Military Tactics

: During the most recent rounds of Base Closure and Realignment Commission activities in 2005, a significant number of training bases were closed. In light of the introduction of new technologies and the great expansion of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) in the force, Department of Defense planners and some in Congress have become concerned that the existing training infrastructure bases and their training support facilities may not be adequate to train UAS air and ground components and the ground forces that use such equipment to capitalize fully on their capabilities. Accordingly, the Deputy Director, Readiness and Training Policy and Programs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD [P&R]) asked the RAND Corporation to assess the adequacy of UAS training to support current and future requirements. In addition, the House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Appropriations Act raised a number of...

Drones are one of the new threats to tactical units. The armed forces use them with various successes in operations. However, the smallest tactical unit such as rifle section is generally still unprepared to operate drones and perform counter measures. Drones have a wide range of capabilities and therefore can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Along with the development of drones, counter-drone systems have also been developed. Several small drones and counter-drone systems suitable for the use by one man are presented in the first part of the research results to show that there is more than one system that can be selected for operational use. This also shows that one soldier in rifle section is capable of operating a small drone and counter-drone systems. This research has aimed to survey the organizational structure and determine organizational capabilities to implement a drone and counter-drone operator duty in rifle section. For that purpose, the research team has...

After a brief description of the units in Alexander’s army and those of the Persian and Indian forces that faced him, Alexander’s four great battles (Granikos, Issos, Gaugamela and Hydaspes) are analysed in detail using the relevant ancient sources in the original.  This avoids many of the errors that have plagued military historians working from incorrect translations. For each battle there is a discussion of the terrain, the problems faced by Alexander, the order of battle of the opposing armies, the battle itself and conclusions. Emphasis is placed throughout on Alexander’s tactics and it will be seen that there are many which he seems to have used repeatedly.

: Many scholars of the First World War have examined the European armies in new ways that have shown not only how those armies actually fought along the Western Front, but how they changed their ideas and methods over time, and why they fought the way they did. This dissertation does the same for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). It examines how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles, what they learned about modern combat in those battles, and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. Although this dissertation describes AEF training and operations, its focus is on ideas and methods, and the changes in both during the war. It shows that when the United States joined the war in 1917, the U.S. Army was doctrinally unprepared for the industrial combat of the Western Front. It demonstrates that General John J. Pershing and other AEF leaders accepted this inadequate prewar doctrine, with o...

Conceptualization of Local Combat Identity revealed through Battle of Gannoruwa.
(AIPAR & AIPA Loop Concept)
Major Thusara Witharana

The Portuguese, who has invaded Kandyan Kingdom in 1592, 1603 and 1630, faced massive defeats from Kandyan army. By the year 1638, King Rajasinghe II, the King of Kandy, was planned to banish the Portuguese with support of Dutch. Portuguese captain general Diogo de Melo de Castro's intention was to invade the Kandyan Kingdom and subjugate entire Sri Lanka before King Rajasinghe's aim was achieved. By this very idea, in 1638, King Rajasingha strategically allowed the Portuguese to enter his territory and he was retreated to Medamahanuwara. Finally, King Rajasinghe defeated the Portuguese at Gannoruwa with the support of the King Wijayapala, the ruler of Matale.

This study depends on secondary data and basically it is a historic battle analysis. Main objective of this study is to expose the Local Combat Identity through the analysis of Gannoruwa battle. Researcher proposes that the Manoeuvrist Approach is applicable to analyze the Gannoruwa Battle. The Gannoruwa Battle analysis which based on the three components of Manoeuvrist Aapproach is as follows.

1. Defeating the enemy’s will to fight. – The Portuguese who invaded Kandy had conspired to get the support from King Wijayapala of Matale. The King Rajasinghe who had identified the trick in advance, completely defeated the will to fight of the Portuguese.
2. Defeating the enemy’s Centre of gravity – It means that, identifying and attacking the powerful but risky source of enemy's battle power. Although the Portuguese awaited the support of King Wijayapala, Rajasingha who had broken that target and assaulted Portuguese by using King Wijayapala's troops in Gunnaruwa.
3. Attacking the enemy’s decision making process by getting inside his decision making cycle - The OODA loop concept, which was introduced by US colonel John Boyd is use to describe this. Observe, Orientate, Decide and Act are 4 components of OODA loop. According to the OODA loop Kandyans watched the enemy, adapted themselves to the situation of the enemy, decided the best time and best way to attack and finally they attacked.

Kandyans have used military technology and plans which were apposite to their geography and defeated more powerful and experienced Portuguese force. The researcher suggests the concept of AIPAR & AIPA loop which was displayed by Kandyan force in Gannoruwa battle is more advanced than the OODA loop concept. It is presented that, understanding of the enemy through stages of Analyze, Identify, Prepare, Act and Response with the understanding of own force through stages of Analyze, Identify, Prepare and Act. This new AIPAR & AIPA loop concept can be used successfully in the creation of an Army doctrine with Sri Lankan identity for Sri Lanka Army.

