American Conservatism

Donald Trump's transformation of Republican Party and conservative ideology has helped reveal major problems in the political science discipline's conceptualization and measurement of ideology. Previous political science scholarship is dominated by the mistaken view that party ideology changes can best be described by parties moving "left" or "right" on a static ideological, spatial spectrum. In reality, the meaning and content of "left" and "right" ("liberal" and "conservative") constantly evolve along with the issue positions of the two major parties. Thus, it makes no sense to describe the parties as moving to the "left" or "right" over time when the very meaning of "liberalism" and "conservatism" change during the same time period. By understanding the dynamic character of ideology, we can reconcile the paradox of how Trump's Republican Party can change its ideology even while continuing to be identified with "conservatism" and the "Right."

В сборника “50 крачки отвъд матрицата” са подбрани 50 от многобройните статии на конституционалиста д-р Борислав Цеков. Съставител е докторът по социология Петко Петков, а инициативата на сдружение “Републикански център”. Повод е 50-годишният юбилей, който д-р Цеков навършва на 19 януари 2022 г. Статиите са посветени на разобличаването на неолибералния глобализъм, джендър-идеологията, както и други интересни теми.

В сборника са поместени и отзиви за публицистиката на д-р Цеков от:

- Проф. Георги Близнашки: „Публицистиката на д-р Борислав Цеков е жива, енергична и динамична, каквито са и проблемите, по които той се произнася с ерудиция и компетентност. Негова отличителна черта е умението високите идеи, принципи и каузи да се обясняват и защитават достъпно и разбираемо. Подобно на своя учител – незабравимия и неповторим Гиньо Ганев – той се стреми към изящно формулиране на своите мисли, а така се раждат ярки и запомнящи се сентенции. Това го прави авторитетна и влиятелна фигура, която не просто обяснява хода на събитията, а много често задава тон в обществения живот на България.”
- Проф. Огнян Герджиков: "Дори когато времето не ми позволява да обърна повече внимание на вестника, не загърбвам материал на д-р Цеков. Винаги е интересен, последователен, злободневен и... честен."
- Доц. Петко Симеонов: “Познавам Борислав Цеков от ученическите му години. В негово лице съм видял как израства и се формира политически деец и политически анализатор от международен мащаб. Добре информиран, ерудиран, с ясна и смело изразявана политическа позиция. Демократ, привързан към републиката, парламентаризма и конституционализма. Д-р Цеков има дарбата да обяснява и развива най-сложни въпроси на достъпен език, понятен за широката публика, приеман и ценен от експертите. Той предлага идеи, които са в челото на световните консервативни школи. Един човек на бъдещето.”
- Петър Кичашки: “Д-р Борислав Цеков е от онази рядка порода хора, които правят големите и трудни неща да изглеждат по ежедневному прости и лесни. Това изисква комплекс от умения - далновидност, ловкост, опит, прозорливост, хъс.”
- Проф. Владимир Чуков: “Поздравявам д-р Борислав Цеков с неговия половинвековен юбилей. Той е един от най-добрите български юристи-конституционалисти. Неговото творчество е оригинална смесица между новаторски дух, неповторим професионализъм и непресъхваща гражданска енергия. На добър път към вековния юбилей!”

По думите на съставителя д-р Петко Петков: „Личностите, които имат куража да правят крачки извън матрицата, са наричани trendsetters – хора, които създават тенденции.  Сред тях без съмнение е и конституционалистът д-р Борислав Цеков. Само няколко примера: още през 2000 г. той първи лансира в печата въвеждането на  преференциална избирателна система, референдуми и прозрачност на партийните финанси; през 2001 г. първи внася историческия Закон за вероизповеданията, който прекрати църковния разкол; през 2016 г. първи у нас концептуализира доктрината “Тръмп”, а през 2018 г. изигра важна роля за спирането на Истанбулската конвенция и по делото в КС.”

“Cancel culture” has become one of the most charged concepts in contemporary culture and politics, but mainstream critiques from both the left and the right provide only snapshots of responses to the phenomenon. Taking a media and cultural studies perspective, this book traces the origins of cancel practices and discourses, and discusses their subsequent evolution within celebrity and fan cultures, consumer culture, and national politics in the U.S. and China. Moving beyond popular press accounts about the latest targets of cancelling or familiar free speech debates, this analysis identifies multiple lineages for both cancelling and criticisms about cancelling, underscoring the various configurations of power associated with “cancel culture” in particular cultural and political contexts.

I walk into class on the first day, scanning my roster and my classroom for visible signs of difference—or lack thereof—that are likely to affect how my students relate to each other and to me, and that may shape how they approach, engage, and use the material presented in the college classroom. I think deeply about the kinds of differences that are not visible yet are present—in sexual orientation, in family status, in invisible disabilities, and in other categories—and adopt a universal design for learning that seeks to meet the needs of all students, respectfully engaging them and supporting them in their studies. I teach explicitly about the community of the Rebecca Barrett-Fox is an assistant professor of sociology at Arkansas State University, where she directs Women and Gender Studies. She is the author of God Hates: Westboro Baptist Church, American Nationalism, and the Religious Right (University Press of Kansas, 2016) as well as numerous articles and chapters focusing on religion, hate and extremism, and sexuality and gender.

The attack on natural right in the name of history takes in most cases the following form: natural right claims to be a right that is discernible by human reason and is universally acknowledged; but history (including anthropology) teaches us that no such right exists; instead of the supposed uniformity we find an indefinite variety of notions of right or justice. Or, in other words, there cannot be natural right if there are no immutable principles of justice, but history shows us that all principles of justice are mutable. One cannot understand the meaning of the attack on natural right in the name of history, before one has realized the utter irrelevance of this argument. In the first place, “consent of all mankind” is by no means a necessary condition of the existence of natural right. Some of the greatest natural right teachers have argued that, precisely if natural right is rational, its discovery presupposes the cultivation of reason, and therefore natural right will not be known universally: one ought not even to expect any real knowledge of natural right among savages. In other words by proving diat there is no principle of justice diat has not been denied somewhere or at some time, one has not yet proven that any given denial was justified or reasonable. Furthermore, it has always been known that different notions of justice obtain at different times and in different nations. It is absurd to claim diat the discovery of a still greater number of such notions by modern students has in any way affected the fundamental issue.

