Schutz

A biographical summary plus a presentation of his basic philosophy focused on the application of phenomenology to the human sciences, especially Communicology and the political/sociological condition of the the ordinary citizen, the "forgotten man". Many summary Tables of key concepts.

El objetivo del presente artículo es explicitar y discutir la relación entre el análisis fenomenológico del mundo de la vida desarrollado por Alfred Schutz y la metodología de las ciencias sociales. En primer lugar, se bosqueja el proyecto schutziano de fundamentar las ciencias sociales en una teoría del mundo de la vida. En segundo término, se presentan los postulados schutzianos referidos a las construcciones modélicas de las científico-sociales. Luego, se coloca el foco en el modo en que Max Weber y Schutz conciben el denominado postulado de adecuación. Finalmente, se pasa revista a intentos actuales de aplicar el análisis del mundo de la vida en la investigación social empírica.

Este livre-escrito se pretende uma aproximação estética ao texto "Água Viva", de Clarice Lispector. Em tal aproximação busca-se uma experiência imediata, explicitante do princípio, já presente nas teorizações das psicoterapias de fundamentação fenomenológico-existencial, segundo o qual não encontram-se no cultivo das capacidades humanas de reflexão as possibilidades de atualização das potencialidades humanas de auto-construção e auto-superação.

Alfred Schutz tends to be falsely considered as an illustrious representative of social ontological individualism. In this paper, I seek to correct this flawed interpretation of his work by means of a revisitation of his criticism of what I – taking up a Marxian term – call the “robinsonades“ intrinsic to Husserl’s 5th Cartesian Meditation. It is my contention that the systematic reconstruction of this classical criticism makes it possible to lay bare Schutz’s actual ontological account, namely: social ontological intersubjectivism.

In her frst research project, Edith Stein set out to defne the essence of Einfühlung (empathy) as an experience of another’s consciousness. Her objective was to justify the fact that such an act opened up the possibility of a transcendental subjectivity as a solution to the solipsism of consciousness, as Husserl had indicated. Stein found the key to that essence in the idea of originariety, but she tried to avoid the problem of aesthetic empathy by resorting to Scheler’s Idols of Self-Knowledge.
.

Dit is een hoofdstuk uit een boek van J. C.  Verhoeven

Schütz is een fenomenologisch georiënteerd socioloog. Hij vertrekt vanuit de alledaagse kennis van het gewone leven naar een wetenschappelijke kennis. De waarnemer is slechts in de ,Umwelt' in staat om het handelen van de ander op een direkte manier te vatten. Voor de socioloog is de ,Mitwelt' echter het waarnemingskader. Tot een direkt beleven van de ander komt hij niet, tenzij hij zijn wetenschappelijkheid laat varen. Dit kan hij voorkomen door beroep te doen op ideaaltypes, die typische patronen v an het handelen vormen. Het postulaat van de subjektieve interpretatie blijft hierdoor behouden.
Bij Schütz werd de aandacht gevestigd op het begrijpen en verklaren van het sociale handelen, zoals hij dit bij Max Weber had ontleend. Het ,verstehen' is echter geen algemeen aanvaarde metode. Door verscheidene sociologen wordt zij als onwetenschappelijk verworpen of als een bepaalde wijze van
hypotesevorming naar het vóór-wetenschappelijke werk verwezen. Voor Schutz is het een op zichzelf staande, waardevolle metode.

El presente artículo intenta brindar un aporte al autoesclarecimiento y la autocomprensión de los cientistas sociales en lo que refiere al uso –y abuso– del concepto de "mundo de la vida" [Lebenswelt] y sus sucedáneos. Con este objetivo, se adopta un modo de proceder bifronte que se inspira en la metodología empleada por el Husserl tardío en la Krisis, a saber: la combinación de (a) reflexiones genealógicas acerca del surgimiento e itinerario histórico del concepto con (b) descripciones fenomenológicas de la "cosa" misma. En términos más precisos, se intenta reconstruir la "protofundación" [Urstiftung] filosófica del concepto por parte de Edmund Husserl y la "retoma" [reprise] científico social del mismo efectuada por Alfred Schutz.

