Iran Foreign Policy

Diese Studie über die Beziehung zwischen Iran und Deutschland mit dem Schwerpunkt Berlin wurde im Auftrag des Senats von Berlin für die Reihe "Miteinander leben in Berlin" geschrieben. Nach einer historischen und forschungsgeschichtlichen Einführung gibt die Autorin einen Überblick über die deutsche Orient-Politik vor dem  ersten Weltkrieg,  und beleuchtet kurz den Zusammenbruch der Konstitutionsbewegung in Persien. Die Interessen des Deutschen Reiches im ersten Weltkrieg führten unter der Lenkung des Auswärtigen Amtes zur Gründung des 'Persischen Komitees' in Berlin, wo  unter der Führung von S.H. Taqizadeh iranische Intellektuelle aus ganz Europa zusammtrafen. Die Zeitschrift KAVEH  wurde Sprachrohr der demokratisch Bewegung und war gleichzeitig unter Mitwirkung von Berliner Orientalisten von Deutschland bezahltes Propaganda-Organ.  Nach dem Krieg entstand die Deutsch-Persische Gesellschaft (1918-1932). Ein grösseres Kapitel beleuchtet die bisher in der Wissenschaft unterschätzte Rolle, die der Schriftsteller und Journalist Hossein Kazemzadeh während und nach dem Krieg innerhalb unter den iranischen Intellektuellen einnahm. Seine Zeitschrift und der gleichnamige Verlag Iranschähr sowie seine anderen kulturellen  Aktivitäten werden hier erstmals dargestellt. Die deutsch-iranischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen den Weltkriegen sowie die politische Gruppe um Tagi Erani Schliessen diesen eigenständigen  historischen Teil der Publikation ab.

Iran and Russia achieved their short-term objective of keeping Bashar al-Assad in power by defeating the
opposition forces. However, the two countries have conflicting medium-term objectives regarding Syria.
• Russia’s approach to Iran is rather instrumental. Moscow needs Tehran as a leverage to achieve its
regional and global objectives.
• Although the Russian President Vladimir Putin called Iran as a strategic partner in 2015, their shared
position in Syria has not gone beyond a tactical cooperation and is far from a coalition.
• Russia’s relations with Israel, its plans regarding Syria’s reconstruction which includes obtaining
privileges from the Assad regime in this respect, the process of normalizing relations between Syria and
the other Arab countries and finally the cooperation between Russia and Turkey over the Syrian crisis are
Tehran’s major sources of distrust vis-à-vis Moscow.
• Although Russia’s ultimate aim is to curtail Iran’s influence in Syria, it does not presently want Iranian
military forces out of the country because of the significance of the latter’s land forces on the ground.
However, the inception of the political dialogue process in Syria will increase the disagreements between
the two countries.
Keywords: Iran, Russia, Syria, Regional Rivalry

Using the Foreign Policy Analysis framework and the concept of Authoritative Decision Units, this article analyzes three cases that required an Iranian response: the Arab Uprisings, the nuclear negotiations, and the 2017 GCC Crisis. The article argues that it was not a single actor taking the foreign policy decisions in those cases, but a combination of individual and collective actors that formed the decision units that designed and implemented Iranian foreign policy. It also contends that those decisions were in line with the overall Iranian foreign policy objective —which is to convert Iran into a regional power— and, to that aim, variations of non-alignment strategies were implemented.

The political vacuum created by the withdrawal of NATO and US forces from Afghanistan has led other powers to attempt to fill the void for reasons of regional stability and/or create and extend their spheres of influence. Afghanistan is a country historically known for being at the centre of the "Great Game" and now for the emerging Asian power rivalry in the aftermath of Washington's decision to withdraw from it by 11 September 2021. As one commentator remarks, 'The political future of Afghanistan will be of considerable significance to several nations with competing sets of interests, as well as to pan-Asian relations as a whole.' Key Points  In politics, a "political vacuum" is described as the political void left by a disengaged power that has not been filled.

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction
Part V: The Broader Strategic Context

by Anathony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz

December 8, 2008

Iran’s nuclear ambitions and missile programs, and their interactions with its growing capabilities for asymmetric warfare, are becoming steadily more critical security issues for the US, Iran’s neighbors, and the international community. The foreign and domestic policy implications for the US will be a major issue that the next administration must address during its first months in office.

Iran’s actions, and the Iraq War, have already made major changes in the military balance in the Gulf and the Middle East. Iran may still be several years to half a decade away from becoming a meaningful nuclear power, but even a potential Iranian nuclear weapon has already led Iran’s neighbors, the US, and Israel to focus on the nuclear threat it can pose and its long-range missile programs.

The Burke Chair has prepared a new set of briefs, prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, which summarize Iran’s actions, current and potential capabilities, and the possible outcome of a nuclear exchange. This briefing draws on official statements, US intelligence judgments, work by the IAEA, and material provided by a number of other research centers, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, ISIS, the Federation of American Scientists, Global Security, and the Brooking Institution among others.

The Burke Chair is releasing these documents in a series of working drafts in an effort to obtain outside views, comments, criticisms, and additions. We hope to use such comments to provide a more comprehensive and more accurate picture of Iran’s controversial and destabilizing WMD programs despite the uncertainty surrounding these foreign policy nightmares.

