.  However, several interpretations of the concept exist, which contributes to theoretical as well as practical confusion.  Moreover, the concept receives critique such as “it is so abstract to be meaningless,” “it fails to provide convincing evidence for its use at the strategic level of war,” “there is a lack of interdisciplinary awareness,” it is an analogy tailored to Prussian military challenges in the early 19th Century, etc.  This article contributes to the discussion by combining the COG concept with strategic theory, hereby addressing many of the raised critique points.  The article presents three COG-Strategy schools, centered on different/competing interpretations of the Clausewitzian Center of Gravity (CoG) concept as well as different approaches to strategy.  Each CoG-strategy school is rooted in the experiences as well as the historical roles of the individual U.S. military services and expresses a distinct, ideal-type way of fighting and winning wars.  The article finishes with a discussion of how the COG concept can connect a grand strategy to the military strategy.  For this purpose, it introduces the Will and Ability COG concept, which belongs to COG-Strategy school three (see below).  The Will and Ability COG concept provides strategists a method for designing war winning strategies that focus on inducing a policy change by the adversary leadership and on defeating the adversary’s strategy, starting at the grand strategic level of war and with the lower levels providing increasingly more details to various elements of the grand strategy.

This article discusses the G-6 Signal planner’s role in the division course-of-action development process, wargaming process and battle-tracking and reporting process. The G-6 planner must learn and apply these processes to the overall pursuit of an endstate, which includes not only the division’s operations plan but also the creation of the Signal execution matrix and the overall division communications-support plan.

It’s important to understand the roles and responsibilities of other division-staff members to coordinate properly. The G-6 planner must be clear as to the planner’s role vs. the Signal battalion S-3’s role during the military decision-making process. In this way, the G-6 planner ensures the division commander has seamless voice and data communications through all combat-operations phases.

Attaining and maintaining operations security remains the primary objective of armed forces on modern battlefields. Due to their flexibility in employment, conventional weapons are the true weapons of war and warfare, and in turn, significantly affect the operational environment based on their offensive as well as defensive capabilities. South Asia being a nuclear flashpoint is still characterized by conventional weapons. This paper intends to investigate the traditional weapon modernization undertaken by India and the likely impact of systems such as the Russian-built T-90S Main Battle Tank and S-400 Missile System, French-built Rafale Omni-role aircraft, and the Indian Navy aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya on the Armed Forces of Pakistan. The paper aspires to examine how and why these weapons and their acquisitions and deployments are likely to affect the operations security of both rival armed forces and recommend several conventional responses to enhance it, with special regard to Pakistan

This paper deals with the background, role players, sequence of events, geopolitical considerations and history of the Angolan War which took place from 1975 to 1990 between the Soviet Union and its allies & proxies on the one hand, and the Republic of South Africa and its allies on the other. It also has a section presenting a rebuttal of previously published material on this subject, and a section on disinformation techniques used in and by the Soviet Union.

The former Soviet military bastion, Russia’s westernmost region, the Kaliningrad Oblast, has
again re-gained its military strength. The process of re-militarization that was initiated after
2009, resulted in transformation of the area into Russia’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)
zone. In the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis (started in the late 2013) and growing alienation
between Moscow and its Western partners, the oblast has stepped onto a qualitatively new
level of militarization. At the same time, following changing nature of warfare, aside from
military-related steps, the Russian side has heavily invested in non-military aspects as well. The
analysis yields three policy implications. First, Russia’s understanding of the A2/AD concept
is different from the Western reading, and Kaliningrad exemplifies this supposition. Second,
Russia will continue using Kaliningrad as a part of its growing reliance on asymmetricity. Third,
underestimation of Russia’s resolve and/or Kaliningrad capabilities will have largely negative
conclusions for the Baltic Sea region and countries that comprise it.

Gap-crossing tactics and the operations that engender them have remained—in function, if not form—essentially the same since the Middle Ages (with the sole exception of the modern recourse to the aerial domain) and therefore retain utility to modern warfighting. Secondly, the examples provided here also suggest weaknesses in current doctrine, especially when maneuvering under fire.

