Asymmetrical Warfare

The article examines how new planning concepts and methods advanced by the RAND Corporation and adopted by the Pentagon during the 1990s served to inflate defense requirements. A version appeared in the March/April 1998 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists as “Inventing Threats.”

Cyberspace is among the four global commons of the human race including, high seas, outer-space and Antarctica. The weaponization of the cyber domain is relatively a new phenomenon in war and warfare. Due to the pivotal need of connectivity and reliance on computers, computer components and internet to transmit, disseminate and communicate data – the cyberspace is used by almost every military force. This dependence on computers and internet has resulted in the vulnerability of certain weapon systems, fire control mechanisms and
command and control platforms to cyber-attacks in the form of hacking, malware, spyware and disruptive and destructive viruses. North Korea is among those countries in the world that possesses a considerable capability to launch, disrupt, paralyze and render temporary or permanent loss of such platforms which assist in command and control of military forces. This article is a concentrated effort to analyse the cyber and electronic warfare strategy of North Korea and their possible use against United States Forces Korea (USFK) and United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).

This paper discusses the depiction of ambushes in chronicles of the High Middle Ages. Identifying ambushes in this period is particularly difficult, as the Latin term 'insidia' could also be used more generically to refer to stratagems, snares and cunning ploys. This paper combines evidence from contemporary chronicles, Patristic and medieval theological writing and Anglo-Norman epic verse to examine the variety of situations in which ambushes were used by medieval combatants and the different lessons that historians drew from tales of warriors ambushed (or ambushing) unawares.

This book review examines a work that looks at finding the balance between the soldierly (professional) ethics and warrior (moral) ethos in contemporary context, especially  under circumstances where the identity of the enemy(foe) is diffuse, that is, asymmetric warfare.

The Military Intervention by Powerful States (MIPS) project develops a rigorous, generalizable measure of the effectiveness of military force as a policy instrument and applies the measure to code the outcomes of all military interventions conducted by five major powers since the termination of World War II. The MIPS dataset provides detailed data on US, British, Chinese, French, and Russian uses of military force against both state and non-state targets between 1946 and 2003. In particular, this project focuses on the political objectives strong states pursue through the use of force, the human and material cost of their military operations, and measures of intervention outcomes relative to the intervening states' objectives. The dataset also includes extensive data on factors commonly hypothesized to be associated with war outcomes, such as the nature of the target, the type of force used by the intervening state, and military aid and assistance provided to each side.

The story of King David is one of the most celebrated ones in the bible. David's relationship with Jonathan, the son of King Saul, played a pivotal role in David's surviving the attempts of Saul to destroy him. -- 

Many believe that David and Jonathan were lovers as evidenced by David's famous lament upon Jonathan's death: "How are the mighty fallen in the midst of the battle. O Jonathan, thou was slain in thine high places. I am distressed for thee, my brother Jonathan. Very pleasant hast thou been unto me: thy love to me was wonderful, passing the love of women." 2 Samuel 1:25,26. Without the love and loyalty of Jonathan, David possibly would have never lived to become king of Israel. --

Malcolm Gladwell's 2013 book on the confrontation between David and Goliath is an in depth examination of how an apparently powerful adversary is no match for a more nimble opponent. -- 

The Orthodox Jews have overlooked this aspect of David's sexuality for centuries to the detriment of human happiness and reproductive success.  See:  David - Tanzio Varallo.pdf - for the famous painting of David. The painting is at the Palazzo dei Musei Pinacoteca di Varallo e Museo Calderini Via Pio Franzani.  My March 2017 letter to Pope Francis included a reproduction of this work.

War spins the wheels of history. It changes societies, alters lives, and brings about new dimensions to inflict more brutality on human beings. This is what happened in the aftermath of World War II, when the advent of the nuclear weapons set about a chapter of sophisticated and lethal warfare. Conventional war between the great powers has since been antiquated. It only puts to display the apparent capabilities of the adversary so that deterrence remains intact. War has now become multilevel and multi-dimensional. In such a case hybrid warfare strategy comes to play-which falls under the third dimension of warfare and includes application of both conventional and non-conventional means. It becomes lethal because it brings together the use of technology and cognition to bring about destruction and disruption. On the other hand, the Strategic Interaction theory examines the asymmetric dimension of warfare which a weaker party undertakes in order to subdue or challenge its adversity. To put all this in context, India and Pakistan both being nuclear states do not directly confront each other by conventional means; rather they opt for the non-conventional means. The doctrinal change and rapid military modernization drive by India creates security dilemma for Pakistan. This paper studies that how India has employed hybrid warfare strategy against Pakistan, what are the vulnerabilities of Pakistan that India is exploiting and can exploit, how Pakistan can confront this type of warfare.

