Psyops

The deep structural and cultural changes taking place in North Korea provide an opportunity to conduct influence operations to shape that country’s culture and society, either to destabilize the government or to prepare the population for a regime change. This paper presents a conceptual model of how contradictions between top down, imposed culture and organic, indigenous culture can be exploited to destabilize the system, and eventually repattern the culture. The process includes the following steps: identification of the cultural type; understanding relevant cultural forms; identification of vulnerable targets; evaluation of the information system; identification of effective elements of persuasion; mapping of the architecture of social control; and introduction of new “attractors” to damage or destroy the constituent cultural myths.

В публикации рассматривается комплекс пропагандистских мероприятий Вермахта против военнослужащих РККА в операции «Барбаросса». Описывается структура немецких военно-пропагандистских структур, основные пропагандистские акции немцев 1941 года, дается оценка их эффективности. Проанализирована динамика результативности немецкой пропаганды с начала войны до конца 1941 г., определен комплекс причин ее зимнего кризиса.

A case study analysis of Russia's employment of Information Operations against Georgia during the 2008 war.  Categories examined include Computer Network Operations, Electronic Warfare, Psychological Warfare, military deception, and operational security.  Authors:  Kenneth Fermaint, Matthew D. Neff, and Daniel Barker

Experts are so alarmed by fake news that no one is paying attention to the other aspects of the internet era potentially employable to carry out psychological operations (pysops). I'm speaking of the so-called influencers, people who make their fortune by promoting goods and by selling their truths and stories to their followers-millions of followers. Everyone can be an influencer: actors, musicians, sportsmen, bloggers, world-travellers, reporters, writers, super-models, ordinary people with no particularly relevant qualities and skills-like good-looking men and women taking photos randomly in attractive places.
People now tend to trust more education-free influencers than politicians and experts, with the latter trusted by more educated people and with the influencers followed, loved and celebrated by the younger generations.
The natural conclusion of the is the following: in the 2020s if a State does want to advance its own interests and convince the public opinion to accept something, like an economic reform or a cultural agenda, must rely on the help of these seemingly unreliable allies, the influencers.

Do percurso iniciado junto ao encantamento da pseudoliberdade até o ponto dos atuais golpes, revoluções coloridas e guerras em rede, estamos descobrindo que não há transparência, de fato, nos processos virtuais estabelecidos na grande rede. Em contrapartida, paga-se um preço alto no mercado capitalista das emoções, onde outra espécie de transparência se apoia na produção de uma exposição incessante de usuários que são exortados a falar, a postar, a se expor, a curtir, a compartilhar, a vigiar e ser vigiado, a consumir e ser consumido.

В статье анализируются политические, экономические, медийные, геополитические факторы информационно-психологического противоборства в Латинской Америке. Обращается внимание на многоуровневый характер такого противоборства, активную вовлеченность высших должностных лиц в информационное противостояние, особенности стратегической коммуникации США, России и Китая в регионе, использование новейших информационных технологий для обеспечения превосходства над противником. Автор рассматривает влияние хода и итогов президентской кампании в США на информационно-психологическое противоборство в латиноамериканских странах.
Ключевые слова: информационно-психологическое противоборство, медиавойны, Латинская Америка, стратегическая коммуникация, коммуникационный менеджмент, Китай, Россия, США.           
The article examines political, economic, media and geopolitical factors of psychological warfare in Latin America. Special attention is given to multilevel character of psychological warfare, active key leaders engagement into psychological confrontation, peculiarities of strategic communications of the USA, Russia and China in the region, use of the latest ICT for the dominance over the foe etc. Finally the author focuses on the influence of presidential campaign in the USA and it’s results on the psychological warfare in Latin American countries.
Keywords: Psychological warfare, media wars, Latin America, strategic communication, communication management, China, Russia, the USA.

Groups interested in optimizing for the acquisition and transmission of knowledge also need to attend to efforts by adversarial groups to undermine their capacity for doing so and must develop methods to armor themselves against such epistemic foes.  Insofar as epistemology is concerned with methods for the optimization of knowledge and knowledge flow, epistemologists should take on these concerns as part of their charter.  In particular, there is a place for work on the epistemology of groups that explores issues of intentional efforts at deception as well as attempts to undermine the abilities of the group to function effectively both as a knowledge acquirer and as a knowledge disseminator. (Draft of paper presented in Summer 2012).

