Defense acquisition

A plug fest is an industry best practice for demonstrating information technology (IT) interoperability in a particular enterprise. Participants earn market share by proving to customers that modular vendor offerings add value out of the box while meeting architecture standards and specifications. The ability to share data effectively across distributed nodes with rapidly evolving state-of-the-art commercial information technology is a key netcentric goal of the defense community. However, the defense acquisition process has had little success achieving that goal for at least two reasons: acquisition strategies do not incentivize horizontal interoperability, and existing command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) IT infrastructure is not sufficient to support the most critical and demanding tactical edge scenarios. The Defense Enterprise will close these gaps by working with like-minded government organizations and commercial consortia to establish an open government-industry community incentivized to address them pragmatically. This community is working with the military operational community to expose critical tactical use cases. It will also continuously evolve open standards that leverage COTS IT; address military-specific requirements; and demonstrate value added, interoperability, and security in runtime. The Government will reduce bureaucratic barriers to implementing these components with demonstrated capabilities via proven approaches such as approved product lists (APL) and convenient pre-negotiated contract vehicles.

Past efforts to reform defense acquisition have been based in New Public Management assumptions that certain attributes of program managers (PMs), such as their training and experience levels, are important for improving outcomes. This article documents an effort to examine the relationship between such PM attributes and program outcomes using data drawn from annual Department of Defense Selected Acquisition Reports for major defense acquisition programs between 1997 and 2010. The findings provide little support for these assumptions. They point instead to the potential for institutionalist theories to explain acquisition outcomes, which can enable more nuanced reform policies in the future.

Acquisition efforts for complex human-machine systems have all too often treated training as an after thought even though training is often expected to accommodate for system performance shortfalls. By incorporating the identification of training requirements early during the system acquisition process and by conducting comprehensive Human Systems Integration (HSI) trade-off analyses, Program Managers can realize two important benefits. First, systems engineers will acquire a fuller understanding of the system's operation and a better interface with system users will be achieved. Second, and most importantly, any adverse impact due to training (e.g., long, costly training pipelines) that may influence system life-cycle cost and performance can be addressed early in the overall system design process.

Academic debate in security and strategic studies over the past two decades has focused overwhelmingly on understanding changes to the security environment and their impact on the strategy and conduct of contemporary wars. Nowhere is this more obvious than with the wars fought by Western armies following the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11). Discussions between academics covered even the most detailed (grand) strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of contemporary war, from the very general to the very specific levels; all but one. The supply of military operations since the end of the Cold War is virtually absent from these debates, despite the central relevance of military logistics for every aspect of military operations, including and particularly for strategy. 1 In effect, the academic literature routinely ignores a pivotal component of war which, on the one hand, is the arbiter of strategic opportunity, 2 and which, on the other hand, is heavily determined by strategic and operational planning. The only area of the supply of war that receives substantial attention is the development of weapon systems and technology in the context of the defence industrial base. 3 Yet even here, the focus is on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the modernisation and globalisation of the defence industry,

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of cost escalation in transportation infrastructure projects. Based on a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth US$90 billion and representing different project types, geographical regions, and historical periods, it is found with overwhelming statistical significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether such projects should be built are highly and systematically misleading. Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic misrepresentation, that is, lying. The policy implications are clear: legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts.

Megaproject Planning and Management: Essential Readings contains the seminal articles from the growing body of research on megaproject planning and management along with an original introduction by the editor, Bent Flyvbjerg. The leading and most cited authority in the field, Flyvbjerg has used crowdsourcing and 25 years of experience to cherry-pick from several hundred articles and books the writings that define the field. This volume will be an indispensable source for those wishing to speak with authority about how megaprojects are prepared, delivered, and fought over. The target audience is students, academics, practitioners, and media pundits alike, as well as communities affected by megaprojects.

Back cover text: Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon of megaprojects. It is a fascinating account of how the promoters of multi-billion dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get projects approved and built. It shows, in unusual depth, how the formula for approval is an unhealthy cocktail of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects. This results in projects that are extremely risky, but where the risk is concealed from MPs, taxpayers and investors. The authors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions drawing on theory, experience and hard, scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations and five continents that illustrate the book. Accessibly written, it will be the standard reference for students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians and interested citizens for many years to come.