Pakistan has regained the status of the frontline state immediately after the holocaust of 9/11 and adopted the both military and non-military based counter terrorism strategy. The paper critically examines evolution, prospects and implications of Pakistan's counter terrorism efforts and analyzes inefficacy of Pakistan's counter terrorism policies during the period 2001-2013. Pakistan has been worst terrorist hit state in the post 9/11 environment which sacrifices over 8500 military and almost 40000 civilian lives. Along with that Pakistan has to face a bounce back reaction of its military operations against the home grown and international terrorists i.e. religious extremism, insurgency, cross border infiltration, affluent terrorist attacks on military and public centers and a terrible series of suicidal attacks. Pakistan faces the after effects of its ineffective counter terrorism strategy in the context of domestic, regional and international security reservations. Although Pakistan has initiated several military operations to root out the sanctuaries of Taliban and al-Qaeda but yet could not satisfy the United States and international community due to lacking of intangible scheme plan, incident to incident counter approach, much focus on negotiation and cease fire, discrimination between bad and good Taliban, sympathetic policy towards home grown terrorist organizations, vulnerable internal security and inconclusive military operations. Pakistan direly needs substantial overhauling policy, a strong national consensus on WOT, balance in civil-military relations in the context of decision making and identification of enemy while fighting against extremism, militancy and terrorism.

Armed conflict and state collapse since 1992 in Somalia have resulted in over 1,000,000 international refugees and 2.6 million people internally displaced people (IDPs).  In this paper, we summarize the findings of the 2017 Somali Minorities Survey, a face-to-face survey of 139 Somali Bantu households (Jareer) who had been displaced from the Lower Jubaa Valley in Somalia during the previous year. The survey was conducted face-to-face between October and December 2017 by local interviewers and used quota sampling.

Our objective in the survey was to understand Al-Shabaab’s treatment of the Somali Bantu and other groups in the five administrative districts located in the Lower and Middle Jubaa Valley, the traditional homeland of Somali Bantu. The Bantu are a sizable ethnic group with East African slave ancestry who live largely in farming communities. The Lower and Middle Jubaa Valley came under Al-Shabaab control in 2009 and only the regional city of Kismayu has been successfully retaken by the Darood-led militia known as the Interim Jubbaland Administration. The rest of the Lower and Middle Jubaa Valley remains under Al-Shabaab control. 

The Survey

The survey asked questions about experiences living under Al-Shabaab rule and focused on two areas: extraction and service provision. Evaluating Al-Shabaab’s predatory extraction practices across ethnic groups and five administrative localities in Somalia Jubba River Valley, we find that Al-Shabaab exploits the Somali Bantu while allowing Somalis from the powerful clans better access to vital services.

Extraction

We find that Al-Shabaab focuses mainly on extraction, providing limited services only to majority-clan members such as the Darood and others, and governs in a way that harms the weakest people in society. This includes not only the Somali Bantu but also women and weak members of other clans.

We find that Al-Shabaab, in order to fund and sustain the war, extracts more resources from and treats most brutally, the Somali Bantu, who may make up to one-third or more of the national population and have a lower social status than other clans, than from members of other clans. The respondents indicate that Al-Shabaab commits numerous atrocities against the Somali Bantu in Somalia, restricting their movement, forcing them to live by Al-Shabaab’s version of Islam, taking their children at young ages for a forced marriage or military service, and punishing any resistance with violence. The Somali Bantu are systematically subjected to extortion by Al-Shabaab, which generates revenues by imposing house taxes, collecting Zakat, seizing remittances, and taking half or more of most farmers’ harvests.

For instance, we find that many Somali Bantu boys are conscripted and that this occurs on average at age 13. Bantu boys receive about one-third of the salary of a Somali soldier (when paid at all). Somalis from Majority clans are reported as subjected to conscription by about one-third of respondents. Many Somali Bantu girls are forcibly married on average at age 16 to Al-Shabaab fighters. Most respondents state that Somali Bantu girls forcibly married to Al-Shabaab militiamen can expect to live fewer than seven days per month in their ‘spouse’s’ household. Moreover, Somali Bantu households are subjected on average to approximately $300 per year in Zakat payments, according to our survey. They must also pay $60 per month on average in a “house tax” and they lose more than 20 percent of their remittances and 50 percent of their harvest to Al-Shabaab extortion. The most common clan to which respondents gave their harvests and house tax was the Ogaden, which is part of the larger Darood clan.

