Anscombe

I describe both the German Aristotelian revival and the Anglo-Saxon virtue-ethics approach and argue that there are some reasons why the Grotian dismissal of Aristotelian practical rationality had finally to be overcome. I suggest that such reasons in turn depend on deeper changes in the structure of the building of  modern philosophy, first among them those carried by the critique of Cartesian foundationalism staged by such odd bed-fellows as Peirce, Wittgenstein, Husserl, and Heidegger, adding quasi-Thomists such as Anscombe and Geach. This may account for the apparently unexpected normative turn which took place in the same years (shortly after or before 1958) in two different and comparatively insulated contexts such as Germany and  the Anglo-Saxon world.

[published in Routledge's "Philosophy and Method in the Social Sciences" series]

This study starts from a simple premise:  human practices are a fundamental constituent — arguably “the” fundamental constituent — of social reality.  It then poses the following question:  What would social scientists’ research look like if they took this insight quite seriously?

That, of course, would depend on what practices are in fact like:  what their generic features are, how they are constituted, how they might be identified and characterised and explained, how they function in concrete contexts, how they might change across time and space.  These are the kinds of questions that this book tries to tackle, insisting that their answers hold important implications for the effective practice of social science.

The book thus attempts to build a philosophical infrastructure for the empirical study of practices in the social sciences and humanities.  At the same time, it also tries to explore the implications of this ontology of human practices for issues in social theory and in the philosophy of the social sciences.  The book thus stands at the intersection of the philosophy of social science, social theory, and the social sciences.

In this paper I examine the relation between intentional action and morality from the perspective of practical epistemology. In other words I study the relation between knowledge of one’s own intentional actions (knowledge in action) and knowledge of what is good to do or what one ought to do in particular circumstances (knowledge in the circumstances).  If practical knowledge in the former sense (knowledge in action) and practical knowledge in the latter sense (knowledge in the circumstances) turn out to constitute exercises of one and the same capacity for knowledge, as I will argue they do, this will give us strong reason to believe that what is known in the two cases (i.e. intentional action and the moral fabric of the world) is in some sense the same.

In examining the relation between practical knowledge of one’s own intentional actions and practical knowledge of what is good to do I draw from two traditions of thought on practical epistemology.  The first is the tradition of Anscombe’s conception of knowledge in action and the second is the tradition of Murdoch’s conception of knowledge in the circumstances.  What is striking about these traditions is that they tend to understand practical knowledge by reference to the possible involvement therein of perception.  Thus Anscombe claims in her Intention[1] that knowledge in action is specified as knowledge without observation; a claim to the effect that the epistemological status of knowledge in action is determined by reference to the lack of a certain sort of involvement therein of perception.  And Iris Murdoch in her Sovereignty of the Good[2] proposes that what makes knowledge in the circumstances knowledge is a form of sensitivity to particular features or aspects of the circumstances in which the agent finds herself.  Thus, for Murdoch, knowledge in the circumstances owes its status as knowledge to the capacity of the agent to perceive what she ought to do in particular circumstances.

In this paper I will argue that both of these forms of knowledge are instances of the exercise of one and the same capacity for knowledge.  But the question now arises.  How can we both claim that the two forms of practical knowledge are instances of the exercise of one and the same capacity for knowledge and that perception plays such a diverse role in their epistemological grounding?  In the main body of this paper I will show how to interpret the Murdochian and the Anscombean claims so as to provide the materials with which we can answer this question.  If the argument of this paper works, it will transpire that both of these forms of knowledge are instances of the exercise of our capacity for self-knowledge.  This account of practical knowledge opens the way for understanding intentional action and the moral fabric of the world as knowable as the self.  And it is thus that what is known in the two forms of knowing (i.e. intentional action and the moral fabric of the world) is in some sense the same.
[1] Anscombe, 1957.
[2] Murdoch, 1970.