The most current draft is now available on the CSIS web site at:
http://www.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081208_IranNucStratCon.pdf
This draft is key to understanding the broader strategic context of Iran’s WMD programs.
Iran has found that an overall asymmetric strategy would be most beneficial to maintaining balance of power and expanding its power and influence in the Middle East region. This strategy has also enabled the Iranian government and military to operate more covertly, both in terms of building capabilities for covert, proxy, and indirect warfare, and in developing a possible nuclear weapons program.

Tehran focused its defense efforts on creating a force structure to pursue an asymmetric strategy which focuses more on the use of proxies to create greater regional instability and export its revolution, while at the same time it has pushed the limits in its missile programs, and pursued the research and development of chemical and biological agents as well as a suspect nuclear program; which together have the makings of a very dangerous and WMD program. 

This is why any assessment of Iran’s motives and capabilities must look beyond the previous assessments of the military balance. Whatever Iran’s actual motives may be a combination of its emerging strengths in asymmetric warfare and nuclear-armed missile forces that can deter or limit conventional reprisals can do much to compensate for its lack of modern conventional forces. 

Iran can exploit a combination of carefully selected precision guided munitions systems, weapons of mass destruction, and the widening use of asymmetrical warfare strategies to make up for shortcomings in conventional warfighting capabilities. Its long-range missiles and WMD programs can both provide a powerful deterrent and support its asymmetric strategies.

This draft covers the broader strategic context of Iran’s WMD real and potential capability. It covers how all of the aspects of Iran’s WMD programs fit into the broader strategic context with Iran’s conventional military forces, the IRGC, use and support of proxies, and ambiguous statements and actions.

About the Book

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has been dubbed the ‘kingmaker’ in recent studies of Iranian politics, precipitating heated debates surrounding the potential militarization of the Iranian regime and giving rise to paradoxical understandings of the IRGC; whether as a military institution entering politics, or a political institution with a military history.

Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics offers a way out of this paradox by showing that the IRGC is not a recently politicized institution, but has instead been highly politicized since its inception. It identifies the ways in which the IRGC relates to national political dynamics, examines the factors contributing to this relationship, and its implications on Iranian politics from the revolution up to the present day. The book examines the three decades following the revolution, uncovering the reasons behind the rise of the Revolutionary Guards and tracking the organization’s evolving relationship with politics. Establishing a theoretical framework from revolution and civil-military relations theories, this book provides new perspectives on the relationship between the IRGC and Iranian politics.

This book would be of interest to students and scholars of Middle East Studies and Iranian Studies, in particular Iranian Politics.

https://www.routledge.com/products/9781138853645

This dissertation is a case study of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s approach to soft power
with a focus on Iran’s use of soft power in Afghanistan. This dissertation is unique as it a delves
into the diverse conceptual prescriptions on soft power, especially from a non-Western
perspective. Studies of soft power in the current International Relations discipline ignore the
implicit widespread liberal democratic bias in the current understanding of the concept. This
dissertation argues that there are certain ontological assumptions lying deep within the soft
power model first proposed by Joseph Nye (1990) that make it difficult to use as a model for
studying non-Western states. This stems from Nye’s consideration that sources of attraction,
essential in wielding soft power, as universal and equivalent to Western liberal values. Nye does
not consider how the sources of attraction that he identifies are biased towards a Western notion
of values, culture, policies and institutions. This has led to a disregard of the use of soft power by
non-Western states. Thus, the aim of this study is to address the western-centric limitation of
Nye’s concept by offering a reconceptualization that can be applied in studying the soft power of
states that do not necessarily adhere to the same universal norms.
By applying Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis framework, this dissertation
examines Iran’s soft power strategy in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2017, in order to enhance
its influence. Iran’s soft power application relies on what that the author calls ‘affinity’, whereby
audience-oriented and localized resources of attraction are identified in the target population and
are subsequently discursively cultivated. Attraction build through the ‘affinity’ process is
different than Western states’ use of attraction and application of soft power.
This dissertation highlights how Iran has created an affinity node centered on a ‘sense of
brotherhood’ with its Afghanistan audience. It also shows that the strength of this narrative is in
Iran’s ability to create an emotional connection that is embedded in commonalities between the
two countries’ in terms of culture, historical legacy, and common language. The analysis
presented shows the affinity node of brotherhood appears in over 20 speeches and statements
targeted at the Afghan population by the Iranian supreme leader and successive Iranian
presidents in recent decades. The notion of brotherhood provides Iran the emotional linkage, the
affinity node, to connect with its Afghan audience.
The affinity that Iran establishes with Afghanistan allows Iran to articulate its foreign
policy objectives by showing how Iranian influence benefits the Afghan population and appeals
to existing Afghan values. In addition, this dissertation finds that Iran devotes considerable
resources to the development of these discourses in Afghanistan through the various institutions
that in charge of Iran’s public diplomacy activities. The focus of these activities is mainly in the
realm of culture, education, and language, leveraging the common ties between Iran and their
Afghan audience.
Lastly, the findings of this study indicate that Iran’s approach to soft power is
strategically calculated. Iran makes explicit use of soft power that is different from the original
notion of soft power as it was formulated by Nye. Iran’s actions show that sources of attraction
do not have to be universal, attraction is contextual in its appeal, based on each target audience
and can be constructed through discourses. Thus, as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) would say, Iran’s
articulation of an antagonistic discourse challenges the hegemonic discourses that are associated
with the Western evaluation of soft power.

