Vladimir Putin

This article argues that accounts of the Russian media system that tend to view the time from Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 2000 as a single homogenous period do not capture major qualitative shifts in state-controlled media coverage. By analyzing the output of Russia’s two main television channels during Putin’s third presidential term, we identify a range of distinctly new features that amount to a new media strategy. This involves a significant increase in the coverage of political issues through the replacement of infotainment with what we term agitainment—an ideologically inflected content that, through adapting global media formats to local needs, attempts to appeal to less engaged and even sceptical viewers. Despite the tightening of political control over the media following the annexation of Crimea, the new strategy paradoxically has strengthened the constitutive role played by the state-controlled broadcasters in the articulation of official discourse.

L’intento di questo lavoro è presentare un quadro che sia il più completo possibile nell’analizzare il percorso dell’Unione delle Repubbliche Socialiste Sovietiche dalla sua nascita, nel 1922, fino al suo crollo, nel 1991 e, successivamente, la delicata fase di transizione russa dal comunismo all’economia di mercato, cercando di mettere in luce i problemi incontrati dal Paese nell’instaurare la democrazia. L'ultima parte analizza la figura della Banca Europea per la Ricostruzione e lo Sviluppo ed il suo ruolo specifico nella delicata fase di transizione economica della Russia.

Russian World 2.0 and Putin's Spirituality religioninpraxis.com/russian-world-2-0-and-putins-spirituality In my publications since 2014, I have repeatedly stressed that the first wave of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine was underpinned by an ideological device known as "Russian world" (see, for example, "Interpreting the 'Russian World,' in Andrii Krawchuk and Thomas Bremer, eds., Churches in the Ukrainian Crisis, New York: Palgrave, 2016: 163-171). This device was originally designed during the 1990s by liberal Russian political scientists. However, in the 2000s, it was taken over by the Moscow Patriarchate, which radically refurbished it and, with its assistance, geared up the conservative turn in both Russian society and Russian Orthodox Church. The "Russian world" was only partially successful in mobilising popular support to Putin's advances in Ukraine in 2014. With its help, he managed to annex Crimea and waged a war in the Donbas area in the eastern Ukraine. However, he failed to instigate the fully fledged "Russian spring," which, as he hoped, would engulf the entire southeastern region of Ukraine. After such a failure, the ideology of the "Russian world," it seems, was shelved. Only marginal groups continued referring to it. Even the Russian church officially preferred not to mention it.

The Syrian war will allow Russia to recover its naval presence in the Mediterranean. The Russian Navy will have more facilities at the same time that the Chinese Navy will appear in this scenario. This new situation will give us a new world order; this period we call "Tens Calm". Something similar happened after Bismarck Era, the period called "Armed Peace" (1890-1914), when the global balance was broken. This pre-war environment in the media could have been avoided. Russia today tries to recover its old deployment in the Mediterranean to become a global power.

Pussy Riot’s surprise punk prayer at the altar of Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ Our Savior instigated significant controversy in Russia and resulted in the conviction of three Pussy Riot members on the charge of “hooliganism motivated by religious hatred.” While the Russian Orthodox Church swiftly condemned the performance as blasphemous, Pussy Riot has contended that its punk prayer is consistent with the message of the Gospels. This study investigates the punk prayer controversy in relation to the figure of the holy fool, a radical behavioral model canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church and secularized in Russia’s literary and artistic traditions.

Why is so little known about the KGB career of Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin? Most reporting on both sides of the Atlantic is thinly sourced, if sourced at all, and often conflicting. Was Putin a professional foreign intelligence cadre officer whose experience abroad exposed him to reformist ideas, as many claim? If so, how was he, the first Russian leader since Andropov to have lived abroad, and the leader who lived abroad the longest since Lenin, exposed to enlightened thinking from his isolated outpost in Erich Honecker's East Germany? If Putin wasn't a cadre intelligence officer, what was he? Determining with which part of the KGB Putin identifies himself will help determine what shaped his professional formation and experience and could serve as a guidepost toward the direction in which he will lead Russia. The KGB was no monolith. Its sprawling bureaucracy and diverse functions employed polished spies steeped in Western ways, scholars, linguists, mathematicians, engineers, paper-pushing bureaucrats, guardsmen, and the ubiquitous thugs, snoops and dissident-hunters that formed the core of the KGB ethos.

