12 F 0344 Millennium Challenge 2002 Experiment Report

u.s.
Joint Forces Command Mill ennium Chall enge 2002: Ex perim ent Report
(Thi s Page Blank)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

USJFCOM
~ ~~1J~'~i~"~4~S~'~'~'~'~'~'~'~'~'~'~"~'~'~'~'~'~C~'~'='='='-:4
a messOiJefromA(JXM. qiam6astiani, ..
Millennium Chall enge 2002, the largest-ever joint experiment conducted by the United
States, was a maj or mil estone in a concept development process that began in 1999 and
continues today. The scale and scope of the experiment was aggressive. But it had to be
aggressive, to all ow us to assess warfi ghting concepts using real operati onal headquarters.
Thi s remarkabl e effort, more than two years in the making, included over 13,500 soldi ers,
sai lors, airmen and marines, operati ng from 25 locati ons across the United States. They were
placed in an operational environment that integrated li ve and computer-simulated fo rces
operating in a complex scenari o that gave us the most extensive and reali stic assessment of our
concepts to date.
MC02 took place at the end of the PROTOTYPE PROTOTYPE
IhIORKING
PARTNERS
summ er in 2002 . The conclusions that SOUTHCOM. EUCOM.
were drawn from the experim ent were Standing Joint
PACOM. CEmCOM NORTHCOM. STRATCOM.
Force HQ
TRANSCOM, SOCOM
current as of August 2002. Since then, a
lot has changed. We have had time to Operational Net PACOM, CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM,
incorporate lessons learned into our Assessment USFK DARPA SOCOM
experim ents and operati ons. We have

Joinllnleragency PACOM. CENTCOM. SOUTHCOM. STRATCOM.
recognized the potential of the concepts Coordination Group USFK,IDAOED TRANSCOM. SOCOM
that were experimented with, and have Joinllogistics
enough confidence to fi eld prototypes (Common Relevant USFK NORTHCOM
Operating Picture)
today that are fundamentall y changing
the way joint forces com muni cate and Effects-based
CENTCOM, USFK
plan verticall y and hori zontally, how they Operations
view the baul espace, how joint task Collaborative
PACOM. CENTCOM.
Information SDUTHCOM, SOCOM
forces are formed, and how they train . Environment
USFK
As this report is being published,
Joint Fires tnitlative CENTCOM, USFK PACOM
U.S. l oi nt Forces Command is helping
combatant commanders impl ement Coll aborative Information Environments, providing training
on Effects-Based Operations and helping impl ement real-world Operational Net Assessments. It
is organi zi ng and training Standing l oint Force Headquarters elements to improve pre-crisis
planning and to speed the formati on ofjoint task fo rces.
The chall enge now is for the military to find ways to in stituti onali ze th e changes required
to impl ement the successful concepts whil e we continue our work refinin g the others and
develop ing new concepts. We must march ahead th roug h a continuing experim ental campaign,
building on the lessons fro m MC02, to ensure the continued superi ority of the United States
Armed Forces to meet any threat when our nati on call s.
Edmund P. G iambastiani, Adm iral, USN

Commander, U.S. l oint Forces Comm and
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U.S. Joint Forces Command Mill ennium Chall enge 2002: Ex perim ent Report
Executive Summary
Introduction
Millennium Chall enge 2002 was a congressionall y mandated, operati onal-l evel, joint
experim ent that combi ned li ve forces with virtual and constructive simulati on. MC02 was
conducted by the U.S . Joi nt Forces Command (USJFCOM) in July and August 2002, and was
the culminati on of a series of joint experi ments. Spanning more than two years, it was designed
to assess the ability of a Joint Task Force (JTF) to execute the Rapid Decisive Operations (ROO)
war-fi ghting concept in thi s decade given a set of
enabling and supporti ng concepts. The hypothesis Hypothesis:
for the experiment is shown in the box at ri ght. If an enhancedjoint force hem/quarters is
MC02 assessed the ROO enabling concepts of informed by an Operational Net
Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), A~.'ieument anti employ!t; Effecb' Ha.'ieti
Effects-Based Operations (EBO), and Operations which u.'ie thefull range of our
Operational Net Assessment (ON A). The ROO national capabilities; then the 2007 joint
supporti ng concepts Coll aborative Info rmation force will be able to contluct Rapid
Environm ent (CIE), Joint lnteragency Decisil'e Operlltions tlgtlinst II t/eterminet/
Coordination Group (Jl ACG), Joi nt Theater 2Ot) 7 tltiversllry.
Logistics Management (JTLM), and Joint
Intelligence, Survei ll ance and Reconnaissance (JlSR), were also assessed. In addition , th e
experim ent included assessment of20 joint initiatives, such as the joi nt fires initi ative (1FJ) and
Joint Enroute Mi ssion Pl anning System (Near-term) (JEMPRS-NT) that were not directly in
support of ROO, but were focused on improving specifi c JTF processes.
MC02 capitali zed on over two years of detail ed conceptual work, as well as a number of
wargames, and meticulous post-event analysis. MC02 ' s successful concepts were shared with
seni or level defense decision makers, and are now in the process of being fielded to support
today ' s forces. Thi s executi ve summary provides an overview of the findings and
recommendations resulting from MC02 experimentation, as well as the assessment methodology,
the scenari o, and organi zati on of the final report.
General Findings
The warfighting abi li ty of the joi nt fo rce was greatl y enhanced by the appli cation of the
experim ental concepts. The CIE contributed signifi cantly to the JTF' s ability to understand the
situati on, accelerated and improved the planning process, and made the exhibited benefits of all
other concepts possibl e. The experimental SJF HQ all owed the JTF to form faster and increased
its situational awareness. EBO and JlACG increased the opti ons available to the joint force and
ensured they were harmoni zed with actions fro m other government agencies. The ONA process
helped the JTF evaluate enemy, fri endl y, and neutral forces as a single inter-related system. Thi s
all owed the force to plan acti ons designed to achieve intended effects whil e identifying potenti al
unintended effects. However, the experim ental tools provided to support th e ONA process were
not suffi cient to support ROO.
Targeting and sustainm ent were improved by the increased abili ty of the force to
collaborate and share infonn ation using the ClE. The Jl SR concept increased the JTF 's abili ty to
synchroni ze intelligence, survei ll ance, and reconnaissance operations, but the tools provided
require more development before fielding.
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u.s. Joint Forces Command Mill ennium Chall enge 2002: Ex perim ent Report
The JTF, however, was not abl e to achi eve the full power expected of the ROO concept.
I?"'-----------------~_ ROO requires the compl ete integrati on of
several supporting operati onal concept
General Findings elements including dominant maneuver,
precision engagement, informati on operati ons,
J> CIE improved communications and
rapid force depl oyment and agil e sustainment .
situational understanding in the JTF ...
These fi ve operati onal concept elements were
J> CIE enabled the other concepts",
not compl ementary due to imm ature effects
J> SJFHO allowed JTF to form quickly
assessment tools, assessment procedures, and
and improved planning ".
the fragmented nature of informati on
J> JIACG informed commander of
operati ons doctrin e, training and th e
Interagency concerns and harmonized
infl exibili ty of the depl oyment and
actions, .
sustainm ent systems.
J> EBO increased the options
available to the JTF".
J> ONA enabled JTF to view the Specific Findings by
enemy, friendly and neutral players as Assessment Area
a single system".
J> Although JTF performance Collaborative Information Environment
increased, ROO was not achieved " . The CIE, consisting of the
InfoWork Space (lW S), SharePoint Portal
Server (S PPS), and the Automated Deep Operati ons Coordinati on System (AOOCS), gave the
j oint force unprecedented ability to share in fo rmati on. The JTF was required to use these
common systems provided by USJFCOM . System commonali ty was as important as system
capability in enabling informati on sharing and the building of situ ati onal awareness and
understanding. As a result, infonn ati on was di sseminated across the force more qui ckl y than in
previous operati ons or exercises.
Consequentl y, overall situati onal
awa reness/understanding was greater than that seen CIE Findings -
in previous exercises or operati ons. In additi on, J> Required common systems ".
targeting was greatl y improved because all tacti cal J> Enabled SJFHO and JIACG
headquarters could see the same targets, all owing collaboration" .
the commanders to " nominate" the use of their J> Enabled integrated Effects
assets to attack. Thi s kind of bidding process was Based Planning at JTF level and
un ex pected pri or to the ex periment. Lastly, an the components ".
info nn al informati on-checking process emerged that J> Improved targeting and JISR
qui ckl y filtered bad informati on from the system. operations ...
The increased quantity of informati on- J> Increased integration of
ex posed requirements demands much g reater logistics with ops planning".
bandwidth or the appli cati on of commensurate
bandwidth reducti on techniques than has previously
been avail abl e to JTFs. In additi on, improved inform ati on visuali zati on tools are needed for
effecti ve presentati ons to decision-makers, if the concept is to reach its full potenti al. The
success of the CIE indi cates that investment in comm on collaborati ve and communi cati ons
systems for JTF's is warranted. Part of the success of the C LE was because it was developed by a
single agency to be interoperabl e. Thi s indi cates that future communi cati on systems should
foll ow the same model and j oint communi cati ons systems be built by a single comm and .
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SJFIIQ
The SJFHQ element improved the formation ofa JTF by bringing specifi c regional
knowledge, experi ence with the collaborative tools, and joint experience to a single-service
headquarters. The organi zati on and manning of the SJFHQ wi ll require minor adjustment, but
the concept all owed an Army corps headquarters to transition to a JTF headquarters more
quickly than has been the experience
in previous operations and exercises,
without the cost of maintaining a
permanently formed joi nt
headquarters.
Effects-Based Operations
EBO showed immense
potential by greatl y broadening the
number and type of operational tools
avail able to JTF commanders,
including non-military elements of
national power and by empowering
subordinate commanders to pl an and
achi eve desired effects. Although non-
military effects in " Dipl omatic, The Pacific Ocean , Aug. 2, 2002 - An MH-60S Knighthawk multi-
mission helicopter makes an approach to the experimental high-
Informati onal , and Economi c" speed vessel off southern California during MC02.
domains were planned and executed
by the JTF, assessment of those effects was difficult, handi capping the executi on of the RDO
concept. Assessment tools fo r these "soft" effects, such as determining the wi ll or the economic
capabili ty of an adversary, are required to enabl e EBO to be practi ced by ajoint force. Those
tools mu st also help the command er, and hi s staff, identify unintended consequences of
achieving desired effects, so they can be mitigated. The experience of this JTF also indicated that
EBO planning processes must be included in military training courses from the earliest stage to
foster its use at the operati onal level. A head quarters cannot begin thinking in this way when it
forms a JTF headquarters. Thi s has to be a habitual thought process honed through training,
experi ence, and education in Service and joi nt professional military education (PME) programs.
Joint lnteragency Coordination Group

The Jl ACG exhibited its usefulness in assisting the combatant comm ander to integrate
non-military elements of national power with the interagency community. Elements not under
the JTF commander' s control , such as diplomatic initiatives, were coordin ated with military
actions to achi eve desired effects. When th e elements could not be coordinated, interagency
ex perts quickly made the combatant and JTF commander aware of potential unintended
consequences. The Jl ACG, as it was designed for the MC02 warfighting scenari o, was most
properly positioned as an adjunct to the combatant com mander' s staff, since most of the non-
military effects are at that level of responsibility. However, the coll aborati on tools all ow for
effective and persistent dialogue between the JTF staff, the combatant command, the JlACG, and
their counterparts in the United States.
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u.s. Joint Forces Command Millennium Chall enge 2002: Experim ent Report
Operational Net Assessment

The ONA concept provided a useful process with which to view enemy, friend ly, and
neutral forces as a seamless system ofsystems. lt helped the JTF identify desired effects and
determine the required actions needed to bring about those effects. It also helped the JTF
consider possibl e unintended actions. Its value was somewhat
mitigated by lack of clear concept definition and understanding. In ONA Findings -
fact, the concept embodied both a process and a product. It al so was ~ ONA provided a
a valuabl e resource for those involved in JTF planning, even though useful process with
it required tools to access its informati on. Finall y, there was an which to view enemy,
ONA organization aspect for MC02; a system of system s analysis friendly, and neutral
(SOSA) cell was developed to design, build, and update the forces as a seamless
ex perim ent's ONA knowledge base. Depending on context, the system ,..
ONA acronym alone could cause confusion. The tool s provided to
access and use ONA were insufficient and required extensive work JFI Findings-
before fieldin g. While refinement of the process used to generate ~ Targeting was
and maintain data is essential to ONA 's future, a top priority of thi s greatly improved by
chall enge should be to develop a tool that all ows the JTF to the use ofthe CIE ...
visuali ze the interrelationship of the systems. ONA, like EBO,
requires education at all levels to effectively integrate it into JTLM Findings-
operations. Thi s thought-process should be incorporated in all ~ JTLM was
Service and joint schools. similarly improved
through use of the
Joint Fires Initiative CIE ...
Targeting was greatly improved by the use of the ClEo
Tactical-level targets were presented in a common picture that JISR Findings -
allowed all functi onal component commands to see them and ~ JISR improved
nominate kill mechani sms. For in stance, a special operations team synchronization of
mi ght detect a hi gh value target such as a mobil e SCUD. At the ISR operations and
same time, the land component may have an attack helicopter armed increased support to
and available to attack the target, and the air component may have operations ...
an appropriate aircraft simil arly avail able. Additionally, if
necessary, the common picture enabled the functional components
to quickl y coordinate and task the most appropriate shooter to attack emerging, time critical
targets. The JTF targeting cell could direct the most availab le and most appropriate shooter to
destroy the target without a cumbersome process of manually passing the target information
across components. The experiment's communications system s functioned seamlessly,
automaticall y sharing the targets with all components.
Joint Theater Logistics Management

Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM) was similarly improved through use of the
CIE. The logistician s used an SPPS di splay that contained a watchboard, which di splayed
continuously updated logistics information for operators and logisticians to use as a deci sion-aid .
Logi stician s were integrated into the operations and plans groups. This improved situational
awareness and increased the responsiveness of deployment and sustainment planning to the
operation, but it made some senior leaders uneasy that there was no single logistics point of
contact equivalent to the director of plans and director of operations.
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Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

The JI SR concept, combi ned with the ab ility of ISR planners and operators to coll aborate
through the CrE, improved synchroni zation of ISR operations and increased ISR support to
operati ons. However, the emul ated tools provided were too
immature to support the concept. ROO Findings -
~ The full power of
Rapid Decisive Operations ROO was not realized
Despite the improvement in synchroni zati on and due to an inability to
collaboration outlined above, the full power of ROO was not incorporate Info
realized due to an in abi lity to incorporate information operations Ops...
(10). 10 were hindered by the JTF ' s inability to assess non-military ~ ROO hampered by
effects, inadequate 10 doctrine, organi zati on and training, and legacy deployment
authority fo r 10 being retai ned at too high a level. ROO was also and sustainment
hampered by a deployment and sustai nm ent system unsuited to systems ...
support a fast-changing operational environm ent. ~ The Deployment,
For RDO to be both rapid and decisive, it requires that Employment, and
dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and 10 be Sustainment system,
compl ementary to achieve synergy. Precision fires must enhance although improved
maneuver and maneuver must exploit the effects of precision fires to by collaboration and
be truly dominant. Likewise, 10 helps identify targets that will result information sharing,
in a reduction of an adversary ' s cohesion. Elements of 10 such as was not responsive
deception and psychological operations mask the pattern of enough for ROO ...
maneuver and fires to increase the problem set for an adversary and ~ The inadequate
to increase the shock effect of those operati ons. 10 was not effects assessment
integrated into the overall operation, despite the best efforts of the process and tools
Blue players. This all owed the adversary to mass forces near targets were key to the 10
it perceived as criti cal to Blue, attempting to use them as bait to problems ...
draw Blue into unfavorab le engagements. ., 10 doctrine,
The inadequate effects assessment process and tools organization, and
discussed in the EBO section above was key to the problems training are not
encountered in 10. Without adequate processes and tools to coherent ...
determin e the value of an information campaign or to identify the ~ AuthOrity for 10
unintended consequences of that campaign, 10 cannot be integrated was held at too high
into the more straightforward operational concepts of precision a level, which
engagement or dominant maneuver. prevented 10 from
10 doctrine, organ ization, and training are not coherent for being agile and
effective use at the joi nt force com mander level. There is no adaptive ...
organi zation at the JTF responsible to integrate the elements of 10.
Throughout the experiment, as the JTF increasingly understood
RDO ' s reliance on 10, it increased the responsibility on the 10 planner until he briefed alongside
the fun cti onal component commanders. However, no organi zation ex isted to enabl e the 10
planner to coordinate 10. A Joint Psychological Operations Task Force coordinated
psychological operations, but responsibility for the other elements of 10 was fragmented across
the ITF. No coherent trai ning program exists to develop 10 leaders.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IX

Authori ty for 10 was held at too high a level , whi ch prevented 10 from being agil e and
adapti ve. Psychological operati ons themes, for instan ce, had to be approved at th e Department of
State. Thi s was faci litated by the JlACG, but in the two weeks of play in the experiment, onl y
one leafl et drop was authori zed, although many more were requested. Thi s prevented integrati on
of 10 into JTF operati ons that were typicall y planned in a 72-96 hour timefram e.
The deployment, employment, and sustainment system, although improved by
collaboration and informati on sharing, still was not responsive enough to support ROO. Forces
were not tailored in CONUS for immediate operations upon arri val. The sustainment process
must be able to adjust to interrupti ons in the fl ow caused by enemy action or by unanti cipated
deployments. ROO requires development of an integrated deployment, empl oyment, and
sustainment process, whi ch will be a significant underta king.
Experiment Methodology
MC02 was designed to assess the ability of a JTF to conduct ROO given a set of
advanced concepts. In addition, the experiment confirmed or refuted conclusions drawn
throughout the two-year experimental campaign in order to shape recomm endations for the
Commander, JFCOM , and the Department of
Defense.
MC02 used players from operational
command s as the experimental audi ence.
Commanders and staffs from III Corps, 12th
Air Force, Third Fleet, and II Marine
Expeditionary Force formed th e JTF and
component command s. Their headquarters
were di stributed in Suffolk, VA and out to
vari ous locations across the United States to
include aboard ship in the Pacifi c Ocean.
Subordin ate forces were a mi x ofl ive and
simulated forces. The li ve forces operated in MC02 Assessment Methodology
training areas across the western United
States and in the Pacifi c Ocean . The simulated forces were emul ated by integrating over 40
service-specifi c models and simulati ons to provide a seaml ess picture of the forces.
A tough, adaptive opposing force (O PFOR) was used to provide the Blue forces with a
determined 2007 enemy. The Blue fo rce and the OPFOR operated under similar rul es of
engagement where each could percei ve and attack onl y what their sensors could detect. Thi s
" firewall" built between the players caused each side to percei ve different views of the action
and different perceptions of the outcome.
Each side operated freel y inside the constraints of the scenari o and the appropri ate tactics
given the situation and their respective goals. Appropri ate actions were all owed in every case
except when they prevented the continuati on of the experi ment and jeopardized the ability to
achi eve experimental objectives. In those few cases, the JFCOM 's Joi nt Ex peri mental Control
Group took one of two action s. Either the action was allowed and the results carefull y
docum ented before resetting the situation to continue th e experim ent, or the action was prevented
after off-line anal ysis of the predi cted results. In the latter case, the off-line analysis was
documented to gai n vital lessons learned on the experim ental concepts.
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A Joint Analysis Team consisting of anal ysts from JFCOM, the Services, and SOCOM
assessed MC02. The team analyzed data fro m many compl emental)' and overl apping data
sources. Specifi c emphasis was placed on reducing and analyzing the data qui ckly in order to
identify di screpancies between data sources for clarificati on and to all ow inclusion of
unanti cipated areas of interest that emerged during the experiment . Subj ecti ve data was coll ected
along with obj ecti ve data from th e models and simul ati ons. The Joint Anal ysis Team captured all
of the data in an experiment database.
Subj ecti ve data was coll ected through over 12,500 pl ayer and observer surveys
di stributed throughout the
experim ent and at seni or
Futu re Joint OperiltiollS
r.. ).... .....,.,. concept devel oper
D-Dny o.'\.ln,d\1f.r roundtabl es conducted twice
SO ... ..I' ......:,)"
dail y. To make the
subj ecti ve data as obj ecti ve
as possibl e, the subj ects were
di vided into three
independent panels: pl ayers
(in cl uding both Blue and
OPFOR), ex pert observers,
and seni or concept
developers. These panels
provided structured
of El<c. n,nn observati ons on the concepts
lnter~~cy during the experiment and
000
o ACllldfmi, parti cipated in post-
experim ent moderated
di scussions. Where the three
Conceptual Operations w ithin a Joint Operations Area upon the independent groups agreed
commencement of a Rapid Decisive Operation .
on the strength or
weaknesses ofa concept, a conclusion could be drawn with great confidence. Di sagreements
were identifi ed within 24 hours after the responses were coll ected, and more data was coll ected
to resolve the matter, or to understand why the di sagreement occurred.
Obj ective data was coll ected fro m the models and simul ati on, the li ve ranges and th e CIE
systems. The models and simul ati on provided "ground truth" positi ons and statu s of fo rces,
whi ch could then be compared to the informati on the JTF received from the CIE. The CLE also
all owed the Joint Analysis Team to capture communi cati ons data such as numbers and types of
messages, parti cipati on in coll aborati ve sessions and bandwidth usage.
Experiment Scenario
The MC02 Scenari o was developed to provide a context that was both plausibl e and
conducive to testing the experiment hypothesis. The scenari o consisted ofa hi gh-end, small-scal e
contingency that had the potential to escalate to a maj or theater war. Real world data were used
to popul ate a database, enabling the avail abili ty of source material to support the process of
reali sti c Blue and Red force pl anning.
The experiment scenari o was set in a 2007 timefra me. The country of interest (Red)
possessed a set of capabilities that U.S. fo rces could reasonabl y ex pect to face at that time. Red
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was located in a geographi call y strategic area, and possessed natural resources criti cal to the
world community.
The scenario began when Red suffered a natural disaster (earthquake) and the subsequent
chain of events resulted in the separation of a rogue military commander. Identifi ed as
Commander, Joint Task Force South (CJTF-S), he, and hi s subordi nate military commanders
spun away fro m nati onal (Government of Red) control. A renegade element within th e Red
leadership, CJTF-S conducted broad acti ons, incl uding conventional military, asymmetric,
dipl omatic, informati on, economic, and terrorist applications, with the goal of establi shing
regional power and control. A dispute over national ownership oflocal islands led to CJTF-S's
seizure of the disputed islands, the launch ofa CJTF-S sponsored military escort service to
ensure safe passage, and a related toll fo r use of that service. These aggressive actions led to
destabili zation of regional security, and represented a direct threat to the region and world
economi es.
Blue' s goals were to secure the shipping lanes for international commerce; neutrali ze
CJTF-S ' s weapons of mass effect (WME) capabi lity; and estab li sh sovereign control of the
disputed islands in accordance with the World Court decision.
All of these elements contributed to a realistic set of circum stances that helped to fully
examine the MC02 objectives. Although this scenario was developed prior to the hostiliti es in
Afghani stan and Iraq , it provided an analogous compl ex situati on. It contai ned a hostil e military
force operating in an environm ent that contained players whose sympathi es ranged from full
support of Blue acti ons to outright hostili ty- with considerable ambiguity as whi ch pl ayers were
whi ch. Although this was chosen as a plausible scenari o of future confli ct, current events have
shown it to be more than just plausibl e.
Report Organization
The report is divided into eight chapters, and fourtee n annexes. The first six chapters
provide the scope, purpose, scenari o ofM C02, and the li ve forces that participated, whil e also
introducing the concepts and objectives. Anal yses of the MC02 concepts and objecti ves are
reflected in Chapter 7, whi ch li sts the findings and recommendati ons. Chapter 8 provides a
summary and
conclusions of the
experim ent. Th e
annexes contai n
detailed informati on
on specifi c aspects of
-: . .-
'.
Me02.
MC02 FINA'_ REDOR-
Way Ahead
In MC02, USJFCOM experimented with new concepts and tools for the warfighters of
the 2 1st centu ry . As the men and women in the military continue to fi ght the global war on terror,
we are learning how to do a better job of thinking about the threat to all ow us to substitute
information for brawn. MC02 has introduced a pathway for future experimentation efforts.
As transformation continues to evolve, we are carving the shape of future warfighting bit
by bit, one experiment at a time. We mu st march ahead with the knowledge gained from MC02
and learn to "think differently, " and ensure the superiority of the United States military wi ll
succeed against any adversary, at any time.
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u.s. Joint Forces Command Millennium Challenge 2002 : Experim ent Report
The Findings
ASSESSMENT AREA 1 - ESTABUSH AND MAINTAIN INFORMAliON
Finding I: As a result of operating in a CIE the CJTF was able to attain a high state of
situational awareness ......................................................................... 55
Finding 2: While operating in a CIE, the JTFHQ and component staffs were able to attain
a high state of accurate and timely situational awareness...................................... 57
Finding 3: The increased visibility of information within the JTF produced an informal,
but active information error detection and correction capability. : ..................... 58
Finding 4: While operating in the collaborative environment the JTF was able to
minimize, but not prevent, surprise attacks by opposing forces ............................ 59
Finding 5: The JTF was able to use shared awareness and collaboration to gain and
maintain high operational tempo. ............................................................................. 60
Finding 6: The JTF was able to use shared awareness and collaboration to synchronize its
forces ............................................................................................................................ 61
Finding 7: Information requirements will grow with the adoption of E80 ......................... 62
ASSESSMENT AREA a- RAPIDLY SET CONDITIONS FOR DECISIVE
Finding I: The ClF. streamlined deployment-planning coordination, but the MC02 joint
force deployment planning procedures did not improve joint force planning or
help develop the JTF TPFDD .................................................................................... 78
Finding 2: Intermediate staging and support bases (lS8s) were suited to rapidly moving
forces and equipment and, with host nation support, instrumental in reducing the
logistics footprint in the JOA .................................................................................... 79
Finding 3: The CIE was effective in synchronizing deployment flow ................................... 79
Finding 4: The Log CROP, an element of the CIE, was a useful information source for
tracking deployment flow, but not for synchronizing it......................................... 80
Finding 5: The Log CROP provided sufficient information to allow the CJTF to divert
PREPO materiel or inbound supplies to satisfy needs elsewhere in the JOA ...... 80
Finding 6: Blue Forces were able to conduct operational maneuver in support of Effects-
Based Operations ........................................................................................................ 80
XI V FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Finding 7: Blue reduced joint force vulnerability to disruption; however, it was not able to
prevent OPFOR observation of its forces, due to sympathizers, terrorist cells, and
during the initial days of the operation, commercial satellite imagery ................. 82
Finding 8: The roles, responsibilities, and functions for deployment planning remained
sOlnewhat unchanged with the MC02 JTF organization ........................................ 84
Finding 9: An assessment of the JRSOI process could not be made during MC02 because
the JRSOI process was not visible in the experiment . ............................................ 84
Finding 10: The CONUS, with its posts, camps, stations, bases, lines of communication, sea
ports of embarkation, and aerial ports of embarkation are part of the baUlespace
and vulnerable to asymmetric attack....................................................................... 84
ASSESSMENT AREA 3- ASSURE ACCESS INTO AND THROUGH THE
Finding 1: Blue forces could not isolate or suppress enemy anti-access capabilities
consistently during the experiment ........................................................................... 93
Finding 2: Blue did not successfully create operational sanctuaries in time and space
necessary for conducting R.DO .................................................................................. 95
Finding 3: Despite persistent targeting and rapid engagement, Blue could not deny the
enemy sanctuary ......................................................................................................... 98
Finding 4: Blue pl'ovided sufficient forces, capabilities, and positioning of sensors

necessary to conduct EBO and to accomplish the assured access mission ............ 98
Finding 5: At the operational level, Blue was able to provide protection for operational
forces, means, and noncombatants in the JOA ...................................................... IOt
Finding 6: Blue was moderately successful in providing operational air, space, and missile
defense ....................................................................................................................... 102
ASSESSMENT AREA 4 - CONDUCT DECISIVE EFFECTSBASED
Finding t: Joint force targeting was greatly enhanced in a CIE, with an ONA, reach-back
capabilities, and effective combat assessment. Elowever, the ability to conduct
effective operational combat assessment was not demonstrated ......................... 113
Finding 2: The JTF was able to effectively attack operational targets to achieve desired
military effects using EBO concepts, collaboration and CIE tools, (SPPS, ONA,
IWS and AOOCS).................................................................................................... 123
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY xv

Finding 3: The JTF exhibited increased ability to coordinate and integrate joint and
interagency assets for EDO. However, the use of DIE elements of national power
to produce JTF desired effects was not effective................................................... 135
Finding 4: The JTF improved its ability to synchronize and employ joint forces against key
tactical objectives, despite not strictly adhering to the concepts of EDO............ 136
Finding 5: The JTF failed to execute and integrate information operations, including
PSYOP and military deception . .............................................................................. 142
ASSESSMENT AREA S-SUSTAIN THE FORCE ........................................ 1S3

Finding 1: The Log CROP became the key tool for displaying logistics information and
providing logistics situational awareness............................................................... 155
Finding 2: Sustainment packages were not tailored for deploying units. ISDs shaped the
logistics footprint. The JTF made good use of multiple delivery platforms for
sustainment distribution . ......................................................................................... 156
Finding 3: Immature development and insufficient integration ofthe Theater Medical

Information Program (TMI P) had a negative impact on the ability of the JTF
staff to ga in and maintain knowledge of force health status ................................ 157
ASSESSMENT AREA 6 - STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Finding 1: The SJFUQ provided valne added to JTF staff for C2 of the joint force. It
reduced the ad hoc nature of activating a JTF, helped surmount the JTF standup
learning curve, and provided continuity in planning and operations from pre-
crisis through execution to transition ..................................................................... 165
Finding 2: Although the SJFHQ provided value added to the JTF, continued refinement of
its organization and CORlposition is warranted ...................................................... 189
Finding 3: The SJFHQ concept' s boards, centers, cells, and working groups provided a
suitable structure fl'om which the JTF staff could control the joint fOIce .......... 207
Finding 4: The SJFHQ presence and effectiveness altered the role of cORlponent command
LNOs at the JTF....................................................................................................... 227
ASSESSMENT AREA 7 - OPERATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT (ONA) 239

Finding I: There is not a COlnmon understanding of the capability and use of the ONA. 245
Finding 2: O NA was useful during the experiment and shows great potential for military
operations.................................................................................................................. 248
XV I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Finding 3: Visualization of information is key to use of the ONA concept and its
components ................................................................................................................ 250
Finding 4: Better tools are needed to develop, manage, and convey ONA data and
infornlation ................................................................................................................ 252
Finding 5: Requirements for the ONA are different at each command level.. ................... 254
Finding 6: Lack of understanding of the philosophical intent, relationship to traditional

staff actions, and application of the O NA concept impacted its use.................... 256
ASSESSMENT AREA 8 - EFFECTSBASED OPERATIONS lEBO):
Finding I: Operating in a CIE, JTF planners were better able to understand the
operational situation and develop better-reasoned courses of action .................. 330
Finding 2: The JTF required extensive experience with ERO before it was able to
adequately analyze intended and unintended effects............................................ 336
Finding 3: The ETO process can be effective at both the JTF and the functional
component commander level ................................................................................... 343
Finding 4: The organization that owns the effect must be able to accomplish and assess it .
.......................................................................................................................... 345
Finding 5: Assessment and prediction are separate and distinct functions, and may require
separate cells within the JTF to properly address both of these process functions .
.................................................................................................................. 347
ASSESSMENT AREA 9 - COLlABORATIVE INFORMATION
Finding I: The Joint Task Force was able to establish a persistent collaborative
environment across all echelons of command ........................................................ 359
Finding 2: The COP provided an adequate picture for situational awareness at the
operational level ........................................................................................................ 363
Finding 3: The JTF was able to maintain command and control of on-going operations
using the collabol'ative tools .................................................................................... 369
Finding 4: To enable operational and tactical-level situational awareness, COP unit icons
must be linked to status information such as posture, activity, and readiness... 369
Finding 5: The collective bandwidth requirement for a JTF using C41 tools similar to the
XC41 tools used in the MC02 experiment is approximately 15 Mb/s with a
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY XV ll

sustained surge capacity to 25 Mb/s. This order of bandwidth usage is much

greater than that which has been available to JTFs to date................................. 370
Finding 6: Interoperability problems prevented effective COP database management... 374
Finding 7: Systems maintenance and the operational battle rhythm have to be closely
integrated to maximize system performance at critical points in the battle....... 376
Finding 8: The Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System- Near Term
(JEMPRS-NT) was effective in enabling the JTF commander and his staff to
collaborate while traveling between command posts ............................................ 377
ASSESSMENT AREA 10 - ENHANCE INTERAGENCY PERSPECTIVE
Finding I: The JIACG enabled the combatant commander to harmonize operational plans
with national policy decisions and guidance.......................................................... 400
Finding 2: The JIACG concept, as it was implemented for the MC02 warfighting scenario,
was most properly positioned to operate at the combatant command level, since
most of the non-military effects are at that level of responsibility ....................... 40 I
Finding 3: A compatible C[E linkage to engaged agencies is essential for the effective
harmonization of lA actions . ................................................................................... 402
Finding 4: The .JlACG composition should be based on the combatant commander's

regional requirements .............................................................................................. 404
Finding 5: The combatant commander' s ability to plan and execute ROO requires a rapid
and decisive national policy determination process. ............................................. 404
Finding 6: The JIACG ' s principal fnnction is to focus on providing lA advisory snpport to
the combatant commander and staff, not on producing combatant commander
plans ........................................................................................................................... 408
ASSESSMENT AREA 11 - JOINT THEATER LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT
Finding I: The Log CROP was successful in achieving situational awareness .................. 416
Finding 2: The Effects-Based Planning and the deployment and sustainment processes
were not effectively integrated ................................................................................ 420
Finding 3: The JTLM concept reduced the logistics footprint in the JOA ......................... 422
Finding 4: Embedding logistics personnel in the operations and plans groups improved
situational awareness across the JTF..................................................................... 422
XV ll! FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

u.s. Joi nt Forces Command Mill ennium Chall enge 2002 : Ex perim ent Report
Findin g 5: The organization of th e SJFHQ and control of the JTF logistics activities needs
refinement to provide more functional special ty expertise................................... 424
Findin g 6: The collaborative logistics board, center, cells, and workin g groups enhanced
the performance a nd situational awa reness of all pl anners and operators across
the joint force ............................................................................................................ 425
Findin g 7: Logistics decision support tool s pl'ovided to the JLM C, J T F, and components
enhanced planning and decision-making............................................................... 430
ASSESSMENT AREA 12 - JOINT INniAliVES ........................................... 439
ASSESSMENT AREA 13 - JOINT IN1EWGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND
Findin g I: J1SR improved integration of ISR with operations............................................ 442
Findin g 2: JISR improved IS R support to operations.......................................................... 442
Findin g 3: Collaboration was the key to J1 SR's successes and performance..................... 442
Findin g 4: A lack of collection management experience detracted from J1SR integration .

................................................................................................... 443
Findin g 5: Tool functionality as emulated did not support the JISR concept.................... 444
Findin g 6: No clear definin g system to establish priorities was available to Collection

M.a nage ln ent .............................................................................................................. 444
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY XI X

Table of Recommendations
ASSESSMENT AREA 1 - ESTABUSH AND MAINTAIN INFORMATION

SUPERIORITY" (IS) ..- - - -..--..- -..---..---..------..---..---..------ 52
t. DoD, immediately select a common collaborative capability (including JE.MPRS-NT) for
use as an interim joint command and control tool. Concurrently, USJFCOM,
supported by unified commanders, Services and other agencies, develop a joint
C41 architecture for the purposes of merging the two efforts for the fielding of a
DoD-wide collaborative information environment by 2005. ------------------- 71
2. USJFCOM, in conjunction with the Services and other combatant commanders, work to
redefine and document the meaning, relationships and importance of
Information Superiority, information operations, decision superiority, knowledge
superiority, knowledge readiness and commander centric operations so a
commonly understood Lexicon is developed. -- ----------------------------------- 71
3. USJFCOM , conduct a manpower study on a JTF supported by a SJFHQ and operating

in a collaborative information environment to determine its' manpower
requirements. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 72
ASSESSMENT AREA a- RAPIDLY SET CONDITIONS FOR DECISIVE
t. The JFCOM Joint Logistics Transformation Center (JLTC) with the JFCOM Joint
Deployment Process Office (JDPO) should, in the near term , host seminars, work
shops or limited objective experiments (LOEs) to explore what changes have to
take place to the effects-based planning and execution process. They should also
examine the means to fully integrate force deployment, employment, and
sustainment. Additionally, the group should review what decision support tools
are needed by the SJFElQ to allow them to rapidly assess the feasibility,
availability of transportation resources, of force deployment and employment
scenarios in the same timeline that effects-based plannin g takes place. -------- 87
2. JFCR development should continue. JFCOM, JLTC and the Services should continue to
populate the JFCR with warfighting capabilities and application usage that
supports units aligned with their capabilities. ----------------------------------- 87
3. JFCOM JDPO should develop decision support tools to support deployment planning.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 87
4. All Services should identify personnel to be tl'ained and function solely as JOPES
opera to rs, ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 87
xx FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5. All Services should review use of PREPO in support of RDO, and ensure PREPO assets
are kept current with force modernization. ----------------------------------- 87
6. For ISB planning, Service components should collaborate as much as possible to reduce
duplication of logistics capability in order to minimize the ISB footprint. ----- 87
7. DoD, develop or modify doctrine to jointly coordinate the movement of forces into the
JOA to facilitate initiation of effects operations upon entry. Include the lA to
ensure DIE aspects al'e integrated into these efforts. ------------------------ 87
8. DoD, develop doctrine establishing APODs and SPODs, which are protected aga inst
asymmetric attacks. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 87
9. DoD, incorporate asymmetric attacks on posts, camps, stations and bases plus APOEs
and SPOEs into all deployment exercises. --------------------------------- 87
ASSESSMENT AREA l - ASSURE ACCESS INTO AND THROUGH THE
I. JFCOM , develop an Assured Access concept to support EBO and ROO. ---------- 105
2. JFCOM, conduct an LOE to explore integration of D, 1, and E with JTF operations. 105
3. JFCOM, investigate the establishment of an ]0 group or task force to integrate]O into

JTF 0 pera t ions. ----------------------------------------------------------------- I 0 5
4. JFCOM , conduct furthel' concept development, experimentation and analysis on J"RSOI

to focus on effects capabilities in support of EBOfRDO. ------------------------105
5. JFCOM , conduct further experimentation on the tailoring of forces from the

components for integration into the JTF. --------------------------------------105
6. JFCOM, improve the effectiveness of decision support tools for the deployment and
redeploynlent of JTF resources. --------------------------------------------------- 106
7. JFCOM, revise concept documents to specify a closer working relationship between the
logistics personnel and the operational planners for ROO logistical integration.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 106
8. JFCOM, research new metrics for assessment of non-kinetic attacks on non-traditional

targets. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 106
9. J"FCOM, explore assigning ISR platforms at lower echelons to meet the tactical ISR
demands placed on tactical units by the asymmetrical nature of EBOfRDO. -106
10. JFCOM, develop a dedicated, joint, rear-area command concept refined for EBOfRDO.
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 106
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY XXI

It. JFCOM, provide guidance on pre-hostility ROE change implementation to support

RDO actions, and to ensure the safety of friendly forces and capabilities in the
J 0 A. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 106
12. JFCOM, refine joint air and space missile defense doctrine to support effects-based
operations. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 106
ASSESSMENT AREA 4 - CONDUCT DECISIVE EFFECTSBASED

OPERATIONS (EBO) ....--.._-_.._ .._-_.._-_.._-_.._ ..__.._-_.._-_.._-_.._ ..--..108
t. JFCOM, develop a PME template to the Service schools and NDV for inclusion in their
c u rricu Iu m. ------------------------------------------------------------------ 149
2. NOV and Services, incorporate the JFCOM ERO template in the curricula of joint and
Service warfare colleges. --------------------------------------------------------- 149
3. JFCOM, refine ERO concept and procedures in future experiments to develop ERO
tools and TTPs. ---------------------------------------------------------149
4. JFCOM , exercise the collaborative process and CIE tools in an LOE to refine the
business rules and processes required to maximize the usefulness ofthese tools.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------149
5. JFCOM, in conjunction with a combatant command, develop a robust ONA tool

incorporatin g better search engines and data visualization tools to help users
more quickly and efficiently access and understand the data contained in the
ON A. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 149
6. JFCOM, further define the reach-back concept as part of future experiments. ------ 149
7. JFCOM, lead an effort to develop a joint integrated tasking order to complement the
ETO and integrate the actions of all components including JFLCC and JSOTF
necessary to create joint effects. ----------------------------------------- 149
8. JFCOM , continue the development and refinement of the CONOPS and TTPs necessary
to build an ETO defining linkages between the ETO, PE L and ONA. ------- 150
9. JFCOM, foster development of lSR systems and M&S tools to replicate ISR systems to
better assess results of EBO effects. --------------------------------------- 150
10. JFCOM, in the SJFElQ concept, move the effect assessment cell from the Information
Superiority group to the plans group. ------------------------------------------- 150
It. JFCOM, reorganize the EAC to include IS personnel, to process BOA data, and
operations personnel to conduct predictive analysis to turn the data into
information that can be used to predict an adversary's capabilities and
intentions. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 150
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12. JFCOM, organize the EAC into three (3) functional groups: intelligence and BDA data
collection and analysis (IS personnel)- effects assessment (IS/OPS personnel)-
predictive/deficiency analysis (OPS personnel). ------------------------------150
13. JFCOM, examine effects assessment in future experiments with an emphasis on

organization, manning, tools, and doctrine (TTP). ------------------------------- 150
14. JFCOM, in conjunction with Service and joint schools, incorporate nodal and
deficiency analysis into curriculum to reinforce the ERO concept. ----------150
15. JFCOM, develop a coherent definition of TST, highlighting the differences between a
target that needs to be prosecuted immediately (TRM, CDCM, etc.) and one that
can wait until an asset is available to prosecute it. ------------------------------ 150
16. DoD, field ADOCS as an interim targeting toolset. ------------------------------150
17. 000, field TST process and JFI concept, incorporating lessons learned and the revised
procedures developed during MC02 as a joint procedure immediately. -------150
IS. DoD, develop M&S tools to better replicate non-kinetic weapon capabilities and effects
in exercise, wargame and experiment events. ----------------------------------- 150
19. JFCOM, modify the JIACG concept to include the Pol/Mil planner as the forward
element liaison between the JIACG and the JTF staff. ----------------------- 150
20. DoD, develop M&S tools to assist with the assessment of DIE actions. -------------151
21. JFCOM, continue development of the effects-based planning process and training fOI'
members of the JTF staffs. ------------------------------------------------------151
22. JFCOM, develop an acceptable mechanism for coordinating SAP/STO actions and
integrating SAP/STO program information into theJTF 10 campaign. ------151
23. JFCOM, take the lead in evaluating inclusion ofSTO in theJTF C lE, and in
determining if more STO billets are required throughout the JTF. --------- 151
ASSESSMENT AREA 5 - SUSTAIN THE FORCE------------------------153

1. JFCOM JLTC, through future experimentation events using the CIE, develop joint
sustainment structure(s) that support RDO scenarios such as those used in MC02
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 160
2. MEDCO M, field-test theater medical information program (TMIP) to validate Service

data integration prior to acceptance.----------------------------------------------- 160
3. JFCOM JLTC, examine networked distribution structure as part of an LOE on

satisfying joint force sustainment requirements for RDO.-------------------160
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY XX ll!

4. JFCOM JLTC, Joint Staff J4, DISA, and Services, continue to refine the Log CROP and
its functionality based on user comments and the availability of new or advanced
tech nol ogies -------------------------------------------------------------------- 160
5. JFCOM JLTC, pursue examination and definition of ' predictive logistics tools' ----- 160
t. DoD, field prototype SJFHQ to each combatant commander using MC02 model as base.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------233
2. JFCOM/SJFIlQ, update SJFIlQ concept of employment (CONEMP) to include KlMP
and integrated Pol/Mil plan as pre-crisis products to be provided by SJFHQ
prior to activation of the JTF. ----------------------------------------------------- 233
3. JFCOM/SJFHQ, update JSOP to clearly define the qualifications, duties, and

responsibil ities fOI' each position. ----------------------------------------- 233
4. JFCOM , investigate the continuing role of the SJFUQ with the JTF as the crisis matures,
to include duration of SJFHQ involvement, role of the SJFHQ in transition to
post-conflict, and provisions for the SJFHQ should a second crisis erupt. ---- 233
5. JFCOM, change the name ofSJFHQ from "Standing Joint Force Headquarters" to
"Standing Joint Force Command and Control Element" to clarify its role. --- 233
6. JFCOM, maintain the current SJFHQ organization-command group, plans group,

operations group, information superiority group, and knowledge manage ment
grou p. ----------------------------------------------------------------- 233
7. JFCOM/SJFHQ, investigate dissolving the IS group and KM group into the plans and
operations groups to provide better support to planning and operations
functions. --------------------------------------------------------------- 233
8. JFCOM/SJFUQ, investigate the establishment of a logistics/support group to coordinate,

synchronize, and integrate logistics and other support functions in pre-crisis
activities, planning, and operations, but keep logistics personnel in the plans
group and operations group. -------------------------------------------- 233
9. JFCOM , investigate the establishment of an 10 group or task force-JIOTF. Clearly,

define 10 and educate DoD and external agencies. -----------------------------233
10. JFCOMlSJFHQ, add fires person to operations group-person also provides fires
expertise during planning. ---------------------------------------------- 233
II. JFCOM/SJFHQ, add STRATL[FT, personnel, and engineer expertise to plans group.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------233
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12. DoS, DoD, and JFCOM, ensure Pol/Mil planner in plans group is a civilian with
regional expertise and lAC experience, and is directly linked to JlACG at
im porta n t. --------------------------------------------------------------------- 233
13. JFCOM/SJF8Q, assign responsibilities to several SJF8Q members in plans group and
operations group to coordinate and synchronize the plans group hand-off to
operations group. ------------------------------------------------------------------ 233
14. 000 and JFCOM/SJF8Q, add a flag or ge neral officer, to command SJF8Q
(command group), Upon integration of the SJFUQ into the JTF, the GOlFO can
fulfill Deputy CJTF or JTF CoS duties. _____234
15. JFCOMfSJFHQ, maintain SJFHQ BCCWG structure, but let JTF add and delete
BCCWGs as requiled. --------------------------------------------------- 234
16. JFCOM/SJFHQ, rework the JISC to improve effectiveness. ------------------------- 234
ASSESSMENT AREA 7 - OPERATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT (ONA) -239
I. JFCOM , define the intended use of 0 NA. ------------------------------------------------ 265
2. JFCOM, establish a section within joint experimentation that designs visualization

models for its concepts. ----------------------------------------------------------- 265
3, JFCOM , focus ONA development on the command level for which it was designed. -265
4. JFCOM , develop a PME template that guides development of joint and service ONA
concept education and training. --------------------------------------------------- 265
5. JFCOM , design ONA knowledge base tools that are intuitive to use and dynamically
support developers and users. ---------------------------------------------- 266
6. JFCOM, in conjunction with a combatant commander, develop a prototype ONA. -- 266
ASSESSMENT AREA 8 - EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS (EBO):

PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT ------------------------------------3a9
t. JFCOM, explore reach-back in future experiments and exercises as a feature of virtual
collaborative planning and assessment to define potential reach-back agencies
that enhance future operations. ---------------------------------------------- 352
2. JFCOM, develop decision support tools for effects visualization and modelin g. -------352
3. JFCOM, modify the EDO concept to include effects timing in the PEL in addition to
describing desired effects in terms of changes to the adversary' s actions or
behavior, the desired level of changes, and the scope and distribution of the
effect. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 352
FOR OFFICIAL liSE ONLY xxv

4. Joint Staff J7, establish, through the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC),
the requirement for joint and Service professional military education institutions
to incorporate the effects-based concept into their curricula. ---------------- 352
ASSESSMENT AREA 9 - COLLABORATIVE INFORMATION
I. JFCOM and the Joint Staff, use the MC02 XC41 system as a baseline fOI' immediate
development of a prototype C41 system to support future joint operations. --- 394
2. JFCOM, develop decision support tools to support EBO. -----------------------------394
3. JFCOM , and the Joint Staff, use the MC02 XC41 network as a model to connect the JTF
with its components and combatant cOlnmander. -------------------------394
4. JFCOM, consolidate and streamline common cm tools. --------------------------------394

WITHIN THE JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --399
1. JFCOM, in conjunction with a combatant command, stand-up a JlACG prototype, in
conjunction with the SJFElQ, to refine doctrine, TTP, and manpower
req u irements. ---------------------------------------------------------- 412
2. JFCOM, refine roles and responsibilities, relationships, functions, vertical and

horizontal communication, and authority of a JIACG during peacetime, theater
engagement, crisis preparations, crisis response, transition, and recovery. --412
3. JFCOM, explore interagency contributions to the SJFUQ and it's enabling concepts
(C IE, ONA, EBO, and JlSR). . ... _ ...... _ ......... _ ...... _ ......... _ ...... _ ....... 412
4. JFCOM , explore cool'dination of civilian multinational entities, regional and

international organizations, and non-governmental organizations into the
concept. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4 t 2
5. JFCOM and OSD, expand interagency play in joint exercises. ------------------------- 4 t 2
6, OSD, develop and field an interagency C IE to implement a secure C IE capability for use
by all departments and agencies with national security responsibilities. ------413
7. JFCOM in conjunction with OSD, develop business rules such as TTP' s, for
collaborative en gagement internal and external to DoD. ---------------------- 4 13

(J1LM) ..- -......- - -..- - - -..- ..- - -..- - - -......- - -..- - - -..- - - -......- - -..- --414
XXVI FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

t. JLTC. continue to refine the roles and responsibilities of the JLMC positions in the
deployment and sustainment TTP and JSOP in future LOEs. ----------------- 435
2. JLTC. in future LOts and work shops. investigate the roles and responsibilities for a
JTF support operations group that integrates all logistics and support functions
under a single director equivalent to the plans and operations group directors.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 435
3. JFCOM/SJFI:IQ, consider a logistics battle rhythm change that establishes a lower level
(action officer) collaborative working group to develop options and
reconlmendations for senior officers prior to the LARB. ----------------------- 436
4. JFCOM/JL TC. improve logistics decision support tools and logistics tools to meet the
agil ity demands of ROO. ------------------------------------------------ 436
5. JFCOM , develop an assured access concept to encompass force protection, employment,

deployment and sustainment from the continental United States to the joint
operations area. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 437
6. JFCOM, review joint doctrine regarding the essential elements and roles and
responsibilities of joint rear area operations. ---------------------------------- 437
7. JFCOM, experiment with a CONOPS specifically targeting joint rear area operations.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 437
ASSESSMENT AREA 12 - JOINT INIlIAlIVES ------------------------ 439
ASSESSMENT AREA 13 - JOINT IN1EWGENCE, SURVEILlANCE, AND

RECONNAISSANCE (JISR) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 441
I. JFCOM, make the emulated tools user-friendlier with increased functionality. ------446
2. JFCOM, conduct a limited objective experiment in an ISR asset constrained

environment with modeling and simulations that adequately supports a
continuing series of TSR experiments. ------------------------------------------- 446
3. JFCOM/SJFI:IQ, move alllSR personnel to the IS group. ------------------------- 446
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Table of Contents
A MESSAGE FROM ADMIRAL GtAMBASltANI-__________-iIi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY---------------------------v
THE FINDINGS---- - - - - --- - .. ---.. xlv
TABLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS ..- --.------.--.-.- --.------ D
TABLE OF CONTENlS-------..-----------..----- DVm
TABLE OF FIGURES-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xuvli
Purpose -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Scope----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
M C 02 Li ve Force Parti ci pan ts ------------------------------------------------------------------ I
Loca ti ons ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8
CHAPTER2-0eJECTIVES----9
Establi sh and Maintain Information Superi ori ty ---------------------------------------------9
Set Conditions for Decisive Operations ------------------------------------------------------- 9
A ssured A ccess --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I 0
Conduct Decisive Effects-Based Operations ----------------------------------------------- 10
Sustain the Force ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- II
CHAPTER3-CONCEPTS- _ . - 1 3
Standing Joint Forces headquarters (SJFHQ)----------------------------------------------- 13
Collaborati ve lnformation Envi ronment (CIE) --------------------------------------------- 14
Operational Net Assessment (ONA)--------------------------------------------------------- IS
Effects-Based Operations (E BO): Pl anning and Assessments --------------------------- 16
In teragen cy -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I8
Jo int Theater Logistics Management -------------------------------------------------------- 19
J oin t Ini ti ati ves --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2I
Joint Intelli gence, Surveillance, and Reconnai ssance (JISR)----------------------------- 22
CHAPTER 4 - EXPERIMENT SCENARIO ..--- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- 23

BIue Forces-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23
XXV111 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

A dapti ve A dversa 'Y ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26

Scen ari 0 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26
Threat forces orga ni zation and systems ----------------------------------------------------- 28
CHAPTER S - EXPERIMENT EXECUTION THE SPIRALS - - - - - - --31

MC02 Test Campaign Plan ------------------------------------------------------------------- 31
Spi ral 0 (December 3- 14, 200 I) -------------------------------------------------------------- 33
Spiral I (January 28 - February 8, 2002) --------------------------------------------------- 35
Spiral 2 (March 4-29, 2002) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 36
Spiral 3 (May 20 - June 14, 2002) ----------------------------------------------------------- 38
E nd-to-End T est -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39
Experim ent Executi on - Simul ati on Federation -------------------------------------------- 44
Experim ent Execution - Hybrid Terrain ---------------------------------------------------- 45
Experim ent Executi on - Data Coll ecti on and Assessment ------------------------------ 46
CHAPTER 6 - ASSUMPTIONS AND UMlTATIONS . --.--.--.-- 47

M C 02 Assum pti ons ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 48
M C 02 L imi ta ti ons ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 49
ASSESSMENT AREA 1 - ESTABUSH AND MAINTAIN INFORMATION

SUPERIORITY" (IS) ..- - - -..- - - -..- - -..- - -..- - - - - -..- - -..- - -..- - - - - - 52
Overall A ssessment Resu Its------------------------------------------------------------------- 52
Methodology ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53
Warfighting Chall enge: Ability to provide situational awareness throughout the JTF 55
Warfighting Chall enge: Ability to use the CROP and coll aborati on to enhance JTF
operati o ns---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 55
Other Ob servati on s ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 62
Relationship to Other Objectives ------------------------------------------------------------ 67
Rel ationshi p to Baseline Anal ysis ----------------------------------------------------------- 69
DO TMLPF Li n kage --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 70
Recom m endati on s ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 1
ASSESSMENT AREA a- RAPIDLY SET CONDlTlONS FOR DECISIVE

OPERATIONS---..- - - -..- - - -..- - - -......- - -..- - - -..- - - -......- - -..- - -.... 74
Overall A ssessmen t ResuIts------------------------------------------------------------------- 74
M eth odology ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 75
Warfighting Chall enges: Ability to establi sh advantageous positions for decisive
operati ons; and ability to decrease joint force vulnerability to di sruption. ------------- 76
Other Ob servati on s ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 84
Relati onship to Other Objectives ------------------------------------------------------------ 85
Rel ationshi p to Baseline Analysis ----------------------------------------------------------- 86
DO TMLP F Li nkage --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 86
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY XX I X

Recom mendati on s ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 87
ASSESSMENT AREA 3- ASSURE ACCESS INTO AND THROUGH THE

BATILESPACE--..- ..--..- - - -..---..---..---..- ..--..---..---..---..- ..--.... 89
Overall A ssessmen t Resul ts------------------------------------------------------------------- 89
Methodology ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 89
Warfighting Chall enge: Ab ility to provide selecti ve dimensional superiority--------- 90
Warfighting Chall enge: Ability to provide suffi cient operational reach---------------- 9 1
Warfig hting Chall enge: Ability to enhance force protecti on----------------------------- 92
Other Ob servati on s --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 104
Rel ationshi p to Other Obj ecti ves ----------------------------------------------------------- 105
Rel ationshi p to Baseline Anal ysis ---------------------------------------------------------- 105
DDTMLP F Li nkage -------------------------------------------------------------------------- I05
Recom mendati on s ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 105
ASSESSMENT AREA 4 - CONDUCT DECISIVE EFFECTS-BASED

OPERATIONS (E80) ..- - - - - - - - - ------ - - -..108
Overall A ssessment ResuIts------------------------------------------------------------------ I 08
Meth odology ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I09
Warfighting Chall enge: Ability to synchroni ze the appli cati on of the full range of joint
capab iliti es in order to engage decisive points in time and space ---------------------- 11 0
Warfighting Challenge: Abi lity to integrate full joint capabilities against tactical level
obj ecti ves -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 1 I
Warfighting Chall enge: Ability to integrate executi on of informati on operati ons into
EBO -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I 12
Other Ob servati ons --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 146
Relationshi p to Other Obj ecti ves ----------------------------------------------------------- 147
Relati onshi p to Baseline Analysis ---------------------------------------------------------- 148
DO TMLPF Li nkage -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 148
Recom mendati ons ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 149
ASSESSMENT AREA 5 - SUSTAIN THE FORCE--- --- -- - - -..163

Overall A ssessment ResuIts------------------------------------------------------------------ 153
Methodology ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I53
Warfighting Chall enge: Ability to Provide Agil e Sustainment ------------------------- 154
Other Ob servati ons --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 158
Rel ationship to Other Objectives ----------------------------------------------------------- 158
Relati onshi p to Baseline Analysis ---------------------------------------------------------- I 59
DOTMLP F Li nkage -------------------------------------------------------------------------- I59
Recom mendati ons ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 160
Overall A ssessmen t Resu Its------------------------------------------------------------------ 162

Methodology ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 163
xxx FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Warfighting Chall enge: Ability to qui ckly achi eve cohesive C2 of a j oint force ----164
Other Ob servati on s --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 229
Relationshi p to Other Obj ecti yes ----------------------------------------------------------- 229
Rel ationshi p to Baseline Analysis ---------------------------------------------------------- 23 I
DO TMLPF Li nkage -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23 I
Appendi x A - SJF HQ M anning------------------------------------------------------------237
ASSESSMENT AREA 7 - OPERATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT (ONA) -239

Overall Assessment Resul ts------------------------------------------------------------------ 239
Meth odology ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 240
Other Ob servati on s --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 1
Relationshi p to Other Obj ecti yes ----------------------------------------------------------- 264
Relationshi p to Baseline Analysis ---------------------------------------------------------- 264
DOTMLPF Linkage-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 264
Recommendati on s ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 265
Appendi x A - ONA Data Coll ecti on Matri x Analysis --------------------------------- 267
Appendi x B - aNA Training-------------------------------------------------------------- 294
Appendi x C - Additi onal Observations and Comments ------------------------------- 296
Appendi x D - ONA Database Development fo r MC02-------------------------------- 30 1
Appendix E - ONA Knowledge Base Information ------------------------------------- 302
Appendi x F - aNA Knowledge Base Access and Use -------------------------------- 304
Appendi x G - ONA Data Coll ecti on Matrix -------------------------------------------- 3 12
ASSESSMENT AREA 8 - EFFECTSBASED OPERATIONS (EBO):

PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -319
Overall Assessmen t ResuIts------------------------------------------------------------------ 329
Methodology ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 329
Warfighting Chall enges: Ab ility to conduct Effects-Based Pl anning; and ability to
conduct Effects A sse ssment ----------------------------------------------------------------- 329
Relationshi p to Other Obj ecti yes ----------------------------------------------------------- 35 1
Rel ationshi p to Baseline Anal ysis ---------------------------------------------------------- 352
DO TMLPF Li nkage -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 352
Recom mendati on s ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 52
ASSESSMENT AREA 9 - COLLABORATIVE INFORMATION

ENVIRONMENT tCIE)-----------....---..----..----......---..--- 3S4.
Overall Assessmen t ResuIts------------------------------------------------------------------ 3 54
Meth odology ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 354
Warfighting Chall enge: Ability to establi sh a valid CO P and build th e CROP in a CIE
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 59
Warfighting Chall enge: Ability to plan coll aboratively in a distributed joint C2
envi ron ment ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 59
Other Ob servati ons --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 78
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY XXX I

Rel ati onshi p to Other Obj ecti ves ----------------------------------------------------------- 388

Relationshi p to Baseline Analysis ---------------------------------------------------------- 389
DDTMLP F Li nkage -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 393
RecoIn mendati on s ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 394
Appendix A - Top Comm ents Group ----------------------------------------------------- 395
Appendix B - SME CROP Survey Questions ------------------------------------------- 397

WITHIN THE JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS ---.--.-----.----.-- 399
Overall A ssessmen t Resul ts------------------------------------------------------------------ 399
Meth odology ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 399
Warfighting Chall enge: Ab ility to qui ckly achieve and maintain cohesive relationships
with the IAC. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 400
Warfighting Chall enge: Ability to improve interagency campai gn planning and
ex ecuti on. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 400
Other Ob servati ons --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 09
Relationshi p to Other Obj ecti ves ----------------------------------------------------------- 41 I
Relati onshi p to Baseline Analysis ---------------------------------------------------------- 4 1I
DO TML PF Li nkages ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 I I
Recom mendati ons ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 12

(J1LM) ..- -......---..- - - -..- - - -..- - - -......---..- - - -..- - - -......---..---414
Overall A ssessmen t ResuI ts------------------------------------------------------------------ 4 14
Meth odology ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 I 5
Warfighting Chall enge: Ability to Plan for Agi le Sustainment------------------------- 4 15
Other Ob servati on s --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 3 3
Relati onshi p to Other Obj ecti ves ----------------------------------------------------------- 434
Relati onshi p to Baseline Anal ysis ---------------------------------------------------------- 43 5
DO TMLPF Li nkage -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 43 5
Recom mendati on s ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 43 5
ASSESSMENT AREA 12 - JOINT INITIATIVES .-.-.----...---.--- 439

Near Tenn Fieldabl e Technologies ---------------------------------------------------------440
ASSESSMENT AREA 13 - JOINT INTEWGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND
Overall A ssessmen t ResuI ts------------------------------------------------------------------ 44 I

Meth odology ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 44 I
Warfighting Chall enge: Ability to provide relevant intelli gence to the commander-441
Relati onshi p to Other Obj ecti ves ----------------------------------------------------------- 446
Relati onshi p to Baseline Anal ysis ---------------------------------------------------------- 446
DO TMLPF Li nkage -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 446
XXX II FOR OFFICIAl. USE ONLY

CHAPTER 8 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS------ - - - - - - - 447
ANNEX A - GLOSSARY/ACRONYMS-......- -......- ..- ......- ..- ..--..- ......- -......- ..-A1
Acronyms---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------A I 7
ANNEX B - ElASEUNE REPORT -- -- ----B1
ANNEX C - ASSESSMENT PLAN - --..- - - - - -..--.-..- --..------C1

Objective # I : Establi sh And Maintain Informati on Superi ority ----------------------- C 14
Objective #2: Rapidly Set Conditi ons For Decisive Operations ----------------------- C 15
Objective #3: Assure Access Into And Through The Battlespace --------------------- C 16
Objective #4: Conduct Decisive Effects- Based Operations ---------------------------- C 18
Objective #5: Sustai n The Force ----------------------------------------------------------- C2 1
ANNEX D - NEAR TERM FIELDABLE TECHNOLOGIES-- - ----01
ANNEX E - EXERCISE CONTROL DESCRIPTION - - - - - - - - - - - --E1

Purpose ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ E I
Ex peri ment Overvi ew ------------------------------------------------------------------------- E I
Control Overvi ew ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ E I
Joi nt Experim ent Control Group (JECG).--------------------------------------------------- E3
Role PI ayers ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- E4
Control Commu n ica ti on s---------------------------------------------------------------------- E5
ANNEX F - ADAPllVe ADVERSARY - ......- -......- ..- ......- ..- ..--..- ......- -......- ..- F1
o PFOR Organi zati on -------------------------------------------------------------------------- F2
OPFOR Campai gn Objectives---------------------------------------------------------------- F2
o PFOR Credibi Iity ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- F9
ROO Vul nerabi li ti es Addressed ------------------------------------------------------------- F 12
Conclusi on ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- F I 7
ANNEX G - RANGE INTEGRATION RESULTS-------------------------G1

Background and Concept of Operations ----------------------------------------------------G3
Requirements Development and Integration CONOPS -----------------------------------G3
Executi on CON 0 PS --------------------------------------------------------------------------- G4
Post executi on and Anal ysis CONOPS------------------------------------------------------G4
Range In tegration CONO PS Findings and Recomm endati ons---------------------------G5
ANNEX H - MODEL AND SIMULATION FEDERATION ------------------H1

Preface ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- H I
Air Force Synthetic Environment for Reconnai ssance and Surveillance (AFSE RS)-- H I
Air Warfare Simulati on, A WS IM ------------------------------------------------------------ H2
C2 Analysi5 and T argeti ng Tool (CA TT) --------------------------------------------------- H3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY XXX ll!