Ronald Reagan’s victory in the 1980 presidential election marked a watershed moment in the history of the United States, heralding the triumph of the American conservative movement. Once a supporter of the New Deal, Reagan had come to symbolize the union of three diverse forms of conservatism—anti-communism, social traditionalism, and libertarianism—that were increasingly intertwined under the banner of the Republican Party. The unlikely development of this new conservative coalition was based upon the larger impacts of the civil rights movement in reshaping the dynamics of the Democratic and Republican parties, the social "backlash" of the Nixon era, the emergence of the religious right, and the economic and political crises that directly set the stage for Reagan’s stunning victory.

In five original, engaging chapters, The 1980 Presidential Election shows how Reagan’s journey to the White House was connected to the wider transformations of post-1945 American history. Supplemented by a fresh collection of primary documents—including previously unpublished transcripts of Reagan’s radio addresses of the late-1970s—this book is an ideal introduction to the origins and impact of the American conservative movement.

""Debates about the relationship and boundary between mainstream and extremist (sometimes referred to as radical or violent) activism historically emerge in response to violent incidents, where defenders of a cause will attempt to differentiate between the two in order to maintain their legitimacy and critics will attempt to make links between them in order to delegitimize the movement. This is necessary in the case of the former and possible in the case of the latter because of both popular opposition and distaste for ‘extremism’ (however defined) and because of the overlap between the ideologies and objectives of mainstream movements and so-called extremist ones, even if they differ in terms of tactics. While a movement’s ideology does come into play in the definition of extremism, its application is usually reserved for those movements or activists that, while sharing an ideology or objectives with mainstream ones, reject legitimate democratic methods in favor of violence. While this analytical distinction and boundary is applied to many movements, perhaps the clearest application is the anti-abortion movement in the United States, which includes: elected officials, members of the Republican Party, the Christian Right, church groups and citizen activists, as well as more militant direct action organizations, terrorists and elements of the extreme right. The distinction and relationship between the ‘mainstream’ and ‘extreme’ anti-abortion activism has become more significant in the first decade of the 21st century as America has not only waged a war against terrorism, but the stigma of terrorism that had become attached to the anti-abortion movement in the 1990s has been obscured as anti-abortion activism reached the White House and political power under President George W. Bush and the ascendant Christian Right. Yet, anti-abortion violence returned soon after Bush left office and Barack Obama entered it as the murder of Dr. George Tiller, one of the few doctors to perform so-called ‘late-term abortions,’ by activist Scott Roeder in Wichita, Kansas on May 31 2009 clearly illustrated.

This chapter provides an overview of the literature on extremist or violence anti-abortion activism, and where it fits in to wider literature on the anti-abortion or pro-life movement, the Christian Right and other forms or sectors of the right, as well as terrorism. This is followed by an overview and examination of the different sectors of the anti-abortion movement, including the mainstream, militant direct action organizations such as Operation Rescue, the Pro-Life Action Network and Lambs of Christ, and extremist ones that advocate or perpetuate violence such as the American Coalition of Life Activists, Missionaries of the Preborn and the Army of God, websites such as the Nuremburg Files and so-called ‘lone wolf’ terrorists such as Rev. Mike Bray, Rev. Paul Hill, John Salvi, James Kopp, Eric Rudolph and Scott Roeder. This includes an overview and examination of the theological and textual sources and material used to advocate and justify violent activism, and the history of anti-abortion extremism and violence in the post-Roe v. Wade context from 1973 to the present. Through these sections, the chapter interrogates the relationships between extremist and violent anti-abortion violence, the mainstream anti-abortion movement, wider mainstream Christian Right and extreme right. It also examines responses to these activists and anti-abortion violence by the government and the mainstream anti-abortion movement. Significantly, the chapter looks at whether the mainstream anti-abortion movement provides support for more extreme elements activists or disassociates itself from these elements as it is frequently called upon to do, and whether it can or should be held responsible for perpetrators of violence who share a common cause. Finally, the chapter examines how anti-abortion extremism and violence are understood in relation in post-9/11 America.

On the book Extremism in America:

“A first-rate survey of the various strands of domestic extremism, from far left to far right, that are increasingly convulsing our country. A must-read for students, scholars, officials, and others entering this important field.”—Mark Potok, Southern Poverty Law Center

“With contributions on areas ranging from anti-abortion extremism to modern anarchism and black nationalism, this is a fascinating study of an often neglected and vital area of American politics.”—Martin Durham, author of White Rage: The Extreme Right and American Politics

The American Republic was born in revolt against the British crown, and ever since, political extremism has had a long tradition in the United States. To some observers, the continued presence of extremist groups?and the escalation of their activities?portends the fragmentation of the country, while others believe such is the way American pluralism works. The word extremism often carries negative connotations, yet in 1964 Barry Goldwater famously said, “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.”
         