Academic debate in security and strategic studies over the past two decades has focused overwhelmingly on understanding changes to the security environment and their impact on the strategy and conduct of contemporary wars. Nowhere is this more obvious than with the wars fought by Western armies following the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11). Discussions between academics covered even the most detailed (grand) strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of contemporary war, from the very general to the very specific levels; all but one. The supply of military operations since the end of the Cold War is virtually absent from these debates, despite the central relevance of military logistics for every aspect of military operations, including and particularly for strategy. 1 In effect, the academic literature routinely ignores a pivotal component of war which, on the one hand, is the arbiter of strategic opportunity, 2 and which, on the other hand, is heavily determined by strategic and operational planning. The only area of the supply of war that receives substantial attention is the development of weapon systems and technology in the context of the defence industrial base. 3 Yet even here, the focus is on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the modernisation and globalisation of the defence industry,

جنگ روانی به مدد رسانه
نویسنده:حسین اژدر
Hossein azhdar
Farsnews(1385)
در نوشته ی قبل به جنگ اطلاعات اشاره کردیم و به برسی مفهومی و اثر
عمیق این سلاح چه در تاکتیکها و چه به رویه وروشها (استراتژی ها) پرداختیم و اینکه جنگ اطلاعات به یکی از عوامل اساسی و همزاد جنگ های کنونی تبدیل شده و غیر قابل صرف نظر اشاره کردیم.
جنگ اطلاعات جزئی لاینفک از جنگ نرم است و به واقع جوهره ی آن را تشکیل میدهد.
جنگ اطلاعات در قالب هایی از جمله (ایجاد اختلال در رد و بدلهای الکترومغناطیسی وداده ها..) در جنگ الکترونیک،(جنگ ماهواره ای و دزدی داده هاو...) در جاسوسی و هم چنین در قالب (طراحی و هدایت افکار مردمان و سپاه و...) با عنوان پروپاگاندا و تبلیغات میتواند خود را به عرصه ی ظهور رساند.
به جاسوسی که خود یکی از ارکان جدانشدنی جنگ دادهها و اطلاهات است در نوشته ی ;جاسوسی فرانوین; پرداختیم.
به بحث جنگ الکترونیک وسایبرنتیک به امید خدا در نوشته های بعدی خواهیم پرداخت ولی موضوعی که کمابیش به روز است مسئله ی جنگ رسانه ای و روانی است.

‘Leaderless resistance’ and ‘lone wolf terrorism’ are concepts that have steadily gained importance in in the study of oppositional subcultures and terrorist groups, being use to describe the operational realities of a variety of terrorisms, from groups like al-Qaeda to Anders Breivik.  In this article, I seek to describe leaderless resistance as a rhetorical construct, a meaning-conferring ‘ideology of effervescence’ that lifts the spirits of both movement progenitors who advocate the strategy as well as incipient lone wolves who consider responding to their exhortations.  Through an examination of the case of Wiebo Ludwig and the EnCana pipeline bombings of 2008-2009, I show how these rhetorics emerge in the interactions between activists and their political enemies.  With this conception, we can, a) understand more fully the discursive/rhetorical dynamics involved in asymmetrical struggle, b) problematize the acceptance of the organizational reality of leaderless resistance in the terrorism literature, and, c) question the assertion of some terrorism scholarship that refers to leaderless resistance and other ideologies of effervescence as hallmarks of the ‘new terrorism.’

Abstract
This article examines the longstanding rivalry of Rome and Parthia, which began as an unintended consequence of Crassus’ decisive defeat at Carrhae in 53 BCE. It synthesizes the accounts and opinions of numerous Graeco-Roman writers from the Augustan Age to late antiquity in order to help illustrate the new and interconnected post-Carrhae world and its legacy. The rivalry of the Romans and Parthians became a primary focus of their foreign policies and drastically expanded their perceptions of the world in which they interacted. Even after the fall of the Parthians to the rebellious Sassanid Persians in the 220s CE, the Romans continued to find their three-century-long rivalry with the Parthians of interest and relevant to the changing world of late antiquity.