Civi I Envi ronment Model (CEM) ------------------------------------------------------------ H3

CIutter!J S A F ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ H3
Digital Battle staff Sustainment Trainer (DBST) ------------------------------------------ H3
Distributed rw Constructive Environment (DICE) ---------------------------------------- H3
Extended Air Defense Simul ation (EADSI:M) --------------------------------------------- H4
Fire Simul a ti on (FfRE S1M) ------------------------------------------------------------------- H4
lQU AD (l CA S and l O IS1M) ----------------------------------------------------------------- H4
l oi nt Confli ct and Tactical Si mul ation (ICATS) (A = Army / M = MarineslSOF)----H4
J oint Semi-Automated Forces (J SAF) ------------------------------------------------------- H4
Missil e Defense Space Warning Tool (MOST) -------------------------------------------- H4
Multipl e Unified Simulation Environment (MUSE)--------------------------------------- H5
National War Gaming System (NW ARS) -------------------------------------------------- H5
Si mulati on of the Location and Attack of Mobi le Enemy Missi les (SLAMEM) ------ H5
Tacti cal Ex pl oitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) ------------------------------- H6
Virtual Surveill ance Target and Attack Radar System 1ST ARS (VST ARS)----------- H7
Airborne Laser Simul ation (ABL) ----------------------------------------------------------- H7
Automated Scriptor Si mul ator Exercise Trainer (ASSET) ------------------------------- H7
A TLO S ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ H 7
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) ---------------------------------------- H7
Battle Force Tactical Trainer (BFTT) ------------------------------------------------------- H7
Cobra 8all --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- H8
CV-22 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- H8
Dynamic Communi cations Environment (DC E) ------------------------------------------- H9
Informati on Warfare Effects Generator (TWEG)------------------------------------------- H9
Flight Deck Operations (FDO) [W ARCONj----------------------------------------------- H9
Integrated Modeling Pl atform for Advanced Computational Technologies---------- HI 0
LOCAAS Engagement Analysis Program Si mul ation (LEAPS) ---------------------- HI O
Logistics Simulation (LOGSLM) ----------------------------------------------------------- HI 0
Multi-LINK System Test and Training Tool (MLST3) --------------------------------- H II
Ocean Atmosphere Space Environmental Services (OASES)-------------------------- H II
Environm ental Data lngestor (ED1)-------------------------------------------------------- H II
Environm ental Data Transformer (EDT)-------------------------------------------------- H II
Environmental Tail oring System (ETS)--------------------------------------------------- H 12
Personal Computer - Shall ow Water Acousti c Toolkit (PC-SWA T) ------------------ H 12
Portable Space Model EnhancedlNavigation (pSM+INA V) --------------------------- H 12
Rivet Joi nt Mission Trainer (RJMT)------------------------------------------------------- H 12
Simulati on C41 Interchange Module for Pl ans, Logisti cs, & Exercises (SLMPLE) - H 12
Unattended MASINT Sensor (UMS) ------------------------------------------------------ H 12
Virtual Submarine (VSSGN) --------------------------------------------------------------- H 13
Weapons Analysis Lethality Toolset (W AL TS) ----------------------------------------- H 13
Tools & Stand-Al one Models:-------------------------------------------------------------- H 14
C41 Gateway (C4 1GW) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- H 14
Chi cken Little-G lobal Positi oning System (CL-GPS)----------------------------------- H 14
Compact Terrain Database (CTDB) ------------------------------------------------------- H 14
Digital Coll ection, Analysis, and Review System (DCARS)--------------------------- HI S
High Level Architecture I Distributed Interactive Simul ation Gateway -------------- HI S
XXX I V FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

High Level Architecture Results ----------------------------------------------------------- H 15

l oint Medical Semi Automated Forces (JMEDSAF) ------------------------------------ HI S
Multi-Host Automation Remote Control & In strum entati on (MARCI)--------------- H 16
Run Ti me Infrastructure (RTI) ------------------------------------------------------------- H 16
ANNEX 1- SPONSORED JOINT INIlIATIVES ----------------------------11

C2 of Space, 10 Forces -------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Global C2 System Integrated Im agery and Intelligence (GCCS-13)---------------------- 17
Global Stri ke Task Force (GSTF) ----------------------------------------------------------- 11 0
Coll aborati on Tool (InfoWorkSpace (IWS) 2.5) ------------------------------------------ li S
l oint Automated Target Folders (IA TF) --------------------------------------------------- 122
Joi nt Enroute Mission Pl anning and Rehearsal System - Near Term (JEMPRS-NT) 126
Joint Fires Initi ative - Automated Deep Operations Coordination System------------ 129
Joint Intelli gence, Surveill ance and Reconnaissance! Coll ection Management------- 135
l oi nt Publi c Affai rs Operations Group (JP AOG) ----------------------------------------- 139
JSOTF Reach-back Special Operations Mission Planning Environm ent (SOMPE) - 149
Logistics Tool Suite (L TS)------------------------------------------------------------------- 153
Maneuver Control System - Tacti cal Combat Operations (MCS-TCO) Interface --- 156
National Im agery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) Initiative ----------------------------- 160
Network Security Management Correlation and Di splay Systems (NSM C& D)----- 162
Theater Medi cal Info rmati on Program - Joint (TMfP-J)------------------------------- 167
Un man ned Sen sor (US) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 170
Operational Network Assessment (ONA) Tool Suite ------------------------------------ 176
Automated Informati on Network Flow (ANTF)------------------------------------------- 18 1
Special Technology Operations (STO) Initi ati ve ----------------------------------------- 183
ANNEX J - PARTICIPATING ORGANtzATIONS ------------------------- J1
ANNEX K - EXPERIMENT LESSONS LEARNED--------------------K1

Titl e: OPFOR Rul es of Engagement (ROE) ------------------------------------------------ K I
Titl e: OPFO R Reaction Tim e----------------------------------------------------------------- K I
Title: Video Media Obj ecti vity --------------------------------------------------------------- K2
Ti tl e: Experiment Pl ay Classification Level------------------------------------------------ K2
Ti tl e: Thi rd Pa rty Grey Cell ------------------------------------------------------------------- K2
Titl e: Simulation-Li ve Event Ti e-in --------------------------------------------------------- K3
Title: Red and Bl ue Dai ly MSEL Processes ------------------------------------------------ K4
Title: Boi l Down Conducted in th e Form of Work Shops Process ----------------------K4
Titl e: Analyst Use of the Coll aborative Information Envi ronment ----------------------K4
Titl e: Post Experim ent After Acti on Review ----------------------------------------------- K5
Title: Surveys - Partici pant Overload -------------------------------------------------------- K5
ANNEX L - SENIOR CONCEPT DEVELOPER/MENTOR OBSERVATIONS-L1

MC02 Executi on Seni or Concept Developer Observations------------------------------- L I
Millenni um Chall enge 2002 OPFOR After Acti on Report ------------------------------- L I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY xxxv

ANNEX M - SERVICE INPUT- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .. M1

USMC - United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command------------- M I
USA - Trai ning and Doctrine Command ------------------------------------------------- M2
USN - Navy Warfare Development Command ----------------------------------------- M7
USAF - Air Force Experim entati on Office ---------------------------------------------- M8
ANNEX N -INDEX- - - - - -- --------N1
ANNEX 0 - DtSTRIBUT&ON UST ..- --..------..--.-..- --..------01
XXXV I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table of Figures
FIGURE 1: RESPONSE CELL AND LIVE FORCES LOCATIONS--------------------------------------------------8
FIGU RE 2: EBO CYC LE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 11
FIGURE 3: MC02 JOINT FORCE HQ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13
FIGURE 4: EXPERIMENTAL COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE
(XC4L) APPARATUS, ALLOWED A COHERENTLY JOINT, REACH-BACK,
COLLABORATIVE INFOR MATION ENVI RON MENT. ---------------------------------------------- 14
FIGURE 5: NAVAL STATION SAN DIEGO, CALIF., JUL 24 , 2002 - A HARBOR TUG PULLS THE
GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER USS FITZGERALD (DDG 62) AWAY FROM PIER 3 AT
THE NAVAL STATION , SAN DIEGO. FITZGERALD WAS PARTICIPATING IN
MILLENN IUM CHALLENGE 2002. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
FIGURE 6: JTF ORGAN IZATION CHART ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
FIGURE 7: J IACG RELA TI ONSH IPS-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18
FIGURE 8: NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE , NEV. (AFIE) -- TECH . SGT. TOMMY MAZZONE, A
LOADMASTER FROM THE 8TH SPEC IAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON AT HURLBURT
FIELD, FLA. LOADS A PALETTE ABOARD A MC-130E COMBAT TALON ON JULY 29
FOR AN AIR DROP DURING MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE. -------------------------------------- 20
FIGURE 9: MC02 SCENAR 10 HIGH LI GHTS---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28
FIGURE 10: CH INA LAKE, CALIF . JULY 30 (AFIE) -- INSIDE THE INTEGRATED BATTLESPACE
ARENA AT MIC HELSON LABORATORY, WARFIGHTERS KEEP A CLOSE EYE ON
SCREENS SHOW1 NG A REAL-TIME PICTURE OF THEATER AIR ASSETS AND A LIVE
FEED FROM A PREDATOR SURVEI LLANCE AIRCRAFT DURING MILLENNIUM
CHALLENGE 2002. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29
FIGURE 11 : SUFFOLK, VA. , JULY 29, 2002 - "WHAT I'VE SEEN IS THE FUTURE," SAID ADM. VERN
CLARK AFTER HI S TOUR OF THE JOINT TRAINING , ANALYSIS, AND SIMULATION
CENTER (JTASC). THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TOURED THE U.S. JOINT
FORC ES COMMAND DUR ING MC02. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 31
FIGURE 12: SAN DIEGO, CALIF., JUL. 26, 2002 - THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, AIR FORCE GEN . RICHARD MYERS (CENTER) AND AIDE NAVY CAPT.
RICHARD W HUNT ARE BRIEFED BY CAPT. KEN GINADER, A DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS IN THE JOINT AIR OPERATIONS CENTER ABOARD USS CORONADO
(AGF 11). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 34
FIGURE 13: RAPTOR 4002 PASSED ITS 300TH FLIGHT-HOUR MARK, THE FIRST F-22 TO DO SO
AT THE AIR FORCE'S FLIGHT TEST CENTER, RECENTLY. WH ILE THIS RAPTOR IS
REAL, THE F-22'S IN MC02 WERE ALL SIMULATED BLUE FORCE ASSETS AS THE
EXERCISE PORTION OF THE EXPERIMENT FEATURED FORCES FROM FY 2007.-- 36
FIGURE 14: MC02 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY --------------------------------------------------------------- 45
FIGURE 15: THE ARMY'S NEWEST FIGHTING VEH ICLE , THE STRYKER GOT A WORKOUT DURING
MC02 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 51
FIGURE 16: RELATIVE INFORMATION POSITION ----------------------------------------------------------------- 53
FIGURE 17: PARTICIPANT VIEW ON CONCEPT CONTR IBUTION --------------------------------------------- 53
FIGURE 18: EXPERIMENTATION INFORMATION FLOW INTO THE JOINT TASK FORCE------------- 54
FIGURE 19: INFORMATION SUPER IOR ITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS--------------------------------------- 54
FIGURE 20: IWS CONFERENCE ROOM USE DESCRIBED------------------------------------------------------ 56
FIGURE 21: THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN THE CIE WAS SUFFIC IENT TO MAINTAIN A HIGH
LEVEL OF AWARENESS REGARDING BOTH THE FRIENDLY AND ENEMY
SITUATIONS AT ALL TIMES. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 56
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY XXXVll

FIGURE 22: HQS EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT TOOL RESUL TS----------------------------------------- 57

FIGURE 23: JISC ROOM CHAT TEXT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 58
FIGURE 24: INTEL ROOM CHAT TEXT --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 59
FIGURE 25: JTF FRAGO DESCRIBED IN DATA REDUCTION---------------------------------------------------- 61
FIGURE 26: SYNCHRON IZA TION LEVEL5----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 61
FIGURE 27: RICHNESS OF INFORMATION IN THE COP, ON BOTH FRIEND AND FOE, WAS
CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE BY A MAJORITY OF JTF STAFF MEMBERS. -------------- 62
FIGURE 28: RICHNESS OF INFORMATION IN THE CROP ------------------------------------------------------- 63
FIGURE 29: MOST THOUGHT THE QUALITY OF THE CROP IMPROVED WITH TIME------------------ 63
FIGURE 30: UTILITY OF INFORMATION IN THE CROP------------------------------------------------------------ 64
FIGURE 31 A & B: PARTICIPANTS' USE OF IWS PEEKED DURING THE ISLAND OPERATIONS
CAMPAIGN (LEFT) , WHICH CORRESPONDED WITH HI GH LEVELS OF E-MAIL USE,
SHOWIN AT R IGHT----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 64
FIGURE 32: TOOLS, WHICH PROVIDED THE MOST USEFUL INFORMATION----------------------------- 65
FIGURE 33: AN F-16 ENGAGES A TARGET OVER THE NEVADA FIRING RANGES IN RESPONSE TO
AN MC02 TASKI NG ORDER ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 73
FIGURE 34: SMES THOUGHT THE JTF STAFF WAS ABLE TO RESPOND MORE QU ICKLY TO
DEPLOYMENT CHANGES IN THE CIE --------------------------------------------------------------- 78
FIGURE 35: MOST AGREED THAT ISBS WERE WELL SUITED TO MOVING FORCES------------------ 79
FIGURE 36: CIE EFFECTIVELY SYNCHRONIZED DEPLOYMENT FORCE FLOW------------------------- 80
FIGURE 37: MAJORITY THOUGHT LOG CROP PROVIDED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO DIVERT
PR EPO MATER IAL------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 81
FIGURE 38: ABI LITY TO DECREASE JTF VULNERABILITY ------------------------------------------------------ 83
FIGURE 39: SERVICES THOUGHT PREPO REDUCED TIMELINES ------------------------------------------- 84
FIGURE 40: A SOLDIER PREPARES A PSC-5 COMMUNICATIONS SET AS BLUE FORCES ASSAULT
AN OPFOR AIRFIELD DURING MC02----------------------------------------------------------------- 88
FIGURE 41 : INSTANCES OF FRIENDLY OPERATI ONS DELAYED , DISRUPTED , AND CANCELED
BECAUSE OF THE ACTIONS OF AN ENEMY FORCE ------------------------------------------- 92
FIGURE 42: RATING OF ADEQUACY OF FRIENDLY STRATEGY TO COUNTER ENEMY ANTI-
ACC ESS STRATEGY--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 94
FIGURE 43: INSTANCES OF LESS THAN OPTIMUM WEAPON SELECTION ------------------------------101
FIGURE 44: INSTANCES OF FRIENDLY OPERATIONS DELAYED BY ENEMY ACTIONS, BY DAYS
OF DELAY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 104
FIGURE 45: INSTANCES OF COMPROMISED INTENTIONS----------------------------------------------------105
FIGURE 46: SEAL TEAM TRANSPORTATION STANDING BY TO EMBARK RIDERS TO AN
OBJECTIVE AREA ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 107
FIGURE 47: INSTANCES OF ISSUES CONCERN ING RELATIONSHIP OF PEL TO JIPTL-------------114
FIGURE 48: REACH-BACK CAPABILITY HAD A POSITI VE IMPACT ON THE TARGETING PROCESS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116
FIGURE 49: COLLABORATION CAPABILITY IS ADEQUATE ----------------------------------------------------117
FIGURE 50: PERCENT OF ONA NODES IDENTIFIED FOR ATTACK ----------------------------------------- 11 9
FIGURE 51: FORTY-THREE PERCENT OF JFACC ASSETS WERE ALLOCATED TO THE TBMIWME
TH REAT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 126
FIGURE 52: THE JFMCC AND JFACC WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTIN G AGAINST TIME
SEN SITIVE TARGETS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 130
FIGURE 53: PARTICIPANTS THOUGHT COLLABORATION IMPROVED TST COORDINATION ------ 132
XXX Vll! FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FIGURE 54: MOST THOUGHT MC02 TST PROCEDURES SHOULD BE ADOPTED AS A JOINT
STAN DAR D ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 33
FIGURE 55: ADOCS VIEWED AS 'BETTER THAN ADEQUATE' FOR USE AS A TARGETING TOOL 134
FIGURE 56: TIME REQUIRED FOR BLUE TO DETERMINE A NEW PLAN IS REQUIRED LESS THEN 1
HOU R ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 39
FIGURE 57: EIGHTY-FIVE PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS INDICATED THAT BLUE FORCES WERE
REPOSITIONED IN LESS THAN SIX HOURS------------------------------------------------------140
FIGURE 58: DEGREE OF SUCCESS ACHIEVED AGAINST 10 OBJECTIVES ------------------------------ 145
FIGURE 59: US NAVY MEDICAL TEAMS WORK ON THE WOUNDED DURING MC02 FIELD
EX ERC ISES-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 52
FIGURE 60: LOG CROP ENHANCES AWARENESS (N=59) -----------------------------------------------------156
FIGURE 61: LOG CROP PROVIDES VISIBILITY-TAI LORING SUSTAINMENT OF DEPLOYED FORCES
(N=5 5)---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 57
FIGURE 62: GETTING READY FOR THE GLOBAL STRIKE TASK FORCE MISSION DURING MC02
EXERC ISES-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 161
FIGURE 63: JSOP CORRECTLY DESCRIBES/DEFINES RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS --- 167
FIGURE 64: SJFHQ PRE-CRISIS PLANNING ENHANCED THE FUNCTION OF THE JTF
HEADQUARTER S ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 168
FIGURE 65: SJFHQ PROVIDED EXPECTED PRODUCTS FROM PRE-CRISIS PLANNING ------------ 169
FIGURE 66: SJFHQ SHOU LD BRING ADDITIONAL SKILLS , KNOWLEDGE, OR PRODUCTS TO JTF
ACTI VA TION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 170
FIGURE 67: JSOP CONSIDERED A 'SOMEWHAT USEFUL' DOCUMENT -----------------------------------17 1
FIGURE 68: JSOP NEEDED MODIFICATION ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 171
FIGURE 69: JTF SUCCESSFUL IN PERFORMING EBO AND UJTL TASK-----------------------------------172
FIGURE 70: JTF FUNCTIONS NOT AFFECTED BY BATTLE RHYTHM RIGOR OR STRUCTURE----173
FIGURE 71 : SJFHQ WAS VALUABLE TO ST ANDUP OF JTF HQ-----------------------------------------------175
FIGURE 72: ATTRIBUTES OF SJFHQ QU ICKENED THE JTF HQ LEARN ING CURVE ------------------176
FIGURE 73: SJFHQ CONSIDERED CR ITICAL TO JTF HQ -------------------------------------------------------176
FIGURE 74: VALUE OF SJFHQ ATTR IBUTES IN QU ICKENING JTF LEARNING CURVE---------------177
FIGURE 75: SJFHQ ENHANCED TASK PERFORMANCE --------------------------------------------------------178
FIGURE 76: JTF RELIED ON SJFHQ FOR TASK PERFORMANCE --------------------------------------------179
FIGURE 77: SME OBSERVED CONTI NUITY IN JTF PLANNING AND OPERATIONS -------------------- 180
FIGURE 78: SJFHQ EXPERTISE WAS VALUABLE TO JTF ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING
INFOR MATION SUPERIOR ITY ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 180
FIGURE 79: SJFHQ WAS A FORCE MULTIPLIER FOR THEJTF AND A VALUABLE TOOL IN
ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING IS --------------------------------------------------------------181
FIGURE 80: SJFHQ EXPERTISE WAS VALUABLE TO JTF SETTING CONDITIONS FOR DECISIVE
OPERATI ONS. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 181
FIGURE 81: SJFHQ WAS AN ENHANCEMENT TO THE JTF FOR SETTING CONDITIONS FOR
DEC IS IVE OPERATION S-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 182
FIGURE 82: SJFHQ EXPERTISE WAS VALUABLE TO THE JTF IN ITS REQUIREMENT TO EXECUTE
"ASSU RED ACCESS" ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 182
FIGURE 83: SJFHQ EXPERTISE WAS VALUABLE TO THE JTF, WHILE CONDUCTI NG EBO --------182
FIGURE 84 : VALUE OF SJFHQ IN ENABLING JTF TO SUSTAIN THE FORCE-----------------------------183
FIGURE 85: SJFHQ ENABLED THE "SUSTAIN THE FORCE" MISSION--------------------------------------183
FIGURE 86: FORMING THE JTF TODAY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 184
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY XX XIX

FIGURE 87: FORMING THE MC02'S JTF ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 185

FIGURE 88: EFFECTS-BASED PLANNING DIDN'T FALTER DUE TO ORGAN IZATIONAL PROBLEMS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 5
FIGURE 89: BCCWG STRUCTURE ENHANCED JTF HQ OPERATIONS-------------------------------------186
FIGURE 90: SJFHQ ENHANCED THE FUNCTION OF THE FORWARD HQ---------------------------------187
FIGURE 91 : SJFHQ PRESENCE REDUCED FORWARD HQ SET-UP TIME---------------------------------188
FIGURE 92:CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED FOR SJFHQ ---------------------------------------189
FIGURE 93: PARTICIPANTS WERE UNSURE OF THE CORRECT NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF
10 PLANNERS WITH THE SFJHQ ---------------------------------------------------------------------194
FIGURE 94: CHANGE IN 10 RESPONSES ----------------------------------------------------------------------------195
FIGURE 95: MOST AGREED THAT LOGISTICIANS IN PLANS ENHANCED JTF ------------------------- 195
FIGURE 96: LOGISTICIANS IN OPERATIONS ENHANCED JTF ------------------------------------------------196
FIGURE 97: GROUP STRUCTURE EFFECT ON JTF OPERATIONS ------------------------------------------197
FIGURE 98: GROUP STRUCTURE EFFECT ON COMPONENT INTERACTION ---------------------------197
FIGURE 99: MOST THOUGHT STRUCTURE WAS AN ENHANCEMENT TO JTFHQ-COMPONENT
INTERACTION . J FACCI JPOTF MIXED. -------------------------------------------------------------- 198
FIGURE 100: MOST TH OUGHT INTERACTION BETWEEN JTF HQ AND THE COMPONENT STAFFS
WAS EFFE CTIVE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 198
FIGURE 101 JTF AND COMPONENTS THOUGHT STRUCTURE ENHANCED INTERACTION
BETWEEN THE COMBATANT COMMANDER'S STAFF AND THE JTF STAFF.
COMBATANT COMMANDER'S STAFF DISAGREED. -------------------------------------------199
FIGURE 102: ADDITIONAL SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE, AND PRODUCTS NEEDED FROM SJFHQ------200
FIGURE 103: BCCWG HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT ON JTF OPERATIONS-----------------------------------207
FIGURE 104: BCCWG EFFECT ON COMPONENT INTERACTION -------------------------------------------- 208
FIGURE 105: BCCWG EFFECT ON COMBATANT COMMANDER STAFF INTERACTION --------------208
FIGURE 106: BLUE/RED CELL INTERVAL, MIX AND NUMBERS WERE CONSIDERED ADEQUATE
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------209
FIGURE 107: BLUE/RED CELL FULFILLMENT OF JTF NEEDS-------------------------------------------------2l 0
FIGURE 108: EFFECTS ASSESSMENT CELL ATTRIBUTES ----------------------------------------------------21 0
FIGURE 109: EFFECTS ASSESSMENT CELL FULFILLED JTF'S NEEDS -----------------------------------2 11
FIGURE 110: INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL CONSIDERED ADEQUATE BY MOST -------------212
FIGURE 111 : INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL FULFILLED OF JTF NEEDS---------------------------213
FIGURE 112: JOINT COORDINATION BOARD MET EVERYONE'S EXPECTATIONS--------------------214
FIGURE 113: JOINT COORDINATION BOARD'S PERFORMANCE IMPROVED BETWEEN SPIRAL 3
AN D MC02 EX ECUTI ON---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 214
FIGURE 114: THE JCB WORKI NG GROUP RECEIVED WIDE ACCLAIM ------------------------------------215
FIGURE 115: JOINT COORDINATION BOARD WORKING GROUP SAW EFFECTIVENESS RATINGS
RISE BETWEEN SPIRAL 3 AND MC02 EXECUTION --------------------------------------------215
FIGURE 116: JOINT COLLECTION MANAGEMENT CELL ATTRIBUTES ------------------------------------216
FIGURE 117: RESPONDENTS CONSIDERED SOME CELL SHORTCOMI NGS----------------------------216
FIGURE 118: JOINT FIRES ELEMENT WORKING GROUP ATTR IBUTES -----------------------------------217
FIGURE 119: JOINT FIRES ELEMENT WG MET JTF NEEDS----------------------------------------------------217
FIGURE 120: JOINT INFO SUPERIORITY CENTER ATTRIBUTES ADEQUATE----------------------------218
FIGURE 121 : JOINT INFO SUPERIORITY CENTER MET JTF NEEDS----------------------------------------219
FIGURE 122: JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER PERSONNEL MIX AND NUMBER CONSIDERED
ADEQUATE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 219
xl FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FIGURE 123: JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER MET THE JTF NEED S------------------------------------------220
FIGURE 124: JOINT PLANNING CENTER ATTRIBUTES----------------------------------------------------------22 1
FIGURE 125: JOINT PLANNING CENTER MET JTF NEEDS ---------------------------------------------------- 22 1
FIGURE 126: ROE WORKING GROUP ATTRIBUTES--------------------------------------------------------------222
FIGURE 127: ROE GROUP JUDGED A BIG SUCCESS -----------------------------------------------------------223
FIGURE 128: ALL WERE SATISFIED WITH THE MIX AND NUMBER OF PERSONNEL WORKING IN
THE TIME SENSITIVE TARGETING CELL ---------------------------------------------------------- 223
FIGURE 129: TIME SENSITIVE TARGET CELL MET JTF NEEDS----------------------------------------------224
FIGURE 130: LOGISTICS ACTION RESPONSE BOARD MET JTF NEEDS---------------------------------225
FIGURE 131 : PARTICIPANTS WERE SATISFIED WITH THE MIX OF BOARDS, CENTER S, CELLS, OR
WORKING GROUPS AND WOULDN'T DELETE ANY -------------------------------------------225
FIGURE 132: COMMAND AND CONTROL IS THE EMPHASIS IN MC02 -------------------------------------238
FIGURE 133: MAJORITY FEELS ONA SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT A BROAD RANGE OF
SPEC IALTI ES. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 46
FIGURE 134: DESIRED ONA CHARACTERISTICS ----------------------------------------------------------------- 24 7
FIGURE 135: ONA BENEFICIAL FOR BLUE -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 248
FIGURE 136 : ONA EFFECTIVEN ESS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24 9
FIGURE 137: EASE OF INFORMATION UPDATE AND MAINTENANCE--------------------------------------251
FIGURE 138: EASE OF ONA INFORMATION RETRIEVAL-------------------------------------------------------- 252
FIGURE 139: EASE OF ONA INFORMATION FILTER AND SORT----------------------------------------------253
FIGURE 140: SHOULD ONA BE A SOURCE FOR CURRENT BDA?-------------------------------------------254
FIGURE 141 : SHOULD ONA BE DESIGNED AS A SOURCE FOR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
INFOR MATION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25 5
FIGURE 142: LESS THAN HALF OF MC02 PARTICIPANTS THOUGHT THEY WERE ADEQUATELY
TRAIN ED ON ONA ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 257
FIGURE 143: INFORMATION RETRIEVAL RECEIVED MIXED GRADES-------------------------------------259
FIGURE 144: EASE OF INFORMATION UPDATE AND MAI NTENANCE IN ONA KNOWLEDGE BASE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 260
FIGURE 145: IMPORTANT TO BE NOTIFIED OF ONA ANALYSIS UPDATES ------------------------------26 1
FIGURE 146: CAN TELL WHEN ONA HAS BEEN UPDATED ----------------------------------------------------26 1
FIGURE 147: ONA DATABASE C HANGES ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 262
FIGURE 148: TOTAL EXECUTION ONA DATABASE CHANGES -----------------------------------------------263
FIGURE 149: ONA DESKTOP SNAPSHOT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 7
FIGURE 150: PRE SPIRAL 3 ONA DATABASE CHANGES ------------------------------------------------------- 268
FIGURE 151 : PRE SPIRAL 3 ONA DATABASE CHANGES ------------------------------------------------------- 269
FIGURE 152: ONA DATABASE VI EWI NG ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 270
FIGURE 153: EXECUTION ONA DATABASE VIEWI NG BY GROUP -------------------------------------------270
FIGURE 154: ONA ANALYSIS IS GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD-------------------------------------------------271
FIGURE 155: ONA ANALYSIS IS THOROUGH AND USEFUL ACCORDING TO MAJORITY------------271
FIGURE 156: ONA ANALYSIS OF BLUE IS USEFUL --------------------------------------------------------------- 272
FIGURE 157: EIGHTY-TWO PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD ONA
ANALYSIS OF RED PMESII ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 273
FIGURE 158: ONA ANALYSIS OF OPFOR GOALS, INTENTIONS, STRENGTHS, AND WEAKNESSES
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------274
FIGURE 159: ONA ANALYSIS OF RED IS USEFUL ---------------------------------------------------------------- 274
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY xli

FIGURE 160: ONA ANALYSIS OF OPFOR GOALS, INTENTIONS, STRENGTHS, AND WEAKNESSES
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------275
FIGURE 161 : ONA PROVIDES AWARENESS OF BATTLESPACE ---------------------------------------------275
FIGURE 162: THE NUMBER OF ONA CHANGES DEPICTED DURING THE JUNE 3-14 PERIOD
REPRESENTS ALL OF THE SPIRAL 3 DATA CHANGE ACTIVITIES BY PARTICIPANTS
AND SOSA ANALYSTS. THE FIGURE INDICATES A GRADUAL INCREASE IN THE ONA
DATABASE CUMULATIVE DATA CHANGES AS SPIRAL 3 APPROAC HED AND A
GRADUAL DECREASE IN THE CUMULATIVE DATA CHANGES IN THE ONA
DATABASE AS SPIRAL 3 PROGRESSED. ONE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE
"APPARENT DECLINE" IN ACTIVITY WAS THAT THE SOSA ANALYSTS WERE
HEAVILY ENGAGED IN CREATING THOUSANDS OF LIN KS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS
EFFECTS, NODES AND ACTIONS AND, UNFORTUNATELY, THIS LINKING ACTIVITY
HAD NOT BEEN PROGRAMMED FOR CAPTURE BY THE AUDIT LOG DURING SPIRAL
3 OR EXEC UTION. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 276
FIGURE 163: THE FIGURE DISPLAYS THE PRE-EXECUTION (JULY 8-24) DATA CHANGE ACTIVITY
IN THE ONA DATABASE. NODES AND SELECTED N-A-E LINKS (INDI CATIVE OF PLAN
CHANGE) CATEGOR IES SAW MODERATE LEVELS OF DATA BEING CHANGED.
EFFECT AND ACTION ITEMS WERE DESCRIBED IN VERY BROAD TERMS WITHIN
THE DATABASE. AS A RESULT, THEY GENERALLY DID NOT NEED TO BE CHANGED.
CHANGES TO EFFECTS AND ACTIONS DATA WERE MINIMAL DURING THIS PERIOD
SPIRAL 3 ONA DATABASE CHANGES. ------------------------------------------------------------276
FIGURE 164 ABOVE: DEPICTS THE PRE-EXECUTION DATABASE AND FIGURE 165 BELOW
DEPICTS THE EXECUTION DATABASE CHANGES. THE EXECUTION DATA CHANGE
ACTIVITY IN THE ONA DATABASE FROM JULY 22 TO AUGUST 10 IS SHOWN IN
FIGURE 164. AGAIN, NODES AND SELECTED N-A-E LIN KS (PLANS ACTIVITY) SAW A
MODERATE LEVEL OF DATA BEING CHANGED. CHANGES TO EFFECTS AND
ACTIONS DATA WERE ALSO MINIMAL DURING THIS PERIOD; THEY WERE WRITTEN
IN BROAD LANGUAGE THAT NEEDED LITTLE MODIFI CATION AS EXECUTION
PROGRESSED. THE PLANS ACTIVITY CHANGE SPIKE ON AUG 6 MAY BE
EXPLAINED BY THE JOINT OPERATION STR IKE PLANNING THAT WAS OCCURR ING
AT THE TIME. AVERAGE PLANNING (SELECTED N-A-E LINKS) CHANGES
INCREASED FROM 27 CHANGES PER DAY DURING SPIRAL 3 TO 103 CHANGES PER
DAY DURING EXECUTION. AVERAGE NODE CHANGES INCREASED FROM 41
CHANGES PER DAY DURING SPIRAL 3 TO 62 CHANGES PER DAY DURING
EXECUTION. THIS CHANGE ACTIVITY, MODEST AS IT IS, SUPPORTS THE TASK TO
CONTIN UALLY UPDATE THE ONA. ------------------------------------------------------------------ 277
FIGURE 165: DEPICTS THE EXECUTION DATABASE CHANGES. --------------------------------------------277
FIGURE 166: ALL EFFECTS IN THE ONA DATABASE WERE ALSO TAGGED WITH "PHASE OF
ENGAGEMENT" META-INFORMATION (INFLUENCE, COERCE, DETER, COMPEL,
DEFEAT AND TRANSITION) . THE FIGURE BREAKS OUT THE AMOUNT OF PHASE-
RELATED DATA CHANGE ACTIVITY FOR EFFECTS DURING EXECUTION. -----------278
FIGURE 167: EXECUTION ONA ACTION DIME CHANGES. ALL ACTIONS IN THE ONA DATABASE
ARE ALSO TAGGED WITH DIME META-INFORMATION. THIS GRAPH BREAKS OUT
THE AMOUNT OF ACTIONS DIME-RELATED DATA CHANGE ACTIVITY DURING
EXECUTION. CHANGES TO ACTIONS WERE MINIMAL, SPORADIC AND NO TRENDS
WERE NOTED.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------278
FIGURE 168: EXECUTION ONA ACTION PHASE CHANGES. ALL ACTIONS IN THE ONA DATABASE
ARE ALSO TAGGED WITH PHASE META-INFORMATION . THE GRAPHS BREAKS OUT
THE AMOUNT OF ACTIONS PHASE-RELATED DATA CHANGE ACTIVITY DURING
EXECUTION. CHANGES TO ACTIONS WERE MINIMAL, SPORADIC AND NO TRENDS
WER E NOTED. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 279
FIGURE 169: EXECUTION ONA NODE PMESII CHANGES. ALL NODES IN THE ONA DATABASE
WERE ALSO TAGGED WITH "PMESII" META-INFORMATION. THIS GRAPH BREAKS
xlii FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OUT THE AMOUNT OF NODES PMESII-RELATED DATA CHANGE ACTIVITY DURING

EXECUTION. IT WAS ANTICIPATED THAT THE NATURE OF DATA CHANGED IN THE
DATABASE MIGHT REFLECT THE PHASES OF ENGAGEMENT WITH OPFOR.
CHANGES TO THE NODES WERE EXTENSIVE, BUT PREDOMINANTLY MILITARY
AND INFORMATION IN NATURE. A MINOR CHANGE INCREASE TREND NOTED
ACROSS ALL THE PMESII META-INFORMATION , ESPECIALLY POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC , SOCIAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE, AROUND 7 AUGUST COULD HAVE
BEEN CAUSED BY THE TRANSITION TO PEACE PLANNING. ------------------------------279
FIGURE 170: MAJORITY THOUGHT NOTIFICATION OF ONA ANALYSIS UPDATES IMPORTANT -280
FIGURE 171 : MOST PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT TELL WHEN ONA WAS UPDATED -----------------280
FIGURE 172: ONA TRAINING VS. RECOGNIZING ONA UPDATES--------------------------------------------281
FIGURE 173: EASE OF INFORMATION RETRIEVAL FROM ONA KNOWLEDGE BASE-----------------282
FIGURE 174: PARTICIPANTS SPLIT ON THE EASE OF RETRIEVING ONA INFORMATION VIA
FILTER AND SORT FUNCTIONS --------------------------------------------------------------------- 283
FIGURE 175: TRAINING VS. ONA INFORMATION RETRIEVAL------------------------------------------------284
FIGURE 176: TRAINING VS. ONA INFORMATION FILTER & SORT -------------------------------------------285
FIGURE 177: ONA WAS USEFUL IN PEL DEVELOPMENT------------------------------------------------------- 286
FIGURE 178: ONA WAS VALUABLE TO ETO DEVELOPMENT -------------------------------------------------287
FIGURE 179: ONA USEFULNESS FOR BOARD/CENTER/CELL PREPARATION.-------------------------287
FIGURE 180: ONA SUPPORTS ENHANCED DECISION-MAKING----------------------------------------------288
FIGURE 181 : ONA ANALYSIS FOR ETO------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 289
FIGURE 182: ONA ANALYSIS USEFUL IN IDENTIFYING RED INTENTIONS-------------------------------290
FIGURE 183: ONA 2ND & 3RD ORDER EFFECTS USED IN DECISION PROCESS ----------------------290
FIGURE 184: ONA IMPACT ON COA SELECTION ------------------------------------------------------------------ 291
FIGURE 185: ONA USEFULNESS IN PEL DEVELOPMENT ------------------------------------------------------291
FIGURE 186: HOW ONA WAS USED -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------292
FIGURE 187: ELEMENTS OF JTF ON OFFENSIVE DUE TO SPEC IFIC SUPPORT FROM ONA------292
FIGURE 188: ONA PROVIDED SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS OF JTF ENABLING ----------------------------293
FIGURE 189: ONA PORTAL PAGE ON SPPS. FIGURE IS A SCREEN CAPTURE OF THE ONA
PORTAL (ENTRYWAy) PAGE ON THE MC02 SPPS. THE ONA PORTAL WAS ALSO
USED AS THE ONA TODAY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PAGE. AS SUC H, THIS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND PORTAL PAGE RECORDED MORE VISITS THAN THE
OTHER ONA PAGES BECAUSE USERS PREDOMINANTLY USED IT TO TRANSIT TO
THEIR DESTINATION PAGE(S) . THE ONA PORTAL LOGGED 2,05 1 VISITS DURING
TH E TH REE-WEEK EXECUTION PERIOD. --------------------------------------------------------- 304
FIGURE 190: A SCREEN CAPTURE OF THE ONA MATRIX PAGE ON THE MC02 SPPS. THE PAGE
WAS VISITED BY 256 USERS DURING THE THREE-WEEK EXECUTION PERIOD ---304
FIGURE 191 : SCREEN CAPTURE OF AN ONA DATABASE LOGIN PAGE, 1,539 USERS VISITED THE
LOGIN PAGE DURING THE THREE-WEEK EXECUTION PERIOD--------------------------305
FIGURE 192: SCREEN CAPTURE OF ONA REFERENCE PAGES. ONE HUNDRED THIRTY USERS
VISITED THE REFERENCES PAGE DURING THE THREE-WEEK EXECUTION PERIOD
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 305
FIGURE 193: A SCREEN CAPTURE OF THE ONA RELATED PRODUCTS PAGE ON THE MC02
SPPS. SIXTY-NINE USERS VISITED THE PRODUCTS PAGE DURING THE THREE-
WEEK EX EC UTI ON PER 10D. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 306
FIGURE 194: THE CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF VISITORS TO ALL THE ONA PAGES ON SPPS PER
DAY. THERE APPEARS TO BE A CORRELATION BETWEEN THE MAJOR PLANNING
ACTIVITIES SHOWN IN THE TEXT BOXES AT THE TOP OF THE CHART WITH THE
CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF VISITORS TO THE ONA PAGES. -------------------------------306
FOR OFFICI A.L USE ONI ,Y xliii

u.s. Joint Forces Command Millennium Chall enge 2002 : Experim ent Report
FIGURE 195: VISITORS ON SPECIFIC ONA PAGES. THIS GRAPHIC BREAKS OUT THE VARIOUS
ONA PAGES TO SHOW THAT THE ONA TODAY (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND
PORTAL) AND THE DATABASE LOGIN PAGES WERE THE PAGES MOST OFTEN
VISITED. THERE APPEARS TO BE A CORRELATION BETWEEN THE MAJOR
PLANNING ACTIVITIES SHOWN IN THE TEXT BOXES AT THE TOP OF THE CHART
WITH THE NUMBER OF VISITORS. ------------------------------------------------------------------ 307
FIGURE 196: THIS CHART SHOWS THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF MINUTES SPENT ON ALL THE
ONA PAGES ON SPPS PER DAY. THIS IS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VISITORS
DIVIDED BY THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MINUTES PER DAY. THERE STILL APPEARS
TO BE A CORRELATION BETWEEN THE MAJOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES SHOWN IN
THE TEXT BOXES AT THE TOP OF THE CHART WITH THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF
MIN UTES ON THE ONA PAG ES ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 307
FIGURE 197: TOTAL MINUTES ON ONA PAGES SHOWS THE CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF MINUTES
SPENT ON ALL THE ONA PAGES ON SPPS PER DAY. THERE APPEARS TO BE A
CORRELATION BETWEEN THE MAJOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES SHOWN IN THE TEXT
BOXES AT THE TOP OF THE CHART WITH THE CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF MINUTES
ON THE ONA PAGES BUT IT IS LESS CLEAR THAN THE PREVIOUS FIGURES. IT
SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE DATA DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE PRODUCTIVE
FROM NON-PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY WHILE SPENDING TIME ON THE PAGE(S). ---308
FIGURE 198: TOTAL MINUTES ON SPECIFIC ONA PAGES BREAKS OUT THE VARIOUS MINUTES
SPENT ON THE VARIOUS ONA PAGES TO SHOW THAT THE ONA TODAY AND THE
DATABASE LOGIN PAGES WERE AGAIN THE FAVORITES. THERE STILL APPEARS
TO BE A CORRELATION BETWEEN THE MAJOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES SHOWN IN
THE TEXT BOXES AT THE TOP OF THE CHART WITH THE NUMBER OF MINUTES ON
EACH OF THE ONA PAGES BUT THE CORRELATION IS LESS CLEAR THAN THE
PREVIOUS FIGURES. MORE CUMULATIVE TIME WAS SPENT ON THE ONA TODAY
PAGE THAN ON THE DATABASE LOGIN PAGE. WHAT WAS UNEXPECTED WAS THE
LACK OF USE OF THE MATRIX PAGE THAT HAD THE BLUE ON RED AND RED ON
BLUE PERSPECTIVES AS WELL AS INFORMATION ON THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES
OF THE REGION. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 308
FIGURE 199: FIGURE SHOWS THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF MINUTES SPENT ON EACH ONA PAGE
ON SPPS PER DAY. THIS IS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VISITORS DIVIDED BY THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF MINUTES PER DAY. THERE STILL APPEARS TO BE A
CORRELATION BETWEEN THE MAJOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES SHOWN IN THE TEXT
BOXES AT THE TOP OF THE CHART WITH THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF MINUTES ON
TH E ONA PAGES.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 309
FIGURE 200 : THE NUMBER OF VISITS CATEGORIZED BY THE VISIT DURATION IN ONE-MINUTE
INTERVALS FOR EACH ONA PAGE ON SPPS----------------------------------------------------309
FIGURE 201 : FIGURE BREAKS OUT THE VARIOUS ONA PAGE VISITS BY GROUP TO SHOW THAT
THE ONA TODAY (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND PORTAL) AND THE DATABASE LOGIN
PAGES WERE THE PREDOMINANT PAGES VISITED CONSISTENTLY. THE JTF,
SJFHQ JFLCC, AND JFMCC GROUPS CONSISTENTLY MADE THE GREATEST
NUMBER OF VISITS TO THE VARIOUS PAGES. AGAIN , THE LACK OF USE OF THE
MATRIX PAGE THAT HAD THE BLUE ON RED AND RED ON BLUE PERSPECTIVES AS
WELL AS INFORMATION ON THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE REGION WAS
UNEXPECTED. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 0
FIGURE 202 : THIS GRAPHIC BREAKS OUT THE PERCENTAGES OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS
VISITING THE ONA PAGES TO SHOW THAT THE JTF, SJFHQ JFLCC AND JFMCC
GROUPS CONSISTENTLY HAD THE GREATEST PERCENTAGE OF VISITS TO THE
VARIOU S PAGES. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 311
FIGURE 203 : SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD IS BRIEFED BY COMMANDER
USJFCOM, GEN WILLIAM F. KERNAN DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO JFCOM'S
xli v FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JOINT TRAINING, ANALYSIS, AND SIMULATION CENTER, SUFFOLK, VA DURING

M ILLENN IUM CHALLENGE 2002 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 328
FIGURE 204 : ACCESS TO THE CROP ENHANCED THE EBP PROCESS-----------------------------------331
FIGURE 205 : THE CIE HELPED TO DEVELOP BETTER COA'S-----------------------------------------------332
FIGURE 206: THE CIE HELPS DEVELOP COA'S MORE QUICKLY --------------------------------------------333
FIGURE 207 : DEMANDS ON PLANNERS' TIME WAS SIGNIFICANT ------------------------------------------334
FIGURE 208 : PARTICIPANTS DISAGREED WITH THE STATEMENT, 'DEMANDS ON PLANNERS'
TIME OUTWEIGH COLLABORATION BENEFITS'. ----------------------------------------------- 335
FIGURE 209 : EFFECT NUMBER DESIGNATED IN THE ONA DATABASE VS. THE NUMBER OF
MEASU RES OF EFFECTI VEN ESS-------------------------------------------------------------------- 345
FIGURE 210 : MOST THOUGHT THE CROP WAS USEFUL IN TRACKING PROGRESS ----------------349
FIGURE 211 : LINE HANDLING EVOLUTIONS ONBOARD USS CORONADO (AFG11) FLAGSHIP FOR
COMMANDER JOINT MARITIME FORCES COMPONENT COMMANDER AND
DEPLOYED HEADQUARTERS FOR THE COMMANDER JOINT TASK FORCE DURING
M ILLENN IUM CHALLENGE 2002 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 353
FIGURE 212 : CIE ARCHITECTURE AT THE TIME OF MC02 EXECUTION ----------------------------------355
FIGURE 213 : COP ARCHITECTURE AT THE TIME OF MC02 EXECUTION---------------------------------356
FIGURE 214: A DEPICTION OF HOW DATA FLOWED FROM THE COMPONENTS' RESPONSE
CELLS TO THE LOG CROP ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 357
FIGURE 215: XC41 WIDE AREA NETWORK RUNNING THE CROP--------------------------------------------358
FIGURE 216 : THE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS THAT WERE LOGGED ONTO IWS WAS FAIRLY
CONSTANT UNTIL THE LAST DAYS OF THE EXPERIMENT ---------------------------------360
FIGURE 217: AVG. DURATION (IN HRS) PARTICIPANTS WERE ACTIVE ON IWS. THE GRAPH IS IN
ONE-HOUR INCREMENTS FROM ZERO THROUGH SEVEN HOURS. --------------------361
FIGURE 218 : IWS CONSIDERED EFFECTIVE BY MOST ---------------------------------------------------------361
FIGURE 219 : A DEPICTION OF THE JTF BATTLE RHYTHM USED IN MC02-------------------------------362
FIGURE 220 : SNAPSHOT OF MC02 CJTF STANDING SCHEDULE OF EVENTS-------------------------362
FIGURE 221 : SNAPSHOT OF ADOCS MAPPING DURING THE EXPERIMENT ----------------------------363
FIGURE 222 : ENEMY LOCATION/STATUS TIMELINESS IN ADOCS------------------------------------------364
FIGURE 223 : ENEMY LOCATION/STATUS DETAIL IN ADOCS ------------------------------------------------- 364
FIGURE 224 : OPFOR SUBMARINE TRACKS IN GCCS -----------------------------------------------------------365
FIGURE 225: ADOCS INFORMATION WAS ONLY 'SOMEWHAT ACCEPTABLE' WITH REGARD TO
LEVEL OF DETAIL ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 365
FIGURE 226: ADOCS INFORMATION WAS ONLY 'SOMEWHAT ACCEPTABLE' WITH REGARDS TO
ITS TIM ELI NESS-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 366
FIGURE 227 : ADOCS DISPLAYED INFORMATION WAS ONLY 'SOMEWHAT ACCEPTABLE' WITH
REGARDS TO ACCURAC Y------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 366
FIGURE 228 : NAVAL FORCES CHART DISPLAYED IN ADOCS------------------------------------------------367
FIGURE 229: GROUND TRUTH AND SIMULATION LOCATIONS WERE RELATIVELY ACCURATE AS
DI SPLAYED HERE. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 368
FIGURE 230: JFLCC ATTACK ON OBJECTIVE TWO SHOWING BOTH GROUND TRUTH AND THE
GCC S DI SPLAY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 368
FIGURE 231 : MC02 PERMANENT VIRTUAL PATHWAYS (PVPS) WITH SOFT PERMANENT VIRTUAL
CONNECTIONS (SPVCS) SUPPORTING COMMAND AND CONTROL APPLICATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 372
FIGURE 232: AVERAGE BANDWIDTH USAGE (TRANSMIT & RECEIVE) FOR EACH HOUR OVER
THE ENTIRE EXPERIMENT (14 DAYS) ------------------------------------------------------------- 373
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY xl v

FIGURE 233: AVERAGE BANDWIDTH USAGE (TRANSM IT & RECEIVE) FOR EACH DAY (14 DAYS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 374
FIGURE 234: AVERAGE BANDWIDTH USAGE (TRANSM IT & RECEIVE) FOR EACH HOUR FOR DAY
D+ 7 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 374
FIGURE 235: AVERAGE BANDWIDTH USAGE (TRANSM IT & RECEIVE) FOR EACH HOUR FOR DAY
D+8 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 375
FIGURE 236 : E-MAIL WAS THE TOOL OF CHOICE FOR MC02 PARTICIPANTS , BUT EXPERIMENTAL
NETWORKING TOOLS SUCH AS THE INFOWORKSPACE AND THE SHARED POINT
PORTAL SERVER WERE AFFORDED A TRYOUT. ----------------------------------------------379
FIGURE 237 : WEB PORTAL PAGE - LOGISTICS ------------------------------------------------------------------ 380
FIGURE 238 : SURVEYS/COMMENTS ON SPPS ELICITED 103 POSITIVE AND 108 NEGATIVE
RESPONSES. EIGHTY-THREE OF THE POSITIVE RESPONSES CONTAINED
NEGATIVE COMMENTS IN THE RESPONSE NARRATIVE-----------------------------------381
FIGURE 239 : EIGHTY-SEVEN VOLUNTARY COMMENTS ON SPPS WERE 2:1 CRITICAL OF THE
TOOL. ONLY THE LOGISTICS PAGE GOT STRONG REVIEWS----------------------------382
FIGURE 240 : VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL COLLABORATION AS DONE DURING MC02 -----------383
FIGURE 241 : USAF AC 130 PILOT PREPARES HI S AIRCRAFT FOR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF
MC02----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 398
FIGURE 242 : JIACG WAS POSITIVELY VIEWED AT JTF HQ----------------------------------------------------402
FIGURE 243 : DOES JIACG PROVIDE RELEVANT IA POLICY-OPERATIONAL LEVEL INSIGHTS AND
UNDER STAN DING? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 403
FIGURE 244 : PHYSICAL DETAILING OF JIACG IA LNO'S IS STI LL NECESSARY, EVEN WITH IWS
(C IE) . ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 403
FIGURE 245 : IMPROVED INSIGHT INTO THE JTF AND COMBATANT COMMANDER DECISION
PROCESS WAS LISTED AS THE BIGGEST BENEFIT FROM THE IA POINT OF VIEW,
WHI LE ACCESS TO THE POL-MIL DEBATE BY THE MILITARY STAFF WAS THE
GREATEST BENEFIT SEEN BY EXPERIMENT PARTICIPANTS. ---------------------------405
FIGURE 246 : JTF STAFFERS CONSIDERED COMBATANT COMMANDER ACCESS TO THE
INTERAGENCY TO BE A SIGNIFICANT CAPABI LITY, WH ILE THE WASH INGTON , DC
AGENCY SOUGHT ACCESS TO THE COMMANDER'S PLANNING AND OPERATIONS
PROC ESS. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 406
FIGURE 247 : IWS WAS DEEMED AN IMPORTANT COLLABORATION TOOL, ESPECIALLY FOR THE
DC/IAC---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------407
FIGURE 248 : PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT IA ADVISORY AND GUIDANCE ROLE WAS
SUCCESSFUL AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED, MELDING WITH DIME -------------------408
FIGURE 249 : DOES JIACG PROVIDE RELEVANT IA POLICY-OPERATIONAL LEVEL INSIGHTS AND
UNDER STAN DING ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 408
FIGURE 250: KEY SKI LLS AND ABI LITIES OF THE JIACG DIRECTOR ARE DEFINED BY THE MC02
PARTI C IPANTS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 409
FIGURE 251 : NIGHT OPERATIONS AT CHINA LAKE DURING MC02 FIELD EXERCISES -------------413
FIGURE 252 : PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION TOOLS AND
LINKS WAS USEFUL IN EXECUTING THEIR MISSION-----------------------------------------417
FIGURE 253: MOST HAD CONFIDENCE IN INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE LOG CROP----417
FIGURE 254 : MOST AGREED THAT THE GCCS PORTAL, JL TOOLS , JFCR AND GTN WERE KEY
DATA SOURCES -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------418
FIGURE 255 : MOST AGREED THAT THE WATCHBOARD ENHANCED AWARENESS OF LOGISTICS
MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT READINESS --------------------------------------------------------4 19
FIGURE 256 : SUPPORT OPTIONS THAT BEST SUPPORTED RDO------------------------------------------421
FIGURE 257 : MOST AGREED THAT OPERATORS PROVIDED BETTER RECOMMENDATIONS----423
xlvi FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FIGURE 258 : LOGISTICS PERSONNEL WORKING IN PLANS CELLS WAS A POSITIVE---------------424

FIGURE 259: OVER 75 PERCENT OF THE JTF PLAYERS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THEIR ROLE IN
ATTENDING THE APPROPRIATE COLLABORATIVE SESSION -----------------------------430
FIGURE 260 : SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS AT SEA IN SUPPORT OF MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE
2002 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------438
FIGURE 261 : ISR AND OPERATIONS WERE SYNCHRONIZED------------------------------------------------442
FIGURE 262 : JISR ENHANCED OPERATIONS ---------------------------------------------------------------------442
FIGURE 263: JISR COLLABORATION WAS EFFECTIVE ---------------------------------------------------------443
FIGURE 264 : JISR COLLABORATION EFFICIENCY IMPROVED OVER THE COURSE OF THE
EXPER IMENT ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 44 3
FIGURE 265 : MOST AGREED THAT ADDITIONAL TOOL FUNCTIONALITY WAS REQUIRED--------444
FIGURE 266 : COLLECTION PRIORITIES WEREN'T CLEAR -----------------------------------------------------445
FIGURE 267 : NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE, NEV. (AFIE) -- AN F-117 STEALTH FIGHTER FLIES OVER
THE NEVADA DESERT AUG. 6 DURING MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002. -------------448
FIGURE 268 : NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE, NEV. (AFIE) -- AN HH-60G PAVE HAWK FROM 66TH
RESCUE SQUADRON HERE REFUELS FROM AN MC-130E COMBAT TALON FROM
THE 711TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON AT DUKE FIELD, FLA. , ON AUG . 5
DU RING MILLEN N IUM CHALLENGE 2002. ---------------------------------------------------------- E2
FIGURE 269 : EXPERIMENT CONTROL ORGANIZATION -------------------------------------------------------- E3
FIGURE 270 : EXPERIMENT CONTROL ARCHITECTURE--------------------------------------------------------- E4
FIGURE 271 : JTF-S EFFECTIVENESS CHART SHOWED THAT OVER TIME THE ADVERSARIES
BECAME LESS AND LESS EFFECTIVE. ------------------------------------------------------------ F4
FIGURE 272 : GOR CAM PA IG N OBJECTI VES ------------------------------------------------------------------------ F6
FIGURE 273 : TERRORIST/PIRATE CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES--------------------------------------------------- F8
FIGURE 274 : EACH RDO VULNERABILITY WAS ADDRESSED BY MULTIPLE OPFOR ACTIONS --F13
FIGURE 275: NETWORK CONNECTIVITY OF THE RANGE INTEGRATION DEMONSTRATION
DURING MC02 REHEARSALS AND THE FINAL EXECUTION. THERE WERE ACTUALLY
TWO PARALLEL NETWORKS. THE FIRST WAS PROVIDED BY DISA-
COMMERCIALLY ACQUIRED CIRCUITS, AND THE SECOND WAS A NETWORK ASSET
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- G2
FIGURE 276 : MC02 FEDERATION CORE MODELS----------------------------------------------------------------- H2
FIGURE 277 : SAILORS UNHOOK A BATTLESPACE PLANNING AUTONOMOUS UNDERWATER
VEHICLE (BPAUV) DURING MINE HUNTING AND OCEAN MAPPING EXERCISES
CONDUCTED DURING THE NAVY'S PORTION OF MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002. H5
FIGURE 278: THE FIRST PRODUCTION A-10A WAS DELIVERED TO DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE
BASE , AZ., IN OCTOBER 1975. IT WAS DESIGNED SPECIALLY FOR THE CLOSE AIR
SUPPORT MISSION AND HAD THE ABILITY TO COMBINE LARGE MILITARY LOADS ,
LONG LOITER AND WIDE COMBAT RADIUS, WHICH PROVED TO BE VITAL ASSETS
TO AMERICA AND ITS ALLIES DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM. IN THE GULF
WAR , A-10S, WITH A MISSION CAPABLE RATE OF 95.7 PERCENT, FLEW 8,100
SORTIES AND LAUNCHED 90 PERCENT OF THE AGM-65 MAVERICK MISSILES.---H8
FIGURE 279 : MC02 SIMULATION SITES ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- H17
FIGURE 280 : INTEGRATION OF COMPONENT PLANNERS ------------------------------------------------------ 14
FIGURE 281 : SPACE & 10 PERSONNEL INCREASED THE CONSIDERATION OF SPACE ASSETS AT
THE JTF LEVEL & BELOW -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
FIGURE 282 : MC02 MIDB REPLICATION ARCHITECTURE-------------------------------------------------------- 18
FIGURE 283: IWS SC REEN CAPTURE ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------11 5
FIGURE 284 : COLLABORATIVE SESSIONS OPENED -------------------------------------------------------------117
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY xl vii

FIGURE 285 : RATING OF THE QUALITY OF VISUAL AND ORAL INFORMATION USERS CONFIDENT
IN QUALITY OF INFORMATION PRESENTED. QUICK LEARNING CURVE RESULTED
IN EXTEN SIVE U SE. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 8
FIGURE 286 A & B: EFFECTIVENESS OF IWS AND ITS ABILITY TO HELP MAINTAIN CROP--------- 11 9
FIGURE 287 : JASGS ARCH ITECTURE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 120
FIGURE 288 : SCREEN CAPTURE OF JATF --------------------------------------------------------------------------123
FIGURE 289 : IMPACT ON JTF PERFORMANCE --------------------------------------------------------------------- 125
FIGURE 290: JEM PR S-NT--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 126
FIGURE 29 1: THE JFI COMMUNICATIONS GRID ENSURES CRITICAL INFORMATION IS SHARED
WITH THE PEOPLE WHO NEED TO KNOW, WHEN THEY NEED TO KNOW IT. -------- 131
FIGURE 292 : EFFECTIVENESS OF JFI CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND TTPS ------------------------- 132
FIGURE 293: IMPORTANCE OF ACCEPTANCE AND VISUALIZATION ---------------------------------------134
FIGURE 294: J ISR TOOL --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 135
FIGURE 295: EFFECTIVENESS OF JISR TOOLS -------------------------------------------------------------------- 137
FIGURE 296 : VISUALIZATION OF ISR MISSIONS AND SENSORS--------------------------------------------137
FIGURE 297 : ENHANCEMENT OF JISR PLANNING ______________________________________________________ ---------- 138
FIGURE 298 : JPAOG REACH-BACK CAPABI LITIES ----------------------------------------------------------------141
FIGURE 299: JSOTF REAC H-BA CKISOM PE -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 9
FIGURE 300 : TOOLS WERE USEFUL TO THE WARFIGHTER--------------------------------------------------- 154
FIGURE 301 : LOGISTICS TOOLS WERE USEFUL------------------------------------------------------------------154
FIGURE 302 : TOOLS WERE USEFUL TO THE WARFIGHTER--------------------------------------------------- 155
FIGURE 303 : UCAX MC S TCO ARC HITECTU RE --------------------------------------------------------------------- 158
FIGURE 304 : SCREEN CAPTURE OF NSM C&D--------------------------------------------------------------------- 163
FIGURE 305: LOGICAL FLOW FOR THE CONOPS DECISION MAKING FOR CND------------------------ 164
FIGURE 306 : EFFE CTIVEN ESS OF TM IP ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 169
FIGURE 307: UNATTENDED GROUND SENSOR --------------------------------------------------------------------170
FIGURE 308 : UGS ARC HITE CTU RE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 171
FIGURE 309 : UAV'S USED IN MC02 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 171
FIGURE 31 0: UAV EM PLO YM ENT ARCH ITECTURE ---------------------------------------------------------------- 172
FIGURE 311 : CJTF'S SITUATIONAL A WARENESS-----------------------------------------------------------------178
FIGURE 312: EASE OF USE AND FUNCTIONALITY FOR UNDERSTANDING AND SITUATIONAL
AWARENESS------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 179
FIGURE 313: ONA DATABASE EFFECTIVENESS AS A COLLABORATIVE , UPDATED INFORMATION
TOOL WAS CONSIDERED VERY GOOD TO AVERAGE BY PARTICIPANTS------------179
FIGURE 314: ANALYST NOTEBOOK EFFECTIVENESS PROVIDING VISUALIZATION FOR ANALYSIS
OF THE ADVERSARY'S POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE---------------------------------------180
FIGURE 315: ARCVIEWIIMS FUNCTIONALITY IN PROVIDING GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION FOR
PLANNING AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS -----------------------------------------------------180
FIGUR E 316: AN IF SCREEN CAPTURE --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 182
xlviii FOR OFFICIAL USE; ONbY

Table of Tables
TABLE 1: MC02 ASSIG NMENTS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
TABLE 2: UNITS INVOLVED IN MC02 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
TABLE 3: POTENTIAL PROBLEM S -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 42
TABLE 4: SAMPLE LAND FUNCTIONAL TASK------------------------------------------------------------------------ 42
TABLE 5: SAMPLE TASK INGS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 43
TABLE 6: SELECTED BASELINE FINDINGS AND CORRESPONDING OBSERVATIONS---------------- 69
TABLE 7: AIRCRAFT LOSSES BY TYPE AND COMPONENT----------------------------------------------------- 96
TABLE 8: SHIP LOSSES BY TYPE AND COMPONENT ------------------------------------------------------------ 96
TABLE 9: PERSONNEL KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING----------------------------------------------------- 97
TABLE 10: FRIENDLY GROUND SYSTEM LOSSES----------------------------------------------------------------- 97
TABLE 11: FORCES OPCON TO THE JRAC BY PHASE ----------------------------------------------------------102
TABLE 12: OPFOR TBM FORCES NEUTRALIZED OR DESTROYED -----------------------------------------126
TABLE 13: MAJOR GROUND EQUIPMENT NEUTRALIZED OR DESTROYED-----------------------------127
TABLE 14: OPFOR GROUND UNIT COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AS OF THE END OF THE
EX PER IMENT. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 127
TABLE 15: ENEMY NAVAL VESSELS NEUTRALIZED OR DESTROYED ------------------------------------129
TABLE 16: ENEMY AIRCRAFT/SAMS/RADARS NEUTRALIZED OR DESTROYED -----------------------129
TABLE 17:
TSTS ATTACKED BY THE FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT ------------------------------------------130
TABLE SJFHQ VALUE ADDED CONSIDERABLE IN ALL AREAS BY MOST ACCOUNTS----------184
18:
TABLE 19:
SUMMARY OF BOARDS, CENTERS, CELLS, AND WORKING GROUPS---------------------227
TABLE 20:
SJFHQ MANNING. THE TABLE BELOW PROVIDES A SUMMARY OF SJFHQ MANNING.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 235
TABLE 21 : ONA SURVEY QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES------------------------------------------------------ 336
TABLE 22: SME SURVEY QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES------------------------------------------------------338
TABLE 33: COMPARING DATA BETWEEN THE SIM AND COP DATABASES------------------------------369
TABLE 34: COMMAN D LEVEL PARTIC IPANTS ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 371
TABLE 35: SPVC IDENTIFIERS AND ASSOCIATED BANDWIDTH---------------------------------------------371
TABLE 36: FOUR SECONDARY PVC LINKED MAINLY TO THE JFLCC--------------------------------------371
TABLE 37: THE REMAINING SPVCS WERE AS FOLLOWS:-----------------------------------------------------372
TABLE 38: MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES IMPACTING ON SPPS AVAILABILITY AND PERFORMANCE
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------376
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY xli x

TABLE 39: WARFIGHTER S CHOICE FOR MOST USEFUL INFORMATION TOOL-----------------------378

TABLE 40: THE AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF USERS 26 JULY THROUGH 8 AUGUST 2002-------379
TABLE 41: COMPARISON OF BASELINE FINDI NGS AND EXPERIMENT OBSERVATIONS----------389
TABLE 42: PLAYERS VIEWOF THE LOGISTICS ACTION RESPONSE BOARD---------------------------426
TABLE 43: RECOMMENDED DEPLOYMENT/REDEPLOYMENT CELL MEMBERSHIP: -----------------429
TABLE 44: OPERATIONS AND PLANS GROUPS LOGISTICS POSITI ONS ---------------------------------436
TABLE 45: SUMMARY OF JOINT INITIATIVES BY GROUP ----------------------------------------------------- C1 0
TABLE 46: GCCSI3 IMPACTS MEASURED ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19
TABLE 47: GSTF PROVIDED SUPPORT TO THE SJFHQ --------------------------------------------------------- 11 3
TABLE 48: IWS EV AL UATION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 6
TABLE 49: JATF SURVEY RESULTS ARE MEASURED------------------------------------------------------------124
TABLE 50: JEMPRS-NT SUPPORT FOR MC02 OBJECTIVES MEASURED----------------------------------128
TABLE 51: JFI SUPPORT FOR MC02 OBJECTIVES MEASURED-----------------------------------------------132
TABLE 52: JISR MODULE RELATIONSHIPS TO MC02 OBJECTIVES AND SJFHQ------------------------ 136
TABLE 53: JPAOG BATTLE TASKS FOR MC02-----------------------------------------------------------------------14 7
TABLE 54: THE JSOTF REACH-BACKISOMPE EVALUATION IN RELATION TO THE RDO KEY
ENABLERS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 152
TABLE 55:
UCAX MCS-TCO INTERFACE MEASURED AS AN ENABLER OF MC02 OBJECTIVES --- 160
TABLE 56:
NIMA INITIATIVE MEASURED AGAIN ST MC02 OBJECTI VES ------------------------------------ 161
TABLE 57:
COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE MEASURED AGAIN ST MC02 OBJECTIVES-----------165
TABLE 58:
THEATER MEDICAL INFORMATION PROGRAM - JOINT MEASURED AGAINST MC02
OBJE CTIVES ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 168
TABLE 59: EVALUATION OF US SUPPORT TO SPEC IAL RECONNAISSANCE----------------------------175
TABLE 60: STO FACTORS MEASURED AGAINST SJFHQ OBJECTIVES ------------------------------------ 186
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 1 - Background
Purpose
Can a u.s. Joint Task Force (JTF) execute a Rapid Decisive Operation (ROO) in thi s
decade? That' s the question U.S. Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) Millennium Challenge
2002 experiment tested. The resulting transformational change package recommendati ons, based
on the findings deri ved from multiple events during the past three years and culminating with the
MC02 findings and lessons learned, target the expectations of our forces, civilian leaders, and the
public for military tran sformati on and Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020) goal s.
Scope
MC02 did not have a traditional training audi ence, since neither the audi ence nor specific
training objectives were the experiment's focus. Thi s di stinction was an important factor in the
control of the experiment. MC02 was designed to create the environment that would all ow the
experiment to proceed toward some reasonable concl usion- the outcome was not preordained-
within which concepts for tran sformation of forces into the JV 2010 and N 2020 precepts could
be observed. Congressional language in the FYOI Defense Authorization Act (HR 5408) directed
USJFCOM , the Services, and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to
demonstrate in FY02, the armed forces' abi lity to conduct ROO using capabi liti es and
technologies avai labl e in thi s decade.
While MC02 assessed U.S. joint capability to cany out RDO in this decade, a number of
related and supporting technical and conceptual ex perim ents were included in the experiment
design, along with the integration of concurrently conducted Service-li ve experiments. The
combination of li ve force maneuvers and training built around and supporting a virtual scenario
was unique in both its size and proportion. Integration of informati on regarding li ve and
simul ated forces into a single common operational picture (COP) was a goal of the experim ent as
was support ofa longer-range project for instrumenting and integrating the Services' western
test-and-training ranges to support joint training.
MC02 Live Force Participants