Extremism in America is a sweeping overview and assessment of the various brands of bigotry, prejudice, zealotry, dogmatism, and partisanship found in the United States, including the extreme right, the antiglobalization movement, Black Nationalism, Chicano separatism, militant Islam, Jewish extremism, eco-extremism, the radical antiabortion movement, and extremist terrorism. Many of these forms of single-minded intolerance are repressed by both the state and society at large, but others receive significant support from their constituencies and enjoy a level of respectability in some quarters of the mainstream. The essays in this volume, written by area specialists, examine the relationship between these movements and the larger society, dissect the arguments of contemporary American anarchist activists, look at recent trends in political extremism, and suggest how and why such arguments resonate with a considerable number of people.
"

Recently, there has been much debate about the rise of an Evangelical Left in the United States. This debate has focused on the emergence of influential evangelical leaders breaking away from the Republican Party, such as Rick Warren. This debate mistakes a hegemonic crisis of (neo-)conservatism with a hegemonic crisis of neoliberalism. Instead, the evangelical movement in the United States needs to be analyzed in the context of neoliberalism and the decline of class-based forms of solidarity, which it replaced. Throughout their ascent, the evangelical institutions have inscribed themselves into and become a part of the neoliberal state. At the same time, the depth of the economic crisis, the remaining class character of the evangelical movement, the importance of evangelical churches as arenas of hegemonic struggles and, finally, the existing shift in national discourse in terms of the ecological question, the social question and the rehabilitation of the state vis-à-vis the market mark an opening of the political situation in the US that may eventually lead to a replacement of the current evangelical centrism by the actual Evangelical Left as part of a counter-hegemonic post-neoliberal historic bloc.

With the election of Donald Trump, the United States was thrown into turmoil. A self-described outlaw and outsider was, against all expectations, president of the nation. Trump's campaign was, to say the least, a tumultuous one that created ecstasy for his supporters and despair for his opponents and his arrival in the Oval Office has generated unprecedented national conflict. This essay attempts to answer the questions How did this happen? What social, economic and political forces brought it about? What are the political implications of this event?

This review article offers a critical assessment of three recent books on postwar conservatism in the United States. The broad themes of these works – anticommunism, the new class critique, and opposition to environmentalism – are used as a basis to review the extant literature and to analyse the historical trajectory of the conservative movement. Although American conservatism is generally a unified political force, important ideological divisions remain both among and between libertarians and social conservatives. These divisions are imperative for understanding the movement today and offer promising lines of future scholarship.

In the United States, Ayn Rand's (1905–1982) novels still appeal to a large readership, in spite of their age and length. While many attribute Rand's lasting popularity to her effect on the presumably young and impressionable, few have actually explored why her novels at times prove to be such a transformative reading experience. The article retraces Rand's impact, through the lens of four writers who have reimagined her readers: Gene H. Bell-Villada, in the novella The Pianist Who Liked Ayn Rand; Tobias Wolff, in Old School; William F. Buckley, in Getting It Right; and Mary Gaitskill, in Two Girls, Fat and Thin. While Bell-Villada, Wolff, and Buckley convey their own attitudes toward Rand through their characters and shy away from creating strong Randian adherents, Gaitskill's dark satiric novel offers a surprisingly more empathic account of a pseudo-Randian acolyte.

Neoliberalism took shape in the 1930s and 1940s as a transnational political philosophy and system of economic, political, and cultural relations. Resting on the fundamental premise that the free market should be unfettered by government intrusion, neoliberal policies have primarily redirected the state's prerogatives away from the postwar Keynesian welfare system and toward the insulation of finance and corporate America from democratic pressure. As neoliberal ideas gained political currency in the 1960s and 1970s, a reactionary cultural turn catalyzed their ascension. The cinema, music, magazine culture, and current events discourse of the 1970s provided the space of negotiation permitting these ideas to take hold and be challenged.

Daniel Robert McClure's book follows the interaction between culture and economics during the transition from Keynesianism in the mid-1960s to the triumph of neoliberalism at the dawn of the 1980s. From the 1965 debate between William F. Buckley and James Baldwin, through the pages of BusinessWeek and Playboy, to the rise of exploitation cinema in the 1970s, McClure tracks the increasingly shared perception by white males that they had "lost" their long-standing rights and that a great neoliberal reckoning might restore America's repressive racial, sexual, gendered, and classed foundations in the wake of the 1960s.


“Winter in America is terrific, moving ably between culture and political economy to mount a sophisticated consideration of race and gender within neoliberalism, all while taking the long view, in contrast to so many accounts supposing that 1972 marked the start something fully new. As monuments fall and we have a chance to rethink received wisdom, it offers the reader a journey that is both unpredictable and exciting.”
—David Roediger, author of The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class

“This is a dazzling tour de force and a sweeping and stimulating synthesis of politics, music, film, poetry, neoliberalism—and more. The cast of characters—James Baldwin, William F. Buckley, John Wayne, and Jayne Cortez, among others—is similarly expansive. It demonstrates the potency of what happens when American studies is executed expertly.”
—Gerald Horne, author of The Bittersweet Science: Racism, Racketeering, and the Political Economy of Boxing

"At a time when modern-day America's cultural and political divides are wider than ever, it's necessary to ask how the nation came to this painful point. In Winter in America, Daniel Robert McClure provides answers. This book frequently makes for uncomfortable reading, but honest reflection on painful facts isn't supposed to be easy. The past has much to teach us, and Winter in America is an essential guide."
—Jeff Guinn, New York Times bestselling author of Manson: The Life and Times of Charles Manson and The Road to Jonestown: Jim Jones and Peoples Temple

Donald Trump’s transformation of Republican Party ideology has helped reveal major problems in the political science discipline’s conceptualization and measurement of ideology. Most scholarship is dominated by the mistaken view that party ideology changes can best be described by parties moving “left” or “right” on a static, ideological, spatial spectrum. In reality, the meaning and content of “left” and “right” (“liberal” and “conservative”) constantly evolve along with the issue positions of the two major parties. Thus, it makes no sense to describe parties as moving to the “left” or “right” over time when the very meanings of “liberalism” and “conservatism” change during the same time period. By understanding the dynamic character of ideology, we can reconcile the paradox of how Trump’s Republican Party can change its ideology even while continuing to be identified with “conservatism” and the “Right.”

