Private military contractors

While the hiring of Private Security Companies (PSCs) such as Blackwater by the United States (US) has been the most widely reported and debated, the European Union (EU) and its member states are increasingly relying on private contractors in multilateral operations. Among others, the EU has employed private security guards to protect the EUPOL headquarters in Afghanistan, to secure the premises of the EULEX mission in Kosovo and to guard the EUPOL mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo). Due to the growing roles of PSCs in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations, the EU and its member states urgently need to consider the possible impact that armed and unarmed security contractors can have on missions and the achievement of mission objectives. This report demonstrates that potential negative effects range from decreased democratic accountability and governmental control to the perceptions of contractor impunity and insecurity among the civilian populations of host states. There is no catch-all solution to these problems, and for many governments the advantages of hiring private security contractors, such as the ability to fill urgent capability and personnel gaps, cost-efficiency and specialist expertise, outweigh the disadvantages. Given the current financial and personnel constraints in Europe, it is likely that the use of PSCs will further increase. It is therefore imperative to develop appropriate mechanisms to address the possible problems of such use before they occur. This report develops five specific recommendations for EU action that would help address risks associated with the increasing use of Private Military and Security Companies.

Изучена практика привлечения отдельными государствами частных военных и охранных компаний для участия в вооруженных конфликтах. Отмечены недостатки в связи с отсутствием механизмов регулирования их деятельности на международном уровне. Исследованы различные подходы к определению понятия «частные военные и охранные компании», предложено авторское определение. Сформулирован перечень услуг, которые могут быть оказаны такими компаниями. Ключевые слова: частные военные и охранные компании, вооруженные конфликты, государства, ООН, международное гуманитарное право Участие частных военных и охранных компаний (далее – ЧВОК) в вооруженных конфликтах зачастую приводит к нарушениям прав человека, и лишь в единичных случаях сотрудники ЧВОК несут юридическую ответственность за их совершение. Государства за редким исключением привлекают компании и их персонал к ответственности ввиду отсутствия правовых механизмов на национальном уровне. Сложившаяся практика вызвала обоснованное беспокойство по поводу соблюдения норм международного права в случаях участия ЧВОК в вооруженных конфликтах. Межправительственная рабочая группа ООН открытого состава по рассмотрению возможности создания международной нормативной базы для регулирования, мониторинга и контроля деятельности частных военных и охранных компаний (далее – Рабочая группа ООН) после изучения практики государств по взаимодействию с ЧВОК предложила принять на международном уровне юридически обязательный документ по данному вопросу. За последние годы практика передачи на исполнение некоторых государственных функций частным военным и охранным компаниям приобрела широкое распространение. Сотрудники ЧВОК предоставляют заказчикам различный спектр услуг от логистики до непосредственного участия в военных действиях. В качестве заказчиков услуг, как правило, выступают государства, международные организации и транснациональные

This chapter provides a policy-based reading of the drivers, processes, and long-term ramifications of the outsourcing of military support services that has thus far been all but absent from the literature. Military support services represent the vast majority of contracts let by the military, so that the findings arrived at here are seen to be representative for the broader issue of military contractorisation. Focusing on the USA and the UK, the chapter will 1) identify the structural, contextual factors that frame defence services acquisition, 2) map the defence services acquisition “policy network”, and 3) identify a systemic bias towards contractorisation. Based on these findings, the chapter will 4) conclude with an outlook over the future of military contractorisation within the political context identified earlier.

The outsourcing of military and security services is the object of intense legal debate. States employ private military and security companies (PMSCs) to perform functions previously exercised by regular armed forces, and increasingly international organisations, NGOs and business corporations do the same to provide security, particularly in crisis situations. Much of the public attention on PMSCs has been in response to incidents in which PMSC employees have been accused of violating international humanitarian law. Therefore initiatives have been launched to introduce uniform international standards amidst what is currently very uneven national regulation. This book analyses and discusses the interplay between international, European, and domestic regulatory measures in the field of PMSCs. It presents a comprehensive assessment of the existing domestic legislation in EU Member States and relevant Third States, and identifies implications for future international regulation. The book also addresses the crucial questions whether and how the EU can potentially play a more active future role in the regulation of PMSCs to ensure compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law.