This article will provide a more complete account of the impact of Radio Free Europe’s broadcasts on Soviet decision making during the crisis, drawing on documents released from Russian, Hungarian, and U.S. archives in recent years. It will be argued that early balloon and leaflet operations during reformist Imre Nagy’s first term as Hungarian prime minister (1953-1955) - namely “Operation Focus” - both antagonized Nagy and spawned a stern neutralism (later, hostility) toward him among US diplomats and RFE broadcasters during the crisis. This, in turn, caused Soviet leaders to doubt Nagy’s managerial skills, fear the power vacuum in Hungary, and conclude that a second military invasion was necessary. Specifically, one can conclude that RFE’s broadcasting was a key causal factor in the Soviet crackdown for at least three distinct, but interrelated, reasons: 1) the broadcasts contributed to Moscow’s lack of faith in Nagy’s ability to control the situation; 2) they aroused Soviet fears of Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact long before Nagy himself announced it; and 3) the broadcasts contributed to the disbandment of the Hungarian security police (ÁVH), thus convincing Soviet (and Hungarian) communist leaders that Soviet troops were needed to fill the security vacuum in Hungary.

В статье рассматриваются вопросы осуществления фронтовой пропагандистской и контрпропагандистской работы отделов Iс вермахта в период операции «Барбаросса» на примере 55-го армейского корпуса, действовавшего на южном участке советско-германского фронта. Описываются пропагандистские мероприятия, проводившиеся сотрудниками отдела Iс корпуса, производится сравнение немецкой и советской фронтовой пропаганды первых месяцев войны. Рассматриваются объем, характер и специфика пропагандистской работы, проводившейся в германских сухопутных войсках на уровне дивизии и корпуса.

Actualmente o terrorismo é a preocupação dominante de muitos Estados, até porque o seu campo de batalha deixou de ser localizado, tornando-se internacional ou como alguns preferem, mesmo com algum risco que a palavra traz, global e portanto, difícil de controlar e de prever. Existe alguma confusão nos entendimentos da natureza deste fenómeno, até porque as acções de terror nunca abateram governos ou venceram guerras - mas se houver algum motivo maior, político, religioso, organizado e existir uma guerrilha a apoiar nessa “guerra psicológica” nos vários ambientes: rural e urbano, pode efectivamente ajudar, como forma complementar, nessa tarefa de luta, geralmente, contra o sistema estabelecido. Todos sabemos que o uso da palavra “terrorismo” é aplicada de forma indiscriminada, basta qualquer violência presta-se logo, quer por conveniência do status quo ou por ignorância a ser usada, lançando alguma confusão nas mentes. Este artigo presume tentar ajudar a tipificar mais claramente o que é o “terrorista guerrilheiro” e os seus métodos, planeamento, organização daquele que é criminoso ou privado. O primeiro é dirigido contra o Estado e governo os outros, podem ser o único ou o principal, quase único, instrumento: geralmente, formas de pressão tentando exacerbar o medo entre as populações para controlar, geralmente, determinada área como faz o narcoterrorismo. Este último também se pode organizar como as células irregulares.

El trabajo analiza el rol del neuromarketing aplicado dentro de la dimensión político-ideológico [NPI], como herramienta comunicacional para construir discursos hegemónicos: su influencia en la sociedad y su esfuerzo por invisibilizar elementos subordinantes; lo que le asigna un rol como arma para Operaciones Psicológicas [PsyOps], y una ventaja para las guerras híbridas informativas, dentro de las que se disputa el poder, local e internacionalmente. Para esto, se realiza una revisión bibliográfica para plantear las principales variables para el análisis del NPI, en la construcción y justificación de la lógica de dominio, y sus posibles usos, para elaborar narrativas contrahegemónicas.