The crisis in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea negatively affected Russia’s image in the United States and in Western Europe. At the same time, the dynamic of the Russian-U.S. relations during the crisis prodded several prominent American right-wing politicians and commentators to make statements about Vladimir Putin that reflected their own ‘desire for a tough leader who will dispense with niceties and embrace power.’ This paper explores the phenomenon of Vladimir Putin’s ‘popularity’ among the American conservatives through qualitative textual analysis of the coverage of his persona in several right-wing publications and blogs. The project engages with the concept of ‘soft power’ by raising the following conceptual question: can a leader who ‘wrestles bears and drills for oil’ leverage these characteristics as a type of ‘soft power’ when it comes to ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of certain international constituencies and under particular international circumstances?

Resumen
El presente trabajo tiene como fin reflexionar brevemente sobre las causas de la crisis de la sociedad occidental contemporánea a partir del pensamiento de Wilhelm Röpke y Russell Kirk. Sendos aportes, desde diferentes contextos -el primero ordoliberal y proponente de la economía social de mercado; el segundo, desde el conservadurismo clásico estadounidense-, desarrollan un pensamiento marcado por un realismo crítico pero optimista. Este planteamiento se basa, primeramente, en asumir el hecho de que los problemas sociales modernos no son sólo de raíz política o económica, sino fundamentalmente de orden moral. Tanto Röpke como Kirk dan razón de esta premisa y por ello, en el actual panorama de desencanto y hastío social,  resulta oportuno volver a estos dos pensadores para buscar un certero diagnóstico. Este trabajo tiene como fin obtener una inspiración filosófica con que revitalizar auténticamente la política occidental yendo más allá de los aspectos epidérmicos de la presente crisis.

Palabras clave: Russell Kirk, Wilhelm Röpke, ordoliberalismo, conservadurismo, economía social de mercado, crisis moral, realismo, ideología, Estado, Occidente.

Abstract
This paper aims to discuss the causes of the social crisis in Western society from the work of Wilhelm Röpke and Russell Kirk. Both thinkers, from different orientations and academic contexts -the former ordoliberal and proponent of the social market economy; the latter, from the American conservatism- develop a thought marked by a critical and optimistic realism. This realism assumes the fact that the social problems that have been occurring since the emergence of Modernity do not have political or economic roots only, but fundamentally moral reasons. Both Röpke as Kirk defend this claim and that is why in these times of political and social disenchantment it is worth coming back to them for an accurate diagnosis. Thus, the goal of this work is to obtain a philosophical inspiration that truly revitalizes Western politics and let us go beyond the epidermal aspects of the current crisis.

Keywords: Russell Kirk, Wilhelm Röpke, ordoliberalism, conservatism, social market economy, moral crisis, realism, ideology, State, Western civilization

ÖZET
Bu makale muhafazakarlığın yönetim anlayışını konu almaktadır. Çalışma zaman dilimi olarak 18. yy.’dan 20. yy.’ın başlarına kadarki dönemi içine almakta, bu dönemde zuhur etmiş muhafazakar düşünür ve hareketleri incelemektedir. Joseph de Maistre ve İngiliz Tory Partisinin öncülüğünü yaptığı eski rejim (ancien régime) muhafazakarlığı (19. yy.’ın başlarına kadar) monarşi, aristokrasi ve din merkezli bir yönetim anlayışı desteklemekte ve demokrasiyi kötü bir yönetim tarzı olarak görmektedir. Edmund Burke ve Alexis de Tocqueville (19. yy. ortalarına kadar) örneklerinde muhafazakarlık bu eski savunuyu sürdürmekte fakat demokrasiye duyduğu nefreti terk etmektedir. Burke ve özellikle Tocqueville demokrasinin kimi özel-liklerini takdirle karşılamakta ve demokrasinin bazen ideal ve doğal bir yönetim olabileceğini düşünmektedir. Yine Burke ve Tocqueville eski rejim savunucuları gibi teokrasi savunusu içine girmemekte, dine işlevsel anlamda önem vermektedir. Bu geleneğin Amerika’daki temsilcileri arasında yer alan John Adams gibi Federalistler demokratik Amerikan toplumunda savunularını güçlü başkanlık, daimi senatörlük, anayasacılık, yargıçların yönetimi gibi düşünce ve politikalarla sürdürmektedir. Amerika örneğinde muhafazakarların özellikle 19. yy.’ın ikinci yarısından itibaren – federalistlerin savunularına ek olarak – burjuvaya ve plütokrasiye karşı cephe aldığı; mülkiyetin eşit dağıtılması, tarımsal doğal hayat ve müdahaleci güçlü devlet gibi savunular benimsediğini görmekteyiz.

ABSTRACT
This article investigates the government understanding of conservatism. The time period of the research conducted for the purpose covers 18th to early 20th century with a look at conservative thinkers and movements appearing at this period. The old regime (ancien régime) conservatism (conservatism until early 19th century), studied here with reference to Joseph de Maistre and English Tory Party, is found to be supporting monarchy, aristocracy and religion with a hatred against democracy. In examples of Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville (until the mids of 19th century), conservatism maintains its old advocacy but abandons its hatred against democracy. Burke and particularly Tocqueville appreciate certain features of democracy and they argue that democracy could sometimes appear as an ideal and natural government. Again Burke and Tocqueville don’t support anything like theocracy, but appreciate functional aspects of religion. Representing this tradition in America, Federalists like John Adams, in democratic American society, maintain their conservative view to politics with notions and policies of strong presidency, permanent senatorship, constitutionalism and rule by the judges. In the example of America, conservatives, after the second half of the 19th century, not totally leaving the line of the federalists, are observed to oppose bourgeoisie and plutocracy while also defending mass distribution of property, agricultural life and effective interventionist state. 
"