In the first part of this text, we analyze Descartes, who is considered the father of modern philosophy and also, to some extent, the founder of modern idealism, who sought to demonstrate  the  existence  of  God  and  the separation between soul and body. Descartes is undoubtedly  a  Christian  and,  for  this  very reason, he reasoned from Christian texts and Christian  theology.  Its  process  is  to  submit everything  to  doubt  as  a  general  principle. Hume, in turn, begins by differentiating the two types of approaches to moral philosophy or the science of human nature, considering that each of  them  may  not  only  interest  but  also contribute to human development. Husserl uses phenomenology  as  a  method  of  descriptive investigation.  Popper  considers  that  the hypotheses or systems of theories of the so-called  empirical  sciences,  especially  their procedures, should be submitted to the logical analysis of scientific investigation or the logic of knowledge. In the second part, we find that Schutz considers that in order to interpret and explain  human  action  and  thought,  it  is necessary to start at a point that precedes the scientific, everyday reality. It is in this everyday region in which there can be understanding, because in it there is an effective participation of man. The understanding between people, with all  the  setbacks,  challenges,  achievements, occurs exactly in this context, that of everyday reality. There the man acts, communicates. A normal, attentive person lives and acts. Berger and Luckman, in turn, propose to unveil the foundations of knowledge in everyday life. Not from intellectuals, but from “everyday” agents in  their  equally  everyday  and  ordinarily ordinary lives.KEYWORDS:  empirical  method  of knowledge,  Descartes,  Hume,  Husserl  and 2 René Descartes (1596-1650) 3 Meditações (1ª a 4ª) Popper, construction of sociological theories, Schutz, Berger and Luckman.

The article discusses the theories of Max Weber and Alfred Schutz and the theoretical approach of these worlds with the phenomenology of philosopher Edmund Husserl. In the text are explored concepts of meaning, understanding, action, social action, social relation among others. The type of action and the two levels of sociological analysis (micro-and macro-) in designing Weber, for whom the action is the result of subjectivity are also presented. Have Schutz, action is intersubjective, socialized and understanding is behind the action, either to the meaning the actor gives his own action (subjective) and for the action of his fellow (intersubjective). Given these theories, this paper presents the divergent and convergent points between them, but above all, how records
are complementary in the pursuit of understanding the meaning of social action. Besides the conceptual precepts, the paper discusses the construction and application of the
model "ideal type" (TI) supported a Schutzian design.

Resumo:

O artigo discorre sobre as teorias de Max Weber e de Alfred Schutz e a aproximação desses mundos teóricos com a fenomenologia do filósofo Edmund Husserl. No texto são
explorados os conceitos de sentido, compreensão, ação, ação social, relação social dentre outros. São apresentados também a tipologia da ação e os dois níveis de análise sociológica (microssocial e macrossocial) na concepção de Weber, para quem a ação é fruto da subjetividade. Já para Schutz, a ação é intersubjetiva, socializada e a compreensão está por detrás da ação, quer para o sentido que o ator dá a sua própria ação (subjetivo), quer para a ação de seu semelhante (intersubjetivo). Tendo em vista essas teorias, este trabalho apresenta os pontos divergentes e convergentes entre elas,
mas acima de tudo, registra o quanto são complementares na busca de compreensão do sentido da ação social. Além dos preceitos conceituais, o texto discute a construção e a aplicação do modelo “tipo ideal” (TI) amparados numa concepção schutziana.

En este trabajo se propone abordar una realidad concreta (el bienestar social), delimitada mediante las dimensiones representadas por los contextos (económico, social, cultural, político), y referida a una situación específica (la pobreza o la sobrevivencia); desde la perspectiva de la propuesta conceptual de la reproducción social y la socialidad de los sujetos. El punto de partida es considerar a las necesidades y sus satisfactores en una relación dialéctica que sustenta el proceso del bienestar social o satisfacción de necesidades, mediante el cual se reproducen estos sujetos y al mismo tiempo contribuyen a la reproducción de los sistemas de los que forman parte. La sobrevivencia es la reproducción social mínima. Para analizar cómo se da este proceso multidimensional de reproducción de sujetos sociales, como la familia, se recurre a conceptualizar la socialidad como articulación de tres conjuntos de fenómenos microsociales: intersubjetividad, interacción y relación social. En este trabajo, por lo tanto, se pretende tender un puente entre el marxismo y la fenomenología social de Schutz. De este modo, subjetividades sociales como la confianza, la reciprocidad y la solidaridad, pertinentes a procesos de reproducción social, en lugar de ser consideradas como características o atributos de los sujetos sociales, se comprenden como entendimientos compartidos o como percepciones construidas socialmente.