The trend towards privatization of security, ranging from the provision of logistics and supply to the utilization of armed units, has spread across democratic states since the 1990s. This article examines the Dutch Government's anti-piracy policies, specifically regarding the use of Private Military Security Companies (PMSCs) to protect Dutch merchant shipping in the Horn of Africa region. The regulation and legal status of Private Military Security Companies, and their role in terms of meeting national security goals, are still being resolved at both the national and international levels, although a patchwork normative regime is emerging. In the Dutch case, legal issues, commercial interests, and the State's ability to protect its nationals all play a role. However, this article focuses on the Ministry of Defence's wish to protect the primary role of the armed forces, and the aim more generally to maintain full jurisdiction over and claim on the monopoly of the use of ...

Lors d'une audience au Congrès américain le 2 octobre 2007, faisant suite à la fusillade de la place Nisour (Bagdad) du 16 septembre 2007, au cours de laquelle des employés de Blackwater firent 17 morts irakiens, le démocrate John Tierney cita l'opinion d'un certain nombre de spécialistes de la doctrine de contre-insurrection sur les SMP. Il fit ainsi dire à Peter Mansoor : « S'ils perturbent la circulation ou tirent sur une voiture qui semble suspecte, ils opèrent peut-être dans les règles de leur contrat, mais au détriment du but de la mission, qui est de rallier les gens à notre cause. » Il cita ensuite Ralph Peters : « les contractuels armés nuisent en effet aux efforts contre-insurrectionnels. Vous n'avez

During the last few years, some donor countries (especially the US and the UK) have been increasingly outsourcing services in post-conflict operations to international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and private military and security companies (PMSCs). These states have also adopted ‘integrated approaches’ to their policy interventions, contributing to the emergence of an ‘aid and security market’. The article uses ideas from both development and defence studies and re-problematises the contracting states’ relationship with PMSCs and INGOs. It argues that although INGOs and PMSCs are very different types of non-state actors, there are striking similarities in outsourcing practices. Moreover, it demonstrates that the leading contracting states have poorly managed their contracts with both INGOs and PMSCs, and have not seriously reflected on the unintended consequences of their contracting practices on the recovery of war-affected countries.

The U.S. national military hires private security companies (PSCs) to operate in zones of conflict. This article introduces the concept of a legitimacy transfer mechanism to answer the question of how nonnational providers of military support can be considered legitimate actors in areas of conflict. PSCs borrow legitimacy from the state that contracts the firm. Private firms do not operate alone; they are hired and, at least marginally, directed by a state. By using the established legitimacy of industrialized states, these firms are able to find legitimacy in Western security culture. To maintain future business, private security is forced to obey the security culture of the hiring state. More so, the firm will mimic the goals and policy of the hiring state in an attempt to build its own, independent, sense of legitimacy.

El ejército de los Estados Unidos contrata compañias de seguridad privada (PSCs por sus siglas en inglés) para operar en zonas de conflicto. En este artículo se introduce el concepto de un mecanismo de transferencia de legitimidad para responder a la pregunta de cómo proveedores no gubernamentales de apoyo militar pueden ser considerados actores legítimos en zonas de conflicto. Las compañías de seguridad privada toman prestada legitimidad del Estado que contrata la empresa. Las empresas privadas no operan por si solas; éstas son contratadas y, de cierta forma, dirigidas por un estado. A través de la legitimidad ya establecida de los estados industrializados estas compañias son capaces de encontrar legitimidad en la cultura de seguridad occidental. Con el fin de mantener el negocios futuros, la seguridad privada se ve obligada a obedecer la cultura de la seguridad del estado que la ha contradado. Más aún, la compañía adoptará la política y objetivos del estado que la ha contradado, esto con el fin de construir un sentido propio e independiente de legitimidad.