The Somali Bantu also state that members of other groups face extortion (e.g., conscription, forced marriage, taxation), but it is less severe than that faced by the Somali Bantu.

Service Provision

We find that Al-Shabaab offers few if any services to Somalis, instead harshly extracting material and human resources. According to the 139 Somali Bantu households interviewed, Al-Shabaab offers few services to majority-clan Somalis except for religious courts and protection for middlemen engaged in trading goods such as charcoal, much of it produced by through Al-Shabaab coercion of Somali Bantu laborers. The Somali Bantu were not entitled to any services, except for religious courts, which are often used as means to punish or coerce minorities and others not abiding by Al-Shabaab rule. In order for Somali Bantu to access basic services like healthcare, education, and government documents, they are required to pay bribes to Al-Shabaab, despite these services mostly being provided by local communities and businessmen.

Comparison with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)

The Somali Civil War has moved through several stages over the decades, with the identities of the primary combatants shifting as the struggle has evolved. Al-Shabaab’s immediate predecessor was known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and it was the ICU’s defeat at the hands of a US-backed Ethiopian invasion that effectively left Al-Shabaab--formerly the ICU’s youth wing--as the most powerful successor. Based on the survey responses, we find that Al-Shabaab treats the Somali Bantu more harshly than did the ICU.

A Post-Al-Shabaab Somalia

Although some news outlets, research organizations and academics claim that the Somali Bantu enthusiastically join Al-Shabaab,  the UN Security Council’s Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea counters this by reporting that the “range of persistent and serious violations experienced by the [Somali Bantu] community as documented by the Monitoring Group may constitute war crimes in non-international armed conflict and also crimes against humanity, including with respect to the underlying acts of persecution, murder, torture and sexual slavery.”  While there may have been some early Somali Bantu acceptance of Al-Shabaab, our research results support the contention that the terrorist organization has lost any support from the Somali Bantu. The Somali Bantu are almost unanimous in claiming that they will abandon Al-Shabaab’s religious practices once the organization is gone and that they perceive themselves to be victims of Al-Shabaab persecution.

Conclusions

The UN has already claimed that Al-Shabaab is exploiting Somali Bantu farmers.  Our research is among the first survey evidence showing that this is occurring and how it is conducted. In this respect, our findings are consistent with other analyses which suggest that some members of majority-clans benefit from this extractive system and thus do not have an incentive to end the war, which also attracts foreign aid.  We believe the current US military strategy in Somalia is unlikely to be successful if the Somali partners from majority clans do not have an incentive to fully defeat Al-Shabaab and end the war.

Our research sheds light on the nature of the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia and offers insights into difficult choices that the international community generally and the US in particular face in Somalia. On a security level, it may be effective to work with the Somali Bantu to defeat Al-Shabaab or at least to force the terrorist organization out of the Jubaa Valley in order to alleviate the gross human rights violations being perpetrated against the Somali Bantu. On the diplomatic level, it may be more effective for the US to use foreign aid and military support as leverage to bring the parties to the table to negotiate a political framework that is acceptable to all stakeholders.

ABSTRACT in English: "‘Partisan warfare’, ‘war in detachment’: the ‘petite guerre’ seen from England (18th century)"
The article aims to measure and to explain the gradual realisation, in Great Britain during the 18th century, of the importance of the "petite guerre" or the "partisan warfare" in military thinking (later that elsewhere in Europe). It shows then the creation and the increase in numbers of British light troops in the course of this century, the Government's policy with regard to them, and the awareness of the British for the "petite guerre" in the field, through a new case study regarding the War of Austrian Succession.

It was only in 1770 that a British author, Stevenson, wrote and published for the first time a treatise on the "petite guerre". Indeed, the British remained for some time on the sidelines of the stream of publications in Europe on this subject. Some historians are asserting that British officers in the 18th century didn't really care about refining their military knowledge. The researches of J. Houlding allow nuancing this statement. The fact remains that a prevailing tactical routine was real, with a tendency in military treatises to instruct only parade and garrison duties.

The article explores the context that brought the real – albeit late – interest expressed by English officers for the "petite guerre" in the years 1760-1770. It should be noted that there have been more translations of foreign books than real national works. 