The article first describes characteristics of major infrastructure projects. Second, it documents a much neglected topic in economics: that ex ante estimates of costs and benefits are often very different from actual ex post costs and benefits. For large infrastructure projects the consequences are cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and the systematic underestimation of risks. Third, implications for cost–benefit analysis are described, including that such analysis is not to be trusted for major infrastructure projects. Fourth, the article uncovers the causes of this state of affairs in terms of perverse incentives that encourage promoters to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits in the business cases for their projects. But the projects that are made to look best on paper are the projects that amass the highest cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in reality. The article depicts this situation as ‘survival of the unfittest’. Fifth, the article sets out to explain how the problem may be solved, with a view to arriving at more efficient and more democratic projects, and avoiding the scandals that often accompany major infrastructure investments. Finally, the article identifies current trends in major infrastructure development. It is argued that a rapid increase in stimulus spending, combined with more investments in emerging economies, combined with more spending on information technology is catapulting infrastructure investment from the frying pan into the fire.

This research provides a critical analysis of Turkey's defense procurement behavior since 1923. The main goal behind focusing on such a long period is to find out the differences and sources of change behind the Turkey's behavior and ideas that justified certain set of behavior. However, mainstream approaches – Defense Economics, Politics of Defense and Political Economy Defense – do not provide necessary tools for such a historical analysis mainly because they are problem solving theories that operate within system that arises at certain historical moment. Furthermore, these theories, although having different focus points, operate within the liberal political economy, which assumes economics and politics are separate spheres and share various assumptions. Consequently, to address limitation of existing theories, this research adopts Gramscian historical materialism and develops Gramscian defense procurement theory. The research focuses on how hegemony is established, maintained and spread among different communities and how interaction between hegemonic structures reflect upon defense procurement behavior. Through application of such theoretical framework, the history of Turkey's defense procurement behavior is examined in three different periods (1923-1945, 1945-1980 and 1980-2013) where international structure showed different characteristics in terms of form of production, ideas and institutions as well as historical blocs and rivalry between blocs. The main argument of this research is that Turkey's defense procurement behavior is shaped the level of integration of structure in Turkey to the hegemonic structure at the international level. Consequently, defense procurement decision are taken within the boundaries of the structure.

Anggaran pertahanan Indonesia terus berfluktuasi. Hal ini
berpengaruh terhadap roda diplomasinya, khususnya di bidang
pertahanan. Fluktuasi anggaran pertahanan kerapkali dikaitkan dengan
pertumbuhan ekonomi. Indonesia mengalami dinamika GDP pada periode
2009—2014. Dinamika ini memengaruhi diplomasi Indonesia, khususnya
dalam kerja sama dengan Korea Selatan yang diprakarsai sejak tahun
2009. Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini mengangkat rumusan masalah yang
dituangkan dalam satu pertanyaan penelitian utama, yaitu bagaimana
anggaran pertahanan mendinamisasi diplomasi pertahanan dalam Joint
Development KFX/IFX, khususnya pada periode 2009—2014?

As megaprojects have become ubiquitous, their real benefits and costs have come under increased scrutiny. We interviewed Bent Flyvbjerg, who has extensively studied megaproject development. Flyvbjerg has found systematic problems in the development process: by intentionally misrepresenting information and deliberately disregarding risks, proponents instigate projects that result in fewer benefits and higher costs than promised.

The Supplementary Green Book Guidance on Optimism Bias (HM Treasury 2003) with reference to the Review of Large Public Procurement in the UK (Mott MacDonald 2002) notes that there is a demonstrated, systematic, tendency for project appraisers to be overly optimistic and that to redress this tendency appraisers should make explicit, empirically based adjustments to the estimates of a project’s costs, benefits, and duration. HM Treasury recommends that these adjustments be based on data from past projects or similar projects elsewhere, and adjusted for the unique characteristics of the project in hand. In the absence of a more specific evidence base, HM Treasury has encouraged departments to collect data to inform future estimates of optimism, and in the meantime use the best available data. In response to this, the Department for Transport (henceforth DfT), has contracted Bent Flyvbjerg in association with COWI to undertake the consultancy assignment "Procedures for dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning". The present Guidance Document is the result of this assignment.