Table of contents

1. Plato and a response to ethical scepticism; 2. Aristotle and the invention of practical philosophy; 3. Diogenes and philosophy as a form of life; 4. Epicurus and ethics as care for oneself; 5. Epictetus and ethics as therapy of the passions; 6. Philo and the reconciliation of Torah and Platonism; 7. Augustine and Christianity as Neo-Platonism; 8. Moshe ben Maimon and the reconciliation of Torah and Aristotelianism; 9. Al Farabi and the reconciliation of Islam and Platonism; 10. Aquinas and the reconciliation of Christian moral doctrine and Aristotelian ethics; 11. Francisco de Vitoria and casuistry; 12. Michel de Montaigne and the art of living
13. Pierre Nicole and neo-Augustinianism; 14. Samuel von Pufendorf and the new science of morality; 15. Richard Cumberland and consequentialist voluntarism; 16. Richard Price and intuitionism; 17. Adam Smith and sentimentalism; 18. Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism; 19. Immanuel Kant, the practical use of reason and judgment; 20. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and a critique of Enlightenment universalism; 21. Friedrich Nietzsche against Christianity and the Enlightenment; 22. George Edward Moore and ideal utilitarianism; 23. Edmund Husserl and the a priori of action; 24. Bertrand Russell and non-cognitivism; 25. Elizabeth Anscombe and the revival of virtue ethics; 26. Richard Hare and neo-Utilitarianism; 27. Hans-Georg Gadamer and rehabilitation of practical philosophy; 28. Karl-Otto Apel and the revival of Kantian ethics; 29. John Rawls and public ethics as applied ethics; 30. Beauchamp and Childress and bioethics as applied ethics.

Dans ce qui suit, je vais exposer cette analyse du double effet développée par Anscombe en rappelant quelques éléments de sa conception de l’action intentionnelle dans Intention et la distinction conceptuelle entre conséquence prévue et conséquence visée (intentionnelle), ainsi que l’extension de la responsabilité morale au-delà des seuls états de choses provoqués intentionnellement (1). J’isolerai deux ambiguïtés, liées au « problème de la proximité », de cette analyse qui paraît ne pas s’accorder avec celle de l’action intentionnelle (2) et je les discuterai tour à tour. La première tient à son refus de tenir pour non intentionnelles les conséquences prévues de l’action intentionnelle quand elles sont trop proches de son résultat visé, et cela même si elles ne jouent pas de rôle dans le raisonnement pratique de l’agent (3). La seconde tient à la distance qui doit séparer le résultat visé de la conséquence prévue, pour que le verdict moral diffère. Se trouve alors posée la question du critère de la distance suffisante, et celle de la pertinence morale de cette distinction métaphysique (4).

It is commonly thought that the concept of euthanasia must include an element of intentional killing, along with a motivation to end suffering. But where death is brought about by an omission rather than an act, there is greater difficulty in determining intentions and moral culpability. Furthermore, the distinction between euthanasia and withdrawing treatment is less clear when the ethical principles for withdrawing treatment have been misapplied. This article seeks to bring clarity to this problem by analysing examples of such cases in order to demonstrate how moral errors about withdrawing treatment, such an underappreciation of the value of human life, which leads to a mistake about what counts as 'futile treatment', or a misunderstanding of how grave the obligation to preserve life is, do not necessarily involve an intention to end life and therefore are not euthanasia in the strict sense. Particular reference is made to the cases of Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans, where, despite the deeply flawed manner in which the High Court made its decision, the intention to end life was arguably absent from the respective judgements.

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness?  If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity?  How do people react to being accused to talking nonsense themselves?  Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life?  In dream-reports perhaps?  Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs?  Or in certain jokes and hoaxes?  Are contradictions felt to be meaningless?  I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties.  First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others.  Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.

The paper is a presentation of Anscombe's 'Intention'.  It analyzes its origins from the conclusions of the pamphlet 'Mr Truman's degree', the WIttgensteian philosophy of psychology providing the theoretical background and the rehabilitation of ideas on action from Aristotle and Aquinas grafted on a Witggensteinian basis.

This is the draft accepted for publication in the collection 'Biblioteca analitica'. Please quote from the published version.

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’).  To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless.  And often one is left guessing.

This is a study of Plato's moral psychology in the Republic as a response to Thrasymachus. I begin (§ 1) by interpreting the contest between Socrates and Thrasymachus as a capsule of the major points of contention between Plato and the sophists, regarding not only moral language but also regarding mind and soul. Then, I explore the Republic's arguments for the inherent normative dimensions of both rule (§ 2) and speech (§ 3), with an eye to connecting these arguments to the initial challenge of Thrasymachus. Finally (§ 4), I offer a brief Platonic rejoinder to two axioms of modern moral philosophy: (a) the strict contrast between reason and desire, and (b) the incompatibility of stance-dependence and normative realism.

This paper focuses on one of the major criticisms made to Aristotle's virtue ethics, namely that it lacks explicit moral action guidance. The same criticism has been addressed to later developments of virtue ethics. There have been several attempts to overcome this objection and to demonstrate that modern theories of virtue ethics do provide principles of right action. In this paper, I discuss mainly two such major attempts: the exemplarist approach and the virtue rules approach. My aim is to examine whether, if applied to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, these two approaches can provide a convincing answer to the criticism that Aristotle’s ethics does not offer explicit moral action guidance .