More important than it seems is the question of the translation – or rather the non-existence of any translation! – of the wording for the "petite guerre" in English during the 18th century ; and, therefore, the difficulty for British historians of the 20th century to suggest an adequate wording in order to express a reality which was only translated with circumlocutions in the 18th century... The article points out the shortcomings of military vocabulary in the English language during the 18th century (recognized at the time), makes an inventory of the authors' choices to express the reality of the "petite guerre", as well as the solutions considered by today's historians. A consequence of this underestimated question is the confusion often remaining nowadays between the "petite guerre" in singular and the small wars in plural (that is, between the tactic of irregular warfare and the small wars in the sense used by Charles Edward Callwell).

Numerous studies have been written within the historiography in English language about the American War of Independence and about the tactic which it used; because civil wars make a bigger mark on the national consciousness than other types of conflicts, especially in the case of an independence war, leading to the birth of a new state! However, contrary to what one might think accordingly, the tactic of "guerrilla" in the American War of Independence only had later an influence of British strategic thinking. To be sure, a theoretician like Emmerich (a Hessian officer who fought with the British in this conflict, and who cites it as an example in his treatise of the "petite guerre" in 1789) has the merit, with his fellow countryman Ewald, of having understood the role that would have from now on the civilian populations and the ideological motivations in conflicts.

However, on one hand real light troops existed in the British army well before the American War of Independence, even if their inception came later than for the main European neighbours. On the other hand, those troops were unfortunately disbanded every time peace was made, and this didn't help the perpetuation of a certain know-how regarding an indirect style of operations. The first real regiment of light troops, the Light Dragoons, was raised in 1745 in order to fight the Jacobite rising. Other were raised on this model, always temporary, on the occasion of the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and then of the Seven Years' War (1756-1763).

The article concludes with a new case study (to be continued) which presents the "petite guerre" understood and conducted by the British during the campaigns in Flanders of the War of Austrian Succession, and especially in 1747. This case study focuses on a period and on a theatre of operation still unexplored regarding this aspect of the art of war, as the British saw and experienced it. We can see that some of their generals didn't wait for the conflicts of the second half of the century and for the American theatre of operation to clearly understand the role of the "petite guerre". Beside some military accounts of British authors published after the conflict, this case study is based mainly on archives still waiting to be used on this subject : the military papers of the Duke of Cumberland, the English commander in chief of the Allies opposed to the French in 1747.

Hybrid warfare is the latest of the terms/concepts that have been used within the defence community in the last three decades to label contemporary warfare. It has been officially adopted in the core strategic documents of NATO, EU and national governments and has already inspired many articles, policy papers and books. However, hybrid warfare is a concept as controversial as it is popular. Frequently criticized for being ambiguous and weak as a concept, it carries the risk of misleading the defence community and obscuring the sound strategic thought. Carrying out a content analysis over 66 media items, this study has demonstrated that hybrid warfare is indeed an ambiguous concept. It is revealed that the authors used hybrid warfare term in its true meaning only 20 (30%) media items. Most of the time (70%), the authors imply another concept when they use hybrid warfare. We believe, it is high time that international defence community built consensus over the actual meaning of hybrid warfare.

ABSTRACT in English (the book is written in French):
This book presents a thorough analysis and a case study upon the "petite guerre" in the 18th century Europe - tactical and operational levels dealt with, as also relations between war and society (with a substantial historical reminder, in a large chapter exclusively devoted to the 17th century).

The “petite guerre“ was a type of warfare consisting in skirmishes and ambushes which, next to the sieges and battles, filled the theatre of operations during the conventional wars between princes. The locution "petite guerre" with this meaning was always used in the singular, and has to be used so today. The first treatises on the art of the “petite guerre” were published in France, from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. The locution “petite guerre” wasn’t translated into English in the eighteenth century, even in treatises published in Great Britain or America (on the contrary, it was translated into German).

Next to the case study of the Flanders during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the book makes an analysis of the thoughts on the “petite guerre” throughout the eighteenth century, in France and in the most important countries of Europe. A special chapter is devoted to the thoughts in Great Britain throughout the 18th century, and to the case study of the actions of British light troops in Flanders (example of 1747), because this topic has not been dealt with before - On the contrary, one book already dealt with the case study of Austria's and another, with the case study of Prussia's use of the "petite guerre" in the eighteenth century.