Abstract
This thesis places the Tea Party movement ideologically in relation to the American conservative movement started in the 1950s. The argument here is that the Tea Party is solely a libertarian movement. Overlaps with the Religious Right a plentiful; but in those instances the Tea Partiers merely happen to also belong to the Religious Right. This does not, however, in any way make the Tea Party religiously fundamentalist or otherwise engaged in social issues.
Further, the thesis argues that the Tea Party critics, who claim the Tea Party to be ‘Astroturf’ rather than a genuine grassroots movement, are right. Not only that, but as the thesis shows, the Tea Party is entirely an artificially orchestrated entity concocted to further a libertarian agenda in the US Congress. While the artificial political machine responsible for backing, endorsing, and electing congressional candidates has become the entity identified as ‘the Tea Party’, private citizen activists and their local groups have taken a backseat after merely supplying the backdrop of popular support.
Chapter 1, Conservatism –noun, provides as exhaustive an account as possible within the space allowed by the thesis format. It is made clear that American conservatism is based on two distinct lines of thought: The classical liberalism of John Locke and the traditional conservatism of Edmund Burke. American conservatism as distinct from traditional European conservatism is shown to not be born before the middle of the 20th century, when especially William Buckley Jr. with the National Review stated an intellectual conservative movement. The differences and clashes between the two basic lines of thought are described along with attempts at alignment of the two.
Chapter 2, Political Application 1945-2008, not surprisingly, describes the different incarnations of American conservatism in the period. The politicians are described both with regards to their own conservative beliefs and with regards to their adherence to the contemporary developments in the intellectual movement. It is found that only the legacies of Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan are remembered fondly by conservatives. Barry Goldwater became an electoral fiasco in 1964 because the conservative movement had not yet grown strong enough to have the momentum necessary to claim the presidency.

Meanwhile, Ronald Reagan became the first to have a broad appeal to, by then, many various groups of conservatives.
Chapter 3, The Tea Party – Who, What, and Why, answers the important basic questions to describe the demographics, beliefs, and motives of Tea Partiers. It is found that the majority of partiers are male, middle-aged or older, white, and middle- or upper middle-class. Partiers are almost exclusively conservative of the libertarian persuasion. Some may have an awareness of traditionalist social issues. Fear and anger over their displacement as the dominant class in America motivate partiers. Particularly Barack Obama has become the personification of these topics.
Chapter 4, Organization and Funding, takes on the almost impossible task of charting the landscape of the decentralized, leaderless Tea Party. It is found that the particulars of local organization and activism is rather inconsequential, as the Tea Party, as it exists in media and politics, no longer has any useful ties to the grassroots. An existing theory devised to clarify the grassroots vs. Astroturf debate is tried against the theory of this thesis that the question of whether local groups are artificial or genuine is no longer interesting.
Chapter 5, Media Minions – Drawing Attention, describes the unprecedented aid the Tea Party received from conservative media in drawing attention to the cause. It is shown, how the extensive web of conservative media reinforces and creates self-referencing confirmation for stories. Further, it is described how especially the Fox News Channel promoted rather than reported the initial rallies helped expedite the growth of the movement. It is discovered that early polls were vague and badly interpreted, which obscured the true size of the movement.
Chapter 6, Entrance into Politics – Pressure on the GOP, deals with the Tea Party as most people know it through the media today – namely as a political force in Congress. It is shown why the GOP has been targeted for a ‘hostile takeover’, and that the tactics are different from previous pressure groups that have tried to sway the GOP. A man who made himself crucial to this tactics, Senator Jim DeMint, is portrayed, and it is shown how his vigilance became a nuisance to the backers. Highly profiled Rand Paul is portrayed,
and in the concluding thoughts, None Dare Call It a Ruse, Paul is used to exemplify how the Tea Party will fare in the future if, indeed, they will at all.
This thesis is 85.2 standard pages (178,923 characters) excluding front page, abstract, table of contents, notes, and bibliography.

Ich nehme Sie sogleich mit nach Amerika, in die Stadt, deren Wolkenkratzer auch für Ayn Rand der Inbegriff amerikanischen Pioniergeists und Unternehmertums war: New York.
Am 29. April 1932 legte dort der Ozeandampfer Berengaria an, der als Reparationszahlung von deutschen in britische Hände gewechselt und nach dem ersten Weltkrieg zahlreiche Emigranten in ihre neue Heimat befördert hatte. Mit an Bord war in jenem Frühling eine Alice Hargreaves, die im Mai an der Columbia University geehrt werden sollte. Mrs Hargreaves – die sich gerne, wenn auch ungerechtfertigt, mit «Lady» ansprechen liess – erhielt einen Ehrentitel, aber nicht etwa für eigene Leistungen. Vielmehr sollte sie dafür ausgezeichnet werden, siebzig Jahre früher einen Oxford-Dozenten für Mathematik zu einem der berühmtesten Kinderbücher der Weltliteratur inspiriert zu haben: Charles Dodgson, uns allen bekannt als Lewis Carroll, widmete der damals zehnjährigen die Geschichte ihrer Namensvetterin «in Wonderland», im Wunderland.
Die amerikanische Presse der Zeit bejubelte ihren Besuch und beschwor angesichts der realen Alice jene im fiktiven Spiegel herauf. So schrieb ein Journalist, Lady Hargreaves habe während eines Empfangs gemeint: «Curiouser and curiouser» – «Merk- und merkerwürdig!» Die Dame liess sich zeitweise ein auf den Tanz zwischen Fakt und Fiktion, liess zu, dass ihre Präsenz stets im Schatten ihres fiktiven Alter Egos stand. So meinte sie in einer Radiosendung, mit der Reise nach Amerika sei sie in ihr eigenes Wunderland zurückgekehrt.
Amerika, ein Wunderland?
Fürwahr hatte die einst so neue Welt für Europäer stets eine Faszination, die sich in zahlreichen Auswandererbiografien niederschlug. Aus kindlichem Gwunder wurde indessen nicht immer erwachsene Bewunderung, sondern immer wieder auch Verwunderung – und gerade heute scheint diese Spielform des Wunderns unsere Gefühle zu dominieren. Wie die fiktive Alice scheinen wir vorgeblich vernünftigen Europäer in der Auseinandersetzung mit Amerikas Gegenwart, insbesondere der politischen Gegenwart, in jenes verwunschene Kaninchenloch zu stürzen, an dessen Ende wir schliesslich in einer verrückten Teegesellschaft landen.
«We’re all mad here» – «Wir alle hier sind verrückt.» Was die Cheshire-Katze, die nach Gutdünken auftaucht und alsbald wieder verschwindet, über Lewis Carrolls Wunderland sagt, scheint für viele von uns auf die USA zuzutreffen. Zumindest für dessen konservativen Teil. Aber dürfen wir so einfach urteilen? Denn die Cheshire-Katze fügt an: «Ich bin verrückt. Du bist verrückt.»
Aber immer der Reihe nach. Oder wie der König gegen Ende von Alices erstem Abenteuer meint: «Begin at the beginning, … and go on till you come to the end: then stop» – «Fang mit dem Anfang an … und geh weiter bis zum Schluss: dann hör auf.»