In The History of Ukraine, Paul Kubicek takes on the daunting task of covering roughly thirteen centuries of Ukrainian history in just 180 pages. The book contains ten concise chapters, as well as a chronology, bibliographical essay, and biographical sketches of key leaders. Chapters One and Two describe Kievan Rus' and the Polish-Lithuanian period respectively. Chapters Four and Five discuss Ukraine under the Russian Empire and Western Ukraine under the Habsburg Empire. The next three chapters trace the rise of Ukrainian nationalism after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, industrial transformation during the Soviet period, and the drive for Ukrainian independence spawned by Mikhail Gorbachev's reform programme in the late 1980s. The final two chapters outline the political and economic struggles in post-Soviet Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma (1991-2004) and the Orange Revolution led by Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko.

В 1996 р. Чеська Республіка вступила до НАТО, а ще через шість років – до Євросоюзу. Ці два головні чинники привели до формування у чехів враження, ніби вони живуть в цілком безпечному просторі, що їхню свободу та демократію вже не спіткають значні виклики. Проте Росія не відкликала своїх агентів, навпаки, за останні роки російський вплив лише збільшився. Російські спецслужби створюють чеськомовні ЗМІ, що стають рупорами пропутінської пропаганди, підкупляють чи шантажують чеських політиків, і все це – через імперські амбіції. І все це для того, щоб підірвати ще нетверду чеську демократію, яка продовжує формуватися, внести безлад, загальмувати інтеграцію Чехії до оборонних та політичних структур Заходу – аби ця центральноєвропейська країна якомога довше залишалася в цупких обіймах скутої санкціями недоімперії.
Відомий чеський журналіст Одржей Кундра в кількох нарисах розповідає про діяльність російських спецслужб в Чехії та Європі взагалі.

Cold War was the way of life between the Soviet Union and the West for many years. Since the war was not actual, battles were fought in buffer countries, sports arenas and last but not least in the media. Many today might still remember the cold war rhetoric of 1980ies when Washington, which TASS described as able to “…think only in terms of confrontation and bellicose, lunatic anticommunism” (Britannica) considered the USSR to be “Guided by a policy of immoral and unbridled expansionism…" (Farnham, 2001).

In an age where nothing seems clear-cut it is wonderful to have a hero and an even clearer villain. Putin is the new Hitler, an obsessive maniac with no respect for human life. The Ukrainians, by contrast, remind us of our parents and grandparents and their pluck during World War II, when Britain stood alone. But, of course, nothing is ever quite so simple. So, at this stage in the war, what is the balance of the good, the bad and the ugly?

The crisis in Ukraine, which began in 2013, has had significant implications for European security. Cristian Nitoiu identifies three perceived security threats implied by developments in Ukraine and how these threats may develop in future years: the threat of so called 'hybrid warfare' spilling over from the standoff between Ukraine and Russia; the threat posed by nuclear weapons; and the threat posed by more conventional forms of warfare. Perceptions of security threats are arguably more salient than actual threats, most times having a deep influence on the actions of states and other international actors. Hence, they play a key role in the way the EU, Kyiv and Moscow will shape their policies towards each other in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. While Russia can employ a wide range of capabilities, the EU and Ukraine have very few instruments to tackle security threats, be they traditional or non­traditional. In the case of Ukraine, but also more broadly the post­Soviet space, EU­Russia/Ukraine relations are affected by the perception of three types of security threats: so called 'hybrid warfare', nuclear threats and traditional military threats (i.e. territorial invasion). Hybrid warfare In the West and Ukraine the perception of the threat posed by hybrid war has recently increased sharply. The annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine have put the spotlight on the way states engage in conflict by using a series of (sometimes innovative) tools and strategies. Hybrid war combines the use of conventional and non­conventional capabilities, the use of irregular troops, cyber­attacks, support for terrorist, rebel and criminal groups, or the use of the media and civil society for propaganda purposes. In eastern Ukraine in particular we have witnessed a combination of the use of both state and non­state actors by all the sides involved. States tend to use parts of this toolkit even in times of peace, however in such situations these instruments are not combined in order to pursue certain assertive foreign policy goals.