In this article, we argue for the importance of the notion of confict in John Dewey’s philosophy. Indeed, many criticisms have been leveled against Dewey regarding his political philosophy and his philosophy of education based on the idea that he underestimated the confict inherent in human afairs. Tese criticisms are compelling because they link the two sides—educational and political—of Dewey’s philosophy. Critics simultaneously address their criticisms to one side vis-à-vis the
adverse consequences caused as a result of the other side. In response to this analysis, we want to argue that confict is indispensable for understanding the theory of inquiry and its validity in the search for knowledge as well as in confronting social and political tensions. In this way, we will frst see the criticisms of Dewey’s lack of emphasis on the notion of confict in his philosophy. Ten we will see how, in response to these criticisms, it is possible to determine three uses of conflict in
Dewey’s work. Finally, we will turn to the role that this notion can play in developing a pedagogy of compromise based on Dewey’s educational philosophy. Thus, we hope to respond to criticisms of Dewey’s work without discarding either side— educational or political—of his theorizing.

This article contributes to current discussions of the spatial inspired by complexity theories that emphasize the multiple and relational qualities of space. It introduces the concept of vagueness and “vague objects” and relates these to spatial theory through the intersubjective theory of Alfred Schutz. The author argues that a consideration of vagueness, especially as constructed in Schutz’s version of intersubjectivity, can provide insights (outside complexity theorizations) into the continuous and multivalent nature of social space and the relationships between spatial experience, practice, representation, and power.


Keywords: Vagueness, Space, Schutz, Power, Lefebvre, Phenomenology, Habermas.

In this article, I adopt the problem of world-experience as a clue to tackling the issue of the transformation of Husserl’s phenomenology in the United States. Starting from Landgrebe’s article on the world as a phenomenological problem I distinguish those thinkers who see in Husserl’s treatment of the life-world the fundamental issue of phenomenology from those who, by contrast, describe phenomenology as an analysis of the given experience. Through a comparison between Farber and Schutz, I reflect on the ways to conciliate the phenomenological method with a natural view of the world, and finally, referring to Gurwitsch’s perspective, I ask to what extent this sort of mundane phenomenology could deal with constitutive analyses.

Sociology is sometimes reproached with the fact that it is still engaged in a search for its object so that as a science it has not achieved any coherent picture of society, nor can it achieve this In addition to this there is the quarrel over methods which was perhaps formerly more violent than it is now, but it has still not entirely disappeared from the scene. Attempts at reconciliation have been made but have not always found a sufficient following. It is, nevertheless, worthwhile continuing the dialogue if a more generally accepted picture of sociology is to be arrived at. In this discussion there is a confrontation between dialectic and « understanding » ("ver-stehen "). The necessity with which the sociologist is confronted of defining his object does not imply that he can do this completely independently of all social-scientific tradition. On the contrary, the sociologist must take the intersubjectivity of his science just as much into account as the researcher into any other scientific discipline. We shall thus begin this study with the confrontation of several recent investigations into the various definitions of the object and their methodological consequences in order, by so doing, not to break the link with the past. In fact the most recent discussions have been about a question which is very old and which already occupied a central position in social philosophy, namely « from which angle must the relationship of the individual to the community be approached » 2).In sociological writings various solutions have been put forward to this problem. One school considers the group as a reality which can be studied in se. Another tendency does not allow the group any existential value and considers that the individual is the only existing reality. Now there is a tendency to accept neither the first nor the second solution but to place both in a dialectical relationship. G. Gurvitch is one of the pioneers of this.