Turkey and Iran have once again found themselves facing
parallel challenges in the form of the group that calls itself
Islamic State (here ISIS) and its implications for both
countries’ security policies as well as interests in Syria and
Iraq. These developments have led to some suggestions
that Turkey and Iran could explore and co-operate on
areas of mutual interest closely.

While such efforts and regional developments do bring the
two countries closer, this essay argues that a brief look at the
history of relations between the two countries, particularly
during the last ten years, reveals a pattern of similar
moments when both countries faced shared challenges
and sought to work closely, which only revealed deeper
differences and conflicts of interests and produced primarily
mutual economic benefit. It argues that Iran and Turkey
continue to walk a tightrope between the prospects of major diplomatic fallout caused by opposing policies and interests
in the Middle East and the benefits of maintaining good
bilateral relations.

Despite various analyses of the extent of Iranian-Russian rapprochement, questions still remain about its fundamental elements and its sustainability in the face of the conflicting interests of the two countries. Iran and Russia have pursued security convergence as a joint power maximisation policy, which can be better understood through Iran and Russia’s common feelings of ‘international misrecognition’ and ‘common threat perceptions’. These are the pillars of the nexus between them, explaining how the two countries have a shared understanding of their security environment and particularly how their mutual sense of insecurity has taken the lead in forging bilateral relations. As long as these pillars remain effective, existing limits to bilateral relations rooted in mistrust, disagreements and rivalries will not have significant effects on the convergence.

An Analysis of South Africa's relations with Iran from the exile of Reza Shah (1942) to the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as president (1994).  Traces the diplomatic, political, economic, cultural, and religious dimensions of the relationship.

In a Middle East beset by shifting alliances, the Iran-Syria relationship has been one of the region’s most enduring axes. Since its establishment following Iran’s revolution in 1979, the alliance has weathered several challenges, from the interstate conflict seen in the Iran-Iraq War, to popular uprisings and now, most recently, Syria’s own protracted and bloody civil war. It is a relationship that has endured because of both states’ shared aims in the region and their positions as vanguards of resistance against U.S. and Israeli interests in the Middle East

Through exploring Iran’s public diplomacy at the international level, this article demonstrates how the Islamic
Republic’s motives should not only be contextualised within the oft-sensationalised, material or ‘hard’ aspects
of its foreign policy, but also within the desire to project its cultural reach through ‘softer’ means. Iran’s
utilisation of culturally defined foreign policy objectives and actions demonstrates its understanding of soft
power’s potentialities. This article explores the ways in which Iran’s public diplomacy is used to promote its soft
power and craft its, at times, shifting image on the world stage.

Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East has often been analyzed through the lenses of religion which seen as an inseparable component of state identity of Iran. Iran’s foreign policy actions in the region have often been interpreted as suspicious as well as posing ideological and sectarian threat by the other Middle East countries that have Shia minorities/majorities in their territories. At that point, Syria war constitutes a relevant example to analyze the determinants of Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East. This study attempts at applying neorealism to analyze the motivations of Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East. It argues that Iran’s foreign policy in Syria needs to be seen beyond the discourse of proxy war; rather it aims at securing Iran’s regional power bases as well as projecting Iranian power to Syria and across the region.

Middle Eastern states see their ability narrow to walk a fine line in the Ukraine conflict. Israel is a case in point as tensions with Iran in Syria and Palestinians in Jerusalem flare, and both Russia and the United States signal impatience with its attempts to straddle the fence.