Keywords: Kandyan Kingdom, Gannoruwa Battle, Manoeuvrist Approach, OODA Loop Concept. AIPAR & AIPA Loop Concept

: Hezbollah has emerged as the most dangerous terrorist group in the world. It has about 25,000 active armed members and it can muster a million more in the streets. These terrorists are disciplined, highly trained, and have incredibly lethal equipment and unprecedented information operations and counterintelligence networks. This thesis will answer the primary question of whether U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is adequate to defeat Hezbollah as a threat model of future insurgencies. Key components of this are Hezbollah and its capabilities, lessons learned by Israel as Hezbollah's most frequent opponent, and U.S. COIN doctrine itself. In the 2006 Lebanon War, Israel was defeated by Hezbollah in most of the world's eyes. Studying the failures of Israel's doctrine as it applies to Hezbollah provides a strong foundation for reviewing U.S. doctrine and can serve as a basis for evaluating whether U.S. doctrine is adequate. To evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. COIN d...

... Also see Siddharth Varadarajan, “After Evi-dence Dossier, Direct Accusation Against Pakistan Strikes Discordant Note,” The Hindu, January 8, 2009. Page 22. Implications The LeT attacks on Mumbai have serious implications for India, Pakistan, the United States and, in some ...

AsDefense agencies and services expand their reliance on computer networks, risk to information availability and integrity increases. It is no longer adequate to rely solely on the now traditional defense-in-depthstrategy. We mustrecognize that we are engaged in a form of warfare, cyber warfare, and deploy our resources using the strategy and tactics of warfare. Most Defense organizations have not

Abstract : The outcome of the conflicts that the American military is likely to fight in the decades ahead will increasingly depend on tactical success and the empowerment of small unit leaders. Recent advances in technology have the potential to improve the intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities of tactical military units. Unfortunately, perceptions about who "does" intelligence and the role and responsibilities of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination threaten to limit the warfighting potential of intelligence technology on the battlefields of the 21st century. A mindset change is required to maximize the evolving capabilities of modern technology.

Abstract : Technological innovation brings with it the promise of greater efficiency. This is particularly true for innovations applied to the implements of war. Moreover, at punctuated intervals throughout human history technical and scientific developments have resulted in a nonlinear change of both battlefield tactics and national strategies. Since 2001, the United States and its allies have employed a host of unmanned or remote-operated robotized devices to support military operations both on the ground and in the air. The proliferation of this technology tends to lessen our recognition of its potential to dramatically change the character of warfare. Although much of the world's current experience with ground robots is directly related to the clearing of mines and IEDs, it is not unreasonable to expect that within the lifetimes of current flesh-and-blood soldiers the world will witness the first use of mechanical soldiers. Because of that, and because robotics offer both state and non-state actors a truly bloodless and potentially revolutionary alternative to traditional combat, the arguments presented in the following chapters are both timely and appropriate. The first cooperative publishing effort between the Combat Studies Institute and Les Ecoles de St. Cyr Coetquidan, this volume should spark further discussion between policy-makers and military practitioners, as well as among ethicists, scientists, and acquisition specialists. The theme of robotization of the battlefield is approached here from the angle of social and political sciences. The work does not cover scientific and technical aspects of the question but concentrates on legal, ethical, psychological, sociological, tactical, and strategic issues, in order to provide an overview of how the amazing development of military robots is going to change the conditions under which our armed forces act: preventing conflicts, coming between hostile parties, military intervention, stabilization and reconstruction.

Abstract : This monograph conducts an analysis of historical data to detect trends in war and the evolution to modern tactical battle. It also investigates the continued use of Lanchester-based attrition models. Military analysts have used the attrition models of Lanchester in an attempt to capture the dynamics of modern battle to answer questions for tactical and strategic decisionmakers. These questions involve technical evaluations of weapon systems, force structure, doctrinal issues, and training. The evolution of modern battle is marked by quantitative difference as measured by the casualty to initial force ratio. There is a trend toward decreasing ratios that coincides with the post- American Civil War period. The five technological innovations of the nineteenth century: rifled muskets, breechloaders, magazines, barbed wire, and smokeless powder were the catalysts of change in the tactical conduct of warfare. The lethality of the new weapons with their increased accuracy and range combined with the substantial increase in rates of fire forced the change in battlefield tactics.

Drones are one of the new threats to tactical units. The armed forces use them with various successes in operations. However, the smallest tactical unit such as rifle section is generally still unprepared to operate drones and perform counter measures. Drones have a wide range of capabilities and therefore can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Along with the development of drones, counter-drone systems have also been developed. Several small drones and counter-drone systems suitable for the use by one man are presented in the first part of the research results to show that there is more than one system that can be selected for operational use. This also shows that one soldier in rifle section is capable of operating a small drone and counter-drone systems. This research has aimed to survey the organizational structure and determine organizational capabilities to implement a drone and counter-drone operator duty in rifle section. For that purpose, the research team has...

