Edmund Husserl

On the lower walls of the Upper Church at Assissi there is a series of frescoes (1297-1300) by Giotto that celebrate the life of St Francis as recounted in Bonaventure’s life of the saint (from which excerpts are found beneath each fresco). One of these frescoes, The Crib at Greccio, shows an unusual view of the exposed carpentry on the verso of the cross fixed above the doorway of the solid tramezzo screen that divides the chorus from the nave. The lecture explores the issue of whether the purpose of this view strangely occluded cross is to interrupt the customary focus of the devout on the mass that takes place on the frontal side of the cross on the other side of the screen. Would this increase the emotional impact of the miraculous vision associated with St Francis’s unprecedented nativity play (that other mass) taking place in the chorus with priest, the saint himself, monks and leading citizens of the city? What is the significance of displacing the scene from its humble hill town setting at Greccio to this new setting in the wealthy Franciscan church pictured in the fresco? Does this deviation from the Bonaventure’s text increase the prestige of the order without destroying the spontaneity of the event? Does it constitute a precedent for liturgy with fresh and moving ideological connotations? Finally, is the setting of the nativity drama in the chorus a ‘front region’ masquerading as a ‘back region’ (in Irving Goffmann’s terms) providing worshippers in the actual church with an especially privileged and emotional identification with the events taking place within the fictional church? Contrasts will be made with Duccio’s double-sided Maestà at Siena, and innovative use will be made of the theories of indeterminacy attributed to the ‘wrong’ sides of things by philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Luc Ferry and Jan Patocka.

Both Millikan's brand of naturalistic analytic philosophy and Husserlian phenomenology have held on to teleological notions, despite their being out of favor in mainstream Western philosophy for most of the twentieth century. Both traditions have recognized the need for teleology in order to adequately account for intentionality, the need to adequately account for intentionality in order to adequately account for meaning, and the need for an adequate theory of meaning in order to precisely and consistently describe the world and life. The stark differences between their accounts of these fundamental concepts stem from radically different conceptions of the world, the natural and life. I argue that Millikan's teleosemantic approach relies on a teleology of determination by means of the lawfulness of nature that leaves no room for the freedom of self-determination, for reason, or for experience-for the reality of lived human life. In contrast to Millikan's account, Husserl's transcendental phenomenology situates teleology as a function of reason and first-personal experience, part of an extended account of intentionality and meaning according to which the full range of our making sense of the world is conceived as a rational activity that is itself a part of that world, and not an unnatural activity to be separated from it. While Husserl's account of these issues is indeed symptomatic of what Millikan calls "meaning rationalism," I argue that it is immune to the sorts of problems she claims will plague any such account, since these problems arise only against the background of a set of presuppositions about intentionality (representationalism, the "mythiness" of all givens) that Husserl does not share. Husserl's position can itself be understood to be within the bounds of a suitably liberal conception of naturalism, and interpreting him in this way it has the added benefit--contra Millikan--of not divorcing teleology from reason, the latter construed as our first-personal striving to make sense of the world as we experience it--of life.

This article presents a brief report of a first-person investigation through drawing, discussing how serially developed drawing can be understood to express the becoming of 'now' – the present moment in time. By employing a phenomenological approach, the notion that drawing expresses this idea is treated as an assumption, meaning a hypothesis to be tested through practice and theory combined. This occurs as part of my developing research practice, where I look to ‘perform philosophy in a non-philosophical way’ (Emoe 2014). Rather than treat art as an object for philosophy, I use philosophy to question a thought that I, as a practitioner, believe is immanent to drawing as form of art – that drawing itself is a form of becoming, based on the intentionality underpinning the temporal experience of drawing.

One of the most persistent and poignant human experiences is the sensation of longing—a restlessness perhaps best described as the unspoken conviction that something is missing from our lives. In this study, Drew M. Dalton attempts to illuminate this experience by examining the philosophical thought of Emmanuel Levinas on longing, or what Levinas terms “metaphysical desire.”