Terrorists attack civilians to coerce their governments into making political concessions. Does this strategy work? To empirically assess the effectiveness of terrorism, the author exploits variation in the target selection of 125 violent substate campaigns. The results show that terrorist campaigns against civilian targets are significantly less effective than guerrilla campaigns against military targets at inducing government concessions. The negative political effect of terrorism is evident across logit model specifications after carefully controlling for tactical confounds. Drawing on political psychology, the author concludes with a theory to account for why governments resist compliance when their civilians are targeted.

W artykule zostaną przedstawione różnice w zakresie temperamentu i agresji wśród młodych dorosłych (N = 106), studentów kierunków humanistycznych (N = 52) i ścisłych (N = 54). Prezentowane wyniki mają charakter eksploracyjny, gdyż autor nie dotarł do badań na ten temat oraz ze względu na wielkość próby badawczej. Wnioskiem wypływającym z przeprowadzonych badań jest stwierdzenie, że studenci kierunków humanistycznych mają wyższy poziom agresji fizycznej niż studenci kierunków ścisłych, natomiast nie ma różnic w zakresie cech temperamentalnych i agresji wśród studentów na w/w kierunkach.
Słowa kluczowe: temperament, agresja, młodzi dorośli, studenci humaniści, studenci kierunków ścisłych
This paper presents differences in temperament and aggression among young adults (N = 106), students of humanities (N = 52) and science (N = 54). The presented oucomes are exploratory research because the author did not reach the research on the subject and because of the size of the study sample. The conclusion derives from the research is that female students of humanities have higher level of physical aggression than female science students while there were not observed any differences in temperament traits and aggression among male students in the humanities and science.

Fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy -which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponents' will… Unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part terra incognita -still awaiting exploration, and understanding. --B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (1954) As countless observers have pointed out, the American-Chinese rivalry in the early 21 st century bears more than a passing resemblance to the Anglo-German antagonism that led to World War I. In these conditions, it is not surprising if a consensus has emerged, among International Relations (IR) academics, around the proposition that the U.S.-China relation is bound to be the most important bilateral relation in the coming decades.

The occurrence and outcomes of the Cod Wars defy both popular and academic expectations. Iceland, a microstate, essentially won four disputes against the United Kingdom, a great power. The two states furthermore belonged to a Western security community, sharing significant institutional, economic and cultural ties. This article reviews the history and international relations literature on the Cod Wars to explain and evaluate why the Cod Wars occurred and why Iceland won them. This article also explains what lessons international relations scholarship has learned from the Cod Wars for liberal IR theory, realism and asymmetric bargaining.

Megjelent: Seregszemle, az MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság folyóirata, XIV. évfolyam, 2. szám, 2016. március–június.
Online elérhető: http://www.honvedelem.hu/container/files/attachments/59672/seregszemle_2016_02.pdf


Amióta 2014 tavaszán Oroszország korábban nem látott, csak a legszűkebb szakmai berkekben ismert eszközök alkalmazásával először elfoglalta a Krím-félszigetet, majd pedig elhúzódó háborút robbantott ki Kelet-Ukrajnában, a hazai és nemzetközi biztonságpolitikai közbeszédben állandó téma az Oroszország által jelentett katonai fenyegetés, illetve hogy Moszkva képes lehet-e az ukrajnai fellépést Európában máshol is megismételni.
Jelen cikk ehhez a vitához kíván kapcsolódni, alapvetően két fő kérdésre keresve választ. Először is arra, hogy az Oroszország által Ukrajnában alkalmazott, közkeletű nevén hibrid hadviselés megvalósítása milyen politikai és katonai feltételekhez kötött. Mindezek alapján másodikként a tanulmány azt is igyekszik bemutatni, hogy melyek a hibrid hadviselés elleni védekezés katonai és nem katonai lehetőségei, illetve mit jelenthet mindez Magyarország számára. Az elemzés négy fejezetből épül fel. Rövid elméleti bevezetés követően a második fejezet az Ukrajnában folytatott orosz hibrid háború főbb jellemzőit és megvalósulási feltételeit vizsgálja. A harmadik fejezet a hibrid háború elleni védekezés lehetőségeivel foglalkozik, külön is kitérve a megelőző, védekező és aktív lépések lehetőségeire. A negyedik rész Magyarország egy esetleges hibrid támadással szembeni sebezhetőségét vizsgálja. A tanulmány egy rövid összegző fejezettel zárul.

ISIS T/O&Es and tactics between 2014 and 2016. This study isn't about strategic matters. It's neither a military history of ISIS, but a kind of "field manual" with tactical overview of the ISIS way of war. In French but T/O&Es are understandable for English readers.