In  this  paper  the  authors  introduce  the  cognitive  dimension 
that is becoming more and more important in the field of information
operations with special regard to psychological operations (PSYOPS).
The  strengthening  role  of  influencing  skills  and  technological 
progress  has  created  new  avenues  and  opportunities  in  the  military 
field. The paper seeks to point out the relationship between marketing
and  PSYOPS.  In  connection  with  this,  the  study  intends  to  present  a  new  approach  to  PSYOPS  that  can  achieve  the  operational  goals 
which  set  by  the  leader  by  applying  guerrilla  marketing  tools  and 
methods.

Absztrakt A katonai pszichológiai művelet (PSYOPS) egy tervezett módszer, amely célzott információkat továbbít egy kiválasztott célcsoport részére oly módon, hogy az befolyásolja érzelmeiket, motivációikat, attitűdjüket. Az élet szinte minden terüle-tén jelentkező pszichológiai ráhatások, befolyással bírhatnak gondolkodásmó-dunkra, és akár egy adott pillanatban meggyőződésünkkel ellentétesen is cselek-vésre késztethetnek. A kommunikáció az emberi lét természetes jelensége, egy olyan folyamat, amelybe gyakorlatilag beleszületünk, és életünk szerves részét képezi. Kultúrától, szubkultúrától függetlenül valamilyen módon és mértékben a társadalmak egésze él vele, és alkalmazza civil, vagy katonai területen egyaránt. A marketingnek is szerves részét képezi a kommunikáció, amelynek segítsé-gével, különböző módszereket alkalmazva képes az egyén tárgyi szemléletmód-jának megváltoztatására. Változatos, egyedi módszerekkel, és eszközökkel ope-rál (például gerillamarketing), amelyek a PSYOPS területén is alkalmazhatóvá válhatnak.
Abstract The military psychological operations (PSYOPS) are a proposed method that transmits information to a selected target audiencies in order to affect their emotions, motivation, and attitude. Almost all aspects of life psychological effects may have influenced our way of thinking, and even a certain moment contrary to our beliefs can induce action. Communication is the natural phenomenon of human existence, a process in which virtually born into, and form an integral part of our lives. Regardless culture or subculture in some way and to an extent the whole society live with it and apply civilian or military field as well. Communication also forms an integral part of marketing whereby using a variety of methods, it will be able to change the individual fixed attitudes. Variety of unique methods and tools are operated (eg: guerrilla marketing) which may become applicable in the territory of PSYOPS too.

State-sponsored cyber intrusion has mostly been a covert activity, whereas my research indicates that rapid and continuous disinformation campaigns reveal insight into the extent that these are driven by military and strategic planning, supporting the activities of Defence and Intelligence agencies to achieve broader national security and geopolitical strategies.
The sophistication of Russian disinformation strategies in its areas of operation, and toward the Western world is increasing and is a part of a broader and integrated military campaign. My research - analysis of events in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and the downing of MH17 - shows key communications improvements in timeliness; specificity and audience targeting. Russia’s disinformation campaigns are also more effectively synchronised with kinetic – especially cyber - operations.
Intelligence collection; military operations and information effects are not separated or coincidental. Russian operations show various uses of that cyber warfare to inform intelligence collection, such as the attacks on the MH17 investigation teams and those on journalists and bloggers. Other attacks are designed to release information to influence; such as US Diplomatic calls in Eastern Ukraine or to destroy communications systems, such as attacks in Crimea. What we’re seeing is an increasing intersection between public information campaigns and intelligence activities.

The article will present the role of the humanitarian aid in the process of creating the US foreign policy. The study will examine two interesting case studies: the Polish Medical Aid Project and the creation of the American Research Hospital for Children in Poland. The work will show the most important aspects of the planning and implementation of those initiatives. This approach will be aimed at answering the title question and will try to define the extent to which the humanitarian aid offered to Poland within a certain period was a political calculation. The final analysis of the congressional hearings conducted in 1962 presents and confirms the complexity of the process of helping the “Captive Nations” in Central Eastern Europe.

In this paper the authors introduce the cognitive dimension that is becoming more and more important in the field of information operations with special regard to psychological operations (PSYOPS). The strengthening role of influencing skills and technological progress has created new avenues and opportunities in the military field. The paper seeks to point out the relationship between marketing and PSYOPS. In connection with this, the study intends to present a new approach to PSYOPS that can achieve the operational goals which set by the leader by applying guerrilla marketing tools and methods.