Metaphysical desire, according to Levinas, does not stem from any determinate lack within us, nor does it aim at a particular object beyond us, much less promise any eventual satisfaction. Rather, it functions in the realm of the infinite where such distinctions as inside and outside or one and the other are indistinguishable, perhaps even eliminated. As Levinas conceives such longing, it becomes a mediator in our relation to the other—both the human other and the divine Other.

Dalton follows the meandering trail of Levinas’s thought along a series of dialogues with some of the philosophers within the history of the Western tradition who have most influenced his corpus. By tracing the genealogy of Levinas’s notion of metaphysical desire—namely in the works of Plato, Heidegger, Fichte, Schelling, and Otto—the nature of this Levinasian theme is elucidated to reveal that it is not simply an idealism, a “hagiography of desire” detached from actual experience and resulting in a disconnect between his phenomenological account and our own lives. Rather, Levinas’s account of metaphysical desire points to a phenomenology of human longing that is both an ethical and religious phenomenon. In the end, human longing is revealed to be one of the most profound ways in which a subject becomes a subject, arising to its “true self,” and hearing the call to responsibility placed upon it by the Other.

Throughout, Dalton explicates the nuance of a number of key Levinasian terms, many of which have been taken from the Western philosophical tradition and reinscribed with a new meaning. Eros, the “Good beyond being,” shame, responsibility, creation, the trace, the il y a, and the holy are discovered to be deeply tied to Levinas’s account of metaphysical desire, resulting in a conclusion regarding longing’s role in the relationship between the finite and the Infinite.

In this paper I discuss in a critical manner what I believe to be some of the more interesting contributions of Anthony Steinbock’s book Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl. I will thus refer mainly to his clarification of the constitution of familiar and alien objects or states of affairs through appropriation and transgression. In connection with this I will try to put forward some of the advantages and implications of a phenomenological approach to the problem of historicity in terms of generativity.  However, I will also discuss some of the limitations and problems of Steinbock’s approach. I believe that most if not all of these problems are related to his understanding of the relationship between static, genetic and generative phenomenological methods. Therefore I will devote some lines to discuss this issue and to rethink some of Steinbock’s main theses under the light of another way of understanding the relationship between these methods as well as the task of the philosophical inquiry proposed by phenomenology.

In my chapter, I criticize a group of definitions of empathy recently proposed by Nancy Snow, Frédérique de Vignemont, and others. These definitions are united by an assumption I call the 'similarity assumption' – roughly, the idea that it is a necessary condition for empathy that empathizer and target are in an emotional state of the same type. I argue that these definitions implausibly count certain cases of emotional contagion as cases of empathy, but that it is unclear whether the similarity assumption is responsible for these problems.

"Michel Weber et Pierfrancesco Basile (sous la direction de), Chromatikon III. Annuaire de la philosophie en procès — Yearbook of Philosophy in Process, Louvain-la-Neuve, Presses universitaires de Louvain, 2007. (300 p. ; ISBN 978-2-8746-3083-5 ; 23 € ; http://www.i6doc.com/fr/livre/?GCOI=28001100028210 ; http://www.i6doc.com/en/livre/?GCOI=28001100028210; http://www.i6doc.com/doc/chromatikon3 & http://www.i6doc.com/doc/chromatikon3-eng)