Abstrakt We współczesnym świecie zagrożenia asymetryczne odgrywają rosnącą rolę w konfliktach zbrojnych. Prowadzi to do zacierania się granic między wojna i nie-wojną, a także żołnierzami i nie-żołnierzami, bronią i narzędziami politycznymi. Jedna z broni stosowanych w asymetrycznych konfliktach zbrojnych jest oparta na demografii. Rola tej broni D jest wciąż niedoceniona mimo jej różniącego znaczenia w obecnych i przyszłych konfliktach. Słowa kluczowe: demografia, broń, wojna asymetryczna, konflikty zbrojne, migracja, żywe tarcze, czystki, przyrost naturalny. Abstract In the contemporary world asymmetric threats play a growing role in armed conflicts. This makes blurring the borders between war and not-war as well as combatant and not-combatant, weapon and political tools. One of the weapons used in asymmetric armed conflicts is based on demographics. Role of this D weapon is still underestimated despite its growing role in present and future conflicts.

The present analysis of military operations carried out by Tatar Hordes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has shown that these operations were basically shaped by asymmetric actions. Their main characteristics were secrecy of action up to the moment of attack, use of information-and-intelligence warfare struggle instruments, a total character of operations taken against civilians, their material resources and economic infrastructure, with use of terrorist tactics and means of psychological impact that aimed at intimidating the community under attack. The actions of Tatar Hordes were primarily focused on non-military aspects and took advantage not only of classic military tools but also a combination of political measures and instruments as well as those typical of economy, these including a variety of economic and demographic pressures. Pursuing asymmetric action was in the hands of the Giray (Gerey) dynasty one of the most important tools enabling them to effi ciently achieve their political goals in the international arena and to support the economic development of the Crimean Khanate through permanent transfers of slaves and tangible property of various sorts. Keywords: asymmetric warfare, Tatar military art of war in the early modern period, organised violence, war amongst the people, southeastern borderlands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 1 Beginning with the late 1990s, the problem of asymmetric threats and confl icts has been more and more often discussed in publications on political science and security studies. Not only has the term 'asym-metric warfare' itself become extremely popular among researchers

In the closing days of the 1982 Falklands War, Argentine forces successfully employed an improvised shore-based Exocet against HMS Glamorgan. The ship survived but was put out of action. 30 years later, the shadow of this half-forgotten incident looms large over East Asia, with shore-based anti-ship missiles being one of the asymmetrical technologies some voices are urging Taipei to adopt as a reaction to a worsening military balance in the Taiwan Strait. A key ethical and political issue is whether to deploy them in built-up areas, this being an essential difference between limited, and people's war.

Army generals unsurprisingly have tended to be remembered best for feats concocted on the battlefield when managing formations of soldiers pitted against similar opposition in an international or a civil war. But the changing nature of military conflict since the end of the Second World War has seen a diminution of all out wars between massed national armies and an increase in what are termed low intensity conflicts where a national army has to contend with an insurgency. The wars fought by the fading colonial powers Britain and France to put down insurrections in the postwar period such as occurred in Palestine, Indochina, Malaya, Kenya, Algeria and others, are notable examples. These conflicts provided fertile breeding ground for a type of soldier immersed in the sort of strategies and tactics not imparted in many staff colleges of the time which focused on conventional warfare. And while the idea of unorthodox warfare was not invented during this period, the experience of fighting against miscellaneous national liberation movements while utilizing irregular methods of warfare brought about new theoretical constructs that began to reshape the thinking of many military staff colleges about the manner in which they trained their officers.

„Formen des Krieges 1600-1815“ ist der Titel der 2019 neu eröffneten Räume des Bayerischen Armeemuseums im Neuen Schloss Ingolstadt. Mit Stücken der Sammlung und einigen bedeutenden Leihgaben zeigen sie die Formen kriegerischer Gewalt in der Frühen Neuzeit. Schwerpunkte sind die Kämpfe auf freiem Feld in den großen Schlachten, die Belagerung und Verteidigung der Festungen und der so genannte Kleine Krieg, der im Umkreis der großen Auseinandersetzungen Land und Leute schwer belastete.
Das Buch bietet eine Einführung in das Thema und informiert über die Neugestaltung der Museumsräume. Alle ausgestellten Stücke sind in Bild und Text dokumentiert, zum großen Teil werden sie hier erstmals publiziert.