Special Editors: Andrea Weiss and Yana Zabanova
Iran & Energy Cooperation in the South Caucasus:
Prospects for the Post-Sanctions Era By Hamed Kazemzadeh (Center for East European Studies, Warsaw)
Connecting Iran and the South Caucasus:
Competing Visions for the North–South Corridor By Yana Zabanova (independent researcher)
The Role of Iranian Azeris, Armenians and Georgians
in Iran’s Economic Relations with the Countries of the South Caucasus By Andrea Weiss (independent researcher)
The Unfreezing of Iran: Economic Opportunities for Georgia By David Jijelava (GeoWel Research, Tbilisi)
---------------------------------
Research on regional powers in the area of the Caucasus, especially from a Western perspective, largely tends to ignore
Iran, as it does not fit neatly into the usual narrative of Russia’s competition with the West (potentially with Turkey
in the background). With the nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions in 2016, Iran’s role in the South Caucasus,
however, has become more prominent. While the election of Donald Trump in the US casts a shadow of uncertainty
over the future of the Iran deal, the lifting of the sanctions has already had implications for the prospects of
several major infrastructure projects in the region, providing a boost to some while hindering others. Some of these
projects serve broader geostrategic goals, such as Iran’s quest for a stable region to its North, in a sea of (perceived)
instability around the Islamic Republic. Consequently, Iran views economic engagement with the region primarily as
a tool to promote stability. Hence its preference for a focus on large projects as opposed to trade relations of mediumsize
enterprises or even small scale trade. Aside from this goal, Iran’s underlying vision of the South Caucasus is similar
to that of the other two regional powers—Russia and Turkey—in one respect: Iran itself looks towards the Caucasus
through the prism of its own history and perceives the region mostly as a part of its own territory, which it lost
in the traumatic Treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828).
This collection of articles represents, to some extent, what Iran does and does not do or see in the Caucasus: while
Hamed Kazemzadeh and Yana Zabanova focus on two issues that Iran assesses as potentially promising—its energy
cooperation with the South Caucasus and its participation in regional transportation corridor projects—Andrea Weiss
and David Jijelava detail factors that limit Iran’s economic engagement in the region.
Kazemzadeh elucidates one of the main issues underlying some of Iran’s geostrategic interests: the country perceives
itself as a land-bridge between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Within this vision, the reinvigoration of energy
cooperation in the post-sanctions era links Iran to the Caucasus, as well as to the wider world beyond (e.g., to the European
Union). The roles of the production, transfer and consumption of energy offer prospects for regional cooperation.
In her analysis of Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s competition for alternative transportation routes connecting Iran, the
South Caucasus, and Europe, Zabanova argues that the impetus behind existing projects, such as the North–South
Corridor through Azerbaijan and the Southern Armenian Railway, largely comes from these two countries rather than
from Iran. In fact, with a wider range of options at its disposal, including participation in China’s Silk Road Economic
Belt initiative, Iran has been cautious about exclusive commitments to major transportation projects in the Caucasus.
Weiss explains that economic relations are the least important reason why the South Caucasus matters to Iran. In
terms of size of these national economies as potential markets, as well as for the type of goods they produce, on a larger
scale they have little to offer to Iran. Logically, as economic relations rank low on Iran’s priority list, and due to their
status in Iran, Iranian Armenians, Iranian Georgians and Iranian Azeris did not assert their comparative advantage
by serving as a bridge and forging economic ties to the South Caucasus.
Jijelava concludes this CAD issue by detailing why, even after the sanctions, Georgian–Iranian economic relations
are unlikely to offer the potential for significant growth or large mutual material benefits in the near future. He exemplifies
this assessment by discussing gas imports from Iran, the import and export of goods and services, and foreign
direct investment in pistachios.

Arap baharı ile başlayan toplumsal ve siyasal değişim süreci Ortadoğu’da egemen olan siyasal rejimlerin kimi yerlerde devrilmesine, kimi yerlerde de sarsılmasına neden olmuştur. Bu sürecin tetiklediği halk isyanları kısa süre içerisinde Suriye’ye de yayılmış ve bu ülkede hakim olan Baas rejimini tehdit etmiştir. Fakat Baas rejimi değişim talebiyle ortaya çıkan isyana karşı şiddet kullanarak mücadele etmek yoluna gitmiş ve bu yolda en büyük siyasi desteği İran’dan almıştır.

Yıllardır bölgede statükoya karşı çıkan ve bu nedenle “İslami uyanış” addettiği Arap baharını destekleyen İran yönetimi Suriye söz konusu olunca “statükonun” sürdürülmesinden yana tavır almıştır. İran’ın bu tavrı kimi çevrelerde mezhep ekseninde siyaset izlemesiyle izah edilmeye çalışılırken İran makamları tarafından İsrail’e ve ABD’ye karşı duran sözde direniş hattının müdafaası şeklinde savunulmuştur.

Farklı ideolojik boyutlarına karşın gerek mezhepçi yaklaşım, gerekse direniş hattı söylemi İran’ın bazı jeopolitik kaygılarına işaret etmektedir. Arap baharının tetiklediği değişim süreci bölgenin jeopolitik yapısında köklü değişikliklere yol açmış, dolayısıyla bölgesel ve küresel aktörlerin Ortadoğu politikalarını yeniden değerlendirmelerine neden olmuştur. Bu değişim süreci bölgedeki tek müttefiki olan Suriye’ye gelene kadar İran jeopolitik çıkarlarına hizmet ederken Suriye’deki muhtemel bir değişim İran’ın jeopolitik çıkarlarını tehdit etmektedir. Bu nedenle İran, Arap baharı Suriye’ye geldiğinde farklı bir tavır almıştır.

İran’ın bölgeye yönelik jeopolitik kaygıları ise ideolojik ve stratejik faktörler tarafından belirlenmektedir. İran’ın devrimci/ideolojik duruşu onun İsrail’i, ABD’yi ve bölgedeki Amerikan müttefiklerini “düşman” olarak görmesine neden olmaktadır. İran devriminden bu yana sözde düşmanları ile İran arasında ortaya çıkan gerginlikler ve çatışmalar, taraflar arasındaki karşılıklı husumet ilişkisine tarihsel bir boyut kazandırmıştır. Bu minval üzere son on yılda Ortadoğu’da İran ve müttefikleri ile Suudi Arabistan, Körfez ülkeleri, Mısır, Ürdün gibi İran karşıtları arasında kamplaşma ve soğuk savaş ortaya çıkmıştır. Böyle bir ortamda İran’ın savunma stratejisinde Suriye ve Hizbullah ile geliştirdiği ittifak ilişkisi önemli bir yer edinmiştir. İran’ın savunma stratejisinde kritik öneme haiz olan Suriye’de ortaya çıkan isyanın İran’ın dostu Esad yönetiminin devrilmesini talep etmesi ve bölgedeki karşıtlarının da isyancılara destek vermesi İran yönetiminin isyancılara karşı Esad’a destek vermesine neden olmuştur.