Seit einigen Jahrzehnten lässt sich innerhalb der praktischen Philosophie und der Moralphilosophie im Besonderen eine Renaissance der aristotelischen Ethik beobachten, welche wohl mit Anscombes Aufsatz Modern Moral Philosophy 1 eingesetzt hat. Ausgehend von einer Kritik an pluralistischen Begründungsstrategien konsequentialistischer Theorien der Ethik, besteht ihr Anliegen darin, zu zeigen, dass moralisches Handeln eigentlich nichts anderes ist als gutes Handeln im Sinne der menschlichen Natur. Diese These ist der Ausgangspunkt derjenigen philosophischen Strömung, welche als aristotelischen oder ethischen Naturalismus oder Neo-Aristotelismus bezeichnet wird. Diese Arbeit soll in gewisser Hinsicht einen Beitrag zur Debatte um den ethischen Naturalismus liefern. Dieser sieht sich oftmals Vorwürfen hinsichtlich des verwendeten Naturbegriffes ausgesetzt. Diese scheinen mir jedoch meistens aus einer Perspektive zu resultieren, welche die Vertreter 2 des ethischen Naturalismus gerade bemüht sind zu hinterfragen. Damit will ich nicht behaupten, dass der Naturbegriff des ethischen Naturalismus unproblematisch ist. Tatsächlich bin ich der Ansicht, dass dieser Begriff noch lange nicht vollständig transparent ist, falls er das jemals überhaupt sein kann. In der Philosophie gibt es die Tendenz, zu meinen, dass es so etwas wie feste, unveränderliche Begriffe, i.e. klar definierbare Termini geben kann, welche für die Wahrheit stehen. Wittgenstein hat sich bemüht, ein derartiges Verständnis von Begriffen und Philosophie zu hinterfragen. 3 Philosophie ist das Denken des Denkens und zwar derart, dass es im Denken zu sich selbst findet. Doch es findet nichts unabhängig von ihm Bestehendes, sondern sich selbst als Denken. Daraus folgt meiner Ansicht nach, dass man das Denken als solches nicht begreifen kann, wenn man versucht es unabhängig von sich selbst zu erklären. Das ist meiner Ansicht nach auch der Gedanke, welcher der Philosophie Anscombes zugrunde liegt. Obwohl sie keine Theorie der Moral 4 entworfen und derartiges vermutlich auch gar nicht angestrebt hat, bin ich der Überzeugung, dass es einen rotes Faden in diversen Texten gibt, welcher oftmals unbeachtet bleibt. Ich habe den Eindruck, dass zwar das Interesse an einer Auseinandersetzung mit MMP im Laufe der letzten Jahre größer geworden ist, doch dies nicht unbedingt zu einer ernsthaften Auseinandersetzung sowohl mit ihrer Kritik an dem moralphilosophischen Diskurs der Moderne, als auch ihrem Lösungsvorschlag führt. Gemeinhin wird ge-1 Im Folgenden kurz: MMP. 2 Der besseren Lesbarkeit wegen, verwende ich in dieser Arbeit das generische Maskulinum, welches als geschlechtsunabhängig verstanden werden soll. 3 Vgl.: Wittgenstein, PU § § 97, 102, 103 4 Ich gebrauche in dieser Arbeit die Ausdrücke "Moral" und "Ethik" synonym. 