The XVlll Airborne Corps was to have provided the core of the JTF headquarters,
supplemented by a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) element from USJFCOM.
However, real-world operations required Commanding General , If1 Corps and hi s staff, from
Fort Hood, TX, to stand-in on short notice. The new JTF commander, taking the reins just prior
to Spiral 3, operated from JFCOM 's Joint Training, Analysis, and Simul ation Center (JTASC),
before deploying forward to the USS Coronado (AGF II) in San Diego, CA, mid-way through
the experiment. The Commanding General, IJ Marine Expediti onary Force (MEF) establi shed a
Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) headquarters at Camp Lej eune, NC. The
nd
JFLCC 's force included elements of the 82 Airborne Di vision from Fort Bragg, NC, and of the
I S\ Marine Regiment from Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, CA. The San Diego, CA, based
Third Fleet stafT, aboard the THIRDFLT fl agship USS Corol/ado (AGF II), formed the Joint
Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) with Commander, Second Fleet acting as the
JFMCC commander. Various Navy and Marine Corps elements of the U.S. Pacific Fleet
supported the JFMCC commander. Commander, Twelfth Air Force operated as Commander,
FOR OFFICI AJ, liSE ONLY

Joint Force Air Component Command (JF ACC), operating out of the Combined Air Operati ons
Center at Nelli s Air Force S ase, NV, with support from Air Force acti viti es throughout the
United States. USSOCOM provided the Joint Special Operati ons Task Force (JSOTF), with
elements ofa Special operati ons group in direct support . USJFCOM establi shed a Joint
Psychological Operati ons Task Force (JPOTF) in Suffolk, V A.
An interagency group made up of indi vidual s from departm ents and agencies of the U.S .
governm ent parti cipated at vari ous times before and during the exercise, primaril y in
devel opment and sustainment of the Operati onal Net Assessment (ONA), and during the
transiti on phase of the operati on. See tabl e I for speci fi c assignments.
Tabl e I: MC02 Assignments
Specific MC02 assignme nts included:

Exercise Director - Deputy Comm ander, USJFCOM
Deputy Director Exercise Control/Offi cer Conducting the Exercise - USJFCOM, J7
Deputy Director Experim ent Control - USJFCOM, J9
Deputy Exercise Director - USJFCOM, fWOI
Director, Joint Exercise Planning Group (JEPG) - USJFCOM, JWOI
Director, Joint Exercise Control Group (JECG) - USJFCOM, JWOI
Commander, Joint Task Force - CDR, 1[( Corps
Commander, Ann y Forces - CDR, 82nd Airborne Di vision
Commander, Air Force Forces - CDR, 12th AF
Commander, Naval Forces - COMSECONDFLT
Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces - CDR II ~F
Joint Force Air Component Commander - CDR, 12th AF
Joint Force Land Component Commander - CDR II MEF
Joint Force Maritime Component Commander - COMSECONDFL T
Commander, Joint Special Operati ons Task Force
Commander, Joint Psychological Operati ons Task Force
The supporting Commands and Agencies were compri sed of US Space Command , US
Special Operati ons Command, US Strategic Comm and, US Transportati on Command,
Central Intelli gence Agency, Defense Infonn ati on Support Agency, Joint
Communi cati ons Support Element, Joint Informati on Operati ons Center, Joint Nati onal
Test Facility, Joint Warfare Anal ysis Center, Marin e Standards and Training Program ,
Nati onal Assessment Group, Nati onal Reconnai ssa nce Office, and the Nati onal
Security Agency.
By congressional directi on, MC02 was to be an assimilati on of li ve and simul ated events.
Thi s combinati on was the first attempt to require that the real-world training exercise support the
simulated training exercise. In general, combinati ons of thi s sort are built around the li ve event
with simul ati ons plugged in to support it.
2 FOR OFFICIAl. USE ONLY

This effort required an extraordinary amount of coordinati on and multi-service

cooperati on to ensure that the events occurred in a timely manner. Not all events were
successful , but the effort was noteworthy. Approximately 13,500 personnel from all of the
Services participated in the MC02 experiment and the accompanying Service experiments
including the units li sted in table 2.
Table 2 Units Involved in Me02
UNIT OPERATING LOC HOME BASEIREMARKS
162ND FIGHTER WING NELLIS AFB, NV AATC , DAVIS MONTHAN AFB , AZ
20 TH FIGHTER WING NELLIS AFB, NV SHAWAFB , SC
2ND BOMBER WING NELLIS AFB, NV BARKSDALE AFB, LA
4 TH WING NELLIS AFB, NV SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB , SC
53 RD WING NELLIS AFB, NV EGLIN AFB , FLA
55 TH RECON WING NELLIS AFB, NV OFFUTT AFB, NE
57 TH WING NELLIS AFB, NV INDIAN SPRINGS AFB, NV
TH
509 BOMBER WING NELLIS AFB , NV WHITEMAN AFB , MO
ND
552 AIR CONTROL WING NELLIS AFB, NV TINKER AFB, OK
TH
9 RECON WING BEALE AFB, CA BEALE AFB, CA
TH
917 WING NELLIS AFB , NV AATC,BARKSDALE AFB, LA
93 RD AIR CONTROL WI NG NELLIS AFB, NV ROBINS AFB, GA
939TH RESCUE WI NG NELLIS AFB , NV ANG, PORTLAND, OR
VMA 214 NELLI S AFB , NV USMC
VMGR 352 NELLIS AFB , NV USMC
645 TH MATS NELLI S AFB , NV AFMC , PALMDALE AFB, CA
16TH SOW NELLIS AFB, NV AFSOC, HURLBURT FIELD , FLA
160TH SOAR NELLI S AFB , NV FT CAMPBELL, KY
193RD SOW NELLIS AFB, NV ANG, MIDDLETOWN, PA
VP40 SOCAL NAS WH IDBEY ISLAN D, WA
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3

u.s. Joint Forces Command Millennium Challenge 2002: Experim ent Report
UNIT OPERATING lOC HOME BASE/REMARKS
ND
92 AIR REFUEL WING NELLIS AFB , NV FA IRCHilD AFB, WA
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
COMSECONDFlT OPERATING AREA USS CORONADO, SAN DIEGO, CA
(SOCAl )
USS CORONADO, AFLOAT PLANS
COMTHIRDFlT STAFF SOCAl
STAFF, SAN DIEGO, CA
COMCARGRU EIGHT NELLIS AFB , NV SAN DIEGO , CA, W/JFACC
USS CORONADO, AFLOAT OPS

COMCARGRU THREE USS CORONADO
STAFF, SAN DIEGO, CA
JFMCC, IWC EMBARKED, SAN
USS CORONADO (AGF 11 ) AFLOAT SOCAl
DIEGO, CA
USS FITZGERALD (DDG
AFLOAT SOCAl SAN DIEGO , CA
62)
USS BENFOLD (DDG 65) AFLOAT SOCAl SAN DIEGO , CA
USS SAL T LAKE CITY (SSN

AFLOAT SOCAl SAN DIEGO , CA, VIRTUAL SSGN
716)
SUPPORT STOM JSHIP, CPR 1
USS BOX ER (lHD 4) AFLOAT SOCAl
EMBARKED , SAN DIEGO, CA
JOINT VENTURE (HSVX-1) AFLOAT SOCAl NSWTG EMBARKED
SEA SLICE AFLOAT SOCAl MIW, ASUW SOF
STRIKE WARFARE CDR , NAS

COM AIR WI NG 11 CHINA LAKE, CA
lEMOORE, CA
SEA COMBAT COMMANDER, SAN
COMDESRON NINE FCTCPAC SD, CA
DIEGO, CA
CATF AMWC STAFF AFLOAT CPR
COMPHIBRON ONE FCTCPAC SD, CA 1 EMBARKED USS BOXER, SAN
DIEGO, CA
10 REAR AREA, NAB LITTLE
FIWC NAB LITTLE CREEK, VA
CREEK, VA
MIWC EMBARKED ON HSV,
COMCMRON THREE SOCAUFCTCPACSD
CORPU S CHRI STI , TX
CTF 12 PEARL HARBOR THEATER ASWC
AADC MODULE (FACTORY

CO, USS ANTIETAM GREENSBORO PRODUCTION UNIT), SAN DIEGO,
CA
VIRTUAL SSGN NUWC NEWPORT NEWPORT, RI
VIRTUAlDDX FCTCPAC SD, CA SAN DIEGO, CA
NAWC SEA TEST RANGE PTMUGU, CA,
4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNIT OPERATING lOC HOME BASE/REMARKS
VC-6 VAR IOUS NORFOLK, VA
PTMUGU NRl SOCAl PTMUGU , CA
VAW116 SOCAl PTMUGU , CA
MCAS
VM FA 242 SOCAl
MIRAMAR, SAN DIEGO, CA
NASNI, SAN DIEGO, CA, ASW
VP9 SOCAl
MISS IONS
VP46 CHI NA LAKE, CA NAS WH IDBEY ISLAND, WA,
VX9 CHINA LAKE, CA PTMUGU , CA
VAQ 135 CHINA LAKE, CA NAS WH IDBEY ISLAND, WA
NAS WH IDBEY ISLAND, WA GSTF

VAQ 132 NELLI S AFB , NV
SUPPORT
NAS NORTH ISLAND, SAN DIEGO
HSl 43, 45 , 47 , 49 SOCAl
CA
VS 33 SOCAl NAS lEMORE, CA
HS-2 SOCAl NASNI, CA
HS-6 SOCAl NASNI, CA
PROVIDED JFlCC STAFF

ELEMENT FOR JOINT TASK
II MEF CAM P lEJEUNE
FORCE LAND COMPONENT,
CAM P lEJUENE, NC
1ST MARINE REGIMENT EMBARKED USS BOXER CAMP PENDLETON , CA
EMBARKED USS
1/1 BlT CAMP PENDLETON , CA
BOXERlHSVX-1
MCAS, CAMP PENDLETON ALSO
SUPPORTED MC SERVICE
HMM268 EMBARKED USS BOXER
EXPERIMENT AT SCLA,
VICTORVillE, CA
SOUTHERN CALIF
l OGISTI CS AIRPORT,
317 BlT SUPPORTED MCB29 PALMS
VICTORVi llE SERVICE
EXPAT SCl A
SOCJ FCOM SU FFOLK, VA SUFFOLK, VA
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE

VARIOUS NAB CORONADO, CA
GROUP ONE

UNIT OPERATING LOC HOME BASE/REMARKS
III CORPS HQ (AS JTF) SU FFOLK, VA FTHOOD , TX
32AAM DC NELLI S AFB , NV FT BLI SS, TX W/J FACC
ST NELLI S AFB, NV
1 BCD FT BRAGG, NC W/JFACC
SU FFOLK, VA
NELLI S AFB, NV
JICC-D FT MCPHERSON, GA
SU FFOLK, VA
ND
82 AIRBORNE DI V FTBRAGG, NC FTBRAGG , NC
Nu
82 AIRBORNE DIV
FT IRWIN (NTC), CA FTBRAGG, NC
TACTICAL CMD POST
C/82D SIG BN (-) FT IRWI N (NTC), CA FTBRAGG , NC

2ND BRIGADE COMBAT
TEAM
ST
1 BATTALION , 325TH
REGIMENT
1-325 TACTICAL
COMMAND POST
1/B/3-4 ADA FT IRWIN (NTC), CA FTBRAGG , NC
HSB/2-319 FA FT IRWIN (NTC) , CA FTBRAGG , NC
N2-3 19 FA FT IRWIN (NTC) , CA FTBRAGG , NC

2ND BATTALION , 325TH
REGIMENT
2-325 TACTICAL
COMMAND POST
RD
3 BATTALION , 325TH
REGIMENT
3-325 TACTICAL
COMMAND POST
B/3 13 MI BN FT IRWIN (NTC), CA FTBRAGG , NC
ND
82 MP CO FT IRWIN (NTC), CA FTBRAGG, NC
sT
21 CHEM CO FT IRWIN (NTC), CA FTBRAGG , NC
N3-27 FA BN (HIMARS) FT IRWI N (NTC) , CA FTBRAGG, NC
234 FAD FT IRWIN (NTC), CA FTBRAGG , NC
HHC DISCOM-82ND ABN

DI V
6 FOR O .... IClAL USE ONLY

ND
782 MSB FT IRWIN (NTG), CA FTBRAGG, NC
407TH FIJIJD SPT BN FT IRWIN (NTG) , CA FTBRAGG , NC
sT
HHC 1 COSCOM (-) SPT FT IRWIN (NTG), CA FTBRAGG , NC
HHC 311 TH COSCOM (_)
FT IRWIN (NTC), CA FTLEWIS. WA
SPT
B/82D SIG BN (-) FT IRWIN (NTG) , CA FTBRAGG , NC
B/1-58 ATS FT IRWIN (NTC), CA FTBRAGG , NC
313 TH MI BN , 82N D ABN DI V FT IRWIN (NTG) , CA FTBRAGG , NC

ND
82 SIG BN , 82ND ABN
FT IRWIN (NTG), CA FTBRAGG, NC
DI V
11 TH HHC TRAN S BN FT IRWI N (NTG) , CA FT EUSTIS, VA
372 TRAN S CGO TRANS

FT IRWIN (NTG) , CA FT EUSTI S, VA
CO
1066 MVT CTL TM (CGO
FT IRWIN (NTG) , CA FT EUSTIS, VA
DOG)
STRYKER BRIGADE
FT IRWIN (NTC), CA FTLEWIS, WA
COMBAT TEAM
RD
3 BDE, 2ND INF DI V
(SBCT) (-) (TOG)
5-20 INF BN (-) (TOG) FT IRWIN (NTG), CA FTLEWl S, WA
5-20 TACTI CAL COMMAND

POST
A/5-20 INF (CO) FT IRWIN (NTC), CA FTLEWIS, WA
1-14 CAV SODN (RSTA) (-)

(TOG)
1-23 INF BN (-) (TOG) FT IRWIN (NTG), CA FTLEWl S, WA
3-2 INF BN (-) (TOC) FT IRWIN (NTG), CA FTLEWl S, WA
296 H BR IGADE SUPPORT

BATTLION (-)
HHC 101 ST AVN BDE HO (-) FT IRWIN (NTG) , CA FT CAMPBELL, KY

2ND BATTALION , 101 sT
FT IRWIN (NTG) , CA FT CAMPBELL, KY
AVIATION
2-101 TACTICAL
FT IRWIN (NTG) , CA FT CAMPBELL, KY
OPERATIONS CENTER
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI ,Y 7

HHC 82D AVN BDE (-) FT IRWIN (NTC) , CA FTBRAGG , NC
Locations
The overall joint experiment force structure was an integrated organization including li ve
(Service experiment) and simulated forces (See Fi gure I). Central control of Service experiment
li ve forces, to include opposing forces (OPFOR), was restricted to agreed upon joint events.
Outsid e of those events, Services had full control ofl ive forces. Control of all simulated forces
included in the joint experiment remained with JFCOM 's Joint Experiment Control Group
(JECG),
Li ve forces were located primarily on ranges in the western United States (Fort Irwin,
CA; Camp Pendleton, CA; China Lake, CA; Nelli s AFB , NY) and the San Nicholas Island sea
ranges off the coast of South ern California. In addition , component response cell s with their
simulations were located at Fort Irwin, CA; Camp Lejeune, NC ; Hurlburt Field, FL, and Fleet
Combat Training Center Pacific in San Di ego, CA. The component commands were located at
Camp Lejeune, NC - JFLCC ; at Nellis AFB , NV - IF ACC; and on board the USS Corol/ado -
IFMCC.
The JTF, along with the JlACG, the J SOTF, and the Joint Psychological Operations Task
Force (JPOTF), was located in the JFCOM , JTASC in Suffolk, VA , Mid-way through the
operation , the JTF commander and elements of hi s staff forward deployed to the USS Coronado
(AGF-II), joining the JFMCC and operating in the Pacifi c Ocean waters off San Diego, CA.
Senior simulati on controll ers and simulati on tech controllers managed forces at the
JTASC. JTASC controllers managed all simulated OPFOR in the joint experim ent, as well as
li ve forces participating in certain key joint events supporting specific experiment objectives.
Li ve force parti cipants were under direct central control during joint events, but were controll ed
locall y during Service specific experiments.
* 8live IO c:'l ti o n s
1- silnuhll e d locatio n s
13.000 se.-v ice Ine lllbers
Figure 1: Response cell and live forces locations

Chapter 2 - Objectives
MC02 experiment designers identified fi ve objectives integral to the ROO concept.

Unequi vocal attainment of the objectives through employment of the concepts and tool s at the
center of ROO would provide the basis for support of the ROO process. Equall y, failure to attain
those objectives could indicate a need to rework the concept or to recon sider support for the
entire proposal. The actual findings are provided in detail in Chapter 7. The fi ve objectives are
summari zed below.
Establish and Maintain Information Superiority

Information Superiority (IS), according to Joint Publication 1-02, occurs when the degree
of dominance in the infonnation domain permits the conduct of operations without effective
opposition. There are multiple tasks and challenges within this objective.
The initial task or chall enge was to demonstrate the ability to provide situational
awareness to everyone. The first step was to keep the Blue-force picture clear. The JTF
di sseminated the composite picture by maintaining and di stributing a timel y, accurate, relevant,
and integrated picture of friendl y units' locations, and operational status. Thi s step was
successful if the infonnation provided by the Blue force Common Relevant Operational Picture
(CROP) was of sufficient richness to meet the operational needs of the Blue fo rce commander.
The second step involved the adversary's force. The JTF had to issue timely and accurate reports
on the adversary's relevant operational capabilities, location, courses of action, and intentions.
Like the first step, this step was successful if the information provided by the CROP met the
needs of the Blue force commander.
The next task was demonstrating the ability to use the CROP and collaborating within the
force to enhance JTF operational timelines. Success revolved around the degree of shared
awareness within the force, the deci sion-making timeline, synchroni zation of efforts, economical
employment of forces, maintenance of operational tempo, and logistical support .
The last task was to use information to prevent surpri ses by the adversary . The
effectiveness of having superi or information availabl e at the JTF deci sion-making level to
predict adversarial actions was measured by documenting in stances in which Blue forces were
surpri sed or confused by actions taken by the adversary.
Set Conditions for Decisive Operations

The JTF needed to establi sh early in the confli ct the right conditions from which to
launch ROO . The right cond iti ons meant a shortened deployment period, and very rapid joint
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) times or a condition where
JRSOllead-time was not a factor at all .
During Effects-Based Operations (EBO), the staffs used a revised joint deployment
process. In coll aboration with the components, they sy nchroni zed the force flow, and equipm ent
arri val times and established a di stributed deployment and sustainment intennediate staging and
support base (lSB) infra structure. The ISB reduced inserti on and sustainment times for " ready
off the ramp" forces. A new tool , the Joint Force Capabilities Register (JFCR), aided planners
during mi ssion anal ysis and course of acti on development.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI ,y 9

Assured Access
In order to conduct ROO again st a ca pabl e adversary, the component comm ander mu st
provide hi s on-scene commander access to the battl efi eld in suffi cient volume to ensure the task
force has room to maneuver and an unbroken logisti c train. Assured Access is defin ed as the
ability to set and sustain the battl espace conditi ons necessary to provide the joint fo rce
commander (JFC) suffi cient freedom of action to achi eve the desired effects in conducting a
rapid deci sive operati on. The component commanders and the JFC continuall y addressed thi s
obj ecti ve as the adversari es pressed constantly to reduce the Blue footprint in the th eater. Future
JFC's should ex pect to encounter foes that have any or all of the foll owing:
Robu st intelligence, surveillance, and reconnai ssance (lSR) architectures, or open access to
commerciall y availabl e space-based ISR products
Cruise and balli sti c mi ssil es with improved range and lethality as well as capabilities that
include sal vo fire against in- theater bases, staging areas, and maritime forces
Integrated air defense systems to protect their offensive ca pability and infrastructure, while
infli cting attriti on losses on the joint force
Long range strike aircraft
Weapons of mass effect
Maritime capabilities, mine warfare, coastal-defense crui se mi ssil es, crui se mi ssil e equipped
patrol boats, and subm arin es, all designed and depl oyed to deny access to the region
Full spectrum info rm ati on capabilities, including military decepti on, electroni c warfare,
psychological operati ons, operati onal security, physical destructi on, and informati on attacks
used to counter the U.S.' s heavy reli ance on integrated informati on systems
The MC02 foes had area deni al capabiliti es with the potenti al to deny an opponent rapid
access to the region.
Conduct Decisive Effects-Based Operations

The j oint force commander, hi s staff, and the component headquarters were expected to
conduct decisive, Effects-B ased Operati ons in the executi on of an ROO.
EBO, whi ch is di scussed in detail in the next chapter, is a process fo r obtaining a desired
strategic outcome or "effect" through the sy nergisti c and cumulati ve appli cation of the full range
of military and nonmilitary capabilities at all levels of confli ct. An "effect" is the physical,
fun cti onal , or psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from specifi c military or
non-military acti ons.
The EBO process can be depicted as a continuous and iterati ve pl anning and executi on
cycle. The cycl e begin s with the development of a comprehensive in sight or knowledge of the
nature of the adversary, the environment, and our own capabilities (See Fi gure 2). EBO
envisions the development of broader and deeper knowledge of th e adversary than is currently
achieved. The comprehensive insight developed through systems analysis will enabl e planning
staffs to determine more accurately the strength or cohesion that hold s the adversary together and
moti vates him to acti on. In consonance with other nati onal acti ons, the j oint force comm ander's
intent will then stress the desired effects necessary to break that cohesion and convince or
compel th e adversary to change hi s behavior. Guidance given in terms of desired effects is an
essenti al pi ece of the strategy-to-task linkage. Appli cati on is then a fun cti on of determining and
applying those elements of nati onal power that will be most effecti ve in achi eving the desired

effects in a coordi nated and synergistic mann er. An aggressive, full y integrated, and continuous
assessment process measures the impact of the effects created . Thi s assessment mu st determine if
the desired effects were achi eved, what unintended effects were produced, their overall impact
on the joint effort, and why effects either did or did not contribute to campaign objecti ves. The
assessment process faci litates decisions the comm ander must make to adapt and adjust hi s
current course of action to reach hi s desired end-state more effectively and rapidl y.
EBO takes the objectives-based approach with comm ander's intent one step furth er;
commanders examine the causal
Develop com prehensive Plan for effects,
linkages and effects through whi ch
insight into adver sary, _----~ emphasizin2 str ategy.
actions lead to objectives. Causal
environ ment :U1d self -- to.task linkage linkages help planners understand
why a proposed action could be
expected to produce a desired
effect given the circumstances.
What separates effects from
objecti ves is the type of results that
are call ed effects, vice the type of
results that are call ed objectives.
Adju st E);ecute plan. Effects include all of the results of
course cousidering full actions, incl uding the undesired
of action r au2e of
Assess im pact and unexpected. Objecti ves onl y
capabilities
of effects include the results to be achi eved
- th e desired results. It is,
Figure 2: ESO Cycle therefore, the considerati on of the
full range of potenti al results of
actions that is the key to, and the chall enge of, EBO.
Sustain the Force

Demonstrating the abili ty to provide agil e sustainment was an MC02 goal. To attain thi s
goal, parti cipants had to successfull y sati sfy the JFC deployment, empl oyment, and sustainment
requirements fo r ROO . They also had to gain and mai ntain knowledge of force health status and
provide medical care .
Concurrent collaboration and a logisti cs CRO P providing access to emerging
technologies such as Joint Total Asset Visibili ty (JTAV), Global Combat Support System
(GCSS), a logistics CROP, and l oint Logisti cs Decision Support Tool s (DSTs) all owed the stafT
to rapidly process data and manage the logistics environment.
Empl oyi ng a di stributi on structure to sati sfy the JFC deployment, empl oyment, and
sustainm ent requirements included the use of ISBs, sea based logistics, forward rearming and
refueling points, tailored support packages, and alternate deli very methods such as using the high
speed vessel (HSV).
The JTF staff empl oyed an experi mental product, Theater Management Information
System (TMIP) in an effort to sati sfy the requirement to track patients throughout the theater of
operati ons and back to Level 4 treatment centers.
FOR OFFICIAL I ISE ONLY II

(Thi s Page Blank)

Chapter 3 - Concepts
"Joint Concept Development and Experim entation," USJFCOM ' s charge, takes a
promi sing, emergi ng idea like ROO, fro m concept development to impl ementation. MC02 was
the experimentati on phase of ROO development. Here, seven concepts at the core of RDO were
tested in whole or in part and a short overview follows. These concepts are enabl ers for the fi ve
objectives described in Chapter 2.
Standing Joint Forces headquarters (SJFHQ)

RDO requires a greater coherence of operati onal level advanced pl anning and comm and
and control than current ad hoc or augmented Service core-headquarters can generate (See
Figure 3). Successful, rapid response in future operati ons requires a headquarters that has a
detail ed understanding of the designated region and is immediately respon sive to the regional
combatant commander for crisis respon se pl anning and executi on. The SJFHQ meets these
requirements. The SJFHQ, as part of the com mander' s staff, develops conti nually updated
procedures for joi nt force
operati ons within the designated The SJFHQ provides:
region, as well as pre-crisi s Capability to integrate EBO into
an existing headquarters by:
planning for areas of focus as ~ Utilizing collaborative tools
A-
~ Exploiting reach-back {;CJ
assigned by the combatant
~ Integrating inte ragenc y and
commander. Pre-crisis planning coalition partners' considerations
~ Augmenting designated JTF
includes managing the existing organizational structure
development of the ONA, the ~ Providing key "plugs"
development of contingency Ability to rapidly integrate ONA,
plans for the focus areas, and

relation ship building with other
Effects Asses s ment, Information
Superiority, and ETO
development process into a
range of Service or other HQs
*** JrFHQ
potential participants across the designated to perform JTF

function s
governm ent interagency Provides continuity in planning SJFHQ enables seamless
communi ty (lAC). These and operations ~ pre-crisis thru planning and operations 18
response and termination
relation ships, establi shed through
a network of collaboration, Figure 3: MC02 Joint Force HQ
become the ba sis for expanding
the SJF HQ 's core capabilities as a cri sis develops. As a cri sis develops, th e SJFHQ rapidly and
seamlessly shifts from planning to execution. It employs its developed knowledge of all aspects
of the crisis area to advise the combatant commander on the use of fl exibl e deterrent opti ons and
to facilitate the ramp-up of a subordinate staff designated to handl e the crisis. The SJFHQ may
be incorporated into the Joi nt Task Force (JTF) com mander's staff. In all cases, the JTF would be
supported by extensive reach-back to the combatant commander's staff and oth er supporting
agencies.
The MC02 SJFHQ was functionall y organi zed to facilitate effects-based operation s and
to conduct rapid planning and executi on. As part of the combatant com mander' s staff, it
conducted pre-crisis planning acti vity, including the development ofa contingency plan and an
initi al effects tasking order (ETO). As the crisis developed, the SJFHQ was reassigned to
augment the staff of the designated JTF commander to help resolve the cri sis presented by the

ex perim ent scenari o. The SJFHQ parti cipants included fo rm er, retired, and current military
members from all Services with an average of 23 years of military experi ence and over three
years of j oint experi ence. These parti cipants included a form er operati ons chief and a former
plans chi ef on a combatant commander's staff.
The primary elements of the SJFHQ organi zati on are the command group, the operati ons
group, the pl ans group, the informati on superi ori ty group, and the knowledge management
group. The III Corps JTF commander used thi s architecture as the organi zati onal structure for the
JTF HQ,
Collaborative I nformation Environment (CIE)

Access to the right informati on, at the ri ght place, at the right time, in the right
presentati on fo rmat to accel erate th e commander' s decision-to-acti on tim e is fundam ental to
info rm ati on-age warfare. The CIE provides the JTF the ability to share informati on, facilitates
reduced pl anning timelines, and enhances organi zati onal effecti veness. Thi s environment,
enabl ed by high-speed communi cations link s, fed through large bandwidth pipelines, and using
electroni c collaborati ve tools, improves the exchange of informati on among members of the joint
force and those
organi zati ons
supporting or being
supported by the
"'- j oint force (See
Common R~I~I;1;/ Figure 4), The CIE
Op'erational
contain s three
_" n,," x P'.....~_
= = = "~~SIr."'POiint Po,'
. Server (SPP S) major components:
Auto mated Deep Operations -KnoWledge P the COP, the
Coordinat io n Syst em (ADOCS) CROP, and an on-
- Situational A.""me .. '-C. line coll aborati ve
tool suite.
Military
commanders must
be abl e to
understand, decide,
and act.
The design goal
Figure 4: Experimental Command , Control, Communications, and Intelligence for CIE is to
(XC41) apparatus, allowed a coherently joint , reach-ba ck, collaborative information increase shared
environment. inform ati on, use
shared informati on
to improve shared awareness, and , with shared awareness, extend and enri ch coll aborati on both
verti cally and hori zontally throughout the fo rce. The CIE should enri ch collaborati on to improve
the synchroni zati on of tacti cal, operati onal , and strategic acti ons by the j oint force. The C ROP is
the prim ary repository and means of access for most inform ati on products necessary for the joint
force. The C ROP presents timely, fused, accurate, assured, and relevant informati on that may be
tail ored to meet th e requirements of the j oint force. Th e info rm ati on will be ava il abl e to every
properl y equipped organi zati on and indi vidual involved in a joint operati on. The CROP enabl es
the j oint force to achi eve the hi gh level of knowledge necessary to support ROO . The C ROP is a
14 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI Y

virtual warehouse of information - friendl y, neutral and enemy force dispositions (aerospace,
land, and sea); intelligence; maps and imagery; logistics data; planning data; weather; socio-
economi c data; and cultural informati on. Users access thi s virtual warehouse to extract the
information they need to accompli sh their mi ssion. Access to the information residing in the
CROP, combined with the ability to collaborate quickly with domain experts in the CIE, should
enabl e commanders and their staffs to achieve an excepti onall y high degree of shared battl espace
awa reness.
Informati on Superi ori ty is a byproduct of effective CIE. Within the informati on domain,
superiority is a state of imbalance in one' s favor (relati ve advantage). Advantage is achi eved by
being abl e to give the right informati on to the ri ght people, at the right time, in the right form ,
whil e denying an adversary the ability to do the same. Thi s way of thinking about Informati on
Superiority combines a specifi c outcome associated with Info rm ation Superi ority and th e method
that is used to achieve it. Informati on Superi ority derives from the ability to create a relative
inform ation advantage over an adversary. Information adva ntage is not a new concept.
Commanders have
always sought a
decisive informati on
advantage over their
adversari es. Surpri se,
one of the immutabl e
principles of war, can
be viewed as a type of
information advantage
that one force is ab le to
establi sh over another.
Informati on
advantage is not
exclusively about
coll ection,
visuali zation, analysis,
and dissemination, but
it is also about a
force's ability to meet
its inform ation needs Figure 5: Nava l Station San Diego , Calif., Jul. 24 , 2002 - A harbor tug pulls
with availabl e resources the guided missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DOG 62) away from Pier 3 at
and to do it more the Nava l Station , Sa n Diego. Fitzgerald was participating in Millennium
Challenge 2002.
effectively than its
adversary does. In fact, the degree to whi ch the force can meet its informati on needs, compared
to its counterpart, determines in large part th e degree of success of the particular operati on. The
key to gai ning th e informati on advantage is to match informati on-related capabilities with the
ri ght concept of operati ons, organi zation, and approach to command and control, and the
capabilities of the peopl e and the weapons systems involved.
Operational Net Assessment (ONA)

ONA provides the foundation of knowledge and understanding about an adversary
needed for ROO. It provides information in suffi cient detail to criti call y focus the appli cati on of

integrated dipl omati c, info rmati on, military, and economi c (DUvtE) fri endl y acti ons decisively
again st an adversary ' s political, military, economi c, social, infrastructure, and informati on
(PMES Il) systems. Thi s knowledge base includes systems analyses that identify critical
adversary vulnerabiliti es and potenti al fri endl y DIME acti ons with th e goal of causing desired
effects. It is a product of coll aborati on among a wide variety of organi zati ons, providing data to
decision makers from strategic to tacti cal levels. ONA is one of the supporting concepts enabling
RDO and it provides the foundati on for a
coherent knowledge base that enabl es EBO as Combatant Commander RUOI>-b. <k
well. I",.rag.nov 11.0.)
ONA requires an understanding of JTF _ - - , i:;~~~~!

both adversary and fri endl y forces as a set of
interdependent systems, PMESII, and is a
product of collaborati on between strategic,
operati onal, and tacti cal levels. It provides a
common knowledge base avail abl e to
customers from the nati onal strategic level to
the tacti cal. These potential customers al so Figure 6: JTF organization chart
parti cipate in and contribute to the
development of the ONA by their interacti on. They contribute to each element of the ONA they
touch.
Under the concept, a virtual, di stributi ve Nati onal Knowledge Advantage Center supports
the system-of-systems analysis. The lAC, through the JlA CG, whi ch represents the lAC on the
theater combatant comm ander's staff, arti culates effects on adversary PMES II . Th e lAC and
components contribute to identifi cati on of DlME acti ons to create a desired effect. All
parti cipants formul ate the resource and support requirements associated with each acti on. Whil e
thi s concept of operati ons addresses the ONA from the perspecti ve of the SfFHQ, the producti on
ofa credibl e ONA requires sustained involvement from the JlACG and Service components. It is
not done and cannot be done by the combatant commander' s staff alone.
The ONA approaches a potenti al adversary as an inter-dependent system-of-system s. All
of the systems contribute toward the adversary ' s publi c unity, will , and capability to pursue a
course of acti on unfavorabl e to U.S. interests. The ONA supports EBO, whi ch requires that all
levels- strategic to tacti cal - collaborate to plan and execute synchroni zed operati ons producing
desired effects upon the adversary ' s capability to conduct operati ons. The ONA goes far beyond
traditi onal intelligence assessments. It is an acti on-ori ented process, whi ch provides a continuous
stream of knowledge, from desired effects to adversary vulnerabiliti es to tasks. As such, ONA
represents a phil osophy that continuously dri ves a process to develop an acti onabl e product. The
process builds situati onal awareness and understanding, supports pl ans and executi on of
operati ons, and the ONA product changes and expands over time. The ONA is a medium that
provides the analyti c knowledge and questi ons th at dri ve the coll ecti on process.
Effects-Based Operations (EBO): Planning and Assessments

The Effects-Based Planning (EBP) process is a modifi cati on of the current joint pl anning
process. The EBP leverages knowledge systems and the benefits of collaborati on. Furthermore, it
forces th e JFC to ex plore and consider th e compl ex strategic and operati onal-l evel
interrel ati onships coincident with appli cati on of all elem ents of nati onal power. The
modifi cati ons to the current process better leverage knowledge systems, improve coll aborati on,
16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI ,Y

and address the compl ex strategic and operati onal-l evel interrelati onships caused by the
globali zati on of economi es and mass media. The modifi ed military planning process is designed
to leverage the attributes of the j oint force as described in JV 2020 (dominant maneuver,
precision engagement, focused logisti cs, and full-dim ensional protecti on) in sy nchroni zati on
with acti vities appl ying other elements of nati onal power. Furthermore, the process requires an
iterati ve feedback mechani sm that coll ects, processes, analyzes, and di sseminates informati on
and knowledge in a suffi cientl y timely manner to enabl e commanders at all level s to make better
decisions. It should all ow commanders to make better decisions more rapidl y than the opposing
commander. The improved functionality of the ESP combined with the effects-based strategy-to-
task linkage supports the rapid adaptati on element desired to promote decisiveness,
unpredi ctabili ty, and increased decision-to-acti on tempo.
Th e CROP and the continually updated ONA provide the force pl anners with Inform ati on
Superi ority. Thi s in sight shapes the planning process by focusing it on both effects and tasks vice
just the tasks. Pl anners are also abl e to expand their analysis of adversary centers of gravity
(COG) by study of adversari al PMES U.
During the ESP process, operati onal-level pl anners and commanders focus not onl y on
the desired outcomes of pl anned acti ons including second and third order effects, but also oth er
potential consequences such as undesired effects. Examinati on of the hi erarchy and relati onships
between anti cipated effects maximi zes the impact of acti ons and develops the most effecti ve
course of acti on (COA) opti ons. Additi onally, military pl anners benefit from interagency
parti cipati on in pl anning. Those interagency contributors, including scienti sts, educators, and
engineers, working in the coll aborati ve environment with access to the ONA and analysis tools,
provide multipl e alternati ves for acti on. ESP provides comm anders an in creased ability to have a
far-reaching impact in areas not traditi onall y within the military scope of operati ons.
The effects assessment (EA) process starts during the COA development step and run s
throughout the ESP cycl e. Since th e goal is to achi eve effects on a compl ex adapti ve adversary,
the process must include the ability to adapt the pl an to deal with: I) the adversary ' s acti ons that
are based on hi s own initi ati ve; 2) acti on taken in response to previous fri endl y efforts; and 3)
undesired or ineffi cient effects, and defeated acti ons. Assessment planning identifi es measures
for desired and supporting effects. The evaluati on and compari son of measures of performance
(MOP) and measures of effecti veness (MOE) provides effects assessment. MOP is the obj ecti ve
metri c of the " outcome" of a " tacti cal acti on." Normally the component level of comm and
provides the MOP. It is the result of the tacti cal acti ons performed to achi eve a desired effect,
such as was the target hit and what level of damage was achi eved. More than one MOP can be
associated with each MOE, as many tacti ca l actions may be required to bring about a desired
effect. MOE are most often " subj ecti ve indi cators" that all ow identifi cati on of the resulting
effects of acti ons or appli ed capabiliti es. MO E arti cul ate where to look and what to measure in
order to determine if the desired effect has been achi eved. In short, MO E must be abl e to show
incremental progress in achi eving desired effects.
Measures used in assessment become meaningful when they are ti ed to theater obj ecti ves,
reliabl e when they can be validated by coll ecti on di sciplines, and observabl e when all ocated
traditi onal and non-traditi onal means of observing, and reporting data can be tasked before,
during, and after the appli cati on of capabiliti es. Developing MOE start with the clear articulati on
of the desired effect and should encompass param eters describing such things as the level s of
change (di srupti on, deni al, neutrali zati on), the di stributi on (geographi c, organi zati onal, politi cal,
cultural), and durati on of the effect.

Robust collection is integral to comprehensive EA. Coll ection planning mu st incorporate

all-source collection requirements in support of the overall EA process and at the same time be
respon sive to the dynamic environment inherent in RDO. A Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnai ssance (JISR) process is required to ensure collection assets are effectively tasked . To
thi s end, the JTF or the combatant commander should state collection requirements early.
During MC02 execution , all employers of DLM.E elements of national power performed
EA. A JTF EA cell was responsible for coordinating all levels of military EA. The EA cell and
component staff elements continuall y assessed the impact that tacti cal actions achieved and
provided that information to the Joint Planning Center and the Joint Operations Center. In
roughl y the same way, the effects analysts worked in the collaborative environment with the lAC
to ensure that the effects achieved by other agencies' actions were available to joint planners and
operators. The effort was a dynamic process that drove planners and operators to closely
consider specifi c aspects of the plan to determine what, if any, modifi cati on had to be made to
improve the pace of achi eving the JTF commander' s desired effects.
Interagency
MC02 explored
methodologies to facilitate U.S .
Government interagency
planning and executi on in
support of EBO in ROO . Two
significant components to the
experiment relate to
interagen cy activity.
First, the combatant
commander's staff was
augmented with an
experimental staff element-
the llACG. The Jl ACG Figure 7: JIACG Relationships
represented the lAC at the
operational-level (See Fi gure 7). Their mi ssion was to facilitate information sharing across the
lAC to include the embassy/country team . Second, a common, secure collaborati ve network
linked selected members of the U.S. Interagency to facilitate planning and coordination. The
desired result was an effective political-military plan and a combatant commander's operational
plan, developed to effectively and efficientl y employ all elements of national power in support of
national and regional poli cy aims, as well as the combatant commander' s theater engagement
plan.
With shared equities in the management of national security and its transformation ,
interagency representati ves coll aborated during a series of di screet events to produce the
strategic documentation required to support MC02 experiment objectives. lAC parti cipation
vari ed as issues changed. The intent was to include as many lAC representatives as appropriate.
However, real-world commitments prevented some lAC representati ves from participating
throughout the entire experiment. The requi site knowledge and expertise remained constant as
substitutes ca me in to pi ck up the load when necessary.
The goal of interagency experimentation in MC02 was to develop orga ni zati onal
relation ships, tool s, and processes to optimi ze civilian and military interoperability within the

l AC and to accomplish operational-l evel coordination. This enhan ced coordi nati on was
empl oyed to support: deliberate crisis, and transition planning; nati onal-l evel net assessment
synchroni zation of actions to achi eve desired effects and strategic objecti ves; and conducting
Effects-Based Operations.
The interagency concept of operations for MC02 incl uded four signifi cant engagements
with the wider interagency, beginning in January 2002 and concluding with the executi on of
MC02 in Jul y and August 2002. The three events schedul ed pri or to MC02 establi shed the
nati onal strategic and regional approach for the experim ent, resulted in a Politi cal-Mi litary Plan,
and all owed personnel training on the use of the coll aborative tools empl oyed during MC02.
The Jl ACG intenti ons were to:
Establi sh regular, timely, coll aborati ve working relationships among military and civili an
operational planners
Form, train, and exercise a new staff element Jl ACG composed largely of U.S. civili an
personnel with strong agency expertise and connections
Create opportuniti es fo r realistic and accelerated operati onal planning upon approval ofa
politi cal-military pl an
Build on initi al efforts to integrate military and civi li an planning issues usi ng a deliberate
planning process

Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM) is a process that provides the combatant
commander the ability to synchroni ze, pri oriti ze, direct, integrate, and coordinate common-user
and cross-Service logisti cs functions, optimi zing support to the joint force. The process all ows
centrali zed management of the most critica l supply areas such as in-theater logisti cs, inter- and
intra-theater transportation, in-theater contracting, host nati on support, and criti cal supply items
such as precision guided munitions, and common ground muniti ons and fuel. Key elements of
JTLM provide for efficient comm on-u ser logistics support, ensuring a small er logisti cs footprint
by reduci ng redundancy, and most important integrating component logistics forces.
JTLM relies heavil y on an improved, robust com muni cations system. Today's advanced
inform ation systems, and the CIE all ows JTLM to provide a centrali zed location to track the
Services' support to anyone facet of a mi ssion. JTLM ensures that the corresponding Service
logistics demands have the right priority and emphasis. Usi ng the CIE, the theater staff has the
capab ility to reach back and harness a vast array of techni cal expertise, and resolve compl ex
issues in a timely manner.
The MC02 JTLM organi zati on was two-tiered. At the upper level was the Joint Logistics
Management Center (JLMC), which compri ses the theater comm ander's J4 staff, and staff fro m
US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the
Services. The JLM C planned, coordinated , and deconflicted logisti cs support for the theater. The
second level ofi ogisti cs pl anning concentrati on was at the JTF level. Logisticians were
embedded within each of the JTF groups, providing those planning staffs with organi c logistics
experti se. The Logistic Acti on Response Board (LARS) tied the two halves of the logisti cs
planning effort together, using the communi cations tools inherent in the CrE. The LARB , a
concurrent virtual, collaborati ve board made up of members of the JLMC, the JTF, and
component/Service logistics staffs, met to sy nchroni ze plans and operati ons in support of

The functions, roles and responsibilities of each of th e JTF logistics positions, after the
SJFHQ was absorbed into the JTF, are described in the SJFHQ Concept of Empl oyment, the
Deployment and Sustai nm ent CONOPS and TTP, and th e Joint Standard Operating Procedure
(JSOP) manual.
The LARB was the principal fo rum fo r overall collaboration of logistics support to the
operati on. It augmented, but did not replace norm al staff procedures and was intended to resolve
compl ex, sophi sti cated issues. The LARB convened daily, after Joint Pl anning Center (JPC)
collaborative sessions in support of ETO development and as required to resolve specifi c
logistics issues.
It facilitated the coordinati on of logisti cs and transportation support for Effects-Based
Pl anning and current operati ons by:
Bringing the strategic, operational, and tactical levels together
Enabling rapid response to short-fused logistics problems
Helping to ensure the ETOs were resourced
The logistics CROP, whi ch included access to Global Combat Support System (GCSS),
combatant commander/JTF, Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTA V), Global Transportati on Network
(GTN), and the joint logistics tools faci litated the fun ctions. The Log CROP was built in the
SharePoint Portal Server (SPPS). The log watchboard provided a com mander and hi s staffa
stopli ght chart on the status of JTF component commanders' criti cal warfighting resources. For
exampl e, if the JFMCC
reported ammunition
stores as criti call y low, at
a predetermined point
below the wartime
requirement, he colored
the appropriate block
Red . At a glance, other
commanders and
logisticians could see the
problem, find the cause,
and correct it.
Logistics
functional areas, whi ch
act as a library for
vari ous reports and Figure 8: NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE, Nev. (AFIE) -- Tech. Sgt. Tommy
plans, are shown on the Mazzone, a load ma ster from the 8th Special Operations Squadron at
Hurlburt Field , Fla ., loads a palette aboard a MC-130E Combat Talon on
left of the Log CROP. July 29 for an air drop during Millennium Challenge.
The ADOCS COP was
also displayed on the Log CROP and provided situati onal awareness. However, the ADOCS
presentation was not real-time and had to be periodically refreshed.
On the right of th e Log CROP display, the user had access to additi onal informati on.
Tools and logisti cs system s were also avail abl e here, including data marts containing large
amounts of reference informati on, such as the Defense Management Data Center (DMDC), the
Automated Air Facilities Information File (AAFIF), the Worldwide Port System (WPS), and the
Joint Electroni c Battlebook (JEB).

During MC02 ESP, the logistics plans officer, the logistics coordinator, and most of the
JTF ' s log plans section personnel participated in the joint planning center (JPC) planning
sessions. The log operations sustainment officer and other selected log operations personnel
monitored the JPc. The relation ship between COA development and deployment planning starts
with the assignment of effects-based mi ssions from a pri oriti zed effects li st (PEL) being given to
the components. The components conducted their COA development by selecting capabilities to
accompli sh the assigned tasks. The JTF then synchronized and sequenced the force flo w based
on the PEL leading to development of the time-phased force and depl oyment data (TPFDD). The
JTF then had to deconflict competing demands for limited air and sealift. Such conflicts could
have been attenuated by the JTF with the support of the components selecting the desired
capabiliti es and considering the net lift cost of each selection.
As ESP continued, the normal logistics planning fun cti ons required in support of CO A
development, such as the construction of a logisti cs staff estimate, and the assessment of COAs
for logistics and tran sportation feasibility were accomplished based on the desired effects. The
products were provided to the plans Director and included in the logistics portion of the ETO.
After the first ETO was published and executi on began, the ETO process became iterati ve. The
process repeated itselfin a somewhat abbreviated manner, based on the assessment of the
success of the planned effects, and in respon se to new mi ssions and/or requirements. The
logistics operations director with th e logistics coordinator convened the LARS to ensu re a
smooth and complete exchange of sustainment information, achieve synchronization of
sustainment, employment, and tran sportation and other resources, and to address issues that
exceeded the ability of routine staff work to resolve. A deployment-planning cell was convened
as necessary to ensure the smooth and complete exchange of deployment information, achieve
sy nchronization of deployment, employment, and tran sportation and other resources.
Approximately 176 logistician s were involved in MC02.
Joint Initiatives
The MC02 joint initiati ves process provided a systemati c, objective review of proposed
joint initiati ves. The process featured a multi-l evel review of initiati ves with command-wide
involvement supplem ented by interagency and service representation. The initiati ve approval
process objectively compared each proposed initiati ve to the overall experiment objectives as
well as appli cabi li ty to the joint environment. Additionally, the process provided continual
tracking and addressing of associated issues throughout event preparation. The joint initiati ves
process provided two-way communications between the indi vidual initiati ve sponsors and the
MC02 experiment planning and integration team s. The review process provided for three
examination sessions. Each session was progressively more detailed and required higher-level s
of endorsement than its predecessor did . Phase I was the initial review by subject matter experts
from the functional and experimentation community that screened submi ssions against ROO
objectives and MC02 joint experiment objectives. As part of Phase 2, a " Council of Colonels"
was formed to review the recommendation of the operational/technical panels and forward its
findings to the third phase, a general officer/fl ag officer panel. Man y Service proposed initiati ves
were not approved for joint integration because the initi atives lacked ajoint application or
perspecti ve. The Services evaluated some of these initiati ves on their own. Thi s process is
planned for use in future major experiments to ensure a standard and formal procedure exists for
vetting new ideas and technologies into the joint experim entation process.

One of the new initiatives reviewed in MC02 through thi s process was the joint fires
initi ati ve (IFl). The IFI concept enables tim e sensiti ve target (TST) coordinati on across
components and the Joint Task Force. It provides a common tool set, architecture, and automated
processes for the joi nt fo rce com mander, component commanders, and supporting tactical
commanders to operational and tactical fires across the engagement spectrum from planning to
executi on for time-sensitive targeting. The IFI mi ssion is enhanced by CRO P toolsets providing
users with the same information, the same results, and ensuring consistent hori zontal integrati on
of information across components.
Joint lntelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR)

nSR is a network-centric approach to the management of ISR pl atforms and sensors to
better support the quick-paced demands of EBO. n SR, as employed in MC02, emphasized
collaboration between producers and users to provide rapid and responsive mi ssion focu sed ISR,
essenti al to future joint operations. Pl anners and operators shared informati on rather than
working through and around cumbersome, single-intelli gence "stovepipe" tactics, techniques,
and procedures. In the context of the MC02 experiment, the n SR concept and supporti ng tools
were relati vely immature. They had not undergone preceding experimentation. Consequently, the
focu s of the II SR assessment was limited to coll ection management and ISR operation s.
n SR thrives in a rapid-fire, informati on exchange environment characteri zed formed by
the integration of sensors at the national, theater, and tactical levels. Thi s concept streamlines
ISR management using new integrated, OPS/fNTEL capabilities, all owi ng dynami c re-tasking of
sensors to ensure ISR optimi zation . In additi on, multipl e sensor cross-cueing becomes routine,
and the sy nchroni zation ofl SR assets with operations, the norm .
As our understanding of the key tenets ofEBO and th e EBP processes matures, Jl SR wi ll
assume an ever more criti cal role. The ability to effecti vely manage multipl e coll ecti on sensors,
spanning several levels of operati onal control, within the compressed decision timelines
associated with ROO wi ll be key. Jl SR will enable the JFC to smartly coupl e ISR assets to
specific effects, th ereby optimi zing the employment of hi gh demand/low density assets.

Chapter 4 - Experiment Scenario
Blue Forces
Com mander, Blue Forces/Com mander, Joi nt Task Force (CJTF) led a U.S. land, sea, air
and special operations expediti onary force in support of a theater commander. The task force
consisted of units from the four Services, supporting comm anders, and a Special Operati ons
Command task fo rce. An Army corps headquarters unit composed the JTF staff and an Army
li eutenant general led the Joi nt Task Force, reporti ng directl y to the combatant commander.
Members of a Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJFHQ) augmented the JTF . The SJFHQ,
itself a new warfare concept under review, was a detachment of the th eater combatant
commander assigned to speed th e JTF ' s learn ing/accl imation process. The JTF com mander' s
functional component support was provided as follows:
A JFLCC, a Marine Corps maj or general and the staff of a marine expediti onary force; a
JF ACC, an Air Force li eutenant general from a numbered Air Force element and hi s staff; and a
JFMCC- a vice admiral from a numbered fl eet command . The Service components were j oined
by a JSOTF led by an Army colonel and a JPOTF led by an Army li eutenant colonel. The
commander was provided assistance through various means by elements of the interagency
(ci vili an departments and agencies of the U. S. Governm ent) .
Navy Order of Battle

The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander had two Carrier Battle Groups. Each
battle group included an aircraft carrier and its embarked air wing, AEG IS cruisers, AEG IS
guided mi ssile destroyers, non-AEG IS destroyers and fri gates, a close support subm arine, and
supporti ng repleni shment vessels. In additi on, two amphibi ous ready groups made up of three
amphibi ous ships each (LHD, LH A, LSD), were carryi ng the Marine Expediti onary Units
(ME U). Mine countermeasure forces included both MCM and MHC class ships and H-S3
heli copter support. The naval fo rce commander, who broke hi s flag in a Navy command ship,
also had at hi s di sposal the ships ofa standing naval theater force (already in the theater when the
confli ct began), in thi s case consisting of a cruiser and two guided mi ssile destroyers. Various
suppl y, cargo, military prepositi oning ships, and auxili ary craft of the service fl eet were also
assigned. Four special boat units were avai lab le to support Navy SEAL team s. The SEALS and
their support craft were under the tacti cal control of th e special operations force (SOF)
commander. For MC02, the fl eet al so had at its di sposal the ex perimental high-speed vessels,
providing rapid logistics and inserti on capabi liti es for Marine and SOF forces. The carri er air
wings each consisted ofF/ A 18's (C and F models), EA6B ' s, E2C's; S-3B's; SH-60R' s, MH-
60 ' s and C2A ' s.
Marine Corps Order of Battle

The Marine Corps was selected to stand up the JFLCC . The JFLCC was assigned both
Army Forces (ARFOR) and Marine Forces (MARFO R) . The Army order of battle is described
below. MARFOR consisted of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and two ME Us. The
ME B brought with it a command element, including a headquarters group with a radio battalion,
a com muni cations battalion and an intelli gence battali on; a fo rce reconnaissance detachm ent; a
civil affairs detachment; a Marine liai son element company, and a Marine air-ground task force

command and control detachment. The MEB ' s ground combat element (MEB GCE) consisted of
a regimental headquarters; infantry battalions; infantry battalion headquarters with di visional
headquarters detachm ent support ; a reconnai ssance company; and a reinforced artill ery battalion
that had a chemi cal, biological and radiological (CBR) detachm ent and a high mobility artill ery
rocket system (HIMAR S) battery. Additi onall y, the MEB GCE had an advanced amphibi ous
assault vehicl e battalion (AAA V); a li ght armored reconnai ssance battalion, made up ofl ight
armored vehicl es (LA V-25 ' s); one tank battalion, consisting of M I A I tanks, and a constructi on
engineer battalion (CEB) assigned . The MEB air combat element (MEB ACE) included a Marine
wing headquarters squadron and a Marine air control group with its various support squadron s, a
reinforced low altitude air defen se (LAAD) battalion with a detachment of Avengers and Claws
and a detachment of vehicl e-mounted UAV 's (VMUA V) and verti call y launched UAV
(VTUA V) (Dragon Eye and Dragon Warrior).
The Marine ai r group was reinforced and incl uded two squadron s ofF/A- 18C' s, a
squadron ofF/A- 180 's, a squad ron of AV-8 8 's, a squadron of C- 130' s, and as previously
menti oned an EA-6B squadron under IF ACC control. Rotary wi ng assets included V-22
squadron s, a squadron ofCH-53E's, and a squadron oflight attack heli copters AH-I Z's and UH-
I V' s. A Marine wing support group and a Marine air logisti cs squadron supported the group.
ME B service support group included a headquarters and support battalion and supply,
maintenance, engineering, transportation support, and medical battalions. The IFLCC was also
able to draw upon two Marine Ex peditionary Units (MEU). Each MEU consisted ofa battalion
landing team (BLT), V-22 ' s, CH-53E's, AH-l Z's, UH-l Y' s, AV-8B's, and necessary support
group detachments. Unlike the MEB , the MEU is a component of a Navy ' s aircraft carri er battle
group (CVBG) or an amphibious ready group (ARG). The MEU embarks in a three-ship ARG
and may deploy with the battle group or deploy independently with escorts.
Air Force Order of Battle

The Air Force, acting as the fun cti onal air-warfare commander, was set up as the Joi nt
Force Air Component Commander and operated out of th e Combined Air Operations Center
(CA OC) at Nelli s AFB , NY. The staff of a numbered Air Force commander manned the IF ACC.
Those forces were augmented by other agencies and organi zati ons to include U.S. Space
Command, U.S. Transportati on Command, and U.S. Strategic Command . The JFACC was
responsibl e for a deployable global strike task fo rce (GSTF), an lSRlJAOC FDO, in-theater air
defense units, and vari ous support elements. Th e GSTF consisted of 8-2s, 8-52s, 8-1 s, F-22s,
and two squad rons of KC-1 35 and KC- IO air refu eling aircraft. Also availabl e to the IF ACC
were E-8 JST ARS , E-3A AWACS , RC-1 35J' s, Global Hawks, ABL ' s, U-2's, EC-1 30H
(Compass Call), C-1 30' s, C- 130H' s, and EA-6B ' s (USMC assets TACON to the JFACC).
The JFACC also controll ed in-theater forces consisting of F-1 5C and F-15 E aircraft, RQ I
Predators, Joint Strike Fighters, F-1 6CJ' s, F-1 6C L' s, F-ll Ts, A- lO's, EC-1 30H' s (Compass
Call), HH-60 ' s, KC- 135 and KC-lO tankers, and necessary C-130, C- 17 and C-5 lift support
aircraft. Also on scene were combat service support units (tanker ai rlift control , mi ssion support
teams, air mobility elements).
Special Operations Force Order of Battle (SOF)

The SOF provided a signi ficant piece to th e puzzle. Headquartered with the JTF
commander and functi oning as a JTF component - JSOTF - was a theater special operation s
command , consisting of two support battalions and a special operation s task force. The task force

was made up of Special Forces battali ons, ranger battali ons, and a ranger regim ental
headquarters staff. In additi on, there was a special operati ons aviati on regiment, providing MH-
47E's, MHJ-60 L' s, and AH-6/MELB aircraft. The Navy added a naval special warfare task
g roup to include a headquarters unit, SEAL teams, special boat units, and an expl osive ordnance
detachment . An Air Force special operatio ns wing was also attached to the J SOTF. The wing
was made up of a special tacti cs squadron and a special operati ons squadron - Air Force foreign
internal defense unit. Additi onall y, there were AC-1 30's, MC-1 30 HIP ' s, CY-22's, and EC-1 30J
aircraft assig ned in support . Operating with th e JSOTF was the JPOTF, consisting of one Army
PYSOP g roup. The g roup was made up of a regimental support battali on, di sseminati on
battali on, tacti cal battali ons, and one enemy pri soner of war (EPW) battali on.
Army Order of Battle

The ARFOR was task-organi zed under an airborne di vision headquarters, compri sed of a
Stryker brigade combat team (S BCT), an airborne di vision ready bri gade, a deep strike/mobil e
strike aviati on task force package, and associated di vision and corps units that were necessary for
force protecti on, sustainment, and C4ISR fun cti ons. The brigade incl uded a headquarters
element, airborne infantry battali ons, a IOS mm fi eld artill ery battali on (towed), a forward
support battali on, a reconnaissance battali on, an air defense artill ery battali on, a military
intelli gence company, a communicati ons and signal pl atoon, a military poli ce pl atoon, and a
nuclear, bi ological and chemi cal pl atoon. The Stryker brigade combat team includ ed a brigade
headquarters element, Stryker-equipped infantry battali ons, a Stryker-equipped reconnaissance,
surveill ance, and target acqui siti on (R STA) squadron. It also included a I SS mm (towed) fi eld
artill ery battali on, a brigade support battali on, a Stry ker-equipped anti-tank company, an
engineer company, a military intelligence company, a signal company, an attached combat
service support company, and (for MC02) an attached air defense artill ery battery (Avenger).
Mechani zed infantry battali ons, a mechani zed reconnaissance surveill ance and target
acqui siti on squadron, an anti-tank company, a I SS mm field artill ery battali on (towed), a combat
engineer company (wheeled), a military intelli gence battali on, a communi cati ons and sig nals
battali on, a bri gade support battali on and an air defense artill ery battery (Avenger) . The ARFOR
aviati on brigade included a medium attack heli copter squadron of AH-64' s and RAH-66' s, a
Multipl e-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battali on with a target acqui siti on company, support
battali ons, military intelligence battali on, a communi cati ons and signal s battali on, a civil affairs
unit, and a psychological operati ons unit.
Army forces were equipped with the Army Battl e Command Systems (ABCS), whi ch
includes th e Army Tacti cal Command and Control System (A TCCS) suite of systems at bri gade
throug h corps levels. The Maneuver Control System (M CS), Maneuver Control System - Lig ht
(MCS-L), All- Source Analysis System (ASAS), All-Source Analysis System - Li ght, (ASAS-L),
Advanced Fi eld Artill ery Tacti cal Data System (AF ATDS), Air and Mi ssil e Defense
Work stati on (AMDW/S), and the Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS) make up
the ABCS. The Global Comm and and Control System-Army (GCCS-A) was positi oned at the
ARFOR, U.S. Army Special Operati ons Command (U SA SOC), and the JFLCC to all ow joint
connecti vity during the pl anning and executi on of MC02. The Integrated Meteorological
Systems (IMET S), the Di gital Topographi cal Support System (DTSS ), and the Tacti cal Airspace
Integrati on System (T AIS) were al so employed.

Adaptive Adversary
The MC02 opposing forces' (OPFOR) mi ssion was to be a credibl e adversary for the
Blue force. Thi s required an OPFOR that was aggressive and adapti ve, capabl e of achi eving its
own obj ecti ves through dipl omati c, informati on, military, and economi c influences. The overall
obj ecti ve of the MC02 OPFOR was to provide a 2007-based, reali sti c, adapti ve opponent that
would test the vulnerabiliti es of the ROO concept. In concert with the MC02 scenari o, the multi-
faceted adversary portrayed to the Blue JTF provided a reali sti c test opponent. The confrontati on
that devel oped created an excell ent environm ent in whi ch the ROO concept could be expl ored. It
all owed examinati on of the ONA, EBO, interagency, SlFHQ, and other supporting concepts and
obj ecti ves. The lFCOM Joint Warfighting Center Support Team (J ST), in coordinati on with the
JFCOM World Class Adversary (WCA) Team, provided the OP FOR.
JFCOM anal ysts and subj ect matter ex perts (SMEs) assessed the OPFOR orga ni zati on
and campai gn during MC02. Thi s all owed for an in-depth understanding of the success and
failure of Blue Effects-Based Operati ons. The assessment team met with OPFOR seni or leaders
dail y to review their operati ons, how they planned to respond to BLUE efforts, and to collect
DlME/PMES ll self-assessment data.
Th e seni or OPFOR leadership team incl uded a retired lieutenant general (USMC), who
was the JTF-South comm ander and a form er U.S. ambassador, the GOR Supreme Leader.
The MC02 scenari o call ed for an upper level, small-scale contingency (SSC). As such,
the OPFOR organized into a multi-faceted group that incl uded government, military, terrori st,
pirate, subversive, militant, and criminal elements. These elements each had their own obj ecti ves
and did not always work cooperati vely. As such, they posed a considerabl e chall enge for the
Blue JTF .
Scenario
The MC02 scenari o postulated a year 2007 regional power, Red, situated within an area
of criti cal world strategic and economi c importance (See Figure 9). Red suffered a natural
di saster (ea rthquake) and the sub sequent chain of events resulted in th e separati on of a rogue
military commander. Identifi ed as CJTF-South , he and hi s sub ordinate military commanders
spun away from nati onal (Government of Red) control. A renegade element within the Red
leadership, CJTF-S conducted broad acti ons, incl uding conventi onal military, asymmetri c,
dipl omati c, informati on, economi c, and terrori st appli cati ons, with the goal of establi shing
regional power and control. A di spute over nati onal ownership of local islands led to CJTF-S's
seizure of the di sputed islands, and the sub sequent launch of a CJTF-S sponsored military escort
service to ensure safe passage, and a related toll for use of that service. Blue ordered the
executi on of decisive operati ons that led to the initiati on of hostiliti es.
Blue goal s were to secure the shipping lanes for internati onal commerce; neutrali ze Red's
WME capability; establi sh sovereign control of the di sputed islands in accordance with a World
Court decision, and compel JTF-S to abandon its politi cal agenda in pursuit of regional
hegemony.
Adversary goals were as vari ed as the fa cti ons that chall enged the Blue forces. The
OPFOR consisted of three primary elements: JTF-S military forces, the Government of Red
(GOR) nati onal leadership, and a terrori st organi zati on that included pirates, a pri vate company,
and criminal elements. Th e JTF-South obj ecti ves were to preserve the regim e, deter Blue
military depl oyment, limit Blue war aims, and restore internal cohesion. In additi on, JTF-S
aimed to reduce Blue presence in the region, develop regional influence, and speed economi c

U.S. Joint Forces Command Mill ennium Chall enge 2002: Ex perim ent Report
Me02 Scenario Timeline
Experiment Force Activity
The diagrams here

provide a visual depiction I" "I ." ~r
: I'
MOY
I
Jun Jul
,: I
....... g
I
of the buildup of events SJFHQ
s........ SplrIII2
that eventually led to 16 Jiin 02 18-29 Mar 02
hostilities and Blue conflict

w ith CJTF-S. Warning Orde
The diagrams also JTF Stand-up

describe component COR's Estimate Alert
Order
activity in support of the
MC02 experiment scenario
and its schedule of events. Diagram 1: MC02 scenario time line from the stand up of the
SJFHQ through the initiation of hostilities
UNCLASSIFIED
Me02 Execution Activity rUSA I
=~;;~ I~VPI = ~s~
2728293031 1
[~~ ( I~ I I
GSTF Tillie Crifkul Taq~ets
Lj\'e/\ ATO
FlyL....::!.
Ls 'JrrFIY6
TSTs
A( -130 ,It U( AX
Jmnt tUlH' OPS En,lhl('"
Diagram 2: Overlay of component exercise play and the MC02 experiment scenario.