Table
Michel Weber, Avant-Propos & Foreword
I. Séminaires de recherche — Research Seminars
Pierfrancesco Basile, The Reality of Forms
Jean-Marie Breuvart, Husserl et Whitehead, sur l’Intentionnalité
Didier Debaise, Life and Orders
Ronny Desmet, The Rebirth of the Ether
Guillaume Durand, Les objets perceptuels du Professeur Whitehead
Franck Robert, Penser la couleur avec Process and Reality
Xavier Verley, Sentir : Whitehead et Merleau-Ponty
II. Etudes critiques — Critical Studies
Jean-Pascal Alcantara, Le rôle des mathématiques dans la genèse whiteheadienne
Une Sœur de Saint-Jean, Un Principe que les religions appellent « Dieu »
Laura Ilinescu, Vérité et pouvoir dans le Léviathan de Thomas Hobbes
Marc Maesschalck, Raison et événement chez Jean Ladrière
Pierre Montebello, Nietzsche, une philosophie de la nature
Michel Weber, Contact Made Vision: The Apocryphal Whitehead
III. Comptes rendus — Critical Reviews
Stéphan Galetic : James, Essais d’empirisme radical
Ronny Desmet : Lacoste Lareymondie, Une philosophie pour la physique quantique
IV. Informations réticulaires — Reticular News
Discussion: David Ray Griffin, A Reply to Alexander Cockburn
Notes : Peter H. Hare, On Gertrude Stein and Mathematical Logic
Interview : Carlo Sini, Luca Gaeta and Luca Vanzago, The Milano School
Tribute: Leemon McHenry, T.L.S. Sprigge, the Last Idealist
Séminaires — Seminars
Publications
Table des matières — Table of Contents
"

Having asked, What, then, is time? Augustine admitted, I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled. We all have a sense of time, but the description and explanation of it remain remarkably elusive. Through a series of detailed descriptions, Husserl attempted to clarify this sense of time. This book traces the development of his account of our temporal self-awareness, starting with his early 1905-1909 lectures on time consciousness and proceeding through the 1917-18 Bernau Manuscripts, the Analyses of Passive Syntheses of the 1920s and ending with the C, B and E manuscripts on time and instincts of the 1930s. Although it covers all the stages of Husserl’s account of temporality, the book is nonetheless systematic in its approach. It is organized about a number of basic topics in the theory of time and presents and critically appraises Husserl’s positions on the issues pertaining to each.

In this afterword to an important collection of essays that address the clinical aspects of the new phenomenology's concept of "atmospheres" in terms of psychopathology, I consider whether gestalt therapy may be an hospitable modality for these concerns.  I approach gestalt therapy as a clinical phenomenology and, as such, see many possible ways for the new phenomenology and gestalt therapy to critically engage one another. 

Please cite: Dan Bloom, D. (2019). Neither from the “Inside” Looking “Out” nor from the “Outside” Looking “In.” In G. Francesetti & T. Griffero (Eds.), Psychopathology and Atmospheres, neither inside nor outside (pp. 178–190). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Wenn man die Parallelen zwischen Husserl und seinen Vorgängern in der klassischen deutschen Philosophie nachverfolgen und systematisch explizieren will, muss man zunächst einmal den gemeinsamen Boden freilegen, auf dem sie jeweils angesiedelt werden können bzw. schon angesiedelt sind. Freilich, die Unterschiede, Differenzen und Meinungsverschiedenheiten, die beide "Traditionen" charakterisieren, sind unbestreitbar.