“As to Europe—keep it in a gray, ominous, evil fog.”—Ayn Rand (1905–1982) thus commented on the role of Europe in her key novel, Atlas Shrugged (1957). The same could be said of the way Europe features in her own biography and in the general perception of her persona. Even though Rand was born in pre-revolutionary Russia, she is nowadays considered anAmerican phenomenon, whose reach ends at the Atlantic shore. This book lifts the "gray fog" cast over her relationship with Europe, retracing the changing perception of the continent in both her fiction and thought. Her apparent lack of success with European readers is often explained by allegedly different reading tastes. However, a look at her publication history and reception shows that many factors played a role why her work found fewer European than US readers. Finally, an archipelago of European readers and admirers emerges which is testament to Rand's impact on European art and politics.

Studies have shown that US college and university professors are disproportionately left-leaning and Democratic and these tendencies are especially pronounced in the social sciences. Critics of this ideological homogeneity have leveled a wide range of charges in light of these findings: that these political orientations seep into research and teaching, that it affects accumulated knowledge, policymaking, student attitudes, American political culture, and that it promotes motivated reasoning, bias, and groupthink. This chapter reviews the most credible of the arguments for greater ideological diversity and attempts to move beyond applied concerns by asking whether and how discussion of political diversity and bias in academia might be reconceptualized to form the basis for meaningful empirical studies.

Fred C. Schwarz (1913-2009) was an Australian-born medical doctor and evangelical preacher who settled in the United States in the early 1950s, where he founded the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade. His work as an anticommunist educator spanned five decades; his campaigns attracted large crowds, strengthened grassroots conservatism, and influenced political leaders.

By the late 1950s, the Crusade had become one of the most important conservative organizations in America, turning numerous citizens into lifelong right-wing militants. In Teaching Anticommunism Hubert Villeneuve sheds light on Schwarz's fascinating career and organization, which left a distinct mark on the United States and was also active internationally. Cold War anticommunism in the US consisted of more than the House Un-American Activities Committee and the campaign led by Senator Joseph McCarthy. Villeneuve shows that, by the early 1960s, Schwarz's Crusade was an integral part of a burgeoning American anticommunist subculture that united grassroots conservatives of all stripes. Its influence continued, paving the way for the development of the "New Right" that began in the 1970s. In addition to exploring the life and work of Schwarz, the book highlights the transnational dimension of US conservatism by outlining the Crusade's role in worldwide anticommunist networks that operated throughout the Cold War. Packed with unnerving evidence but leavened with humorous anecdotes and insights into a mercurial figure, Teaching Anticommunism provides a unique perspective on the evolution of the contemporary American right wing and its global connections.

Le présent chapitre dresse une brève histoire comparative du conservatisme américain et européen. Dans un premier temps, je me concentre sur le conservatisme tel qu'il s'articule à partir des années 1970 dans la foulée de la critique de l'État providence en Europe de l'Ouest (particulièrement en France et en Grande-Bretagne) et aux États-Unis. Dans un deuxième temps, j'examine le populisme d'extrême droite en Europe et les forces idéologiques et sociales qui ont porté Donald Trump au pouvoir. Je conclus le chapitre en suggérant que malgré des différences persistantes quant au rôle de l'État dans la régulation sociale et économique et à l'engouement pour l'économie de marché, le type de conservatisme incarné par Donald Trump marque une certaine convergence avec la droite et l'extrême droite européenne, plus ouvertement nationaliste et ethno-centrée. Au travers de mon analyse, j'insiste sur les conditions matérielles, culturelles et idéologiques qui ont façonné l'évolution et la transformation de la philosophie conservatrice en Europe et aux États-Unis. Conservatisme, populisme et extrême droite Le conservatisme est essentiellement une riposte politique et intellectuelle intermittente qui tend à adopter et intégrer les idées de ses opposants idéologiques. Comme l'affirme Clinton Rossiter (1982), la lutte entre la droite et la gauche n'est rien d'autre qu'une tentative de s'approprier les termes centraux du discours politique comme la liberté, l'égalité, le progrès et l'individualité. Alors que certaines variétés de conservatisme adoptent des notions politiques progressistes, d'autres refusent catégoriquement le changement et s'en remettent à la seule défense de la tradition. Cependant, dans la plupart des cas, l'appropriation des idées progressistes est une façon de diluer leur facture révolutionnaire. Les conservateurs ne s'opposent donc pas forcément au changement; ils sont avant tout préoccupés par les transformations engendrées par les collectivités humaines et par la gestion ou le contrôle de celles-ci (Freeden, 1996, p. 332). Selon eux, le rythme du changement doit être ajusté à la capacité des individus de s'y adapter. Quoiqu'on associe le conservatisme au maintien du privilège des élites politiques et économiques, les idéologues et politiciens conservateurs ont pour la plupart su intégrer les aspirations populaires dans leurs narratifs. Ce populisme peut se décliner de plusieurs façons mais en appelle surtout à un sentiment de nostalgie pour un passé en apparence plus clément. Les conservateurs s'adressent avant tout aux dépossédés (Robin, 2011, p.58), à ceux qui ont le sentiment d'avoir perdu leur place dans la foulée de bouleversements culturels, économiques ou politiques importants et, plus particulièrement, d'avoir perdu les privilèges liés à une identité ethnique/nationale ou un statut socioéconomique particulier. Enfin, il importe de distinguer le conservatisme de l'extrême-droite. Cette distinction est compliquée par le fait que les frontières de chaque idéologie sont poreuses. Elle l'est encore plus par le fait que les partis d'extrême droite contemporains se sont pour la plupart dissociés de leur passé fasciste. Par contre, si les conservateurs et l'extrême droite partagent une certaine fibre nationaliste, ils se distinguent dans le ton et les mesures