The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on some of the most sensitive questions surrounding international security. One of these is the US-Iran crisis, where the two countries have been on the brink of a full military confrontation since January. To date, both countries continue a zero-sum game, exploiting the pandemic as an opportunity to mount pressure on the adversary. Will the common threat caused by Covid-19 be able to divert Iran and the US from the collision course and push them towards more cooperative behaviour? This policy brief focuses on the cost that current confrontational strategies could have for both sides amid the Covid-19 outbreak, highlighting the threats and the political and strategic limitations that have emerged as a result of the pandemic. It also shows the potential gains at both the regional and the global levels that could arise for both actors if they were to adopt a new approach, based on health diplomacy and cooperation in health security.

This study sought to answer why conflict in Turkey-Iran relations increased
in the covered period, considering –relatively- smooth relations between Turkey and
Iran in the 1980s, and thermidorizing of Iran in the 1990s. Indeed, ideology has had
an important place in bilateral relations between Iran and Turkey for a long time.
Ideological factors constituted the immediate reasons for conflict between Turkey
and Iran in the 1990s as well. However, ideological differences between the two
countries did not cause any serious conflict in the 1980s. Then, the question arises,
why and how did ideological reasons led to severe frictions between Iran and Turkey
in the 1990s. In this regard, this thesis paid attention to two factors that have
profound effects on the foreign policies of Turkey and Iran; changing internal
conditions, and the changing geopolitics of Turkey and Iran after the dissolution of
the USSR and the Gulf War of 1991.
Keywords: Turkey, Iran, Thermidor, Ideological Confrontation, Geopolitical
Competition, Northern Iraq, Caucasus, Central Asia, Economy, Cooperation.

Türkiye ve İran başta coğrafya, kültür, tarih, siyaset ve diplomasi olmak üzere sahip oldukları önemli ulusal güç kapasiteleriyle Ortadoğu toplumlarını kendi eksenlerinde hareket etmeye zorlayan ve dolayısıyla da birbirleriyle yarışan iki önemli bölgesel güçtür. Türkiye-İran ilişkileri, tarih boyunca Ortadoğu’nun kaderini belirlemede etkin bir rol oynamıştır. Türkiye ve İran, Asya-Avrupa geçiş kuşağını kontrol etmekte ve bölgenin eko-politik düzenini inşa etmede farklı stratejik eğilimler geliştirmektelerdir. Bu sebeple gelecek yüzyılın inşasında da bu iki gücün geliştireceği politikalar ve ikili ilişkilerdeki işbirliği veya etkileşim düzeyi, küresel güçlerin kurmaya çalıştığı Ortadoğu düzeninde denklem değiştiren bir rol üstlenecek ve birlikte hareket edebildikleri takdirde Ortadoğu barışının temellerini atacaklardır.

Bu yazıda İran İslam Cumhuriyeti’nin dış politikasındaki dönüşüm, dönüşümün nedenleri ve sonuçları analiz edilecektir. Bu çerçevede öncelikle devrim sonrası İran dış politikası genel hatlarıyla incelencek, İran dış politikasında belirleyici faktörler tartışılacak, İran’da “ideolojik evrim” ve İran’ın değişen jeopolitiği ve bunların İran dış politikasına yansımaları üzerinde durulacaktır.

Iran has remained one of the most effective tools in Russia's foreign policy towards the West for more than two hundred years. Drawing on previously unpublished and recently declassified sources which change the established wisdom on many aspects of the history of Russia and Iran, Denis V. Volkov examines this relationship, and situates it within the broader context of Oriental studies. With a particular focus on the activities of scholars-diplomats, as well as scholars involved in academia, missionary activities and the military within their own professional domains, Volkov analyses the interaction of intellectuals with state structures and their participation in the process of shaping and conducting foreign policy towards Iran. This work explores the specific institutional practices of Russia's Oriental studies, including organisation of scholarly intelligence networks, taking advantage of state power for the promotion of institutional and individual interests, and profound engagement with Russia's domestic and foreign policy discourses of its time.

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction
Doctrine, Policy and Command

by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz

January 12, 2009

Iran’s nuclear ambitions and missile programs, and their interactions with its growing capabilities for asymmetric warfare, are becoming steadily more critical security issues for the US, Iran’s neighbors, and the international community. The foreign and domestic policy implications for the US will be a major issue that the next administration must address during its first months in office.

Iran’s actions, and the Iraq War, have already made major changes in the military balance in the Gulf and the Middle East. Iran may still be several years to half a decade away from becoming a meaningful nuclear power, but even a potential Iranian nuclear weapon has already led Iran’s neighbors, the US, and Israel to focus on the nuclear threat it can pose and its long-range missile programs.

The Burke Chair has prepared a new set of briefs, prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, which summarize Iran’s actions, current and potential capabilities, and the possible outcome of a nuclear exchange. This briefing draws on official statements, US intelligence judgments, work by the IAEA, and material provided by a number of other research centers, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, ISIS, the Federation of American Scientists, Global Security, and the Brooking Institution among others.