Private Military Companies (PMCs) such as Blackwater Worldwide provide significant support to traditional military forces in the field. PMCs provide logistic support, operational and training for their clients. While PMC contractors are civilians, they may support of active operations and use armed force to complete their tasks or in self defense. Because they often fall under other regulations and ultimately outside of the traditional chain of command, PMCs generally have a poor reputation among the professional soldiers they serve beside. This paper is about the PMC industry and need for risk management, specifically the use of the triple bottom line as a holistic approach to risk management for a company that operates within an industry that is characterized by a high degree of uncertainly and physical danger, coupled with immediate global visibility. Using the triple bottom line, this paper will review the PMC industry with emphasis on examination of current issues, assess potential areas of risk associated with the industry and provide recommendations for optimization of the company's operations.

Московский государственный институт международных отношений (университет) МИД России. Россия, 119454, Москва, проспект Вернадского, 76 Динамика современных мировых процессов диктует неоднородность среды международной безопасности, включающей в себя как государственных, так и негосударственных акторов, причём правовой статус некоторых негосударственных акторов не всегда чётко определён. 5 Возникновение новых акторов или их быстрая трансформация и переход от прежних форм активности к новым зачастую опережают политико-правовую оценку характера их деятельности, а также степень и возможные последствия подобного воздействия на международные процессы. Государства и международные организации, представители бизнеса и неправительственные организации всё чаще пользуются услугами частных акторов в сфере безопасности. Традиционные методы государственного насилия пополняются нетрадиционными формами, меняя отношение к насилию в обществе вообще. 5 Иногда эффективность негосударственных акторов и скорость оказания ими услуг в сфере безопасности превышает профессионализм государственных служащих и манёвренность государственной машины, однако данные обстоятельства не могут являться ключевыми аспектами, легитимирующими деятельность негосударственных акторов. 5 Случается, что в течение некоторого, иногда продолжительного, времени новые акторы действуют, имея лишь частичную легитимность и, как следствие, неясный характер ответственности. Различные подходы к проблеме регулирования таких акторов на национальном или региональном уровнях частично проясняют, но всё же не приводят к обретению ими правового статуса, закреплённого в международном праве. 5 Для решения данной проблемы требуется выработка комплексного под-хода с применением существующих механизмов международного права, а также разрабатываемых методов в сфере саморегулирования. Ключевые слова: негосударственные акторы, частные военные и охранные компании, наёмники, международное право, приватизация, аутсорсинг, суверенитет, международное гуманитарное право, ООН, Швейцарская инициатива.

The UN is increasingly relying on private military and security companies (pmscs) for a wide range of services. Until recently, UN use of pmscs was not governed by system-wide rules and standards. The establishment of guidelines on the use of armed private security in late 2012 has led to greater accountability and transparency around this practice. The guidelines clarify the decision-making process and the criteria for the selection and hiring of companies providing armed security. However, they are overly reliant on self-regulation by pmscs and remain limited, raising questions about their capacity to avoid companies with objectionable records and prevent potential incidents. Moreover, the guidelines raise concerns that the use of pmscs by the UN may become normalised, with yet unexamined effects on the organisation’s security policies and its image.

Abstract The so-called ‘Blackwater scandal’ – a reference to the seventeen Iraqi civilians killed on Nisour Square by security guards of the private military company (PMC) Blackwater in September 2007 – puts into question the proposition that private military contractors or ‘mercenaries’ could be relied upon to act effectively and responsibly in peacekeeping and other international operations. Arguably, Blackwater’s frequently observed callousness, if typical of other Private Military Companies (PMCs), gravely undermines this proposition. After closely analysing the Nisour Square incident and the Blackwater company in a wider context of revealed patterns of violence by the personnel of multiple PMCs, the article concludes that the use of ‘mercenaries’ is in principle still possible, doable and defensible – after the necessary reforms and improvements have been made. Yet it remains doubtful whether a sufficient number of PMCs and their personnel are or will become (self-)disciplined, well-trained and trustworthy enough for large, complex and dangerous operations. One certainly should strengthen the (pre) conditions for deploying these ‘contractors’ in both international military missions which involve combat duties and operations, and international civilian missions with a military component focused on (body)guard and sentry duties only.