ABSTRACT

Conservatism is the most important ideological family in the American political scene today. Its meaning, however, raises many ambiguities and its manifestations throughout American history have been very diverse. Its more recent incarnation, a coalition of movements opposed to modern American liberalism, appears right after World War II and many of its subjects and positions come from the works of one of its "founding fathers", the journalist Wiliam F. Buckley Jr., and his magazine, National Review, created in 1955. In order to understand this postwar conservatism, there is a brief theoretical discussion of conservatism as a concept, followed by an overview of its main manifestations in American political thought. Then a selection of Buckley's and his National Review colleague's articles are analyzed to illustrate the main traits of their criticism of the liberal "Establishment" of the 1950's and 60's. Finally, as a special case, we investigate National Review's position on the civil rights movement, emphasizing school desegregaton in the 1950's and Martin Luther King's campaigns of the next decade.

Keywords: Conservatism. United States. Ideology. Right. Liberalism. National Review. Cold War. Race. Civil rights.

I valori fondamentali americani hanno conosciuto diverse sfide durante il Novecento, sfide che hanno alimentato il dibattito tra conservatorismo e liberalismo. Al centro di questo dibattito si è avvicendato il ruolo della famiglia ‘tradizionale’, della donna, della libertà individuale e della libertà religiosa. Come europei la nostra comprensione del dibattito americano è sempre parziale; cionondimeno, assistendo alla mutazione della percezione dei diritti degli omosessuali dalla prima sentenza del 2003 in Texas (che poneva fine al reato di sodomia) al regime diffusamente pro matrimonio omosessuale soli undici anni dopo, non ci si può non interrogare su quali profondi mutamenti ed innovative sfide il conservatorismo americano debba affrontare. In questo paper il mio scopo è evidenziare come la fine della relazione biunivoca tra ‘donna’ e ‘famiglia’, la tendenza a celebrare il successo individuale esplosa negli anni Ottanta assieme alla finanziarizzazione dell’economia, e le forze multiculturali incarnate dal doppio mandato elettorale di Obama, abbiamo reso insostenibile ed obsoleta la legislazione contraria al matrimonio omosessuale. Infine, gli Stati Uniti si trovano allineati con l’Europa nella peculiare situazione di essere in contro tendenza in un mondo che crescentemente penalizza il matrimonio non etero-fondato o addirittura criminalizza, soprattutto in Africa sub-sahariana, gli omosessuali. In questo contesto di profondo mutamento, il partito repubblicano deve gestire la destra religiosa ed il Tea party, al fine di recuperare terreno rispetto ad un partito democratico progressista ed impegnato a riabilitare il termine liberal.

The novels by Russian immigrant writer Ayn Rand (1905-82) still attract a large readership, not least thanks to a recent renaissance of libertarian ideas in the US. Was it Rand’s intention, when writing her novels, to construct political tracts, as many insinuate, or was she indeed trying to imitate her literary idols, as she herself claimed? The answer is complicated due to Rand’s own contradictory statements on fiction’s impact. Although Rand suggested that it was the reader who gave text meaning, she also believed her books to have an unambiguous message that should have a distinct effect on the reader

In the fall of 1921 oil workers of the San Joaquin Valley faced a post-war economic slump, wage cuts across the board and an increasingly hostile attitude of oil operators towards consultation with the federal government on labor relations. They voted to strike, and the next day eight thousand workers walked off the fields. Strikers crafted an image of “patriotic unionism,” underpinned by a faith in the federal government and the ideology of the American Legion. The strike did not end in gruesome class warfare like had been seen months earlier in the coal mines of West Virginia, but rather in ideological confusion and despair. The oil workers movement never fully embraced a class identity; instead it embraced the burgeoning conservative identity of Americanism. This effectively hobbled the growth of the movement. Upon the strike’s conclusion there was no mass pull to the left on the part of oil workers in the San Joaquin Valley, despite the fact that their movement’s design and identity had gotten them nowhere. On the contrary a portion of workers and supporters of the strike turned to the nativism of the Klan. Overall this project looks to complicate the narrative of “us vs. them” in labor history by analyzing workers’ identities, and also looks to contribute to the ever-evolving discourse on how historians should track American conservatism as a social force.