#SocialMedia - Covert Unilateral Unfollowing (CUU) https://www.instagram.com/p/BualX-rgGrq/ #UMN #Boomers #GenX #Millennials #College #GenZ #Teen #FFA #HighSchool #HomeSchool #VoTech #Military #Militia #Republican #Democrats #TPUSA #Conservative #MAGA #Qanon #gun @WayneDupreeShow #MarkLevinShow #ChrisSalcedoTX #LarryElder #PragerU #Trump #Brexit #YellowVest #GiletJaunes #ChalecosAmarillos #YellowVestAmerica #MainstreamMedia #BuildTheWall #ActForAmerica #Infowars #BlackHistoryMonth #COSAction #PeteHegseth #CFR #CIA #KanyeWest #TaylorSwift #KatyPerry #AriannaGrande #TheEllenShow @LadyGaga #JimmyKimmelLive #Beyonce #JLo #theView #OWNTV #Oprah #60Minutes #LindsayLohan #Kaepernick #AlyssaMilano #AlecBaldwin #JamesWoods #CNN #NBC #CBS #ABC #FOXNews #MSNBC

here is really no significant difference between the various forms of mass persuasion methods, though the terminology used may vary. Analyzing basic elements of political marketing and psychological operations (PSYOP)—beyond the basics of audience/message/channel—shows a similarity of techniques and procedures. An analysis of the PSYOP campaign of the Islamic organization Hamas against Israel in the past decade demonstrates that there is a striking similarity between political marketing and PSYOP (formerly known as “propaganda”). This is not mere theoretical hairsplitting; it is an important understanding that democracies should pay careful attention to when they contemplate their survival strategies.

KEYWORDS: hamasisraelpsychological warfarePSYOP

Challenges related to hybrid threats and hybrid warfare (HT&HW) are today something that is high on the security agenda across the world. The need to manage a range of hybrid measures is widely recognized among experts and practitioners,[2] as well as by key international organizations such as NATO and the European Union (EU).[3] It has become clear that the battlefield of the future exists in the grey zone between war and peace. In this grey zone, you will find non-kinetic effects replacing, or mixed with, kinetic effects. There will be a synergistic assortment of military and non-military activities, ranging from different forms of strategic communication, through active measures as intrusions, special operations, sanctions and subversions, through the use of masked soldiers like to so-called green men in Crimea, cyberattacks, sabotage and terror or proxy warfare, before passing the borderline of war. Thus, today there is a need to be able to develop resilience towards, and capabilities to pursue, effective operations and tactics against HT&HW.

To counter HT&HW, there is a need for a range of actors to work together and use the full range of tools at their disposal. This chapter focuses on one part of the toolbox for countering HT&HW: the military. What role, if any, can and should the military play against hybrid scenarios such as the presence of green men, infrastructure and logistics protection, cyber defence, information and influence operations, or simply in support of civil society?

It is crucial to understand the role of the military in the grey zone. Unless HT&HW can be successfully handled there, the war is likely to have been lost before a conventional war breaks out. Sun Zsu’s age-old wisdom that ‘[t]he greatest victory is that which requires no battle’ is as true today as it was 2,000 years ago. This is also a wisdom encapsulated in Russia’s style of warfare which ‘combines the political, economic, social and kinetic in a conflict that recognizes no boundaries between civilian and combatant, covert and overt, war and peace . . . [where] achieving victory – however that may be defined – permits and demands whatever means will be successful’.[4]

In other words, when preparing for a conventional high-intensity conflict towards a qualified opponent, you are preparing for a situation that will not happen if your opponent succeeds wi th its strategy. Thus, it is of paramount importance to analyse and understand what role the military can and should play in responding to HT&HW today and in the future. The important thing is not if or how the military should contribute, but to allow for making informed decisions and to know what the consequences are with one’s choices. Or lack of choices; not choosing is also a choice. It might be that the sole role for the military is to fight during a conventional war – but then this decision should be taken based on well-informed analysis.