Hat die derzeitige politische Ordnung in Russland mittel- und langfristig Bestand? Die fundamentale Herausforderung der Fortexistenz des heutigen kleptokratischen Regimes Russlands in den kommenden Jahren wird das Zusammenfallen zweier systemunterwandernder Tendenzen – ökonomischer Stagnation und politischer Transition – sein. Deren kombinierter Effekt wird selbst kluge Kremlführung nicht ohne weiteres neutralisieren können. Es wird daher früher oder später wieder zu einem System- und nicht nur Führungswechsel in Russland kommen, worauf der Westen sich bereits heute einstellen sollte.

The forum was the largest event on econom cs n the post-pandem c world. 13,500 part c pants from 141 countr es attended the forum. 43 m n sters from fore gn nat ons, 93 d plomats (84 of wh ch were top ambassadors) part c pated alongs de 9 Russ an Deputy Pr me M n sters and 6 M n sters. 5,000 of the total part c pants were the representat ves from both Russ an and fore gn compan es, wh le 1,500 of these were sen or execut ves. More than 1,000 med a outlets from a total of 46 countr es were present n the forum. Guest Country of the Forum: Qatar Th s year's guest country was Qatar (Ch na was the guest country of the forum n 2019, wh le the forum was suspended due to the pandem c n 2020). Therefore, the largest 06/19/2021 21.07.2021 The St. Petersburg Econom c Forum-Un ted World Internat onal https://un tedworld nt.com/19290-the-st-petersburg-econom c-forum/ 2/12 numbers of part c pants were from Qatar (around 400). These were followed by part c pants were from the Un ted States w th more than 200, wh le German v s tors ranked th rd w th more than 140, the UK fourth w th more than 110 and France f fth w th more than 100 part c pants. Turk sh Ambassador to Russ a, Mehmet Samsar has also attended the forum, wh le the Vatan Party was nv ted to take part n th s nternat onal forum as well. The Afr can cry for a vacc ne More than 190 separate events were held as parts of the forum, where 1,300 Russ an and fore gn guests have held speeches. The speakers of the open ng sess on were the Russ an F rst Deputy Pr me M n ster Andrey Belousov, Qatar M n ster of Commerce and Industry Al b n Ahmed Al Kuwar , and the Rwandan Pr me M n ster Édouard Ng rente. The Pres dent of the Democrat c Republ c of Congo Fél x Tsh seked , the Pres dent of the World Bank Group Dav d Malpass, and the member of the Commun st Party of V etnam Central Comm ttee Pol tburo and Head of the CVP's Econom c Comm ttee Tran Tuan Anh, have jo ned the open ng sess on v a a v deo conference.

For strategic reasons and to maximise profits, industry-sponsored clinical drug trials on human subjects
are increasingly off shored in developing and emerging countries, including Russia. In Russia European and American pharmaceutical companies found a large pool of vulnerable people willing to take part in drug trials as it represents often their only treatment option

In political science an accent on individuals (political leaders) in researching politics is neither popular nor advocated one. In authoritarian countries like Russia or China, however, political leaders and their personalities are a crucial factor in trying to understand the political processes there. Both Vladimir Putin in Russia and Xi Jinping in China have dominated their respective political systems. This, combined with good state of Russia-China relations makes it an interesting case study of the influence of political leaders on authoritarian countries. Both Putin and Xi are new type of leaders: they both follow the main ideas of political realism (though with "national differences") and they share a 19 th century outlook on the global affairs ("concert of powers") yet they use contemporary means to fulfil these interests. Their personal understanding provides a predictability and stability: both Putin and Xi function in accordance with balance of power and respect for zones of influence concepts. That is why differences in other spheres, like Rus-sia's and China's approaches to the USA do not influence the general good mood of Sino-Russian relationship.