This chapter brings the field of feminist ethics together with
the growing body of critical scholarship in international
relations devoted to examining the impact of private military
and security companies (PMSCs) in order to assess the
complex moral and ethical implications of employing private
force in contemporary war. It argues that using a feminist
ethical framework premised on empathy and responsibility
acknowledges the relational and contextual nature of PMSC
employees’ lived experiences, resulting in a more complex and
varied set of moral uncertainties than existing analyses have
suggested when stressing individualistic and self-motivated
ethical dilemmas. Rather than articulate a set of abstract
moral principles from which to make judgments about private
force, this framework exposes the ethical ambiguities present
in contemporary PMSC realities and demonstrates the
relevance of empathy and responsibility in thinking about the
changing nature of modern warfare.

The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), in 1991, was followed by a series of intense military conflicts that broke out along the Soviet periphery and across its former sphere of influence. The dire state of the Russian economy, domestic political turmoil and the necessity to uphold a liberal façade to its new Western backers prevented Moscow from becoming openly involved in these conflicts. However, a Russian footprint was still present thanks to the arrival of so-called “volunteers,” who poured into these emerging zones of instability. This period played an important role in the development of future Russian Private Military Companies (PMC) and the way the government would subsequently use them in other theaters. First, these Russian irregulars gained experience (not necessarily positive or state-sponsored) in regional conflicts stretching from Central Asia to the Balkans and became acquainted with the specificities of non-linear, asymmetric warfare under different geographic and climactic conditions. Second, their participation created an aura of “volunteerism” and justice-seeking that substantially increased Russia’s popularity abroad. Finally, this involvement of volunteer irregulars allowed Moscow to create zones of instability (so-called “frozen conflicts”) that it continues to use to this day for various geopolitical purposes.
Among other aspects, this paper aims to:
Discuss the main operational theaters and composition of Russian irregular/mercenary forces in regional armed conflicts until 2013;
Trace the fighting tactics/techniques employed by Russian irregulars;
Discern the motivating factors driving Russian irregulars/mercenaries;
Identify the “volunteers’ ” recruitment techniques and command-and-control (C2) structures;
Mention and discuss the main groups/companies/organizations that formed the foundation for Russia’s current Private Military Companies;
Present the main factors that prevented nascent Russian PMCs from pursuing the trajectory followed by Western enterprises.

Throughout both early and modern history, military forces have been contingent on civilian contractors/companies to give their military forces flexibility, or to fulfill logistical and support functions that would ease the burden on enlisted soldiers. During the Vietnam War the military relied heavily on civilian contractors to maintain equipment needed for the field in areas such as communication and maintenance of most field equipment. With the advancement of new and specialized equipment the ordinary soldier is not equipped with the necessary technical skills to repair specialized equipment, so the military uses civilians to keep the various systems and field equipment in running order. After the Cold War conventional warfare and the use of military has changed from conventional to unconventional warfare, guerilla warfare.Private military companies maybe one of the most important concept within the security studies that has developed over the past decade or so. This new industry, where these companies not only supply the necessary equipment of warfare, but also fulfill many of the professional functions within warzones, is not only significant to the defense community, but has wider ramifications for international policies and warfare.

Amidst arguments that the nature of war has changed, notably by , , Private Military Companies (PMCs) have received increasing media and scholarly attention over the past decade. South Africa is no stranger to the media storm evoked by Blackwater USA during the recent conflict in Iraq Executive Outcomes (hereafter referred to as EO) caused a comparable controversy during the 1990s, first through their involvement in Angola after the withdrawal of the SADF, and later through their contract in Sierra Leone. At the time, PMCs were still a relatively new phenomenon, and thus research was scarce and it was difficult to discuss EO properly in the context of PMCs rather than as mercenaries. In the wake of the war in Iraq, the rapid growth of research into the PMC phenomenon has however provided a wealth of information that facilitates a better understanding of EO's role in the post-Cold War conflict environment. This article aims to discuss EO in this global debate by using recent research into the phenomenon, arguing that Executive Outcomes was part of a global trend in warfare.