1 sagt, Anscombe kritisiert dieses&jenes und meint, wir sollten statt dessen lieber das&das machen. Das schreibt Anscombe auch tatsächlich. Ich bin jedoch der Meinung, dass sich unter der Oberfläche, dessen was sie schreibt, mehr verbirgt, als die meistens Leser von MMP überhaupt erahnen, was vermutlich für alle Texte von ihr gilt. Sie vertritt die Ansicht, dass Moralphilosophen aufhören sollten, nach einem abstrakten Kriterium für die Moralität oder Richtigkeit von Handlungen zu fragen. Stattdessen, so ihr Vorschlag, sollte man sich auf das Beschreiben von Handlungen fokussieren, welches Begriffe involviert, die eine spezifische Güte oder Schlechtigkeit einer Handlung zum Ausdruck bringen. Diese Beschreibungen sind Beschreibungen, welche Handlungen als tugendhafte bzw. lasterhafte Handlungen vorstellen z.B. als ungerecht, verlogen, barmherzig, schamlos etc. Dadurch wäre man in der Lage eine Handlung als wesentlichen Vollzug des Menschen zu beurteilen. So lautet zumindest Anscombes Prognose, denn einer ihrer zentralen Behauptungen in MMP besagt, dass wir, um überhaupt Moralphilosophie betreiben zu können, uns über Begriffe klar werden müssen, welche die Philosophie der Psychologie betreffen. Wir müssen uns darüber klar werden, was die Natur bzw. das Wesen des Menschen auszeichnet. Pigden, einer ihrer Kritiker, merkt an, dass man Anscombes Kritik an der moralphilosophischen Debatte nur dann teilt, wenn man bereits ihrem Lösungsansatz zustimmt. Ihre Kritik ist eine Scheinkritik und die von ihr vorgeschlagene Alternative nur eine Alternative, aber keine moralphilosophischer Ansatz, welcher an sich notwendig ist. 5 Tatsächlich ist es so, dass diejenigen, welche Anscombes Vision der Ethik teilen auch Sympathisanten des ethischen Naturalismus und demzufolge bestrebt sind, auf Basis einer aristotelischen Analyse des Naturbegriffes und des Wesens des Menschen ein ethisches System zu entwickeln. Doch Pigden und andere Philosophen, deren Kritik an Anscombe ähnlich ausgerichtet ist, übersehen, dass Anscombes Kritik nicht von der Prämisse ausgeht, allein eine aristotelische Ethik sei die wahre Ethik und demzufolge sind alle anderen Theorien falsch. Ihr Unmut speist sich eher aus der offensichtlichen Dissonanz zwischen den Schlussfolgerungen ihrer Antagonisten und dem, was Anscombe wohl als gesunden Menschenverstand bezeichnen würde. Diese Schlussfolgerungen erwecken den Eindruck, als ob sich jede einzelne Handlung indifferent gegenüber einer moralischen Beurteilung verhält. Die Handlung als einzelnes Geschehnis ist mithin unabhängig von moralischen Kriterien. Doch offensichtlich muss es irgendeinen moralischen Maßstab der Beurteilung geben, die Frage ist nur, wie er zu konstruieren ist. Was das betrifft, haben unterschiedliche Philosophen eben unterschiedliche Meinungen und natürlich meinen alle, ihre eigene Theorie sie die richtige. Daraus entspinnt sich ein Diskurs, der aus Anscom-5 Vgl.: Pigden, "Anscombe on 'Ought'", S. 22 2 bes Sicht auf begrifflichen Vorurteilen beruht, welche diese Philosophen unreflektiert voraussetzen. Anscombe geht es nicht um die richtige Theorie der Ethik. Es geht ihr um die richtige Art und Weise Moralphilosophie zu betreiben und das beinhaltet, sich über die begrifflichen Grundlagen des eigenen Denkens Klarheit zu verschaffen. Wenn die begrifflichen Grundlagen zu unhaltbaren Thesen und abstrusen Argumentationen führen, dann sind es nicht die Thesen oder die Argumentationen, welche abgeändert und ausgebaut, sondern die begrifflichen Grundlagen, welche überdacht werden müssen. Diese Voraussetzung gilt unabhängig davon, ob man nun Anhänger einer aristotelischen Ethik ist oder nicht. Aristoteles zumindest, hat genau das gemacht, was viele Moralphilosophen der Moderne versäumen zu tun. Seine Ethik ist