The use of Combined Arms, a very important set of tactics, techniques, and procedures to the Marine Corps, is complex and requires considerable practice and training of the entire Combined Arms (CA) team. Simulations exist and are being developed that provide a ...

Chapter 10 Dialogue as Medium (and Message) for Training Critical Thinking Marvin S. Cohen Cognitive Technologies, Inc., Arlington, VA Leonard Adelman George Mason University Terry Bresnick F. Freeman Marvin Innovative Decisions, Inc., Vienna, VA Eduardo Salas ...

: This research paper addresses different (e.g. historical, ideological, operational, tactical, technical) aspects related to the unique asymmetric naval warfare doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and its naval forces. It is based on the assumption that the ruling IRI regime is, so far, undeterred and fully determined to achieve its final goal to get weapons of mass destruction, thus setting the precondition for further dangerous developments which may eventually lead toward direct confrontation with the USA, and perhaps some other state. Research argues that in any kind of a military-type scenario, the naval power of the IRI would play a crucial role in the overall asymmetric response by the Iranians. To support this thesis, the research, particularly reviews and analyzes: *The essence of, and philosophy behind, the Iranian asymmetric warfare strategy (including its part relevant to naval domain), its historical roots and evolution (how the Islamic Revolution, Iran-Iraq...

: A psychologically-oriented conceptual framework of distributed tactical decision making (DTDM), applicable to future Naval Battle Groups/Forces operating within a reconfigurable command and control system in a multithreat environment, is subjected to critical analysis. Empirical results point to the need for more systematically addressing the issues of performance measurement and the means to facilitate proper distribution of resources to enhance overall group performance. Keywords Cognitive psychology, Group dynamics, Distributed tactical, Psychological framework, Empirical research.

: This study attempts to analyze the decisions made by Field Marshal Albert Kesselring prior to and during the battle of Anzio in February 1944. The focus of the investigation is on Kesselring's decision to shift Army Group reserves from the Rome area prior to the Allied amphibious assault at Anzio on 18 January 1944, then his involvement in the development and execution of the German counterattack against the Allied beachhead conducted on 16 February 1944. The investigation reveals that Kesselring, the Army Group commander, made a proper and effective decision in committing the Army Group reserves to the German defensive line prior to the invasion, and that his involvement in the development and execution of the German counterattack at Anzio was doctrinally sound and generally effective.

: Just over a century ago, a British admiral condemned the newly invented submarine as an "underhand, unfair, and damned un-English weapon." The officer underscored his disdain for the craft by urging that submarine crews be treated as pirates and hanged. Winston Churchill, then the Royal Navy's political head, was not willing to go quite that far, yet at one point during World War I, he ordered that captured U-boat crews be treated as criminals, not prisoners of war. Churchill's action was symptomatic of the professional naval attitude toward this below-the-belt weapon: sinking merchant ships without warning was not "legitimate" warfare as behooved a civilized power. Those sentiments of long ago have a familiar ring, albeit in a different context: insurgency warfare. Regular soldiers have historically looked on insurgency warfare as underhanded and unfair and, a U.S. combatant in Iraq might add, "damned un-American." From the Soldier's pers...

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: The penalty for undertaking urban combat operations without first performing reconnaissance has historically proven very costly on more than one occasion. Yet reconnaissance is considerably more difficult in villages, towns, and cities than in open terrain. The many buildings and other structures can provide cover and concealment for large numbers of a foe's vehicles, personnel, and supplies. Unlike when these assets are hidden in more open ground under foliage or camouflage nets, overhead systems often cannot penetrate the concealment in urban areas. The acquisition of trustworthy and timely combat intelligence must therefore rely on units trained and equipped to conduct ground combat reconnaissance. Urban areas also present special challenges to these men. Undetected movement is difficult in an environment dense with noncombatants and, possibly, enemy. Noise ricochets off hard surfaces so that even a minor slip can compromise a unit's location. Structures and infrastruct...

: As Defense agencies and services expand their reliance on computer networks, risk to information availability and integrity increases. It is no longer adequate to rely solely on the now traditional defense-in-depth strategy. We must recognize that we are engaged in a form of warfare, cyber warfare, and deploy our resources using the strategy and tactics of warfare. Most Defense organizations have not yet developed strategies or tactics for cyber warfare. This causes security devices to be used ineffectively and responses to be untimely. Cyber warfare then becomes a one-sided battle where the attacker makes all the strikes and the target of the attack responds so slowly that the attacker usually gets away without being identified. Employing cyber warfare strategy and tactics requires a cyber warfare command and control system. Responses to cyber attacks do not require offensive measures outside our own network boundaries to be effective, but they do require timely responses. Timely...