ABSTRACT in English (résumé en français ci-après):
This article (as all my other articles on Clausewitz) isn’t a discussion “around” the thoughts of Clausewitz, which would be first based on Clausewitz – an attractive name! – in order to speak thereafter in a prospective manner, as we see quite often. My article is an analysis focussed on what Clausewitz actually wrote in his lectures on the “kleinen Krieg” [I would say here “small war” to be short, even if I don’t like this translation]. The aim is, first, making a synthesis of the thoughts of Clausewitz on the relations between the “kleinen Krieg” and insurrectional wars; and, second, explaining the context of that days which underlain his thoughts, in order to better understand them: the context related to 1) the wars on which Clausewitz bases his speech, 2) the military culture of the officers of that days (and also the military culture of Clausewitz) and 3) the reflection of his time on the “kleinen Krieg” and on insurrectional wars.

Indeed, Prussia's military defeats in 1806 led in this country to a reflection on national defence, on the question of armed citizens, and on the “petite guerre” as the appropriate tactic for popular uprisings. The lecture upon the “petite guerre” that Clausewitz delivered at the War College in Berlin between 1810 and 1812 is part of this framework. Moreover, the Revolutionary War, which was an insurrection against the British homeland, is one of the examples Clausewitz did choose to feed his thinking, just like the Wars of the Vendée and the Tyrolean events during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars – which were other uprisings with insurrectional characteristics. In his lecture, Clausewitz doesn’t distinguish between the two words and the two realities of “petite guerre” and “guerrilla warfare”; however, he shows from time to time the particularities of the civil wars and of the wars with armed citizens. Our article studies the lecture on the “petite guerre” from Clausewitz with a new point of view, in order to point out the parts which are related to the popular wars and to the insurrections; indeed, as Raymond Aron expresses it, the thinking of Clausewitz has been built on watching how the extreme violence of passions could not be separated from people's wars.

RESUME en français :
Cet article (comme tous mes autres articles sur Clausewitz) n’est pas une discussion « autour » de la pensée de Clausewitz, qui partirait de Clausewitz – un nom porteur ! – pour parler de façon prospective, comme on le voit souvent. C’est une analyse centrée exclusivement sur ce que Clausewitz a écrit dans son "Cours sur la petite guerre". L’objectif est, premièrement, de saisir et de synthétiser la pensée de Clausewitz sur les rapports entre petite guerre et guerre insurrectionnelle ; et, deuxièmement, d’expliciter le contexte de l’époque qui a nourri cette réflexion, pour mieux la comprendre : le contexte concernant 1) les guerres sur lesquelles Clausewitz appuie son discours, 2) la culture militaire des officiers de ce temps (donc la sienne) et 3) la réflexion de son temps sur la petite guerre et la guerre insurrectionnelle.

Les défaites subies en 1806 engendrèrent en effet, en Prusse, une réflexion sur la défense nationale, sur l’armement du peuple, et sur la petite guerre comme tactique du peuple soulevé. Le « Cours sur la petite guerre » donné par Clausewitz à l’École supérieure de guerre de Berlin, entre 1810 et 1812, s’inscrit entres autres dans le fil de cette impulsion. Au reste, la guerre d’Indépendance américaine, insurrection contre la métropole anglaise, est au nombre des exemples choisis par Clausewitz pour alimenter sa réflexion, comme les guerres de Vendée et les épisodes tyroliens de la Révolution et de l’Empire, autres soulèvements à caractère insurrectionnel. Si Clausewitz n’opère pas pour ses auditeurs la distinction entre « petite guerre » et « guérilla », il pointe de temps à autre les particularismes des guerres civiles et des contextes guerriers avec armement du peuple. Cet article revisite le Cours sur la petite guerre de Clausewitz pour y relever la part redevable aux guerres populaires et aux insurrections, si tant est que, comme l’exprime Raymond Aron, la pensée de Clausewitz sur la guerre s’est construite en considérant le déchaînement des passions inhérent aux guerres populaires.

The climactic Battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE was the first major engagement between the Romans and Parthians. In the battle, the mobile Parthian army outmaneuvered and overwhelmed Crassus’ much larger force. There is a longstanding, recently restated scholarly tradition that this battle and the Parthians’ approach to it was anomalous; however, this article rejects the notion that the Parthians’ fought atypically at Carrhae. Instead, it investigates the Parthians’ unique tactical and strategic approach to warfare and its long tradition of success since the reign of Arsaces I in the mid-third century BCE. It also illustrates the Parthians’ implementation of their unique mode of warfare through a close consideration of the decisive events at Carrhae.