"Over budget, over time, over and over again" appears to be an appropriate slogan for large, complex infrastructure projects. This article explains why cost, benefits, and time forecasts for such projects are systematically over-optimistic in the planning phase. The underlying reasons for forecasting errors are grouped into three categories: delusions or honest mistakes; deceptions or strategic manipulation of information or processes; or bad luck. Delusion and deception have each been addressed in the management literature before, but here they are jointly considered for the first time. They are specifically applied to infrastructure problems in a manner that allows both academics and practitioners to understand and implement the suggested corrective procedures. The article provides a framework for analyzing the relative explanatory power of delusion and deception. It also suggests a simplified framework for analyzing the complex principal-agent relationships that are involved in the approval and construction of large infrastructure projects, which can be used to improve forecasts. Finally, the article illustrates reference class forecasting, an outside view de-biasing technique that has proven successful in overcoming both delusion and deception in private and public investment decisions.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of traffic forecasts in transportation infrastructure projects. The sample used is the largest of its kind, covering 210 projects in 14 nations worth U.S.$59 billion. The study shows with very high statistical significance that forecasters generally do a poor job of estimating the demand for transportation infrastructure projects. For 9 out of 10 rail projects, passenger forecasts are overestimated; the average overestimation is 106%. For half of all road projects, the difference between actual and forecasted traffic is more than ±20%. The result is substantial financial risks, which are typically ignored or downplayed by planners and decision makers to the detriment of social and economic welfare. Our data also show that forecasts have not become more accurate over the 30-year period studied, despite claims to the contrary by forecasters. The causes of inaccuracy in forecasts are different for rail and road projects, with political causes playing a larger role for rail than for road. The cure is transparency, accountability, and new forecasting methods. The challenge is to change the governance structures for forecasting and project development. Our article shows how planners may help achieve this.

Do different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns? This apparently simple question is at the heart of research at the University of Oxford aimed at understanding the characteristics of megaprojects, particularly in terms of how they are established, run and concluded. In this study, we set out to investigate cost overruns in the Olympic Games. To do so, we examined the costs of the Games over half a century, including both summer and winter Olympics. We looked at the evolution of final reported costs and compared these to the costs established in the Games bids, submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) up to seven years before the Games occurred. In so doing we established the largest dataset of its kind, and documented for the first time in a consistent fashion the costs and cost overruns for the Olympic Games, from 1960 to 2012. We discovered that the Games stand out in two distinct ways compared to other megaprojects: (1) The Games overrun with 100 per cent consistency. No other type of megaproject is this consistent regarding cost overrun. Other project types are typically on budget from time to time, but not the Olympics. (2) With an average cost overrun in real terms of 179 per cent – and 324 per cent in nominal terms – overruns in the Games have historically been significantly larger than for other types of megaprojects, including infrastructure, construction, ICT, and dams. The data thus show that for a city and nation to decide to host the Olympic Games is to take on one of the most financially risky type of megaproject that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril. For the London 2012 Games, we find that: (1) With sports-related real costs currently estimated at USD14.8 billion, London is on track to become the most costly Olympics ever. (2) With a projected cost overrun of 101 per cent in real terms, overrun for London is below the historical average for the Games, but not significantly so. (3) The London cost overrun is, however, significantly higher than overruns for recent Games since 1999. London therefore is reversing a positive trend of falling cost overruns for the Games.

As megaprojects have become ubiquitous, their real benefits and costs have come under increased scrutiny. We interviewed Bent Flyvbjerg, who has extensively studied megaproject development. Flyvbjerg has found systematic problems in the development process: by intentionally misrepresenting information and deliberately disregarding risks, proponents instigate projects that result in fewer benefits and higher costs than promised.

Back cover text: This book aims to enlarge the understanding of decision-making on mega-projects and suggest recommendations for a more effective, efficient and democratic approach. Authors from different scientific disciplines address various aspects of the decision-making process, such as management characteristics and cost-benefit analysis, planning and innovation and competition and institutions. The subject matter is highly diverse, but certain questions remain at the forefront. For example, how do we deal with protracted preparation processes, how do we tackle risks and uncertainties, and how can we best divide the risks and responsibilities among the private and public players throughout the different phases of the project? - Presenting a state-of-the-art overview, based on experiences and visions of authors from Europe and North America, this unique book will be of interest to practitioners of large-scale project management, politicians, public officials and private organisations involved in mega-project decision-making. It will also appeal to researchers, consultants and students dealing with substantial engineering projects, complex systems, project management and transport infrastructure.