Tracing the political development of the Chechen Republic since its secessionist movement in the 1990s, this essay illustrates that the Islamic republic has been gradually pacified and stabilized by unpeaceful means: Authoritarian Conflict Management (ACM) and subcontracting authoritarian governance to the de facto autonomous ruler Ramzan Kadyrov. Building on concepts by Max Weber, Immanuel Kant, and Johan Galtung, this essay acknowledges that the notions of stability and peace concern two dimensions: 1. federal Moscow-Chechnya relations, 2. Chechnya’s internal balance. Though both dimensions evidently stabilized on a basis of coercion (especially by the use of regional networks and the blood feud system by pro-Kremlin Kadyrov), the emerging institutional framework exposes sources of instability, as it depends on individual relationships. Democratic innovations would even pose a threat to this established stability. Additionally, social integration of Chechnya into the Federation might be hampered by ethnic nationalism and xenophobia in Russian society. On the Chechen side, a ‘Russian’ identity is fragile. The collective memory still remembers Russian repressions vividly. Quantitative figures suggest pacification alongside the negative definition of peace. However, the case of Chechnya indicates that positive definitions (e.g. by Galtung) cannot be measured dichotomously; structural violence characterizes Chechen society, but, at the same time, a certain form of social integration took place.

The appearance on Russian TV stations Channel One and NTV of the plans for a nuclear torpedo/unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) has prompted much interest among observers.  Among other aspects, its probably salted warhead attracted much attention, the addition of Cobalt-59 ensuring long-lasting radiation designed to render a wide area uninhabitable for years. The July 1948 Baker test in Bikini Atoll illustrated the effects of a shallow underwater explosion. Missile defence experts have noted how, in line with Russian commentary, the system seems to be designed to bypass Western progress in this field. There’s another significant aspect of the possible construction of this weapon: its impact on the international law of the sea.

From this perspective, there are at least three issues that need to be discussed: whether a submarine carrying nuclear torpedoes may carry out innocent passage through another country’s territorial waters, the 1971 treaty banning nuclear weapons on the seabed, and whether a coastal state may restrict the presence of submarines carrying nuclear torpedoes in its EEZ. This paper examines the three.

ABSTRACT
Despite their differences in age, professional career and political background, Milošević and Putin share similar views on one of the main consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the USSR: the involuntary dispersal of Serbs and Russians into different foreign states. This is a study of the segments of Milošević’s and Putin’s speeches referring to Kosovo and to Crimea respectively. The study analyses their rhetorical devices and thematic content, using the analytical framework and instruments for the analysis of nationalist discourses developed by the Vienna School of Critical Discourse Analysis. The speeches, it is argued here, share a topos of sacralisation of the (contested) land based on the ancestors’ holy or glorious deeds which proclaims the land to be sacred to the chosen nation. This creates a ‘national entitlement’ to the land in a depoliticised (‘sacred’) and highly personalised setting.

Bu çalışma, Rusya'nın Güney Kafkasya ile ilgili hedeflerini sağlama çerçevesinde bir uluslar arası hukuk kurumu olan UCM 2 'yi nasıl kullanmak istediğini incelemektedir. Bu çerçevede self-determinasyon ile ilgili mevcut uluslararası hukuk kurallarını temel alarak Güney Osetya'nın Gürcistan'dan ayrılmasının mümkün olmadığı açıklanmakta ve ancak Kosova örneği takip edilerek bağımsızlık ya da ilhakın gerçekleştirilebileceği gösterilmektedir.