The overarching question guiding this chapter is ‘Where do the military fit in when countering HT&HW?’ More specifically, it is asked, ‘What is the role of the military – if any – to counter HT&HW?’. This chapter focus on the role of the military in Western democracies in the Baltic Sea region (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Germany). With its focus on the Baltic Sea region, the chapter will focus on analysing HT&HW relating to Russia. The reason for this limitation is that Russia is identified as the main threat in the threat assessments across the countries in the Baltic Sea region.[5] This is not to say there are no other actors active in the region, but the key actor is nevertheless Russia.

The analysis is conducted using a proposed analytical framework outlining seven dimensions of HT&HW. Using this framework, it will first be analysed what role the military have today and in the future across the Baltic Sea region. After that, it will be asked what role the military should have in the future according to the members of the military themselves. Here Sweden is used as a case study and structured interviews are conducted with senior officers. The latter dimension is important as it allows to better understand what the profession itself thinks about their role and responsibilities. If able to identify possible discrepancies between the officer’s perception and the official strategy, it is possible to enhance ones’ ability to operationalize and implement the strategy successfully. One should also note that as a collective, the officer corps can be expected to have shared insight and knowledge on their capabilities, or lack of the same, which if taken into consideration may enhance the ability to defence against HT&HW.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, the two concepts in focus – HT&HW – will be presented and defined. In the following section, the concepts will be operationalized, and an analytical framework of HT&HW that draws together existing Western thinking and the understandings in military and policy frameworks is proposed. Thereafter, the proposed framework is discussed and contrasted with the Russian approach to HT&HW. In section three, the existing official discourse on how the military fit in the context of HT&HW among countries in the Baltic Sea region will be analysed. This is followed, in section four, with a case study analysing what role the members of the military themselves think it should have. The case used is Sweden, and the analysis builds on structured interviews with eighty-two senior officers.

The Kremlin employs a type of ‘strategic communications’, which, according to the Russian conceptualisation of information war, is a combination of military and non-military means intended to influence the information-psychological space of a targeted audience. This article argues that the Kremlin’s employment of economic counter-sanctions (non-military means) and its intervention in Syria (military means) demonstrate the Kremlin’s capability to participate in information war – the Russian counterpart of Western strategic communications.

Los sistemas de comunicación de las grandes potencias son instrumentales en la expansion económica y política de esas sociedades. La guerra de baja intensidad los utiliza no para propiciar el desarrollo de los pueblos, sino para sabotearlo.

In the 21st century, every company and organization must function in a complex, compound environment. In order to be able to prosper the organization/company, needs to find those elements, which knowledge and manipulation, through adaptation can operate successfully on its territory. Be that civilian or even military sphere. Therefore, beside defining the target group, it is essential to know the environment, which in some part is given, in others it can be altered. The environment orientation is an important task of marketing, which is a continuous examination of the macro and micro environment. It can be successfully adapted by the psychological operations, thus facilitating the planning of an operation. The present article aims to define some useful aspects of the environmental analysis in the field of psychological operations.

A 21. században minden vállalatnak, illetve szervezetnek egy komplex, összetett környezetben kell működnie. Ahhoz, hogy ez a szervezet/vállalat boldogulni tudjon, meg kell találnia azokat az elemeket, melyek ismerete, manipulálása, ahhoz való alkalmazkodása révén sikeresen tud működni saját területén. Legyen az civil, vagy éppen katonai szféra. Éppen ezért a célcsoport meghatározása mellett elengedhetetlen ismerni a környezetet, melynek egy része adottság, másik része változtatható. A marketing egyik fontos feladata a piaci környezetorientáció, amely a makro és a mikrokörnyezet folyamatos vizsgálatát jelenti, valamint sikeresen adaptálható a pszichológiai műveletek által is, megkönnyítve ezzel egy-egy művelet tervezését. Jelenlegi cikkemben a környezetelemzés néhány hasznos vonatkozását szeretném definiálni a pszichológiai műveletek esetében.

Music is not only about happiness and sadness, is not only about dancing and having fun at a party, music – some scientists and sociologists are starting to argue – can be a powerful instrument of mind control, whose power stems from the fact of being apparently harmless.