Orang boleh bilang apa saja tentang kinerja Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) selama hampir 10 tahun masa pemerintahannya. Tetapi, yang tak terduga dan tak banyak dibahas para pengamat politik, SBY tampaknya akan mewariskan industri pertahanan nasional yang mulai bangkit lagi. Industri pertahanan ini awalnya sudah dirintis, sebagai bagian dari industri strategis, oleh Menteri Negara Riset dan Teknologi BJ Habibie di bawah pemerintahan Presiden Soeharto.

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large infrastructure projects. First, it identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure development pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is massive cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, the paper explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and funding. This results in the "survival of the unfittest," where often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, the paper presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large infrastructure projects, with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance structures, the latter being more important.

The "other" in "other transactions" authority (OTA) for prototyping projects, means not subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulations.  This is a powerful tool that Congress has recently made even more powerful.  USAF is applying OTA for prototyping projects in a number of forward leaning acquisition initiatives.  This paper is a draft "how to" guide.  Looking for feedback before publishing.

Risk, including economic risk, is increasingly a concern for public policy and management. The possibility of dealing effectively with risk is hampered, however, by lack of a sound empirical basis for risk assessment and management. This article demonstrates the general point for cost and demand risks in urban rail projects. The article presents empirical evidence that allow valid economic risk assessment and management of urban rail projects, including benchmarking of individual or groups of projects. Benchmarking of the Copenhagen Metro is presented as a case in point. The approach developed is proposed as a model for other types of policies and projects in order to improve economic and financial risk assessment and management in policy and planning.

Out-of-control information technology (IT) projects have ended the careers of top managers, such as EADS CEO Noël Forgeard and Levi Strauss’ CIO David Bergen. Moreover, IT projects have brought down whole companies, like Kmart in the US and Auto Windscreen in the UK. Software and other IT is now such an integral part of most business processes and products that CEOs must know their IT risks, which are typically substantial – and overlooked. The analysis of a sample of 1,471 IT projects showed that the average cost overrun was 27% — but that figure masks a far more alarming “fat tail” risk.  Fully one in six of the projects in the sample was a Black Swan, with a cost overrun of 200%, on average, and a schedule overrun of almost 70%. This highlights the true pitfall of IT change initiatives: It’s not that they’re particularly prone to high cost overruns on average – it is that there are a disproportionate number of Black Swans. By focusing on averages instead of the more damaging outliers, most managers and consultants have been missing the real risk in doing IT. In conclusion, the article outlines ideas as to what can be done to avoid Black Swans.

2008. 352 pp. r150.00 (hardcover). This volume is intended to explain why major investment projects (the so-called mega-projects) often are not completed on time and cost more than originally budgeted. Drawing from experiences of European and North American countries, the book also suggests ways to avoid such failures. Although the topic is rather specific, the book is worth reading for both experts and nonexperts as infrastructure development continues to be a major key to economic expansion across the globe.g row_486 380.. 408 For those who only have a vague idea of what a mega-project is, the book begins by introducing the topic and reviewing the most important recent literature. The first part of the volume, then, provides numerous insights on the complexity of mega-projects, starting from the large number of reasons why mega-projects might fail. For example, the project might be "underdesigned," thus less costly but less robust to unforeseen developments, or it might be "overdesigned," when a large number of weaknesses and possible problems are considered in advance, and solutions are evaluated before the problem actually occurs. Overdesigned projects are more robust, less likely to fail, but are much more costly. The project might involve the use of innovative technologies that have never been applied to a similar context, and that involve more uncertain implementation costs and results. Most projects have an impact on the environment and might face opposition for example from environmentalist groups. If representative of these groups have not been directly involved in the design of the project, they might try to stop it, thus causing delays and increasing costs. Finally, because of incorrect predictions of 380 GROWTH AND CHANGE, JUNE 2009

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects. First, it identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure developments pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, it explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not those of their competition, that gain approval and funding. This results in the ‘survival of the unfittest’, in which often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, it presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance structures, the latter being more important.

A major source of risk in project management is inaccurate forecasts of project costs, demand, and other impacts. The paper presents a promising new approach to mitigating such risk, based on theories of decision making under uncertainty which won the 2002 Nobel prize in economics. First, the paper documents inaccuracy and risk in project management. Second, it explains inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Third, the theoretical basis is presented for a promising new method called "reference class forecasting," which achieves accuracy by basing forecasts on actual performance in a reference class of comparable projects and thereby bypassing both optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Fourth, the paper presents the first instance of practical reference class forecasting, which concerns cost forecasts for large transportation infrastructure projects. Finally, potentials for and barriers to reference class forecasting are assessed.

Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman must be commended for their clear identification of causes and cures to the planning fallacy in “Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives’ Decisions” (July 2003). Their look at overoptimism, anchoring, competitor neglect, and the outside view in forecasting is highly useful to executives and forecasters. However, Lovallo and Kahneman underrate one source of bias in forecasting—the deliberate “cooking” of forecasts to get ventures started. My colleagues and I call this the Machiavelli factor.

Results from the first statistically significant study of the causes of cost escalation in transport infrastructure projects are presented. The study is based on a sample of 258 rail, bridge, tunnel and road projects worth US$90 billion. The focus is on the dependence of cost escalation on: (1) the length of the project‐implementation phase, (2) the size of the project and (3) the type of project ownership. First, it was found, with very high statistical significance, that cost escalation was strongly dependent on the length of the implementation phase. The policy implications are clear: decision‐makers and planners should be highly concerned about delays and long implementation phases because they translate into risks of substantial cost escalations. Second, projects have grown larger over time, and for bridges and tunnels larger projects have larger percentage cost escalations. Finally, by comparing the cost escalation for three types of project ownership - private, state‐owned enterprise and other public ownership - it was shown that the oft‐seen claim that public ownership is problematic and private ownership effective in curbing cost escalation is an oversimplification. The type of accountability appears to matter more to cost escalation than type of ownership.

The F-35 was originally conceived as a multirole air superiority/ strike aircraft capable of operating in self-contained formations, or alone, into hostile airspace. As its development proceeded, however, it proved extremely difficult to overcome the trade-off between low observability, and range and weapons payload. This had a significant impact on the evolution of debates on concepts of operations, leading to a consensus over employing the aircraft as a decentralised node for command & control rather than as originally envisioned. Consequently, requirements for its integration into existing force structures among the programme's partners have not only changed, but have become more demanding and complex, prompting the need to rethink existing defence acquisition organisation and models. keywords

One of many issues associated with the flawed Defense acquisition process, including especially with respect to information systems, is the contracting process.  "Other Transactions" Agreements are designed for experimentation.  The USAF Open System Acquisition initiative is using consortium-type OTAs to experimentally develop more efficient and effective procurement methods.

This paper explores how theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may be used to conduct quality control and due diligence in project management. First, a much-neglected issue in project management is identified, namely that the front-end estimates of costs and benefits – used in the business cases, cost-benefit analyses, and social and environmental impact assessments that typically support decisions on projects – are typically significantly different from actual ex post costs and benefits, and are therefore poor predictors of the actual value and viability of projects. Second, it is discussed how Kahneman and Tversky’s theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may help explain and remedy this situation through quality control of decisions. Third, it is described what quality control and due diligence are in the context of project management, and an eight-step procedure is outlined for due diligence based on the outside view. Fourth, the procedure is tested on a real-life, multibillion-dollar project, organized as a public-private partnership. Finally, Akerlof and Shiller’s recent discussion in economics of “firing the forecaster” is discussed together with its relevance to project management. In sum, the paper demonstrates the need, the theoretical basis, a practical methodology, and a real-life example for how to de-bias project management using quality control and due diligence based on the outside view.

We kidded ourselves for a while that Star Wars had gone away. We pretended that flower power was winning. But in our heart of hearts, in our 3 a.m. nightmares, we knew that no toy of destruction, once conceived of, has ever been left to rest. Like Mordor's ninth ring of power*, hidden forever deep in a dark river beneath a mountain, some Gollum was sure to chance upon it, and once set free it would again corrupt all who carelessly picked it up; (*J.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings). Below is a computer engineer's report on the technical viability of Star Wars I, circa 1986. Judge for yourself how relevant it is to Star Wars II, millennium edition...

Standards, like MIL-STD-810F and RTCA/DO-160D, have been developed to provide manufacturers of military and commercial vehicles with guidelines for acceptable equipment vibration levels. Design engineers use these standards as guidelines for the development, integration, testing, and installation of new equipment. The main purpose of using these standards is to provide guidelines for ensuring that the equipment functions
normally when exposed to vibration and shock within the integrated system. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) ruggedized portable computers are pre-tested for compliance with these standards; however, re-testing is also needed when mechanical or electrical components are added or modified for installation.