A tout instant, quoi que nous fassions, nous sommes environnés par des corps qui réduisent l’espace et opposent de la résistance. Que sont ces corps qui saturent notre quotidien et avec lesquels il nous faut constamment négocier l’espace ? Plus radicalement, pourquoi y a-t-il des corps ? Je soutiens dans cet ouvrage que la psychologie et la physique ne disposent plus des moyens de répondre à cette question. La désubstantialisation du réel amorcée par la révolution quantique sape les fondements de l’explication objectiviste de la perception privilégiée par la première, et elle évide de sa portée ontologique le discours de la seconde.
Expliquer pourquoi la réalité se présente sous la forme d’un agencement de corps exige en premier lieu de comprendre le rôle que remplit l’anticipation du possible dans la perception. Dans le toucher comme dans la vision, poser l’existence d’un corps implique d’anticiper les contraintes que ce corps exerce sur notre champ de possibilités pratiques, accréditer de manière présomptive la disponibilité ou l’indisponibilité de certaines possibilités d’action. C’est donc uniquement parce que notre subjectivité donne sens à ce qui est en le référant à ce qui peut être que la réalité macroscopique à laquelle nous introduit la perception consiste en un monde solide.
Pour développer cette idée, l’ouvrage dresse une critique de la conception actualiste du phénomène de corps, qui subordonne celui-ci à l’expérience en acte d’une résistance, et il déconstruit l’approche physicaliste et objectiviste, qui prétend dériver les propriétés des corps que nous percevons des propriétés de structures physiques qui leur seraient antécédentes ontologiquement. Si la sémantique des corps présuppose l’épaisseur du temps humain et une perspective foncièrement pragmatique sur l’environnement, il n’est plus question d’assimiler sans autre forme de procès le corps à une « structure physique », quelle qu’en soit la teneur. Les corps sont un produit de l’activité constructrice de notre subjectivité, et seule une incursion profonde dans les mécanismes et principes qui régissent cette activité pourra permettre d’accéder à leur vérité.

Interpreters of Michel Foucault's 1966 Les mots et les choses have often conflated the terms 'episteme' and 'historical a priori'. This article suggests that the two terms are entirely separate: while 'episteme' refers to the configuration of thought in a given historical period, 'historical a priori' refers to the conditions of unity for a certain field of science within a given period. In his use of the term 'historical a priori', Foucault is thus much closer to Husserl than has hitherto been appreciated. Keeping the two terms separated also sheds new light on the archaeological method that Foucault uses, showing that there is a procedure to get from an archive of texts to the reconstruction of an episteme.

This essay invites us to take Emmanuel Levinas’s thought in the spirit in which it was written: a profound engagement with Husserlian’s phenomenology and, secondarily, with Heidegger’s existential philosophy. Levinas’s central idea, whether called “responsibility,” “substitution,” or the “other-in-the-same,” has often been criticized as mere “smoke and mirrors”—an indemonstrable hermeneutics of ethical investiture. The purpose of this essay is to show how Levinas analyzed and exploited ambiguities in Husserl’s work on intersubjectivity and sensibility, in view of developing his own phenomenology. It is organized as follows: Following an initial discussion of Husserl’s importance as an intersubjective thinker, I situate briefly Husserl’s interest in, and his approach to ethics. I discuss his early equation of object sensations with sentiments of value. Section II turns to Husserl’s interest in “intropathy” (Einfühlung), a concept he appears to have adapted from Theodor Lipps (1851-1914). It was Einfühlung that allowed Husserl to attempt various phenomenological constitutions of the other person; just as it was Einfühlung that provided a bridge between his extensive investigations into intersubjectivity and passive synthesis. Section III develops Husserl’s phenomenology of passive synthesis in light of the evolution of his conception of the living present and of transcendental consciousness. Section IV returns to a moment (1908) when Husserl’s other, like Levinas’s other in 1961, was “absolute”. Section V discusses Einfühlung in Cartesian Meditation V and Husserl’s notes on intersubjectivity during the period 1921 and 1928. Section VI examines intropathy and pairing with the other’s body in view of self-objectification and what Husserl occasionally called Ent-fremdung (alienation). It ventures a rapprochement with concepts in Levinas’s later work (e.g., “recurrence”). Section VII explores Husserl’s approach to affective forces and a phenomenological “unconscious,” with an eye on Levinas’s 1974 resistance to the passive spontaneity of meaning-formation. Section VIII discusses Husserl’s reading of a master-servant relationship and the fusion of wills in praxis. Section IX examines his subjectivity “thrust into the interior” of another subjectivity, and the possibility that the Husserlian monad might have windows. Section X returns to Husserl’s conception of sensation, this time as originary (hyletic) contents that ‘feed’ the flow of time-consciousness. It summarizes Levinas’s interrogation of Husserl’s formalism, notably between 1905 and 1909. In each section, I emphasize ambiguities in Husserl’s thought and the way in which Levinas utilized these between 1961 and 1974. My hope is to sketch some of the lesser known, phenomenological sources of his thought, and thereby encourage discussion of Levinas as an unorthodox Husserlian.