The Burke Chair is releasing these documents in a series of working drafts in an effort to obtain outside views, comments, criticisms, and additions. We hope to use such comments to provide a more comprehensive and more accurate picture of Iran’s controversial and destabilizing WMD programs despite the uncertainty surrounding these foreign policy nightmares.

Iran presents many challenges in analyzing its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. One is that a nation that denies it is acquiring such weapons does not have a public strategy or doctrine for using them, much less clear plans to acquire them. The second is that Iran has an extremely complex national command authority, where many key elements virtually bypass its president – as well as other national decision-making apparatuses – and report to its Supreme Leader. It also seems to place its missile systems, and much of its military industry under its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and it is this force that seems to be responsible for the development and control of any programs to develop, manufacture, and deploy weapons of mass destruction. Making this situation all the more complex and volatile is the growing influence of the IRGC – especial hard-line members – in the Iranian political arena.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and independence of the Caucasus countries, widespread changes emerged in the political geography of this region and the power vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet created a new opportunity for regional and international actors to define new equations for their relations with the Caucasus countries according to their national interests and strategic goals.
Nearness of the Caspian Sea to the Caucasus and its significant sources of energy attracted the attention of international actors to this area. America, Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, China, India, and Israel are among the main powers and countries who made extensive efforts to attend in the area. These efforts along with the different and often conflicting interests of these powers and their strategic priorities led to wide competitions in the region. For Iran, the Caucasus is not a completely foreign territory and is highly similar to Iran from historical and cultural perspectives.
With collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran was forced to develop a policy to suit the new conditions. This policy was formed around several axes. Preserving security of the country and its territorial integrity, developing bilateral and multilateral economic relations, stressing the geopolitical importance of Iran regarding transit of goods as well as reconstructing the international image of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Abandoning some ideological considerations of the Islamic revolutionary system, Tehran pursued a pragmatic prudent policy in relation to these countries. In addition, the Iranian authorities decided to set their policy in this area in close cooperation with Russia.
Due to the mentioned procedure, we can also talk about another development which is the importance of cultural approaches in Iran's foreign policy. According to this theory, relations between countries are set based on their identity and cultural components. Iran has a great Islamic-Iranian heritage across Central Eurasia and the Caucasus. Albeit, due to the severe impact of power equations and consequences of the big game on one hand and structural carelessness to these countries in Iran's foreign policy during the years following their independence, these socio-cultural assets are less used. Iran sees instability in the South Caucasus as a threat to its national security and hence, tries to consolidate stability and security of its borders by mediating in crises.
Efforts to resolve the Karabakh crisis is a clear example of this policy in establishing security and stability in the region. Emphasis on regional solutions has been the main approach of Iran's foreign policy in the South Caucasus. On the other hand, in the area of Caspian Sea, Iran has been making efforts to avoid excessive tensions in the relations with Azerbaijan Republic. Disputes between the two countries in the field of energy and its transport as well as legal issues of the Caspian Sea have confronted the prospect of their relations with ambiguities. The policy of Azerbaijan in closeness to the America and Israel has had direct effects on its relations with Iran. But relations with Armenia have been more stable, and closeness of Armenia and Iran to Russia has strengthened this stability. Iran's relations with Georgia are also very important because it is located on the energy route to Europe.
However, Russia's interests in the area of the Caspian Sea on the transmission of energy and exploitation of sea resources are in stark contrast to Iran's vital interests.  But the interaction between Iran and Russia in the South Caucasus has been shaped based on international approaches of the foreign policies of both countries, particularly in the context of relations with America in the region. In recent years, Syria has played a significant role in the promotion of cooperation between Iran and Russia. Therefore, Iran's foreign policy and its relations with the South Caucasus republics have been under the strong influence of orientations and policies of the regional and trans-regional actors. In general, Iran's interests in the Caucasus region can be summarized in the following categories:
1. Revive the traditional ties with the Caucasus region aimed at preventing threats against Iran's national security as well as economic and cultural advantages;
2. Gain Iran's interests in the Caspian Lake and extract oil and gas resources;
3. Take advantage of the linking situation of the Caucasus as an alternative route for Turkey to the Europe;
4. Restore the routes of energy to the economic and natural state with the aim of strengthening economic stability and advantage;
5. Prevent the formation of threatening processes by America, NATO, and Israel against Iran in the Caucasus.
After the Soviet collapse, Iran tried to enter that region and have a continuous presence there through communication and direct contact with the Caucasus countries. Therefore, as the first post-Soviet action, Iran recognized the newly independent republics including the three countries of Caucasus, and the IRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to establish its political representations in these countries immediately after declaration of independence of these republics. In this regard, Iran's interests in the Caucasus region can be divided into three geo-political, geo-economical, and geo-cultural fields.

1920 yılında Osmanlı topraklarından kopartılan Musul-Basra-Bağdat vilayetleri, Irak kimliği altında Milletler Cemiyeti tarafından İngiliz mandasına bırakılmıştı. Geçmişte var olamayan bu devlet, 1932 yılında (sözde) bağımsızlığını ilan etse de uzun bir süre İngiltere merkezli yönetilmiştir.