U.S. Joint Forces Command Millennium Chall enge 2002: Experim ent Report
recovery (earthquake aftermath), champion ideal s in Red , control western access to natural
resources, and gain Red stature. GOR objectives were to preserve the regime, reduce Blue
presence in the region, develop regional influence, and speed economic recovery. The terrori sts'
objectives were to deny Blue access to the region , attack opposing politi cal and reli gious
organizations, and di srupt Blue operations.
Threat forces organization and systems

The adversary ground forces consisted of an army of approximately 55,000: four
di vision s, (one armor, two infantry, and one mechanized); two airborne brigades; two
independent armored brigades; a marine brigade; an independent artill ery bri gade ; and variou s
special operations force s. SOF/militia numbered 5,000 personnel for unconventional warfare.
Theater balli sti c mi ssiles (TBM) forces included 200 laun chers and 1,800 mi ssiles with
chemi ca l/biological capable cruise mi ssiles.
Air forces numbered 158 aircraft, including 14 MJG-29's, 4 SU-27's, 20 F5E' s, and
vari ous other fighter, bomber, auxiliary, and support aircraft.
Naval forces included fi ve diesel and four midget submarines; six guided mi ssile frigates;
32 patrol gun boats - most with
surface-to-surface mi ssil e Scenario Imperatives
capability; 13 amphibious class HiglH~ nd :'n llllil sell I"
ships; I 0 auxiliaries; I 05 small eontillg<:I1(":'"
craft armed with recoill ess -Rt':II- wol'ld milit ... :"" Ihn-:1I"
rifles or rocket launchers, and C h",lIe nging geog" ll phic
shore based anti-ship fixed and llCC('.'iS & inf..., s h lI chu "('
truck mounted mi ssile
launch ers. - Histor;c r ('giollll i. e ulhll.)1
Scenario data points include: strife
Though di savowed by the
Government of Red, lI e ut,' .. 1 neighbor's
country Red was a major
state sponsor of terrori sm Figure 9: MC02 Scenario Highlights
and provided sanctuary to
large terrori st groups within its soverei gn borders and conventional force umbrell a
The Red leader employed these global-reach groups to create incidents and threats
throughout the region and world, whil e maintaining official deniability
Regional access was politicall y constrained and logisticall y challenging
JTF- S's campaign plan was characterized by asymmetric attacks, ambiguity, anti-access,
threat of WME, economic leverage and upheaval prepared for a large conventional set-pi ece
battle, local and exported terrori sm against adversary forces, and timing of their choosing
A single-dim ensional respon se (military) would not easi ly neutrali ze Red's coordinated
political , military, economic, social, and informational campaign
Threats to friend ly forces and assets were world wide
Friendly conventional forces had to create selecti ve peri ods of multidimensional supremacy
and deci sively apply military power to achieve desired effects, not necessarily conquer the
country, or escalate the conflict
Knowledge-not mass- was the deci sive force enabl er for fri endl y forces

Figure 10: CHINA LAKE, Calif. July 30 (AFIE) -- Inside the integrated battlespa ce arena at Michelson
Laboratory, warfighters keep a close eye on screens showing a rea l-time picture of theater air assets and
a live feed from a Predator surveillance aircraft during Millennium Challenge 2002.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI Y 29

(Thi s Page Blank)
30 FOR OFFICI A I. liSE ONLY

Chapter 5 - Experiment Execution - The Spirals
MC02 Test Campaign Plan

Focused technical and training events, or "Spirals," preceded MC02. The Spiral s tested
and rehearsed the techni cal infrastructure that carri ed the experiment from coast to coast and
intra-Service. The Spirals also provided the participants an opportuni ty to become acquainted
with the new concept tools and the philosophy and technology of their applications.
The Spiral s, whi ch began in early December 200 1 with Spiral 0, had a dedicated test plan
and concept of operations embedded in the overall MC02 Campaign Plan. Thi s secti on describes
the concept, scope, activities, schedul es, manning, and format used to develop the specifi c MC02
tests. It provides the gui dance fo r the development of th e indi vidual test plans that USJFCOM
and the Service participants used for pre-execution technical tests. The goal of the test program
was to provide suffi cient informati on on the MC02
technical architecture to recommend USJFCOM
accreditati on fo r its use in MC02.
There were three schedul ed Integration
Milestones (TMs) and four additi onal integration
events that were added to address specifi c issues
encountered in the IMs. The IMs were to integrate
the Service simulations into a federation that would
support MC02. Parti cular focus was placed on
simulati on interoperabili ty, federati on scalabili ty,
and federation reliability.
IM-I was held June 4-8, 2001. The event
brought together the MC02 core simul ati ons for the
first tim e. The objectives included:
Federate simulati ons via the Run Time
Infrastructure (RTf) or Gateways
Verify that simulati ons refl ect each oth er' s Figure 11 : Suffolk, Va., July 29, 2002 -
entiti es "\l\lhat I've seen is the future," said Adm.
Verify that entiti es in different sim s detect and Vern Clark after his tour of the Joint
shoot each other Training , Analysis, and Simulation Center
(JTASC). The Chief of Naval Operations
Examin e terrain correlation toured the U. S. Joint Forces Command
Run a limited scale federation scenari o during MC02.
IM-I proved that the MC02 federation was viab le. It also showed that the degree of
terrain correlation was unacceptable and would have to be improved. It also provided the
communi ty ' s first experience with using multi cast addressing over the wide area network
(WAN), whi ch required special router settings.
IM-I A was held June 18-22, 200 I. This limited event investigated th e use of Data
Distribution Management (DDM) as a scaling tool and examined RTI scalabili ty, using onl y
JSAF and clutter. The objective was to gain experi ence with DDM and the RTf prior to usi ng
them in the full federa ti on. The results showed that DDM did support scaling but that getti ng a
display to monitor all the entiti es would require further optimi zati on.

IM-2 was held Jul y 30 - August 3, 200 I. Thi s event started to look at that ability of th e
MC02 fed erati on to scale. The obj ecti ves of the event were:
Start the process of standardi zing enumerati ons
Start the process of standardi zing muniti ons
Investi gate issues associated in simul ating large numb ers of entiti es
Several automated and manual techniques for enumerati on and muniti ons standardi zati on
were successfull y tested across the WAN . A number of potential probl ems that were preventing
the federati on from scaling to 30,000 entiti es were also identified.
IM-2A was held from August 20-24, 200 1 to improve the federati on's ability to scale.
Many scaling tests were held with both RTls and many probl ems were debugged. The federati on
scaled to 35,000 entiti es, but issues with delayed di scovery of new entiti es remained. Clamping
was eliminated as a soluti on for terrain correlati on and work on true correlati on was initiated.
IM-3, held fro m September 17-27, 200 1, obj ecti ves incl uded:
Continue to debug and impl ement DDM and scalability issues
Continue verifi cati on of enumerati ons and muniti ons detonati on interacti ons.
Continue the integrati on of aggregates
Begin the investigati on of fault tolerance and recovery
Begin th e investigati on of minefi eld interacti ons
Begin integrati on of additi onal federates
Begin integrati on of C41 interfaces and equipment
Begin investigati on of WAN issues
Begin investigati on of IFF
Investi gate electroni c warfare issues
All issues showed progress except electroni c warfare. It was determined electroni c
warfare would be handl ed by the Distributed Inform ati on Warfare Constructi ve Environment and
the Command and Control Warfare Analysis and Targeting Tool. IM-3 demonstrated that the
federati on could handl e the required number of entiti es and th at slow di scovery was improved
although not eliminated. Additi onall y, many new simulati ons were integrated into the federati on.
lM-3A was held from October 22-25, 200 I primaril y to examine the performance of a
new RTI version. Thi s version was modifi ed to support MC02 scal abili ty requirements, prim aril y
by turning off perfect filtering. Additi onal goals incl uded:
Verify a single Di stributed Interacti ve Simul ati on/Hi gh Level Architecture (DISIHLA)
gateway can support over 30,000 entiti es
Investi gate settings and performance of multi cast in the Cisco network switch
Integrate new federates into the federati ons
IM-3A verifi ed that the gateway could handl e an adequate number of entiti es. RTl
performance was improved, but still required optimi zati on for multi cast handling and four new
federates were added
IM-3B was held from November 26-30,200 1 to test RTl modifi cati ons to support fault
tolerance. These modifi cati ons were very successful and solved most fa ult toleran ce issues.

IM3-B concluded the 1M process and set the stage fo r the Spiral seri es test events that
foll owed. The Spiral seri es tests techni call y verifi ed the networks and the C41 infrastructure and
provided the experim ent "a running start" into executi on.
Primary obj ecti ves of the spi ral testing incl uded:
Ensure the successful accompli shment of MC02 from a techni cal standpoint
Ensure that the modeling and simul ati on (M&S) architecture supported the accompli shment
of the MC02 obj ectives
4
Ensure that the C 1 architecture supported the accompli shment of the MC02 obj ecti ves
Perform event specifi c validati on of the models and demonstrate that th e federati on could
provide an accurate representati on of the real world (circa 2007) within the contex t of MC02
Validate control procedures
Validate operati onal requirements and the supporting techni cal architecture
Ensure users understood the capabilities and limitati ons of the techni cal architecture to
support their obj ecti ves
Ensure that the network architecture supported the accompli shment of th e MC02 obj ecti ves
Scope of the spiral testing process

JFCOM networked Blue C4 1 architecture, a simul ati on federati on, and a White C 41
architecture to support MC02. The MC02 testing program used a requirements-based approach
to ensure the thoroughness of testing and the validity of the event architecture. Preparati on
involved two phases: Phase I was developm ental , with three integrati on mil estone events; Phase
2 was an accreditati on phase involving four Spi ral events, an end-to-end test, and an ex periment
synchroni zati on drill .
The tests provided suffi cient data on the techni cal and fun cti onal characteri sti cs of the
MC02 Federati on to all ow its accreditati on by JFCOM and its use during MC02 execution. The
test pl an was broken into stages to all ow probl ems to be resolved in parall el with the plan
schedul e. Progressively compl ex techni cal and organi zati onal systems were interconnected and
brought on line in events so that faults could be identifi ed and fi xed, and personnel trained. The
JFCOM Test Director determined the focus and tempo of techni cal events; the JFCOM Exercise
Director determined the focus and tempo of operati onall y focused events.
Spiral tests included :
Spi ral 0 (December 3-14, 200 1) (Techni cal Focus)
Spiral I (J anuary 28 - February 8, 2002) (Techni cal Focus)
Spiral 2 Testing (March 11-22, 2002) (Techni cal Focus)
Spi ral 2 Training Support (March 25-29, 2002) (Operati onal Focus)
Spiral 3 Testing (May 27 - June 7, 2002) (Techni cal Focus)
Spi ral 3 End-to-End Testing and Training Support (June 10-14, 2002) (Operati onal Focus)
End-to-End Test (Jul y 10-20, 2002) (Ensure that the network architecture supported the
accompli shment of the MC02 obj ecti ves) (Techni cal Focus, transiti on to Operati onal Focus)
Experiment Synchroni zati on Drill (Jul y 2 1-23, 2002) (Operational Focus)
Spiral 0 (December 3-14, 2001)

Test setup, November 26-30, 200 1, was foll owed by data review and techni cal
integrati on December 3-14, 200 I and fun cti onal testing of simul ati on interacti ons and C4 )
linkages, December 10-14, 200 1. Spiral 0 was a transiti onal event between Phase I

(Development) and Phase 2 (Accreditation). A successful Spiral 0 permitted transition from a

development-focused event to a fun cti onal-focused event.
Tran siti on from Phase I occurred as expected during Spiral O. M&S C4 1 interface testing,
database verifi cation, terrain
verifi cati on, and functional
testing in air, land, sea,
logisti cs, and intelligence was
accompli shed. Based on the
fun ctional testing, USJFCOM
identifi ed and categori zed non- .-.-.
,
existent or inadequate
simulati on functionali ty that
needed to be fixed.
Additi onall y, this test all owed
JECG personnel, involved with
data analysis, logistics,
intelli gence, and targeting, to
fami li arize themselves with
federation capabi liti es and
review control /coll ection
procedures.
Specific objecti ves for Spiral 0 Figure 12: San Diego, Ca lif., Jul. 26, 2002 - The Chainnan of the
included: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. Richard Myers (center) and aide
Establi sh federation Navy Capt. Richard W. Hunt are briefed by Capt. Ken Ginader, a
Perform federation director of operations in the Joint Air Operations Center aboard USS
Coronado (AGF 11 ).
di agnosti cs
Verify federates generate and receive interacti ons
Perform object ownership tasks - add/delete/modify
Verify obj ect ghosting across federates
Verify terrain
Verify hyb rid geography representati ons in C4 } systems
Perform fun ctional testing of ISR, air, sea and ground entiti es
Assess federation scalability through load test
Conduct latency testing
Determine operati onal interventi on (save, restore, "recock") requirements
Perform network performance monitoring 4
Verify si mul ati on data fl ow to availabl e C 1 systems
Verify targeting requirements
Verify data coll ection and analysis requirements
Verify intel sensors/coll ectors
Verify logistics level ofplay/requirements
Parti cipants in Spiral 0 included simulation owners and techni cal controll ers, network
anal ysts, database builders, JECG POC, USJFCOM C4 1 operators, remote site model operators,
USJFCOM OPFOR model operators. USJFCOM intelli gence integrators. and USJFCOM

logistics integrators. The database to support the test was ready on 26 November 2001 and was
projected at the foll owing levels: terrain , 100 percent; Blue order of battl e 75 percent; Red order
of battle 50 percent; and targets limited.
Spiral I (January 28 - February 8, 2002)

Test setup occurred January 22-25, 2002, followed by data review, technical integration,
and functi onali ty testing January 28 - February 8, 2002. Spiral I was the fir st test to full y focus
on the functional capabi liti es of the federati on. Thi s " technical " test expanded the di stributed
4 4 4
nature of the federation , included more C 1 and experimental C 1 (XC f) system s, and allowed
more end-user participation. The first week of testing focu sed on mapping and enumerations,
database quality control, and system s tests, ensuring full C4 I/XC 4 1 network connectivity was
reached ; full connectivity was necessary to conduct the functional testing planned for the second
week. Following fun cti onal testing, the test plan expanded into thread testing and a build up to
larger scenarios, which would refl ect expected activiti es during MC02. USJFCOM also
conducted a load test, which stressed the systems above expected exercise loads. As in Spiral 0,
the results of the testing caused USJFCOM to identify and categorize non-exi stent or inadequate
4
system fun ctionalities that were then fixed by coding changes to simulations/federati onlC 1
systems, redesigned, or relegated to scripting. Additionall y, thi s test allowed JECG and Service
personnel to assess federation capabilities so that detail ed operational and technical control and
coll ection procedures could be developed.
Specifi c objectives for Spiral I were:
Establish Federation
Perform Federation diagnostics
Verify enumerations
Verify federation save and restore procedures
Verify fed erates generate and recei ve interactions
Perform object ownership tasks - add/delete/ modify
Verify object ghosting across federates
Veri fy database
4
Verify C )links and e-mail procedures
Verify cell workstation/layout requirements
4
Verify simulation data flow to available C 1 system s
Assess Battle Damage Assessment (BOA) requirements/capabilities
Develop Event Tech Control (ETC) procedures
Develop System Control (SYSCON) procedures
4
Define intellevel of play, reports, formats, and C 1 compatibility
Determine simulation rules and workarounds
Verify unit terrain movement capabilities
Functionality testing (air, land, sea, log, intel)
Test A TO procedures
4
Establish XC )
Verify comm uni cations connectivity
4
Verify C ) connectivity
Verify target database

Master Scenario Events Li st (MSEL) scrub

Load testing
Latency testing
Perform network performance monitoring
Define deployment procedures
In stall/test Spiral event control communi cations (VTC, chat room s, web page, shutdown,
STU)
Verify "cl utter" patterns and capabi liti es
Verify weather/night time capabiliti es
4
Verify hybrid geography representati ons in C } systems
Determine Rul es and Workarounds (Simulation, C4 1, XC 4 1, Initi ati ves)
Exercise di stributed Help Desk procedures
Test change over from Federation to Advanced Joint Combined Operation s Model (AJCOM)
based experiment dri ver
Test data analysis functions
Key participants included Service representati ves and technical support personnel,
simulati on owners and technical controll ers, network analysts, database builders, JECG WG
personnel, USJFCOM and Service C4 1 operators, Service remote site model operators,
USJFCOM OPFOR and supporting Service model operators, USJFCOM intelligence integrators,
USJFCOM logistics integrators, and data coll ectors/analysts.
The database to support thi s test was ready on 24 January 2002 at the foll owing levels:
Terrain 100 percent; Blue order of battl e 100 percent; Red order of battle 100 percent, and
targets 100 percent. The Federation
operated conti nuously fo r the
duration of the test to simul ate
extended use.
Spiral 2 (March 4-29, 2002)

Test setup occurred March
4-8, 2002, foll owed by data review,
technical integratio n, and
fun cti onality testing March 11-22,
2002. Training was conducted from
March 25-29, 2002.
Spiral 2 testing examined
the functions and requirements of
the entire MC02 architecture,
including response cell s,
communi cations networks, C4 1
Figure 13: Raptor 4002 passed its 300th flight-hour mark, the system s, and initiati ves. The
fi rst F-22 to do so at the Air Force's Flight Test Center, overarching concept was to operate
recently. VVhile this Raptor is real, the F-22's in MC02 were all the federation from distributed sites
simulated Blue Force assets as the exercise portion of th e with additi onal models and C2
experiment featured forces from FY 2007.
system s to estab li sh "near-exercise"

conditions, to evaluate the infrastructure's ability to support MC02 and to validate control
procedures. As in Spiral I, the test started with data review and technical integration to ensure
week-two functional objectives could be supported .
The second week of Spiral 2 focu sed on tactical and operational vignettes after any
remaining Spiral I functional tests were completed. The vignettes focused on expected MC02
activiti es and, when time and resources pennitted, incorporated known rul es and redesigns.
Spi ral 2 required extensive interaction with C4 1 systems and an assessment of the data fl ows
4
through those system s. Completed tests included any remaining M&S C 1 interface testing and
functional testing in air, land, sea, logistics, and intelli gence. After functional testing, the focus
shifted to thread testing and larger scenari os, reflecting expected MC02 activities. As in the
previous test, load tests were conducted which were less concerned with operational or tactical
accuracy, but with stressing the systems above expected exercise loads.
As in Spirals 0 and I, the results of the testing helped USJFCOM to identify and
categorize non-existent or inadequate system functionalities. Additionally, thi s test allowed
[ECG and Service personnel to test th eir operational and technical control and coll ection
procedures.
Specific objectives for Spiral 2 included:
Establish Federation
Veri fy database
4
Verify C 11inks and e-mail procedures
Verify cell workstati on/layout requirements
4
Verify model message output typesJfonnats for C 1 feeds
Verify BOA procedures (manual/automatic)
Verify Control procedures
Thread Test Intel sensors/coll ectors data fl ow
Validate attrition/usage rates
Validate scenario events li st
Load testing
4
Verify simulation data flow to C 1 system s
Test ATO procedures
4
Test XC 1
Verify communi cations connectivity
4
Verify C 1 connectivity
In stall/test Spiral event control communications (i .e. , VTC, chat room s, web page, shutdown,
STU) (admini strati ve)
Verify readiness to support Service Spiral objectives
Verify weather/night time capabilities
4
Verify hybrid geography representations in C 1 system s
oetennine Rules and Workarounds (Simulation, C4 1, XC 4 1, Initi atives)
Test change over from Federation to AJCOM based experiment dri ver

Test severability of non-essential system s (Degradation Plan)

Li ve-Sim procedures (TBD)
Key participants included Service representati ves and technical support personnel ,
simulation owners and techni cal controll ers, network analysts, database builders, JECG working
4
group personnel , USJFCOM and Service C 1 operators, Service remote site model operators,
USJFCOM OPFOR and supporting Service model operators, USJFCOM intelligence integrators,
USJFCOM logistics integrators, and data coll ectors/analysts.
The database to support thi s test was ready on March 14, 2002 at the following levels:
terrain 100 percent; Blue order of battle 100 percent; Red order of battle 100 percent, and targets
100 percent.
Spiral 3 (May 20 - June 14,2002)

Spiral 3 featured the complete execution architecture. Test setup occurred May 20-24,
2002, foll owed by data review, technical integration, and functionality testing May 27 - June 7,
2002 with end-to-end test and support training, running from June 10-14, 2002.
Spiral 3 tested and validated the entire simulation architecture, including alternate
4
respon se cells, communication nodes, headquarters, and C 1 system s. The overarching objective
was to operate the federation from di stributed sites with all known simul ation and C4 ) system s
full y engaged. Spiral 3 was to replicate the actual exercise load in term s of data, operational
requirements, and network s, while test activities essentially mirrored Spiral 2.
Specifi c objectives for Spiral 3 included:
Establi sh Federation
Validate database
4
Validate C 1links and e-mai l procedures
4
Verify critical C ) interfaces and output di splays
Validate cell workstationl1ayout requirements
4
Validate model message output types/formats for C ) feeds
Validate BDA procedures (manual /automati c)
Validate ETC procedures
Refine simulati on rules and workarounds
Verify attriti on/usage rates
Validate scenario event li st
Load testing
Verify simulation data flow to avai labl e C4 } system s
Test ATO procedures (administrative)
Verify functional interfaces between model s (air, land, sea, log, intel)
Verify intel reporting procedures and report content
4
Test XC } (technical)
Verify communications connectivity
4
Verify C } connectivity
38 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI ,y

Verify intelli gence collection matrix/results

Deconfliction ofl ive and simul ation feeds
Response cell training
Verify supportability of and readiness to support Service Spiral objectives
4
Verify hybrid geography representation s in C ) system s
4 4
Determine Rules and Workarounds (Simulation, C 1, XC 1, Initiatives)
Test change over from Federation to AJCOM based experiment dri ver
Test severability of non-essential system s (Degradation Plan)
Li ve-Sim procedures
Participants and processes were the same as those in Spiral 2 with more robust manning
to replicate the exercise load.
End-to-End Test
The end-to-end test validated the "as built" architecture with the system in the final
experiment configuration. The objective was to operate the federation from di stributed sites with
all known simul ation and C4 ) system s online to replicate the exercise load in terms of data and
operational requirements. Emphasis was on simulati on to C4 ) interfaces and messages. Time was
allocated during thi s period to support final training requirements.
Specific objectives of the end-to-end test included:
4
Verify simulation data flow to avai labl e C 1 system s
Test ATO procedures
Perform network performance monitoring (technical)
Load test entire event architecture
Li ve-Sim procedures testing
Test Activities
To varying degrees, all fi ve tests (Spiral s 0-3 and the End-to-End Test) incorporated the
areas described below and the appropriate test concepts. If remote sites were manned and
communi cations were availab le, the lines and equipment that supported them were tested .
Specific test acti vities are described in the followin g paragraph s.
Federation Infrastructure Testing

Comparable to Joint Training Center techni cal testing, federation infrastructure testing
examined the functionaJ interfaces of the federation and provided suffi cient data to determine the
technical , functi onal , and operational ability of the federation to support the experiment' s training
objectives. The federation technical , functional and operational testing executed during thi s phase
estab li shed a functional baseline and verified that the federation model s demon strated suffi cient
interoperability to support MC02.
FOR OFFICIAl liSE ONLY 39

Data Review Testing

Data review and techni cal integrati on testing were conducted at the start of each Spiral
event to ensure the data and techni cal interfaces were operating properl y to support fun cti onal
and operati onal testing. Data reviews included simul ati on database evaluati on, enumerati ons
checks, terrain and targeting database assessments, and verifi cati on of forces and locati ons.
Database testing validated current databases against requirements and the current model version,
and, where appli cabl e, verifi ed correcti ons to previously reported defici encies. Using the
database li st provided by the database manager (DBM), the fun cti onal test cell leads and site
hosts verifi ed the current database. The troubl e report (TR) form was used to report database
di screpancies.
Techni cal Integrati on Testing

Technical integrati on testing foll owed federati on infrastructure testing and ensured that
the federati on was operating suffi cientl y well to meet event-testing obj ecti ves. Techni cal
integrati on testing included techni cal control procedures, network testing, and initi al COP
testing.
Functi onal and Operati onal Testing

The fun cti onal and operati onal testing perform ed during the MC02 test program validated
specific databases, current model versions, and operati ons unique to MC02 obj ecti ves.
Operati onal acti viti es were tested based on their criti cali ty to the executi on of MC02. Each
indi vidual test specifi ed a task, conditi ons of concern , data to be gathered, and a test format.
Fun cti onal model managers developed those tasks based on knowledge of model fun cti onality
and event requirem ents. A MSEL scrub was conducted concurrently with indi vidual functi onal
tests so that any redesign work could be retested.
Ex perim ent Control

Experim ent control was concerned with the procedures and means that the JECG used to
control the j oint experiment. From thi s testing, control procedures were developed, refin ed, and
tested to prepare for j oint experiment executi on.
Data Collecti on and Analysis

Data coll ecti on and analysis testing dealt with the procedures and means by whi ch data
was coll ected and analyzed during the ex perim ent. From thi s testing, the coll ecti on management
plan was devel oped, tested, and refin ed to prepare fo r j oint ex perim ent executi on.
Scenari o and MSEL

Scenari o and MSEL testing determined whi ch events the simul ati ons could adequately
repli cate. Functi onal test cell leads ex tracted items from the MSEL that related to their respecti ve
fun cti onal area and performed the associated tasks. Redesign work was tested for those events
that could not be repli cated sati sfactoril y in the simul ati ons.
Load Test
To develop the load test parameters, the prim ary factors influencing the load were
identifi ed for each simul ati on. The maximum value of each factor, as constrained by the
database, was used to defin e a target load conditi on. Thi s approach created an entirely artifi cial
40 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI ,Y

target load condition, producing a federation state under which each simulati on was
simultaneousl y in a condition of maximum load within the constraints of the event database. The
artificial condition placed a computational burden on the infrastructure softwa re that exceeded
the anticipated load ofMC02 and therefore, could support the federati on in the actual event, even
during peak periods.
M&S and C4 11nterface Testing

4
In most in stances, C 1 and peripheral equipment installati on was staggered requiring that
additional C4 1 interfaces be tested and data throughput verified throughout the MC02 preparation
period. If avail able, critical C4 1 interfaces were tested during all Spiral events to identify
problems earl y in the process. Selected C4 ) interfaces were tested and data throughput was
verified primaril y during Spirals 2, Spiral 3, as well as the end-to-end test. The latter full y
4
examined the connectivity and readiness of the C 1 system s parti cipating in MC02. Connectivity
testing involved testing the communications networks for the M&S and C 4 1 architecture and
included remote sites. The MC02 architectu re included operational C4 ) system s, authentic
intelli gence system s, and related simulation feeds that provided the operational headquarters with
a reali stic view of the battlefield.
Trouble Reporting
The test manager (TM) coll ected and tracked trouble reports (TR) for each test phase.
Data was coll ected via the trouble report form and any di screpancy or deviation in the execution
of the test was noted . Model and/or database discrepancies found were di scussed at a dail y "hot
wash up" and TRs were generated as necessary . Discrepancies not directly related to the
executi on of a docum ented task were reported to the test manager, who cataloged and prioriti zed
them with input provided by the Service and functional area representati ves. The test director
then approved or re-prioritized the TRs and directed action. Priorities were assigned using M[L-
STD-498 as shown in Table 3. The TM held the dail y hotwash via VTC during Spiral 2 and
Spiral 3 and the end-to-end test. The site or assistant site managers represented the remote sites.
Test Execution
A test readiness review was conducted 7-10 days prior to the start of each test to review
the progress of test preparations and to make adj ustments as necessary. Each test started with a
kickoff meeting the morning of the first day to get participants oriented to the test schedule and
objectives, and to identify issues. At the conclusion of each test day, a hotwash was conducted to
review accomplishments and to coordinate each functional area's plan for the next day.
Federation technical control, simulati on technical control suites, and network/system s
personnel were located at Tech Control where TRs were received and maintained. Database
personnel maintained a trouble report log, while Tech Control personnel maintained a separate
Tech Control Daily Log.
At the conclusion of each Spiral event, JFCOM publi shed a test report, summari zing
major accomplishments, issues, deci sions, and milestones as well as a plan of action that
addressed test issues and items not tested.
Test Plan Development

The test plan for each of the Spiral events foll owed a standardi zed format, depicted
below. Where particular tests cut across functional or organizational areas, the designated

responsible indi vi dual or organization coordinated and integrated efforts and req ui rements before
submitting the test pl an .
Test Plan Input

4
A specific test step governed any test of the simulation s and C 1 system . The test step
described the task, the conditi ons under which that task was to be performed, and the standards
for test success. Tabl e 4 provides a sample land functional task.
Table 3: Potential Problems

Priority Applies if the problem could:
1 (a) Prevent the accomplishment of an operational or mission essential capability.
(b) Jeopardize safety, security, or other requirement designated "critical."
2 (a) Adversely affect the accomplishment of an operational or mission essential capability
and no work around solution was known.
(b) Adversely affect technica l, cost, or schedule risks to the project or to life cycle support
of the system, and no wo rk around exists.
3 (a) Adversely affect the accomplishment of an operational or mission essential capability
but a work around solution was known.
(b) Adversely affect technical, cost, or schedule risks to the project or to life cycle support
of the system, but a work around solution was known.
4 (a) Result in user/operator inconvenience or annoyance but does not affect a required
operational or mission essential capability.
(b) Result in inconvenience or annoyance for development or support personnel but does
not prevent the accomplishment of those responsibilities.
5 Any other effect.
4
C 1 System Testing
4 4
For C ) system testing, which often invol ved multipl e simulation s and C 1 system s in a
single task , testers needed to consider an accompanying test descripti on , as well as avail able
diagrams in order to provide the necessary information and understanding of the rel evance of the
task and how it supported th e exercise.
Table 4: Sample Land Functional Task
Task Test Purpose/Steps (Conditions) Test Verification Results/Remarks

(Standards) (Optional)
Event a. Execute indirect fire missions in MTWS Verify that different type
10 aga inst brigade-sized ground units. Use ground units suffer
Conduct HE, DPICM, and CPHD (PGM) munitions realistic attrition and
indirect for these missions. damage reports are
fire generated. Check spot
missions reports for damage and
verify supply levels are
decremented in the
attacked units.
Table 5 contain s sample descriptions. These are examples only and do not reflect the
actual MC02 architecture.

u.s. Joint Forces Command Millennium Challenge 2002: Experiment Report
Air Warfare Simulation (AWSIM) to Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) ADSl Simulation
Data Flow Test (Red, White, and Blue Fixed-Wing and Rotary-Wing Air)
OPFOR, neutral , and Blue USAF, USA, and SOF fixed-wing and USAF rotary-wing
aircraft tracks were created in the AWSlM. and passed via the Aggregate Level Simulation
Protocol (ALSP) to the Joint Operations Information Simulation (JOISLM). JOlS[M converted
all simulation air tracks into a Tactical Di gital Interface Link-J (TADIL-J) message format and
T a ble 5 S
am ietas kmQS
TASK # REQUIREMENT SYSTEM PROCEDURE RESULTS
D1.3.1 .1 Provide A WSIM- AWSIM Send AWSIM red,
generated air tracks RTI white, and Blue air RED FW_ _
in TADIL-J format to JOISIM tracks via RTI to WHITE
the JWFC ADS I. This JWFCADSI JOISIM. JOISIM FW
includes all AWSIM converts data to TADIL- USAF FW
generated fixed-w ing J message format. USAFW
aircraft and Blue Verify the correct SOFFW
helicopters. receipt and parsing of USAF RW
each different track
type by comparing
model ground truth on
the MAUl workstation
with JVVFC ADSI
displayed track data.
D1.3.1.2 Provide RESA- RESA Send RESA red and
generated Blue RTI Blue maritime air tracks USNFW
maritime air tracks in JOISIM via RTI and JOISIM to USMC FW_ _
TADIL-J format to JWFCADSI the JWFC ADSI. USNRW
the JWFC ADS I. This JOISIM converts data
includes embarked to TADIL-J message
Marine and Allied formal. Verify the
Forces helicopters. correct receipt and
parsing of each
different track type by
comparing model
ground truth on the
MAU l workstation w ith
JVVFC ADSI displayed
track data.
D1.3.1.3 Provide MTWS- MTWS Send red and Blue
generated Blue and RTI helicopter tracks from REDRW
red helicopter tracks JOISIM MTWS via RTI and USMC
in TADIL-J format to JWFCADSI JOISIM to the JWFC RW
the JWFC ADS I. ADS I. JOISIM converts USARW
data to TADIL-J SOFRW
message formal. Verify
the correct receipt and
parsing of each
different track type by
comparing model
ground truth on the
MAUl workstation w ith
JVVFC ADSI displayed
track data.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLy' 43

forwarded them via serial interface to the JWFC Air Defense Systems lntegrator (AD SI) at the
JTASC in Suffolk, VA. The AD S) correlated the incoming track informati on with existing
database informati on and updated track status for local di splay. Testing verifi ed the correct
receipt and parsing of each different track type by comparing model ground truth on the MAGTF
Tacti cal Warfare Simulati on Advanced User Interface (MAUl) workstati on with JWFC AD Sl
di splayed track data.
RESA to JWFC ADSl Simul ati on Data Fl ow Test (Blue Fi xed-Win g! Rotary-Wing Air)
Blue USN and USMC fi xed-wing and USN rotary-wing aircraft tracks were created in
the Navy Research, Evaluati on and Systems Analysis (RESA) model, passed via the ALSP to
JOI SIM , converted to TADIL-J format, and forwarded to the JWFC AD SI. Testing verifi ed the
correct receipt and parsing of each different track type by comparing model ground truth on the
MAUl work stati on with JWFC AD Sl di splayed track data .
MTWS to JWFC ADS) Simul ati on Data Fl ow Test (Red and Blue Air)
OPFOR rotary-wing and USMC, USA, and SOF rotary-wing aircraft tracks were created
in th e MTWS model, passed via the AL SP to JOl SIM , converted to TADIL-J format, and
forwa rded to the JWFC AD SI. Testing verifi ed the correct receipt and parsing of each different
track type by comparing model ground truth on the MAUl workstati on with JWFC ADS)
di splayed track data.
JWFC ADSI to JFACC ADSI Simulati on Data Fl ow Test (All Air)

Simul ati on TADIL-J air tracks from th e JWFC ADSI were forwarded to the JFACC
AD Sl fo r correlati on via di al-up STU-III (model 19 10) modem. The tracks were then forwa rded
to the AF FOR Theater Battle Management Core System (TBM CS) Situati on Awareness and
Assessment (SAA) modul e. From there, they were forwarded via Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNET) to the GCCS tacti cal database master server, on whi ch the COP resided.
Thi s server was referred to as th e TOP COP. Air tracks were th en di stributed from the TOP COP
to the component's tacti cal di splay system s. Testing verifi ed the correct receipt of each different
ty pe of track by comparing model ground truth on the MAUl workstati on with TOP COP
di spl ayed track data. The TOP COP was located at JWFC for thi s test.
Experiment Execution - Simulation Federation

The MC02 M&S federation was the largest, most compl ex Hi gh Level Architecture
(liLA) federati on ever attempted. Nineteen core, 24 Service, and 16 stand-al one models or
simulati ons made up the Joint Ex perim ental Federati on (JEF). Core simul ati ons compri sed the
minimum essenti al set of simul ati ons required to support the USJFCOM experimental obj ecti ves.
Service simul ati ons consisted of the tacti cal and operati onal simul ati ons necessary for the
Services to sati sfy their unique ex perim ental requirements whil e still parti cipating in the MC02
overall M&S architecture. Stand-alone simul ati ons, simulators, tools, and models fulfill ed a
vari ety of supporting roles, for both joint and Service experimentati on. Thi s virtual environment
supported over 30,000 battl espace entiti es set up across eight operating locati ons spanning the
United States. The fed erati on provided excell ent battl espace fun cti onality based upon predi cted
2007 joint and Service capabiliti es with similarly enh anced supporting environments for terrain,
n SR, communi cati ons and j amming, logisti cs, TBM and infrastructure.
44 FORO ONLY
Created in April 2001 , this joint federation was operated in cl ose coordi nati on with th e
Services, and was tied to a requirements development and testing process. The resulting
federation used Service-nominated simulati ons to represent Service-unique capabiliti es, with
USJFCOM provided funding for improvements and integration necessary to form the HLA
federation . The Johns Hopki ns University Applied Physics Laboratory conducted all validation
and verifi cation (V&V) testing on the JEF in accordance with 0 00 Instructi on 5000.6 1 (draft);
the V&V report was compl eted Jul y 19, 2002. The USJFCOM accredited the JEF for use in
Me02 on Jul y 24, 2002.
Experiment Execution - Hybrid Terrain

Scenario driven, exercise requirements dictated a combinati on of simulati on activities
that follow th e constructive/virtual/li ve approach to accomplish th e experiment goals. A series of
modifications were made to the set of available Southwest United States data maps to all ow li ve
force exercise events occurring on western U.S. training ranges to appear in the correct locations
(scenario-wise) on the virtual warfare maps displaying a make-beli eve world .
While certain components of the JFCOM modifi ed terrain database effort were
conventi onal , the database tail ori ng and oth er speci fi c requirements in creased its complex ity. In
particular, M&S tools required a correlated "play-box, " whi ch became known as the "hybrid
terrain, " that all owed for a
shared common view of the
, Mentors
SME' s
constructi ve battlespace.
, For consistency with
it the experiment/exercise
scenario, the hybrid terrain
was required to exhibit the
following characteri sti cs:
present the scenari o on one
L.... e S!mu!" ted
V'/ 3I""1! ght geography to ensure one
CO P, create an environment
that supports both li ve and
, "W.:;;:;r,;;;'.r~
virtual action, create a
Join;
world that is NATO
releasable, use data from
real-world
databases/sources.
Figure 14: MC02 Assessment Methodology Several special
MC02 products including
several types of terrain, elevation, bathymetric and map data suppl emented the real-world map
and terrain products, were developed to support use of the hybrid terrain .
Experiment Execution - Data Collection and Assessment

The data coll ection and assessment plan for MC02 was developed to support the concepts
and objectives investigated in MC02. The comprehensive JFCOM Experim ent Analysis Pl an
(lEAP) docum ents the plan for assessing MC02 and provides an overview of the intent, scope,
concept, and methodology for that assessment.

A key element of the plan was the breadth and depth of the avai lable data sources. A
significant amount of quantitati ve data was coll ected from the experim ental C4 1 system s, the
modeling and simul ation federation , and the CrE. Thi s data has provided a basis for the in-depth
analysis presented in Chapter 7. Thi s analysis is further supported by robust qualitati ve data from
senior mentors, trained subj ect matter experts, and warfi ghters (See Fi gure 14).
Senior mentor 's provided input at dail y, warfighting challenge-focused seminars, through
direct participation in three facilitated after-action reviews during the experim ent, and by
submi ssion of a comprehensive, consolidated report at the end of the experiment. SrvtEs,
embedded in each headquarters, provided structured observations and responded to analyst-
developed surveys. Military participants responded to targeted surveys and submitted un solicited
comments and observations that allowed them to di scuss experiment concepts and objectives
from the perspecti ve of their position and experience.
46 FO USE ONLY
Chapter 6 - Assumptions and Limitations
MC02 was an extraordinary event, unlike any previou sly undertaken at JFCOM. It
combined real world and simulated forces and it combined training and experimentation
requirements. Beyond thi s, MC02 included both technological and intellectual chall enges, which
required leading edge soluti ons. Above all el se, the MC02 experim ent sought to replicate
warfare-a daunting task.
Two key documents establi shed the basi s for the conduct of MC02.
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for FY2001 (public Law 106-398):
" The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a joint field experiment in fi sca l yea r 2002. The
Secretary shall ensure that the planning for the joint field experiment is carried out in fiscal year
200 I. The purpose of the j oint field experiment is to ex plore critical warfighting challenges at th e
operational level of war that wi ll confront United States joint military forces after 20 I O. The joint
field experiment shall involve elements of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, and
shall include special operations force s. The forces designated to participate in the joint field
experim ent shall exemplify the concepts for organization, equipment, and doctrine that are
conceived for the forces after 2010 under Joint Vision 20 10 and Joint Vision 2020 (i ssued by the
Joint Chiefs of Staft) and the current vision statements of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the
Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force, including the foll owing concepts: (A) Army - " Medium Weight Brigades, " (B) Navy
- " Forward-From-The-Sea, " (C) Air Force - " Expeditionary Aerospace Forces. "
Report from the Secretary of Defense to Congress pursuant to Floyd D. Spence National Defen se
Authori zation Act of FY200 I :
" MC02 is designed to examine some key operational capabi liti es of the future forces of
the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
within ajoint warfighting context against an adaptive, competent adversary set in the year 2007.
The experiment will yield doctrinal , organizational, and technological in sights for potential
changes to future concepts and capabi liti es that will ensure our qualitati ve advantages over
potential regional adversaries in 20 I 0 and beyond.
" The overall objective of thi s joint experim ent is to examine the extent to which the joint
force will be able to impl ement the primary concepts of JV 2020 (dominant maneuver, precision
engagement, full dimen sional protection, and focused logistics) by conducting Rapid Deci sive
Operations (ROO) within thi s decade. MC02 also serves as the primary venue to examine two
additional consideration s. The first is to provide the Services and USSOCOM ajoint operational-
level context in which they can develop future core competencies and secondl y to determine how
well the future joint force ca n actually work together. lmproving the operational-l evel
interoperability of future joint forces is a critical objective of our overall j oint experimentation
campaign and MC02 specificall y.
" The central warfighting problem that MC02 will address is to determine how our joint
forces of2007 can conduct ROO in a matter of days and weeks rather than month s against an
adaptive, advanced adversary who possesses the ca pability and will to defeat U.S. Joint Forces.

The context for the scenari o is at the high-end level of a small-scal e contingency where tensions
teeter on the verge of escalating into a maj or theater war if the adversary is not defeated."
MC02 Assumptions
During the planning and executi on ofM C02, assumpti ons were made that could have an
impact on the conduct of the experiment and resulting analyses.
General Assumpti ons -
Personnel assigned to the OPFOR, JTF and fun cti onal component commands would have the
requi site educati on, training and experi ence necessary to perform their duti es
Warfi ghters understand knowledge management to include business rul es, what knowledge
should be managed and how to use management tools
Suffi cient training would be avail abl e to assigned personnel to all ow them to become
famili ar with the concepts and tools to be used during the experim ent
Scenari o Assumpti ons -

D-I-E efforts during pre-hostiliti es phases would not prevent cri sis escalati on to a state of war
Neith er JTF, nor OPFOR would be all owed to empl oy WMD during conduct of th e
experiment
Scenari o would not all ow escalati on to a maj or theater war
JTF and OPFOR equipm ent and forces would represent the technology and capabilities
expected to be avail abl e to them in 2007
An adapti ve adversary would provide the JTF with a determined 2007 enemy
JTF Assumpti ons-

All operati ons would be unimpeded by real-world meteorological events
JR SOI would be compl eted within 48 hours after arri val
Real-world constraints were not experi enced or imposed on JRSOI
JTF would have unhindered access to local and nati onall SR assets
JTF would have unimpeded access to the JOA
OPFOR Assumpti ons -

OPFOR would be all owed to operate freely within the constraints of th e scenari o, the
appropriate tacti cs, given the situati on, its goal s and the persona written for the OPFOR
pl ayers
OPFOR would be abl e to maintain communi cati ons with hi s forces and alli es throughout the
ex periment using non-standard, non-electroni c methods such as: couri ers, smoke, fl ags and
religious serm ons
OPFOR would have the capability and resources avail abl e to ascertain JTF satellite
operating/coverage windows
OPFOR would be all owed to covertly mine the shipping lanes pri or to MC02 executi on
OPFOR attacks on commercial shipping as well as civili an populations in neighboring states
would escalate throughout the scenari o
Technologica l (M odel s and Simul ati ons) Assumpti ons -
48 - FOR OFFICIAL l iSE ONLY

A virtual landm ass in Californi a and Nevada linked to a geo-politi cal database, to emul ate
real-world reach-back capabiliti es, could be created (Hybrid Terrain Model) to establish real-
world, anti-access conditi ons against a capabl e adversary
Li ve and simulated fo rces can be translated and integrated into a common operati onal level,
virtuall y repli cated, real-world battl espace
Federati on of models and simul ati ons could provide the requi site fid elity fo r the conduct of
the ex periment
MC02 Limitations
During the pl anning, executi on, and analysis phases of the ex perim ent, all of the qualiti es
and requirements of MC02 needed to be united to meet the experim ent obj ecti ves. The result was
the existence of a recogni zed set of limitati ons that could influence the conduct of the experim ent
and the validity of the results. Some limitati ons were the result of existing techni cal shortfall s.
Others, sometimes referred to as delimiters, were intenti onally set to produce specifi c
opportuniti es to expl ore th e concepts and meet th e ex periment obj ecti ves. Still other limitati ons
were used to balance and pri oriti ze di verse requirem ents. Consequentl y, limitati ons themselves
did not always indi cate a negati ve impact on the validity of the experimental findings.
These comprehensive limitati ons area focal point of thi s report :
MC02 was a single, one-time experiment without multipl e tri als
MC02 pl aced a high reli ance on the outcome of adjudi cati on, parti cul arl y fo r soft effects
" Actors, " albeit knowledgeabl e actors, role-pl ayed opposing forces
Differences ex isted between th e actual concepts and the way th ey were operati onali zed in the
ex periment
The first three of these limitati ons exemplify the diffi cul ty of repli cating warfare in an
ex perim entati on environment . The fourth one is unique and is incl uded for its hi gh relevance in
assessing th e value of the concepts. Ideally, the concepts would have been appli ed within th e
ex perim ent exactl y as the concept developers envisioned them . However, since these futuri sti c
concepts often are ahead of avail abl e technology, surrogate systems were used to repli cate
required concept capabiliti es, even though such systems may depart from the exact intent of the
concepts.
Other simil ar departures are the result of varying degrees of maturi ty for each of the
concepts. For the less-developed concepts, MC02 represented a unique and valuabl e learning
opportunity that knowingly would affect their subsequent assessment . Thus, the assessment of
the indi vidual concepts is relati ve to the degree to whi ch they were accurately appli ed in the
experim ent.
Parti cipants, analysts, and experiment controll ers worked within these specifi c imitati ons:
Scenari o Limitati ons -

The MC02 scenari o was built deliberately to represent a future wa rfighting scenari o,
including time frame, threat, and corresponding geographi c area. To that end , these scenari o
limitati ons were applied during the experiment to meet ex perim ent objecti ves:
Multi-nati onal coaliti on military forces were not included
Escalation to use of weapons of mass destructi on was not all owed
The use of a year 2007 scenari o prevented the use of a " true" baseline

Weather was not permitted to disrupt operations

A hyb rid, mi xing of geographi cal regions, terrain was used
Manually generated key events extracted from the master events scenari o li st were used to
stimul ate force acti ons
Experim ent Design Limitations -

Simul ations were used to replicate force movements, systems, and engagements
Indi vidual simul ations had varyi ng degrees of functionality and their output had varyi ng
degrees of fidelity
Surrogate systems were used to repli cate required concept system capabiliti es
The JTF ' s experi mental comm and and control network was a self contained and isolated
network
The OPFOR command headquarters staff was not robustly staffed
The OPFOR command and control network was not completely repli cated
Combatant commander, other agency and reach back organi zations were minim all y staffed
Timelines associated with the empl oy ment ofreal worl d forces had to be adhered to
Assessors used some intrusive means to coll ect data
Human adj udi cation of simulation results was required
Parti cipant training and knowledge of the concepts was less than could be expected upon
fielding of the concepts
JECG exercised selecti ve control over opposition force acti viti es
Concept Limitati ons -

For the duration ofMC02, the concepts were employed at varyi ng degrees of
development. In additi on, certain concepts required the use of specifi c, yet-to-be-developed
tools. Thu s, resulting concept limitati ons included:
A Joi nt Task Force and specifi cally a JTF headquarters perspective dominated the assessment
of the concepts
The CrE did not include decision support tools to the degree the concept envisions, open
source information was not readily availabl e and reach-back to centers of excell ence and
knowledge sources was limited
The ONA tool was marginall y populated with informati on at the beginning of the experiment
Effects generated as part of JTF ' s Effects-Based Operations mi ght not be recognizable within
the time frame of the experiment
50 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONbY

Chapter 7 - The Findings
Figure 15: The Army's newest fighting vehicle, The STRYKER got a workout during Me 02

Assessment Area 1 - Establish and Maintain Information

Superiority (IS)
Overall Assessment Results
;'Know your enemy and know yourselfand you can jighl a hundred balltes wilho",
disasler. " Sun Tzu
Establi shing and maintaining Informati on Superi ori ty was one of the fi ve MC02
objectives. Achievement of thi s objective was identifi ed as being necessary for the JTF to
conduct Rapid Deci sive Operation s.
Experim ent results indi cate that the JTF estab li shed and maintai ned lnformati on
Superiority in the form of superior informati on reach and ri chness. Thi s superiority was
establi shed and maintained over the OPFOR except during the period of an adversary surpri se
attack and during an amphibi ous landing. Thi s finding, while in part subjective, can be
substantially validated . Thi s conclusion is further supported by the JTF ' s demon strated ability to
conduct continuous operati ons. Achi evement of thi s objective is viewed as a requirement for
RDO.
To be effective, military commanders must be ab le to
Overall Assessment
understand, decide, and act. The ability to di sseminate timel y
Results
and accurate inform ation, such as the Commander' s Intent,
j- JTF established
through a coll aborati ve informati on environment sig nifi cantl y
and maintained IS ...
enhanced these acti ons. Thi s was a primary facto r in
." RDO information
adva ntageously positi oning the JTF with respect to informati on.
requirements met ...
Figure 16 illu strates the perceived relative informational
j, CIE primary factor
positi ons of the JTF and opposing force s, JTF-South. Thi s
in successful info
advantageous position supported the executi on of ROO.
dissemination ...
Rapidi ty of operations was deri ved from the ability to execute
j- Collaborative
rapid pl anning in response to a changing operational
sessions produced
environment. Decisiveness was foste red using shared awareness
shared awareness ...
and shared understanding to the degree that sy nchronizati on of
j- Provided the CJTF
forces could occur. These capabiliti es were most visibl e during
with appropriate
the JTF ' s island operations. In that in stance, the pl anning
information at a very
process was initi ated when the CJTF di sseminated hi s intent to
high confidence
the JTF staff and components during a coll aborative session.
level...
Thi s session, whi ch was supported by the coll aborati ve tool,
j- CIE contributed the
produced shared awa reness and understanding with respect to
most to achieving and
CJTF intent. Thi s session fo rm ed the foundation fo r the
maintaining IS ...
subsequent rapid planning. Thi s foundation consisted primarily
of accurate and di spersed inform ation. Leveraging the same
collaboration tool, the JTF and component pl anners were able
to execute a planning process for a relati vely compl ex j oint operation in 24 hours. The plan ,
consisting of synchroni zed use of force, was successfully executed in the simul ated environm ent.
Of specifi c and special value was the abili ty of the JTF staff to provide the CJTF with
appropri ate informati on and a very hi gh confidence level that he understood " the situation." A
hi gh level of confidence is a prerequi site fo r rapid, timely, and sound deci sion-making.
Across the participants, subj ect matter experts, and senior concept developers (SCDs),
there was consensus th at, of the experimental concepts, the CrE contributed the most to
52 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONIS

u.s. Joint Forces Command Mill ennium Chall enge 2002: Ex peri ment Report
achieving and maintaining IS. Figure 17 depicts the JTF perspecti ve on the contribution of the
CrE to achi eving IS. Additi onal supporting evidence is contained within th e findings.
Both warfighting challenges associated with the Info rmati on Superi ority obj ecti ve were
suffi cientl y addressed and achieved. Of note, the ability to provide a high level of situational
awa reness with respect to own force intent in a changing operational environm ent was
demonstrated.
Meth odology
No specifi c conceptual process was intended to be a panacea for the achievement of
Informati on Superi ority. Instead, the concepts in total, their supporting surrogate systems, and a
set of standard processes woul d contribute sy nergisti cally to th e result . The Coll aborati ve
Information Environment, Operational Net Assessment, Standing Joint Force Headquarters, Joint
Interagency Coordination Group, and
Joint Intelligence Surveill ance and Relati ve Info rm ati o n Positio ns
,
,
Reconnai ssance concepts were Hi gh

,
,
,
recogni zed as probabl e contri butors to ,
,
,
, JTF
achieving Infonn ati on Superi ority. c ,
,
. ,
To assess the achi evem ent of ~ ,
0 ,
0 ,

0 ,
Informati on Superi ority, analysts E 0 ,
,
- '"
,2 ,
working with concept developers ,
c JTF- S ,
,
,
identifi ed two Warfighting Chall enges. ,
,
,
,
Each addressed basic fun cti onaliti es Lo w ,
that were relevant to the concepts and Low Info nnati on Richness lIigh
surrogate tools. These fun cti onali ties
were developed from the USJFCOM Figure 16: Relative mformatlon posItion
concepts ofCrE; Joint Interacti ve
Pl anning (HP); and C ROP ; existing Infonn ati on Superiori ty defin iti ons; and, later from 0 00
Command and Control Research Program (CC RP) publicati on, Underslalldillg Information Age
Wwfare, published in Septemb er, 200 1. A central theme in the assessment of thi s obj ecti ve
became the paradig m that shared
Partk:ipant View on lIIJhich Concept Contributed the Most to
infonn ati on leads to shared awareness, Achieving and Maintaining Informa tion Superiority
which contributes to coll aborati on "Xl%
leading to synchroni zati on of forces on
the battl efield . Thi s th eme would be
used to mitigate probl ems associated
~
'"
a
50%
with evaluating th e quali ty of JTF-S
inform ati on and retain a di sciplined
~
~ 25%
assessment process. ~
Analysts, working with the 0% = D D

ONA ,eo 0' JIACG JTLS ""R
D
concept developers, then separated the N:31 '"''''
warfig hting chall enges into supporting
Concept
tasks and subtasks. At the task and
subtask levels, appropri ate data Figure 17: Participant View on Concept Contribution
requirements were developed against
whi ch experimental data coul d be coll ected. Thi s effort was fina lized in the fonn of a data
coll ecti on matri x that contained all the necessary inform ati on to support the data coll ecti on pl an.
FOR OFF ICIAL USE ON I Y 53

External
Organizations
Joint Exercise
Control Group
Organic
Joint Task
r--f Data Bases

Force
Modeling and Response

Simulation Cell Inorganic
Figure 18: Experimentation Information Flow into the Joint Task Force
.
Data Bases
Data was coll ected fro m fi ve primary sources: participant surveys, subj ect matter ex pert
surveys, seni or concept developer input, post-experiment interviews with participants, and
electroni c data ca ptured from rws logs, e-mai l logs, results fro m the di gital coll ection analysis
and review system (DCARS) and web trend results. Figure 18 depicts the fl ow of informati on
into the JTF during the ex periment. These fl ow paths were part of the experimental design. It
should be noted that the JECG was instrumental , and active, in determining the quantity and
quality of information reaching the ITF .
Equi valent informati on fl ow paths ex isted for the opposition forces, ITF-S. The JECG
was also active in restricting or directing participant actions as part of its control and
adjudication functi ons. Other assessment constraints included actual JECG and modeling and
si mulati on capabiliti es. These constraints caused peri odic artificialities in the quantity and
Assess Quality of Information

Assess utility of Assess ability to des siminate
(Richness and Reach)
Information Information -
--. Assess ability to dewlap

shared awareness
Assess ability to conduct
continuos operations
Figure 19: Information Superiority assessment process

- Assess the abilty to
sy nchronize operations
quali ty of information provided to the participants. A final constraint was JTF-S did not use real-
world system s for command and control. Thi s was monitored and compensated for by JECG.
Compensati on methods in cl uded built-in delays between receipt of orders and actual CJTF-S

force movements. It was within thi s context that the achievement of Information Superiority was
assessed.
Due to the above constraints, it was not feasible to assess the quality and attributes of
CJTF- S information. Consequently, a direct compari son of JTF information levels to CJTF-S
information levels or their respecti ve informational needs was not feasibl e. In place of thi s, a
focu s was placed on assessing JTF information and the JTF ' s abi lity to use information to
support operations. The resultant Information Superiority assessment process is shown in figure
19.
The final element of the assessment process was extracting data from the baseline, and
comparing it to the MC02 results. These extractions are representati ve of traditi onal JTF problem
areas relevant to the achievement of Information Superiority. The comparison identified ga ins
and losses in JTF capabilities. Theoreticall y, these gains and losses would be attributabl e to the
implementation of one or more of the concepts being assessed. However, the exact cause and
effect relation ships between concepts and changes in JTF capabi liti es or performance could not
be identified due to the large number of concepts being assessed and the complex relati onships
between them .
The Information Superiori ty objective was broken down into two warfighting challenges.
These were viewed as being relevant to demonstrating the potential impact of the experimental
concepts and their importance in achieving and maintaining Information Superiority.
Warrighting Challenge: Ability to provide situational awareness throughout the JTF

The first of two warfi ghting challenges, which is identified above, involved the
achievement of situational awareness, a product of information richness and reach . Thi s
chall enge' s two associated ta sks and corresponding findin gs are li sted below.
Task: Maintain and di stribute a timel y and accurate relevant integrated picture of JTF
units, locations, status, and actions
Task: Determine and di sseminate timel y and accurate information on relevant adversary's
operational capabi lities, location, courses of action , and intentions
Warrighting Challenge: Ability to use the CROP and collaboration to enhance JTF
operations
The second of two warfighting challenges, identifi ed above, involved enhancement of
JTF operations, an indirect product of collaboration and use of the CROP. This challenge' s
associated tasks and corresponding findings are li sted below.
Task: Use information to prevent surprises by the adversary

Task: Use shared awareness and collaboration to maintain operational tempo
Task: Use shared awareness and collaboration to facilitate sy nchroni zation of forces
Finding . .... As a result of operating in a CI E the CJTF was able to attain a high state of
situational awareness.
This findin g results directl y from specific CJTF comments describing his level of
situational awareness and corroborating evidence. The CJTF firmly stated that the CIE ensured
that hi s Commander's Intent " was di stributed to hi s forces." Feedback from the same system
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI .Y 55

provided the CJTF with assurance that hi s intent was understood, and that foll ow-up actions,
consistent with hi s intent, were occurring.
The result was that the CJTF, irrespective of any existing intelligence deficiencies or
unknowns, was extremely confident that he understood th e current state of hi s own forces and
the direction that they were
IWS Conference Room Utilization head ing. This knowledge provided
500 rlCommander's
Up:late I
Joint Coordination
Board
him with a high level of
confidence. The JTF ' s opini on was
deemed accurate and was full y
400
supported by the senior concept
"
~ <
~:;; 300 /\ 1\ developers and subject matter

~Q
E 0 200
, CI
/ \ /'- / \ experts.
thi s into
They further expanded
the realm of decision
"-/
/
"
z ~
100
Q JCB superiority. They concluded
e I I
..
> 0 / Working Group
7 B 9 10 11 121314151617 18 1920 21 2223

decision superiority is a function
of the commander' s confidence in
hi s staff and subordinate
Time of Day (Hour) commanders. The CIE estab li shed
the conditi ons to permit thi s. Not
to be lost in thi s is the importance
Figure 20: IWS Conference Room use described
of the contributi ons to awareness
made by th e COP, whi ch is residing in the CIE. This conditi on is specificall y addressed in
Assessment Area 9.
The two primary vehicl es for the accurate disseminati on of the JTF 's intent and guidance
were the dail y commander' s bri efing and the Joi nt Coordination Board. Each was a battle
scheduled event, attended JTF members in the virtual environment created
100% r---------------------------------\
D JTF Respon5e Iiiil Sr.E Re5pon5e ~_-.l
Information
75% +-------------------- categorized as
~ sufficient to
c
o maintain
~ 50% +-------------------~
~
~
o
~ 25% +-----------.-,-------\
O% +--'--"=="-r-"--
Stongl y Disagree Agree Strongly
N=121 (JlF) Disagree Agree
Response
N=42 (Sr.E)
Figure 21: The information available in th e CIE was sufficient to maintain a high level of awareness
regard ing both the friendly and enemy situations at all times.