September 2004

Since the first civilian contractors started operating in Iraq in the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq there has been growing public scrutiny of their activities. While most of the attention has been paid to the activities of contractors doing reconstruction work such as Halliburton, Parsons, Fluor, et cetera, growing attention and concern has been paid to the operations of those private military and security firms (herein referred as Private Military Companies, or PMCs) who provide security for such firms, as well as for Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) workers, nongovernmental organizations, and western media.
This BASIC Report provides an analysis of the PMC activities in Iraq over the past year.
To paraphrase the old Virginia Slims cigarette commercial, PMCs have come a long way. Where as little as a decade ago they were limited to African war zones they have now assumed a leading role in the activities of the world’s sole military superpower, as well as being a front and center actor in the daily life of Iraq. If there were an Oscar category for combat participants, PMCs would certainly win the nomination for best supporting actor.
PMCs and their conduct are now out in the open, officially above the horizon of public awareness, although concerns about transparency, openness and regulatory oversight remain. An illustrative list of PMCs operating in Iraq can be found in the Appendix. Their relative numbers in the two Gulf Wars illustrate the increase in the use of PMCs: during the first Gulf War in 1991 for every one contractor there were 50 military personnel involved. In the 2003 conflict the ratio was 1 to 10.
It seems likely that any proliferation of private security firms will precede a period of consolidation as those companies that acquire profitability absorb those that fail.

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are, currently, possessing huge potentials to be considered game-changers in international security. They have gained broader acceptance. However, they are controversial actors who could be indispensable somewhere and risky in other where.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE), is considered one of the Middle East region’s states, and it has recently made remarkable use of PMSCs outside its boundaries.
The Middle East region is the most troubled region, where many countries are undergoing an uncertain transition, in addition to many conflicts. The UAE pursues to avoid sliding into the same situation and attain some benefits given the region’s status quo. So, it seems like a window of opportunities that the UAE tries to invest to enhance its influence.
The theoretical framework for this article is underpinned by the concept of Security Governance as defined by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance and the Regional Security Complex Theory developed by Barry Buzan. The article does not purport to make a judgment on the legitimacy of PMSCs, nor to evaluate the legal statute of their activities. Hereof this article focuses on two main parts; first, on reviewing the development of the relation between the PMSCs and the Middle East security governance, and the second, it analyses the perspective of the UAE toward the use of PMSCs in addressing its regional policy regarding the Middle East region and the implications of this perspective in formulating such policies.

February 2006

Contents
1. Overview of strengths and failings of PMCs in Iraq
2. Operational Coordination between PMCs
3. What Do They Do?
4. Casualties: The PMC body count in Iraq
5. Differences between companies for different countries?
6. Transparency, reporting, democratic control
7. Political influence
8. Small Arms: Use, transport and purchase of arms
9. Conclusion