The chaos of 2020 has many people confused and frustrated and trying to make sense of it all. At the same time, their busy and hectic schedules allow them very little time to understand and try to make sense of what is causing this chaos. To which we offer the following preliminary explanation which is based on facts that can be corroborated….

The increasing proliferation and psychological and physical embeddedness of the global digital infrastructure call us to reconsider traditional models of vulnerability, attack trees, and security auditing. The easy coordination of disparate digital means of attack suggests we should move to tighter coordination between digital information assurance, psychological operations, and physical security. Examples at the physical end of the spectrum includes embedded Floating Point Gate Array (FPGA) computer chips that can be configured on the fly to function as completely different chips, 3D printers that can be used to bypass traditional physical security, hypervisors that virtualize complexity previously instantiated in hardware, and immersive communications environments where traditional physical facilities are being replaced. Digital technology also has a profound ability to monitor and induce behavior, opinion, and identity in ways that were not possible in previous eras. These include vivid multimedia production resources capable of inducing assumptions of events and facts in large populations, artificial intelligent systems capable of filtering of large volumes of communications for population behavior and also filter for patterns or persons of interest, and opportunities for highly engaging insertions of pseudonym contact and identity imprinting with low risk to operatives. Analyzing the behavior of a population and inducing behavior seem separate at first, but from the perspective of bit‐induced reality and bit monitored reality, the two are ever closer. The author proposes that we re‐assess vulnerability models to ensure that the natural integration occurring across a new Psy‐BIR‐Phys spectrum that tracks the level at which systems are a Bit‐induced Reality (BIR) across a psychological‐physical spectrum. The examples presented are particularly in reference to persistent threats and long‐term security requirements. Traditional resources and functions are drawn by the author in a way that reflects changing vulnerabilities as they migrate within the author’s Psy‐BIR‐Phys Matrix model. Scenarios presented in this work, like an attack on a device with a speaker, are formulated by the author based on an analysis of recent incidents and technology trends that include mobile devices, cloud infrastructure, programmable logic controllers, internet‐based surveillance, and social media.

ABSTRACT There is really no significant difference between the various forms of mass persuasion methods, though the terminology used may vary. Analyzing basic elements of political marketing and psychological operations (PSYOP)—beyond the basics of audience/message/channel—shows a similarity of techniques and procedures. An analysis of the PSYOP campaign of the Islamic organization Hamas against Israel in the past decade demonstrates that there is a striking similarity between political marketing and PSYOP (formerly known as “propaganda”). This is not mere theoretical hairsplitting; it is an important understanding that democracies should pay careful attention to when they contemplate their survival strategies.

In this paper the authors introduce the cognitive dimension that is becoming more and more important in the field of information operations with special regard to psychological operations (PSYOPS). The strengthening role of influencing skills and technological progress has created new avenues and opportunities in the military field. The paper seeks to point out the relationship between marketing and PSYOPS. In connection with this, the study intends to present a new approach to PSYOPS that can achieve the operational goals which set by the leader by applying guerrilla marketing tools and methods.

Professionals entering the information security
field need new models to manage user reactions to the loss of control over their digital identities. Escalations in authentication technologies like behavioral blocks and biometric data breaches are reducing the user's control over the management of their digital identities. Simultaneously, users are becoming more digitally dependent regarding financial transactions, buying food, emotionally connecting with loved ones on social media, managing personal information, and writing personal documents. This research presents a tool to address this issue pulled from the fields of education, political science, psychology, and cyber security. It is combined as a set of models to be delivered as part of information security curricula. Recent analysis of brain scans and population behavior studies have suggested that when people feel their identity at risk and feel disempowered they will have a stronger disposition towards authoritarianism, desire for retribution, and a desire for simplistic solutions instead of acting with reasoned and adaptive responses. Indicators in other fields suggest that the way professionals and educators characterize incidents that threaten digital identity can habituate different types of societal attitudes about the Internet and institutional data usage. The model presented herein should help cyber security educators characterize user responds to digital identity threats, and provides a scale for evaluating those responses.