В статье исследуется российская несистемная оппозиция как политический феномен, категоризация которого произошла в 2000-х гг. Несистемная оппозиция рассматривается в контексте принципиального изменения характера деполитизации после президентских выборов 2012 г., когда административно-бюрократическая рациональность сменилась секьюритизацией ключевых сфер общественной жизни. Отмечается, что мобилизация понятия «неси-стемная оппозиция» является частью стратегии властного дискурса. Постепенно «несистемность» переводится из юридического в культурное предметное поле посредством противопоставления «стабильности» — основному по-стулату риторики президентской кампании Владимира Путина 2012 г. Таким образом запускается механизм отчуж-дения части политического сообщества и формирования негативного к ней отношения в общественном сознании. По мере реализации стратегии секьюритизации это понятие постепенно выходит из публичного оборота.

Russia's premier, Vladimir Putin has garnered various opinions regarding his leadership and handling of state affairs with many arguing that he is bringing Russia to be a major player in power politics. This paper examines the motivations behind Putin's foreign, arguing that the main motivation behind Russian foreign policy today is the drive to restore Russia as one of the world's great powers. This paper will take into account all the events that unfolded during both of Putin's tenancy as president.

The political evolution of Russia led by Putin is a recreation of the pure ideals of Socialist former USSR, this connection to its loyal to the former Soviet Union fruit of having full military service by socialist land, provides the curiosity to understand how it is possible in full season of Western democracies, Russia to assert itself as a superpower in the international system. The entry into Putin scene with the new Russian doctrine for its external action as well as the remarkable return of the Russian Federation to the global arena are phenomena for which it is necessary to make an introspection on Putin's terms, perceive the rotational logic between Putin and Medvedev and how can the Russian Federation to respond to the attacks of Western organizations to Eastern European countries, more precisely, the former territories of the EX-USSR. The understandings of Putin's policies under foreign will be presented based on studies conducted at different times about your attitude and your burning interest to act on the international stage, whether as evidence of its existence (Munich Conference on 2008), either by their action with the 'near abroad', colliding with cooperative ideals of NATO and the European Union Community. Certain questions are raised mainly by attempts to annexation by Russia, as well as the constant attempt by the European Union to promote an integrative culture of the Eastern countries and use NATO as a security force, which describes Putin as a premise to the United United States assert themselves by being part of that organization.

Rusya’da popülizm yeni bir olgu olduğunu iddia etmemiz yanlış olur. On dokuzuncu yüzyıla dayanan Rus popülizmi her zaman iktidar ve muhalif çevrelerin kullandığı en etkin politik enstrüman olmuştur. Bununla birlikte okuyucu da Rus popülizminin Narodniklerle başlayan ve günümüze kadar gelen “halktan olma” söylemi ile bağlantılı olduğu beklentisinin farkındayım. Öte yandan Rusya’da halktan olma söylemi karşısında her zaman güçlü devlet vurgusu üzerinden inşa edilen bir popülizmin olduğunu da görmemiz gerekir.

Le prince de Kiev Iaroslav le Sage (978-1054) ne pouvait pas imaginer la folie fratricide de ses lointains descendants en 2022. Il est aujourd'hui convoqué par la Russie comme l'Ukraine qui revendiquent son État, la Rous, comme source exclusive de leur légitimité historique. La guerre des récits historiques a précédé celle du champ de bataille… Depuis l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique, la Russie et l'Ukraine ont forgé des récits antagonistes de l'histoire. Néo-impérialiste dans un cas, nationaliste dans l'autre, ils ont alimenté un contentieux qu'utilise aujourd'hui Moscou pour justifier son agression. Ces relectures du passé se rejoignent cependant sur un point : le rejet de l'héritage communiste.

Today’s expert literature on the Kremlin’s subversive activities in Europe is often confusing in terms of the concepts and definitions used by authors in their reports and analyses. This paper aims to remedy this shortcoming by providing a comprehensive theoretical framework for analyzing the malign influence of Putin’s Russia in Europe in the most efficient way.

We define malign influence in Europe as a specific type of influence that directly or indirectly subverts and undermines European values and democratic institutions. We also put the concept of malign influence in the context of political warfare in order to delineate the meaning of such influence: it does not belong to the areas of cooperation between nations in times of peace.