Besides the tactical level, the book shows how the use of the "petite guerre" was necessary to contribute to the victory in a military campaign at the operational level. In Flanders between 1745 and 1748, the Marshall of Saxe (commander of the French Army) and the Allies (Austrian, British and Dutch armies and their commanders) understood the advantage and importance of the "petite guerre" at this level. A case study shows in detail how the "petite guerre" strongly contributed to the main aims of the French army in August 1746.

However, the topic of the book goes beyond the scope of a tactical and operational study. By showing the impact of the “petite guerre” on civilians and on the activity of the provincial administration, by analyzing the French government policy towards light troops (the light troops were the specialists of the “petite guerre”), by approaching the opinions of the Parisian society (and of the elite as a whole) towards such military tactic and the troops specializing in it, what is at stake is also the possibility to grasp the ideas and sensitivity of society towards the “petite guerre”. This work is thus a contribution to a larger study ‒ that of an era's mentalities towards military issues.

The conclusion of the book offers the beginning of an analysis of the transformations in the use of the “petite guerre” during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

The Military Expedition of Krzysztof Radziwiłł „Perkūnas” to Livonia in the Winter of 1579

The article presents the Lithuanian expedition carried out in Livonia in the winter of 1579. On the basis of the itinerary [itinerarium] and iconographic and written
sources it has been established that three regiments were to act in a coordinated manner to conduct the military action against the Russian Empire. All the three regiments were to set off from Kieś [Wenden] and through different ways reach Dorpat [Tartu] occupied by the Russians. The whole expedition included about 200 cavalry soldiers and about 400 common infantry soldiers [Polish: drab] along with several light artillery and a numerous lager. Owing to the activities undertaken by the three regiments, destructions were much more extensive, more loot was acquired and military successes were more significant – the castle of Kierepeć was conquered. The activity of
three separate regiments confused the enemy and prevented them from undertaking the effective defence. The expedition was carried out from 16 February to 6 March, which also affected its outcome. The late winter provided the best conditions for the land communication, while the upcoming thaw made it impossible for the enemy to launch the counter-defence. It resulted in the safe return to Kieś and a lack of Moscovite units sent from Dorpat. To my way of thinking, the winter expedition of 1579 to Livonia was the best example of the manoeuvre art of the Polish-Lithuanian army in the 16th century.
The routes of two regiments (the left one and the central one) ran close to each other, while the third one (the right one) had a totally different route entering the Russian lands from the back. The right regiment was commanded by the Oberst [Colonel] of Courland Jürgen Buttler, who conquered the castle of Kierepeć [Kirempe].
The main unit was commanded by Krzysztof Radziwiłł nicknamed “Perkūnas”, who plundered the vicinities of Dorpat. The analysis of the itinerary of 1579 prepared by
Krzysztof Radziwiłł indicates that the mile recorded there corresponded to 8 kilometres. The average daily velocity of the expedition Kieś–Dorpat–Kieć amounted to 21.55 km, which corresponded to 2.7 miles. During the expedition the regiments covered from 250 to 310 km, which along with the return journey amounted to 500 km.

This article provides an analysis of the problematic of foresight in traditional Chinese thought, articulating it with current developments in the epistemology of futures studies, planning theory, and strategic management. It is argued that in Chinese thought the answer to the question " Can the future be predicted? " depends on the forecasting horizon: whereas the immediate future can be sensed and taken advantage of by immersing oneself in the evolving situation, the remote future is fundamentally unpredictable. These dual answers are entrenched in discussions of what constitutes wisdom, opening up productive spaces of encounter between the problematic of foresight and the problematic of wisdom. https://doi.org/10.6531/JFS.2018.22(3).00A35

Fallstudie für das Basis-Szenario 5: Gewaltsamer Konflikt zwischen Bevölkerungsgruppen in einem Staat Im falschen Konflikt? Deutschland und die Kurden
Innerstaatlicher Konflikt zumindest zweier rivalisierender Parteien. Der Staat hat nicht die Kontrolle über sein gesamtes Territorium inne. Die Machtfrage steht im Zentrum. Es kommt zu gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen. Die politische und territoriale Integrität des Staates bleiben erhalten.