Greece yearly allocates a substantial part of its national income to defence. Its defence burden is the highest among EU and NATO members. Greek military spending has continuously exhibited a steady upward trend. During the post-bipolar era, while most countries have reduced their defence budgets, Greek military spending has grown in real terms by about 35% while, the corresponding change for total EU and NATO military expenditure was –12% and –23.4% respectively. For military hardware, Greece relies almost exclusively on imports. According to SIPRI data during 1996-2000 Greece ranked as the seventh importer of major conventional weapons in the world. Its total imports for this period amounted to about $3665 millions. In the past the development of an indigenous arms production capability was seen as an important step towards achieving a minimum degree military of self sufficiency and thus reduce its dependence on external suppliers of military hardware. The driving forces behind this policy of import substitution were a) the arms embargo during the military dictatorship and b) the fact that Greek defence planners felt that in case of an arms confrontation with Turkey (its mainly rival but at the same time NATO ally) Greece could not rely on its arms suppliers (mainly the USA and West European countries) and that it could be faced with a slow down in equipment and spare parts thus hindering its military effort. A number of industries were thus set up. They were mostly joint ventures between the Greek state and foreign arms producing companies. Most prominent cases were the Hellenic Aerospace Industry (EAB), the Hellenic Arms Industry (EBO), the Hellenic Vehicle Industry (ELBO). About three decades after the original ambitious plans, Greece has achieved a limited degree of import substitution in weapons requirements in such areas as ammunition, portable infantry weapons, jeeps and trucks, APCs and IFVs, and in airplane and helicopter maintenance. These however represent only a small proportion of the needs in military hardware. The majority of weapons systems are still imported including fighter planes, MBTs, helicopters, naval units, electronic equipment etc. All of which are of crucial determinants of the fighting capability of the Greek armed forces. Similarly, plans for extensive co-production agreements have not fully materialized while export performance has at best been limited. Currently the Greek defence industry is comprised of about 80 companies with a yearly turnover of more than 1,4 bn.€ and employing more than 16200 people. Most of the major indigenous military producers have for a number of years been facing important problems, of both financial and technological nature.
This paper attempts to address some important questions concerning the Greek arms industry. For example, why has Greece, despite its importance as a major importer and, until recently, the favourable conditions in the global defence market (the huge downturn that has however started to reverse during the last two years) not been able to succeed in its import substitution policy in defence procurement and thus effectively supporting the indigenous defence industry? Why do foreign firms have to look for capable local partners each time a Greek defence program is executed, and not vice versa? That is, why are Greek firms not capable of searching for, and assembling, industrial groups of local and foreign firms, in order to pursue the opportunities that appear in the local defence market? The paper surveys the Greek defence industry and its development over the last decades and discusses the options available to it in order to overcome its current problems. Emphasis is placed upon the technological capabilities of the local firms and upon the role that the defence procurement process can possibly play in augmenting these, so as to embed Greece in the current techno – economic paradigm.

On June 9, Russian Special Presidential Envoy for the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov dismissed the presence of Russian mercenaries in Libya and their military support of the Libyan National Army (LNA). The diplomat stated that, “Information spread by some foreign sources, including the U.S. State Department, that the Wagner Group’s members are present in Libya and participate in combat actions on the side of the Libyan National Army of Khalifa Haftar, largely relies on fabricated data and is aimed at discrediting Russia’s policy on Libya”

The so-called ‘Blackwater scandal’ – a reference to the seventeen Iraqi civilians killed on Nisour Square by security guards of the private military company (PMC) Blackwater in September 1997 – puts into question the proposition that private military contractors or ‘mercenaries’ could be relied upon to act effectively and responsibly in peacekeeping and other international operations. Arguably, Blackwater’s frequently observed callousness, if typical of other Private Military Companies (PMCs), gravely undermines this proposition. After closely analysing the Nisour Square incident and the Blackwater company in a wider context of revealed patterns of violence by the personnel of multiple PMCs, the article concludes that the use of ‘mercenaries’ is in principle still possible, doable and defensible – after the necessary reforms an improvements have been made. Yet it remains doubtful whether a sufficient number of PMCs and their personnel are or soon will be (self-)disciplined, well-trained and thrustworthy enough for large, complex and dangerous operations. Be as it may, one should strengthen the (pre)conditions for deploying these ‘contractors’ in both international military missions which involve combat duties and operations, and international civilian missions with a military component focused on (body)guard and sentry duties only.