Note: Now published and available at Amazon: http://www.amazon.com/Desktop-Regulatory-State-Countervailing-Individuals/dp/1523275596/

The implosion of capital outlays associated with the desktop revolution, and the virtual disappearance of transaction costs of coordinating action associated with the network revolution, have (as Tom Coates has said) eliminated the gap between what can be produced within large hierarchical organizations and what can be produced at home in a wide range of industries:  software, publishing, music, education, and journalism among them.

The practical significance of this, which I develop in this book, is that many of the functions of government can be included in that list.  The central theme of this book is the potential for networked organization to constrain the exercise of power by large, hierarchical institutions in a way that once required the countervailing power of other large, hierarchical institutions.

Traditionally, the power of the large corporation was explained by the large amounts of capital required for manufacturing, broadcasting or publishing.  Such large amounts of capital meant that only the very rich, or a very large aggregation of rich people, could afford the outlays to undertake production, and that these people had to hire wage laborers to actually work the machinery for them.  Such outlays also required a large, hierarchical, bureaucratic institution to administer the plant and equipment.  And these large institutions, in turn, required other large institutions like regulatory agencies, big establishment unions, and the big establishment media, to act as watchdogs.

Unfortunately, despite Galbraith’s theory of countervailing power, in practice government agencies, corporations and media outlets tended to cluster together in complexes of allied institutions in which the ostensible regulators and regulated were actually on the same side.  Rather than the liberal “interest group pluralism” model implicit in Galbraith’s analysis, what we actually had was an interlocking Power Elite of the sort described by Mill and Domhoff.  The large size and small number of institutional actors, and the enormous entry barriers erected against ordinary people attempting to compete with them, made such a clustering of interests based on shared bureacuratic culture inevitable.

The desktop and digital revolution, the network revolution, and the forms of stigmergic organization that they make possible, together destroy the material basis for the old mass production/bureaucratic/broadcast model described above.  Instead — just as, in my previous book, I described the increasing ability of micromanufacturers with a few thousand dollars in capital to undertake forms of production previously requiring million-dollar factories — individually affordable capital goods for information production and network organization are leading to what John Robb calls “individual superempowerment.”  The individual increasingly has at her disposal the means of taking on large, powerful bureaucratic institutions as an equal.

Networked consumer, environmental and labor activism, with its ability to subject corporate malefactors to boycotts or tort actions, and to expose them to humiliating scrutiny, offers the potential to control and punish bad corporate behavior at least as well as did the regulatory state or the traditional press, and — insofar as they are not prone to the same sorts of cross-institutional collusion — to do an even better job of it.

This includes “culture jamming” of the sort employed by the McLibel defendants and by Frank Kernaghan against Kathie Lee Gifford.  It includes labor-led boycotts and information campaigns based on “open mouth sabotage” like those of the Imolakee Workers and the Wal-Mart Workers Association, and a whole host of online “employernamesucks.com” websites.  It includes targeted campaigns to embarrass such corporate malefactors in the eyes of their suppliers, outlets, major stakeholders, and labor and consumer interest organizations.  It includes networked activism through umbrella movements of labor, consumer and social justice organizations linked together for ad hoc single issue campaigns against a particular corporate criminal.  It includes efforts like Wikileaks to promote whistleblowing and provide secure platforms for circulating embarrassing information about corporate misbehavior.  It incorporates a large element of what John Keane calls “monitory democracy.”

Networked organization offers, as well, to supplant the regulatory state’s old licensing, authentication and quality certification functions.  If Consumer Reports was pithecanthropus in this evolutionary schema, and Angie’s List is homo erectus, then the future lies with full-blown networked civil societies, organized on a voluntary basis, providing a context within which secure commercial relationships and other forms of cooperation can take place.  The future of this model has been described variously as neo-Venetianism or phyles (fictionally in Stephenson’s The Diamond Age and non-fictionally in de Ugarte’s work), the Darknet in Suarez’s Freedom, and “economies as a social software service” by John Robb.

In short, networked activism offers to do to the state and the large corporation what the file-sharing movement has only begun to do to the record industry, and what Wikileaks has barely even begun to do to the U.S. national security community.