IWS, the surrogate coll aborati on tool. JTF attendance for these events, shown in figure 20,
confirm ed the JTF's opinion that hi s word was getting out. In addition, the JTF's ab ility to
broadcast was mai ntained when he physicall y departed the headquarters using the Joint En-route
Mi ssion Pl anning Rehearsal System - Near Term (JEMPRS-NT).
The investment in man-days, as depicted by the graph in figure 20, was the source of
di scussion among seni or concept developers and parti cipants. Two concerns arose; people
needed time to think, and they needed time to work. Gi ven the priceless nature of JTF 's
situati onal awareness and und erstanding, thi s " cost" or one of simil ar magnitude is probabl y
warranted . The CJTF thought the value gain ed outweighed the cost of the man-hours incurred by
attending hi s coll aborative sessions.
A representative cost in achi evi ng the commander's hi gh state of situational awareness
can be calcul ated in th e form of JTF manhours expended in these bri efings. A conservati ve
appli cati on of the data, in whi ch SO percent of the users are non-JTF members, indi cates a
minimum of SO eight-hour man-
days per day, or based on a l 2-hour Headquarters Effectiveness Assessme nt Tool Resuhs
experim ent day, 33 man-days per LOO ,---_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
day invested in these meetings.
Thi s level of effort was spread
across the JTF HQ and component
command s. It should be recogni zed
that signifi cantl y more than just
achi evement of th e JTF 's
,,

;;; 0.50
situati onal awareness was ~
~
accompli shed during these events. .,
" 0.25
Finall y, further comm ents
on decision superiority are ii5
warranted. It became evident during
the experiment that decision 0.00
, , ,
superiority was a very important SUrveyf.kJmber
idea and that a process was needed
for the JTF to assess its abili ty to
make better, fa ster decisions as Figure 22: HQs effectiveness assessment tool results
compared to those of the adversary.
From thi s, the senior concept developers' noti on, there emerged a recogni zed need to first
address "knowl edge readiness" and how it contributes to the idea of overall " decision
superi ori ty."
Finding 2 .... While operating in a elE, the JTFHQ and component staffs were able to
attain a high state of accurate and timely situational awareness.
A criti cal piece of evidence that supports thi s finding is drawn from the previous finding.
That is, if the JTF has an accurate, com plete, and timely picture of the Commander's Intent, then
it has achi eved a signifi cant degree of situational awa reness. The evidence that thi s occurred is
included as part of the preceding fi nding.
Both the SMEs and the participants themselves support the finding. As shown in fi gure
2 1, both the JTF (64 percent) and the SMEs (8 5 percent) agreed that the informati on availabl e in
llOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 57

the CIE was suffi ciently rich with respect to quantity and quality to maintain a hi gh level of
awa reness of both the friendly and enemy situati ons.
To substantiate that the data was suffi cient to maintain situational awareness, anal ysts
periodically examined the contents of the JCe and commanders update briefs for accuracy.
Indi vidual JTF members were also periodicall y queried on the situati on during the experim ent.
The results indicated that the contents of the JCe and commanders briefs, shown as the group
results in the fi gure 22, accurately reflected ground truth. The JTF was able to accurately portray
the situation in these briefs. It had achi eved a hi gh state (>. 75) of situati onal awareness.
The group results are relevant to this finding. The situational awareness scores for
individuals are incl uded because of what they mi ght suggest. Indi vidual situational awareness
scores remained constant and were consi derab ly lower than the group scores. Parti al rational for
this is that JTF members focused their awareness on their specifi c fun ctional areas and group
situati onal awareness was achi eved through the additi on and integrati on of individual awareness
levels, whi ch was made possible by the CIE.
In add iti on, the graph suggests that the CJTF is in the best position and the one most
likely, to achieve the maximum level of situati on awareness. Thi s afterthought supports the
concept of commander-centri c operati ons. The commander is in the best position to integrate the
availabl e informati on and achieve the hi ghest awareness level. It is also the commander, who in
all probability has the greatest experi ence; experi ence supports accurate decision-making.
Finding 3 .... The increased visibility of information within the JTF produced an informal,
but active information error detection and correction capability. ....
By design, informati on contained or originating in the ClE was accessibl e to all members
of the JTF and observation two corroborates that. In additi on to and consistent with the design
approach, JTF personnel were not procedurally constrai ned fro m accessi ng information. JTF
personnel li stened in to coll aborati ve sessions not onl y when directed but also on their own
accord. The viewi ng of CROP information outside of th eir immediate organi zati on was simi larl y
un constrain ed. Consequently, information was extremely visible. Many indi viduals, each with
hi s own perspective, were able to view and scruti ni zed large quantities of informati on. Thi s had
the effect of creating an infonn al informati on validati on process.
An exampl e of this occurred during a commander's daily update briefing that focused on
the status ofCJTF-S forces on several islands and is provided in figures 23 and 24. The text in
each fi gure is copi ed from different lWS virtual locati ons, the JI SC, and the INTEL rooms. The
JTFCOLLECTIONSOFF (4) (2:09:55 PM): JFMC: ADM "DELETED" just briefed that you all have
indications of a "DELETED" radar on "LOCATION DELETED" Is this correct?
JFMOpslnlel (2: 10:19 PM): THAT IS CORRECT.
TFCOLLECTIONSOFF (4) (2:10:50 PM): V\lhat kind of report?
JFMOpslntel (2: 11 :09 PM): ~ Report Type Deleted"
JTFCOLLECTIONSOFF (4) (2: 12:00 PM): Did you cue a ~ Deleted ~ asset to confirm presence of any
other forces?
JFMOpslntel (2: 12:34 PM): YES. A TST HAS ALSO BEEN SUBMITTED.
Figure 23: JI SC Room Chat Text
meetings in these rooms were being held concurrent with , but independent of the comm ander' s
daily update briefing. The text reveals that the JTF coll ections officer was able to validate the

JFMCC' s informati on concerning radar emi ssions by communi cating with the JFM ops-intel and
lJTFRFlMAN within S9 seconds. Prior to thi s, the JTF collecti ons officer's database did not
include thi s rel evant information and consequentl y he thought the new informati on might not be
accurate. Thi s informati on was then added to hi s database. Due to the transparency of th e
inform ation databases, the JTF collecti ons offi cer, whil e attending the commander's brief, was
ab le to do thi s.
If developed further, thi s di scovery could have important and fa vorab le ramificati ons on
JTFCOLLECTIONSOFF (2:08:54 PM): JFMC: ADM "DELETED" just briefed that you all have
indications of a "DELETED" radar on "LOCATION DELETED." Is this correct?
2:11 :59 PM: AN LISDEP is now in the chat session.
IJTFRFIMAN (2:13:44 PM): JTFCOLLECTIONSOFF-I know we received a ~ Del eted ~ hit from the
islands
JTFCOLLECTIONSOFF (2:14:56 PM) : Roger, I already confirmed with JFMC . They have established
a TST there as well
Figure 24: Intel Room Chat Text
developing Info rm ation Superi ori ty and on the ability to conduct operations in the informati on
age. As future informati on requirements are met and the quantiti es of informatio n exceed what
mi ght be astronom ical numbers, an equall y robust information validati on capab ility is desirabl e.
Many eyes emanating from uniquel y different reference points and focused on the same piece of
inform ation, as was the case in MC02, provides a new means of validating informati on. If thi s
technique can be formali zed, harnessed, conceivabl y through training, then it may be of value. It
is comparabl e to increasing the number of quality assurance inspectors peering over the
production lines in a factory . Here, the product is information. Again if harnessed, the capab ility
may hold value in determining what is the " truth. "
Finding 4 .... While operating in the collaborative environment the JTF was able to
minimize, but not prevent, surprise attacks by opposing forces_
Thi s findin g is based on an instance in whi ch the JTF did not have Information
Superiority. At the end of Spiral 3, the planning phase of MC02, th e JTF had identified the threat
of a surpri se attack by CJTF-S as the number one item on its' integration matri x. In fact, in the
ex perim ent CJTF-S did plan and execute a major preempti ve attack again st JTF forces. Thi s
attack ultimately caused the sinking of several JTF ships and became a primary source of
controversy. Additional detail surrounding thi s surpri se attack again st the JTF includes both the
CJTF and the fFMCC stating they thought the CJTF-S forces would conduct a preempti ve
attack. JFM CC had identifi ed thi s JTF- S course of action in Spiral 3 and the CJTF, on the
morning of the attack. After recei ving th e CJTF recognition of a hi gh probability of attack, the
JTF staff was unable to adequately validate JTF-S intenti ons in the short time frame, three hours,
that it had avail able. At thi s point in the experi ment, the JTF was still at the infancy stage in its
ability to use the experimental C4 ( tool s.
The controversy that ensued centered on shortfall s in experiment design and simulati on
capab iliti es. Exampl es in cl ude; a time lag in intelli gence, surveillance, and reconnaissa nce
inform ation being forwarded to the JTF by the JECG earl y in the execution pha se of the
ex perim ent, unreali sti c respon se cell actions in particular the positi oning of JTF ships and the
actual attriti on results produced by the simul ations. Given these shortfall s, JECG adjudication

reduced the initi al number of ships that the simulati ons had reported sunk to a level that would
permit a less turbulent continuati on of the experiment. In doing so, the JECG adjudicati on
validated the surpri se attack.
However, th e result does wa rrant some furth er comment. CJTF-S stated that he chose to
conduct the preemptive attack because he was (situationall y) aware of the JTF 's ability to
conduct rapid and decisive operati ons. He calculated a preemptive attack as being hi s best course
of acti on. This was the CJTF-S' s dominant strategy, in that it produced hi s perceived highest
probability of success. The concern is that a ROO capabili ty will drive the decision process of
opponents in other scenari os to the same conclusion. If this is the case then the relevancy of
assured access should be elevated to mitigate the impact of an increase in the probability of
preemptive attacks on JTF 's conducting Rapid Decisive Operations. Furthermore, and with
respect to achieving Inform ation Superi ority it may be wiser to achieve it prior to rather than
during the execution of Rapid Decisive Operations. Thi s would also tend to offset an increase in
the probability of preemptive attacks on JTF ' s conducting Rapid Decisive Operations.
Following the events associated with the preemptive attack, the JTF was able to quickly
adapt to its plans. Thi s is the best indi cator that the JTF had reduced its probabili ty ofbeing
surpri sed. Of the 3 S fragmentary orders (FRA GO) issued by the JTF, only one was the result of a
"surpri se," that being the previously discussed preemptive attack.
Furthermore, potential CJTF-S actions were always included as part of the Joint
Coordination Board. A specifi c secti on of the brief was dedicated to this. The presentation
methodology had the presenter role-playing the CJTF-S. During the briefs, the CJTF provided
hi s view of what JTF-S' s next actions would be. Predictions of JTF-S actions became
commander-centric, which was faci litated by the CIE.
In total , the JTF continuall y attempted to prevent surpri se by coll aborating on potential
future JTF-S acti ons. The CJTF, him self, was part of this coll aborati on process. The impact was
a lack of reactive, JTF-S-induced, FRAGOs.
Finding 5 .... The JTF was able to use shared awareness and collaboration to gain and
maintain high operational tempo.
During the experim ent, the JTF was required to plan and execute operati ons that would
generate seven different effects. The use of effects as opposed to missions, objectives, or tasks is
consistent with the Effects-Based Operations concept. In additi on, the combata nt commander
increased the scope of the initi al JTF mi ssion by requiring the JTF to resolve the threat posed by
the weapons of mass effect. Seni or concept developers considered the size and compl exity of the
resulting operations to be hi gh relative to previous exercises.
In order to maintain operational tempo, the JTF used FRAGOs to refine the direction of
the operati on. Figure 2S shows the rate at whi ch FRAGOs were issued and implicitly the
responsiveness of the JTF . During operati ons, the JTF issued 37 FRAGOs. As menti oned
previously only one FRAGO was reactive in nature. All others were attempts to mai ntain
operational tempo in light of the emergi ng, daily, changes in the operational environment. The
need for a FRAGa was norm all y identifi ed during the daily, ClE enabled, meetings with the
CJTF . Each FRAGa was then produced and disseminated within the ClEo
An exampl e of thi s was th e reprioritization of the effects li sted in the Pri oritized Effects
List (PEL), in order to eliminate JTF-S ' s command and control capabi li ty . This action was done
in response to indi cati ons that JTF-S was successfull y commanding and controlling hi s forces.

Finding 6 .... The JTF was able to use shared awareness and collaboration to synchronize its
forces.
The strongest, and most easi ly depicted, evidence that synchroni zation of forces occurred
was the JTF ' s offensive operation again st the islands on day D+ 12. In hi s summ ary, JFLCC, the
supported comm ander for the operation, described the air portion of the operation as fo ll ows:
" We had a USMC air operations cell
directing USAF and USN aircraft in JTF FRAGOs
support of USA ground operations."

Thi s accompli shm ent was achi eved Pre-E.eution
becau se of a plan deri ved from a 12-
hou r collaborati ve planning session.
In add iti on to the specific
incident cited above, participants and
SMEs also acknowledged through Da ily Quant it ies
survey results and comments that
operations were sy nchroni zed.
Perspecti ves on the degree to whi ch t 23 4 5 6 7 8 9 to tt 1213 t4 1516 t 7 t 819 202 t 222324
synchro nization was achi eved were Experiment Day
obtained using surveys.

The data is presented in a Figure 25: JTF FRAGO described in data red uction
quanti fied fo rmat in fi gure 26. A direct
method was used and it queried parti cipants and SMEs as to what degree they beli eved
synchroni zation occurred. The lines in the figure indicate these results. They show a level of
sy nchronization that averages approx imately A on a scale of minus I, for confli cting, and a
positi ve I, fo r full y synchroni zed. An indirect method was al so used. Here, participants and
SMEs were queried as to what degree
each component was synchroni zed with
the other components. A pair wise
0 .8 compari son was done with these results
O~ ~ and they are shown as dots on the graph .
0.4i====='=======''= These results show that synchroni zation
0+-______--__----__----__--__
0.2
occurred (value greater than 0), and that
the level can be characteri zed as
~: l'
JFACC JFLCC JFMCC JSOTF
approximately 45 percent (A5 of 1.0) of
.o, Force maximum sy nchroni zati on. Both methods
.o8
produced nearl y equal results and provide
~ 0 SI>E _ . Participant
corroborating evidence that supports the
Figure 26 Synchronization levels JFLCC 's comments.
In summ ary, the findings support
the concl usion that the tasks associated with the warfighting chall enges were accompli shed with
the notable excepti on the task- being able to completely prevent surpri se. The findings were
deri ved from a mi x of qualitati ve and quantitati ve data . The data suggests, th at with less than
perfect informati on, the JTF was able to aggressively share information, coll aborate, maintain
operati onal tempo and synchronize its forces. The evidence further indi cates that these successes
were inextricably linked to the capability provided by the CrE and most notably the coll aboration

capability. In turn, the warfighting chall enges and the achievement and maintenance of the
Informati on Superi ority objective were met.
Finding 7 .... Information requirements will grow with the adoption of EBO.
The EBO concept requires th e JTF to assess the achievement of effects. In performing
this assessment function, informati on requirements not normall y associated with traditi onal ISR
operati ons and ca pabilities are likely to be encountered. As currentl y structured, thi s fun cti on is
additive to ex isti ng battle damage assessment requirements. Effects assessment is di fficult,
especiall y relati ng to the
Richness of Information in COP
intangibl e nature of many
100% , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - effects such as information,
o hformation on JTF Ii!i!I h formation on JTF-S economi cs, and social
networks. Both seni or
75% +----.== .----- - -==- - - - - - - - - concept developers and
subj ect matter experts
50% made these observations.
In today ' s
infonn ation age, we have
25%
the opportuni ty to replace
the inefficient appli cation
0% -1---'-- of mass that was based on
Accuracy Timeliness Completeness uncertainty, to a more
N=100 Information Criteria precise appli cati on of
nati onal power based on
Figure 27: Richness of infonnation in the COP, on both friend and foe , knowledge. Effects- Based
was considered acceptable by a majority of JTF staff members. Operations has the potential
to be the "operati onal art of the information age." It is apparent that with this wi ll come
additi onal demand for more informati on.
Other Observations
Observation I: Information provided to the JTF through surrogate systems used in the
experiment was of sufficient richness to maintain an accurate and relevant integrated
picture.
The richness of the JTF 's informati on was assessed using four primary criteria: accuracy,
precision, timeliness, and relevancy. The participants and th e subj ect matter experts provided th e
data relevant to thi s observation.
The primary infonnati on repositori es examined were the ex perim ental COP and the
CROP. For purposes of simpli city, the CO P equates to the wi ndow into the Global Comm and
and Control System (GCCS), where friendl y and opposing fo rces were displayed and tracked and
the CROP was the web portal used by the JTF to post and display relevant infonn ation. Detailed
descripti ons of the CO P and CROP can be found in the Coll aborati ve Informati on Environm ent
section of Chapter 3, Concepts. The ri chn ess of the informati on available within these systems
was hi ghl y dependent on the quality of the data provided by ori gi nating sources such as Joi nt
Intelligence Surveill ance and Reconnaissance (Jl SR) . The primary infonn ation dissemination
system examined was a surrogate collaboration system, InfoWork Space (IWS) 2.S.

With respect to inform ation accuracy, timeliness, and completeness participant views on
the richness of JTF and JTF- S information contained within the CO P, was characterized as
acceptable by more than 60 percent of the respondents. This is shown in the preceding fi gure,
100%
figure 27. The impli cati on is that
the CO P, even with surrogate
; Parlicipanl Subjecl MaUer Eicpert
systems, presented informati on at
% t-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - acceptable levels. This information
was used prim aril y to monitor both
fri endl y and hostil e forces.
Using similar criteri a, as
shown in figure 28, JTF
info rmation contained within the
CRO P, using as its surrogate
SharePoi nt Portal Server, was
characterized as being slig htly less
acceptable. On average, 44 percent
N=17S (Parlicipanl) Information Criteria
found the inform ation to be
N=40 (S/IIE) acceptable. The participant data
Figure 28: Richness of information in the CROP revealed that the C ROP informati on
was not as timely or complete as
information contained within COP. However, as shown in the same fi gure, the SME perception
of inform ation in the CRO P was higher. On average, 62 percent found it acceptabl e with respect
to the criteria, with its relevancy being considered acceptabl e by more than 75 percent of the
respondents. The
The quality of CROP Information Improved as the
combin ed information Experiment Progressed.
richness data for the
COP and CROP 100%
reveals that the JTF
did not have, or 75%
possibly could not <
find , all the 8.
information it desired, 50%
..-
.l1
when it desired it. 0
25%
However, the
surrogate systems did
demonstrate a 0% I I
Strongl y Disagree Agree Strongly
ca pability to meet the
Disagree Participant Opinion Agree
ITF ' s informati on N=236
requirements. It can be Figure 29: Most thought the quality of the CROP improved with time
ex pected th at the
overall richness of th e information will improve as surrogate systems are replaced with
production models and personnel become more adept at using the systems. The data in fi gure 29
is a soft indi cator of thi s. It shows parti cipants believed that the quality and quantity of
information contained in th e C ROP improved as the experiment proceeded and suggests
improvements in information qua lity are achievable.

Utiily d J1fortretiM if! theeFa'

To further assess the quality of the
information, subject matter experts were
"'" asked to quali fy the utility of the
i~ information wi th respect to the JTF ' s
., pl anning and comm and and control
~E
!~ "" functions. The results are shown in figure
~lo 30. Here, seventy-fi ve percent of the
~~
"i; ,,8
",Iii."
.~iiL Iii
'" subject matter experts believed that
friend ly force information contained in the
~..e
'.
-s
~~
""
CROP was adequate for planning and
com mand and control , and 55 percent
'O~
believed that opposing force inform ation
"" IrlaTreticn <7l JTF Irbm6:n oo.J1R>
was adequate for the same functions .
In summary, information contained
TWe of IlDnution
"" in the CROP and COP, while not perfect,
was ri ch enough for the JTF to perform its
Figure 30: Utility of information in the CROP
primary funti ons.
Observation 2: Information provided to the JTF through the surrogate syste ms had
sufficient reach to distribute an integrated picture.
,
,
Use oflWS /7"; ..
" f- ~~ G;'~
.',
" /'--. r-- /

/\\~;:.
~.Y~rf """
~ ' 2COO
".!' ~
Use of e-ma il
r-/ ' '
\
",
'OCOO ~
;,
,/ \ I
V
'"-----. "=
,
!
;'

-=
,
!
! ~
z
""'

~,
~.
.~, ~,
"
~"
""" eo.. cfSce ... ~o
,
Figure 31 A & B. Participants use of IVVS peeked dunng the Island Operations campaign (left), which
corresponded with high levels of e-mail use, shown at right
The ClE and supporting surrogate systems used to disseminate informati on were
designed to maximize connecti vity and information accessibility. As shown in fi gure 32 the
participants identified the coll aboration system, rws, and e-mai l as their primary means of
gaining access to informati on.
IWS provided synchronous information disseminati on and access capabiliti es. E-mail
provided th e equi valent capabiliti es asynchronously. Both of these system s provided virtuall y
unconstrained connecti vity for JTF personnel and organi zations. System reliability rates for both
were hi gh. Reach-back, com muni cations outside of the JTF, was constrai ned by experimental
design.
Usage rates of the two systems are depicted in the two fi gures 3 1A and 3 1B. The graphs
demonstrate steady continuous use of and reli ance on both systems. Thi s supports the data
contai ned in fi gure 32. A 53 percent increase in rws usage occurred on days Day+ 10 and D+ II.
64 FOR OF " ' C ' AL USE ON' ,Y

This is reflecti ve of the additional information needs necessitated by the requirement to plan for
the island operations.
A 20 percent spike in e-mai l usage was recorded for thi s same time frame. In total , the
two systems provided a persistent means of communicating, moving information , across
organizational and geographic boundaries during both high and low optempos.
Of special note is the
difference in the size of the
lWS and e-mail usage 100%
spikes during the planning
for the island operations,
days 0 + I 0, and II. The 53 7f!%
percent increase for rws as
opposed to the 20 percent
increase for e-mai l provides
strong evidence that IWS
was the primary planning e-
tool for thi s operation. Thi s ",
o
conclusion is consistent
with S!\1E observations. Its
significance cannot be
understated as it validates
the coll aboration system ,
IWS , as a planning tool.
n=SPPS
n
IV\6
,----, n
The use of data and Paticipart fEspoose
the inherent capabiliti es of N=32O
the two systems support the
finding that the JTF was able Figure 32: Tools , which provided the most useful infonnation
to and did di sseminate
needed information widely and readily, with suffi cient reach, across the JTF .
Observation 3: The JTF was unable to use the formal information validation process as
described in the Knowledge Information Management Plan (KfMP) because it was not
feasible.
The KlMP provided a detailed process that was to be used by the JTF to qualify the
reliability, currency, and completeness of information. Thi s process was call ed the information
confidence convention. Ideall y, and in accordance with the KfMP, indi vidual JTF members
would indi viduall y qualify information that th ey had generated.
During senior concept developers meetings, di scussion s with the subj ect matter experts
and post experiment interviews with the participants it was obvious that the information
confidence convention was not used. Knowledge managers, a pi votal position for information
assurance, described the proposed convention as impractical and too time consuming to
implement. At times, it did not seem possible to validate specifi c information . In other cases, the
relation ship between reliability and currency became problemati c. Everything gets old and the
operating environment is dynamic. The JTF was not able to rectify the problem .
Senior concept developers validated the need for an information confidence mechani sm.
They noted that there were instances when bad information had been di spersed throughout the
JTF . The potential for thi s to affect operations caused legitimate concern among the senior

concept developers. The logic behind their concern was that bad information was worse than no
informati on. In summary, as we move further into the information age, and the quantity of
informati on handled by the JTF grows, it is not feasible to assume information confidence levels
can be assigned satisfactorily using a process that is primaril y a manual process. Thi s is not to
say the process should not involve members of the JTF, but rather that the integrity of the
process can not depend full y on the actions of indi vidual JTF members because the quantity of
informati on and the corresponding amount of effort required to perform the task is likely to be
too hi gh.
Observation 4: There may be a conflict between the time required to ga in the maximum
benefit provided by an abundance of information and rapid operations.
Thi s observation was deri ved from senior concept developer comments. The rationale
was that the maximum benefit of an abundance of relevant information could only be attained
through deep reflecti ve thought, which requires time. The JTF operational, rapid , tempo did not
permit thi s. Although the exact speed at which operations are supposed to occur is not defined in
minutes and hours by the ROO concept it implies faster is better. It should be recogni zed that
" permitting" tim e for refl ective thought is potentiall y counterproductive to " rapid" operation s.
The two may be at odds with each other. It is conceivable that the experiment environment
contributed to or exacerbated the problem.
Nonetheless, thi s finding recogni zes the physical limitati ons of the human mind. Impli ed
within thi s findin g is that the erE was successful to such a degree that it may have outpaced the
thinking capabilities of the JTF .
Suggested compensating action s included use of reach-back capabilities and
incorporation of decision support tools. It is not clear to what degree these compensating actions
will miti gate the problem, if one exists. Another alternati ve is the emergence of pattern
recognition as the primary deci sion making process, as opposed to the classical approach of
evaluating pros and cons, for rapid deci sive operations. Thi s points toward s achievement of
commander-centric operations as being criti cal, as it is the commander (minus information
available through reach back), who has the most experi ence and will be best able to recogni ze
patterns.
A key learning point when transitioning from a staff-centric operation to a commander-
centric operation is the need for time to think. The concept of the battle rhythm was brought
forward by the JTF because no one could conceive of operating any differently. What no one
realized is that the current battle rhythm is focused on produ cti on (documents, plans, etc) where
in a commander-centric operation, the focus should be on deci sion s, or at least informed
di scussions.
Observation 5: Achievement and maintenance of Information Superiority in support of
RDO is manpower intensive.
There was considerabl e evidence that selected JTF members were "over worked" because
of the combined requirem ents to participate in coll aboration sessions and support planning and
execution of operations. Thi s cannot be overstated . However, survey results indi cated that time
spent in coll aboration session s favorably supported the completion of planning and operationa l
tasks. There is a legitimate, but hard to understand dilemma. In addition, it should be noted "over
worked" personn el are not conducive to knowledge-centric operations where alert minds are a
valuable commodity .

Some of this effect could be miti gated using extensive reach-back capabilities. Additional
soluti ons may reside in battle rhythm, staffi ng, and process changes. Resolution of thi s problem
wi ll be necessary to reli ab ly execute Rapid Decisive Operations in a knowledge-centric
organi zati on.
Relationship to Other Objectives

Other objecti ves associated with RDO were Setting Conditi ons, Assured Access, Effects-
Based Operations, and Agi le Sustainment. Joint Vision 2020 identifi es those qualities associated
with Info rm ation Superi ority as precursors to and enabl ers of the desired capab ilities of fo rce
protection, maneuver, fires, and logisti cs. A parallel relationship existed in the experiment
between the Inform ation Superi ority objective and the four other experiment objectives.
Informati on, preferably Informati on Superiority, was necessary to achieve the other objectives.
A controversial event in the experiment was the preemptive attack by JTF-S on the JTF .
In spite of the controversy, thi s event provides insight into the relationship between Informati on
Superi ority and the objecti ves of setting conditi ons and assured access. Accurate informati on
about the intent ofCJTF-S was required to prevent or avoid the preemptive attack. Conversely,
JTF-S did know that the JTF had a rapid and decisive operational capability. As stated by th e
CJTF- S, this was suffi cient to influence hi s decision making process. His resultant decision was
to conduct a preemptive attack. That attack occurred during the conditi on setting phase and
placed access at risk . The preceding description of events is a brief but relevant portrayal of
events.
The CJTF-S decision to conduct a preempti ve attack is interesting in its own right with
respect to Informati on Superi ority and Rapid Decisive Operations. The impli cati on is that a rapid
and decisive operati onal capabi lity, whil e potentially a deterrent to an adversary, provides the
enemy with knowledge that he is currently vulnerab le to imminent attack and defeat. This
knowledge dictates that hi s dominant strategy will be to attack first. Thi s provides him with the
greatest, and perhaps only, possibility of winning.
Relationship to Concepts
As previously shown, achi evement of the Informati on Superiority objective was
perceived to be attributable to the impact of multipl e concepts. These concepts were the
Coll aborati ve Info rm ation Environment, whi ch has been addressed; the Standing Joi nt Force
Headquarters; Operational Net Assessment; Effects Based Operations; and Joint Intelli gence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Although not identifi ed by the participants, other data
identified the Joint Inter-Agency Coordinati on Group as an information source and consequently
a contributor to the achievement of Informati on Superiority.
Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)

- The Standing Joint Force Headquarters supported objecti ve achi evement through the general
military knowledge and regional specifi c knowledge of its members. It provided intellectual
capital and advanced system operating ski ll s required to fun cti on in a CrE. Evidence of each is
provided in Assessment Area 6

- The ONA concept was visibl e in the inform ation domain primarily through the ONA tool. This
tool resided in the coll aborati ve informati on environment as a secti on of the JTF 's CROP. The
FOR OFFICIAL US!;; ONI ,Y 67

ONA informati on added to the overall quantity and quali ty of informati on because it was fully
integrated, and described the threat. This information was highly valued. However, during the
experim ent, the ONA information was intenti onall y designed to be accurate. This was done to
facilitate experimentati on of the ONA process. Thi s created an "input equaled output" result. The
true impact of the ONA on establi shing Informati on Superi ority would be heavil y dependent on
the ability to accurately identify the cause and effect relationships contai ned in the database.
A seni or concept developer stated that, " ONA-like processes have an insatiable appetite fo r
information." Thi s observati on is consistent with existing literature that describes building
databases for compl ex, nonlinear problems, such as determining cause and effect relationships,
as being extremely resource intensive in order to make it accurate. While it is envisioned that the
ONA database would be developed prior to JTF operations and mai ntain ed at the combatant
commander level, there is potenti al for the ONA to generate ad diti onal informati on requirements
on th e JTF . The difficulty experi enced during the ex periment in maintaining the database
provides some evi dence to this accord
Effects-Based Operations (EBO)

- EBO was identifi ed as a contributor to the achi evement of the Informati on Superi ori ty
objecti ve, based on its ab ility to facilitate integration of informati on operati ons with kinetic
operations. It is a very desirable capab ility, and one that is very relevant to achieving lnformation
Superiority . However, the quali ty of information operation in MC02 was consi dered less than
desirabl e. The most visibl e in sight into the impact of EBO was the probable increase in the level
of information required in order to assess effects. During th e experiment, suffi cient numbers and
types of ISR assets ex isted to meet stated surveillan ce requirements. Consequently, Jl SR
capabiliti es were not stressed and the full impact of effects assessment on information
requirements could not be determined
Joint Intelligence Surveill ance and Reconnaissance (JI SR)

- Jl SR is an integral part of the achi evement of Informati on Superi ori ty . It is a prim ary source of
information perta ining to the threat. Any improvements in Jl SR operati ons would favorab ly
effect objective achi evement. During the ex peri ment, JlSR operations were conducted under
multipl e experiment design and JECG induced constrai nts, most notabl y were the abundance of
Jl SR assets and JECG deficiencies in suppl ying th e JTF with timely information, specifi call y
during th e initi al days of the experim ent. The Jl SR concept is discussed in Assessment Area 13
Joint Inter-Agency Coordinati on Group (JlACG)

- The Jl ACG operated within the coll aborati ve envi ronment. It provided required information to
the JTF as necessary and suppl emented it with a different perspective. Each had value in
objective achi evement
- The most visibl e contributi on came in support of planning for tran siti on operations. Thi s was
signifi cant because it fi ll ed a recognized information void. The void ex ists because littl e
emphasis has been placed on transition operations in joi nt training programs. Thi s is true even
though problems associated with transition are well documented. The result was a tran sition
plan, judged to be of a hi gher quality than previously produced joint exercise pl ans

Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM)

- Participants did not identify JTLM as a contributor to achievement of this objective. Logistics
operations benefited from unconstrained access to planning and operational information. In turn ,
this supported JTF fl exibility and readiness. Additi onall y the logistics CROP was identified as
being the most robust and customer orientated
Relationship to Baseline Analys is

Experimental observations compared favorably to the baseline findings.
- Hi gh profile difference between the baseli ne findings and the experiment observations are that
the emergence of knowledge management as a more effective information dissemination
capabi lity was achieved in th e experim ent. In additi on, a greater reliance was placed on
individual skill s and initiati ve in the experiment (See Table 6)
T a ble 6 S i ted b aseme

eec r fiIn dInas an d correSDon ma 0 bserva rIons
Baseline Finding Experiment Observation
1M is a critical element of successful JTF Knowledge Management has been added as a

headquarters operations. That success depends critical element for successful JTF headquarters
on a well developed IMP and a capable IMO. operations. Success is probably related to a well
The inverse is also indicated; JTF staffs struggle developed KIMP and dependent upon skilled
when the IMP and/or the IMO are wea k or Knowledge Management Officers (KMO) and ski lls
lacking. and initiative of individual JTF members.
Having all commanders at a single meeting for This was done routinely with commanders at
back-briefs facilitated cross-component distributed HQs using IWS, with the same result.
understanding of each other's plans, and
identified cross-component coordination and
interoperability issues.
"The extraordinary success that the JTF Of the four key factors, th ree of them were
experienced in handling , analyzing, and improved or expanded upon: the JTF homepage in
providing critical information to the commander the form of the SPPS portals, accessibility to the
can be attributed to four key factors: commonly commander, and the RFI process.
understood 1M processes, employment of a JTF The contents and process described in the KIMP
Homepage, accessibility of the commander, and were not commonly understood.
a manageable RFI process. ~ The processes associated with the CIE were
commonly understood.
The task of disseminating information is difficult The task of disseminating information was not
even when all conditions are met. Rapid difficult.
advances in , and unfamiliarity w ith , available In general , technology did not cause information to
technology often cause information to be become inaccessible; the opposite was true.
misrouted or inaccessible, which may result in In cases where it was inaccessible, it was due to a
required actions not being taken. When using lack of a discipline in storing information.
web-based technology for disseminating It was still necessary to ensure data was not buried
information, it is necessary to ensure that the to deeply. The search fun ctions did not overcome
data is not buried too deeply in the system. this.
"Initially, infonnation was difficult to locate on the No change, the same basic problem was observed.
Homepage. Many documents were filed w ithin
the file structu re of the orig inating staff, rather
than under a topical label. For instance, the
exercise IMP was filed on the exercise
Homepage under J3 Current Operations,
instead of under IMP. For staff members who
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI ,Y 69

did not know the origin of documents, it took

considerable time to locate them."
"Worthy of specific note was the command No equivalent command emphasis was placed on
emphasis on 1M. At the outset, the commander KM; it was placed on collaboration.
emphasized his concern for accessing critical No worries were observed with regard to a "vast
decision-making information from the anticipated collection of data."
vast accumulation of general information and
data. His guidance was clear - the Homepage
should not become a huge and cumbersome
electronic filing cabinet.
JTF information managers had to constantly No change. In addition, the JTF KM organization
review, evaluate, and prioritize information on was heavily burdened with maintaining the
the web pages to ensure that information was systems. This interfered with the ability to execute
current and not buried under layers of the described process.
directories. Individual JTF members were responsible for these
actions as well.
The JTF KM organizations were not resourced with
standard tools to execute the review, evaluate, and
prioritize process.
Web-based technology does not replace active No change with respect to Web-based technology.
command and control (C2). The collaboration system did effectively support
and supplement command and control.
Access and security issues also hinder This problem was not encountered in the
execution of a good IMP. In exercises and experiment because allies and coalition partners
operations that include allies and coalition were not part of the experiment.
partners, problems often arise with gaining There was no indication that this challenge would
access to U.S. systems. be overcome by adoption of the concepts.
IW activities were accomplished in the The JTF experienced similar problems in
J3Command and Control Warfare (C2W) cell. developing and integrating information warfare
As course of action (COA) development operations.
preceded, the commander decided to form
another organization to address IW. He had
several options: 1) form a J31W element as part
of the Operations Directorate; 2) create a Joint
(J) (lW) Directorate on a par with the other "J"
codes; 3) form functional component Joint
Information Warfare Centers (JIWC); 4) create a
Joint Information Warfare Center (JIWC).
Boards, centers, cells, and agencies placed a No change.
heavy time demand on the JTF staff, in some
cases becoming counterproductive.
DOTMLPF Linkage
- This Information Superiority assessment area supports on-going DOTMLPF CIE submissions,
specifically those related to fielding a collaboration system. It demonstrates significant value in
using an XC 4I-like system for the development of CJTF and JTF situational awareness and use
of the systems is consistent with information age operational needs. It also points out that there is
a need to further refine, the CIE technology (M), and realign the training (T) and education (L)

of our military personnel (P) in order to better prepare them to serve in an information age
environment
Recommendations
1. DoD, immediately select a common collaborative capability (including JEMPRS-NT) for use
as an interim joint command and control tool. Concurrently, USJFCOM, supported by unified
commanders, Services and other agencies, develop a joint C4I architecture for the purposes of
merging the two efforts for the fielding of a DoD-wide collaborative information environment by
2005.~
- CIE, in particular the collaborative tool, empowered the JTF by enhancing open dialogue,
compressing the decision-making process and decision to action cycle. The CIE allowed the
combatant command headquarters, the JTF headquarters and the components to share
information and ideas both horizontally (across components) and vertically (from the
components, through the JTF to the combatant command staff), resulting in dramatically reduced
planning timelines and enhanced organizational effectiveness. During MC02, the CIE allowed
command guidance and intent to be better and more simultaneously understood at all echelons
within the environment. It allowed the commander to maintain continuous participation in the
collaborative environment while moving from one location to another. The ability to collaborate
in real time enhanced trust and confidence across the JTF's organizations. The CIE significantly
empowered the important relationships that underlie any organization. Thus, the focus and unity
of effort that are usually resident only in very small groups was replicated at large geographic
scales and across sizable organizations. This was a new and compelling phenomenon.
Ultimately, the CIE allowed a more synchronous application of military capabilities, and was
seen by participants as a "gold medal" winner ofMC02.
- The collaborative information environment (CIE) used in MC02 was built as a coherently joint
experimental C4I (XC 4I) system that linked the knowledge and decision centers, such as the
combatant command headquarters, the JTF and components, and external agencies. This XC 4I
system was a surrogate built using commercial (and government) off-the-shelf applications. It
used high-speed bandwidth connectivity and electronic collaborative tools to facilitate rapid
information sharing. XC 4I was never intended to be fielded, but was exemplary of the
technologies that could be quickly fielded. Consequently, DoD and USJFCOM must identify an
effective and suitable collaboration system for fielding.
2. USJFCOM, in conjunction with the Services and other combatant commanders, work to
redefine and document the meaning, relationships and importance ofInformation Superiority,
information operations, decision superiority, knowledge superiority, knowledge readiness and
commander centric operations so a commonly understood lexicon is developed. ~
- MC02 demonstrated that a gap in military readiness exists, as we enter and operate in the
information age that prevents us from fully realizing the gains that might be achieved through
transformation. Capitalizing on advances in information technology is pivotal to transformation.
It is part of the reason we are transforming. Given this, it is imperative that we understand the
intricacies and meaning of achieving Information Superiority. This begins with the basics,
understanding of the meaning, relationships and importance ofInformation Superiority,
information operations, decision superiority, knowledge superiority, knowledge readiness, and
commander-centric operations. Each of these terms is relevant to operating effectively in the

information age. There is likely to be still yet more information age terms that appropriately can
be added to the list.
- The military has not been completely void of addressing the issue. For example; the RDO
concept defines decision superiority as: "The ability of the commander, based upon Information
Superiority and situational understanding, to make effective decisions more rapidly than the
adversary, thereby allowing him to dramatically increase the pace, coherence, and effectiveness
of operations." Definitions for some of the other phrases also exist, but like the preceding one,
they tend to be complex and often leave the reader asking, "How do you do that?" There is an
overall lack of clarity and unanimity surrounding how to operate in the information age.
3. USJFCOM, conduct a manpower study on a JTF supported by a SJFHQ and operating in a

collaborative information environment to determine its' manpower requirements. ~
- Multiple findings highlighted the large quantity of time that was spent by the JTF staff using
the collaborative system. This quantity was periodically identified as being excessive and the
cause of overworked personnel. Furthermore, in MC02, the CIE was overlaid on existing JTF
processes without expressed elimination of any traditional tasks. The appearance was that
additional work had been added without additional resources. While the notion "greater
knowledge created by the CIE would enable faster task accomplishment" has merit, time
management difficulties emerged. At times, personnel choose between attending collaborative
sessions and performing another task. It is not reasonable to assume MC02 JTF staffing
approached optimality. It is highly likely that JTF operations can be improved upon through a
more precise application of manpower to function, process, and tasks.

Figure 33: An F-16 engages a target over the Nevada firing ranges in response to an MC02 tasking order
FUR OFFICIAL USE ON.,y 73

Assessment Area 2 - Rapidly Set Conditions for Decisive

Operations
The joint force deployment planning procedures and tools developed to support the task
'Position Combat-Configured Forces for Joint Operations' were not as effective as might have
been anticipated. The Joint Force Capabilities Register (JFCR), a 1-''''''''''.'''5
envisioned for two reasons. First, due to the nature of the
experiment, the available force list was already determined, so
the components saw little utility in using the JFCR to select
capabilities to accomplish an effect. Secondly, the JFCR is still
in development and participants reported it did not have
sufficient detail in some areas.
No one envisioned the impact that the CIE had on the
course of action (COA) development and the impact that
Effects-Based planning and operations had on the deployment
planning process. In certain cases it streamlined planning
because of the concurrent collaborative planning capability.
However, collaboration seemed to blur some of the habitual
understanding of deployment planning roles, responsibilities
and functions.
In effects-based planning, the relationship between
COA development and deployment planning was not fully
understood. It was envisioned that as effects-based missions
(task, purpose, and effects) were assigned to components they
would select a capability to accomplish the task. Once the
capabilities were selected by the components, the JTF, using
the JFCR, would begin sequencing the force flow with the
priority of effects desired. The new capability selection process
should have been coordinated and arbitrated at the JTF level.
During the experiment, the JTF developed its operating
concept based on the commander's intent and guidance and the
priority effects list (PEL). The JTF assigned effects-based
missions (task, purpose, and effects) to components, which
developed COAs for their effects-based missions based on
supported and supporting command relationships. There was
good component horizontal collaboration within each effects-
based mission, but the components developed their COAs
without the benefit of an integrating JTF COA. The JTF COA
would have included a JTF concept of deployment that
supported a JTF concept of employment. Consequently, the
components' plans used unconstrained forces and force flow for their COAs. The JTF
(influenced by non effects-producing capabilities, the desire to show off their true capabilities,
and efforts to attain Service exercise objectives, which did not match MC02 objectives) began
COA analysis without an integrated JTF COA. Because of the lack of force flow sequencing, it
was difficult, if not impossible, to determine what resources were to flow where and when. After
74 FOR OFFICIl'... L USE ONLY

the COA wargaming was complete, the JTF put all the component force flow requirements
together and discovered they were beyond their force flow capability. The JTF adjusted the
forces and the flow and, once the two were integrated, they had a feasible COA from a
deployment perspective. However, during execution, artificialities applied to the movement of
forces further calls into question the ability of current deployment processes and capabilities
effectively support RDO.
Prepositioned (PREPO) material was used to offset deployment requirements.
Intermediate staging and support bases (ISB) were used to streamline deployment and to
minimize the logistics footprint in the JOA. Where possible, host nation support was used to
minimize the logistics footprint. The effects of JRSOI could not be assessed because no actual
JRSOI was conducted or simulated, and that is the only way to accurately assess the process. The
Log CROP, although a great information source, was not seen as effective in synchronizing
deployment flow.
Methodology
More than 215 experiment participants and observers evaluated Rapidly Setting
Conditions for Decisive Operations. A series of 32 questions were given to the warfighters, 34
questions were submitted to the SMEs, five C4I inputs were gathered, and two modeling and
simulation inputs were gathered addressing this objective. The questions were directed to the
specific person or group that was responsible for the desired information or subject area. Specific
information was sought from the C4I systems and the M&S systems during and at the conclusion
of the experiment. Data from the modeling and simulation areas were gathered via DCARS; the
C4I information was gathered from SPPS. JDCAT captured the warfighters' and SMEs'
information. All of these sources provided the information that was reviewed and analyzed for
this objective. Additionally, after action reviews from various working groups and comments and
recommendations captured via JDCAT were used to supplement the programmed data capture.
The responses were screened, sorted, analyzed, and tabulated. The data was rolled up through the
element, data requirement, measure, subtask, task, and the warfighting challenge levels to answer
the objective. Azimuth check papers for this objective were written in which the key points of
the objective were listed and brought to the attention of the SMEs, analysts and the SCDs. The
papers were available through the SPPS system, and were the focal point during 26-27 July
SMEs, analysts, and SCDs meetings.
The "Rapidly Set Conditions for Decisive Operations Objective" was broken into two
warfighting challenges: 1) ability to establish advantageous positions for decisive operations, and
2) ability to decrease joint force vulnerability to disruption. The first warfighting challenge was
broken into two tasks, and 10 sub tasks. The second warfighting challenge was broken into one
task and six measures. The data for this objective was split between logistics and effects-based
functions. Therefore, the logistical analysis team concentrated on the first task of the first
warfighting challenge, and the effects analysis team concentrated on the second task of the first
warfighting challenge and on the entire second warfighting challenge.
Due to experiment guidance, enemy forces were restricted from attacking Blue forces for
16 days prior to the start of hostilities. Many asymmetric and some kinetic enemy actions might
have been directed against Blue forces flowing into the region had there been no forced
inactivity. If the enemy had attacked Blue forces earlier, the pre-emptive strike may have had a
smaller effect or not occurred at all. However, earlier enemy activity may have had a greater
impact on Blue at the operational level, and affected Blue's ability to gain entry into the JOA.

To analyze the primary sub task, use joint force deployment planning procedures, six key
areas were reviewed to determine the effectiveness of the joint force planning process:
Use of the joint deployment process initiatives, joint force capability register (JFCR), and
collaboration during the joint deployment planning process
The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and standing operating procedures (SOP) that
comprise the joint SOP (JSOP) on deployment planning procedures
Number of deployment flow changes made in the first seven days and why they were made
Tailoring of initial and follow-on logistics packages to reduce lift requirements and minimize
logistics footprint in theater
Procedures to develop and approve COA quicker for logistics supportability
Procedures and systems for sourcing, tailoring, and validating the time-phased force and
deployment data (TPFDD)
Supporting subtasks were addressed as follows:

Impact of various PREPO alternatives on the ability to rapidly close a force
Reduce JRSOI processing time
Assess deployment distribution structure
Determine the information, communications and systems and tools that are required to
synchronize the deployment flow
Determine the amount of asset visibility required to divert assets
Determine the utility of the high speed vessel (HSV) for positioning/supporting combat-
configured forces for decisive operations
Data was collected, primarily, from the logistics participants and subject matter experts
using automated questionnaires and from the comments and recommendations provided by all
participants, various after action reviews (AARs) and in-focus sessions. The locations and
number of the logisticians follows: plans group, 14; operations group, 12; SMEs, 12; functional
component, 5; Joint Logistics Management Center (JLMC), 16; and the JECG deployment
sustainment support cell (DSSC), 17.
Warfighting Challenges: Ability to establish advantageous positions for decisive

operations; and ability to decrease joint force vulnerability to disruption.
The deployment portion of the warfighting challenge, 'ability to establish advantageous
positions for decisive operations', was postulated because of reliance on infrastructure-dependent
deployment methods that prevent j oint forces from direct deployment into the j oint operations
area (JOA); therefore, the delivery of highly mobile forces in non-continuous operations cannot
be accomplished efficiently. From this warfighting challenge, metrics (tasks, subtasks, questions
and data elements) were developed based on information from several sources, most notable are:
Concept Experimentation Strategy (CES) to Deploy and Sustain the Force in Rapid Decisive
Operations (RDO, 2114/01)
Focused Logistics: Enabling Early Decisive Operations (10110/99), Strategic Deployment
(511 0/00) and Rapid Decisive Operations (311/02) White papers
Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) Concept ofEmployment for MC02 (8117/01)
Deployment & Sustainment in MC02 Concept of Operations (3118/02)
Deployment & Sustainment in MC02 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (1/9/02)
76 FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONI,V

Me02 Joint Standing Operating Procedure
These sources were used to generate the metrics and formed the basis for data collection
plan development. The data collection plan was vetted with the logistics concept developers and
other members of the JFCOM Analysis Division. The high order metrics follow:
Task: Position combat-configured joint forces for decisive operations
SubTask: Use joint force deployment planning procedures
SubTask: Determine the impact of various PREPO alternatives on the ability to rapidly close
a force
SubTask: Reduce JRSOI processing time
SubTask: Assess deployment distribution structure
SubTask: Determine the information, communications and systems and tools that are
required to synchronize the deployment flow
SubTask: Determine the amount of asset visibility required to divert assets
SubTask: Determine the utility of the HSV for positioning/supporting combat-configured
forces for decisive operations.
Although enemy actions negatively impacted the force's operational mobility, these
detractions were not enough to stop the JTF from establishing advantageous positions during
some operations in time and space. Blue was able to position its forces and create combat-
configured packages for decisive operations. Effects planning procedures showed continual
improvement as the experiment progressed, though more work is required. At times when Blue
achieved advantageous positioning, it was not always able to successfully execute the planned
operation; additional preparation of the battlefield was required.
Blue achieved a high level oflogistical build-up flexibility. However, force tailoring
could have been better as the components erred on the side of retaining in-house capabilities
versus leaving those capabilities behind, even though another component had the same
capability. One war fighter mentioned, "The logistics plans-ops transition worked better than the
JTF plans-ops transition." Additionally, node-action-resource level of planning proficiency was
not attained from an effects planning perspective. Footprint minimization could also improve
with the streamlining of JTF capabilities. Planning was comparable to legacy methods, but there
is much more room for improvement by using CIE in conjunction with effects planners and
operators. TPFDD measurements were not meaningful due to the lack of fidelity in the
experiment.
Another participant observed, "MC02 never got advanced enough to allow or drive the
TPFDD refinement process." PREPO supplies and equipment were a success, supporting the
flexibility and timeliness of the JTF and effects operations. JRSOI could not be properly
measured during MC02 due to the lack of fidelity in RSOI areas. ISBs show promise, but
participants commented that other systems are necessary for the success and implementation of
the ISB concept. The information, communications, systems, and tools that are required to
synchronize the deployment flow were generally available to the experiment audience. Most
respondents indicated that the CIE, with collaboration, allowed the movement of JTF forces in a
much more condensed time frame. The visibility required for the diversion of assets in support of
RDO was met during MC02.
FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONI,V 77

Finding The CIE streamlined deployment-planning coordination, but the MC02 joint
force deployment planning procedures did not improve joint force planning or help
develop the JTF TPFDD.
The JSOP caused some problems for deployment planning, partially because the
document was not clear on the division of duties and responsibilities for deployment planning,
and partially because the deployment planner was located in the log plans portion of the plans
group. As a result, the JTF planners looked to the log planners to develop the TPFDD without
operational planning involvement. This resulted in some unproductive deployment planning
sessions, as the deployment planners had no employment plan or force flow from which to work.
During deployment planning, experiment observers expected that JTF and component
planners and operators would use the JFCR to identify potential forces for use and then conduct
transportation feasibility analyses to identify constraints. However, the JFCR was not used as
anticipated. The JTF assigned missions to components and then asked for a deployment force
list. In tum, the components, already familiar with their unit capabilities, simply chose units from
the already prepared MC02 force list. There was never a need to use the JFCR or any other tool.
Those that attempted to use the JFCR were hampered by a lack of training with the newly
produced tool and, not surprisingly, found it lacking. Representative comments included these:
"Although partial engineering data is included in the register, the force modules
populating the register are too large and too generic to aid as an effective search tool to meet the
objectives ofMC02."
"The JFCR does
not provide the level of
detail that the medical JTF Staff was Able to Repond More Quickly to
planners need. The medical Deployment Changes in the CIE
community needs
information on what each 12
unit brings with it and how 10
Q)
it is configured." IJ)
8
Sustainment details c..
had not been rolled into the ~ 6
JFCR for some w 4
2:
components, causing (J)
2
planners to use other
sources for planning
o
Yes No n=12
details. Most participants
responded that with
additional development it Figure 34: SMEs thought the JTF staff was able to respond more quickly
would be a useful tool for to deployment changes in the CIE
combatant command-level or SJFHQ core planners in identifying capabilities available for use
against effects, and determining rough-order transportation requirements, as they develop their
CONOPS.
The CIE's impact on deployment planning was not clearly envisioned. While it had some
very obvious benefits in reducing planning time by enabling concurrent planning by the JTF,
components and subordinate commands, there was a misunderstanding about what concurrent
planning could and could not do. An experiment goal was to reduce the planning time needed to
begin operations - reduce or eliminate the one-third, two-third time allocation rule for mission
78 F'OR OFFICIAL USE QNI,Y

planning - through early and concurrent JTF-component participation in the planning process.
However, this goal was not portrayed clearly to experiment participants and as a result,
components and subordinate commands said pressured for deployment information in the
absence of a finalized JTF COA and force list.
Significant adjustments were made to the initial deployment flow in the first week of
experiment execution because the TPFDD had not been finalized before the end of Spiral 3.
Changes were made at the direction of the JTF commander and, on request, from the
components. As depicted in figure 34, the CIE made these requests and the coordination process
much easier.
Finding Intermediate staging and support bases (ISBs) were suited to rapidly moving
forces and equipment and, with host nation support, instrumental in reducing the logistics
footprint in the JOA.
As depicted in figure 35 below, the majority of participants understood that the ISBs
described in the deployment and sustainment MC02 CONOPS were suited to rapidly moving and
integrating forces.
However, the experiment was not able to actually measure the reduction in JRSOI time as
it was not conducted in simulation and unit RSOI was assumed completed 48 hours after arrival.
ISB locations
were seen as ISBs in ROO are Suited to Rapidly Moving and
being effective Integrating Forces
in extending
operational reach 50
and were 45
40
selected based I/) 35
on facility 5lr::: 30
availability, and &25
dispersed to gj 20
c:: 15
provide 10
maximum force 5
protection and o
reduce Yes No
n=55
vulnerabili ty.
TheJTF
Figure 35: Most agreed that ISBs were well suited to moving forces
maximized the
use of host nation support and civil augmentation program support to minimize the logistics
footprint in the JOA. A key point for any deployment is that regardless of the deploying force's
readiness or packaging, assembly will still be required before the force can be employed.
Finding The CIE was effective in synchronizing deployment flow.
Participants noted that CIE effectively synchronized deployment flow and that it allowed
them to address issues and to coordinate necessary changes. Some participants' comments
included:
"Collaboration was the only way this would have happened in the time it was
accomplished."
FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONLY 79

"The JTF surgeon and the Service components used [the] collaborative environment to
deconflict issues for medical units."
"Thus far in the exercise, it appears that [the] CIE was the key factor that achieved
synchronization for deployment and sustainment."
Figure 36 depicts participant evaluation of the CIE effectiveness on deployment
synchronization.
Finding The Log CROP, an element of the CIE, was a useful information source for
tracking deployment flow, but not for synchronizing it.
The majority of respondents (43 of 55) found the Log CROP to be a useful information
source for tracking deployment flow. However, some also reported that it did little to actually
synchronize the flow. Initially,
participants had difficulty CIE Effectiveness for Synchronizing Deployment Flow
locating the deployment flow
status on the Log CROP; this 50
improved over time. Afterward, it 40
C/l
became an issue of information CIl
~ 30
currency and accuracy. What o
finally evolved were discussions It 20
~
in the Logistics Action Response 10
Board (LARB) to resolve o
deployment related issues. Effective Ineffective N ~ 51
Participants provided the
following comments on the utility Figure 36: CIE effectively synchronized deployment force flow
of the Log CROP in deployment
flow tracking:
"The Log CROP was a great tool however [it] had little relevance to synchronizing
deployment flow."
"Force flow charts were compiled from information from GTNI Global Transportation
Network Exercise System (GES) and posted on the Log CROP which gave visibility on the
deployment."
"The Log CROP is looked at more as a source of general information than a planning
tool."
"OK, but all the systems take a lot of training, need to be user friendly."
"Better than manually reviewing Service planning docs, but not fully used by planners."
Finding The Log CROP provided sufficient information to allow the CJTF to divert
PREPO materiel or inbound supplies to satisfy needs elsewhere in the JOA.
Of 58 respondents, 44 stated the Log CROP provided sufficient information to allow the
CJTF to divert PREPO materiel or inbound supplies to satisfy needs elsewhere in the JOA (See
Figure 37). However, surveys indicated a participant view that the JTF would coordinate with
components before redirecting materiel.
Finding Blue Forces were able to conduct operational maneuver in support of Effects-
Based Operations.

Through situational awareness and superior mobility and firepower, Blue was able to
monitor enemy movements and choose the time and location for counter-mobility operations.
Blue constrained CJTF -S' s movement of forces using aerial targeting of his mobile forces. The
adversary did not retain freedom of movement to conduct maj or operations. At other times, Blue
could maintain situational awareness for EBO through just monitoring enemy movements. Yet,
the OPFOR was able to move two reserve, armored brigades over 200KMs without being
attacked. These brigades were subsequently attrited when they were moved into direct action.
Blue successfully conducted counter-mobility operations against enemy forces whenever
necessary or as needed in support of
EBO andRDO. Log CROP Provided Sufficient Information for CJTF to
Divert PREPO Material
All of the forces allocated to
the JTF for planning purposes were 50
deployed into the theater, with a ::l 40
majority arriving ahead of schedule. ~ 30
o
However, because there was It 20
insufficient resolution of the exercise ~ 10
timeline in the 16 days preceding o
Yes No
execution start, the actual TPFDD
deployment status was unclear.
During this pre-execution period, the
Figure 37: Majority thought Log CROP provided sufficient
OPFOR was not allowed to attack information to divert PRE PO material
Blue force deployment efforts.
Therefore, Blue was able to deploy into the theater unimpaired. Blue positioned its forces in
operational formations with little concern for terrorist or other enemy actions. All necessary
forces and support elements were positioned to ensure freedom of navigation, neutralization of
weapons of mass effects, and subsequent transitioning of the JOA to follow-on forces and
agencies. Blue positioned its forces so operational formations could form and operate, but there
could have been better coordination and synchronization between the components and JTF and
between logistics personnel and operators. Better use of the ONA, better information sharing,
and better operations to logistics planning would have aided effects accomplishments.
Blue was able to assemble its forces in the JOA in a timely, but uncontested manner, and
in sufficient numbers to begin effects operations by C+ 17, in accordance with planning
timelines.
The JTF commander used "effects packages" on several occasions to achieve his early,
desired effects. These "effects packages" were not built until the component elements reached
their designated assembly areas in the JOA. The Service elements in these "effects packages"
were controlled through supported-supporting command relationships. In each of those actions,
that relationship caused these collective units to be somewhat different from units incorporated
in j oint tactical action (JTA) elements where all elements in the JTA fall under the command of a
j oint force commander.
Operations requiring "joint tactical operations" were identified early in the planning
process, using the collaborative construct. Operations as small as direct action efforts to seize
specified locations ranging from small to large events such as the seizure of the islands, and
defense against swarm boat attacks, required frequent use of "joint tactical actions."
Collaboration allowed the JTF and components to quickly determine requirements and rapidly
de-conflict resources. Subsequent to the arrival of Blue forces in the JOA, OPFOR detected and

attacked both air and maritime elements causing damages and losses. These attacks did not have
a large enough effect to stop Blue from setting conditions for decisive operations.
Blue exercised operational mobility into and through the JOA. The OPFOR, however, did
delay, disrupt, and modify Blue operational mobility, by mining the waters in the area of
operations; conducting pre-emptive strikes on Blue forces in the JOA; and by conducting
terrorist attacks on Blue lines of communications, and APODs and SPODs. In spite of the
obstacles encountered, Blue retained operational level mobility.
To ensure the proper execution of the TPFDD, consideration should be given to the early
securing of lines of communication (LOC). LOCs should be secured in the period prior to the
commencement of hostilities and prior to forces flowing into a JOA. At the tactical level, Blue
maritime forces were slowed due to OPFOR mining efforts. Blue was forced to conduct mine
clearing operations to open sea-lanes, while APODs and SPODs were closed due to potential
chemical/biological contamination, physical damages to infrastructure, and from environmental
damage to port facilities. These enemy actions forced disruption and delays on Blue's planned
timelines, and were effective tactical-level distracters.
Blue forces were successful in counter mobility operations against enemy forces as
demonstrated by Blue air interdiction of an enemy ground forces moving toward Blue forces at
objective Pioneer. Blue forces retained the ability to restrict or stop enemy forces. The exception
was the enemy's pre-emptive attack. That very effective strike had a major, short-term effect on
Blue's operational freedom of maritime maneuver, but the OPFOR was not able to gain any
lasting advantage as the momentum passed back to Blue shortly after the attack. Operationally,
the OPFOR had very limited conventional military options after launching pre-emptive strikes on
Blue forces moving into the JOA. Primarily, the OPFOR spent the vast majority of its air,
missile, and maritime attack capability in the initial attack. With nothing more to follow-up or
forces to hold ground, the JTF continued to conduct operational maneuver within the JOA,
deploying, positioning, assembling, and using the desired forces/capabilities at their disposal.
The enemy forces may have been able to delay, disrupt, and modify the flow of forces by
maritime mining and terrorist activities against the APODs and SPODs, but they could not
operate to a degree that placed significant operational limitations on Blue forces. In some
instances, the OPFOR was able to severely limit Blue's operational maneuver. One such case
was the Blue Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) that came ashore before the battlefield was
properly prepared. This miscue resulted in significant Blue losses and a JECG controlled
administrative withdrawal. After the lesson learned was filed away, the exercise was continued,
allowing Blue to assemble the necessary personnel, equipment, and supplies by D-I and begin
effects operations, in support of operational maneuvers.
Finding Blue reduced joint force vulnerability to disruption; however, it was not able
to prevent OPFOR observation of its forces, due to sympathizers, terrorist cells, and during
the initial days of the operation, commercial satellite imagery.
Blue reduced its vulnerability to disruption by tailoring forces to meet requirements for
specific effects, minimizing the footprint within the JOA, and reducing adversary access to
satellite and other open source intelligence data.
Blue also reduced its vulnerability by:
using weapon system range and standoff range of delivery systems
establishing rear area security operations
diverting airflow to APODs with lower risk levels

damaging adversary electronic communications capabilities

using the capabilities of the HSV, the OV-22, and the C-17
using PREPO supplies outside of the JOA
using host nation support, diplomatic and informational initiatives
Additionally, much of the senior terrorist leadership was targeted and destroyed through a
scripted event. Despite the OPFOR's ability to use both regular and terrorist forces to disrupt
Blue air, naval and land forces and facilities, Blue was able to establish some advantageous
positions to conduct decisive operations.
Through positioning of forces within the JOA, minimizing their footprint in the JOA, and
maximizing aircraft operational
ranges, Blue minimized any
OPFOR initiated disruption (See 14~-------------
Figure 38).
~ 12~-------------
These Blue initiatives VI
<:
~ 10~-------------
strengthened already in place VI
force protection measures, ~ 8~--

'0
safeguarding friendly assets. ~ 6~--
E
Therefore, while Red was able to ~ 4~---
disrupt Blue's logistical elements 2~---
by mining and terrorist activities,

O~--
the disruptions were not to the Great effect Some effect Little effect
degree where Blue operational Abilityto decrease JTF vulnerability
forces were noticeably affected.
Some of the potential impacts
due to OPFOR operations were Figure 38: Ability to decrease JTF vulnerability
adjudicated out by the JECG, to
keep the experiment on track.
Daily reports on enemy or terrorist activities observed at APODs and SPODs were made
to the headquarters and activity was generally very limited. This type of activity was managed at
times by the JECG to ensure accomplishment of experiment objectives. Experiment participants
reported on the JTF's ability to reduce its vulnerability due to disruption. The majority of
responses received (26 of 32) indicated that the JTF was able to reduce its vulnerability to
disruption to varying degrees. This was contrary to the OPFOR terrorist view that it initially had
relatively free access to Blue targets throughout the JOA. This access was degraded over time by
counter-terrorism efforts and by JECG controllers.
OPFOR was able to inflict some damage on Blue causing tactical level disruption, but
through counter-measures, and flexibility, Blue was able to overcome enemy efforts.
Above the operational level, CJTF -S forces or sympathizers were able to interrupt the
flow of maritime forces through one LOC to the JOA. Terrorist and enemy activity did playa
noticeable part in SPOD and APOD operations and rear area Blue personnel were killed and
wounded by terrorist/enemy attacks. Additionally, Blue logistical operations were degraded
when an SPOD was closed due to the grounding of a hazardous materials laden ship. Attempts
by OPFOR forces to attack APODs with TBMs were thwarted by Blue defenses -- defenses that
included FY 2007 capabilities. APOD and SPOD operations were modified to accommodate
temporary closures due to OPFOR actions. Though the OPFOR were not allowed to target civil
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y 83

US. Joint Forces Command Millennium Challenge 2002: Experiment Report
reserve aircraft, it was noted that had such an operation been permitted, it would have had an
impact.
Finding The roles, responsibilities, and functions for deployment planning remained
somewhat unchanged with the MC02 JTF organization.
The matching of capabilities required to the effects desired, somewhat without regard to
Service, is one of the most important aspects of effects-based planning. Force flow must be
sequenced with consideration for the desired priority of effects. There was little to no input from
the operational and planning communities in the development of the initial force flow and
requirements as participants fell back on habitual understandings of the roles and responsibilities
of logisticians. It is critical to the success of deployment planning to have operators involved in
the decision processes that will intimately decide on force employment. Some senior mentor
comments on deployment bring out some key concerns:
"When we talk about deployment, we have to talk about employment. The adversaries
have learned that the way to deal with us is to disrupt power projection through asymmetric
attacks. They can slime bases in the US. so force protection goes far below the operational level
of war in the JOA. Force integration will have to be done in the US."
"Force deployment tools are inadequate. They are labor intensive and are not user
friendly. Single keystrokes can delete masses of painfully constructed data. The Joint Force
Capabilities Register is a step in the right direction insofar as tool development is concerned.
Additional improvements are needed."
Finding An assessment of the JRSOI process could not be made during MC02 because
the JRSOI process was not visible in the experiment.
JRSOI was not part of the simulation and was assumed completed. Real-world
constraints were not experienced or imposed.
Finding 10~ The CONUS, with its posts, camps, stations, bases, lines of communication,
sea ports of embarkation, and aerial ports of embarkation are part of the battles pace and
vulnerable to asymmetric attack.
Multi-dimensional (cyber, sea, air, space, and ground) attacks should become part of the
training regime. An enemy will
Prepositioned Materiel (PREPO) Use Reduced attack these vital, yet vulnerable,
Deployment Timelines
aspects of our national military
power and the results of those
60
attacks and the cascading effects
50
of such attacks against key
::lC/l 40
c: concepts such as synchronization,
8.. 30 just in time logistics, protect the
C/l
~ 20 force should be played out.
10
o Other Observations
Army PREPO Air Force Marine PREPO
PREPO n=55 Observation 1: Using pre-
positioned (PREPO) materiel as
Figure 39: Services thought PRE PO reduced timelines an alternative to deploying
84 FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONLY

materiel from CONUS was seen generally to be beneficial to rapidly closing a force.
Reducing materiel transportation times and requirements benefited force closure rates,
according to participants' comments and as depicted in figure 39, below. The key is to place the
correct equipment and sustainment in sufficient quantities near the crisis area. This is important
because as Services begin to transform and modernize their forces, they will need to ensure
acquisition of sufficient "spares" and sustainment to place into PREPO. During MC02,
participants were limited to using real world PREPO. This became apparent to the JTF planners
because certain experimental unit materials were not available in PREPO to affect deployment or
replacement.
PREPO reduced deploying sustainment, as planners were able to take advantage of what
was available as common items of support, such as water, fuel, and ammunition. It is imperative
that all planners know what is available in PREPO and know how to find it. The medical planner
did not have any information about medical materiel available in PREPO because it wasn't clear
to him what medical units and equipment were available.
Observation 2: Logistics decision support tools' performance mixed in test to synchronize
deployment flow.
Logistics decision support tools (DSTs), including the Global Transportation Network
(GTN), Global Status of Resources and Training (GSORTS), Joint Operations Planning and
Execution System (JOPES), Joint Total Asset Visibility System (JTAV), National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA), and Port and Airfield Collaborative Environment (PACE), received
mixed reviews. Whether a tool received a positive or negative review often depended on the
reviewer's level of training and his or her proficiency with the tool. In some instances, users
were not able to access the tools because they did not have a Service-provided SIPRNET Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certification (experiment artificiality). One major criticism was the lack
of data or fidelity behind some of the tools for this experiment (experiment artificiality).