'Moral obligation' discusses Elizabeth Anscombe's account of moral obligation.  The paper argues that account of moral obligation she favoured is quite different from that taught by early modern and late medieval Catholic scholasticism.  She regarded moral obligatoriness as a reason-giving feature, akin to the feature of being commanded by a law-giver.  But the scholastic tradition viewed moral obligatoriness as a justificatory force.

The paper explains what hangs on this distinction between a reason-giving feature and a justificatory force, and examines the  implications of this distinction for a divine command theory of ethics.

I argue that the idea of virtue has become central after the Fifties in both Anglo-Saxon and German moral philosophy  and that this revival has come together with recognition of the legitimacy of discussion of issues in normative ethics, something that philosophers both on the Continent and in the Anglo-Saxon world used to overlook in the first half of the twentieth-century. I point at examples such as Stuart Hampshire and Elizabeth Anscombe as proof of the centrality of virtue ethics in the first phase of the normative turn. I also argue that, far from being a radical alternative to ‘modern moral philosophy’ as its proponents believe, virtue ethics is precisely moral argument of the kind both Kantian ethics at its best and less dogmatic versions of utilitarianism have brought to the fore of philosophical discussion.

Philosophers commonly talk of Anscombe's book Intention as a single unified account produced at a particular moment in time. Yet we share a tendency to refer to the text of the second (1963) edition while citing the first (1957) one.  Between these two there also lies the 1958 second impression of the first edition, which already contained some significant alterations noted by Anscombe herself.This paper offers a detailed consideration of the differences between these three publications, as well as her earlier Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society article 'Intention'. In what follows I catalogue the various changes she made with the aim of clarifying whether it makes sense, in light of them, to talk of an early and late Intention. I conclude that while this would be going too far, Anscombe’s views on action description and practical reasoning have changed in ways in which it would be profitable for philosophers of action and moral psychology to track.

Believing someone is, as Elizabeth Anscombe said, “trusting him for the truth.”  Recent accounts of how we trust speakers for the truth have said little about what it is to take a speaker to be trustworthy. I argue that a Thomistic account of truthfulness provides the best available account of speaker trustworthiness, and I explain how trusting a truthful speaker can be better for you epistemically than either following your own evidence or merely relying on a speaker.

I discuss the third of Anscombe’s theses from “Modern Moral Philosophy”, namely that post-Sidgwickian consequentialism makes the worst action acceptable. I scrutinize Anscombe’s comprehension of “consequentialism”, her reconstruction of Sidgwick’s view of intention, her defence of a new kind of casuistry, her view of morality as based on Divine commands, her recourse to theodicy in order to save absolute prohibitions. In my conclusions I suggest that Anscombe’s view of divine law is a strange notion, more modern and British than Biblical or Scholastic; Anscombe uncritically accepts an impoverished image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism, which was, ironically, an unaware bequest from her consequentialist opponents.

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

This chapter gives an overview of Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism, with a particular focus on the theory developed by Philippa Foot, in order to address the question whether Elizabeth Anscombe was right to oppose it to the natural law tradition.

This paper argues that there was considerably more philosophy of action in moral theory before 1958 (when Anscombe complained of its lack under the banner 'philosophy of psychology') than there has been since. This is in part because Anscombe influenced the formation of 'virtue theory' as yet another position within normative ethics, and her work contributed to the fashioning of 'moral psychology' as an altogether distinct (and now increasingly empirical) branch of moral philosophy.

This paper looks at philosophical accusations of talking nonsense from the perspective of argumentation theory.  An accusation of this sort, when seriously meant, amounts to the claim that someone believes there is something she means by her utterance when in fact she means nothing whatsoever by it.  Such accusations may indeed be peculiar to philosophy.  They also involve the claim that there can be ILLUSIONS OF ARGUMENTATION, both inter- and intra-personal.  The problem of how one could possibly diagnose such illusions is raised and I suggest that, if there is a way, it will require a therapeutic rather than a polemical approach.  This suggestion is of course made by Wittgenstein and some of his followers but, in my view, it has remained undeveloped.  It often takes the form of a comparison with psychoanalysis.  I note that the more like psychoanalysis it becomes, the less like traditional argumentation, philosophical or otherwise, it will be.

This paper provides an overview of G.E.M. Anscombe's moral vision, with special interest in her critique of consequentialism. It connects her critique of consequentialism to her discussion of the dignity of the human being. It draws on the results to reflect on physical handicap and genetic testing.

Is the idea of the voluntary important? Those who think so tend to regard it as an idea that can be metaphysically deepened through a theory about voluntary action, while those who think it a superficial idea that cannot coherently be deepened tend to neglect it as unimportant. Parting company with both camps, I argue that the idea of the voluntary is at once important and superficial-it is an essentially superficial notion that performs important functions, but can only perform them if we refrain from deepening it. After elaborating the contrast between superficial and deepened ideas of the voluntary, I identify the important functions that the superficial idea performs in relation to demands for fairness and freedom. I then suggest that theories trying to deepen the idea exemplify a problematic moralization of psychology-they warp psychological ideas to ensure that moral demands can be met. I offer a three-tier model of the problematic dynamics this creates, and show why the pressure to deepen the idea should be resisted. On this basis, I take stock of what an idea of the voluntary worth having should look like, and what residual tensions with moral ideas this leaves us with.