This paper discusses the vibration issues that need to be considered when designing computer equipment for installation on a commercial aircraft, based on the aforementioned standards. A case study is included which provides details of lessons learned during the installation of a COTS ruggedized portable computer on C-5 Aircraft where failures due to vibration did occur.

This study analyzes the practices of acquisition of defense technologies in the United States (U.S.) and Brazil. The first objective is to elucidate the processes adopted by both countries in order to produce conclusions to improve the generation of science and technology in Brazil (especially with dual use – civilian and military). The second objective of this study is to propose a model of generation of science and technology through National Defense to Brazil, respecting the history of the country and its objectives, expressed in its National Defense Strategy and National Defense Policy. The cutting is from the advent of the Second World War (1st September, 1939) to the present. The methodologies are: review of the academic literature, analysis of practices of generation of technologies based on Defense, budget data comparison and verification of acquisition processes in both countries. In the conclusions we propose a model to produce dual use innovations in Brazil, through cooperation between government and military with industries and universities. The research was conducted in both countries, with a first analysis produced at Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and a second part developed at Harvard University, USA (with a full scholarship from Government of Brazil/CAPES and Lemann Foundation).

Keywords: Military-industrial-academic complex. Production of science and technology through National Defense. Defense Industrial Base. Models of military acquisition of dual use technologies. Processes and practices of military innovation in the United States and Brazil. Triple Helix: government, industries and universities.

Niniejszy rozdział stanowi analizę polityki zbrojeniowej Stanów Zjednoczonych oraz kondycji amerykańskiego przemysłu obronnego w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku. Pierwsza część dotyczy lat wcześniejszych i stanowi swego rodzaju wprowadzenie do właściwej analizy tematu w drugim i trzecim fragmencie, podzielonych na dwa podokresy. Ostatnia zaś odnosi się do najnowszych wydarzeń w omawianej kwestii oraz jest próbą wskazania możliwych scenariuszy dla amerykańskich zbrojeń.

As it is pointed out in a previous document published by Shaffer [1] technology growth is a non-linear process whereas acquisition path remains linear. Therefore, a need for defense acquisition transformation is emphasized in many current reports and studies in order to avoid problems related to acquisition process [2, 3, 4]. Within that scope, major efforts such as the Act No. 3238 have led to improvements in the defense acquisition in Turkey. However, it is also seen that many of the key reforms have not been sufficiently implemented. In order to implement acquisition reforms successfully, addressing the properly trained and qualified workforce gains significance. This study aims to present both current and envisioned defense acquisition process in Turkey in a comparative manner and to discuss necessary methods and precautions to improve this process. In order to present that, current legal procurement documents of Turkish Defense Industry and academic publishing related to this f...

As it is pointed out in a previous document published by Shaffer [1] technology growth is a non-linear process whereas acquisition path remains linear. Therefore, a need for defense acquisition transformation is emphasized in many current reports and studies in order to avoid problems related to acquisition process [2, 3, 4]. Within that scope, major efforts such as the Act No. 3238 have led to improvements in the defense acquisition in Turkey. However, it is also seen that many of the key reforms have not been sufficiently implemented. In order to implement acquisition reforms successfully, addressing the properly trained and qualified workforce gains significance. This study aims to present both current and envisioned defense acquisition process in Turkey in a comparative manner and to discuss necessary methods and precautions to improve this process. In order to present that, current legal procurement documents of Turkish Defense Industry and academic publishing related to this f...

A percepção de um sistema de aquisição de defesa pouco eficiente e a necessidade de se ter prontidão para combate em um mundo com ameaças transnacionais em recrudescimento motivou as administrações britânicas mais recentes a remodelar o seu sistema de aquisição de defesa. A formalização de dois documentos principais concernentes a esse tema, o Acquisition System Operating Model (ASOM) e o Acquisition System Handbook (ASH) formaram uma base sólida em busca de responsabilidades mais claras e imputabilidade dos agentes envolvidos no sistema. Com as novas iniciativas voltadas ao aprimoramento do Sistema, foi formada a Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S), agência do governo britânico, focada em equipar e apoiar as Forças Armadas do Reino Unido nas operações imediatas e futuras. Considerando a importância do sistema de aquisição, esse trabalho buscou traçar um panorama sobre a recente reforma do Sistema de Aquisição de Defesa do Reino Unido, objetivando-se verificar o seu papel estratégico dentro do Sistema de Defesa do Reino Unido.