1958 yılında Haşimi Krallığı devrilerek Cumhuriyet rejimine geçen Irak’da, 1979 yılında Saddam Hüseyin’in iktidarını pekiştireceği süreye kadar yedi kez darbe gerçekleşti. Bunlardan 1973 yılındaki başarısız olurken diğerleri yönetimin değişmesi ile sonuçlandı.[1] Yaşanılan bu siyasi istikrarsız ortama rağmen Irak, 1970’li yıllar boyunca kalkınma hamleleri ile refah seviyesini bölgedeki diğer ülkelere göre yükseltmiştir.

Tüm bu gelişmelere rağmen Irak, 1980 yılında İran ile amansız bir savaşa girdi. Kazananı olmayan bu savaştan geriye 1.5-2 milyona yakın ölü, sayısı belli olmayan yaralı ve yıkılmış şehirler kaldı. Irak için savaşın sebebi; 1979 yılında gerçekleşen Tahran Devrimi ile İran’da kurulan Şii yönetimi devirmekti. İran için ise mevcut Irak yönetimini düşürerek Şii yönetim kurarak benimsedikleri Şii Hilali projesini hayata geçirmekti.

1990 yılında Irak’ın Kuveyt’i işgal etmesi ve akabinde Amerika’nın başını çektiği güçlerin Irak’a saldırması ile ülke yıkımın eşiğine geldi. BMGK’nın ambargoları ile de sıkıntılı süreçler yaşayan Irak, türlü bahaneler ile 2003 yılında resmen ABD ve İngiltere tarafından işgal edildi. 90’lı yıllardan itibaren İran, Irak aleyhine birçok politika gerçekleştirdi ve 2003 Irak devletinin yıkılması ile oluşturulan kurumlardaki etkisi ile istediğini aldı.

Kuruluşunda İngiltere’nin mandası olan Irak, 2003 Amerikan işgalinden sonra İran’ın mandası olma yolunda ilerlemektedir. Ele alacağımız bu makalede Irak-İran savaşındaki politikalar ve 2003 işgali sonrasındaki gelişmeleri sistematik bir şekilde inceleyerek İran’ın nüfuzunu ortaya koymaya çalışacağız.

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Capabilities, Developments and Strategic Uncertainties

by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz

October 14, 2008

The Burke Chair has prepared a new set of briefs, prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, which summarize Iran’s actions, current and potential capabilities, and the possible outcome of a nuclear exchange. This briefing draws on official statements, US intelligence judgments, work by the IAEA, and material provided by a number of other research centers, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, ISIS, the Federation of American Scientists, Global Security, and the Brooking Institution among others.

The Burke Chair is releasing these documents in a series of working drafts in an effort to obtain outside views, comments, criticisms, and additions. We hope to use such comments to provide a more comprehensive and more accurate picture of Iran’s controversial and destabilizing WMD programs despite the uncertainty surrounding these foreign policy nightmares.

This first working draft in the series is available on the CSIS web site at:
http://www.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081015_iran.wmd.pdf
It covers the capabilities and uncertainties of Iran’s missile program, as well as other possible means of deliver that Iran could utilize in conjunction with its CBRN programs.

2011 yılında başlayan Suriye’deki iç savaş, devlet ve devlet-dışı aktörlerin dahli ile birlikte uluslararası bir hal almıştır. Savaşın tarafı olan aktörler, silahlı mücadelelerinin yanı sıra propaganda faaliyetlerinde de bulunmuşlar ve izledikleri politikalara meşruiyet kazandırma çabası içerisinde olmuşlardır. Bu süreçte İran da Suriye İç Savaşı’nda taraf olan ve propaganda faaliyetleri yürüten aktörlerden olmuştur. İran, 1979 yılındaki devrimin ardından değişen dış politika paradigması çerçevesinde Suriye savaşına müdahil olmuş ve savaş sürecinde mezhepçilik yaptığı, iç meselelerini göz ardı ettiği gibi gerekçelerle eleştirilmiştir. Bu eleştirilere karşı yumuşak bir güç olarak sinemayı propaganda aracı olarak kullanan İran, böylelikle hem dış politikada hem de iç politikada meşruiyet zemini aramıştır. Bu aşamada İran yönetimi tarafından propaganda amaçlı kullanılan “Şam Saatine Göre” filmi, İran’ın bu girişiminin bir ürünü olmakla beraber, devletin Suriye’deki iç savaşı algılayışına ve savaş sürecinde ürettiği söyleme örnek oluşturmaktadır. Çalışma bu bağlamda, 1979’daki İslami devriminden günümüze kadar İran’ın sinemayı bir propaganda aracı olarak kullanışını “Şam Saatine Göre” filminden hareketle, İranSuriye ilişkileri ve Arap Baharı çerçevesinde ele almaktadır. Çalışmada Teun A. Van Dijk’in eleştirel söylem analizi yöntemi kullanılarak “Şam Saatine Göre” filminin analizi yapılmaktadır. İran’ın Suriye’deki savaşı algılayışının görsel ve söylemsel yollar ile yeniden inşa edildiği sonucuna ulaşılmaktadır. Çalışma, Suriye İç Savaşı, Arap Baharı ve İran’ın bu iki meseleye bakış açısı konusunda literatüre katkı sunma amacındadır.