The paper highlights major areas in which actors of Putin’s Russia exercise malign influence, identify main categories of Russian operators and their European facilitators that conduct or help conduct the Kremlin’s political warfare against the West, and, finally, describes vulnerabilities of European states to malign influence of Putin’s Russia.

Cтоит ли классифицировать природу «системы Путина», ввиду ее недавней радикализации, как современное проявление фашизма, как это недавно сделали некоторые — в том числе и русские — обозреватели? У этих явно антипутинских комментаторов — напр., А. Мотыль, В. Иноземцев, М. Снеговая и др. — прослеживается своего рода утилитарное отношение и избирательный подход к набору свойств исторического фашизма для как можно более эффектного разоблачения бесспорно террористического, агрессивного и репрессивного характера сегодняшнего российского режима. Типичной ценой применения термина «фашистский» к путинскому режиму в результате этого «сбора вишни» является, однако, чрезмерно широкая дефиниция общего понятия «фашизм». Такого рода инклюзивные определения сути фашизма, как правило, приводят к имплицитному утверждению о существовании десятков независимых «фашистских» режимов в истории человечества — а не только в Германии Гитлера, Италии Муссолини, России Путина. Еще одним последствием такой преднамеренной инфляции этого ключевого исторического понятия является открытие вопроса о том, как же тогда обозначить комбинацию тех характеристик итальянской ПНФ, немецкой НСДАП, румынской «Железной гвардии», венгерской Партии скрещенных стрел, испанской Фаланги и др., которую в сравнительном обществоведении иногда называют «фашистским минимумом» или «ядром».

Pussy Riot emerged in 2011 as an anonymous Russian political activist art collective that impersonated a punk rock band in their staging of protests against the autocratic regime of Vladimir Putin. In 2012, three of its members were tried and imprisoned for nearly two years, which garnered the attention and outrage of the United States and Western Euro pean countries. The illegal punk performance actions of Pussy Riot, disseminated in edit ed videos through the Internet, depended on late capitalism's global network, which turns DIY underproduction into viral capitalistic overproduction (to use Shane Greene's terms of analysis). These are the same technological routes and apparatuses of disinfor mation through which Russia attempted to sow social discord to the advantage of Donald Trump in the 2016 election. This essay traces the reconfiguration of punk in the course of the actions and trial of Pussy Riot, from the generic punk music stance of jamming the system with loud noise and mischievous fakery, to an understanding of punk as an ac tivism that works through the court system and champions transparency. In the face the lawless autocracies of Putin and Trump, where shocking disregard for institutions has be come an overproduced political norm, punk rebellion ironically may take the form of a methodical and rigorous investment in the rule of law. Pussy Riot's post-trial punk does not envision anarchy, but rather a functioning legal system and government institutions that that protect human rights.

Wenn ein Unterzeichnerland des Vertrages selbst vor einem der fünf Garanten des Sperrabkommens nicht sicher sein kann: Welchen Sinn hat dann das Verbot der Nichtweiterverbreitung von Kernwaffen? Im Austausch gegen einen Abbau von Nuklearwaffen erteilen drei atomwaffenbesitzende UNO-Sicherheitsratsmitglieder dem abrüstenden Land kollektive, ausdrückliche und schriftlich fixierte Sicherheitszusagen. Eines dieser Großmächte erklärt jedoch 20 Jahre später diese Vereinbarung für nichtig: Welches Land ohne eigene Atomwaffen oder enges Bündnis mit einer Nuklearmacht kann sich nun der Unverletzlichkeit seiner Grenzen noch sicher sein? Wenn selbst eine mit Ausnahmerechten ausgestattete Vetomacht im UNO-Sicherheitsrat sich auf Kosten eines Nachbarstaates territorial ausdehnen kann, dann wird das internationale Atomwaffensperrregime zum Selbstbedienungsladen der offiziellen Nuklearmächte.