Przysługujący widmom wywrotowy, niemalże rewolucyjny potencjał został odsunięty oraz zagubiony poprzez pozbycie się tej kontrowersyjnej kategorii z terytorium metafizyki i zbyt pośpieszne odesłanie jej do przestrzeni badań nad literaturą, sprowadzając ją jedynie do roli użytecznego, bezpiecznego narzędzia interpretacji.

Książka Andrzeja Marca odzyskuje niepokojący charakter widmontologii i ponownie wprowadza widma do myśli metafizycznej. Czym nawiedzona i przeniknięta jest tradycyjna metafizyka, co właściwie ją dręczy, nie daje spokoju oraz nieustannie podmywa jej stabilność?

Kategoria widma Derridy posłużyła Marcowi przede wszystkim do rozważań nad charakterem współczesności i przeobrażeń, jakie dokonały się w obrębie myśli ponowoczesnej. Współczesna kultura, zdaniem Marca, stała się miejscem powstawania widm, nieustannie powracających z przeszłości. Uznając, że nie jesteśmy już w stanie tworzyć utopijnych wizji przyszłości, autor stara się zdać sprawę z widmowego charakteru współczesnej kultury, analizując m. in. strategie vintage, retro, nurt no future w kulturze lat 70. czy nurt fantastyki naukowej w literaturze.

The first know book to be published (published by Cornell University Press in 1977). It offers a clear explanation of Husserl's phenomenology, with applications to Gödel's mathematical realism (long before Gödel's papers on phenomenology & phenomenology-logic-mathematics were available), applications to the problem of multiple logics, explaining how especially how Intuitionistic and Classical logic are valid albeit in different domains. There is a criticism of then Analytic philosophy treatment of (natural language).  The Preface & parts of the Introduction are way out of date, by the main text is more enduring.  It is written in an effort to make the phenomenology of Husserl available to readers who found Husserl's writings impenetrable.  It is principally aimed at applying phenomenology rather than to academic treatment of Husserl's work, applied to those who might like drawn upon phenomenology to achieve better understanding of concrete phenomenology (rather than academically aimed at  explaining & criticizing Husserl's texts and other texts interpreting Husserl's texts).

Nel quadro dei rapporti implicati dal titolo del nostro programma di ricerca 1 la questione Heidegger-Husserl rientra come uno dei momenti determinanti. In primo luogo perché la critica di Heidegger alla riduzione trascendentale husserliana e alla possibilità di tematizzare una "coscienza pura" con funzione costituente (nella formulazione offerta principalmente in Ideen I) è condotta esplicitamente sul terreno della problematica ontologica; in secondo luogo poiché è una critica che risospinge Husserl e la fenomenologia all'interno di quella matrice "tradizionale" (moderna) del pensiero da cui la contemporaneità attenderebbe ancora di liberarsi definitivamente.

This chapter focuses on a number of respects in which Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of the world differ, despite other significant commonalities. Specifically, it discusses how both Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of our experience of the world challenge Husserl’s assertion of the possibility of a worldless consciousness; how Heidegger’s discussion of the world entails a rejection of Husserl’s claim that the world is at bottom nature; and how Merleau-Ponty puts pressure on Husserl’s account of the necessary structure of the world. In concluding, and as a propaedeutic to adjudicating these disputes, this chapter aims to show why Husserl makes these contested claims. Specifically, it suggests that it is Husserl’s phenomenological conception of reason and his commitment to (this conception of) reason that motivate him to make the claims about our experience and world with which the later phenomenologists take issue.