The Late Bronze Age ended with a bang in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean: palaces and empires collapsed, from Greece to Egypt; coastal territories were beset by pirates and marauders; migratory peoples were on the move across land and sea; and geopolitical lines were permanently redrawn – conditions reflected, in many ways, by the world portrayed in Homer’s Odyssey. The notorious ‘Sea Peoples,’ mysterious groups of warriors who were credited by the pharaoh Ramesses III with destroying empires across the Near East at this time, fit into this puzzle in some way, although their exact role continues to be hotly debated. In the Odyssey’s various subplots, Odysseus himself carries out activities that are that highly reminiscent of the Sea Peoples, as he engages in raids and skirmishes while circuitously making his way back from Troy. Though it is presented as a falsehood within Homer’s master narrative, one such subplot, the “Second Cretan Lie” (Odyssey xiv 191–359) is striking in its similarity to the experience of one specific Sea Peoples group, whom Egyptian pharaohs referred to as the "Sherden of the Sea", and whose seaborne attacks they claimed that “none could withstand.”
This book marshals documentary, pictorial, and material evidence to examine Odysseus’ Second Cretan Lie in the context of the Late Bronze–Iron Age transition, with particular emphasis on changes in the iconography of warriors and warfare, social and economic upheaval, and remarkable innovation in maritime technology and tactics. Particular focus is given the hero’s description of his frequent raiding activities, including an ill–fated attempt on the Nile Delta, and on his description of seven subsequent years spent in the land of the pharaohs, during which he claims to have gathered great wealth. Setting the evidence for the Sherden of the Sea against this Homeric narrative demonstrates not only that Odysseus’ Second Cretan Lie fits into the temporal framework of the Late Bronze–Early Iron Age transition, but that there were historical people who actually lived that which Odysseus falsely claims as his own experience.

Traditionally, Byzantium is said to have adopted a guerrilla strategy along its eastern frontier after the seventh century as a means of dealing with the superior forces of the Muslims. A tenth-century military manual attributed to the emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (r. 963 - 969) known as De Velitatione Bellica describes warfare in this manner, emphasizing tactics that minimize risk such as ambushes and indirect engagement. In its preface, the manual claims that since the danger of the Muslims has receded, the sort of tactics described within are no longer necessary but are nonetheless being recorded for posterity. This study examines this claim by looking at De Velitatione’s past and future by examining what evidence exists for the Byzantine-Muslim warfare taking place as the manual describes, and whether the text might have had any influence later. This is done through case studies of the eighth and eleventh centuries, which suggests that the tactics described in the manual have a long history in the Byzantine world and remained in use well after the manual claimed that they were antiquated.

This paper deals with the background, role players, sequence of events, geopolitical considerations and history of the Angolan War which took place from 1975 to 1990 between the Soviet Union and its allies & proxies on the one hand, and the Republic of South Africa and its allies on the other. It also has a section presenting a rebuttal of previously published material on this subject, and a section on disinformation techniques used in and by the Soviet Union.

Bu çalışma Soğuk Savaş’ın bitişiyle beraber değişen tehdit algısını ve bu tehditlere karşılık güvenlik kurumları için çözüm önerilerini incelemektedir. Yeni tehdit paradigması, yeni güvenlik paradigmalarını gündeme getirmiştir. Değişen kamu yönetimi anlayışıyla beraber stratejik yönetim ortaya çıkmış ve kamu veya özel sektör fark etmeksizin bütün örgütleri etkilemiştir. Değişime ayak uydurmak isteyen bütün örgütler, hayatta kalmak için bu değişimleri takip etmek ve sürekli gelişim içerisinde olmak zorunda kalmıştır.

Bu çalışmada stratejik yönetimin asimetrik tehditlerle mücadele için uygunluğu değerlendirilmiştir. Çalışmada şok edici, görünmeyen ve dinamik özellikler gösteren asimetrik tehditlerle mücadelede stratejik yönetimin uygun savunma ve engelleme mekanizmaları kurabilme olanağı araştırılmaktadır. Ayrıca stratejik yönetimin değişime vurgu yapan yönünün, güvenlik kurumlarına ve diğer örgütlere 21. yüzyılda ve gelecekte, asimetrik tehditler başta olmak üzere olası güvenlik sorunlarının önüne geçmede kazandırabileceği yeteneklerin incelenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Konunun daha iyi anlaşılması adına Türkiye’de stratejik yönetimi ilk uygulayan güvenlik kurumu olan Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü örnek olarak verilmiştir. Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü’nün hazırladığı stratejik planlarda, asimetrik tehditlerin niteliklerine dikkat çeken tespitlerde bulunulmuştur.