SJFHQ
- Force deployment and sustainment planning functions of personnel in log operations and log
plans positions in SJFHQ
ONA
- Database research for facilities and infrastructure to support deployment and logistics
operations in the JOA
Effects Base Operations (EBO) [Planning]

- Develop deployment and logistics concepts of support for Effects-Based Operations and future
branches and sequels
Sustainment
- Plan and provide logistics sustainment for the JTF
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Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)

- Environment for collaborative planning and coordinating logistics operations, force deployment
and sustainment, horizontally and vertically; i.e. Logistics Action Response Board
Interagency Agency (IA)

- Interaction for coordinating host nation support (food, facilities, equipment) and humanitarian
assistance
Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (nSR)

- Intelligence on the JOA and adversary activities therein that would adversely impact force
deployment and logistics operations
Initiatives
- Introduction and experimentation of new logistics tools suite
Assured Access (AA)

- Ensuring access into the JOA and facilities therein to support force deployment
Effects Based Operations (EBO) [Conduct]

- Support force deployment and execute logistics operations to sustain forces conducting Effects-
Based Operations
Relationship to Baseline Analysis

The following entries are relevant to major observations made during MC02.
Baseline entry: The deployment branch was not manned to handle assigned responsibilities and
the branch staff did not have relevant experience or technical expertise. This resulted in poor
time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) performance in the conduct of movement
planning and execution
MC02 Result: No Change
Baseline entry: The JMC had difficulty in force tracking; reducing force capability to develop
and execute movement plans
MC02 Result: The Log CROP, with the CIE, improved the tracking capability
Baseline entry: The major challenge of JTF TPFDD managers was obtaining a common
understanding of the relationship between prioritization, synchronization, and flow of forces
within the constraints of lift and throughput
MC02 Result: No change, continued emphasis is needed in this area
DOTMLPF Linkage
Training
- Deployment and sustainment planners should be fully integrated into the CIE
86 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ON.,V

- Consider developing training programs for multi-functional joint logistics planners,

knowledgeable in all Service capabilities
- Reassess time allocation for subordinate command mission planning time in a CIE
- Consider programs to develop and maintain proficiency in logistics decision support tools
Material
- Formalize the Log CROP
Leadership
- Train leaders on the importance of lift and logistics integration in EBO
- Reinforce adequate allocation of time for subordinate's mission planning requirements
Facilities
- Facilities (CONUS air/sea ports) to support deployment
Recommendations
1. The JFCOM Joint Logistics Transformation Center (JL TC) with the JFCOM Joint
Deployment Process Office (JDPO) should, in the near term, host seminars, work shops or
limited objective experiments (LOEs) to explore what changes have to take place to the effects-
based planning and execution process. They should also examine the means to fully integrate
force deployment, employment, and sustainment. Additionally, the group should review what
decision support tools are needed by the SJFHQ to allow them to rapidly assess the feasibility,
availability of transportation resources, of force deployment and employment scenarios in the
same timeline that effects-based planning takes place. ~
2. JFCR development should continue. JFCOM, JL TC and the Services should continue to
populate the JFCR with warfighting capabilities and application usage that supports units aligned
with their capabilities. ~
3. JFCOM JDPO should develop decision support tools to support deployment planning. ~
4. All Services should identify personnel to be trained and function solely as JOPES operators. ~
5. All Services should review use of PREP 0 in support ofRDO, and ensure PREPO assets are
kept current with force modernization. ~
6. For ISB planning, Service components should collaborate as much as possible to reduce
duplication of logistics capability in order to minimize the ISB footprint. ~
7. DoD, develop or modify doctrine to jointly coordinate the movement of forces into the JOA to
facilitate initiation of effects operations upon entry. Include the IA to ensure DIE aspects are
integrated into these efforts. ~
8. DoD, develop doctrine establishing APODs and SPODs, which are protected against
asymmetric attacks. ~
- Consideration should be placed on ADA, anti-ship, anti-submarine systems placement, and the
ability of authorities to restrict the flow of civilian traffic into and around the APODS/SPODS.
9. DoD, incorporate asymmetric attacks on posts, camps, stations and bases plus APOEs and
SPOEs into all deployment exercises. ~
F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 87

Figure 40: A soldier prepares a PSC-S communications set as Blue forces assault an
OPFOR airfield during MC02
88 FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONLY

Assessment Area 3 - Assure Access Into and Through the

Battlespace
Friendly forces successfully assured access into and through the battlespace; however,
exercise constraints prevented enemy anti-access play for the 16-day period prior to the start of
hostilities, when Blue soldiers were not available to participate.
Two of the three warfighting challenges-providing sufficient operational reach and
enhancing force protection-were achieved, but Blue was not consistently able to provide
selective dimensional superiority. Blue did not accomplish this
objective unscathed, however, and there were several caveats
to Blue's success.
First, Blue forces sustained significant losses, especially
to its maritime component, when the enemy launched a
successful pre-emptive strike. The pre-emptive strike was a
tactical success and nearly achieved an operational-level effect
on Blue forces, but Blue was able to accomplish effects tasking
order 1 (ETO) with its remaining assets.
Second, terrorist forces were able to successfully attack
Blue aircraft flying near APODS and they were able to mine
shipping lanes, thus affecting friendly lines of communication.
Again, this type of attack had a tactical effect, but was not
severe enough to initiate a friendly force change in operations.
Third, Blue forces were not able to defend against enemy air
attacks because the adversary used civilian aircraft. These
enemy attacks deceived friendly air defenses, but did not affect
friendly actions at the operational level.
In summarizing the three warfighting challenges: Blue
was not able to consistently provide selective dimensional
superiority, was only moderately successful at providing
sufficient operational reach in all instances, and had moderate
success in enhancing force protection. Nevertheless, in total,
Blue successfully and at will, entered and transited the
battlespace in support ofRDO and this MC02 objective.
Methodology
Subject matter experts, experiment participants, and observers evaluated this objective. A
series of 12 questions were submitted to the SMEs, one question was given to the warfighters, 19
command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence inputs were gathered, and 27
modeling and simulations inputs were collected throughout the experiment to address this
objective. The questions were directed to the specific person or group that was responsible for
the desired information or subject area. Specific information was gathered from the C4I systems
and the M&S systems during and at the conclusion of the experiment. Data from the modeling
and simulation areas were gathered via DCARS, the C4I information was gathered from the
SharePoint Portal Server (SPPS). mCAT captured the warfighters and SME's information.
FOR OFFICIAL T ISE ONLY 89

In addition, working group after-action reviews, and comments and recommendations,

captured via mCAT, were used to supplement the programmed data capture. The responses
were screened, sorted, analyzed, and tabulated. The data was rolled up through the element, data
requirement, measure, subtask, task, and the warfighting challenge levels to answer the
objective. Azimuth check papers were written, underscoring key points of the objective and
brought to the attention of the SMEs, analysts, and the SCDs. These papers were available
through the SPPS system, and they were the focal points during the July 29 and August 3
seSSIOns.
The assessment area was divided into three warfighting challenges: 1) the ability to provide
selective dimensional superiority, 2) the ability to provide sufficient operational reach, and 3) the
ability to enhance force protection.
The first warfighting challenge was broken into three tasks, of six measures, three
measures, and two measures respectively.
The second warfighting challenge consisted of only one task, but had three subtasks, with
three, two and four measures, respectively.
The third warfighting challenge was divided into three tasks: One of those had four
measures and one had one measure; the third task contained four subtasks of two, five, two, and
two measures, respectively.
The following systems and methods were used to collect data on these three warfighting
challenges:
COP/CROP to maintain situational awareness of attack by adversarial systems during
specific periods of time and in designated areas in the JOA; be aware of operations directed
into, directed from and occurring within the JOA, considering Blue systems capabilities and
ranges; and Blue force protection operations within the JOA
CIE and the ONA to identify and control the attacks on the enemy's key PMESII nodes and
associated linkages
CIE to control j oint forces from their home bases to the target area and back and for
coordination of force protection measures
ONA to assist in identifying potential threats
JISR for surveillance and assessment of PMESII nodes, to position j oint forces so that
mission accomplishment is minimally impacted by adversarial system positioning, and for
surveillance and assessment of potential and actual threats
EBP and EA processes to maximize joint force effectiveness and efficiency
Joint forces systems capabilities, such as stealth and standoff ability, in the JIP process to
mitigate adversarial system capabilities
EBOIEBA to position defensive forces and systems
Concepts, which impacted on these war-fighting challenges, include: CIE (COP/CROP),

JIACG, ONA, EBP, EBO, EA, JISR, and the JIP.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to provide selective dimensional superiority

This warfighting challenge addresses the ability of the joint force to dominate the
adversary during specific periods of time and in specific locations during RDO. This challenge is
oriented towards the military aspect of the DIMEIPMESII domains. The j oint force must be able
to dominate the adversary in specific locations and for set periods to provide an acceptable
90 FOR OFFICIl'",L TISE ONLY

environment for RDO. By maximizing the use of intelligence, communications capabilities and
weapons employment techniques and abilities, the joint force can attack targets selectively so
that the combatant commander may create the desired effects in the adversary's systems while
minimizing collateral damage, and friendly forces losses.
In conclusion, Blue did not provide selective dimensional superiority for all operations.
Blue capabilities were degraded by an apparent lack ofM&S ISR fidelity and timeliness. The
less than optimal M&S ISR process contributed to the unsuccessful Blue STOM executed by the
Marine component. Significantly, Blue forces did not counter the enemy's pre-emptive strike
successfully. Comments from both the Blue air and land components indicate that further
refinement in the definition, criteria, and processes is necessary for properly executing this
warfighting challenge.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to provide sufficient operational reach

This warfighting challenge addresses the ability of the joint force to provide sufficient
operational reach in support ofRDO. This challenge is oriented towards the military aspect of
the DIMEIPMESII domains. Blue power projection philosophy rests upon the ability to deploy
from present locations into the JOA. Blue forces are susceptible to numerous operational
detractors, both military and non-military. This warfighting challenge is designed to test the joint
force's ability to operate while minimizing any negative effects the adversary may direct towards
it.
In conclusion, Blue provided sufficient operational reach, however, not all systems were
sited to exploit their full range of capabilities. Sufficient or redundant friendly weapon systems
and sensors were positioned to provide Blue forces the ability to monitor areas of interest and
attack enemy targets. In some instances, while Blue weapon and sensor systems were placed
where they could complete their missions, those emplacements exposed the forces to undue or
excessive risk. Redundant capabilities and large force numbers allowed Blue more flexibility in
positioning systems than might otherwise have been feasible.
Diplomatic constraints on the positioning of friendly systems were inherent prior to and,
during hostilities. Other friendly assets were requested to supplement or replace constrained or
ineffective assets thereby ensuring Blue capabilities remained. However, benefit analysis may
have precluded the implementation of some of these options.
Most friendly assets used by the JTF were staged inside the JOA. The physical presence
of Blue forces staged in areas under enemy influence provided easier targets for terrorist and
partisan activities. Populations of sympathetic or apathetic individuals provided the terrorists
many opportunities that may have been precluded if friendly assets were staged in low threat
areas.
Stealth capabilities were successfully employed during the experiment. They provided
more capabilities to the JTF commander than comparable non-stealth assets, and did so with a
lower loss rate. Caution is necessary in this area, as the fidelity of the experimental data analyzed
thus far cannot distinguish type of targets, or level of danger the different airframes were subject
to during their attacks.
ISR system positioning was initially constrained by diplomatic issues, causing non-
optimal coverage of some of the enemy's capabilities. As hostilities commenced, those assets
moved to orbits and routes that were more favorable. However, while the JTF was asset rich, the
processing ofISR information through the M&S systems was not optimal and as a result
planning, operations and assessment did not benefit from the numbers of assets.

Blue weapons ranges were not maximized in all instances, but the redundant capabilities
offered by the components provided flexibility in the choice of weapon to employ on the
enemy's nodes.
An interesting after action review comment was made concerning the fact that two fights
were occurring. The first fight was in the traditional realm. An example of a fight in the
traditional realm could be the destruction or neutralization of coastal defense systems. The
second fight was against the asymmetrical threats. Asymmetrical examples might include deep,
behind enemy lines operations-Special Forces reconnaissance or HUMINT. Operational reach
was addressed more in the traditional fight than in the asymmetrical fight. As fighting
progressed, Blue's use of its 10 assets improved, specifically in the use of press coverage, press
conferences, pushing broadcasts, and leaflets. Operational reach in the asymmetrical fight has
different meaning and parameters than in the traditional sense.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to enhance force protection

This warfighting challenge addresses the JTF's ability to enhance force protection in
support of RDO. Enhanced protection of the j oint forces provides the combatant commander
greater flexibility to employ effects packages. Force protection encompasses not only military
elements, but also the non-combatants and systems of all DIME domains in the JOA. Adversarial
political, military, terrorist, and criminal elements as well as adversary-sympathetic entities are
potential threats to the combatant commander's j oint force.
In conclusion, Blue was able to provide limited protection for systems, capabilities, and
non-combatants in the JOA; forces in the rear area; and, with a few exceptions, forces in the
combatant areas. Except for OPFOR' s pre-emptive naval attack, successful terrorist attacks near
Blue APODs, and the use of civilian aircraft in attacking Blue infrastructure, operational air,
space, and missile defense was well executed. Systems and capabilities were generally well
protected.
Instances of friendly operations delayed, disrupted,
canceled or modified due to attacks from enemy forces
(ground or naval), partisans, or terrorists
180
160
140
I/)
Q)
I/)
120
!: 100
0
a. 80
I/)
~ 60
40
20
0
N/A Less than 5 5 to 8 13 to 16 More than 16
E] CORONADO. LEJEUNE 0 NELLIS 0 SUFFOLK n=359
Figure 41: Instances of friendly operations delayed, disrupted, and canceled because of the actions of
an enemy force

Blue forces suffered some personnel and materiel losses from enemy forces and
terrorists, but friendly force protection measures provided a sufficient level of security level to
allow the JTF commander flexibility in his range of options. The damages and losses Blue forces
sustained did not cause any alterations at the operational level, and few tactical changes (See
Figure 41).
With the assets available to the JTF during this exercise, TBM defense was 100 percent
effective in protecting the JTF' s rear areas and security measures were adequate for the
protection of Blue personnel, as well as material and facilities, contributing to relatively low
material losses and limited casualties in the rear areas. The integrated friendly air and missile
defense was operational prior to the start of hostilities, and no enemy military aircraft
successfully struck the JTF rear areas.
With the exception of the Marine STOM, Blue intentions were sufficiently shaded from
enemy forces so that conditions were set for successful Blue RDO. Additionally, Blue had one
special reconnaissance operation compromised and five Blue personnel were captured as a result.
Finding Blue forces could not isolate or suppress enemy anti-access capabilities
consistently during the experiment.
Numerous enemy anti-access targets were identified and destroyed, but CJTF-S retained
an anti -access capability throughout most of the experiment. CJTF -S used the maj ority of his
anti-access capabilities during the pre-emptive strike on Blue forces entering the JOA.
Additionally, he used deception and concealment to retain some of these assets. CJTF-S's use of
asymmetric assets such as civilian aircraft, terrorist MANPADS (man-portable-air-defense-
system) and naval mining enhanced his anti-access campaign. CJTF-S could not stop Blue forces
entering the area AOR, but he definitely disrupted Blue forces entering the JOA. 10 efforts
above the JTF level would have played a large part in the success of Blue's ability to suppress
adversarial anti-access capabilities and 10 play may have contributed to the constraining of
terrorist or other asymmetrical threats to friendly forces, prior to and during hostilities. There
were, however, no indications of 10 play above the JTF echelon.
From the completion of the Blue planning phase until Blue's entry in the JOA, OPFOR
forces took no kinetic actions against friendly forces. Many asymmetric and some kinetic enemy
actions might have been directed against Blue forces flowing into the region during this lull in
combat. If the enemy had attacked Blue forces during this period, the pre-emptive strike may
have had less effect or may have been precluded entirely. Nevertheless, an OPFOR anti-access
campaign initiated, during this period, may have hampered Blue's ability to gain entry into the
JOA.
Most respondents reported the friendly strategy to counter the enemy anti-access strategy
was adequate (See Figure 42), but it was not adequate at the operational level. If CJTF -S had a
few more assets, his strategy probably would have had an operational effect on Blue forces. As
the experiment demonstrated, CJTF-S was able to disrupt Blue's flow into the JOA. One
respondent commented, "Enemy strategy has not significantly degraded the ability of BLUE to
access or move within the theater. I do not perceive that the enemy (CJTF-S) intended to restrict
access. Most of the focus was to disrupt the ability and garner world sympathy to his plight.
Estimating that he (CJTF-S) could not totally prevent access to RED, his use of forces to attack
and degrade capabilities seems to be more effective than trying to totally prevent access."
Another participant said, "Friendly [Blue] commanders were able to anticipate enemy
activity, but not pre-empt (it)." "Blue has done a good job of collecting information on Red units
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V 93

and disposition." "Assessment was dead on. Information gathered enabled Blue forces to assess,
plan, and execute their operation to fruition."
The OPFOR pre-emptive strike was a good example of assessing the risk, but failing to
take the necessary action to address that risk. Blue considered a pre-emptive possible, but
40
I/)
II)
~ 30
o
~ 20
II)
0::
10
o
Average and Above Below Average
II[] CORONADO. LEJEUNE 0 NELLIS 0 SUFFOLK I n=84
Figure 42: Rating of adequacy of friendly strategy to counter enemy anti-access strategy
was not fully prepared for the CJTF-S's attack. Blue apparently identified and considered the
possibility of an enemy pre-emptive attack as part of the base plan during Spiral 3, but
countering that possible CJTF -S option was not further pursued by the JTF at the start of the
execution phase. Possible contributing factors to Blue's moderately unsuccessful handling of the
enemy's anti-access strategy may be due to inexperienced personnel, the lack of familiarity with
Blue staffing structure and processes, and information overload. These factors affected the staff's
ability to distill the important information from the tremendous amount of data available to the
JTF and process it through the proper sections in a timely, orderly fashion.
At the component level, measures were considered and emplaced for their entries into the
JOA, but there was an apparent failure at the JTF level to assimilate/integrate the component's
JOA entry plans into a coherent JTF level entry plan. A mitigating factor here may be that the
heavy, mission-planning load, which occurred concurrently with JOA entry, may have
overshadowed counter-strategies for OPFOR anti-access initiatives.
Apparently, there was no conceptual linkage between the components and the JTF for
joint entry operations. The joint rear area coordinator (JRAC) appeared to have the majority of
the security and protection assets in place prior to hostilities. On D+2, a JF ACC observer/trainer
indicated that the isolation and suppression ofCJTF-S's anti-access capabilities were a primary
obj ective for the JF ACC. Specific JF ACC actions for freedom of navigation operations (FON)
were to fly CAP to support JFMCC efforts to restore FON, support JFMCC efforts to neutralize
CJTF -S threat to FON in the littorals and the chokepoints, support the JFMCC to neutralize
CJTF-S mine-laying capabilities, and find and deny/destroy CJTF-S CDCM capabilities.
The JFMCC appeared prepared for most enemy contingencies, unfortunately the enemy's
pre-emptive strike overwhelmed Blue's air defense capabilities. Friendly force flow into the JOA
appeared well thought out and executed. The TPFDD process received a few comments
94 F OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

indicating that a closer relationship between logisticians, planners, and operators would improve
RDO operations.
Senior concept developer comments indicated that the CIE environment helped with both
the isolation and suppression of adversary anti -access capabilities and with Blue's ability to
achieve operational sanctuaries of space and time necessary to execute RDO. The clear
delineation of the supporting/supported relationships between the components also contributed to
the success of both of these warfighting challenges. Although numerous ISR assets were
available to Blue forces, the limited feedback from these systems (through modeling and
simulations), hindered planning and operations. Prior deliberate planning must occur and force
protection must continue when Blue executes missions to achieve operational sanctuaries.
The SCD also noted, there were no apparent re-supplying actions of enemy forces once
hostilities began from external sources. There were internal enemy re-supply operations within
the JOA between CJTF -S forces, in particular supply runs to the disputed islands where military
supplies were hidden amongst civilian supplies. Additionally, there was also an unconfirmed
report of an attempted shipment of military equipment inter-coastally to one ofCJTF-S's
residences on D+2.
Comments included, "At 030937Z Merchant vessels seen making continuous re-supply
runs to the islands." "A military element in [CJTF-S controlled coastal location] was preparing to
deliver unidentified military equipment to CJTF-S during the late Zulu hours of28 July 07. The
equipment was to be delivered to one of the CJTF-S's residences during the early hours of29
July."
There was no evidence of active DIME support for CJTF-S from outside the JOA.
However, passive assistance in the diplomatic arena came through sympathy to CJTF-S,
including some foot-dragging by some regional officials on investigations and actions for
incidents in which Blue forces were targeted by terrorists in neighboring countries, as well as
intermittent support from the government of Red. Protests occurred in neutral countries, not for
the OPFOR, but against Blue's actions in the region. The enemy was receiving open source
information from some countries, until that flow of information was shut down in response to a
Blue request. No noted military assistance flowed to the enemy. Additionally, there was no
indication of economic support to assist the enemy.
Finding Blue did not successfully create operational sanctuaries in time and space
necessary for conducting RDO.
The OPFOR pre-emptive strike, the Marine STOM and to a lesser degree, the
compromised Special Forces reconnaissance mission demonstrate Blue's inability to achieve and
or maintain operational sanctuaries in time and space. However, Blue was able to overcome each
of these specific events and successfully accomplish the assigned missions.
Although Blue suffered land, air, and sea forces losses, Blue was able to consistently
achieve local superiority at the time and location of its choosing. Blue was able to achieve
operational sanctuaries of time and space necessary to conduct RDO with two notable
exceptions: the enemy's pre-emptive strike on Blue forces in the JOA, and the Marine STOM.
OPFOR still posed threats in the air, land, and sea environments, but generally, they could not
fend off Blue military attacks against their PMESII nodes. Blue's aircraft losses are shown in
Table 7. Blue ship losses are shown in Table 8. Blue personnel losses are shown in Table 9 and
ground system losses are shown in Table 10. The majority of air and naval losses were due to air
FOR OFFICIl'"L USE ONI,V 95

and missile attacks during the OPFOR pre-emptive strike. Naval mines also contributed to Blue
losses. Further analysis is necessary to determine the specific systems causing the damage.
The majority of Blue aircraft losses were due to enemy SAM activity. As reported on
DCARS, 74 UAVs were destroyed and 349 manned Blue aircraft. These losses did not stop Blue
from achieving operational sanctions except during the pre-emptive strike and the Marine
STOM.
Table 7: Aircraft losses by type and component

I Aircraft I iI iI i i i
IComponent Equipment
I Authorized Itoss
I Replacement Available
JFACC Fixed Wing 448 32 5 421
Helo 6 0 0 6
JFLCC
Army Div Fixed Wing 12 0 0 12
Helo 42 4 0 38
MARFOR Fixed Wing 75 7 4 72
Helo 123 24 9 108
JFMCC Fixed Wing 143 11 0 132
Helo 55 11 0 44
MPA 10 0 0 10
UAV 30 4 0 26
Logistics 4 0 0 4
JSOTF Fixed Wing 26 1 0 25
Helo 35 0 0 35
JPOTF N/A
Blue reported 13 ships lost to CJTF-S action, with other ships sustaining varying degrees
of damage (See Table 8). Enemy forces inflicted this maritime damage and destruction through a
combination of CDCMs, surface to surface, SWARM attacks, mines, and mini-sub/mine
activities. Except for the pre-emptive strike, Blue naval forces provided sanctuaries in time and
space.
JFMCC Carrier 2 0 0 2
CRUDES 13 3 0 10
AMPHIB 6 0 0 6
Support/Mine 19 6 0 13
HSV/HSS 9 4 2 2
Submarines 4 0 0 4
JFLCC N/A

JFACC N/A
JSOTF Various 20 o o 20
JPOTF N/A
Blue land forces established sanctuaries in time and space, except during the Marine
STOM when the majority ofland component losses occurred. Further analysis is necessary to
determine the specific enemy systems that caused the Blue losses.
Blue personnel losses were concentrated during the pre-emptive strike period and during
the Marine STOM. Again, with these two exceptions, Blue forces established sanctuaries in time
and space. A SOF team was compromised, resulting in the capture of five of its personnel,
exemplifying a small but significant loss of Blue sanctuary.
XMEB 151 330 92%

Army Div 794 224 o 91%
MEU 23 117 o 90%
JRAC o o o 100%
JFLCC 968 671 91%
Table 10: Friendly ground system losses
JFLCC
MLRS 18 0 0 18
HMMWV 69 4 7 58
Stryker 274 2 0 272
MARFOR M1A1 68 0 68
AAAV 153 0 153
IAV 274 3 271
LAV 53 8 45
JFACC 861 0 29 803
JFMCC N/A
JSOTF N/A
JPOTF Various 69 0 0 69
JTF 1839 17 36 1757

Finding Despite persistent targeting and rapid engagement, Blue could not deny the
enemy sanctuary.
Enemy forces re-grouped during lulls between Blue attacks. CJTF-S's pre-emptive strike
denied Blue targets, which his anti-access assets would have presented had they not been used
first. CJTF -S forces also used dispersion, cover, concealment, and deception to preserve assets.
Blue forces dominated enemy forces during specific engagements, but enemy capabilities that
remained operational after Blue's immediate objective was achieved, had the potential to impact
other remaining effects desired by the Blue forces.
Blue's persistent targeting and rapid engagement ofOPFOR did not serve to deny
sanctuary to the enemy. Moreover, as the OPFOR regrouped between Blue's strikes, Blue's
efforts were shown as 'not persistent.' The ONA provided a good starting point in conjunction
with the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) to target key enemy locations,
equipment, and forces. The joint fires element (JFE) was responsive to information received, but
the time it took the JISR process to feed new and updated information to the other elements in
the system was problematic. This delay diminished Blue's efforts to counter enemy PMESII
nodes.
The JFACC indicated that the CJTF-S's pre-emptive strike pushed Blue air power
somewhat off balance, and that a great effort was necessary to keep Blue air corridors open.
Additionally, the lack ofM&S ISR fidelity caused frustration amongst the JF ACC staff. The
JFMCC said the definition for rapidly setting conditions for decisive operations needed to be
adjusted before they could become comfortable with it. The Marine STOM was initially
unsuccessful and was an indicator that Blue could not consistently set the conditions and
successfully execute all operations necessary to achieve the desired effects against enemy
PMESII nodes.
To counter enemy anti-access strategies, Blue combined the efforts of the components
with the JFMCC targeting C2, TBMs, CDCMs, lADS, surface and sub-surface maritime targets,
terrorists, and pirates. The JF ACC targeted C2, TBMs, and enemy air and provided support to
the JFMCC. The JSOTF targeted terrorists, enemy leadership, communications nodes, and
assisted the JFMCC with anti-surface attack against enemy vessels.
Blue reported that 24 percent (12 of 49 node groups for freedom of navigation
operations) were effectively struck during ETO 1 operations, on D+4. Additional freedom of
navigation nodes were struck, but were not degraded sufficiently to meet the desired effects
levels. Forty-three percent (21 of 49) of the node groups attacked in ETO 1 were only partially
destroyed, while 16 node groups (33 percent) were rated as not meeting the desired effects
levels. During ETO lA, the percentage of effectively struck node groups rose to 78 percent (38
of 49 node groups for effect 823 during ETO lA). Partially achieved effects came to 20 percent
(10 of 49 node groups), and unachieved effects node groups totaled two percent (1 of 49 node
groups). Many of the anti-access PMESII nodes were similar for both ETO 1 and ETO lA,
which allowed the ETO 1 effects achieved to contribute to the ETO lA effects. This cumulative
achievement of effects directly reflects in the increased percentage of effectively struck node
groups for ETO lA versus ETO 1.
Finding Blue provided sufficient forces, capabilities, and positioning of sensors

necessary to conduct EBO and to accomplish the assured access mission.
Blue forces considered the diplomatic and enemy situations and placed complimentary
weapon and sensor systems to provide the necessary capabilities to the JTF commander. When a

Blue system could not be placed to take advantage of it' s inherent capabilities, other Blue assets
filled the void.
An observer/trainer indicated that Blue's redundant capabilities provided incentive to
ensure that friendly weapon systems were positioned to take advantage of their operational reach.
Additionally, most observers indicated Blue positioning was good and that it accommodated
constraints imposed by OPFOR systems.
"Planners are moving JIACG constraining, ISR platform tracks to optimize coverage for
the current desired effects(s). The limitation was lADS and for AA threat."
"Again, from what I can tell, and with the limitations, placed on the JTF from the JIACG,
they were deployed to exploit the (IR) maximum capabilities."
Had the JTF been tailored (reduced in size) to a greater extent, the components would
have placed much more emphasis on weapon system placement. Blue force positioning factors
included OPFOR air, lADS, CDCMs, and TBM range capabilities as well as political
considerations constraining Blue force deployment, basing, and employment. A senior concept
developer mentioned that MC02 might not provide the proper venue to properly test Blue's
ability to provide sufficient operational reach.
Blue had mixed results with the placement of systems to find enemy forces and
capabilities. Some individual pieces of equipment could not be placed for maximum operational
reach; however, other Blue assets performed the necessary functions. Initial friendly force
positioning somewhat limited Blue's ability to find and monitor enemy assets. When the JTF
placed equipment in non-optimal locations, it was usually because of diplomatic or geographical
reasons. Prior to hostilities, friendly ISR devices were positioned away from enemy territory so
that optimal systems coverage was not possible for many assets. However, friendly maritime
assets were stationed in or transited waters within the enemy's monitor and attack radius. Some
Blue war fighters defended this use of friendly maritime assets as being within the range of
acceptable risk, and because this course of action would allow more flexibility for the anticipated
follow-on mission of capturing the disputed islands.
Additionally, an experiment related shortfall might have caused critical intelligence data
from reaching the right people. There was a possible breakdown in the complete and timely
transmission of data from sensors to end users, which may have been due to a modeling/scripting
shortfall.
Blue used assets based both in and out of the JOA. Approximately seven percent of fixed
wing air power, including B-52s, KC-IOs, B-Is, and B-2s, were based outside the JOA, and Blue
forces took advantage of these systems' operational reach. Additionally, various higher echelon
ISR assets were based outside the JOA, although, much of their collection efforts went to the
JTF.
Given the initial diplomatic and geographical constraints, the early designation of
component ownership of rear area control responsibilities may have eased de-confliction issues,
and may have resulted in a more optimal positioning of assets. As fuel was supplied through host
nation support, Blue systems again, may not have been optimally positioned to take advantage of
their inherent operational reach. Organization and planning, such as that done for the 82D
Airborne Division assets, could have resulted in better use of operational reach. In the 82D's
case, a smaller rear area footprint, a reduced TPFDD requirement, and a smaller force flow may
have resulted from a better use of the unit's operational reach capabilities, if deployed without
intermediate staging in the rear area. If the airborne forces flow straight from their home base to
FOR OFFICIl'"L USE ONI,V 99

their combat mission, there would be a reduced requirement for a logistics tail at ISBs and a
corresponding reduction in the overall number of support personnel.
Other key points that affected force positioning included the need to have more and better
j oint training, highly capable command and control capability (especially for the j oint tactical
actions that in the future may be an integral component of the JTF), and an ability to dynamically
re-task components. Strategic choke points, such as the Suez and Panama Canals, and various
straits may be rendered impassible to traffic, which in turn could force units to occupy alternate
locations.
Terrorist activities at APODs and SPODs will also contribute heavily to the non-optimal
positioning of friendly forces. A balance between the safety of forces and the ability to use
asset's capabilities to the fullest may shift positioning criteria. A C-17 full of paratroopers may
be safer and more effective dropping over an enemy objective than landing in the theater rear
area due to MANP AD-equipped terrorists operating near the APODs. As a senior concept
developer indicated, US. forces may have to consider the boundaries of the continental US. as
the line of departure/line of contact. Although not noticed in this experiment, the positioning of
forces for a deception plan may be reason enough not to optimally position forces, for their range
capabilities, but rather for their desired effects on the enemy.
Blue was able to successfully employ stealth assets against numerous enemy nodes.
Friendly stealth aircraft conducted a disproportionate percentage of the mission strikes compared
to non-stealth aircraft. Stealth aircraft constituted only 10 percent of the friendly attacking fixed
winged assets, yet they conducted 16 percent of the strike missions. Additionally, stealth losses
were only five percent of overall attack aircraft losses with the downing of a single B-2. Time
constraints precluded an assessment of data to determine targeting breakout between stealth and
non-stealth assets, but generally, Blue stealth assets were more effective than non-stealth assets
against the enemy forces.
Prior to hostilities, diplomatic constraints caused some friendly ISR assets to be placed in
constrained locations negatively impacting their coverage of OPFOR assets and capabilities.
Additionally, Blue did not want to upset the government of Red by operating ISR platforms too
close to their borders.
Once hostilities began, Blue repositioned its sensor systems to provide coverage of the
enemy's assets. Tactically, some airborne sensors had modifications to their tracks to
accommodate potential enemy SAM locations. One SME stated, "In looking at other possible
target areas, it was determined that intelligence coverage was desired. When analyzing the
available coverage, the UAVs did not have the required range. Re-evaluation of BLUE SOF
elements was conducted and it was determined that it was not economical (man-power or
material-wise) to task currently employed forces. Coordination to gain national assets to cover
the intelligence gap was surfaced." When certain Blue assets lacked the capacity to fulfill a
specific mission, the JTF used other assets to perform that mission, or a request for higher
echelon assistance was forwarded to the combatant commander.
Other comments indicated that there were sufficient Blue ISR assets to cover the PMESII
nodes. Space assets were used in general support, but there was no indication of specific PMESII
nodes being covered by space assets. Airborne sensor positions were limited by pre-hostilities
diplomatic constraints and later by enemy anti-aircraft defensive systems once hostilities began.
These constrained locations prevented friendly assets from using their full capabilities against
enemy forces and systems. Some instances of Blue stand off weapons include: air and sea
100 FOR OFFICIAL lISE ONLY

launched cruise missiles, guided anti-tank weapons, directed bombs, and surface to surface
missiles.
The level of detail available for analysis precludes the ability to distinguish specific
PMESII nodes covered by space assets; however, Blue briefings indicated that space assets
provided general JOA coverage.
No specific instances were discernable where a weapon was assigned to an enemy
PMESII node when a longer range, equally capable weapon was available. However, generalities
such as the "Weapons used were appropriate," and "ATACMS vs. B-2 for soft targets" were
mentioned by SMEs. These SME comments indicated that Blue had sufficient capabilities to
choose among various types of ordnances to accomplish a mission. Therefore, Blue was not
forced to use less optimal weapons during operations (See Figure 43).
Comments included using the appropriate assets to target PMESII nodes and noted
concern about failure to reach certain targets due to range limitations of the UAV. Additional
assets were being investigated fill holes in the coverage. The limited range of some aerial assets
precluded them from accomplishing some long-range missions. The asymmetrical nature of
RDO pushed the need for lower echelon units to have longer-range ISR capabilities.
Instances of attacks on PMESII nodes have occurred, but those attacks were ordered by
conscious decision. Range is only a small portion of the equation. There are collateral damage
concerns, which may require precision guided munitions or non-lethal platforms when attacking
PMESII nodes.
Instances of PMESII nodes being attacked by aweapon when alonger range

and equally capable weapon was available.
250
II)
G)
200
II)
r::: 150
0
c.. 100
II)
G)
0:: 50
0
NlA Less than 5 5 to 8 9to 12
IEm CORONADO. LEJEUNE 0 NELLIS 0 SUFFOLK I
Figure 43: Instances of less than optimum weapon selection
Finding At the operational level, Blue was able to provide protection for operational
forces, means, and noncombatants in the JOA.

Blue successfully protected the personnel and assets engaged in RDO. Blue was very
successful in protecting civilians (both in the CJTFs controlled areas and in areas friendly to
Blue forces) from both enemy actions and unintended friendly actions. MC02 experiment
warfighters reported few instances where friendly operations were delayed, disrupted, canceled,
or modified due to attacks by enemy forces, partisans, or terrorists. The respondents appeared to
refer solely to tactical operations in their comments on this question. SCDs, SMEs, and OPFOR
observers stated that the enemy inflicted operational level damage on Blue assets specifically
referring to the preemptive strike. Some of the success of the pre-emptive strike may be due to
the experiment artificialities and scripting limitations experienced during the experiment.
Supporting Analysis:
Blue provided protection against enemy missile and air attacks in the rear areas. But, the
enemy was able to conduct successful attacks using civilian airplanes and vessels, and did so
primarily to impede APOD and SPOD operations. Additionally, using terrorists, enemy forces
attacked supporting, host-nation infrastructure and personnel along with any key leadership
whom they thought were aiding the Blue effort.
Operationally, Blue continued its planned missions throughout the exercise without
delay, disruption, cancellation, or modification. Blue's depth in resources more than made up for
any losses causes by enemy hostile action. Although the enemy was able to delay, disrupt, and
modify Blue actions at the tactical level, including sinking Blue ships and downing Blue aircraft,
they were not able to cause the cancellation of Blue operational actions.
Senior warfighters and concept developers warned that the rear area commander should
be identified early on in the JTF process. This would allow the command and control and
working relationships between the elements from the participating components, and the host
nations sufficient time to jell. Designation of a rear area, component commander, to fulfill both
the JRHC and the component synchronization of supporting functions duties, is a possible
solution. Although the enemy inflicted personnel losses and equipment damages and losses on
Blue, the OPFOR could not force Blue to change its operational goals.
Table 11: Forces OPCON to the JRAC by Phase
InfBn (USMC) 1
MV -22 (USMC) 2
1 1
F-18 2
InfBN 2 1
UH-60 CO (ARMY) 1 1
AH-64 CO (ARMY) 1 1
Approximately four percent of Blue ground forces were assigned to rear area security.
That number nearly tripled depending on the phase of rear area operation if OPCON forces are
included in the JRAC ground personnel count.
Finding Blue was moderately successful in providing operational air, space, and missile
defense.

Blue actions, although generally successful, had notable shortcomings. A preemptive,

combined, air and missile attack on forces in the JOA showcased a Blue shortcoming. The Blue
maritime component was unable to provide air defense against an overwhelming attacking force,
absorbing a tremendous strike, which damaged and sunk several high-value ships. Additionally,
Blue was unable to control the airspace around the SPODS and APODS as the OPFOR used
civilian aircraft to penetrate friendly airspace. Blue shortcomings may have resulted from:
Planning for the most likely enemy COA versus planning for the most dangerous COA
Linkage between component entry capabilities and the JTF JOA entry plan left
vulnerabilities open for enemy attack
Maximum operational reach may not have been used due to positioning for successive
mISSIOns
Vulnerability to terrorist attacks against APODs, SPODs, aircraft, and personnel
Blue successfully provided integrated air and missile defense to the degree that the only
Blue operational modification was a disrupted entry into the JOA at the beginning of Operation
Sovereign Passage. Blue's air and missile defense system was largely in place prior to the
commencement of hostilities. Blue prevented all enemy military air and missile attacks from
causing damage to the JROAC areas.
Enemy civilian (terrorist) airplanes caused tactical level damage due to the inability to
determine the intent of the civilian plane's operators. Blue forces were aware of the aircraft, but
could not ascertain the intentions of the pilot. On occasion, these aircraft would veer off their
flight paths at the last moment to attack Blue facilities, crashing civilian airplanes into friendly
facilities, causing damage to aircraft and killing or wounding personnel. Some of these aircraft
were suspected of carrying chemical or biological weapons.
The JTF took 19 days to complete its anti-air umbrella, from the movement to the SPODs
on C-5 until the assumption of the JOA responsibilities on C+ 14. A missile defense battery
flown into theater was in place by C+5 for an establishment time of four days. Six missile
defense batteries were reported operational, protecting 10 CAL sites by C+ 16. Four CAL sites
were covered by Aegis systems, and host nation missile defenses covered three other CAL sites.
Limited THAAD coverage was also in place.
CJTF-S's early preemptive strike was the sole instance where Blue operational level
actions were affected by enemy offensive air or missile attacks during the entire exercise.
JFMCC sustained significant damage; enough to disrupt his freedom of navigation goal. Other
enemy missile attacks became tactically significant, especially when Blue, or merchant vessels
were struck, damaged, or sunk. These tactical actions, however, did not cause Blue operational
delay, disruption, modification, or cancellation (See Figure 44). This result should be considered
within the context of the experiment assumptions and limitations presented in Chapter 6.
Friendly forces successfully identified, attacked and destroyed, or neutralized enemy
offensive military air assets. They identified all enemy military aircraft and destroyed 87 percent
of them (90 percent of fixed wing, over 80 percent of rotary-winged assets). There were no
indications that there were any lapses in Blue's monitoring of enemy aircraft and missile usage
against Blue forces. The level of model and simulation detail and the supplemental scripting
levels, however, did not provide detailed information specific enough to obtain a definitive
answer.

Instances of friendly operations delayed, disrupted,

canceled or modified due to enemy offensive air or
missile attacks.
140 , ..................................~==~.
120 + -- - - I f--------------'~
:3 100 +-----j/I--------~...........
~ 80 1 - - - 1 I------~_______.
o
Q.
C/)
60
&! 40
20
o
N/A Less than 5 5 to 8 13 to 16 More than 16
II!![] CORONADO. LEJEUNE D NELLIS D SUFFOLK I n=309
Figure 44: Instances of friendly operations delayed by enemy actions, by days of delay
MANP ADS, used by terrorists near friendly airfields, were successfully employed by
OPFOR, bringing down three large support aircraft, including a C-5, a 767, and a KC-135.
Approximately 76 percent of offensive enemy missiles were destroyed in flight. Blue
naval forces suffered early losses as 11 ships were hit and suffered some level of damage: one
AOR, two DDGs, one DDX, three HSVs, one MCM, one MHC, one T-AGOS, and one MPS.
The friendly rear area was very well defended against TBM attacks, with no reported
destruction or damage due to those enemy missile systems.
Grading the conduct of tactical warning and attack assessment in the JOA, Blue was
successful in identifying incoming missile and air attacks, except during the enemy's pre-
emptive strike. The enemy's plan to distract, then overwhelm, Blue anti-air and anti-missile
assets produced a great deal of damage and destruction of maritime assets during the opening
engagement of the war.
Other Observations
Observation 1: Blue forces protected systems and capabilities in the JOA.
No operations and security (OPSEC) violations were reported neither were there any
incidences of Blue action or inaction that conveyed intent to the enemy, such that Blue joint
operations were delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified.
Some minor Blue OPSEC breaches occurred, but these incidences had no effect on Blue
operations (See Figure 45).

A Special Forces team

was compromised, causing the Instances of compromise of friendly intentions causing
loss of personnel, but there was joint operations to be delayed, disrupted, canceled, or
modified.
no noticeable impact on joint
operations that resulted in delay,
disruption, cancellation, or 200 + _ - - - - = = - - - - - - c 7 >
ill
modifications to plans. One SME ~
o
150+_--~... r----~.
stated, "Friendly intentions were ~100+_--~... <r-----~9

&!
not compromised due to a team 50
being discovered." Had the o

N/A Less than 5 5 to 8 9 to 12
experiment lasted longer, Blue
would most likely have added I El CORONADO III LEJEUNE El NELLIS El SUFFOLK I n=359
further missions to rescue the

captured SF personnel. Figure 45: Instances of compromised intentions

Assessment Area 3 impacted several other experimental concepts and assessment areas.
The ones affected are discussed below.
ONA
- Database research for facilities and infrastructure provides support to access operations into and
throughout the JOA
EBO
- EBO assists with the development and execution of Assured Access plans and operations.
Assured Access is an integral component necessary to ensure that further Effects Based
Operations can occur in the JOA
Sustainment
- Assured access permits sustainment of the JTF
Collaborative Information Environment

- CIE provides the environment for collaborative planning and coordinating logistics and
operations in support of Assured Access operations
Interagency
- Interagency relations affect the interaction for coordinating host nation support (food, facilities,
equipment) and humanitarian assistance in preparation for and execution of Assured Access
operations
JISR
- JISR impacts the intelligence on the deployment routes, the JOA and adversary activities
therein that would adversely impact force deployment and Assured Access operations

IS
- Information Superiority is a major component in ensuring conditions for assured access
operations
EBO Decisive Operations
- Assured access is an instrumental condition for the execution of decisive operations in the JOA
EBO Planning and Assessment

- Effects Based Planning is essential for successful assured access planning and operations
Sustain the Force

- Assured access is necessary for force sustainment operations. Sustainment operations to the
JOA are vital for successful assured access operations

Baseline entry: The JMC had difficulty in force tracking; reducing force capability to develop
and execute movement plans
MC02 Result: The JFMCC showed a vast improvement in this area
Baseline entry: Forces arrived late in the JOA, severely degrading the commander, joint task
force (CJTF) ability to successfully prosecute his assigned missions
MC02 Result: During MC02 the JFMCC showed an improvement in his ability to integrate
forces arriving in the JOA
Baseline entry: The JTF did not maintain adequate visibility on rear area operations (RAO)
MC02 Result: During MC02 the JTF had very good visibility of the RAO, with CIE, LOG
CROP etc. assisting in the situational awareness
Baseline entry: There was little coordination between the theater missile defense (TMD) cell and
the joint fires element (JFE). This resulted in ineffective targeting guidance
MC02 Result: During MC02 the JTF was very successful in coordination of TMD and effective
targeting guidance given to firing elements. Rear area missile defense was conducted in an
exemplary fashion with near perfect performance
Baseline entry: The joint rear area (JRA) was not defined until well after the planning phase,
causing general confusion in JRA operations

MC02 Result: During MC02 the JRA was defined early on in the experiment. The rear area
planning and coordination for operations was performed in a very organized manner and this
resulted in a successful RAO defense
DOTMLPF Linkage
- There is no DOTMLPF package associated with Assured Access
Recommendations
1. JFCOM, develop an Assured Access concept to support EBO and RDO. ~
2. JFCOM, conduct an LOE to explore integration ofD, I, and E with JTF operations. ~
- All aspects of the DIME elements of national power should be considered collaboratively,
when dealing with an enemy. Collaboration between the D and M aspects of the national
elements of power is a pre-requisite for a successful counter to enemy anti-access strategies. For
example, regarding the diplomatic to military linkage, a demarche's likely effects on the enemy
need to be considered prior to the commitment of friendly military elements. A specific set of
ROE for implementation with the issuance of the demarche may increase Blue's ability to
successfully counter enemy anti-access strategies. If an enemy is diplomatically backed into a
corner where his best and only viable alternative is a pre-emptive attack, the friendly forces in
the area should be aware and prepared for that possibility before the enemy attacks.
3. JFCOM, investigate the establishment of an 10 group or task force to integrate 10 into JTF
operations. ~
4. JFCOM, conduct further concept development, experimentation and analysis on JRSOI to
focus on effects capabilities in support ofEBOIRDO. ~
5. JFCOM, conduct further experimentation on the tailoring of forces from the components for
integration into the JTF. ~
- The JTA concept may need to be revised or eliminated, as the supported-supporting
relationships seemed to be more than sufficient for all the joint missions executed by the JTF.
The tailoring of forces should help reduce the JTF footprint in the JOA, reduce the redundancy
of capabilities brought into the JOA by each of the components, reduce the transportation asset
requirements for the JTF, and indirectly force the logistics to planner/operations relationships to
become more intertwined and streamlined.
6. JFCOM, improve the effectiveness of decision support tools for the deployment and
redeployment of JTF resources. ~
7. JFCOM, revise concept documents to specify a closer working relationship between the
logistics personnel and the operational planners for RDO logistical integration. ~
- Logistical integration should be much more important in EBO and RDO than in legacy
operations. Therefore, a closer and timelier link between the traditional planning and logistics
functions is needed. An ONA conduit or linkage for logistical information should assist in the
conduct ofEBOIRDO.

8. JFCOM, research new metrics for assessment of non-kinetic attacks on non-traditional

targets.~
- Blue forces understood and resourced traditional targets without difficulty. However,
asymmetrical targets, such as 10 targets or deep land component targets, needed dedicated
servicing (complete target cycle) designed for that effect. This servicing implies that a new
metric is needed for asymmetric targets, including operational reach. Operational reach in the
asymmetrical fight, which has different meaning and parameters than in the traditional sense,
should be researched further.
9. JFCOM, explore assigning ISR platforms at lower echelons to meet the tactical ISR demands
placed on tactical units by the asymmetrical nature ofEBOIRDO. ~
10. JFCOM, develop a dedicated, joint, rear-area command concept refined for EBOIRDO. ~
11. JFCOM, provide guidance on pre-hostility ROE change implementation to support RDO
actions, and to ensure the safety of friendly forces and capabilities in the JOA. ~
- Specifically, establish clear guidelines for civilian aircraft transiting the JOA. This guidance
should help ensure safety in the JOA from civilian aircraft, whose intentions are unknown. The
guidance should give friendly forces the time and space necessary to react to civilian aircraft
once their intentions are determined.
12. JFCOM, refine joint air and space missile defense doctrine to support effects-based
operations. ~
- Both force packaging of ADA assets and TPFDD flows of ADA assets, combined with naval
air defensive capabilities and host nation ADA capabilities, are ingredients necessary to ensure
JOA air and space missile defense is provided through JOA establishment, operations, and
disestablishment.

Figure 46: SEAL Team transportation standing by to embark riders to an objective area

Assessment Area 4 - Conduct Decisive Effects..Based

Operations (EBO)
The ability to conduct decisive Effects-Based Operations demonstrated future potential as
a defense application during this experiment. The JTF proved it could coordinate the actions of a
diverse force throughout a large geographic area against a determined and diverse adversary
using EBO concepts, processes, and tools. This objective was
comprised of three warfighting challenges: to demonstrate the
ability to synchronize the application of the full range of joint
capabilities in order to engage decisive points in time and
space; to demonstrate the ability to integrate full joint
capabilities against tactical level objectives; to demonstrate the
ability to integrate execution of information operations into
The ability to synchronize the application of the full
range of joint capabili ti es in order to engage deci si ve points in
time and space was successfully demonstrated during this
experiment and was greatly enhanced by the use of Effects-
Based Planning. The use of CIE tools gave the JTF and
functional components the ability to plan simultaneously both
vertically and horizontally allowing better developed responses
to the adversary's actions. The availability of the ONA and the
ability to access non-military resources through the JIACG and
reach-back capability enabled the JTF to access and better
understand the application of all facets of National Power
(DIME). It also allowed the JTF to achieve desired effects and
to respond in a more comprehensive manner to changes in the
political and economic scenario. The joint fires initiative (JFI)
and time sensitive target (TST) concept, in conjunction with
CIE tools, greatly enhanced the JTF's ability to identify, locate,
and prosecute targets and to achieve desired effects. However,
the ability to conduct operational combat assessment was not
successfully demonstrated during the experiment. The ability to
conduct combat assessment was hindered in part by experiment
constraints, M&S fidelity, and manning of the assessment cells. There are also indications that
some of the EBO concepts were not fully used or understood by the participants.
The ability to integrate full joint capabilities against tactical level objectives was
demonstrated during this experiment. Although the JTF successfully met this challenge, there
was ample evidence that it did not adhere to all of the concepts of Effects-Based Operations and
Planning. There is evidence that JTF planners did not develop branches and sequels based on
effects assessment, deficiency analysis and predictive analysis as required by the concept. In
addition, planning was driven more by the commander than by the principles of effects-based
planning. Wargaming was conducted only sporadically during the experiment by JTF and
component planners, and then only at the tactical level, leading to an overall inability to
anticipate OPFOR's moves and plan proper responses to counter them. The use of collaboration
110 FOR OFFICIAl, lISE ONLY

and CIE tools enabled the JTF to overcome some of the problems that could have been caused by
failure to follow the concept methods. The result of not following concept guidelines was that the
JTF was unable to get inside OPFOR's decision cycle and anticipate its moves. The JTF was, as
a result, more reactive than proactive in the prosecution of the conflict. Even so, JTF was able to
quickly assemble, synchronize, and employ joint forces against key tactical and operational
objectives to achieve desired effects, and able to maintain the initiative and dictate the tempo of
operations throughout the experiment. Most of the problems observed during the execution of
this warfighting challenge can be corrected through training and experience.
The ability to integrate execution of information operations into effects-based operations
was not successfully demonstrated during the experiment. Although 10 capabilities were
considered during operational planning, and some were executed, all 10 capabilities were not
used and integrated into JTF operations. During the experiment, the assessment of the
contribution of 10 actions was not fully considered or used to modify or initiate plans and
actions. Whether this was a process problem or caused by limitations due to M&S, assessment of
the contribution of 10 actions was not considered. The JTFs 10 campaign plan was mostly
ineffective, failing to win over the hearts and minds of the adversary or have a significant impact
on the JTFs ability to achieve desired effects.
Special technical operations (STO) was a notable exception in the 10 campaign. STO
actions were coordinated at the component level, and the information was disseminated to the
JTF via STO personnel assigned to the JTF. However, STO actions were not fully integrated
across the JTF or into the JTF 10 plan. 10 was planned, coordinated, and executed at the JTF and
component levels, but it was not integrated across the force. Due to poor BDA, the effects of the
10 campaign were not always recognized by either the JTF or components; this led to allocation
of resources against 10 targets that may have already been neutralized. This warfighting
challenge needs to be re-evaluated in future experiments.
Methodology
More than 215 experiment participants and observers evaluated this assessment area. A
series of 50 questions were given to the warfighters, 68 questions were submitted to the SMEs,
49 C 41 questions were asked, and 40 M&S questions went out, which were addressing this
objective. The questions were directed to the specific person or group that was responsible for
the desired information or subject area. Specific information was sought from the C 41 systems
and the M&S systems personnel during and at the conclusion of the experiment via SPPS and
DCARS, respectively. JDCAT was used to record the warfighters' and SMEs' surveys and
comments. In addition, AARs from various working group, boildown sessions conducted at the
conclusion of the experiment with senior JTF HQ and component participants were recorded and
comments and recommendations (captured via JDCAT) were used to supplement the
programmed data capture. The responses were screened, sorted, analyzed, and tabulated. The
data was rolled up through the element, data requirement, measure, subtask, task, and the
warfighting challenge levels to answer the objective question. 'Azimuth check' papers for this
objective were written in which the key points of the objective were listed and brought to the
attention of the SMEs, analysts and the senior concept developers. The papers were available
through the SPPS system, and they were the focal points during several August meetings of the
SMEs, analysts, and SCDs.

Warfighting Challenge: Ability to synchronize the application of the full range of joint
capabilities in order to engage decisive points in time and space
This warfighting challenge addresses the ability of the joint force to identify, target,
attack, disrupt, and destroy an adversary's PMESII key nodes, linkages, and TSTs in support of
EBO.
The ability to synchronize the application of the full range of j oint DIME capabilities in
order to engage decisive points in time and space depends on the ability to rapidly identify
potential targets. Also, sought are the ability to engage TST targets, assigning the appropriate
DIME capability to engage the target, and the ability to accurately assess the success or failure of
the engagement, determining if the desired effects have been achieved. The specific tasks used to
assess this warfighting challenge were: Conduct joint force targeting to support EBO, attack
operational targets to achieve desired effects, and coordinate and integrate joint, multinational
and interagency support for EBO.
In conclusion, the ability to synchronize the application of the full range of joint
capabilities in order to engage decisive points in time and space, as demonstrated in this
experiment, was enhanced by the use of Effects Based Operations and Planning. The use ofCIE
tools gave the JTF and Functional components the ability to plan simultaneously both
horizontally and vertically allowing quicker and better-developed responses to an adversary's
actions. The availability of the ONA and reach back capability gave the JTF the ability to access
and understand the application of all facets of national power (DIME) to achieve desired effects
and enabled the JTF to respond in a more comprehensive manner to changes in the political and
economic scenario. The ability to develop operational targets was successfully demonstrated and
the ability of the JTF to prosecute TST targets using JFIITST procedures was a significant
success. Collaboration enabled the functional components to quickly identify and prosecute
TSTs as they were found. It also enabled cross-cueing of targets and provided a nearly flawless
transfer of target responsibility from one functional component to another.
The ability of the JTF to conduct operational combat assessment was not demonstrated
successfully, possibly due to problems with obtaining timely and accurate BDA and
organizational and training deficiencies in the effects assessment cell. The ability to obtain
accurate and timely BDA and to assess the success or failure of JTF target prosecution was
hindered by poor M&S fidelity and the ISR model's inability to accurately replicate ISR assets.
Without accurate and timely BDA, some JTF assets were tasked to re-attack targets already
destroyed, or targets that required re-attack were not placed back on the target list.
JTF demonstrated the ability to attack operational targets successfully, using the ONA
and reach-back capabilities to determine weapon and target selection to attain the desired effects
promulgated in the ETO. The consensus indicated that the TST procedures used during MC02
were nearly ready to use as a j oint standard. Some of the procedures and techniques were
modified during the experiment and these changes need to be incorporated in the TTP. ADOCS
proved to be a viable targeting tool, especially for TST presentation. It should be fielded as an
interim improvement, now. However, some users indicated that ADOCS needs further
development to become user-friendly. Prior to fielding, the ADOCS interface should be tested to
ensure compatibility with other software systems used throughout the JTF.
The ability to integrate joint, multinational, and interagency support for EBO is a concept
that showed great potential during the experiment. The use of DIE pillars of national power can
have a powerful effect on the battlefield. With the potential impact of DIE actions on the
battlespace and the diverse organizations and individuals needed to implement DIE actions, who

should coordinate DIE actions and where should the JIACG be located? The JIACG, as used in
this experiment, was constituted as a cell/board within the JECG. Most DIE assets are not
controlled by CJTF and the effects they generate are most associated with combatant
commander/national goals (nation building, regime change, coalition building, humanitarian aid)
as opposed to CJTF desired effects; and in some instances can work against CJTFs plans.
A senior concept developer said, "The CJTF doesn't have the horsepower or authority to
access all aspects of DIME. "
One recommendation for the JIACG calls for a JIACG forward element to serve as a
liaison cell/group on the JTF staff. The group would apprise the JTF of the DIE actions being
conducted or contemplated and would solicit feedback regarding these actions' effects on CJTF's
overall campaign plan. The liaison cell also would emphasize a JIACG-like element on the
combatant commanders staff to direct and coordinate DIE actions. In this experiment, the JTF
discussed and contemplated DIE actions, but did not implement them. Due to the construct of the
experiment, the major emphasis of the JTF's campaign was focused on the military aspects of
DIME.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to integrate full joint capabilities against tactical level
objectives
This warfighting challenge addresses the ability of the joint force to assemble and deploy
forces to take advantage of a rapidly changing scenario. The change in situation may be caused
by disruption or destruction of the adversary's capabilities, in which case the force is required to
dynamically re-task effects packages. Re-tasking is used for follow-on actions or in response to
an adversary's surprise attack or when an operational branch is no longer available, suitable, or
acceptable for the mission.
Execution of this warfighting challenge depends on the ability of the joint force to
respond to a rapidly changing scenario, rapidly assessing an adversary's actions and assembling
the appropriate effects packages to take advantage of the changes in the adversary's capabilities
or actions. The specific tasks used to assess this warfighting challenge were: Synchronize and
employ joint capabilities against key tactical objectives, and dynamically re-task affects
packages for follow-on actions.
In conclusion, the JTF successfully demonstrated the ability to integrate full joint
capabilities against tactical level objectives. However, although JTF successfully met this
challenge, there is ample evidence that JTF did not adhere to all of the concepts of effects-based
planning and operations. There is evidence that JTF planners did not develop branches and
sequels based on effects assessment and predictive analysis as the EBO concept required.
Wargaming was conducted only sporadically at the JTF and component levels, contributing to an
inability to anticipate and counter OPFOR's moves. The use of collaboration and CIE tools
enabled the JTF to overcome most of the problems that could have been caused by not following
the concept methods. The JTF was reactive instead of proactive throughout the experiment.
Horizontal and vertical collaboration allowed the JTF to quickly assemble, synchronize,
and employ joint forces against key tactical objectives. When tasked by the combatant
commander to secure OPFOR's WME sites, the JTF quickly was able to assemble the required
forces, assign a commander to develop a sound plan for implementation, deploy the forces, and
conduct RDO (all in less than 48 hours). Under current procedures and doctrine, an operation of
this scale could have taken much longer to develop and execute. Using collaboration, the correct

level ofleadership interacted directly to rapidly and efficiently resolve all the inherent problems
associated with a task of this magnitude.
OPFOR's reaction to the ultimatum delivered by regional governments surprised Blue
commanders. However, after an initial setback, coming in the wake of OPFOR' s opening attack,
Blue quickly regained the initiative and dictated the tempo of operations throughout the JOA.
With few exceptions, the JTF conducted operations in the JOA with a minimum of disruption
and delay. Due more to overwhelming force than to the use of EBO concepts, the JTF took
advantage of disruptions to OPFOR's operations and changes in relative strength and position on
the battlefield to achieve desired effects.
The concepts concerning joint tactical actions and effects packages need to be redefined.
There is no universally accepted definition of what JTAs or effects packages are, nor is there
documentation to explain how to employ, control, and sustain them. Nevertheless, JTAs and
effects packages, as defined in this experiment, were successfully conducted. The JTF was able
to assemble forces, assign a commander to plan and execute a specific mission, and then after the
mission was completed, reintegrate the forces back into the JTF command structure.
Other than as noted above, analysis indicates that the JTF successfully met the
warfighting challenge to integrate full joint capabilities against tactical level targets.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to integrate execution of information operations into EBO

EBO uses the cohesive, rational, timely, and synergistic application of the DIME
elements of national power to affect the coherence of an adversary's war making potential. EBO
focuses on the adversary's PMESII centers of gravity. The foundation ofIO within EBO is to
create desired effects or outcomes that influence an adversary's behavior and will.
This warfighting challenge would use 10 to provide the commander with a flexible
means to manipulate or influence an adversary's societal coherence and to affect, that which is
cherished by the society, regardless of technical competency. According to the 10 concept, if
planned and executed properly, 10 can defuse crises, reduce periods of friction and
confrontation, and enhance other DIME elements of U.S. national power. The specific task
written to assess this warfighting challenge was' execute offensive information operations, to
include PSYOP and military deception' .
In conclusion, the ability to integrate execution of information operations into effects-
based operations was not successfully demonstrated during the experiment. Although 10
capabilities were considered during operational planning, and some were executed, not all 10
capabilities were used or integrated into JTF operations. Whether this was a process problem or
this lack ofIO activity was caused by limitations in M&S, assessment of the contribution ofIO
actions was incomplete.
STO was the one bright spot in the 10 effort, STO actions were coordinated with the
components, and the information was passed to the JTF via STO personnel assigned to the ISG.
However, STO actions were not integrated across the JTF and was not fully integrated into the
JTF 10 plan. 10 was planned, coordinated, and executed at the JTF and component levels, but it
was not integrated across the force. Due to poor BDA, the effects of the 10 campaign were not
always recognized by either the JTF or components; this led to allocation of resources against 10
targets that may have already been neutralized.
In summary, the JTFs 10 campaign plan was mostly ineffective and failed to win over the
hearts and minds of the adversary or have a significant impact on the JTFs ability to achieve
desired effects.

Finding Joint force targeting was greatly enhanced in a CIE, with an ONA, reach-back
capabilities, and effective combat assessment. However, the ability to conduct effective
operational combat assessment was not demonstrated.
Joint force targeting in support of Effects-Based Operations was demonstrated during this
experiment. Collaboration enabled the rapid flow of information both horizontally and vertically,
and gave all the players a forum to interact closely to quickly resolve issues of resource
allocation, battlespace deconfliction, target allocation/prioritization, and command relationship.
CIE tools, such as SPPS and ADOCS, provided the force with access to the information
required to achieve greater situational awareness within the JOA. However, these tools were not
as user friendly as they could have been and accessing information was sometimes cumbersome.
IWS, on the other hand, smoothly handled dynamic re-tasking of assets with minimal impact on
other operations. Asset retasking was necessary to meet emerging threats and operations,
ensuring that the appropriate weapon and platform was assigned to the mission,
Collaboration and CIE tools (ADOCS, IWS, and SPPS) were big winners in this
experiment, though. IWS was credited with improving situational awareness throughout the
force. On the negative side, however, excessive time spent with this tool appeared to become
burdensome, especially for decision makers.
Targeting was also enhanced by other concept tools such as ONA, reach-back and the
ATOIMTOIETO process, however, while all of those tools showed great promise, none of them
was sufficiently robust or sufficiently refined during MC02 to have a major impact on events.
Although a robust ONA was not developed for this experiment, ONA demonstrated that
it could have a major impact on future JTF operations. However, at this stage of its development,
ONA was not user friendly.
Reach-back in support of targeting could have been an effective tool, however, there
were only limited reach back resources available to test the process.
The ATO and MTO proved to be excellent tools in their domains; however, they were
insufficient to integrate the actions of all components including JFLCC and JSOTF.
The ETO showed great potential as a vehicle to provide the commander's guidance and
intentions to the JTF. Additionally, the use of the ETO to provide force coordination, tasking,
target allocation, ROE, and target prioritization gave the force a single source for all command
information. However, based on the small number of the nodes actually attacked and the large
number of nodes associated with the CJTF PEL, there appears to be a disconnect between the
processes and linkages between the ONA, the ETO and the PEL.
Assessment may be the key to Effects-Based Operations, however due to limitations in
M&S fidelity and experiment constraints, accurate BDA, and combat assessments were not
always available.
The performance of the effects assessment cell (EAC) was marginal at best. EAC's
problems were caused primarily by inaccurate, inadequate, and time-late BDA from M&S; an
absence of ISR analysis tools; and an inadequately trained/prepared team.
Predictive analysis was not regularly conducted and as a result, the JTF did little "What
if" planning. Branches and sequels were not developed, in accordance with EBO concepts,
anticipating what CJTF-S might do, but were based more on what was happening at the moment.
As a result, the JTF was more reactive than proactive in prosecution of the conflict.

Supporting Analysis. The PEL is the portion of the ETO that the CJTF uses to establish
the effects he wants to achieve in order to meet the combatant commander's objectives for the
crisis/conflict; the PEL is modified
or changed only when there is a
maj or change in the course of the
conflict.
The JF ACC uses the joint
integrated priority target list ;
(JIPTL) to identify his allocation J 6
't
of airpower, to meet the It
requirements identified in the PEL;

the JIPTL is published daily.
Component operations SMEs were
surveyed to determine if there were
NlA
any issues concerning the Less than 5 5 to 8 9 to 12
# of Instances
relationship of the PEL to the
JIPTL. Based on 36 surveys, 91
percent of the respondents Figure 47: Instances of issues concerning relationship of PEL to
indicated that they found none (See JIPTL
Figure 47). As presented during the
JCB meetings, the JPITL paralleled and addressed all items listed in the PEL and indicated the
allocation of air resources to each PEL item, effectively complimenting and amplifying the PEL
andETO.
Comments received from some of the SMEs are included below:
"Components were very good about deleting target nominations which no longer
reflected the priorities established in the PEL. Frequently, they nominated new targets as a result
of PEL changes."
"The PEL was definitely used for planning; the maritime target list was consolidated in
the MTO and passed to the JFACC as a part of the MTO/ATO integration."
On the negative side, these comments were noted:
"The JIPTL has seemed to jump around from WME, to islands, to maritime superiority
with accompanying shifts of main effort from JFMCC to JFLCC and back."
"Focus changes a lot after 1-3 days and the JIPTL may conflict with PEL of the day (that
the JIPTL is in effect.)"
The JIPTL proved to be an effective tool for turning the PEL's desired effects into a plan
for allocation of assets via the ATOIMTO.
The ETO is the document published by the JTF to impart his guidance and intent, force
allocations, ROE, PEL, target restrictions, and other vital information to his subordinates. After
publishing, the ETO was usually modified by issuance ofFRAGOs. New ETOs were issued
when there was a major change in the emphasis of the conflict and to direct Branches and
Sequels to the ETO.
The ATO and the MTO were developed and published daily by the JFACC and JFMCC.
Survey responses obtained during the experiment and anecdotal evidence obtained from senior
concept developers, testers and warfighters during Azimuth, Infocus sessions and AAR briefings
all indicate that there were no significant issues concerning the cyclical targeting cycle and the

non-cyclical ETO process. Component operations SMEs were also surveyed and 94 percent of
the respondents (based on 36 surveys returned) indicated that there were no significant issues
(less than five instances noted), concerning the cyclical targeting cycle and the non-cyclical ETO
process.
The ETO was modified by FRAGOs as incidents occurred and the conflict changed scope
and direction, the ATOIMTO was modified daily, as required, in response to the FRAGOs, JTF
guidance and to meet the requirements specified in the FRAGOs. In this experiment, the
targeting cycle as represented in the ATOIMTO was unaffected by the ETO cycle, and was able
to respond quickly and efficiently to changes in the ETO targeting requirements as promulgated
in the FRAGOS. However, the need to rework ATOIMTOs in response to the issuance of the
FRAGO could lead to problems developing future ATOIMTOs, possibly a shorter ATOIMTO
cycle or the development of a cycle within the cycle needs to be developed.
Of those that identified instances of issues, the following comments were submitted:
"The added issue of the indirect link between non-cyclic ETO process and targeting cycle
is amplified. When in a responsive mode (as in after the enemy preemptive strike), the change in
the desired effects in the ETO process will directly affect the targeting cycle. It may be a
significant issue as in drastically changing the targeting priorities due to a major shift in effects-
based operational planning. Or it may result in a small change in the target priorities due to the
lack of expected results from the first effects-based operational assessment."
"Planning on the fly for multiple ATOIMTOs. ATO 'C' required significant rework.
Rework of both ATO 'K', 'L' slowed down ATO 'M'. A shorter ATO cycle might be considered
to support RDO or create a cycle within a cycle." (JFMCC SME)
"There were some issues revolving around the need to match the MTO to the ATO. The
internal maritime planning process imposed constraints on the 10 cell in an attempt to coordinate
a deception plan. The MSR deadline precluded flexibility in developing the plan. In this exercise
PEL equaled tasks not effects." (JFMCC operations chief)
"ETO process was off concept. New ETOs should have been issued in place of some
FRAGOs that were issued when changes to the situation required a change in tactics or
emphasis. TST priorities where changed via FRAGO when the concept called for a new ETO to
be issued." (A component operations chief)
Senior concept developers held that the future belonged to a new generation of automated
orders. The ATO and MTO are excellent tools in their domains, but they can't integrate the
action of all components including JFLCC and JSOTF/JATF necessary to create joint effects.
Said one developer, "I believe we should move from the ETO to a JTO, and eventually replace
all the Service orders (with a FRAGO or a JTO). We should move toward a Joint Integrated
Tasking Order (JTO or JITO) to complement the ETO. The ETO itself should continue to focus
at the operational level, and should not itself substitute for a tactical execution order like the
ATO."
The CJTF said, "To seize the islands within 48 hours, the battle rhythm went out the
window. The capability of the ETO, empowered by the ATO-MTO, coupled with commanders'
understanding of my guidance and intent could turn the entire force within two days-this is
phenomenal. We turned it physically and mentally, with diplomatic support as well. Everything
we needed was there. Rapid and decisive actions were empowered without orders."
High Payoff Target List (HPTL). The HPTL was developed during Spiral 3 (regarding
OPFOR Targets). MARFOR and JFACC addressed the use of the HPTL in their CONPLANS.