Slavonic Corps Limited became Russia’s first and, in many ways, rather experimental “new type” private military company (PMC), concerned with tasks typically performed by private armies, such as frontal attacks and combat operations—in contrast with Western PMCs, which are mainly assigned auxiliary or training roles. Slavonic Corps suffered a quick defeat in Syria; however, many of its members (including its leader, Dmitry Utkin, nom de guerre Wagner) would later reassemble under the umbrella of a new organization—the Wagner Group. Participation in the wars in Syria and Ukraine helped the Wagner Group achieve valuable experience and modernize its organizational (army-type) structure.
While engaged in Syria, the Wagner Group demonstrated four essential qualities: First, it showed it could be successfully employed in military-related tasks (assuming a relatively weak opposing force). Second, it could be used jointly or in conjunction with regular formations (the Special Operations Forces and the Aerospace Forces) for intelligence gathering and reconnaissance. Third, this force could be used to protect objects/critical infrastructure. Fourth, another useful area of application for Wagner has been training local military personnel. The latter two functions are regularly performed by Western PMCs, which may signify a certain transformation that Russian PMCs are currently undergoing in Syria—gradually, and at least partially, becoming more like their American and European counterparts.
Russian PMCs can certainly be an effective tool of power politics. However, when confronted by technologically superior militaries and/or if operating in difficult terrain, formations of this type lose effectiveness.
The Wagner Group’s overwhelming defeat by US-led forces in early February 2018, in Deir ez-Zor province, stemmed in part from the PMC’s inferior arms/munitions and lack of any aerial support. But the deadly incident also demonstrated the exceedingly poor level of Wagner’s coordination with the regular Syrian Army and affiliated militia formations. Nevertheless, Wagner’s involvement importantly offered Russia plausible deniability, which helped Moscow avoid both domestic and international repercussions of this massacre of Russian mercenary forces.
Syria has become a crucial training ground for Russian PMCs. And Moscow is now (successfully) duplicating this model in other theaters of the world—notably, Libya and sub-Saharan Africa.
The Syrian campaign has arguably demonstrated that all of the main Russian PMCs appear to be tightly linked to a powerful triad composed of oligarchs, the military and the government. However, deeper research and more concrete, fact-based data will be required to ascertain the whole structure with necessary precision and accuracy—and the acquisition of such information could prove a rather onerous task.

The chapter analyses the use of private security and military companies (PSMC) as tools to intervene in conflict-affected scenarios. It begins by exploring the main reasons behind the tendency to rely on private security providers and the impact they have on conflict areas. The main objective of the analysis is to determine whether their active presence counts as a strategy to ensure peace-making and promote peacebuilding or, on the contrary, represents a source of further conflict and more instability. It argues that although the privatization of security entails political and economic advantages for states, there are still various disadvantages that make the use of PSMCs a mechanism that enables armed conflict and impedes the promotion of peace. The analysis shows the exponential growth of PSMCs in the aftermath of the Cold War. These companies have been employed to return order and stability in conflict zones, to assist peacekeeping operations, and to support the provision of humanitarian assistance. However, their real contribution to peacemaking and peacebuilding is questionable. In many cases PSMCs get involved in peacekeeping operations to help fulfill unfinished duties as a result of a shortage of troops and a weak political support, but they are not designed for long-term peacebuilding strategies. Their increasing presence in the field undermines the state’s relative monopoly of the use of violence, compromising the transparent elaboration of public security policies and hindering the possibility to strengthen international coalitions that aim at preserving peace in and among states. It is in this sense that PSMCs are better characterized as facilitators of war rather than promoters of peace.

This study explores the private security sector and its consequences in international politics. The objective of the research is to identify which pertinent roles can Private Military Companies (PMCs) fulfil in today’s security environment, after having accounted for the power transformations and socio-political problems induced by the emergence of these new security actors.

Over the past two decades a network-centric “revolution in military affairs” has profoundly reshaped the geographies of war. No less revolutionary has been the U.S. military’s increasing reliance on private companies that employ a global army of civilian laborers to provide logistical support for operations around the world. This article provides an overview of the scale, scope, and emergence of this phenomenon, supplemented by an analysis of contracting activities at the peak of the war in Iraq in 2008. Following this, I detail three notable geopolitical and geo-economic entanglements that logistics contracting has engendered: 1) subcontracting and the exploitation of a largely South and Southeast Asian subcontracting workforce that is fueled by inadequate military oversight and the down-sourcing of risk, 2) the geopolitics of contractor deaths, travel bans and troop withdrawals instituted by labor exporting countries, and 3) the duality of prosperity and precarity experienced by Bosnians who have worked for U.S. military logistics contractors over the past two decades. Impacting politics, economic livelihoods, and social relations in countries around the world, these entanglements require a rethinking of the spatial dimensions of war.