This was originally a talk for an APA panel 'Anscombe's Intention, 50 years after' (in 2008 I think) ; it was reprinted in Ford, Hornsby, Stoutland, 'Essays on Anscombe's Intention', HUP 2014  The exhibition of Anscombe's independence from Wittgenstein is a crucial element in 'rescuing [her] from the enormous condescension of posterity', though it is pretty artlessly attempted in the first few pages here.

I discuss the second of the three theses advanced by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. The focus is the nature of entities to which – if Anscombe's diagnosis is correct – ought and cognate modals are assumed by modern moral philosophers to refer. I reconstruct the alternative account offered by Anscombe of viable and justified 'Aristotelian' modals – as contrasted with mysterious and unjustified 'Kantian' modals; I discuss the nature and status of 'Aristotelian necessity' to which such legitimate modals refer to. I conclude with the claims that Anscombe's account of modern moral philosophy is viciously parochial, reducing it to Oxford philosophy from the Thirties and Forties and its immediate antecedents; that her historical reconstruction is vitiated by lack of awareness of the existence of law-views of morality preceding Christian theology, artful anticipation of secularization in order to fit her picture of modern moral philosophy as the 'day after' of Christianity; that Aquinas's and her own view of natural morality as made of rational moral judgments laws is incompatible with both her predilection for 'divine law' instead of plain down-to-earth 'natural law'; that her strained reconstruction of a Christian-Jewish-Stoic view of morality as law promulgated by God has little to share with any reconstruction of the Biblical moral traditions meeting academic standard and in more detail there is no possible translation of Torah as Law; and that her criticism hits just targets from the old little British world she was familiar with, while leaving Kantian ethics unaffected.

This essay deals with the question whether the anselmian argumento of the Proslogion is or is not an ontological argument. For this purpose, it convenes the position of G. E. M. Anscombe, who maintains that the anselmian argument is not an ontological argument, in the light of a personal interpretation of the text. However she has a pejorative idea about ontological arguments, which became current after Kant. As an alternative to the anscombian position, this essay assumes a non kantian idea about the property of ontological and sustains that the argument of the Proslogion is an ontological argument, according to the nature of its principles.

If it is part of the tragedy of the fall that we do violence to other creatures, that we kill other animals for food, clothing, sport, for testing medicines, shave creams and eye shadows, then our killing of other animals, must, in some way, be seen as a part of a “culture of death.” Why should we hesitate to kill other animals? First and foremost, we should hesitate because of respect for the intrinsic goodness of their lives. That non-human creatures have intrinsic value -- i.e. are not to be seen merely as matter to be manipulated -- is a fact which John Paul II calls a “truth of creation.” Secondly, our doing or aiding and abetting any unnecessary violence against other animals initiates us into the culture of death, and as such wounds our characters. But is the killing of other animals unnecessary? In many parts of the world, including our own, it is clear that almost all of us can lead flourishing lives without the killing of other animals. Thus, if we as Christians are to be faithful to the call to be witnesses to a consistent gospel of life, if we are to speak as Christians with an evangelical voice to our culture, then we will seek to avoid needless suffering and death to other animals, at least those which will in no way produce fruit for the kingdom of God.

PRACTICAL INTENTIONALITY, REASONS AND CAUSES
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

What is an intentional action? How do intentionality, rationality and having a reason to act
relate? The debate between reasons and causes is badly put: the real question is not whether
the relationship between intention and action is causal or not, but whether what makes an
action intentional is a natural fact or a form of description (Anscombe). Acting intentionally
does require possession of the description under which the action is intentional, so intentional
action is best approached by reasons.
Having an intention is not willing: the intention is not the start of action but a first-personal
action-thought or “practical knowledge.” The antinomy between reasons and causes really
stems from the asymmetry of psychological verbs (Wittgenstein). For action verbs too are
psychological verbs, even though they relate to happenings that take place outside our bodies.
Causal explanations of action are typically third-personal, whereas reasons are always firstpersonal.
Confusions between theses two standpoints lead to tremendous errors about practical
rationality.
The distinction between reasons and causes really becomes insightful when applied to moral
psychology: it sheds light on the relationship between reason and motivation. Practical
reasoning leads to action, and therefore motivates; but it is also defeasible (or non-monotonic).
If reasons for action are never complete, why act on them? Various forms of skepticism are
envisioned. I conclude that practical reasoning is a genuine form of inference, but that it is a
material, not a formal one, in which will and intelligence melt (Aristotle). In the end, I
advocate an expressivist account of practical reasoning.