This paper will focus on the aims, methods and problems of both Husserl's and Foucault's projects in order to mark their differences and their similarities. In so doing, it will underscore their shared (Kantian) goal: to strengthen the human capacity for reason as a critical means of theoretical and practical reflection. It is my contention that the differences between the thinkers' specific aims only reinforce their respective routes towards a common objective. In this respect, I will argue that both thinkers actually engage in a project to objectify subjective reason. My reasoning follows that both apply a methodological reduction in order to understand and thereby reduce the discursive and social powers that determine the praxis of reasoning. As a result, Husserl sought to make the sciences aware of their foundations in the life-world, while Foucault sought to expose their basis in and through the workings of power.

Sound coming from outside the field of vision, from somewhere beyond, holds a privileged place in the Western imagination. When separated from their source, sounds seem to manifest transcendent realms, divine powers, or supernatural forces. According to legend, the philosopher Pythagoras lectured to his disciples from behind a veil, and two thousand years later, in the age of absolute music, listeners were similarly fascinated with disembodied sounds, employing various techniques to isolate sounds from their sources. With recording and radio came spatial and temporal separation of sounds from sources, and new ways of composing music.

Sound Unseen: Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice explores the phenomenon of acousmatic sound. An unusual and neglected word, "acousmatic" was first introduced into modern parlance in the mid-1960s by avant garde composer of musique concrète Pierre Schaeffer to describe the experience of hearing a sound without seeing its cause. Working through, and often against, Schaeffer's ideas, Brian Kane presents a powerful argument for the central yet overlooked role of acousmatic sound in music aesthetics, sound studies, literature, philosophy and the history of the senses. Kane investigates acousmatic sound from a number of methodological perspectives -- historical, cultural, philosophical and musical -- and provides a framework that makes sense of the many surprising and paradoxical ways that unseen sound has been understood. Finely detailed and thoroughly researched, Sound Unseen pursues unseen sounds through a stunning array of cases -- from Bayreuth to Kafka's "Burrow," Apollinaire to Zizek, music and metaphysics to architecture and automata, and from Pythagoras to the present -- to offer the definitive account of acousmatic sound in theory and practice.

The first major study in English of Pierre Schaeffer's theory of "acousmatics," Sound Unseen is an essential text for scholars of philosophy of music, electronic music, sound studies, and the history of the senses.

In everyday language, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, "people often confuse the words empathy and sympathy." As is clarified promptly, "empathy means 'the ability to understand and share the feelings of another' (as in both authors have the skill to make you feel empathy with their heroines), whereas sympathy means 'feelings of pity and sorrow for someone else's misfortune' (as in they had great sympathy for the flood victims)." In the case of "compassion", the usage is presented as rather straightforward. Compassion is understood as "sympathetic pity and concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others: the victims should be treated with compassion." The formulation "should be treated" already implies an otherdirected awareness that is aimed at a helping behaviour--even if no action proper is taken, compassion demands one to adopt a certain respectful attitude toward the suffering person.

Reviews: Andrea Staiti, “Reactivating Husserl’s Crisis. D. Moran, Introduction to Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,” Research in Phenomenology 44/1 (2014), 143-159; Michael Landes, Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review, Volume 52 Issue no. 1 (March 2013), pp. 195-197; David Bachyrycz, Husserl Studies, 2013. DOI 10.1007/s10743-013-9140-y; Thane Martin Naberhaus, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014/06/21 (https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/48881-husserl-s-crisis-of-the-european-sciences-and-transcendental-phenomenology-an-introduction/)

Part I sets out the most essential features of
Husserl’s understanding of aesthetic consciousness, namely, its status as mode of valuing
grounded in the realm of sensory and/or phantasy appearance, which involves the
disinterested appreciation of such appearances. A number of comparisons and contrasts are
made with Kant’s aesthetics (with which Husserl’s has some affinity). We then move on to
discussion of the varieties of aesthetic object that Husserl identifies. Part II addresses those
arising from ‘external perception’ most notably the aesthetic consciousness of nature, and
Part III discusses the aesthetics of phantasy as such, and of the spatial arts, and of the
symbolically presented arts of literature and music. In Part IV, we address the interesting
general significance that Husserl assigns to the aesthetic and beauty, and in Conclusion, we
offer a critical review of his theory overall and a further development of one of its most
interesting points.