However, based on the responses from 36 of 40 surveys sent to component operations SMEs
during the execution phase of the experiment, the HPTL developed during Spiral 3 was neither
modified nor referenced during execution. For JFMCC there was a list ofnon-TSTs that were
high priority and the ATOIMTO was modified to accommodate them. Those targets were
directly related to the PELIJIPTL. High payoff targets were addressed as part of the JCB brief to
CJTF and identified in the PELIJIPTLITST target lists. However, there were no known issues of
its relationship to the PELIJIPTL and TST Priority List.
SME comments included:
"TST list has remained relatively stable. High payoff targets have shifted with the
changing priorities of the main effortiJIPTL."
"For JFMCC, there is a list ofnon-TSTs that are high priority and the ATOIMTO may be
modified to accommodate them. Those targets are directly related to the PELIJIPTL."
"The TST is being used extensively in the JSOTF. All executions of missions are listed
and prioritized on the TST priority listing."
The reach-back concept was envisioned as a method for warfighters to gain direct access
to resources such as centers of excellence (COE), academia, and Service colleges as needed. The
concept allowed them to garner pertinent information that could help them choose the target, the
appropriate weapon, and the platform to inflict the most damage on an adversary's capabilities,
while inflicting a minimum of collateral damage on the civilian population.
Although experiment constraints prevented creation of a robust reach-back capability,
there is anecdotal evidence that reach-back was successfully used to augment the ONA when
30
25
20
.
II)
II)
c
.
0
Q.
II)
15
CL
......
0
'It
10
o
Components JTF HQ-IS JTF HQ-OPS JTF HQ-PLANS
Component/JTF-HQ Group
I El Positive Impact El No Impact I!i!II Negative Impact I
Figure 48: Reach-back capability had a positive impact on the targeting process

researching targets for prosecution. The biggest use of reach-back was to assess collateral
damage probabilities on selected targets. Of 102 survey responses from SMEs (See Figure 48),
55 percent indicated that the reach-back capability provided a positive impact on the targeting
process.
Forty-five percent indicated "No Impact" (31 percent) or "Negative Impact" (14 percent);
however, there were few comments provided from the SMEs as to why they indicated that the
35
30
25
.,..
.,<:
0
20
.,..
Q.
C!
.....0
15
0
Z
10
0
COMPONENT JTF HQ-IS JTF HQ-OPS JTF HQ-PLANS
Component/JTF-HQ GROUP
EJ Adequate IIii!I Inadequate
Figure 49: Collaboration capability is adequate
impact of reach-back in support of the targeting process was negative. Said one SME, "IWS
provides great reach-back to national level agencies to support targeting," he said "reach-back to
FIWC helped targeting 10 targets." In regards to the robustness of the capability, a JTF HQ IS
and plans SME said, "Simulated reach-back did not replicate requirements," and "it could not
exercise full capabilities due to the artificiality of the current ONA database. "
Although reach-back capability in support of the targeting process could not be fully
demonstrated during this experiment, it showed great potential.
Collaboration, specifically using IWS, was rated an overwhelming success in supporting
the targeting process. In the prosecution ofTSTs, the JFE's ability to more rapidly and
efficiently service targets was improved.
Collaboration allows a significant amount of information to be delivered to many people
quickly; however, this information still must be processed and put into action. Too many CIE
meetings can lead to too little time for turning the information into knowledge and into coherent
actions. Considering the number of people who can access a collaborative session, rules are
needed to avoid lengthy and complicated sessions that slow the targeting process. In addition,
some participants indicated that the meetings were more informational than decisional; the
F OR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V 119

meetings should have provided information that would lead to discussions of options that could
lead to decisions. Some warfighters indicated that the CIE tools needed a better balance of
push/pull and that more information should be pushed to the users.
Overall, collaboration enabled the rapid flow of information both horizontally and
vertically between components and the JTF staff. Pop-up and emerging targets could be
identified, located, assigned, and prosecuted quickly using the appropriate weapons and
platforms for the task. Collaboration gave the force the ability to de-conflict the battlespace, and
resolve attendant collateral damage issues in an open forum allowing for efficient use of assets
against these targets. Some problem areas include an over use of CIE can lead to wasted time in
virtual meetings, the ability for anyone to attend a CIE meeting can lead to too many people in
meetings and not enough people doing real work. Good business rules need to be in place to
streamline the CIE process. Figure 49 above shows the breakdown of survey responses by both
JTF and component participants. Based on 138 responses, 63 percent of the respondents agreed
that the collaboration capability supporting the targeting process was adequate.
Comments included, "The potential capability these collaborative systems afford us in the
targeting process is very good," said one. "It was helpful to have instant feedback from the
coordination component during the TST fire missions. IWS and ADOCS were helpful in clearing
targets and airspace to ensure fratricide incidents were minimized." Another officer noted,
"There seemed to be enough interaction among key players. All participants were encouraged to
add their opinions and no decisions were made without hearing from everyone -- well done --
wonderful concept, collaboration is a great tool." The JTF deputy director of plans said, "the
ability to collaborate with higher and adjacent commands in CIE gave us the opportunity to work
efficiently through issues that previously would have taken hours or days of man-hours."
However, not all comments were approving. There is an "inability to automatically track
between ONA nodes and BE numbers, which essentially stopped the JTF 10 cell from tracking
and redirecting the 10 fight in any meaningful way. It was too slow. Targeting is a dynamic
process. Collaboration gives everyone an opportunity to contribute to the process. That is not a
good thing- people with nothing to contribute can waste the time of those attempting to do
actual targeting. In theory, collaboration should speed everything up, but in MC02, it slowed
things to a crawl, while people spent enormous amounts of wasted time in chat rooms and
briefings and got nothing out of it." Said another, "It was too complicated and took too much
time. From what I observed in passing TSTs from either JF ACC, JFLCC, or JFMCC, there needs
to be a standard method of gathering imagery, mensurating coordinates, and a common reference
point for the TST cell's to be truly effective. Simply put, I need to be completely sure that the
target JF ACC is passing off to JFMCC is accurately targeted for a GPS weapon. Too much time
was spent determining the credibility of a TSTs position."
A JTF planner said, "We can only do one thing at a time, especially in a collaborative
environment. We must decide when to use collaboration. It's not always necessary. We must be
disciplined - who really needs to play?" In addition, from a component operations chief, "CIE
and its tools made situational awareness better, but it also tied the commanders to too many
meetings. There was little discipline in the CIE meetings, too much meandering, no real time for
planning, CIE can lead to virtual creep, and CIE can adversely affect both JTF and component
battle rhythms."
The senior mentors thought collaboration worked exceptionally well. "The collaborative
tools greatly facilitated execution, while a mission was ongoing, permitting commanders to
discuss branches, modifications, in a quick and outstanding manner," said one mentor. IWS

helped the JCB to achieve overall synchronization." A second mentor said, "The components
collaborated on the CIE quickly, developed a common SOP, and used the ADOCS and other
tools. It improved TST cross-cueing component to component."
The following responses were received during the combatant commander's In Focus
seSSIOn:
"Key enabler, huge impact horizontally and vertically, allowed the commanders to
command."
"Process allows you to build your own "CROP" - once you have the CROP, you do not
need to drill down to the tactical level. "
"Command enabled because everyone understood the commander's intent, provided
ultimate in "mission type orders. "
100%
90%
80%
"C
70%
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U
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60%
VI
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"C
50%
z
<C
z 40%
0
'0
;f<
30%
20%
10%
0%
GOR CJTF-S is OPFOR CJTF-S is CJTF-S cannot OPFOR can not CJTF-S cannot CJTF-S forces GOR regains Set conditions
acknowledges incapab Ie of incapab Ie of unable to employ TBM employ WME control employ removed form control of for Island
Blue presence threatening threatening command and and WME terrorists disputed CJTF-S forces turnover
in region FON FON control its islands
forces
PEL Effect
10% Nodes Nominated for Attack (ETa-1) 0% Nodes Nominated for Attack (ETa-1A) O%Nodes Nominated for Attack (ETa-2) I
Figure 50: Percent of ONA nodes identified for attack
The ability to rapidly locate, identify, and prosecute targets, within in the JOA, can be
enhanced by the use of reach-back and collaborative tools such as IWS and ADOCS. The
improved prosecution of TSTs was especially successful during the experiment, due to the use of
Collaborative tools. The use of reach-back to augment the information in the ONA allowed the
planners to more thoroughly asses the probable unintended consequences of an attack on the
target, enabling them to choose the appropriate weapon while minimizing collateral damage. The
ability to reach-back to centers of excellence for assistance in determining target priorities and to

help identify the possible unintended consequences of striking particular targets can be a
powerful tool in the targeting process. Reach-back in support of targeting can be a very effective
tool. However, only limited reach-back resources such as access to the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA), Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC), and the Joint Forces Warfighting
Center (JFWC) were available during the experiment. The ability to directly contact centers of
excellence, academia, industry, and Service colleges gives the JTF sources of information to help
select the appropriate resources to achieve the desired effects. These sources can help the
planners and operators choose the appropriate targets, and the appropriate weapon to minimize
collateral damage while creating the desired effect
The Prioritized Effects List. The prioritized, desired effects identified in ETO-I, ETO-
lA, and ETO-2 and their associated PELs (PEL 001, PEL OOIA, and PEL 002) were compared
with the nodes associated with those effects in the ONA. Figure 50 on the preceding page
graphically shows the comparison of the percent of ONA nodes, nominated for attack, for each
promulgated ETO by effect. Based on this comparison, ETO-I (Operation Sovereign Passage),
as identified in PEL 001 and promulgated on July 25, nominated 48 percent of the nodes
identified in the ONA for attack. Additionally, 58 percent of the ONA nodes, linked to the
desired effects for ETO-IA (Operation Joint Strike), as identified in PEL OOIA promulgated on
July 29, were nominated for attack. In addition, 47 percent of the ONA nodes, linked to the
desired effects for ETO-2 (Operation Joint Stability), as identified in PEL 002 and promulgated
on August 13, were nominated for attack. A review of the ONA identified 377 nodes associated
with the 10 prioritized effects identified in ETO-I (seven effects/300 nodes), ETO-IA (seven
effects/300 nodes), and ETO-2 (six effects1202 nodes). ETO-I identified 143 nodes, ETO-IA
identified 173 nodes, and ETO-2 identified 94 nodes for attack.
ONA. During this experiment, a robust ONA was not fully developed, likewise all
attendant nodes and key linkages were not identified or available. However, ONA demonstrated
its potential for future JTF operations. With a fully developed ONA, the JTF will be able to
select target nodes and linkages for disruption, neutralization, or destruction that have the
greatest impact on an adversary's capabilities while minimizing the impact on the civilian
population by minimizing collateral damage. The information contained in the ONA will help
the JTF select the appropriate level of force and resources to accomplish his goals quickly and
efficiently, and will help put the JTF inside the adversary's decision cycle.
ONA is an essential tool for successful EBO. However, new tools need to be developed
to help users to more efficiently and quickly access the data. A more robust ONA, incorporating
better search engines and tools, needs to be presented in future exercises and experiments. Most
of the MC02 play concentrated on the military aspects ofPMESII. Therefore, the targeting
guidance was heavily weighted towards the military effects without much thought being given to
other components ofPMESII that, if attacked, might have achieved the JTF's objectives more
quickly with fewer casualties and losses on both sides.
The need to re-task assets in response to the discovery of critical enemy nodes may
negatively affect the overall campaign if the re-tasking is not managed to minimize the impact on
preplanned and ongoing missions. Surveys sent to component and j oint fires cell SMEs noted
that throughout the experiment numerous critical targets were discovered and attacked during
ETO execution. In all cases, appropriate air, sea or ground assets were assigned to prosecute the
new targets.
For example, during the execution ofETO-I, CJTF-S used a regional radio station to
transmit orders and information to his forces, making this station a critical node in his C2 system.
122 FOR OFFICIAl, IJSE ONLY

The CJTF immediately made the neutralization/destruction of the radio station a top priority in
the PEL and ordered the force to take the radio station off the air. The ATO was adjusted to
allocate increased ISR and other air and land assets to the problem. Blue air, sea, ground, and
SOF forces repeatedly attacked JTF-S missile sites as well as WME sites. In order to preserve his
WME assets, CJTF-S moved part of his WME assets to hide sites. These sites were located and
attacked as they were found. Providing strike assets required the dynamic re-tasking of air and
land units and changes in the ATOIMTO "on-the-fly." In all cases, prosecution of these
emerging targets was handled efficiently with minimal impact on the overall ETO targeting plan.
In these and other cases not listed here, collaboration and CIE tools enabled the CJTF to quickly
issue guidance and intent to the components, and rapidly and efficiently formulate a plan, and
coordinate all phases of the operation. CIE tools, especially IWS, allowed the components to
effectively and decisively resolve issues such as resource allocation, collateral damage, and
unintended consequences.
Because of the re-tasking of assets to prosecute critical targets of opportunity or emerging
TSTs, other operations may have been delayed, disrupted, or even canceled, which could have
had a negative impact on the JTF's overall campaign. However, surveys, sent out to component
and JTF HQ operations SMEs, found the opposite. Ninety-two percent of respondents reported
that there were no operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified, while awaiting
operational firepower support. Of the 8 percent of responses indicating that operations were
delayed or disrupted, one JFMCC SME indicated that approximately eight operations were
affected by the lack of operational firepower as follows: "Three operations were delayed due to
fire support. Five canceled awaiting fire support that was destroyed or damaged in initial enemy
attack." No other incidents of delays or disruptions were noted by the other SMEs surveyed.
During ETO execution a number of critical operational targets and targets of opportunity
were discovered that had not been previously identified for investigation or prosecution. As these
new targets were identified, the JTF rapidly re-tasked surveillance and attack assets, using CIE
tools, to investigate and prosecute them, with minimal impact on ATOIMTO operations. This
experiment demonstrated that the use of collaborative tools in a CIE greatly enhances the ability
of the JTF to rapidly identify and attack critical enemy nodes and key linkages found during
ETO execution.
Combat assessment is an essential part ofEBO. Poor, or inadequate BDA, may lead to a
misallocation of resources, and an underestimation of the adversary's true capabilities and intent.
Surveys were sent daily to 57 component and JTF HQ plans SMEs, throughout the experiment,
in an effort to determine the percentage of targets for which combat assessment was available.
Most of the 36 responding SMEs stated that they could not accurately arrive at an answer for this
question. Others indicated that as few as 20 to more than 100, targets could be assessed. The
following comments were received:
"Assessment is the key to EBO. Effects assessment cell is supposed to fuse information
into usable data. The EAC's efforts degraded from effects to BDA as the experiment progressed.
Multiple attacks on the same targets were conducted due to poor BDA - a lot of infrastructure
was damaged chasing CJTF-S in disregard to PEL (minimize damage to infrastructure). EAC
was not really looking at effects." (Component operations chief)
"Most targets can be combat assessed, although many are time late."
"Difficult to tell. A number of targets were nominated for strike but feedback from the
effort was inconsistent. Much of the BDA that was received was in the form of level 2 rollup
reports."

"Unsure at this time. We are trying to resolve discrepancies with COP display and BDA
from response to enemy action."
" ... Had difficulty receiving BDA for component MOPs which impacted ability to make
judgments on MOE by the EAC. Suspect overall problem was a modeling simulation problem
but it caused us to put greater emphasis on certain effects, (i.e. take more action with air strikes)
and ISR collection efforts on enemy C2. "
"Getting BDA for C 2 was very difficult. ISR did not seem to be coordinated to confirm
this high priority from CJTF. JTF ISR planners' believed the problem was at the JF ACC level in
that they were not coordinating TOT windows to effect ISR collection. MJIC provided phase 3
BDA assessment of C 2 (believe white cell input) which allowed the EAC to change assessment
from red to amber - this was a go-no-go area for 30 Jul AM airborne drop."
Poor BDA can lead to the unnecessary assignment of assets and resources to prosecute
targets that are already destroyed or out of action or allow still combat effective targets to remain
unchallenged. Surveys were sent to component effects assessment SMEs to determine what
percent of targets assessed as 'killed' were actually still combat effective. Most indicated that
there was very little BDA available to confirm kills, requiring EAC to use secondary methods,
such as media reports, and tactical intercept to determine effects. EAC received poor BDA
during the experiment mostly due to a lack ofM&S fidelity and exercise/experiment constraints
and limitations.
A JCB participant said, "Failure to provide adequate assessment of JTF-S's C2 status,
allowed JTF-S to launch a full scale coordinated attack on the Blue force insertion into objective
areas #1 & 2. "
Anecdotal evidence brought up by component commanders and briefers at various JTF
update sessions, indicated that the percentage of unnecessary target re-attacks was higher than
expected. Poor BDA (inaccurate, insufficient, and late), due to experiment constraints/limitations
and M&S ISR fidelity, delivered to the assessment cells, was blamed for the high reattack rate.
From a component planner, "lack ofBDA was a factor. We probably got good effects, but didn't
always know, so we had to go back and re-attack."
Summarizing this finding, this experiment showed that joint force targeting can be
greatly enhanced by using collaborative tools, reach-back, and effective combat assessment.
Collaboration, using IWS, helped clear away the 'Fog of War' and gave all the players a forum
to interact, to resolve resource allocation issues, battlespace deconfliction, target allocation and
prioritization, and command relationships. CIE tools, such as SPPS and ADOCS, provided the
force with access to the information required to achieve greater situational awareness within the
JOA. Emerging targets were identified, located, and assigned for prosecution quickly and
efficiently, using ADOCS and IWS to facilitate cross-cueing and asset allocation. Dynamic re-
tasking of assets, to meet emerging threats and operations, was handled smoothly using IWS,
ensuring that the appropriate weapon and platform was assigned to the mission with minimal
impact on other operations. Collaboration and CIE tools (ADOCS, IWS, and SPPS) were the big
winners in this experiment. Throughout the experiment, as users became more comfortable with
the tools and procedures, their usefulness became more pronounced. The basic concepts are
sound; however, more work is necessary on TTPs and development of business rules.
This experiment also demonstrated the JTF's ability to develop operational targets during
ETO execution. Using IWS and ADOCS, the JTF was able to identify, locate, and prosecute
emerging targets while minimizing the impact on other operations. IWS enabled the force to
124 ~OR OFFICIAl, USE ONLY

quickly prioritize targets, allocate resources, and de-conflict the battlespace as necessary to
prosecute the targets quickly and efficiently.
Assessment is the key to EBO. The ability to conduct operational combat assessment in
the real world depends on the assets the JTF and components have to dedicate to BDA. In this
experiment, there were no asset limitations. However, due to limitations in M&S fidelity and
experiment constraints, accurate BDA, and combat assessments were not always available to the
JTF HQ or the components.
Over the course of the experiment, the EAC regressed from assessing effects to assessing
Battle Damage. As stated by one component operations chief, "Overall, effects assessment didn't
work. There were some success stories (Island Campaign), but overall it missed the boat."
"BDA looks through a 'Blue lens','" said one senior officer. "Effects assessment, done
properly, looks through a 'red lens'. Effects assessment should examine the state of Red from
Red's perspective."
During this experiment, the performance of the EAC was marginal at best. The
preponderance of evidence indicates that the EACs problems were caused primarily by
inaccurate, inadequate, and late BDA provided by M&S, and a lack of adequate personnel
assigned to the cell. Correction of the M&S problems will require the development of new or
modifications to current models to more accurately provide the specificity needed for this type of
experimentation. In addition, ISR tools need to be developed to assist the assessment cell with
the analysis of the, sometimes, overwhelming data that comes into the cell from ISR and other
sources. On the personnel issue, the opinion of a number of SMEs, senior mentors, and OTs was
that the EAC was undermanned, not organized efficiently, and not manned with the correct mix
of specialties. The following recommendations were made by senior mentors, IS SMEs, and
other component and JTF personnel during Azimuth, Infocus and AAR briefings:
The EAC needs to be removed from control of the ISG and placed in either OPS or
PLANS. The EAC is currently manned with IS personnel, this is effective in interpreting BDA
data, but this information needs to be turned into knowledge that can be used by the operators.
Manning in the EAC should be balanced with IS personnel, to process BDA information,
and OPS personnel to conduct predictive analysis and turn the intelligence information into
knowledge of the adversary's capabilities and intentions that OPS and PLANS cells can use to
develop future operations.
The EAC should be organized into three functional groups:
Intelligence and BDA data collection and analysis (IS personnel)
Effects assessment (IS/OPS personnel)
Predictive analysis (OPS personnel)
Under this organization, operations personnel would be responsible for predictive

analysis. As stated earlier in this finding, there was ample evidence indicating that predictive
analysis was not being conducted.
Finding The JTF was able to effectively attack operational targets to achieve desired
military effects using EBO concepts, collaboration and CIE tools, (SPPS, ONA, IWS and
ADOCS).
Based on attrition data, the JTF was successful in neutralizing or destroying CJTF-S's
ability to conduct war. Over 80 percent ofCJTF-S's air and naval forces were destroyed, his
primary WME facilities and equipment were captured and/or neutralized, and most of his ground

forces were rendered combat ineffective with the destruction of over 60 percent of his equipment
and 40 percent of his personnel.
The JTF's use of the ONA, to establish the key nodes and linkages that would most
greatly affect CJTF-S's ability to conduct his operations, and the use ofCIE tools and
collaboration to coordinate his forces enabled JTF to quickly and efficiently counter CJTF-S's
force movements.
Although the ONA used during this experiment was not robust and reach-back
capabilities were limited, the information contained in the ONA coupled with reach-back
capability and collaboration gave the JTF the tools needed to select the appropriate weapons and
platforms to achieve the desired effects while minimizing collateral damage to civilians and local
infrastructure. The ONA also helped minimize the risks of potential fratricide. See Finding 1 for
additional discussion on this subject.
In addition, as described in Finding 1, some of the nodes that were attacked were not
identified as critical nodes for the effects contained in either the ETO or the PEL. This is an
indication that the assessment cells were not conducting nodal and deficiency analysis in
accordance with the EBO concept doctrine. Due to the poor BDA provided by M&S during the
experiment and the lack of good ISR models, there were higher incidents of targets already
neutralized being re-attacked and targets still combat effective not being re-attacked, than
expected.
The joint fires initiative coupled with TST procedures was very successful.
The ability of the force to use collaboration and CIE tools for cross-cueing of TST and
other targets, coordination of forces within the battlespace to minimize mutual interference and
battlespace deconfliction issues improved target prosecution significantly.
Collaboration enhanced the ability of the components to coordinate the handoff of TST
targets from one component to another.
Collaboration as part of the TST process greatly changed the dynamics of the process,
coordination at all levels (horizontally and vertically) was enhanced, and time from target
nomination to prosecution was improved.
Although some minor ADOCS problems were experienced during the experiment, when
used properly, ADOCS provided a good visual display of the battlefield, providing operators and
planners at all levels, improved situational awareness, combat assessment of the TST mission,
and the information required to make quick decisions on re-strike nominations. ADOCS, when
used in coordination with other CIE tools (specifically IWS), simplified the airspace and
operations deconfliction process and made the assignment of assets to prosecute TST targets
more efficient.
IWS was a powerful tool that quickly provided amplifying information to all participants
in the TST process (perfectly complimented ADOCS/TBMCS), however, use of this tool could
become excessive and burdensome and business rules were needed to limit the time spent in
lengthy chat room sessions.
Finding 2 Supporting Analysis:

The JTF' s ability to attack operational targets to achieve desired effects was assessed. In
order to establish the JTF's success or failure, it was necessary to determine what nodes were
available for attack and the percentage of nodes that were successfully attacked. The ONA used
during the experiment contained 706 unique PMESII nodes, with 189 (377 total nodes)
associated with the effects published in the ETOs. Reviewing the PELs for each ETO identified

140 unique PMESII nodes that were selected for attack, many of which consisted of multiple
targets and aim points. Based on BDA information contained in the ONA, 214 enemy PMESII
nodes were successfully attacked, 70 of which were directly linked to ETO effects. The
remaining 144 nodes were mostly targets of opportunity or emerging TST targets selected to
support ongoing operations. It should be noted, however, that after assessment of available data,
it was determined that most of the collected attrition data did not identify the specific PMESII
nodes attacked. The disparity between the number ofETO-designated nodes (70) and the total
nodes attacked (214) could be related to either the lack of a robust ONA, poor deficiency
analysis within the EAC, or poor nodal analysis conducted by the planners.
A thorough nodal analysis within the planning cells should have been able to isolate those
nodes that would have had the greatest impact on achieving the desired effect, and limiting the
target list to only those nodes. Done properly, this would have reduced the resources required
and the time necessary to achieve the desired effect. Deficiency analysis is used to determine
why kinetic and non-kinetic attacks are not achieving the desired effects and quickly determine if
the correct nodes were selected for attack or if additional nodes need to be attacked to achieve
the goal. As noted in Finding 1, there was evidence that deficiency analysis was not being
conducted in the effects assessment cells for a variety of reasons, including inaccurate and time
late BDA, insufficient manning, wrong mix of specialties within the cell, and the commander
centric mindset that developed as the experiment progressed. It is uncertain, based on the
available data, whether any nodal analysis was done in the planning cells.
Using only the minimal level of force necessary to achieve the desired effect is one of the
key concepts ofEBO. Matching force to effect in manner minimizes collateral damage and
maximizes the use of available resources. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to
understand the intended and unintended consequences of the actions being taken to achieve the
desired effect.
EA cell SMEs were surveyed daily to determine instances of friendly actions having
unintended effects. The results indicated that there were no instances of friendly actions having
unintended affects that violated ROE or SECDEF guidance. However, anecdotal evidence of one
incident was brought up at an azimuth check briefing, where an attack on a WME storage facility
could have resulted in the release of poisonous gas. A second incident was the issuing of the
ultimatum, which had the unintended consequence ofCJTF-S's initiation of hostilities. Another
instance was the disruption of a major power grid. OPFOR turned the attack into a PR disaster
for Blue, claiming that the power disruption caused a major chemical/gas leak at an aluminum
factory that resulted in thousands of civilian casualties. Blue did not have sufficient information
about the factory to refute OPFOR claims.
Minimizing collateral damage and fratricide was another aspect to the task of' attacking
operational targets'. No instances of collateral damage and fratricide were noted by SMEs.
However, senior mentors recounted one instance of unintended, collateral damage. An attack on
the power grid of a maj or Red city led to a loss of electrical power at a large number of hospitals
in Red. Due to a lack of back up electrical generators, a large number of unintended civilian
casualties occurred.
Over all, the use ofEBO & EBP procedures to attack operational targets was successful.
Due to the importance of neutralizing or destroying OPFOR's WME and TBM sites, the
JF ACC apportioned air assets to these threats at an equal level of importance. JF ACC air
allocation for attacks on TBM and WME sites were combined in the PEL and in the JIPTL into
one grouping. Based on data obtained from daily JFACC ATOIMTO and JIPTLs submitted to

the JCB, on average 43 percent of available airpower was tasked to the TBMlWME threat.
Figure 51 shows JF ACC' s daily allocation of airpower to the TBMlWME problem.
CJTF used air and SOF assets to neutralize or destroy 133 enemy TBMs and 33 TBM
launchers. The destruction of 83 percent of OPFOR' s TBM launchers effectively eliminated the
TBM threat to Blue forces and Coalition partners in the JOA. Use of procedures developed as
part of the joint fires initiative and TST tools developed during the experiment were the key to
Blue's success against OPFOR's
TBM threat. Use of collaboration
and CIE tools between
components enabled the JF ACC to
rapidly assign air assets to counter
the threat, as the location of
OPFOR's TBM assets became
i 40". known. JSOTF assets were used to
oS
:;;: locate TBM sites and destroy the
~ 30'.
.g-
00<
TBMs and their launchers or relay
target information back to JF ACC
for air prosecution. Naval surface
and air forces, in conjunction with
JF ACC air assets, were successful
7/25 7/26 7/27 7/28 7/29 7/30 7/31 8/1 8/2 8/3 8/4 8/5 8/6 817 8/8 8/9
Doys
in destroying TBMs in flight.
Table 12 shows the status of
Figure 51: Forty-three percent of JFACC assets were allocated OPFOR's TBM assets at the
to the TBMIWME threat cessation of hostilities.
MRBM (1300km) 0 100

SRBM (500km) 120 44 76 37
SRBM (250km) 40 8 32 20
SRBM (200km) 50 50 0 100
SRBM (150km) 100 30 70 30
TBM Totals 311 133 178 43
Launcher Totals 40 33 7 83
The ONA provided the JTF with the location of all of OPFOR' s WME sites prior to the
start of hostilities. When hostilities commenced, the combatant commander determined that there
was an immediate need to secure OPFOR's WME sites, as they were a threat to JTF forces and
coalition partners within the JOA.
Using collaboration and CIE tools, JTF formulated a plan to rapidly and decisively take
control of OPFOR' s primary WME sites. JFLCC was assigned the task to capture and neutralize
the WME sites. All ofCJTF-S's WME primary facilities were captured or neutralized by Blue
128 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V

MARFOR/ARFOR/SOF forces. However, prior to Blue's attack on the WME sites, CJTF-S
moved WME material and assets to hide sites. Blue forces were able to locate and capture these
sites as well, using the ONA and CIE tools (IWS, ADOCS, and SPPS) to coordinate assets and
mission assignments.
Describing the planning that went into the WME operation, the JTF deputy director of
plans said, "The ability to collaborate with higher and adjacent commands in a CIE gave us the
opportunity to work efficiently through issues that previously would have taken hours or days."
At the beginning of the conflict, CJTF -S had over 1800 pieces of maj or ground
equipment, including heavy and light tanks, APCs, MRLs, large and small caliber howitzers, and
recoilless rifles and it took the full breadth of Blue's forces to neutralize OPFOR's ground
capabilities. The use of ADOCS, IWS, and SPPS to provide a visual display of OPFOR' s
movements and disposition gave Blue the ability to rapidly redeploy forces and to quickly and
decisively counter OPFOR's moves. Collaboration, both horizontally and vertically, using IWS,
enabled the rapid resolution of potential targeting and battlespace deconfliction issues between
components. It also allowed JTF to assign the appropriate force for the task. Table 13 below
shows the breakdown ofOPFOR's major ground equipment, by type, neutralized, or destroyed
by Blue forces.
Table 13: Major Ground Equipment Neutralized or Destroyed
Tanks 315 238 76

TOW 111 86 77
APCs 9 7 78
MRLs 129 110 85
Artillery 442 374 85
Mortars 775 388 50
CDCMs 32 29 91
Total Equipment 1813 1232 68
Based on an examination of DCARS, ADOCS data, and ground unit end strengths
reported by OPFOR during the course of the experiment, Blue forces neutralized or destroyed 45
percent ofOPFOR's ground forces. Coupled with Blue's destruction of 68 percent of his major
equipment, listed above, OPFOR's ground forces were effectively rendered "Combat
Ineffective." The table below shows OPFOR's ground unit combat effectiveness at the
conclusion of hostilities.
Table 14: OPFOR ground unit combat effectiveness as of the end of the experiment.
Ground Force HQ Division Strength 63

2nd Mech BDE/8th DIV 100

~#:~iV~ness
I Headquarters I Unit
3rd Armor BDE/8th DIV 100

1st Armor BDE/88th Armor DIV 100
300th ARTY BN 100
2nd Armor BDE/88th Armor DIV 100
381 st ARTY BN 100
1st Marine BDE 3
2nd Marine BDE 3
34th Marine BDE 89
91 st SAR Flight 15
41st ATKIASSL T BN 25
3rd ATK BN 26
4th ASSLT BN 25
19th INF DIV Division Strength 68
1st INF BDE 95
2nd INF BDE 96
3rd INF BDE 100
4th Mech BDE 22
19th DIV ARTY 38
48th INF BDE 75
33rd Airborne BDE 81
37th Armor BDE 39
41st MECH DIV Division Strength 29
1st INF BDE 56
2nd Mech BDE 2
3rd Armor BDE 46
4th INF BDE 79
55th Airborne BDE 33
28th Armor BDE 26
56th ARTY Group 7
1st CAV SQDN 5
41st DIVARTY 3
At the onset of hostilities, the adversary had a robust naval force consisting of large diesel
and mini submarines, medium surface combatants, amphibious and logistics ships and a large
inventory of small boats, including Bog Hammers, minelayers, and Boston Whaler type boats.
All small craft were equipped with machineguns and RPGs. Using collaborative tools for
coordination and deconfliction, Blue naval forces successfully neutralized or destroyed 53
percent of OPFOR' s naval assets (one SSN defected to GOR prior to the end of hostilities),
including 80 percent ofOPFOR's major combatants and 40 percent of the small boats. Table 15
130 FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

below shows a breakdown of OPFOR' s naval forces neutralized or destroyed by Blue during
hostilities.
Table 15: E
Submarines 8 8 100
Surface Ships 30 28 93
Small boats 133 53 40
Amphibious/Logistics 23 13 57
Totals 194 102 53
Blue was very successful in targeting, neutralizing and/or destroying OPFOR aircraft,
SAMs, and radar systems. JFACC, using an integrated ATOIMTO, was able to effectively use all
available Blue assets to locate, target and attack OPFOR's SEAD and lADS. Use of
collaborative tools, specifically IWS and ADOCS, enabled JF ACC to assign the appropriate
assets and deconflict the airspace to effectively prosecute air, SEAD, and lADS Targets. Table
16 below shows the breakdown of OPFOR' s air, lADS, and SEADs systems that were destroyed
or neutralized by Blue forces.
Table 16: Ene
Fighters 76 65 86
Recon/SAR 100
C2/ECW 10 10 100
Support 12 10 83
Misc 60 52 87
lADS Radars 14 14 100
SAMS 19 19 100
Totals 192 171 89
A review of the enemy nodes selected by the JTF for attack showed that 53 ETO
designated nodes and 39 non-ETO designated nodes could be attacked with non-kinetic
weapons. Of the nodes that could be attacked using non-kinetic weapons, only five nodes were
identified. The non-kinetic attacks were successful and helped the JTF achieve its desired effects.
Due to the experiment's construct and constraints, the JTF did not have the time or resources to
employ non-kinetic weapons against all targets capable of being affected in this manner. As a
result, JTF quickly defaulted to the kinetic option to achieve his goals. A more robust JIACG and
reach-back capability would have allowed the JTF more latitude in the use of non-kinetic
weapons to achieve some of the effects identified in the ETOs.

There were two incidents of potential fratricide noted during the experiment. Both of
these incidents were caused by software problems associated with ADOCS and AFATDS.
During the course of the experiment, procedures were developed to correct this problem and
make ADOCS more effective and useful as a targeting tool. These new procedures need to be re-
tested in future experiments and then incorporated into the TTP.
Based on a review of available target data, approximately 927 targets, within the JOA,
were identified as potential TST targets, meeting the TST requirements and priorities established
by CJTF in ETO-I, IA & 2. Of these 200
available targets, 444 (48 percent)

180
were located, identified, and
160
nominated for attack by friendly
forces. JFMCC nominated 40 140
percent of the TST targets for attack, 120
with JFACC nominating 35 percent, 100

~
JFLCC 14 percent, and JSOTF 11 80
percent. Of the 444 targets identified 60
and nominated for attack, 327 (78 40
percent) targets were prosecuted and 20
122 (27 percent) of those were

assessed as destroyed or neutralized. T5Ts Nominated by T5Ts Prosecuted by T5Ts Neutralized by
TST Actions
Figure 52 shows the breakdown of IIIJSOTF I
I[J J'ACC O J'MCC O J'LCC
targets nominated, prosecuted, and

neutralized by each functional Figure 52: The JFMCC and JFACC were responsible for acting
component. against time sensitive targets
Seventy-eight percent of
identified and nominated TST targets were engaged by friendly assets. The percentage
breakdown ofTST targets engaged by friendly forces follows: JFACC assets engaged 38
percent, JFMCC assets engaged 46 percent, and JFLCC assets engaged 16 percent. Table 17
below describes the breakdown of TST attacks by the functional commander. It is significant to
note that SOF assets were not used to attack TST targets; they were however used to locate,
identify, and spot TST targets.
Table 17: TSTs attacked by the functional component
JSOTF 49 0 15 21 2 38
JFACC 155 0 81 36 13 130
JFMCC 179 0 27 92 23 142
JFLCC 61 0 10 11 16 37
Totals 444 0 133 160 54 347
Twenty-seven percent (122) of the identified TSTs engaged by friendly assets were
successfully neutralized or destroyed. JF ACC assets neutralized 45 percent, JFMCC assets
neutralized 45 percent, and JFLCC assets neutralized 10 percent.
132 FORO NLY

During this experiment, the JTF was able to demonstrate the ability to conduct precision
engagement against time sensitive targets (TST). Potential TST targets were identified and
prioritized by CJTF, in his ETOs, based on their impact on JTF operations and desired effects.
Components located and identified TSTs lAW JTF ETO guidance and nominated targets for
attack. JTF used CIE tools to coordinate and assign resources to attack the nominated TSTs.
Surveys were sent to component and JTF-HQ Operations SMEs periodically during the
experiment to determine if there were any instances of TST resource allocation that required
JTF-HQ adjudication. Based on the responses received, there were a few instances noted when
TST resource issues needed to be adjudicated by JTF HQ. Most of the instances concerned
weapons selection to reduce or minimize collateral damage. The JFMCC SME noted, "JTF
weighed in on approx. 10 instances in resource allocation."
Although JF ACC and JFMCC attempted to mitigate the probability of disruption,
cancellation, or modification of operations due to emerging TST missions, by pre-designating
resources to the TST mission in the ATOIMTO, there were still instances where the ATOIMTO
had to be modified on the fly to accommodate emerging TST missions. However, in general,
overall operations were not delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified due to TST missions. One
instance was noted by a senior mentor, "most targets were nominated above the line, except on
one occasion when 48 JFLCC targets were nominated below the line. This happened because
JFMCC had set aside an air package for TST purposes, and therefore, the JFLCC targets were
not hit. JFLCC was supposed to be the main effort."
Initial TST guidance was issued by the JTF commander under ETO-1 (Operation
Sovereign Passage) and modified by FRAGO #s 015,018,021,023, and 027. Initial TST targets
were identified by priority and amplifying information on each target type was provided. Each
FRAGO was issued to reprioritize targets, and to add or delete target types as the scenario
progressed. No TST guidance was issued in either ETO-1A or ETO-2.
Surveys were sent to component and JTF-HQ operations SMEs to identify instances of
TST priority categories and their impact on TST operations. The results of the surveys indicated
that instances of the usage ofTST priority categories were identified, but none had any
significant impact on TST operations. "TST priority categories were used with the TST targets,"
said one SME observer. "All targets were tracked and passed to the JF ACC in a timely manner
and acted upon." (JSOTF SME). TST priority categories had no negative impact on targets being
struck." Moreover, he said, "priorities on TSTs did not hamper them being struck."
Based on surveys sent to component operations SMEs and JTF HQ TST cell SMEs and
other anecdotal evidence, throughout the experiment there was no degradation of TST capability
during transfers of TST responsibility from one functional component to another. In fact, due to
IWS, the JFE/TST process and ADOCS/TBMCS protocols developed during the experiment,
TST transfers were virtually flawless and seamless from one functional component to another.
"Great coordination by JFMCC and JF ACC operations groups in execution of TSTs,"
said one expert. "Smooth handoffs generally between functional components thanks to good
collaboration using IWS, ADOCS, and TBMCS." Another SME noted, "IWS and ADOCS have
been excellent tools in supporting collaboration and prosecution. All TST missions were
transferred without degraded capabilities."
Based on the information received from the surveys submitted from various component
and JTF HQ SMEs as shown above, it appears that the TST process, linked to the joint fires
initiative, worked extremely well. "The TST process worked, but we need more ISR M&S to
accurately represent TSTs; need to differentiate between TSTs and TCTs and how they should be

attacked and screened for collateral damage," said a component operations chief. In addition,
according to one senior officer, "The JFI and TST are bullet proof. We got good response. The
JFI is one of the success stories and so far is focused on TST."
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the driving factors for the success of the TST/JFI
process were CIE (especially IWS) and ADOCS procedures developed during the experiment.
Over 200 TSTs were prosecuted during the experiment. "The CIE has been essential," said a
senior mentor. "The JTF has executed over 200+ TSTs, an amazing feat. However, there is a
tradeoff because those assets have been planned to hit other targets. However, all components
requirements were filled."
The time to process TSTs from nomination to prosecution initially was slow to develop,
however, as familiarity with the procedures and tools increased, the time delay between
nomination and prosecution decreased dramatically. The use of ADOCS with IWS enabled the
smooth flow of information as TST responsibility was passed from one functional commander to
another for prosecution.
"The process for TST collaboration was mature within the Air Force," said the JFACC
Excellent Good Adequate Not at All Adequate
Components
IOJFACC OJFLCC IIIIJFMCC OJSOTF IIIIJTF-HQ I
Figure 53: Participants thought collaboration improved TST coordination
commander. "JFI and ADOCS helped component collaboration." The ability to identify TST
targets and post them in ADOCS enabled all components to maintain good situational awareness
of the TST threats.
There were some shortfalls. During a number of' Azimuth Check' briefings, senior
mentors observed that although the TST process apparently worked very successfully, some of
the targets assigned, as TST targets probably did not qualify as TST targets. In their opinion,
some components were using the TST process solely to improve the priority of targets they
wanted prosecuted, even if those targets didn't meet TST requirements. "We had many TSTs that
were not truly TSTs," said one plans chief. "The term TST still has a confusing, dysfunctional
definition because it covers too broad a range of eventualities," according to a senior concept
134 FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONI,Y

developer. "We need to distinguish between threatening targets that need to be killed
immediately when identified, and those that are fleeting, highly lucrative targets. One
definitional term cannot adequately cover both eventualities without confusion in planning and
execution. There are differences that need to be sorted out between TST, HPT, and HVT because
there is still much confusion."
The procedures for using CIE tools for consolidating and coordinating TST information
and prosecution were refined and improved during the experiment. These revised procedures
need to be verified during future exercises and codified in the TTP.
The TST process and concept, incorporating lessons learned and the revised procedures
developed during the experiment, needs to be verified and tested during future exercise and
experiments.
According to 32 JTF-HQ SMEs surveyed, the collaboration process greatly enhanced the
process for JTF and component planning and TST identification and prosecution. Seventy-two
percent of the respondents rated the process as "Good" or "Excellent, " 22 percent rated the
process as "Adequate" and six percent rated the process as "Not at All Adequate. "Figure 53
25
20
II! 15
<II
II!
C
o
Co
II!
~
'0
'It 10
o
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
Components
IIIIIIJFACC IIiIIJFLCC DJFMCC DJSOTF DJTF-HQ I
Figure 54: Most thought MC02 TST procedures should be adopted as a joint standard
shows the breakdown of responses.

Collaboration and standardization were the most appreciated attributes of the CIE tools,
according to SMEs. "The tool really supported getting everyone on the same page, and worked
towards standardization of reporting," said one expert. "More emphasis needs to be placed on
business rules enforcement, and each component needs to put more thought into their doctrine
behind TST." Said another, "Without chat, the immediacy ofTST might have been lost. Weapon
to platform was coordinated quickly, as opposed to entering data into a target card, having it

fully understood, and perhaps not knowing who was going to engage." "The tool is good right
now with the potential to be great. Keep pressing." Said another, "It needs to be fielded and
manned down to MSCs as it is at the components."
On the negative side, one user noted, "With multiple users using multiple tools, there
were numerous opportunities for human error, such as multiple conversations in several rooms,
information being dropped or acted on by multiple parties. The process needs to be more
automated with better error data." Another's remarks were more tempered, "The only problem
was that the components weren't updating the TST info in the DTL," he said. "If the components
don't support the system, the process and/or info in the system are corrupt."
Seventy-one percent of JTF-HQ SMEs surveyed (32) indicated that the TST procedures
used during the experiment were well prepared. They added that with some changes, identified
and implemented during the experiment, the process should be adopted as a j oint standard.
Twenty-nine percent of the respondents indicated that the procedures were not ready for
16
14
12
10
II!
<II
II!
C
0
Co
II! 8
<II
...
~
0
'It
6
0
Excellent Good Adequate Partially Adeq uate Not at All Adeq uate Don't Know
Components
IIIIIJFMCC DJFLCC DJFACC DJSOTF IiiiJJTF-HQ I
Figure 55: ADOCS viewed as 'better than adequate' for use as a targeting tool
implementation as a joint standard (See Figure 54).

But others thought the system had some maturing to do before it is fielded, "This system
has a long way to go before it is ready for fleet use," a participant said, "it has integration and
human factors issues. CONOPS also need to be refined and improved especially in the area of
CM and BDA." Said another, "Almost there. There is a good baseline to work with, but not quite
ready to go prime time. That's not the purpose anyway. The purpose is to experiment and leam-
then refine and go to prime time. I think details need to be provided, especially in terms of
reporting processes, and access to reports. As one of the folks in charge ofBDA analysis, I had
extreme difficulty in obtaining timely reporting from other components."

With regard to ADOCS' contribution to this process, 72 percent SME respondents rated
ADOCS 'excellent' as a common targeting tool. Eighteen percent said that ADOCS was not
adequate (See Figure 55).
Some favored ADOCS, "Works as long as components are disciplined and close the loop
with the TST in the Target Card," said one expert. "System has the right blocks, but hard to get
them filled in."
However, not all agreed, "There is support, but I don't think we components within the
JTF have come to a common understanding of what information to put in the blocks, when, and
when to turn colors," said one participant, "It appears there are coordination issues there as well.
Our BDA assessment person had to manually monitor and follow up on everything."
Overall, most indicated ADOCS had great potential as a targeting toolset. More fidelity
may be required to identify TST targets and some procedures need to be modified and added.
However, evidence indicates that TST prosecution is greatly enhanced by an ADOCS-like tool.
Most thought ADOCS should be fielded as a TST targeting tool. Given the current
developmental status of the ADOCS software program, fielding as an interim target toolset may
best serve the warfighter.
In summary, the JTF attacked operational targets and thereby achieved desired effects.
The JTF neutralized or destroyed OPFOR's ability to conduct war. The ONA was used to
establish the key nodes and linkages that most affected OPFOR's ability to conduct his
operations. Additionally, the use of CIE tools and collaboration to coordinate his forces enabled
JTF to quickly and efficiently counter OPFOR' s force movements.
Although some ADOCS problems were experienced during the experiment, ADOCS
generally provided a good visual display of the battlefield, providing operators improved
common situational awareness, combat assessment of the TST mission, and the quick decisions
to re-strike targets. ADOCS, when used in coordination with other CIE tools (specifically IWS)
simplified the airspace and operations deconfliction process and made the assignment of assets to
prosecute TST targets more efficiently.
The handoff of TST responsibility between functional components was quicker and less
complicated, ensuring that the appropriate weapon and platform was assigned to the target. IWS
proved it was a powerful tool and that it complimented ADOCS/TBMCS.
Finding The JTF exhibited increased ability to coordinate and integrate joint and
interagency assets for EBO. However, the use of DIE elements of national power to
produce JTF desired effects was not effective.
The potential for this concept is enormous and could become the cornerstone of a
combatant commander's CONPLAN.
The JIACG concept as demonstrated during the experiment shows great potential to
become a powerful tool in the JTF's arsenal.
The use of DIE actions is sometimes very slow moving and not very conducive to RDO.
However, CJTF's ability to use DIE actions to achieve goals with a minimum loss oflife and
resources cannot be overstated. One problem with using DIE actions is a lack of the assets and
tools needed to measure success or failure. Many DIE effects can only be sensed by the
adversary, while others are so subtle, as to be immeasurable. Therefore, it is sometimes difficult
to determine which actions are producing desired effects and which ones are not.

Due to the lack of a robust JIACG component and reach-back capability, non-kinetic
weapons were seldom used and most DIE actions, although considered in planning were not
conducted. The experiment concentrated mostly on the military (M) portion of DIME.

After reviewing the ONA, ETO-I, ETO-IA, ETO-2 and their associated PELs, the PELs
identified 140 targets for attack, of these, 53 nodes were identified as DIE targets (38 percent).
Thirty-nine additional nodes, not associated with an ETO desired effect, were also selected for
attack. Only five of the selected nodes were attacked using DIE actions and these actions were
all successful. This experiment was heavily weighted for the use of the military portion of
national power with minimal consideration of DIE actions. This was driven by the construct of
the experiment and the lack of a robust JIACG component and the lack of reach-back capability.
A SME said, "Have not observed any DIE means from the EAC. EAC is focused on "M"
only, although they constantly get system of systems analysis (SOSA) inputs from PollMil and
ONA effects in their assessment decisions." He added, "We do not see much DIE activity from
this point of view." Another SME saw some activity, "We started to factor economic aspects into
the plan, but no attacks resulted, " " ... discussed using economic, P A means to influence enemy
leadership. "
As one observer noted, "The 'M' portion of DIME can be rapid and decisive, DIE
portions take time to implement and effect the situation." The lack of a robust JIACG contingent
and reach-back capabilities to key centers of excellence may have been the reason for the short
shrift given to DIE components of national power. Another limitation to the implementation of
DIE alternatives was the construct of the scenario.
Said an operations chief, "The role of DIE was underplayed in the scenario. More
emphasis on the non-kinetic aspects of DIME could have preempted the outbreak of hostilities."
Additional observations included, "We didn't have much IA input. Centers of excellence are
useful for day-to-day operations. However, when planning RDO, they don't have much utility
because things move too fast. They can help in the planning process, especially with
infrastructure. They are useful in providing resources to fill the gaps in our knowledge." "We
must have good IA input into the ONA process."
Experiment constraints had a negative impact, according to some participants. "IA
visibility was limited by experiment constraints. We need live contact for it to be effective." Yet
one former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State had seen enough to make up his mind with
regard to the usefulness of the JIACG, "The concept is validated. Future operational planning
must be an interagency enterprise."
Finding 4111-The JTF improved its ability to synchronize and employ joint forces against
key tactical objectives, despite not strictly adhering to the concepts of EBO.
By taking advantage of tactical opportunities presented to them, the JTF was consistently
able to disrupt OPFOR operations and control the timing and tempo of the campaign. Using the
supported/supporting command structure, Blue assembled and employed the appropriate forces
needed to rapidly respond to changes in OPFOR's operations.
The success on the battlefield came despite the fact that the JTF, shunning branch and
sequel development based on effects assessment and predictive analysis, did not adhere to the
strict renderings of the EBO concept. Additionally, wargaming was conducted only sporadically

at the JTF and component level, hindering the commander's ability to anticipate OPFOR's
strategy and develop counter plans.
However, use of collaboration and CIE tools may have provided Blue with a significant
enough force multiplier, that in this instance, failure to follow the concept methods was
mitigated. Using collaboration and the CIE tools, Blue was able to maintain good situational
awareness within the JOA. That awareness enabled the JTF to rapidly plan actions in response to
the changing scenario, resolve target priorities, and command issues, including deconfliction of
the battlespace. It also helped the JTF identify, allocate, and deploy the resources needed for the
accomplishment of the mission and take advantage of opportunities presented by the opposition.
JTAs and effects packages, as defined in this experiment, were successfully conducted.
JTF was able to assemble forces, assign a commander to plan and execute a specific mission, and
then after the mission was completed, reintegrate the forces back into the JTF command
structure. However, JTA packages were played as a loosely defined concept and neither
warfighters, nor SMEs were given adequate information to accurately assess this concept

The preponderance of observations indicated that branch plans weren't developed at
either the JTF or the component level. Sequels were being developed for transition and emerging
operations (WME), but the development of branch plans was not evident.
"The JTF has not developed any 'what if' branch plans," said one observer. "They are
currently focused on sequel transition planning." "From the JSOTF perspective, I have not seen
any operational branches that have opened to BLUE due to current operations disrupting the
adversary. "
A JFMCC observer noted, "I did not see evidence of any branch plans developed by
JFMCC, although there were such plans at CJTF. Re-planning by JFMCC planning cell was
always reactive. They seemed to be driven to provide supporting plans to the JTF as they
developed alternatives (FRAGOs)."
One plans chief observed, "JTF micromanaged planning and focused on tactical vice
operational details. RDO does not translate to rapid decisive planning and until the commander
and his staff turn the commander's decision into COAs. The components can't plan completely."
Anecdotal evidence indicated that the planning process was commander-centric. The
process did not allow time for plans to be developed at the component and JTF -HQ level. With
adequate time, the components, using JTF guidance to develop several COAs, could have
wargamed the COAs and identified the best plan based on full knowledge of the intended and
unintended consequences inherent in each COA. Instead, the commander's ideas, voiced during
the JCB, were taken as gospel by the staff and plans were developed accordingly.
Said a senior component planner, "I had no CONPLAN to counter enemy acts. No one
looked to see if the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) were being answered ... and if they
were, no one had a branch plan to respond. "
"There was no wargaming at the JTF looking beyond what effects-based missions
planning the components were doing," said another plans officer. "The JTF should look beyond
the current operations," said a senior mentor. "No one is looking to see what else the enemy
could be doing. No one is operationalizing the plan, so there is no branch plan to be active and
exploit sudden advantages. They are focused on FRAGOs vice branch plans."
JTF-HQ operations and plans SMEs were asked if there were any instances of operational
branches, formerly closed to Blue, becoming feasible and acceptable due to disruptions to

OPFOR operations. Based on responses, Blue did not need to use formerly closed operational
branches because the opposition was already disrupted.
There was some evidence that branches, formerly open to OPFOR, became unfeasible,
suitable, or acceptable due to disruption of Red's C2 and infrastructure. For example, due to the
destruction of C2 systems, OPFOR was unable to communicate with terrorists and this loss
degraded their control over pirate operations, making Red campaign strategy more one
dimensional and predictable. As Blue attrited JTF -S naval units, JTF -S was forced to abandon its
White shipping escort program (a ploy to look magnanimous to regional governments).
Eighty-eight percent of surveyed EA SMEs said they knew of no instances of operational
branches that were formerly open to Blue being no longer feasible, suitable, or acceptable. The
preponderance of observations from the SMEs indicated that little or no thought went into the
preparation of branch plans at either the JTF or the component level. Anecdotal evidence points
to a lack of war-gaming at the JTF level as the major cause of this. If alternative courses of
action were being investigated at either the JTF or the component level, they were not made
available to all levels of planning.
Although there is little indication that planners at either the JTF or the component level
were developing branch plans, JTF and the components were able to take advantage of tactical
opportunities presented to them by changes in the adversary's capabilities and disruption of his
operations. On the other hand, even though Blue was forced to delay or modify some of its
operations due to OPFOR's actions, such as mining of navigable waterways and mass attack
against JFMCC assets, and OPFOR's decision to defend the islands, Blue was able to dictate the
tempo of operations throughout the JOA. All other Blue tactical operations where executed
without delay or disruption.
Neither the JTF-HQ, nor the component staffs completely understood the EBO planning
process. This finding was based on the JTF's lack of wargaming, apparent lack of development
of branch plans and sequels, and the use of effects assessment and predictive analysis.
For the most part, at the operational level, it did not appear that OPFOR was surprised by
Blue's tactics or operations; however, at the tactical level, Blue conducted actions that did catch
OPFOR off guard. One OPFOR SME said, "Blue achieved tactical surprise by picking the time
and the place of attacks, but never achieved operational surprise."
One action by Blue did surprise OPFOR. OPFOR was taken by surprise at Blue's
issuance of a political 'ultimatum' just prior to the start of hostilities.
Said one participant, "JTF-S was surprised by the tone, timeline, and manner of delivery
of the 25 July demands. Delivery to CJTF-S without routing through the national capital was
seen as a pre-cursor to Blue combat operations."
A JFMCC operations chief described another surprise event, "The SOF raid on a location
of significant importance was probably an unpredictable move that caught OPFOR by surprise."
Anecdotal evidence indicates that OPFOR knew what Blue wanted to do in advance of Blue's
actions; however, they were unable to capitalize on this information due to Blue's overwhelming
force. "We used known and practiced tactics which made us predictable," said an operations
chief.
Nevertheless, Blue was equally susceptible to the surprise move. Blue was caught by
surprise when OPFOR initiated hostilities, launching a massed coordinated attack on Blue naval
units, transiting a narrow strait. "Operational surprise was achieved by OPFOR conducting pre-
emptive strikes against Blue naval forces and ISBs," said a headquarters observer. "The enemy
achieved tactical (not operational) surprise when they initiated hostilities." "Blue was surprised

at the two major naval attacks despite anticipating them and being prepared," noted another
observer.
OPFOR's attempt to close an important international waterway by mining also caught
Blue by surprise. "The two big attacks, the restricted passage closing, and the terrorist attacks
were surprising despite anticipating them." In addition, Blue anticipated neither the ferocity, nor
the determination of the pirates' and terrorists' attack in their drive to undermine Blue's influence
and disrupt Blue's re-supply efforts. They also failed to foresee the breadth and depth of the
terrorist activity against coalition partners. The ability and intensity of the terrorist attacks on
Blue APODs and SPODs caught Blue by surprise, as well.
It took less than one hour for Blue to detect the initiation of an OPFOR attack (detection
of an OPFOR TBM launch was immediate), according to 91 percent of SMEs surveyed and 71
percent then declared that Blue was able to change plans in reaction to an OPFOR attack within
the same one-hour time span.
120
100
80
.,
III
III
C
0
.,
Q.
III
60
a.
.....0
*I:
40
20
o
Less than 1 hour 1 to 6 hours 7 to 12 hours 13 to 24 hours 1 day to 2 days More than 2 days
Components
IDJFMCC I!iIIJFLCC DJSOTF/JTF-HQ I
Figure 56: Time required for Blue to determine a new plan is required less then 1 hour
However, 15 percent claimed that it took more than 24 hours for Blue to determine a new
plan was required, especially after the initial attack. Figure 56 shows the breakout of responses
received.
"On notification that SR 411 was compromised, the JSOTF immediately initiated
contingency plans and began working additional branches, while plans was looking at options
based on today's events and working 48 to 96 hours out, discussing viable options," one
participant said.

"The JTF received an order from the combatant commander to take the islands within 48
hours after an ultimatum was issued. The CJTF, within a few hours, met the commanders and
their staffs in the CIE and developed and issued a FRAGO in about 1.5 hours."
"CJTF -S attack drove the JTF to execute combat operations approximately 20 hours
earlier than planned. Decision to execute early took about three minutes from JTF-S' attack."
"After the initial attack, JFMCC plans realized right away plans would be modified as
priorities changed."
When indications that CJTF -S intended to move WME weapons and material to other
sites, a plan to secure the WME sites was formulated within 24 hrs. Based on the survey results,
it is apparent that Blue was quick to grasp the need for new or revised plans in response to
OPFOR's actions.
Eighty-seven percent of survey respondents indicated that the time to prepare and
disseminate a new plan following CJTF's decision to act was less than six hours. The planning
cells were able to react quickly once guidance was received from CJTF, in regards to how he
wanted to respond to emerging scenarios.
The ability to rapidly prepare and disseminate new plans in response to OPFOR actions
may have been due to the planning cells proactive approach to the planning cycle, and explicit
guidance given by the CJTF, to the components and JTF planning staff at the daily JCB briefings
as to how he expected the operation to flow. Although little branch planning was evident, the
planners were kept cognizant of OPFOR actions and the possible effects they had on Blue
30
25
20
'"<:
III
'"
0
Q.
'"
III
Cl.
15
.....0
'1:1:
10
o
Less than 1 hour 1 to 6 hours 13 to 24 hours 1 day to 2 days More than 2 days
Components
IDJFMCC DJFLCC IIIIJFACC III JSOTF/JTF-HQ I
Figure 57: Eighty-five percent of respondents indicated that Blue forces were repositioned in less
than six hours
operations and they were prepared to issue FRAGOs. Thirty-six FRAGOs were issued for ETO -

1, 13 FRAGOs were issued for ETO-1A, and three FRAGOs were issued for ETO-2. Use of
collaboration and CIE tools greatly enhanced the ability of JTF to develop and implement new
plans to counter OPFOR actions.
Eighty-five percent of respondents indicated that from the time a new plan was
disseminated, Blue required less than six hours to get forces repositioned to counter an
adversary's attack. Figure 57 shows the breakdown of responses from the SMEs.
In summary, Blue was able to conduct operations in the JOA, virtually at will. Although
data indicates that OPFOR usually anticipated Blue operations, Blue's superior capabilities made
this knowledge moot. The JTF and components were able to act quickly in response to OPFOR's
actions through the extensive use of collaboration and CIE tools such as IWS and ADOCS. The
CIE concept and tools allowed the flow of information to move swiftly throughout the force,
both vertically and horizontally, and provided a coherent operational picture to the entire force.
Situational awareness was improved at all levels, and the ability to communicate directly through
IWS eliminated deconfliction problems inherent in the majority of past exercises and operations.
Collaboration enabled rapid resolution of targeting problems and asset allocation to maximize
effects on the battlefield. With CIE, prioritization of targets between components could be
quickly and efficiently resolved. Although Blue was initially caught off guard by the intensity of
OPFOR's response to the ultimatum, JTF was quickly able to regain the initiative and follow
through with its operational plans.
As the scenario progressed and Blue determined that new plans were required to counter
OPFOR's movements, the CIE concept in conjunction with ADOCS, IWS and SPPS enabled the
components and JTF HQ to rapidly formulate new strategies, assign tasks and allocate resources
to carry out the new plan. Collaboration allowed all participants to voice their opinions, present
their case in regards to resources, and target priorities. Using IWS and SPPS, the new plan was
rapidly disseminated to the force for implementation. ADOCS provided a COP to the entire
force, displaying OPFOR and Blue force positional data and force strength as obtained from
intelligence sources positioned throughout the JOA. This improved situational awareness
enabled Blue to react quickly to OPFOR's movements and rapidly shift forces in response to
OPFOR's moves.
Joint tactical action (JTA) packages were played as a loosely defined concept during
experiment execution. Neither warfighters nor SMEs were given adequate information to
accurately assess this concept. The concept developers intended for the effects packages to be
single Service/component actions designed to achieve an effect, for this analysis, JTA packages
were taken to be joint Service/component actions designed to achieve an effect outside the
normal supporting /supported command structure. A component operations chief, who was able
to infer the difference between a JTA and an effects package made this comment: "JTAs are high
risk and they presuppose that a problem exists with the supporting/supported command concept."
Surveys revealed that participants were unsure of the difference between a JTA and an
effects package. Senior concept developers and senior mentors also had differing opinions about
JTAs.
"By giving out effects-based missions, I had a lot of flexibility to accomplish the
mission," said the commander of the JSOTF. "It allowed me to look at numerous ways to do a
mission rather than being given a solution."
"When JTAs are assigned to the functional components and are required to be conducted
simultaneously, who will synchronize the actions in time and space, resources, and outcome?"
asked a concept developer. "Will the ability to conduct JTAs require functional component staffs
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 143

to be j oint?" "There is no concept for JTA, but even if we have a force that has embraced all four
concepts successfully, how do these new opportunities manifest themselves? In the past, we have
not been full, networked, or effects-based. We couldn't successfully optimize joint tactical
actions."
The JTA concept needs clearer definitions of what a JTA is intended to be as compared to
an effects package, how to employ it, and who has OPCON and TACON of the forces assigned.
This concept is not ready for force implementation.
Finding The JTF failed to execute and integrate information operations, including
PSYOP and military deception.
While 10 capabilities were considered during JTF operational planning and execution,
not all 10 capabilities were used and or integrated into JTF operations. Likewise, the assessment
of 10 actions was neither fully considered, nor fully used to modify or initiate plans and
operations. Finally, assessment of the success or failure ofIO actions was also not fully
considered.
10 was planned, coordinated, and conducted at the JTF and component levels, but it was
not integrated across the force. Due to poor BDA, the effects of the 10 campaign were never
really recognized by either the JTF or components. Anecdotal evidence from OPFOR SMEs and
analysts indicate that OPFOR believed Blue's 10 campaign was ineffective, disorganized, and
uncoordinated. OPFOR believed that it had won the 10 war and Blue failed to win over the
hearts and minds of OPFOR's supporters. STO was a notable exception in the 10 campaign, STO
actions were coordinated at the component level, and the information was disseminated to the
JTF via STO personnel assigned to the JTF. However, STO actions were not fully integrated
across the JTF or into the JTF 10 plan.