There are passages in Wittgenstein where he compares his method to psychotherapy and one or two where he seems to suggest that the ‘patient’ has the last word on his ‘illness’ and ‘cure’.  This paper tries to take these seriously, especially in connexion with the idea that victims of philosophical confusion talk nonsense.

Philosophical accusations of talking nonsense made in a polemical spirit are bound to fail, since the only way one can effectively criticise another’s utterance is by attaching some meaning to it.  But if the other acknowledges the possibility that his puzzlement arises from his having been taken in by nonsense, then perhaps a co-operative investigation of this suggestion might be fruitful.  Indeed self-diagnosis ought in principle to be possible.  Ought it not to have happened at least once in the history of philosophy if philosophical nonsense has ever been exposed? 

But there are difficulties.  For example:
a) We must ask whether or not philosophical nonsense, when exposed as such, is supposed to lose all appearance of meaningfulness.  Either answer is problematic.
b) The acknowledged similarity of the methodology under investigation to that of psychoanalysis exposes it to many of the familiar objections to the methodology of psychoanalysis, especially those that draw attention to the misleading influence of suggestion by an authority-figure.
c) The proposal that relentless cross-questioning of a suspected nonsense-talker will eventually lead her to ‘dry up’ (if she really is talking nonsense) seems to involve a version of the so-called Socratic Fallacy.

This paper addresses how Elizabeth Anscombe understands the link between action theory and ethics, by focusing on her theory of practical knowledge. I argue that, for Anscombe, a capacity for practical knowledge is best understood as a capacity to do things for reasons, where reasons are the ends pursued by the agent as practically intelligible goods; on this view, knowing what one is doing and knowing the intended good of doing it are two different aspects of one and the same practical knowledge.  On my reading of Anscombe, the central task of action theory is to elucidate this capacity for practical knowledge, which is exercised anytime one acts in the characteristically human way (intentionally or voluntarily). The proper task of ethics, by contrast, is to elucidate the perfected exercise of this power in the practically wise or virtuous person—i.e., the one who is properly disposed to act for the right reasons and thus lives well.

Ongoing discussion of this paper here: https://www.academia.edu/s/cf13d33860?source=link
Philosophy – whether traditional or contemporary – has nothing to say about the human metaphysical predicament, and cannot even offer a basic phenomenology of the human condition. Part of the problem is the ongoing confusion as to what philosophy actually amounts to, and what it can achieve. It is necessary to demystify philosophy, and have it restricted to the discipline of critical thinking, and it should not be thought of as possessing any substantial theoretical content of its own. It is a method, a skillset, a series of techniques, not a repository of various highbrow theories, whether about mind, epistemology, ontology, cosmology, science, or anything else. Metaphysics is an entirely distinct and separate field of inquiry, and concerns the human predicament, and ultimate human fulfilment, and it is to this end that critical thinking skills can usefully be applied. The purpose of this short study is to give some help to those hoping to gain an insight into the metaphysical realms of their being, and who would like some guidance with regard to those formal and academic disciplines supposedly geared to dealing with that very subject.

Many philosophers nowadays take for granted a causalist view of action explanation, according to which intentional action is a movement caused by mental antecedents. For them, “the possibility of human agency evidently requires that our mental states – our beliefs, desires, and intentions – have causal effects in the physical world: in voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, or intentions and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways” (Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, 2000 (1998), p. 31). The main question then is not to know whether there is mental causation at all, but how we should account for it. How can the mind move our body? In her 1983 paper, “The Causation of Action”, Elizabeth Anscombe shows how confused this way of putting things is. For her, if intentions or beliefs can indeed be taken to be causes of action, it is not in any metaphysically problematic sense. Seeing this requires us to distinguish clearly two theses: (1) “to be done in execution of a certain intention” is not a causal relation between intention and action; (2) an intention may be said to cause something: but this pertains to a specific kind of causal history, different from that which is uncovered by physical enquiry. First we will show how the metaphysical problem of mental causation arises from a given conception of action. Then we will turn to Anscombe’s arguments in favour of the two aforementioned theses.

espanolEste articulo argumenta que habia considerablemente mas filosofia de accion en teoria moral antes de 1958 (cuando Anscombe se quejo de su falta bajo el lema «filosofia de la psicologia») que la que ha habido desde entonces. Esto se debe en parte a que Anscombe influyo en la formacion de la «teoria de la virtud» como otra posicion mas dentro de la etica normativa, y el trabajo de Anscombe contribuyo a la formacion de la «psicologia moral» como una rama completamente distinta (y ahora cada vez mas empirica) de la filosofia moral. catalaAquest article argumenta que hi havia considerablement mes filosofia d’accio en teoria moral abans de 1958 (quan Anscombe es va queixar que en faltava sota el lema «filosofia de la psicologia») que la que hi ha hagut des de llavors. Aixo es deu en part al fet que Anscombe va influir en la formacio de la «teoria de la virtut» com una posicio mes dins de l’etica normativa, i el treball d’Anscombe va contribuir a la formacio de la «psicologia moral»...