The state of conflict is a natural state of affairs, either between the individuals or between sovereign states. In any kind of conflict, power matters. Just like the one with a weapon is more likely to prevail over the unarmed, the military superpower is more likely to destroy the military dwarf. However, it is not impossible for the inferiors to prevail. The history of military confrontations is not lacking the examples when the inherently inferior forces managed to achieve victory over the superior. This happened regardless of the fact that the handicap of power between adversaries was assessed as 5:1. In this regard, the aim of this dissertation is to understand the logics behind the unexpected losses of the military superpowers when confronted with the deficient powers. Such losses are scrutinized through the prism of the asymmetric wars. The latter envisages analysis of the existing theories which intend to explain frequently ambiguous outcomes of the asymmetric wars. This thesis also aims to examine the modern notion of warfare and connect it to the existing theories of asymmetric conflicts. In the end, a suggestion on the essence of contemporary asymmetric wars has been made. The overall victory is predefined by a series of spatial victories in social psychological confrontation, where the support of people becomes the strategic resource.

Despite centuries of scholarship regarding Amerindian warfare, both academic and public narratives that address the European conquest of the Americas privilege the absolute and total conquest and subjugation of the American Indian. As such, the legitimate Amerindian role in the conquest of the New World empires has entered the fray, and this in large part is due to the academy’s failure to consider more fully the role of Indian militias and allies, or indios amigos. In those contexts where Indian militias are discussed, their role is generally treated as cursory, or in the case of Mexican nationalist narratives, as an utter betrayal of Amerindian self determination. In an effort to reassert the role of the Amerindian warrior in assuring self-autonomy and assuming defense against European forces throughout the Americas, this essay will address three primary themes. First, we introduce that pervasive mythology of conquest that reifies the wholesale destruction of the Amerindian past, and one defined solely in terms of its relevance to European triumphalism, and Amerindian subjugation, subordination, and cultural annihilation or extinction. Second, we address the implications of an ascendant body of new and revisionist scholarship that clearly chronicles and privileges the pervasive role of Amerindian militias and allied indigenous kingdoms in the authentic conquest of the Americas. Finally, we review a select sampling of those military engagements in which Amerindian forces won decisive military contests against European belligerents in the Americas. Ultimately, we contend that prevailing public and scholarly narratives that seek to pacify the Amerindian past are in effect predominantly Eurocentric creations that continue to tout an Amerindian past borne of little more than collective martyrology over substance and historical authenticity.

Cet article se veut un outil précis et fouillé à l’usage des chercheurs souhaitant approfondir le domaine de la petite guerre et des troupes légères (mise à jour, 2005).
Depuis un article d’André Martel paru dans la « Revue Historique » en 1971, la communauté des historiens militaires en France n’a cessé périodiquement de souligner jusqu’à nos jours – avec des approches actualisées – le renouveau de cette histoire militaire. L’intérêt pour la petite guerre s’inscrit dans ce mouvement. Il a été porté aussi par la réalité de beaucoup des conflits d’aujourd’hui, dits « de basse intensité », dans lesquels la tactique des troupes légères d’autrefois, alternative à la bataille, trouve son avatar contemporain. L’article attire d’abord l’attention sur la plus ou moins grande pertinence de l’emploi de l’expression de « petite guerre » dans l’historiographie, en français, en allemand et en anglais. Il procède ensuite à la généalogie de l’étude de la petite guerre à l’époque moderne (XVIe - XVIIIe siècles), en France et dans les mondes anglo-saxon et germanique. Il pointe enfin le problème du cloisonnement des travaux, entre les périodes historiques comme d’un pays à l’autre.

The Pentagon released a 9 page report concerning UFOs and UAPs at the end of June.  Given the brevity of the unclassified version I felt the need to issue my own.

Aviation and defense related technology on our planet has advanced to the point internationally where a whole new set of considerations need to be applied to our monitoring and investigations of unexplained aerial phenomenon.  The way things are currently it looks like we'll all have to take more of a Ground Observer Corps approach to the subject while keeping up on the latest technical developments.

Now that the US Congress has recognized the importance of these issues it is hoped that these matters discussed will now be treated with the seriousness that they deserve.

The published Counterpunch version of my 10 February 2016 article "Dugins Occult Fascism and the Hijacking of Left Anti Imperialism and Muslim Anti Salafism" http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/02/10/dugins-occult-fascism-and-the-hijacking-of-left-anti-imperialism-and-muslim-anti-salafism/