Num momento cultural em que não são mais possíveis nem as garantias fundamentais da tradição nem a referência moderna à vontade livre de um Eu soberano como instâncias últimas de decisão ética, jurídica e política, revelam-se as práticas psicológicas fenomenológico existenciais, em seu compromisso com aquele horizonte da trágica verdade humana, fundamento da irrepetível singularidade de seu existir que se subtrai por essência a toda captura por parte do conhecer, uma bem sucedida resposta cultural ao modo como se coloca contemporaneamente o problema irrecusável da verdade e sentido da ação humana no mundo – núcleo originário mesmo das questões éticas.

El presente texto debe comprenderse como un aporte metodológico al debate acerca de la aplicación de procedimientos de análisis del discurso en la sociología. Se propone considerar las contribuciones de la teoría de la relevancia de Alfred Schutz a este campo de investigación. Un estudio anterior del autor, en la cual se aplica la teoría de la relevancia en el marco de un análisis empírico del discurso, constituye el trasfondo de las reflexiones aquí vertidas. Se introducen ejemplos de este estudio para ilustrar las consideraciones teóricas del artículo.

"Full text published in english (translation from polish)

http://www.stageplays.com/products/cuts_last_but_one_seancecategorycyberpresscode366/
Marat%20Dakunin

""ABOUT CERTAIN FORMAL ASPECTS OF THE “CUT’S LAST (BUT ONE) SÉANCE” DRAMA



„Cut’s Last (But One) Show” is a drama of ego – actually, it is a monodrama; still, it is written for two actors. Cut’s personality is not revealed through actions – Cut prides himself on not taking any actions (dicit et non facis – though referring to which as devil’s definition is an exaltation in a certain way). There is no conflict – but a longing for a conflict (even shown literally). A conflict between existence and aspirations of existence (their irrelevance). A certain staticality is a dramaticality here, as Pieta or the Thinker by Rodin are static.

The drama has some features of a mass.
A mass is a celebration – a celebration can be either a despair or hope.
The essence of a mass is based not only on a ceremonial but also on evoking – one evokes “deeds and conversations, impressions, thoughts, and they become symbolized. A mass is a way of sharing collective consciousness and emitting of collective consciousness. Everything that happens on the stage evokes everything what happened outside but; also and first of all, „inside”. Ceremonies evoke memory; sometimes they try to sift it, determine it more, catch it in the past and in everything that is changing; everything what „happens” is a ritual which refers to something (particularly, it concerns recollection, hope, experience, ultimate – boundary idea (of love) – it concerns absolutely). Exceeding the limits of permissible repetitiveness, we refer by a ritual to what was before an „automatism” of sensation.
Everything is a ceremony since everything is a reference.
Paradoxically, a ceremony is horrendously difficult to be played. It is also about grasping a plane – where between a blasé ritual, which is actually empty, and a pure idea (which is not fouled by it) the truth about a man is revealed. But this truth must be purified.

The „séance” is a black mass („burying” Isis little by little) and an Easter morning mass. At the end of drama some “movement” is started – a movement (a change) is earlier referred to statically – because a change is something that hurts Cut („former days were better than these”…”Say not thou that the future days would bring what they always bring” – melancholy of loss, of what is removed by a change, of what is gone) – still, a movement simultaneously means life, stillness means death. „A moment, last forever” actually means „it would be better for me to never be born”.
Written for two actors, the monodrama, the ego drama has, in an ideal prospect, another function of ceremony, ritual – forgetting about your ego.
Isis a total reference for Cut because she is: the absolute (the One, perfection), the personal God (and these are both this withdrawn one and this engaged one, immanent towards Cut and transcendent one); besides she is Isis – a mother, Isis – a wife, Isis – a feminine element, exiled Shekinah, a woman as everything what is different but also everything what is found in yourself, a neighbor (“You”, a man). What is more and first of all – she is hope for Cut to find himself.
In everything that Isis on the stage and Isis on the screen do (and in the fact of her being divided into stage and projection) there is a consequence of it (a consequence of a total reference – a word – a thought – a feeling – an impression – magic (what is mystic, what is seen). Prima facie, it might seem to have other type of consequence – a rather banal consequence: the stage – reality, the projection – Cut’s images or dreams."""