Conozca a #PamelaKarlan, testigo de audiencia progresiva de culto y testigo de juicio político https://www.instagram.com/p/B56qtbngefb/
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“Time bombs,” “Trojans Horses” and “Dithering Hamlets” were all part of the everyday jargon of the World War II’s ultra-Secretive Political Warfare Executive (PWE). The PWE’s instructors used these terms in the training of the next generation of propagandists and political warriors. The Political Warfare Executive Syllabus reveals for the first time what it took to become a propagandist in what was then the elite political/psychological warfare unit in the world. Under the maxim that a good propagandist is trained not born, the lecturers of the PWE Training School at Woburn Abbey and then Brondesbury systematically explored every aspect of how to deliver a lethal dose of propaganda to the enemy and then a purgative and curative dose in the peace that followed.
The views of the PWE’s instructors were controversial. This is significant because they would play an important, if hidden, role in how Europe is developing even today. For example, they held a low opinion of the French in general and considered that they had been reduced to the level of “dithering Hamlets” by the German “Trojan Horses” even before the first German tank had crossed the Belgian frontier. On the dark side of PWE operations, they were not above killing the prostitutes whose brothels served the German U-Boot fleet in order to amplify their propaganda message. Perhaps most significant is that they saw Great Britain as European and espoused a Europe that looks very much like the European Union of the early 21st Century. However, there is one important difference. They saw this Greater Europe as accepting the British way of life and being led by Great Britain and not embracing American culture under German leadership.
The Political Warfare Executive Syllabus:  A Crash Course in Mass Deception Volume I introduces the reader to the history and theory of political warfare as seen through the eyes of the inheritors of Lord Northcliffe’s Crewe House. Drawing on JFC Fuller and his concept of a war fought in the mind without armies, it establishes the theoretical parameters of political warfare. The Political Warfare Executive Syllabus: Words at War Volume II takes the PWE’s theories and shows what it might look like when words are weaponised and deployed in anger. Though the lectures are over 70-years old they are once more relevant in that they resonated with current attempts at engaging in political warfare that now plays itself out through social media platforms. A modern-day amalgam of leaflet, broadcast and rumour.

" Schemes " of reality, which are often invisible and organically interwoven into the very " fabric " of words, exist within these words, images or human actions. Selective attention to a certain topic leaves strategically more important things out of human perception. Symbols were used in staff military exercises from ancient times. Their roots go back to ... billiards, which was a strategic game of military commanders in Ancient China. The billiard balls of different sizes represented various kinds of troops-infantry, cavalry, archers, and allowed to objectively assess the " fighting clashes " results. In recent times, there are two major approaches to military staff exercises: tactical and strategic. A tactical approach is often associated with " coloured labels " , when contrast paper maps' colours are used to indicate own forces and forces of the enemy. The colour markers have been traditionally more convenient to identify, read and correct maps in the conditions of combat operations. This approach also includes a NATO graphic symbols' system which makes a colour solution more appropriate for paper topographic maps in the circumstances of a possible combat encounter. A strategic approach might employ the names of fictional countries. There are three major reasons for this: 1. Political conspiracy is crucial in the strategic planning on a global scale. Even if everyone knows and understands which country is mentioned under a certain name, a possible leakage of strategic information (betrayal, theft of documents or espionage) will not lead to a formal pretext for political demarches at a high level 2. A conditional country as an actor in combat operations: this option allows strategic analysts to abstract from a possible prejudiced "own-alien" attitude which influences the unbiased assessment and results of the analysis 3. Morphology rules influence the semantic property of words which indicates an imaginary enemy. Several root morphemes might be replaced by a meaningless combination of sounds, however the meaning of a word remains quite clear. Imagine a fictional country named "Vrussia", for instance. It is immediately understood what imaginary enemy we are dealing with. In a case of "Veishnoria", most probably, we talk about Northern Europe or the Baltic region. A Brigade General Washington Platt's classic work "Information Work of Strategic Intelligence. Basic Principles", translated into Russian in 1958, is considered as a "Bible" of the conditional country names' usage in strategic planning. General Platt was one of the CIA founders and consultants. Platt used the examples of fictional characters, fictional biographies of non-existent officers with their fictitious names and surnames to explain the principles of information analysis.