ABSTRACT in English (résumé en français plus bas): "The Méhaigne manoeuvre (War of the Austrian Succession), a masterpiece of the indirect style of warfare, as part of the debate upon the 'petite guerre' in the 18th century"
This case study on the operational level is an excellent example of the possible contribution of the history of a campaign in the eighteenth century to the reflection of the military men today, regarding this level of war, beyond the technical differences.
The victory of Fontenoy is the main event related to Maurice de Saxe in the first biography dedicated to him. A battle, thus an event likely to summarize the value of a man of war when he was victorious, since it was the traditional image of what war had to be. This article shows however it its first part that Marshal de Saxe – the leading general of Louis XV – was a great master as well in the art of coordinating small scale actions (the "petite guerre") in order to push the enemy back without any battle, as in the art of confront him in battle. The Méhaigne manoeuvre, in August 1746, is the most dazzling example of it, and allowed the French to start laying the siege of Namur in good conditions. The article explores, in a second part, the "gap between the practice of war and the ideas on it", namely the reasons which could explain why many officers were reluctant towards the "petite guerre" in the 18th century: tactical, social and moral aspects, and the Government's attitude.

RESUME en français :
« La manœuvre de la Méhaigne (guerre de Succession d’Autriche), chef d’œuvre du style indirect, dans le cadre du débat sur la petite guerre au XVIIIe siècle »
La victoire de Fontenoy est l'événement-phare associé à Maurice de Saxe dans la première biographie qui lui est consacrée. Une bataille, donc ; événement propre à résumer la valeur d'un homme de guerre quand il en était victorieux, parce que c'était l'image traditionnelle de ce que devait être la guerre. Or l'article, dans sa 1ère partie, montre que le maréchal de Saxe, principal général de Louis XV, fut un aussi grand maître dans l'art de coordonner des actions de détail (la « petite guerre ») pour faire reculer l'ennemi sans bataille, que dans celui de donner des batailles. La manœuvre de la Méhaigne, en août 1746, en est l'exemple le plus éclatant, qui permit aux Français d'entamer le siège de Namur dans de bonnes conditions. L'article explore, dans une 2e partie, le « décalage entre la pratique de la guerre et les idées sur la guerre », c'est-à-dire les raisons qui pouvaient expliquer les réticences de beaucoup d'officiers à l'égard de la petite guerre, au XVIIIe siècle : aspects tactiques, sociaux, moraux, attitude du gouvernement.

This paper provided a new framework i.e., fifth-generation literature on suicide bombings. The latter have always been a central debate/value in warfare; however, they have taken a centre stage in asymmetric warfare. The lethality and commitment to the cause makes a suicide attacker a real danger. The Iraqi episode of Al-Qaeda used suicide bombings as a military operation, and it transferred the expertise to Taliban to fight against the U.S-led Allied Forces in Afghanistan. From there the same tactics proliferated to Pakistani Taliban who used it as a military operation against the security and civil establishments of Islamabad. Apart from the Pashtunwali Code and the strict adherence to the Deobandi School of thought, the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan readily accepted to recruit and train suicide attackers and employed suicide bombings as a military operation. This analytical and explanatory study generally banked on secondary data, normally gathered from the academic sources; however, primary data was also used, and an interview of an anonymous security official was conducted as well. This paper is a concentrated effort to probe and investigate the advent of suicide bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to examine that how and why the Pashtuns used it as a military operation to achieve their desired objectives. The article found that the selection and indoctrination of a suicide bomber involves almost eight stages.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

Allied Fighting Effectiveness in North Africa and Italy, 1942-1945 offers a collection of scholarly papers focusing on heretofore understudied aspects of the Second World War. Encompassing the major campaigns of North Africa, Sicily and Italy from operation TORCH to the end of the war in Europe, this volume explores the intriguing dichotomy of the nature of battle in the Mediterranean theatre, whilst helping to emphasise its significance to the study of Second Word War military history. The chapters, written by a number of international scholars, offer a discussion of a range of subjects, including: logistics, the air-land battle, coalition operations, doctrine and training, command, control and communications, and airborne and special forces.