"This book offers annotated translations of documents touching on Dutch admiral Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge and his voyage to Asia between 1605 and 1608. These translations are aimed at a contemporary English-speaking Asian readership interested in the early modern history of European trade, warfare and expansion in Southeast Asia with a focus on Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Researchers specialising in early European colonialism, international law, international relations, security studies, and diplomatic history will also find that the documents translated in this volume offer new and unfamiliar perspectives. Materlieff’s business acumen, military and diplomataic prowess as well as his vision of empire all have implications for examining not only European expansion into Southeast Asia, but also into other regions at large, including especially south Asia, Africa and the Americas.
Admiral Matelieff was a director of the Rotterdam Chamber of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) formed in 1602. He was appointed fleet commander on one of the company’s first voyages to Asia. Matelieff’s mission was both commercial and military: he launched a major sea-borne attack on the Portuguese colony of Melaka, arranged for the signing of treaties with the rulers of Johor, Aceh and Ternate, and founded the first Dutch fort on the island of Ternate. His endeavours, however, to open the Chinese market for the Dutch company proved unsuccessful.
Following his return to the Dutch Republic in September 1608, Matelieff penned a series of memorials and letters. In these he advanced recommendations for changing the way the company organized its fleets and conducted business. More importantly he offered  his Dutch contemporaries a vision of empire in Asia. The materials contained in this volume offer important observations of a perceptive analyst who was also determined to grasp the political and economic structures of Asia, and also of inter-state relations in across this vast region. At a time of Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Danish, French and English engagement in Southeast Asia, Matelieff sought to critically assess and strategize on the ways in which Europeans were increasingly engaging with Asian polities and their rulers.

This book will be released for sale in Australasia and Europe in June 2014 and available in the Americas after September 2014
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IS BEYOND WHAT ANYBODY HAS ENVISIONED – SHALL WE START? 
LIKE THE ABILITY TO RENDER A COUNTRY INVULNERABLE TO GUNS, JETS AND MISSILES.  REDUCE ARMIES TO STICKS AND SWORDS. 
https://www.academia.edu/63683096/THE_BEST_WAY_TO_START_A_BUBBLE_PROJECT_DEC_21

The role of national military institutions as the crucial site for the (re)production of masculinity has been extensively studied. The recent trend of the privatization of security not only questions if national military actors are still the protagonists in conflict, but also begs the question of how the relation between masculinity and military institutions might change due to the advent of private military and security companies (PMSCs). This thesis examines in what way both prospective actors (public and private) mobilize masculinity in order to recruit. This thesis does a comparative case study of the recruitment videos of the U.S. national army and U.S. based PMSCs. The results shows that the national army and PMSCs mobilize recruits with different notions of masculinity that seem to be complementary: whereas the U.S. national army mainly displays traditional notions of hegemonic masculinity in their recruitment videos, the private contractors show notions of feminized hegemonic masculinity. Therefore, the analysis lends force to scholars suggesting that the privatization of security has brought about a re-masculinization of the national army, and a feminization of private contractors.
Keywords: PMSCs, recruitment, masculinity, content analysis

A native of Bruges (now part of Belgium), Jacques de Coutre was a gem trader who spent nearly a decade in Southeast Asia in the early 17th century. In addition to a substantial autobiography written in Spanish and preserved in the National Library of Spain in Madrid, he wrote a series of memorials to the united crown of Spain and Portugal that contain recommendations designed to reverse the decline in the fortunes of the Iberian powers in Southeast Asia, particularly against the backdrop of early Dutch political and commercial penetration into the region. Translated into English for the first time, these materials provide a valuable first-hand account of the bigger issues confronting the early colonial powers in Southeast Asia, and deep insights into the societies De Coutre encountered in the territory that today makes up Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.