The aim of this paper is to clarify Kierkegaard’s concept of demonic despair (and
demonic evil) and to show its relevance for discussions of the guise of the good
thesis (i.e. that in f-ing intentionally, we take f-ing to be good). Contemporary
discussions of diabolic evil often emphasise the phenomena of despair and
acedia as apparent counter-examples to the guise of the good. I contend that
Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair is relevant to these discussions, because it
reconciles demonic (extreme) despair and acedia with the guise of the good.
In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard provides an influential, systematic
account of despair that relates evil, despair, and acedia to each other.
Michelle Kosch argues that this account goes beyond Kierkegaard’s German
predecessors by introducing a concept of diabolic evil and despair. By
contrast, the present paper argues that Kierkegaard takes diabolic evil to be
impossible, although he offers a rich analysis of the demonic that resembles
diabolic agency. Still, Kierkegaard’s analysis rests on ontological assumptions
about the nature of the good that belong to a Platonico-Christian tradition
that is controversial today.

Although Anscombe’s moral philosophy is often described as an “absolutism”, commentators on Anscombe have confused what kind of absolutism she held. In this paper, I argue that to properly understand Anscombe’s position on ethical absolutism one must see it as essentially tied to her work on intention and not on external activities performed. When Anscombe’s view is understood in such a manner, it renders her moral philosophy more closely harmonious not only with her other philosophical works, but the Catholic intellectual tradition especially Thomism. And while one might extrapolate from this harmony Anscombe’s indebtedness to this tradition, one might just as easy see her philosophical work as itself being a clarifying force for contemporary accounts of ethics in the Catholic tradition. To be able to accomplish this, the paper first argues for a proper understanding of Anscombe’s ethical absolutism according to her contemporary commentators. One I have established this proper understanding, I indicate how, in the second part of the paper, ethicists working more directly in the Catholic intellectual tradition are closer to Anscombe’s authentic ethical account of absolutism than her own commentators. After exploring a place of seemingly inflexible disagreement for contemporary Catholic ethicists, I lay out how Anscombe’s account of intention can both illuminate the nature of her ethical absolutism and simultaneously contribute to that tradition from which she at least seems to have received.

Recently, arguments against the possibility of basic action have been advanced, based on the temporal complexity even of putatively basic action and on considerations about the nature of action as a rational capacity generally. I argue that the latter concern derives from a too-limited, "technological'" conception what a rational capacity could be, and that once we admit an alternative, second-natural approach to capacities, the arguments concerning temporal complexity can be overcome. I close by considering briefly some general characteristics of second-natural capacities and how the approach to basic actions based on them should influence how we  think of the body in action.

Penultimate version; pls see Time and the Philosophy of Action for the final version.

The aim of this paper is to display an alternative to the familiar decompositional approach in action theory, one that resists the demand for an explanation of action in non-agential terms, while not simply treating the notion of intentional agency as an unexplained primitive. On this Anscombean alternative, action is not a worldly event with certain psychological causes, but a distinctive form of material process, one that is not simply caused by an exercise of reason but is itself a productive exercise of reason. I argue that to comprehend the proposed alternative requires an account of the temporality of events in general. An event does not simply have a position in time, but is itself temporally structured. With the inner temporality of events in view, the Anscombean conception of action as a specifically self-conscious form of temporal unity is made available for critical reflection.

This chapter compares the general form and state of moral philosophy during the first half of the twentieth century (§1) to how it stands today (§3). These two overviews serve as the bread of a GEMA-filled sandwich. In §2 I accordingly consider Anscombe's criticisms of 'modern moral philosophy' from Sidgwick to Ross. Anyone in sympathy with the general line of her criticisms, I argue, must concede that the state of moral philosophy was in far better shape in the decades before she wrote her seminal 1958 paper than it has been ever since. Ironically, contemporary moral philosophy has become what it is partly due to Anscombe's own unintended role in influencing (i) the formation of 'virtue theory' as yet another position within normative ethics, and (ii) the fashioning of 'moral psychology' as an altogether distinct-and increasingly empirical-branch of moral philosophy.