What can phenomenological reflection contribute to the ongoing discussion of transcendental thought? What kind of transcendental philosophy is phenomenology? Why does Husserl's unfinished project merit the name transcendental? Can the notion of transcendental phenomenology be defended today, and is Husserl right in insisting upon its uniqueness and indeclinability? To what extent is the very idea of transcendental phenomenology deeply committed to metaphysical prejudices that we have to renounce the transcendental project in favour of other projects? To what extent is speculative realism in a position to overcome the Kantian philosophical framework? This impressive collection of essays is a lucid, insightful and important attempt to answer these questions. Not only does it give new insight into the transcendental character of phenomenology, but it also outlines the dynamic development of phenomenology as a continuing and expanding domain of research. The editors claim that this volume " is motivated by the insight that the novel interdisciplinary situation in which phenomenology conducts fruitful exchanges with several empirical sciences demands that we reconsider thoroughly the fundamental methodological questions concerning the transcendental character of phenomenological inquiries. Phenomenology and the Transcendental brings together original articles that together clarify the transcendental aspects of phenomenology and outline new transcendental versions of phenom-enology in distinction from the naturalistic, vitalist, and poststructuralist approaches that dominate philosophy at the moment " (p. 3). In this review, I provide a brief overview of the contributions to this volume to show how the transcendental standpoint is indispensable for genuine phenomenology and philosophical reasoning in general.

In phenomenology, normality is neither an objectively measurable average nor a mere historical or social construct. Rather than being understood from without, looked at from the outside of lived experiences, normality is approached from within as a condition and mode of lived experience. In the first part of the paper, I will show why it is relevant to turn to a phenomenological investigation of normality if one is interested in normativity. This perspective, so I will argue, is needed if one wants to understand not only how external norms actually become part of subjective experience but also how norms develop in the first place through repeated practices. As such, the experience of normality, understood here as consisting of selfevident feelings of orientation and familiarity, can be interpreted as the result of an operative normativity. In the second part, I will present Husserl's theory of normality in more detail in order to demonstrate how it could be applied to a more systematic investigation of normality and norms on different genetic levels. Lived normality is seen here as a dynamic and fragile system of balances; a constant attempt to achieve an equilibrium with one's environment and fellow subjects. (Re)turning to normality allows us to see normativity at work, embedded in the need for constant development, appropriation, and transformations of regular structures in experience.

In this chapter I focus on a few selected building blocks that will pave the way for a renewed, thorough, and sober phenomenological reading of Marx’s philosophy. I intend to show here that this can be done best through 1) moving Marx away from a Hegelian framework, 2) understanding the concept of critique as an attempt to de-naturalize social phenomena and as disclosure, and 3) showing that Marx’s concept of philosophy, his method, as well as his understanding of technology, are forms of “disclosure.” This, in turn, should point us away from a dialectical understanding of Marx and open up new venues for a phenomenologically inspired critique of political economy.