Despite his promises, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has so far not succeeded in bringing a rapprochement in relations with the strongest Arab state in the Persian Gulf – Saudi Arabia. It is the opposite. Both states are struggling fiercely for influence and power in the region, particularly at “the nexus of Shiite and Sunni worlds” (Henderson 2014), i.e. Iraq, currently immersed in a highly brutal civil war, but also and most recently, Yemen, where both states are involved in a “proxy war”. Although the scale of Iranian involvement in Iraq in unknown, it is believed that Iran trains and controls local armed groups, sends military advisors as well as provides military hardware. Saudi Arabia is trying to seize the bridgeheads and neutralize Iran’s influence. Such rivalry is no surprise as strategic aims are at stake. This is not only a struggle for a control over Iraq between Saudi Arabia and Iran but also a quest for hegemony over the Middle East.

دراسة: "الأبعاد الجيو-استراتيجية للسياستين الإيرانيّة والتركيّة حيال سوريا"

قمت بانجاز هذه الدراسة في اوائل سنة 2012، وقام المركز العربي بنشرها في شهر آذار- مارس من العام 2013 نظرا لاهمّيتها ولان التوقعات المستقبليّة فيها تستشرف ما يجري اليوم. تمّ تطويرها ونشرها في كتاب "خلفيات الثورة: دراسات سورية" في ايلول 2013.

أقسام الدراسة:

· جيوبوليتيك المشروع الإيراني وموقع سورية فيه

· جيوبوليتيك المشروع التركي وموقع سورية فيه،

· التنافس الإيراني - التركي لاستقطاب سورية

· إدارة التوازنات الجيوبوليتيكية السورية – الإيرانية – التركية

· الانعكاسات الجيوبوليتيكية المستقبلية للثورة السورية

الباحث: علي حسين باكير

دار النشر: المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات

تاريخ النشر: أيلول 2013

Since 2018, an increasing number of Iran-backed armed groups have started to be integrated into the Syrian and Iraqi official armed forces. The integration of armed groups allows Tehran to enjoy a multi-layered, longer-term, and potentially less expensive influence in Iraq and Syria. Besides, underlying ideological and ideational ties between the armed groups and Iran continue to affect their strategic choices. Meanwhile, and in order to preserve its ability to directly impact the developments, Tehran continues to support an array of smaller militias outside the state structures. This indicates a shifting pattern in Iran’s regional network, from relying predominantly on non-state actors to enjoying a more complex set of non-state and semi-state allies. The consolidation of this model could have considerable implications for Iraq and Syria: 1- Dual loyalties in the Iraqi and Syrian states will make it difficult to form an inclusive government and promote national unity; 2- Anti-American and anti-Israeli ideological elements in the Iraqi and Syrian armed forces’ structure could prevent establishing better ties with the US or Israel; 3- The concern of Iran’s regional rivals over the expansion of Tehran’s influence in Iraq and Syria turns the two countries into a theater for regional confrontations.

Regardless of the political and ideological diversity in disputes that engulf many of the Islamic nations of the Middle East today, the Shia versus Sunni conflict is gradually defining most of them. It appears that the United States administration and its Arab allies do not distinguish between the Shia phenomenon – its rise and potential – and aspects of Iranian foreign policy. To them, the Shia ‘threat’ is part and parcel of a larger problem, a potential Iranian threat. Notwithstanding many observers arguing that it would be a catastrophic mistake to confuse containing Iran with containing Shia Islam, a US-led policy of containing Iran is increasingly being fused with the latter. As a consequence, the Middle East is arguably on the verge of witnessing a profound shift in the power balance that could alter/determine the geopolitics of the region for decades to come. The primary aim of this paper, however, is not to account for the historical/political rise of Shiaism or of Iran, or even debate the existence of the so-called ‘Shia Crescent,’ but to examine instead, the perceptions of Sunni Arab states and the US, who feel threatened by a pan-Shia movement. It is in this respect that this paper seeks to add to existing scholarship.

The Master's work in International Criminal Justice at Portsmouth in 2010 explores various security issues concerning Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program and the potential threat of WMD usage by terrorist groups, specifically focusing on Hezbollah. The research undertakes a detailed analysis of open-source intelligence data to examine Iran's nuclear ambitions' genesis, growth, and current standing while highlighting the significant factors that have shaped these pursuits within its foreign security policy and strategic decision-making. It critically evaluates the international community's varying responses to Iran's nuclear program, spotlighting the contrasting approaches of countries like the U.S. and Israel that favour military intervention against the diplomatic solutions preferred by France, China, Germany, and Russia. It delves into the potential regional ramifications of Iran's nuclear program and assesses its chances of success. The study's consensus is that a one-dimensional approach towards Iran's nuclear aspirations could intensify regional and international security risks. Instead, the research advocates for a more sophisticated, multifaceted strategy to alleviate the nuclear crisis and safeguard regional stability. The work presents a multi-layered analysis to help understand the intricacies surrounding Iran's nuclear program and the world's reaction to it. It also meticulously assesses the risks associated with the potential use of WMDs by terrorist organisations, emphasising Hezbollah and the consequent threat level for the European Union. It thoroughly explores the connection between WMD proliferation and the global security climate. This aspect of the research broadens the scope of the discussion, shedding light on the complex challenges tied to nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The need for comprehensive, globally unified strategies is underlined, highlighting the importance of collaboration in maintaining international peace and security.