Pierre Manent és az európai (város)állam nagy narratívája

Összefoglaló

Ez a dolgozat a neves kortárs francia liberális-konzervatív gondolkodó, Pierre Manent-nak a republikánus hagyomány újragondolására tett javaslatát mutatja be és elemzi. Nemrég megjelent nagy történeti narratívájában (Les Métamorphoses de la cité, 2010) Manent, aki Aron és Strauss hatása alatt kezdett filozofálni, az antik városállamot nem pusztán múló történeti példának tekinti, hanem úgy gondolja, a periklészi Athéntól folytonos fejlődés vezet a kortárs nyugati liberális államig. E folytonosság persze a folyamatos változás (metamorfózis) jegyében áll, s Manent megpróbálja megmutatni, hol vannak a történet fordulópontjai.
Szerinte már az antik Athén is egy tökéletesnek tartott előképet, a homéroszi mintát követte, nem csoda, ha a későbbi Európa is ilyen példakövetés révén fejlődött folyamatosan. Manent szerint az ember Arisztotelész által kimondott politikai természetét a városban tudja kiélni, s ehhez képest már a római birodalom is újszerű alakulat volt, hisz feladta a városi léptéket. Ám továbbra is megőrizte egyén és város között a szoros kapcsolatot, pedig Cicero már bevezette az egyéni érdekei által motivált privát polgár ideálját. Ezt viszi tovább a kereszténység, miután Ágoston elkülöníti a vallás és a politika szféráját. A politika innét kezdve az egyénhez képest külsődleges, formai kérdéssé válik. Hiába jelenik meg Luther működése nyomán a konfesszionálisan elkötelezett modern állam, valójában a protestantizmus és a hatására kialakuló vallásháborúk csak a felekezetektől független, semleges állam előkészítőjének bizonyult.
Manent meggyőződése szerint ez a politikai rezsim megszakítja az embert Isten felé hajtó törekvést. Ám a gaullista Manent politikai szempontból még mindig leginkább védhetőnek a nemzetet találja, mivel abban szerinte megvan a közvetítés, a mediáció lehetősége az ember és az abszolútum között, miközben megőrzi az ókori Athén demokratikus elveit.



Pierre Manent and the Grand narrative of the European (city)state


This study introduces and interprets the suggestion for a renewal of the republican tradition by the contemporary French liberal-conservative philosopher, Pierre Manent. In his recently published grand historical narrative (Les Métamorphoses de la cité, 2010) Manent, a student of Aron and Strauss, does not accept that the ancient Greek city-state was only a momentary historical example, but  claims that a continuous development leads from the Athens of Pericles to the contemporary Western liberal state. This continuity of course only means a continuity of changes (metamorphoses), and Manent’s aim is to show the turning points of this  story.
As he sees it, already ancient Athens followed an earlier, more perfect forerunner, the example told in the epic stories of Homer, there is no wonder, therefore, that later Europe followed the same pattern. In his view, the political nature of the human being, as explained by Aristotle, was best suited to the conditions of the city, and compared to that, already the Roman empire was a novel political formation, in so far as it gave up the scale of the city. Although already Cicero introduced the figure of the private citizen, Rome still preserved the close connection between the individual and the city, although partly motivated by private interests. This was developed in Christianity, when St Augustine differentiated between the sphere of politics and religion. From then on, politics became an external and formal issue. Although Luther helped to create the modern confessionally engaged state,  in fact protestantism, and the religious wars that accompanied its progress, proved to prepare only the way to the birth of the confessionally independent, neutral state.
Manent forcefully claims that this political regime aborts man’s search for God. But himself a gaullist, he stil finds the most easily defendable position from a political perspective – the nation, because as he sees it, the nation preserves the option of transmission or mediation,  between man and the Absolute, while securing the democratic principles of ancient Athens.

With the election of Barack Obama, much attention in Europe has focused on the possibility of the return of the good transatlantic relations that characterised the post-war period and was seriously damaged under Bush’s war on terror, unilateralism and imperialism. Much attention has also inevitably been focused on the fact that Obama is the first African-American president elected in a country that many view as historically and structurally racist. While Obama's election was seen to represent an end to both the damaging impact on transatlantic relations of the Bush era and to white supremacy in America, these two issues have rarely been connected. This chapter will look at the link between these by focusing on the “special relationship” between the United States and Britain, a relationship that has not only been the most enduring, if at times unequal and controversial, partnerships in the post-war era. Most notably between Churchill and FDR during the Second World War, Thatcher and Reagan during the Cold War and Blair and Bush during the War on Terror and invasion of Iraq. In spite of such cooperation, it is a relationship founded on colonialism and anti-colonialism, conflict and criticism – American criticism of British colonialism and, corresponding to it, British criticism of American racism. Far from representing pure anti-racism or anti-colonialism, British criticisms of American racism and American criticism of British colonialism have been deployed at crucial moments in which their relationship and relative geo-political power and influence was being contested or undergoing realignment, from the American Revolution through the cold war to the election of Obama.

This chapter examines the British response to the election of Obama in terms of the realignment of the special relationship and the place of both race and colonialism in the discussions about Obama’s election and relationship with Britain. More specifically, it looks at how this election has been celebrated in Britain as a victory over American racism, while his relationship to Britain has been criticised for his alleged anti-colonialism. I argue that this response to Obama reflects historical and current tensions over the colonialism and imperialism of and racism in both countries, the realignment of the special relationship and concerns about the image, influence and power of each country globally following the Bush-Blair years, as well as changes in the domestic politics of each country following their elections.

There is growing numbers of African American scholars and political activists who are voicing their disappointment that President Obama has not put forth a black legislative agenda. It appears that their criticism holds the President disproportionately responsible for the lack of progress in addressing the social and economic concerns that have plagued the African American community for generations. However , to date it appears that these critics have not published an explanation of how Congressional obstruction by House and Senate Republicans, as well as Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid's failure to negotiate filibuster reform prevents the President from successfully navigating any legislation in Congress as well as and judicial and executive nominations that, if passed, would support the infrastructure needed to more successfully promote broad social reform for economically vulnerable Americans. In this paper, I will explain that while there are numerous legitimate issues of concern for the black community, the insistence of a presidential or Congressional black agenda is a political non-starter. I will also argue that the failure to explain the complexities related to Congressional obstruction is promoting a disservice and undermining the capacity of community activists and political allies from engaging in collaborative political action with constituencies with similar concerns to put forth an agenda that can accomplish much needed social change. The insistence of a black agenda also undermines the opportunity to strengthen African American electoral turnout in party primaries, mid-term elections, and state and local elections. It also weakens the focus on other pipelines that allow politicians to come to Congress with the intent of rolling back social and political development for all people of color. The African American community can achieve many of their goals by supporting a political agenda that benefits their community by engaging in effective collective action for vulnerable low and middle-income voters who need banking and housing reform, immigration reform, stronger employment rights, as well as increased protection for the rights of women. JEL Codes: D72