LEXIKON 09-1/2 Husserl-Lexikon / hrsg. von Hans-Helmuth Gander. In red. Zusammenarbeit mit Thiemo Breyer ... -Darmstadt : Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, [Abt. Verlag], 2010. -335 S. ; 25 cm. -ISBN 978-3-534-16493-6 : EUR 79.00, EUR 49.90 (für Mitgl.) [#0897] Die Philosophie Husserls ist, obwohl nicht gerade leicht zugänglich, im 20. Jahrhundert wirkungsgeschichtlich von großer Bedeutung gewesen. Die Wirkung Husserls kann als eine weltweite bezeichnet werden. 1 Daraus resultiert auch in erster Linie das Interesse, das gegenwärtig an Husserls Philosophie besteht, die im wesentlichen als eine Form der Phänomenologie verstanden werden kann. Phänomenologie ist hier jedoch nicht im Sinne Hegels zu verstehen, sondern hat bei Husserl eine spezifische Bedeutung -die im vorliegenden Husserl-Lexikon selbstverständlich auch in einem eigenen Eintrag ausführlich dargestellt wird. Neben Lexika zu Hegel, 2 zu Nietzsche, 3 zu Platon 4 und zur französischen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts 5 aus demselben Verlag tritt nun auch ein

Husserlian phenomenology can analyze the art criticism in two ways: first, it can analyze its very transcendental possibilities; second, it can analyze it as a particular cultural institution. The former approach places art criticism within analyses of pure consciousness at the " crossroad " between aesthetic and natural attitude while arguing for primacy of the aesthetic experience in artistic value judgment. This analysis comes with a particular normative prescription for the art criticism. However, such prescription does not sufficiently address the multifaceted tasks the living art criticism takes upon itself. Therefore, the article investigates and outlines the latter approach , too, that is, the ways in which Husserlian phenomenology can engage with the art criticism as a cultural institution. Leads are offered by Husserl's treatment of the ethical dimension of vocation, which could be fruitful for the art criticism as well.

The article presents the transcendental reduction as a type of questioning, and by so doing formulates the problem of the structure and motivation of reduction. Transcendental questioning is presented as a permanent formulation and reformulation of questions, which, it is argued, make it possible to overcome the naïveté of the natural attitude. However, the phenomenologist does not overcome naïveté in the sense of excluding it; instead, he is conscious of it. It is argued that one should understand transcendental questioning as a practical activity that makes the phenomenologist responsible for knowledge by leading toward the essence, which seems to be “unquestionable.”

olduğu o fiyakalı imza belki de yadsınamaz. Ne ki, çağdaş bilişsel-bilim çalışmaları moleküler ve sinirbilimsel düzeyde ilerlediği ve o arada çeşitli (az sayıda olmayan ve daha ziyade gelişimsel evrelerin geçişliliği bahsinde kümelenen) noktalarda Piaget'yle çeliştiği için, bilişsel teorilerde yazarın esamisi pek okunmaz bugün. Buna karşılık, gelişim teorilerinde adını sık duyarız -'gelişimselci'lerden (developmentalist) addedildiğini duyarız. Konvansiyonel koordinatları itibarıyla, kısacası, günümüzde Piaget zikredilince, bugüne bugün, üç başlık sökün etmelidir hafıza-i beşeriyete: Gelişimsel psikoloji, bilişsel kuram, genetik epistemoloji.³ Fakat, yine ivedilikle belirtilmeli ki, hepsinden önce o bir zoologdu.

This paper aims to understand the basic issues of Heidegger’s criticism to the conception of subject presented mainly in Husserl’s phenomenology. In order to do this, the article faces the course of 1928 titled Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, where Heidegger shows the recurrence in phenomenology of two different dogmatic aspects received by the modern tradition, namely the character of ontology of nature and of theory of knowledge. In considering the problematics of these aspects, the article will attempt to explain the alternative presented by Heidegger in order to conceive an idea of subjectivity that does not fall in a not phenomenological repetition of the tradition and really investigates starting from the things themselves.

Investigación sobre la raigambre inconsciente que la emoción del miedo a Dios (o lo anterior al
origen) supone. El horizonte de esta indagación fue trazado por la realización de un Taller de
Dibujo en el Hospital Psiquiátrico Víctor Larco Herrera, el cual desencadenó un grupo de preguntas
que, volcándose paulatinamente al plano consciente, aluden a la realidad espiritual.