The following comments were received from participants:
"It's ugly" (senior mentor)
"Need to build a functional and JTF level 10 structure" (senior mentor)
"10 redefines "Broke" and the problem goes well beyond the JTF and combatant commander
levels" (senior mentor)
"Need organization to bring the five pillars ofIO together at the combatant commander
level" (senior mentor)
"10 integration component wide needed a lot of work" (senior mentor)
"JTF slow to integrate 10 into plans" (JTF IS SME)
"Full time 10 person was needed in plans cell." (JTF IS SME)
"Special 10 tools need to be developed." (JTF IS SME)
"10 needs to be defined and integrated into all facets of operations." (JFMCC SME)
Fifty-seven JTFHQ and component IS SMEs were surveyed over the course of the
experiment. Eighty-five percent of the 34 SMEs who provided comments indicated that
appropriate 10 resources and capabilities were factored into operational plans and actions.
"10 resources have been an integral part of the planning process," said one expert.
"JFMCC 10 cell did a good job of incorporating 10 aspects into the planning. Believe they are
ahead of the game in timing and capability analysis. The only weakness noted was OP level

deception. JFMCC was planning and conducting tactical deception in conjunction with transit.
Computer Network Defense (CND) conditions were upgraded."
Another observer noted that the 10 rep was present at all guidance, apportionment, and
targeting and master air attack plan sessions to direct and suggest non-kinetic actions to support
the effects planning. "Absolutely! At the JFLCC, the commander was very straightforward on
what his desires were in terms of 10 integration and maximizing the capabilities of 10 within
their mission."
Nevertheless, there are always improvements that can be made. "JFMCC 10 capabilities
were not clearly defined for the CJFMCC," one observer noted. "10 was underused during the
initial surge operations. While P AO, EW and PSYOP planning was progressing well, a lack of
guidance for the theater deception plan significantly hindered 10 efforts."
Said one observer during the experiment, "the 10 cell is integrated into all of the planning
meetings held at the JTF and JFLCC levels. Their awareness of the commander's intent is high.
However, awareness of the 10 objectives is not universal across the staff, yet, primarily because
the planning is in early stages at this point. Expect awareness ofIO objectives and planning will
increase dramatically after JTF/JFLCC holds an 10 working group to develop fidelity on these
issues."
The majority of 26 survey respondents indicated that all available resources and
capabilities were factored into operational plans and actions. Many provided comments such as:
"Use ofIO resources was maximized."
"10 plans appeared to be well planned and used available resources."
"Did not see where resources and capabilities failed to be factored into operational
plans."
"Members of the JIACG could have more effect in getting the message to the adversary
through national media instead of the 10 cell writing local articles. More effective collaboration
at all levels should resolve this issue."
"Some resources are used more than others in planning efforts, but nothing has been left
out of the planning efforts at this point."
"Not enough leaflets being dropped due to problems getting this worked into the ATO."
"PSYOPS and Civil Military Operations. CMO also plays a major role in D, I, E and it is
not being used in this experiment."
"In concert with JIACG, need to make better use of P AO to convey message through
CNN and other national media."
While most SMEs thought that 10 was fully considered and factored into operational
plans and actions, a majority (87 percent) thought that even if no 10 resources and capabilities
had been factored, there would have been minimal impact on operations.
JFMCC's operations chief said, "The 10 plan was not seen as effective. 10 was
considered and planned, however, kinetic options were quicker and more visible. Certainty of
success of the 10 campaign was not visible, therefore; efforts went to kinetic options, which
were quicker." "Big effect on operations, especially Commando Solo," said another operations
officer. "Leaflet drop operations and TARBS broadcasts made the island campaign easier."
Component and JTF-HQ planners had the following significant comments in regards to
10 use and exploitation efforts:
"10 should not become another functional component stovepipe. Doing so hampers
integration."
"We do not have visibility at the JPC of how we are incorporating 10 into our plan."

"10 needs to be embedded in the planning process. It does not help to have 10 as part of
the IS folks. "
"If the JTF commander does not understand what 10 is or what he wants from it, the
plans cannot incorporate 10 in a useful manner."
Combat assessment ofIO actions was equally inadequate due probably to a lack ofM&S
fidelity and experiment constraints. Assessing the effects of the 10 campaign can be very
difficult. Red could only perceive some 10 actions, while other actions took a long time to bear
fruit. However, failure to assess the success or failure of the 10 campaign can lead to the
misallocation of resources and an underestimation of the adversary's resources and capabilities.
In this experiment, there were sufficient ISR assets available to assess 10 actions, and, based on
the daily ISR allocation plan, they were positioned adequately to monitor the 10 targets.
However, M&S could not provide the fidelity necessary to provide the EAC with adequate
information to properly assess the effects of the 10 actions.
There is insufficient information to determine when the initial and modified 10 plans
were completed and submitted for approval. For example, a JTF 10 plan was approved for
implementation on 12 June 2002 (MC02 Spiral 3) and modified on 4 August 2002 (MC02
Execution.)
Based on the responses received from daily surveys given to effects assessment cell
SMEs, there were no instances of unintended 10 actions causing disruption or delay of
operational plans and objectives noted. However, the destruction of a major radio station may
have deprived Blue of a vital method for gauging public sentiment and the effects of their actions
on OPFOR.
Due to OPFOR known and suspected IADS/SEAD positions and movements, some 10
mission air resources and tracks were modified. However, there were no known disruptions in 10
actions due to adversary 10 actions. There were only a few instances of operational 10 actions
discarded due to timeliness. One SME indicated, "Deception plan coordination could not be
accomplished within the established timelines to support MTO development." Another SME
observed that, "some delays were noted due to the rigid nature of the JFMCC planning process
and its reliance on MSRs. Current Ops responses to activity were timely."
A JFMCC SME reported that a planned attack on a radio site was denied due to 'a
disconnect' with the desired effect. The 10 cell cited a 'deny/damage' level, but the item was
changed to 'destroy' by planslMTO. 10 intended a non-lethal means, but the brief did not match
the request.
The JF ACC senior mentor observed, "The process to get 10 targets approved up thru the
SECDEF level is slow." Because of these delays, a number of 10 targets nominated for
prosecution had to be dropped or delayed because of the delays in the approval process.
Full combat assessment of attacks on 10 targets was never achieved. M&S was unable to
provide the level ofBDA required to assess the 10 campaign adequately, could not be provided
due to lack ofM&S fidelity and ability to accurately replicate ISR assets, and because of this, an
average time to provide full combat assessment of attacks on 10 targets couldn't be calculated.
Although sufficient ISR assets were available and allocated to evaluate 10 targets, M&S lacked
the fidelity to interpret the results. In addition, due to the lack of adequate and timely BDA a
significant number of 10 targets were re-struck before combat assessment was available.
The 10 plan identified 20 individual effects and 88 key nodes/targets from the ONA for
prosecution during the 10 campaign. Most surveyed SMEs couldn't judge whether the 10
146 FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

campaign was a success or failure (See figure 58). Of the 16 who responded to the survey, three-
fourths rated the campaign a success.
Some comments received from the IS SMEs include:
"Indications, thus far, show that 10 is having some of the desired effects. However,
developing and collecting on indicators is relatively new and personnel are still working on it."
"There were no 10 indicators developed for the Intel collection plan. Development of
these indicators is the responsibility of the 10 cell. Subsequent to this, 10 indicators have been
developed, and are being refined, and should be included in subsequent collection plans."
"Believe the overall campaign had good measure of success. The JFMCC staff was very
proactive in their approach. In fact that may be to a fault - some actions not fully coordinated
across the naval force or with the JTF. Collaboration helped identify most of these (since they
were mentioned during briefings, updates, or meetings) and resulted in a better overall product."
High Moderate Low

Degree of Success
1111 JFM CC 0 JFLCC 0 JSOTFI JTF-f-Q I
Figure 58: Degree of success achieved against 10 objectives
"Everything was considered, having some success. Some targets are hard to evaluate."
A comment from an OPFOR SME paints a different picture, "The 10 campaign is not
winning the war over the hearts and minds of Red," and "the 10 program is not reaching the
people."
This comment was received from a JTF IS Mentor, "JTF has been unable to use 10 to get
into OPFOR's decision loop."
The lack of credible BDA was the biggest problem associated with, assessing the success
or failure of the 10 campaign. There were no apparent MOPs or MOEs established to be used to
evaluate the effects on the campaign on the selected targets. There were sufficient ISR assets to
be used to assess the 10 campaign, but there was little evidence that the information was getting
back to the effects assessment cell for evaluation. In addition, HUMINT assets were not

considered in the 10 plan, either to carry out or provide BDA assessment ofIO actions. One
reason may have been the lack of fidelity in the models to interpret the ISR data properly for 10
actions or lack of adequate and timely JECG injects to the assessment cells regarding BDA.
Another reason may have been due to experiment constraints. It has been recommended by
SMEs and senior mentors that 10 personnel are integrated into the JTF plans and JTF operations
cells in order to maximize the benefits of 10 capabilities.
STO/SAP actions were conducted at the component level and fed to the JTF through STO
personnel assigned to the staff. The following STO/SAP comments were received from SCDs:
"CIE empowered us, with the exception of the STO, where we had little or no
collaboration." (CJFMCC)
"We made great progress with STO ... " (SCD)
"STO helped me figure out what not to do." (CJTF)
"We made landmark progress in STO, but not so in 10." (SCD)
"We had SCI and STO and we had no good chat room. We need to get classified
programs at the unit level." (CJF ACC)
"The STO activities provided unparalleled opportunities to examine our capabilities that
are important to the joint fight. We need a covered and secure organization to bring access to all
service programs." (CJTF)
In summary, 10 was planned, coordinated, and conducted at the JTF and component
levels, but it was not integrated across the force. Due to poor BDA, the effects of the 10
campaign were never really recognized by either the JTF or components. One notable 10 success
was the 10 Island Campaign. Commando Solo and leaflet drops were used to convince CJTF-S's
forces to surrender. On two of the islands, CJTF -S forces surrendered without resistance, thereby
minimizing casualties, and the time and resources needed to liberate the Islands. Anecdotal
evidence from OPFOR SMEs and analysts indicate that OPFOR considered Blue's 10 campaign
ineffective, disorganized, and uncoordinated. OPFOR believed that it had won the 10 war and
Blue failed to win over the hearts and minds of OPFOR's supporters.
Other Observations
Observation 1: JTF exhibited the ability to dynamically re-task JISR assets for follow-on
actions and emerging tasks. It should be noted, however, that the JTF was allocated a
large, disproportionate number of national assets.
As noted in Finding 4, the participants were not given an adequate definition of the
differences between a JTA and an effects package, therefore analysis of this task concentrated on
how JTF organized and controlled forces to conduct limited or special operations missions.
Surveys were sent out to JTF-HQ and component operations SMEs to assess the JTF's
ability to dynamically re-task effects packages for follow-on actions. The majority of the
responses to all of the questions regarding effects packages indicated that they could not
accurately answer the questions because they were unsure of the difference between a JTA and
an effects package. However, regardless of whether or not they knew the difference between a
JTA and an effects package, they could comment on whether the JTF could successfully re-task
assets as required to meet emerging mission requirements. During the course of the experiment,
four missions were conducted that could be considered either JTA or effects package missions,
Neutralization ofOPFOR's WME primary storage facilities, the raid on the fisheries to capture

terrorist leaders, the raids to secure WME weapons/material at OPFOR's WME "hide sites," and
the operation to capture CJTF -So
Surveys were sent to component operations SMEs to determine if there were any
instances of effects packages, previously committed to action, not being redeployed in response
to newly developing situation. The response from the majority of the SMEs indicated that there
was no need to redeploy the assets of any of the effects packages/JTAs in response to emerging
situations, because there were adequate assets in theater to handle all missions assigned.
Component and JTF-HQ operations SMEs were asked if JTF assets were double tasked.
The response from all of the respondents indicated that no unusual double tasking of units
occurred. They did note that many JTF assets are multi tasked as part of normal operations. A
good example of this is most naval surface ships are tasked with multiple missions and it is not
uncommon to have a unit conducting a gunfire support mission, while also conducting an ASW
mission in support of JFMCC, and a strike mission in support of JF ACC.
To be effective, effects/JTA packages may require additional support from assets not
directly allocated as part of the effect/JTA package. A review of the data, to date, indicates that
neither CONUS AOR assets, nor assets transiting the AOR were used to support effects/JTA
packages. Forward presence forces were assigned to the JTF and these assets may have been
used in support of effects/JTA packages on or after C-Day.
Effects/JTA packages either can be under the direct control of the JTF or assigned to
another commander within the JTF for control. All of the missions identified above were under
the control and supervision of commanders assigned to the task by the JTF; none of the missions
were under JTF direct supervision.
As the need for special missions became apparent, CJTF assigned a commander to plan,
organize, and execute the mission. Resources were drawn from JTF assigned forces as needed to
complete the mission. When the mission was completed, these forces were returned to the
control of their component commanders for reassignment. Forward presence units were fully
integrated into the JTF as part of his assigned forces. Therefore, some of these units did
participate in support of these actions.

The following assessment areas or concepts are either directly linked to the conduct of
Effects-Based Operations or provide a necessary function in support ofEBO.
Establish and Maintain Information Superiority (10)

- The ability to establish and maintain Information Superiority, enables the JTF to operate his
forces with a full knowledge of the adversary's capabilities and intentions, and enables him to
deny the adversary knowledge of his own capabilities and intentions. In addition, information
operations can help the JTF shape the battlespace to facilitate the conduct of effects-based
operations
Rapidly Set Conditions for Decisive Operations

- For EBO to be effective, all JTF forces must be available in theater, with the equipment needed
to conduct the operations, and be in position to conduct RDO. In addition, JTF must be able to
shape the battlespace to maximize the effectiveness of his forces while reducing the enemy's
capability to react to his actions
F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V 149

Assure Access
- JTF forces must be able to enter the JOA and transit to assigned areas of operations with
minimal interruption and loss in order to conduct EBO

- EBO requires an enormous amount information and knowledge to be effective. ONA
incorporates an information database on the adversary's PMESII nodes and linkages with a
reach-back capability, allowing planners and targeteers access to centers of excellence,
academia, industry, government labs, etc. to determine what targets should be neutralized or
destroyed, to ensure that the JTF' s desired effects can be achieved with a minimum of collateral
damage and loss

- EBO cannot be successfully accomplished without effects-based planning and assessment.
EBO must be planned to achieve the JTF's desired effects. Planners must use ONA and reach-
back to identify the targets, to allocate the assets to accomplish the tasks and the timing and
sequencing of force deployment to accomplish the assigned tasks. ISR assets must be positioned
to assess the success or failure of the individual actions, and the intended and unintended
consequences of conducting the actions then must be understood. Planning must also take into
account and understand how the adversary will react and what actions he may take in response to
JTF actions and how this will impact on the JTF's ability to achieve his goals. Assessment must
be conducted to evaluate how the success or failure of JTF actions is contributing to his desired
effects. Poor assessment can result in under or over estimating an adversary's strengths and
weaknesses and can lead to inefficient use of resources to attack targets already
destroyed/neutralized or not required to achieve the desired effects, or can result in the failure to
re-attack important targets that have not been previously neutralized or destroyed

- Provides the tools and environment to integrate planning functions vertically and horizontally
and provides the tools (ADOCS/SPPS) used to provide situational awareness across the force
Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG)

- Coordinates and integrates the DIE portions of national power to support and/or supplement
EBO actions
Joint Initiatives
- Specifically in this experiment the joint fires initiative (JFI), time sensitive targets concept,
IWS, ADOCS tools, and ONA tools were fully implemented and used to support EBO

- No baseline information exists for this, Conduct Decisive Effects Based Operations, assessment
area
150 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DOTMLPF Linkage
-The JFCOM capability change recommendation (DOTMLPF format) for Effects-Based
Operations can be based on the following findings garnered by JFCOM J-9 analysts during
MC02 Spiral 3 and MC02 execution:
Effects-based thinking has the potential to become the joint operational concept for the
information age
Effects-based planning necessitates change to the military decision-making thought process.
Developing an effects-based mindset and applying that mindset will require focused
education programs
Effects-based Operations have the potential to be the future doctrinal centerpiece for
planning, execution, and assessing j oint military actions
The combatant commander's staff, including the SJFHQ, supported by ONA and the Joint
Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) plays an essential role in effects-based planning,
execution, and assessment
Continued EBO concept refinement will improve national abilities to orchestrate political
and military activities in support of future j oint operations
Recommendations
The EBO concept showed great potential during this experiment and has the potential to
be our future doctrinal centerpiece for planning, executing, and assessing joint military actions.
However, due to the limited training received by the participants prior to the start of the
experiment, not all EBO concepts were adequately understood or practiced during this
experiment. Most of the problems observed during the experiment can easily be overcome with
training and practice.
1. JFCOM, develop a PME template to the Service schools and NDU for inclusion in their
curri cuI urn. ~
2. NDU and Services, incorporate the JFCOM EBO template in the curricula of joint and Service
warfare colleges. ~
3. JFCOM, refine EBO concept and procedures in future experiments to develop EBO tools and
TTPs.~
4. JFCOM, exercise the collaborative process and CIE tools in an LOE to refine the business
rules and processes required to maximize the usefulness of these tools. ~
5. JFCOM, in conjunction with a combatant command, develop a robust ONA tool incorporating
better search engines and data visualization tools to help users more quickly and efficiently
access and understand the data contained in the ONA. ~
6. JFCOM, further define the reach-back concept as part of future experiments. ~
7. JFCOM, lead an effort to develop a joint integrated tasking order to complement the ETO and
integrate the actions of all components including JFLCC and JSOTF necessary to create joint
effects. ~
- The integrated ATO and maritime tasking order (MTO) are excellent tools in their domains;
however, they are insufficient to integrate all other actions necessary to create joint effects.

8. JFCOM, continue the development and refinement of the CONOPS and TTPs necessary to
build an ETO defining linkages between the ETO, PEL and ONA. ~
9. JFCOM, foster development ofISR systems and M&S tools to replicate ISR systems to better
assess results ofEBO effects. ~
- There is currently no method of obtaining this information in current ISR architecture.
Senior mentors, SMEs, and JTF personnel have made the following recommendations for
improvement ofEAC operations:
10. JFCOM, in the SJFHQ concept, move the effect assessment cell from the Information
Superiority group to the plans group. ~
11. JFCOM, reorganize the EAC to include IS personnel, to process BDA data, and operations
personnel to conduct predictive analysis to turn the data into information that can be used to
predict an adversary's capabilities and intentions. ~
12. JFCOM, organize the EAC into three (3) functional groups: intelligence and BDA data
collection and analysis (IS personnel)- effects assessment (IS/OPS personnel)-
predictive/deficiency analysis (OPS personnel). ~
13. JFCOM, examine effects assessment in future experiments with an emphasis on organization,
manning, tools, and doctrine (TTP). ~
14. JFCOM, in conjunction with Service and joint schools, incorporate nodal and deficiency
analysis into curriculum to reinforce the EBO concept. ~
15. JFCOM, develop a coherent definition of TST, highlighting the differences between a target
that needs to be prosecuted immediately (TBM, CDCM, etc.) and one that can wait until an asset
is available to prosecute it. ~
16. DoD, field ADOCS as an interim targeting toolset. ~
- ADOCS as a common targeting toolset showed great potential during MC02, however more
fidelity may be required, and procedures need to be modified or added to make the process and
toolset user-friendly.
17. DoD, field TST process and JFI concept, incorporating lessons learned and the revised
procedures developed during MC02 as ajoint procedure immediately. ~
18. DoD, develop M&S tools to better replicate non-kinetic weapon capabilities and effects in
exercise, wargame and experiment events. ~
19. JFCOM, modify the JIACG concept to include the PollMil planner as the forward element
liaison between the JIACG and the JTF staff. ~
- A recommendation for the JIACG, proposed by some senior mentors and players, constitutes a
JIACG forward element as a liaison cell/group on the JTF staff, to apprise the JTF on what DIE
actions are being conducted or contemplated, and to solicit inputs on how these actions are
effecting or will effect CJTFs overall campaign plan. This places the main emphasis on a
JIACG-like element on the combatant commanders staff to harmonize DIE actions.

20. DoD, develop M&S tools to assist with the assessment of DIE actions. ~
21. JFCOM, continue development of the effects-based planning process and training for
members of the JTF staffs. ~
- Effects-Based Planning necessitates a change in the military decision-making thought process.
The lack of war gaming at the JTF level and the apparent lack of development of branch plans
and sequels based on the use of effects assessment and predictive analysis indicates that EBO
planning process as described by the EBO concept developers was not completely adhered to by
the JTF -HQ staff. The concept itself appears to be sound, however, based on this experiment
more in-depth training is needed to insure that all members of the JTF and component staffs
follow the planning principles ofEBO.
22. JFCOM, develop an acceptable mechanism for coordinating SAP/STO actions and
integrating SAP/STO program information into the JTF 10 campaign. ~
23. JFCOM, take the lead in evaluating inclusion of STO in the JTF CIE, and in determining if
more STO billets are required throughout the JTF. ~

Figure 59: US Navy medical teams work on the wounded during MC02 field exercises
154 FOR OFFICIAL USE QNI,Y

Assessment Area 5 - Sustain the Force

The procedures developed to satisfy the warfighting challenge' Ability to Provide Agile
Sustainment for Joint Forces in Rapid Decisive Operations' could not be completely validated
because of the experiment construct. As discussed below, some of the procedures require further
experimentation.
The logistics common relevant operational picture (Log CROP) proved to be a powerful
and well-received tool, enabling the JTF to rapidly process data
and generate logistics knowledge by integrating sustainment as
an integral part of Effects-Based Operations. The watchboard
was the most commented on and used part of the Log CROP.
However, it did not provide a predictive logistics capability.
The experiment construct did not enable an accurate
assessment of the ability to 'Employ a Networked Sustainment
Distribution Structure to Satisfy the JFC Sustainment
Requirements for RDO' because the structure was not
simulated and was not visible to the participants. However,
insights gained from participants showed that while the Log
CROP provided sufficient information to be able to tailor
logistics forces, sufficient planning time was not allocated to
arrive at a tailored solution in either force structure or
sustainment packaging. ISBs and host nation support were used
efficiently to minimize the logistics footprint in the JOA.
JRSOI procedures and networked distribution, however, could
not be evaluated without benefit of more detailed modeling
because of all the factors that affect those procedures. The JTF
successfully used a combination of delivery platforms for
sustainment distribution, including using strategic lift assets.
However, the high speed vessel (HSV) was never used for
sustainment distribution during the experiment because the JFMCC and the JTF could not agree
on how the revolutionary new vessel should be employed.
In the area of 'Gain and Maintain Knowledge of Force Health Status', the Theater
Medical Information Program (TMIP) was not mature enough or sufficiently integrated into the
MC02 C4ISR design to provide situational awareness to the JTF surgeon staff or to assist in their
planning, coordinating, and decision-making process.
The assessment of 'Provide Medical Care' was inconclusive. The joint medical semi-
automated forces (JMedSAF) simulation did not portray movement of casualties from point of
injury, to Level 1, and to Level 2 treatment. In addition, Level 1 units were not played and not all
Level 2 units were played in JMedSAF. Whether those units were capable of providing adequate
medical care in the JOA could not be determined.
Methodology
In analyzing the task, 'Rapidly Process Data and Generate Logistics Knowledge by
Integrating Sustainment as an Integral Part of Effects-Based Operations', the Log CROP, which
was seen as the key area to review, was broken down as follows:

Collecting, processing, and displaying full visibility of operations and logistics information
Log CROP ability to display complex logistics information
Log CROP ability to ensure a "predictive" capability for logistics
Ability to acquire critical logistics information from the Log CROP for planning and analysis
and dissemination to subordinate logistics commanders
The second task, 'Employ a Networked Sustainment Distribution Structure to Satisfy the
JFC Sustainment Requirements for RDO' addressed the following:
Tailor sustainment for synchronization with deploying forces
Shape the logistics footprint in JOA to extend operational reach
Procedures and practices to ensure time-definite delivery and support for agile mobile forces
Use strategic lift to augment theater distribution
Employ a combination of delivery platforms to ensure time-definite delivery, improve
throughput, and support agile mobile forces
The last tasks, 'Gain and Maintain Knowledge of Force Health Status and Provide
Medical Care', were assessed by:
Track patients throughout the theater of operations and to CONUS
Monitor DNBIIcombat casualty rates as related to force readiness
Determine the tool required to provide the JFC and subordinates the knowledge needed to
assess the medical feasibility of operational activities
Determine patient data trending
Data was collected primarily from the logistics participants and SMEs using automated
questionnaires and from the written comments and recommendations provided by all
participants, various after action reviews, and In-Focus Sessions. The locations and number of
the logisticians follows: plans group, 14; operations group, 12; SMEs, 12; functional component,
5; JLMC, 16; and the JECG deployment sustainment support cell (DSSC), 17.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to Provide Agile Sustainment

The warfighting challenge, 'Ability to Provide Agile Sustainment', was developed
because the current force sustainment methodology requires establishing a large vulnerable
infrastructure to collect equipment, personnel, and consumables and to perform employment and
sustainment functions. Because of its size and its nature, it is challenged to provide agile
sustainment to highly mobile forces in non-contiguous operations. The tasks, subtasks, questions,
and data elements constituting this study were developed based on information from several
sources, most notable being:
Focused Logistics: Enabling Early Decisive Operations (FLEEDO, 1011 0/99)
Operations (RDO, 2114/01)
Strategic Deployment (SD, 511 0/00)
RDO White papers (311/02)
Deployment & Sustainment in MC02 Concept of Operations (CONOPS, 3118/02)
Deployment & Sustainment in MC02 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs, 1/9/02)
156 FOR OFFICIAL USE QNI,V

Me02 Joint Standing Operating Procedure (JSOP)
These sources were used to generate the metrics and form the basis for data collection
plan development. The logistics concept developers, including the Joint Logistics
Transformation Center (JL TC) and medical SMEs, and JFCOM analysts vetted the data
collection plan. The high order metrics:
Task: Rapidly process data and generate logistics knowledge by integrating sustainment as an
integral part of effects-based operations
Task: Employ a networked sustainment distribution structure to satisfy the JFC sustainment
requirements for RDO
Subtask: Tailor sustainment for synchronization with deploying forces
Subtask: Shape the logistics footprint in JOA to extend operational reach
Subtask: Employ a combination of delivery platforms to ensure time-definite
delivery, improve throughput and support agile mobile forces
Subtask: Determine the impact of using strategic lift to augment theater distribution
Task: Gain and maintain knowledge of force health status

Subtask: Track patients throughout the theater of operations and to CONUS
Subtask: Determine the tools required to provide the JFC and subordinates the
knowledge needed to assess the medical feasibility of operational activities
Task: Provide medical care

Subtask: Determine the impact of using lifts of opportunity vs. dedicated air
evacuation to move patients from the battlefield
Subtask: Determine the means of reducing the medical footprint in the JOA
Finding The Log CROP became the key tool for displaying logistics information and
providing logistics situational awareness.
As depicted in figure 60 below, most participants, logisticians and operators alike, saw
the Log CROP as the most effective tool in the experiment for capturing and displaying logistics
information. From it, commanders and staff could select areas of information relevant to them.
The most widely used part of the Log CROP was the watchboard, which was a "stoplight chart"
that provided a near real time view of component status of critical classes of supply and flow
capacity across critical nodes and lines of communication. MC02 effectiveness notwithstanding,
the Log CROP needs continued refinement to provide an automated method of integrating
logistical information across all echelons, and to ensure the links to information sources are kept
current. JTF component and MSC elements, with information posted on the watchboard piece of
the Log CROP, or available via links on the watchboard, must also keep those links current.
Business or knowledge management rules also need to be developed, as an SOP, to standardize
Log CROP use and update procedures.
In some instances, participants recommended deleting some links and recommended
adding others. Of significance was the lack of engineer and medical information sources linked
to the Log CROP.

The JTF log operations director did not see the Log CROP as a "predictive logistics" tool.
To become such a tool would require adding a forecasting capability, enabling forecasting out to
96 hours, or adding links to component or Service forecasting tools.
"JTFICorps-levellogisticians don't live 24-48 hours out; they live 72-96 hours out;
otherwise, they can't affect anything in time to make a difference," said one participant. "Some
means of building projections, some kind
of predictive capability into the data on the Log CROP Enhances Awareness and
Assessment of Deployment and
log watchboard would be highly
Sustainment
desirable," said another.
Information on the log watchboard 60
VI
was not seen as actionable. Respondents CII
:g 40
reported that the log watchboard served o
~ 20
more as a location to place component and CII
a:: 0
subordinate command status information. Agree Disagree
Having the log watchboard as a source for
actionable information should come about
over time. JTF elements must become more Figure 60: Log CROP enhances awareness (n=59)
familiar with it, and SOPs must be
developed.
Some respondents indicated there was too much information on the Log CROP, and
desired the ability to tailor the display to their needs. "We should have the ability to individually
sculpt the page when it opens up, based on the person's log in," said one participant. Another
noted, "We should have some ability to tailor what's seen on the page so people can put what's
most important to them, where they can find it easiest."
One analyst observation was that none of the logistics systems was incorporated or linked
to the ONA database. Since the ONA is supposed to present both Blue and OPFOR information
pertaining to the JOA, the issue of whether or not the two information sources should be
integrated or linked should be investigated.
Finding Sustainment packages were not tailored for deploying units. ISBs shaped the
logistics footprint. The JTF made good use of multiple delivery platforms for sustainment
distribution.
Tailoring sustainment packages for deploying units was not well executed. Participants
noted that there was insufficient time to allow for the detailed planning necessary to develop
tailored sustainment. Said one player, "The planning timeline developed by the JTF did not allow
our subordinate commands to do the planning necessary to come up with a task organized
sustainment package."
As shown in figure 61 below, the Log CROP provided the JTF sufficient visibility over
logistical assets to be able to tailor logistics for deployed forces; however, as stated previously
there was insufficient planning time to go through the process to arrive at a tailored solution.
While the tool exists (Log CROP), appropriate time must still be made available for planning.
With respect to the use of ISB to support sustainment distribution, the JTF positioned
ISBs to reduce the logistics footprint in the JOA and extend operational reach, while still
considering force protection. One concern raised was that by reducing the footprint in the JOA,
the JTF was limiting its in-theater support options, while at the same time downsizing facilities
outside the JOA, which would cause difficulties for follow-on forces. This was a meaningful and

essential constraint in MC02. The real key was the desire for large effects in the JOA, but
realized via Effects-Based Planning, that large forces were not required.
Maintaining sustainment aboard ship served to minimize the logistics footprint in the
JOA. Even with the intent of minimizing the log footprint, the JTF still ended up with two
sizeable ISBs in the JOA. There were also forward operating bases that had to expand because of
the number of personnel operating from them. While not directly stated, this would indicate
insufficient coordination among components to minimize supply stockage and duplicate forces.
Extensive use of host nation resources helped to offset the log footprint in the number of U.S.
forces personnel and amount of
sustainment required.
Log CROP Provided Sufficient Visibility for The JTF successfully used
Tailoring Sustainment for Deployed Forces a combination of delivery
platforms for sustainment
45 distribution; including using
40
strategic lift assets to resupply the
JFLCC subordinate commands.
35 However, the high speed vessel
(HSV) was never used for
30
sustainment distribution during the
VI
CII
VI 25 experiment. The JFMCC used the
s:::
0
c.. HSV as one of its operational
CII 20
VI
a:: assets rather than as a theater
15
common-use transportation asset.
The JTF successfully
10 coordinated with USTRANSCOM
to retain strategic lift into the JOA
5
and to support aerial
o transportation requirements
Yes No following the airborne insertion.
This reallocation of strategic lift
Figure 61: Log CROP provides visibility-tailoring sustainment of proved to be essential for
deployed forces (n=55) accomplishing the mission in Red,
and showed the degree of
increased airlift resources that might be required to support Army operations on this scale.
Finding Immature development and insufficient integration of the Theater Medical

Information Program (TMIP) had a negative impact on the ability of the JTF staff to gain
and maintain knowledge of force health status.
The lack of early planning and knowledge of what assets were already in theater slowed
the delivery of focused medical support services. Comments included, "Since medical play was
never designed into the MC02 exercise and experimental construct, the flow of information
between the response cells to the functional components and on to the JTF, because of the
numerous work-a-rounds, was cumbersome, confusing, and the ROE changed almost daily."
Another noted, " ... For this experiment, TMIP did not have the capability to track patients.
NavMedWatch was better at this [tracking patients] than TMIP. We would have needed

additional information scripted, to put into TMIP in order to show the evacuation, additional
visits, and patient encounters."
Other Observations
Observation 1: The assessment of "Provide Battlefield Medical Care" was inconclusive.
No assessment can be made regarding the subtask, 'Determine the Impact of Using Lifts
of Opportunity vs. Dedicated Air Evacuation' to move patients from the battlefield; or the
subtask 'Determine the Means of Reducing the Medical Footprint in the JOA'. The lack of
medical planning for MC02 and the poor integration of the experimental systems with Service
reporting prevents any meaningful review of these subtasks.
The joint medical semi-automated forces (JMedSAF) simulation did not portray
movement of casualties from point of injury, to Level 1 care, or to Level 2. JMedSAF
automatically placed casualties into Level 2 medical facilities. In addition, Levell units were not
played, and not all Level 2 units were played in JMedSAF. Whether those units were capable of
providing adequate medical care in the JOA could not be determined. As such, the JTF medical
staff had no capability to make a decision regarding whether their medical footprint in the JOA
was effective. Because lifts of opportunity were not simulated, no assessment can be made as to
whether they were effective, or whether casualties were dying due to no dedicated air evacuation
assets in the JOA.
The concept of using 'lifts of opportunity' to evacuate casualties elicited a strong
response from one experiment participant, "Patient evacuation by lift of opportunity should be
used as an exception, not as the rule," he said. "In RDO, with a minimal (or nonexistent) medical
footprint in the JOA, dedicated medical lift, with embarked, skilled, medical personnel to
monitor and treat stabilized patients, as they are evacuated from stabilization platforms like an
FST, EMEDS, or CRTS, to definitive care is necessary. Lift of opportunity is for stable patients
that require little or less medical expertise during evacuation. If we make opportune lift our
primary means of evacuation, soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines will die en-route."
Observation 2: Deployment and sustainment planners should be fully integrated into the
CIE
According to one senior mentor, joint interactive planning (np) should apply to functions
as well as forces. "They should be participants, not observers, as courses of action are developed,
evaluated, and selected. Transportation feasibility and sustainment supportability assessments
should be considered during COA development, and not during comparison and selection."
Standing Joint Forces headquarters (SJFHQ)

- Functions of personnel in log operations and log plans positions in SJFHQ

- Database research for facilities and infrastructure to support logistics operations in JOA

- Develop logistics concept of support for Effects-Based Operation(s) and future branches and
sequels

Sustainment

and sustainment, horizontally and vertically; i.e. logistics action response board (LARB)
Interagency Agency (IA)

assistance
Joint Information Surveillance & Reconnaissance (nSR)

Joint Initiatives
- Introduction and experimentation of new joint logistics tools (JL Tools)
Assured Access (AA)

Effects Based Operations (EBO)

- Execute logistics operations to sustain forces conducting effects-based operations
Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM)

- None

Baseline entry: The J-4 was not able to adequately track key trigger points throughout the
operation, or monitor major changes during the campaign
MC02 Result: The Log CROP, with the CIE, improved the capability to track key trigger points
Baseline entry: The JTF requested and received directive authority for logistics, enabling the JTF
to direct or assign common user items and services to specific components. The resulting
continuous flow of support was crucial to mission accomplishment
MC02 Result: In MC02, directive authority for logistics with the lead Service for classes I, III
and IV was recognized as a good support combination
DOTMLPF Linkage
Doctrine
- TTP/SOP is needed for Log CROP knowledge management: keeping the Log CROP current

- TTP/SOP are needed for employment of new systems (TMIP)
Organization
- Improve reach-back capability for CONOPS medical planning
Training
- Deployment and sustainment planners should be fully integrated into the collaborative
information environment (CIE)
- Consider developing training programs for multi-functional joint log planners, knowledgeable
in all Service capabilities
- Consider training programs to develop and maintain proficiency in logistics decision support
tools
Materiel
- Formalize the Log CROP
- TMIP needs to be refined before employment
Leadership
Personnel
- None
Facilities
- None
Recommendations
1. JFCOM JLTC, through future experimentation events using the CIE, develop joint
sustainment structure(s) that support RDO scenarios such as those used in MC02.
2. MEDCOM, field-test theater medical information program (TMIP) to validate Service data
integration prior to acceptance.
3. JFCOM JL TC, examine networked distribution structure as part of an LOE on satisfying joint
force sustainment requirements for RDO.
4. JFCOM JL TC, Joint Staff J4, DISA, and Services, continue to refine the Log CROP and its
functionality based on user comments and the availability of new or advanced technologies.
- Include the need to automatically integrate logistical information across all echelons in this
effort.
5. JFCOM JL TC, pursue examination and definition of 'predictive logistics tools'.

Figure 62: Getting ready for the Global Strike Task Force mission during MC02 exercises

Assessment Area 6 - Standing Joint Force Headquarters

(SJFHQ)
The SJFHQ assisted the Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters in quickly achieving
command and control (C2) of the JTF formed to resolve the crisis presented by the MC02
experiment scenario. The value-added by the SJFHQ was
unquestionable and prevalent throughout the experiment. The
SJFHQ members reduced the ad hoc characteristics normally
associated with the activation of a JTF, helped surmount the
JTF standup learning curve, and provided continuity in
planning and operations from pre-crisis through execution to
transition - invaluable contributors to the JTF staff according
to participants, SMEs, and senior mentors.
Although the SJFHQ added value to the JTF, refinement
of its organization and composition is still warranted. The
organization and composition need minor refinement, however
not a major overhaul. The SJFHQ group organization-
command group (CmdGrp), plans group (PG), operations group
(OpsGrp), information superiority group (ISG), and knowledge
management group (KMG)-doesn't require changes. Further
study is recommended with regards to a proposed elimination
of the ISG and the KMG and redistribution of its members
within the organization. Further study is also recommended to
investigate the addition of a logistics support. Assessment of
the SJFHQ group compositions describes the addition of five
people to the SJFHQ: a commander, to be incorporated into the
command group; added expertise in the areas of strategic lift,
personnel, and engineering as part of the PG; and the addition
of a fires officer in the operations group. Individual attributes,
knowledge, and experience of the SJFHQ members are critical
to credibility and effectiveness. There is also concern regarding
the mix of military, government, and contracted personnel -
military and government personnel cannot be subordinate to contractors. This assessment
pertains to the specific SJFHQ structure and not the JTF. The CJTF organizes the JTF based on
requirements.
The boards, centers, cells, and working groups (BCCWG) envisioned by the SJFHQ
concept provided a suitable structure to the JTF staff for j oint force C2. Most BCCWGs were
adequately organized and were able to meet the needs of the JTF. The BCCWG structure
enhanced JTF operations and enhanced interaction between the JTF headquarters and the
component and combatant commander staffs. The BCCWGs used during MC02 and discussed
below are the same organizations that the SJFHQ uses when it operates as a stand alone JTF and
are only a starting point from which the CJTF and his staff can add, delete, or adjust based on the
requirements of the situation.
The SJFHQ and what it brought to the fight, especially the CIE, altered the role of
component LNOs at the JTF headquarters. The SJFHQ and CIE facilitated a reduction in the
164 FOR OFFICIAl, USE ONLY

workload. The SJFHQ provided an in-place understanding and experience in joint operations and
the CIE served as a substitute for face-to-face communications. However, the increased tempo,
brought on by faster, better, and more accurate data substantiated the need for well-trained LNOs
with analytical skills necessary to process the data and discern what was important and when
actions needed to be taken. This coupled with the necessity for the LNO to perform his
traditional roles when the CIE went down, showed a potential increase in the importance of the
LNO and the necessity of the LNO being the commander's representative with his full trust and
confidence.
Highlighted throughout this assessment of the SJFHQ is the importance of the CIE.
Respondents noted that the CIE was the key to the success of the SJFHQ and to the effectiveness
of the groups and BCCWGs, during pre-crisis activities through transition. The SJFHQ and CIE
were inextricably linked and had a synergistic effect to enhance JTF operations. The CIE was the
means through which many SJFHQ and JTF functions were performed. It enabled the SJFHQ
and JTF to rapidly and effectively perform EBO and UJTL tasks. The SJFHQ's expertise with
the collaborative processes employed was the most valued of the SJFHQ attributes.
Review of the MC02 UJTL Baseline Report, dated 11 July 2002, indicates the SJFHQ
and its concept of employment are to provide a means to alleviate major difficulties in
accomplishing UJTL task OP5, Provide Command and Control. The concept directly addresses
root causes of some cross-task performance issues, and provide a means to overcome some
aspects of five of the 10 JTF challenges as stated in the baseline report.
Methodology
The data, provided by experiment participants, subject matter experts and senior concept
developers, was predominantly qualitative. The data was gathered from personnel who emulated
the combatant commander's staff and SMEs, who were positioned at key nodes within the JTF
headquarters and at the locations of the five functional component commander headquarters
located throughout the United States. Two SMEs also accompanied the selected members of the
JTF headquarters (Forward), who deployed to the USS Coronado, July 30 to August 2.
Experiment participants and SMEs were asked to complete surveys at selected points
throughout the experiment to gather data regarding the use of the SJFHQ. The surveys were
administered electronically using the web-based JBC Data Collection Analysis Tool (JDCAT). A
total of 52 participant surveys and 33 SME surveys were issued during Spiral 3, 3-14 June 2002,
and during MC02 Execution, July 24 to August 14,2002. These resulted in approximately 8,000
individual surveys completed and submitted by the SMEs and participants. The survey
completion rate was approximately 80 percent overall. Experiment participants and SMEs were
also asked to submit observations concerning any strengths or weaknesses of the organizations,
processes, procedures, and tools used in the experiment. These observations were narrative in
nature and were collected using an electronic format persistently available at every computer
workstation that also carried JDCAT.
This capability allowed for rapid compilation of data and daily roll-ups, which was
provided to experiment analyst personnel. This was a rich source of experiment data and
generated approximately 360 observations related to the SJFHQ. Participant and SME
representatives also participated in a post-execution SJFHQ working group session that
discussed all aspects of the SJFHQ. This session developed additional data used in this analysis.
Senior concept developer input was gathered during daily In-Focus and Azimuth Check sessions
and weekly after action reviews. A compilation of the senior concept developer comments made
FOR OFFICIl'"L USE ONI,Y 165

in these venues was also used as source data for this analysis. Analysts also interviewed selected
senior concept developers and key JTF headquarters staff members, to include the chief of staff,
and the group directors to further develop data used for this analysis.
The organizational structures, functions, and products of the SJFHQ concept were the
focus of this evaluation. The analysis process consisted of a daily, preliminary review of the
incoming data from the sources described above and the daily production of emerging insights
for presentation to the senior experiment analysts. These emerging insights became the basis for
the development of the findings presented in this analysis. Logical groupings of survey and
comment data from the experiment participants, SMEs, and senior concept developers, from
Spiral 3 and Execution, were then distilled to the information presented herein.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to quickly achieve cohesive C2 of a joint force

A JTF, enhanced with a SJFHQ, should be able to more quickly achieve cohesive C2 of a
joint force than it would ifit did not have a SJFHQ. Therefore, the SJFHQ facilitates the JTF's
conduct ofRDO. The SJFHQ should provide the ability to rapidly integrate precise knowledge
and understanding of the adversary into early planning and execution by the JTF headquarters,
providing the degree of continuity in planning and operations that enables execution ofRDO.
The SJFHQ should be a key component, helping the JTF to quickly achieve cohesive C2 of a
joint force, facilitating RDO.
The RDO concept paper (Jan 16,2001) reads:
RDO requires a greater coherence of operational level advanced planning and

command and control than current ad hoc or augmented Service core headquarters can
generate. Successful, rapid response in future operations requires a headquarters that has a
detailed understanding of the area of operations and is immediately responsive to the
geographical combatant commander for crisis response planning and execution.
The SJFHQ Concept of Employment paper (Aug 17,2001) reads:
The SJFHQ is intended to provide each warfightingjoint theater commander with a

trained and equipped standing, joint command and control (C2) capability specifically
organized to reduce lag time involved in setting up a JTF headquarters ready to rapidly and
decisively conduct contingency operations.
Given this warfighting challenge, metrics (tasks, subtasks, questions and data elements)
were developed based on information from the various sources listed below:
RapidDecisive Operations Concept Paper (RDO, Jan 16,2001)
RapidDecisive Operations Concept Paper (RDO, Jan 26, 2001)RapidDecisive Operations
Concept Paper (RDO, 0908 01)USJFCOM Adaptive Joint Command and Control (AJC2)
White Paper
USJFCOM Adaptive Joint Command & Control (AJC2) Concept Baseline Collective
Assessment (BCA)Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) Concept ofEmployment for
MC02 (Aug 17,2001)
MC02 Joint Standing Operating Procedure (JSOP)
Ideas extracted from works by RAND; Institute for Defense Analysis; Defense Group, Inc;
and Service concepts for future operations
166 F OR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y

These sources were used to generate the metrics and formed the basis for data collection
plan development. Data collection was aimed at the goal of determining if each of the developed
tasks and sub-tasks was performed or achieved. Successful task accomplishment is the basis for a
determination that the warfighting challenge was overcome. The data collection plan was vetted
with the SJFHQ Concept Developers and USJFCOM analysts.
The high order task and sub-task architecture follows:
TASK: Quickly establish a JTF headquarters ready to conduct RDO
Subtask: Establish a standing element of a Joint Force headquarters (SJFHQ)
Subtask: Employ the SJFHQ to conduct pre-crisis planning
Subtask: Integrate the SJFHQ into the JTF headquarters to perform RDO planning
and execution
TASK: Provide continuity in planning and operations from pre-crisis through execution and
transition
Subtask: Establish cell-organized JTF headquarters around the SJFHQ structure and
processes
Subtask: Use SJFHQ architecture to establish a j oint force C2 structure
Subtask: Employ the SJFHQ to assist with deployment of the forward headquarters
Subtask: Employ the SJFHQ to assist in the conduct of staff operations
Subtask: Employ the SJFHQ to assist in coordination and integration of j oint and
interagency support
Finding The SJFHQ provided value added to JTF staff for C2 of the joint force. It
reduced the ad hoc nature of activating a JTF, helped surmount the JTF stand up learning
curve, and provided continuity in planning and operations from pre-crisis through
execution to transition.
This finding is supported by the following detailed 'facts':
The SJFHQ completed expected pre-crisis activities
The SJFHQ provided the pre-crisis products necessary for the JTF to more rapidly surmount
the learning curve
The MC02 JTF performed expected JTF functions
The SJFHQ reduced the ad hoc nature of JTF headquarters activation
The SJFHQ enhanced JTF performance of EBO and UJTL tasks
The SJFHQ contributed to the continuity demonstrated by the MC02 JTF
The presence of the SJFHQ provided value-added to the JTF's accomplishment of the MC02
experiment objectives
The organizational structures described by the SJFHQ concept and used in MC02 enhanced
the function of the JTF
The function of the forward headquarters was enhanced by the presence of a portion of the
SJFHQ
Fact: The SJFHQ completed expected pre-crisis activities.

The data for this fact was provided by key SJFHQ personnel. Analysis was performed
comparing the actual activities and products that the SJFHQ provided with the activities and

products required by the reference documents, specifically, the concept for employment
(CONEMP) and the JTF standard operating procedures (JSOP).
Background. The 55-man, SJFHQ was formally established on February 19,2002. Its
organization evolved from research done during Joint Experiment Unified Vision 2001 and from
subsequent limited objective experiments. The actual MC02 team carried 59 personnel as four
training slots were added. Although there were nine administrative membership changes within
the group from start-up date to MC02 execution, the SJFHQ remained in a stable organizational
environment throughout.
Pre-Crisis Activities. From the CONEMP, the SJFHQ concentrates on three primary
tasks during pre-crisis activity: combatant commander engagement, planning, and training. The
duties involved in combatant commander engagement include identifying the mission essential
roles for allied and regional partners by collaborating with those partners and developing
situational awareness and understanding. Planning duties focus on identifying and characterizing
key nodes and vulnerabilities of potential adversaries within the framework of ONA parameters.
This information is integrated into a focused area ONA and used to develop effects-based
options. In developing the ONA and contingency plans, the SJFHQ produces and ensures that a
coherent, understandable joint standard operating procedures (JSOP) document exists. Training
duties, both internal and external to the SJFHQ, include training in use of collaboration and
decision support tools, understanding command relationships, improving lines of communication
between headquarters and external support, participation in exercises with component
headquarters and combatant commander staffs, and training the augmentees and liaisons who
will participate with the SJFHQ in contingency operations.
Interviews were conducted with key SJFHQ personnel to determine whether the SJFHQ
was conducting pre-crisis activities in accordance with the CONEMP. These key personnel
included the deputy chief of staff, the joint operations center chief, the plans director, the
operations director, the lead knowledge management officer, and the information superiority
coordinator. Results of these interviews indicated that the SJFHQ engaged in the following pre-
crisis activities: JSOP development, building the ONA, developing the PollMil plan,
coordination with component headquarters, CONOPS development, training (both internal and
external), knowledge and information management plan (KIMP) development, and technical
testing of computer networks. All respondents indicated that building the ONA and developing
the JSOP were the activities that required the majority of their time. Concerning the development
of the ONA, one participant commented, "There is not enough time to put together a
good/comprehensive ONA."
He then went on to state that the system of systems analysis (SoSA) cell helped the
SJFHQ to develop the ONA. The SoSA cell is not a part of the SJFHQ; however, one participant
stated that they should be members of the SJFHQ, while another participant said that the SoSA
cell should reside in the combatant commander's j oint intelligence center (JIC). The planning
activities prescribed by the CONEMP, but not accomplished by the SJFHQ were due to
experiment artificialities. The SJFHQ was unable to exercise reach-back or relationship building
with the combatant commander's staff or the centers of excellence because the experiment
design indicated that the combatant commander's staffwould only participate with
representatives in the JECG.
SJFHQ personnel attended the following preparatory training:
JTF Doctrinal Review (five days)
RDO Concept (two days)

EBO Concept (one day)

SJFHQ Concept (two days)
4
XC 1 (three days)
ONA Refinement
CONPLAN Development
SOP Refinement
ONA, ADOCS, IWS, SPPS, JISR (Tool Suite, combatant commander Collection Plan,
Requirements, Allocation, Matrix, Targets, Tasks, JCMC Agenda, Re-tasking)
10, ATOIMTO, TOP COP, EA Concept, LOG (Collaboration, Command and Control, PA,
JFCR, GTN EX System, Sustainment Overview, Reports, AMMO, Fuel, Intra-theater
Transportation Operations, HSV, C-130, Rotary Wing, Casualty Management, Evacuation
Procedures, Medical Reports, MED CROP, Medical Practical Applications, Patient Tracking,
Casualty Evacuation)
The SJFHQ provided training to III Corps participants in various venues. Key personnel
from the III Corps staff attended a SJFHQ led j oint concept seminar at Fort Hood, TX. Topics of
the seminar included SJFHQ Concept of Operations, Rapid Decisive Operations, Effects Based
Operations, forming a JTF Headquarters, Operational Net Assessment, Knowledge Management,
Inter-Agency CONOPS, Joint Information Operations, Effects Based Planning, Effects
Assessment, Joint Fires and Targeting, Hybrid Terrain, Joint Experimentation Operational
Environment, and Joint Logistics/Sustainment Planning.
The original JTF headquarters slated for MC02, XVIII Airborne Corps, being replaced by
III Corps because of mission requirements, necessitated this four-day seminar. This change was
announced in late April 2002 with the seminar conducted only two weeks later. This unplanned
situation, and not a formal part of the MC02 assessment strategy, may be the best example of
SJFHQ value-added and its ability to maintain continuity from pre-crisis planning through
execution to transition.
Additionally, all participants were provided training immediately prior to Spiral 3 and
during Spiral 3. All participants were required to complete five modules of web-based training.
The training topics included Joint
JSOP Job Descriptions
n=52 Experimentation, Rapid Decisive
60% Operations, SJFHQ, ONA, and
T.............................................................................................................................................................................................. ,
EBP. Additional training provided

50%
during Spiral 3 included: XC 41
40%
Systems, ADOCS, IWS, SPPS,
JISR, ONA, 10 (NA, PSYOP),
30% ATOIMTO, TOP COP, EA, and
LOG (LOG Overview, LOG
20%
Collaboration, Allocation, Matrix,
10% JFCR, GTN EX System,
Sustainment Overview, Reports,
0%
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
AMMO, Fuel, Intra-theater
Transportation Operations,
II JSOP Correctly Describes Responsibilities Ii'I JSOP Correctly Defines Functions
Movement Practical Applications,
Figure 63: JSOP correctly describes/defines responsibilities and HSV, C-130, Rotary Wing,
functions Casualty Management, Evacuation
FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY 169

Procedures, Medical Reports, MED CROP, Medical Practical Applications, Patient Tracking,
and Casualty Evacuation).
In summary, the SJFHQ completed all pre-crisis activities as described in the CONEMP,
with the exception of activities that could not be performed due to experiment artificialities. The
SJFHQ, aware of these exceptions, would have performed the tasks had actual centers of
excellence and a combatant commander's staffbeen available.
As part of the analysis of the SJFHQ pre-crisis activity, a survey was given to the SJFHQ
concerning the job descriptions and billet functions as described in the JSOP. Three fourths of
the SJFHQ members surveyed either strongly agree or agree that the JSOP correctly describes
their specific job responsibilities and functions that they actually performed. In terms of
responsibilities only 19 percent and in terms of functions only 15 percent disagree or strongly
disagree that the JSOP is off the mark in these two areas.
Results of responses from exercise participants and SMEs indicate that additional details
concerning job descriptions of billets other than those of the SJFHQ are necessary and should be
included in the JSOP.
Did results of SJFHQ pre-crisis planning Fact: The SJFHQ

enhance JTF HQ functions? provided the pre-crisis products
necessary for the JTF to more
rapidly surmount the learning
80% curve.
60% III Enhanced In accordance with the
III Had No Effect CONEMP, the SJFHQ arrives at
40%
o Degraded the JTF with a JSOP, a
20%
comprehensive and focused ONA,
0% and a CONPLAN. During pre-
JTF HQ Component Other Total
n=206 MC02 forming, research, and
training, the SJFHQ determined
Figure 64: SJFHQ pre-crisis planning enhanced the function of that two additional products, a
the JTF headquarters KIMP and a pol/mil plan, were
necessary for the rapid standup of
a JTF. All of these products were completed and provided to the JTF at the start ofMC02.
Interviews with key SJFHQ personnel indicated that the ONA is never finished; it is a continual
work in progress and requires constant updating. As stated earlier, some of the key participants
stated that there was not enough time to develop a comprehensive ONA, that the ability to
provide a detailed ONA was exacerbated by exercise artificialities, and that information access
limitations hindered in-depth analysis of the area.
SME responses to five surveys along with participant responses to four surveys regarding
SJFHQ-provided pre-crisis products (five in Spiral 3 and four in execution) are the basis for the
data used in this sub-finding. The survey respondents were asked to consider the usefulness of
the JSOP, whether or not modifications to the JSOP were required, participant adherence to the
JSOP, and whether the JTF desired additional pre-crisis products to be provided by the SJFHQ.
Pre-crisis planning is one of the more valuable services SJFHQ has to offer. During
Spiral 3, JTF headquarters, component, and other participants with visibility on JTF activity were
asked if the results of SJFHQ pre-crisis planning enhanced the function of the JTF headquarters.
170 FOR OFFICIl'",L lISE ONLY

Of the 206 respondents, the overall majority, 83 percent, reported the results of SJFHQ pre-crisis
planning enhanced the function of the JTF headquarters.
Participants were also asked if the SJFHQ provided the pre-crisis planning products they
thought it would provide. By an overall margin of two to one, the 372 respondents indicated the
SJFHQ provided the pre-crisis products they expected.
SJFHQ provided expected products from

pre-crisis planning
800/0 +---------------------------
60%
I_Yes
40% II No
20%
0%
Partie-JTFHQ Partie-Comp Partie-Other Total
n=372
Figure 65: SJFHQ provided expected products from pre-crisis planning
The need for additional skills, knowledge, or products to be brought to JTF activation by
the SJFHQ was explored with both SMEs and participants. During Spiral 3 and again in
execution, the SMEs were asked if they thought there were additional skills, knowledge, or
products the SJFHQ should bring to the activation of a JTF. If they answered yes, they were
asked to identify what was needed. Of the 56 SMEs who formulated a position, approximately
two-thirds answered that additional skills, knowledge, or products were needed.
Because this question asked about the need for additional skills and knowledge, in
addition to products, further examination of the accompanying comments are required to
determine the magnitude of the need for additional products, which is the focus of this portion of
the analysis. Analysis of the additional skills and knowledge required is presented under the
SJFHQ organization and composition finding found later in this report. Thirty-five of 36
respondents complied with the survey directions and provided a comment indicating what
additional skill, knowledge, or product needed to be provided by the SJFHQ. Of these 35
comments, only eight dealt with the need for additional products. SMEs confirmed the
participant view that the SJFHQ provided the products expected of it.
JTF headquarters participants were asked the same question as the SMEs, however they
were not given the choice of a yes or no answer; they were just given the opportunity to
comment on what additional skills, knowledge, or products the SJFHQ should bring to the
activation of the JTF. One hundred ninety-two participants responded to this question in Spiral 3
and 201 responded during execution. Of these 393 respondents, 69 in Spiral 3, or 36 percent, and
F OR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y 171

84 in execution, or 42 percent, stated additional skills, knowledge, or products were required

from the SJFHQ. Although not as high as the nearly two-thirds of SMEs who said additional
items were required, this is a substantial figure. However, as was discussed in the previous
paragraph, further examination of the comment data was required to more accurately determine
what portion of this perceived need is directed at the requirement for additional products. Of the
153 comments related to a desire for something additional, approximately a fourth, or 39, were
focused on the need for additional product from the SJFHQ. The majority of these participant
comments called for the SJFHQ to bring a refined SOP and canned formats for recurring
briefings and products to the activation of the JTF.
SMEs and JTF headquarters participants were asked during Spiral 3 and execution about
the usefulness of the JSOP that was developed by the SJFHQ as part of its pre-event activities.
Additional skills, knowledge, or products SJFHQ

should bring to activation of JTF?
100%
80%
60%
I_Yes
40% III No
20%
0%
SME Sp3 SME Ex TOTAL
n=56
Figure 66: SJFHQ should bring Additional skills, knowledge, or products to JTF activation
Answer choices of 'Very Useful', 'Somewhat Useful', 'Of Little Use', 'Of No Use', and 'Don't
KnowlDid Not Use' were available. Of the 295 respondents who made a 'usefulness'
determination, over three-fourths said the JSOP was at least somewhat useful (See Figure 67). A
slight decrease in the usefulness of the JSOP was detected between Spiral 3 and execution, which
can probably be attributed to the fact that the JTF HQ was more mature and familiar with its
roles in execution and that the pace of activity in execution was much higher, which provided
less opportunity to access the JSOP.
SME and participant comment responses indicated that the JSOP developed for MC02
was a good baseline document from which to get the JTF up to speed and that it provided the
detailed information on the processes and procedures that were required to make operations and
planning in the collaborative environment possible. The maj ority of respondents that rated the
JSOP as 'of little use' or 'of no use' indicated that the JSOP was too long of a document (greater
than 600 pages) and that they had no time to read it.

Further evidence of the usefulness of the SOP was indicated when SMEs were asked to
comment on whether the JTF appeared to adhere to the JSOP. Three fourths (n=81) of the SMEs
indicated that the JTF followed and referred to the JSOP on a regular basis.
While the JSOP was rated as useful, a high percentage of the respondents indicated that
J50P usefulness
100%
80%
60% .Spiral3
40% Execution
20%
0%
Very Somewhat Of little/no
useful useful use n=295
Figure 67: JSOP considered a 'somewhat useful' document
the JSOP needed modification. This was explored by asking SMEs and JTF headquarters
participants during Spiral 3 and execution if the JSOP required modification. The high
percentage of affirmative responses was particularly pronounced in execution where over 80
percent of SMEs and participants indicated modifications were required. In Spiral 3 over 80
percent of SMEs also stated, the JSOP required modifications, however JTF participants were
nearly split.
The evenly split JTF
participant response in Spiral 3
JSOP modification requirement should be tempered because those
participants were given the option
100% ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1 of answering yes, no, or don't
80% +------------ know in execution, but were only
_ Mod Required
60% +------------ given a yes or no choice in Spiral
3. Since over half of the total
40% _Mod Not number of JTF headquarters
20% Required
respondents answered don't know
0% during execution, it is reasonable
Spiral 3 Execution to believe many of those who
n=286 answered 'No' in Spiral 3 would
have chosen "Don't Know" if it
Figure 68: JSOP needed modification had been available.
FOR OFFICIAL lISE ONLY 173

Multiple respondents stated that SOPs are living documents and, as such, modifications
should be expected to ensure that the JSOP remains a current and useful document. Most of the
calls for modification concerned the lack of detail in the descriptions of duties and
responsibilities for various JTF positions. One participant stated, "Duties and responsibilities for
each position need to be more clearly defined," while another participant said, "Very descriptive
duties must be outlined." While a significant number of respondents indicated that the JSOP was
too long, a call for more details vice general information was evident, specifically in the areas of
the reports annex and the sample briefings.
The analysis regarding the JTF challenge, common Combined/Joint Task Force (C/JTF)
SOPs, TTPs, and collaborative tools, provided in the MC02 baseline report, states:
An information management plan that clearly defines guidelines on how information

is to be handled is essential ... Hardware, software, and processes that solve this problem
must be identified. Additionally, the database tells us that the battle rhythm of the JTF must
serve the process of delivering products and the information needs of higher and lower
headquarters and the timing of product delivery to both. An information manager within
every major division of the JTF staff is a requirement for efficient operations.
The SJFHQ and its concept of employment directly address this challenge. As described
above, the SJFHQ comes with a JSOP, which includes a KIMP that provides the guidelines for
knowledge management, business rules for the CIE, and a battle rhythm to meet the JTF's needs.
The SJFHQ also
JTF success in performing EBO and UJTL brings to the fight
TTP and expertise
tasks
with the collaborative
tools. The structure
of the SJFHQ
80% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - j includes a knowledge
management officer
60% IIIVery successful
(KMO/IMO) in each
I11II Somewhat successful
40% group.
o Unsuccessful
20%
0%
Fact: The
MC02JTF
EBO Total UJlL Total TOTAL
n=44 performed expected
JTF functions.
Figure 69: JTF successful in performing EBO and UJTL task
The data for
this fact is presented
not as an assessment of the performance of the JTF; instead, it indicates the MC02 experimental
JTF was similar to the actual JTFs in the necessity to perform a wide range of tasks related to the
command and control of the joint force. This builds context for the finding that the SJFHQ
provided value-added to the MC02 JTF; therefore similar value-added could be expected if the
SJFHQ were to be used with other JTFs in an experiment, exercise, or real-world situation.

Two survey questions to SMEs during MC02 Spiral 3 and two during execution explored
the JTF's accomplishment of a group ofEBO tasks and a selected group of operational level
UJTL tasks. Five additional questions to SMEs at approximately three-day intervals throughout
MC02 explored if the battle rhythm or virtual board, center, cell organization used by this JTF
was causing any expected JTF functions to fall through the cracks.
SME responses indicated this JTF achieved a moderate level of success in performing
both EBO tasks and operational level UJTL tasks. A higher reported level of success in
accomplishing UJTL tasks was noted. The high percentage of SME selection of' Somewhat' and
'Very Successful' task accomplishment was reported in both Spiral 3 and execution.
A number of the SME comments were associated with the selection of the 'Very
Successful' choice on these survey questions. Two of these SME comments were, "The JTF was
very successful in performing information operations, joint force targeting, directing operational
intel, assessing operational situation, preparing plans and orders, commanding subordinate
forces. The use of the CIE and CROP enabled the JTF to rapidly and effectively perform the
above tasks," and "Overall the JTF was successful in coordinating munitions, fuel supply, and
other support for forces. The logistics watchboard was used very effectively at JTF and
combatant
command JLMC
Are there expected JTF functions not occurring levels to monitor
because of MC02 battle rhythm or and manage
organizational structure? support to the
operations."
The
majority of SME
80% + - - - - -
comments were
60%
40%
I-vesII No
associated with the
selection of the
20% 'Somewhat
0% Successful' choice
24-28 28-30 30 July - 02-05 05-08 TOTAL on these survey
July July 02 Aug Aug Aug questions.
n=20
Representative
comments were,
Figure 70: JTF functions not affected by battle rhythm rigor or structure "In my opinion, the
JTF did a fair job in
all of these areas [EBO tasks]. I think that progress was initially hindered as they struggled using
IWS and knowing which rooms to collaborate in," and "Overall, I think the JTF was successful
[in performing UJTL tasks]. I think that getting used to the new organizational structure and
concepts initially hampered task performance."
During Spiral 3, one SME who judged UJTL task performance to be 'Somewhat
Successful' reported that participant focus on learning and using the collaborative tool might
have hampered the accomplishment of normal JTF management processes (e.g. journal keeping).
A theme noted by several SMEs dealt with the lack of wargaming and course of action (COA)
analysis by this JTF. A SME, knowledgeable in the conduct of the JTF planning function
observed, "The JTF executed Effects-Based Planning well. The one area they need work on is
COA analysis or wargaming. The joint planning center (JPC) tends to synchronize COAs rather
F OR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y 175

than war game. There is very little discussion of enemy actions when they synch plans." Another
SME noted, "[Regarding] preparing plans and orders. The JTF in fact produced plans and orders
well for the most part. The JTF failed to really understand and employ Effects-Based Operations.
Furthermore they never fully understood or demonstrated an ability to plan current ops, future
ops and future plans simultaneously."
The number of SME responses reporting that expected JTF functions were falling
through the cracks because of the battle rhythm or virtual board, center, cell organization used by
this JTF averaged 26 percent for the four measurements taken over the first 12 days of the MC02
execution. This fell to five percent for the last measurement covering the period August 5-8.
Twenty SMEs responded to each occurrence of this survey.
Covering all five applications of this survey, 23 individual functions were described by
SMEs 'as falling through the cracks.' These seemed to fall into three groups: four occurrences
were related to information operations (10), four were related to deployment planning, and five
had to do with JTF planning focus and branch planning. With respect to 10, SME responses
indicated the power of this discipline was not being fully realized because of a lack of
organizational integration into the JTF; however, another SME indicated the level ofIO observed
was greater than a traditional JTF. This indicates the need for further experimentation regarding
the use and organizational placement of the 10 function within the JTF.
Regarding deployment planning two SMEs provided a number of indications the JTF did
not conduct sufficient monitoring of the deployment process. Their comments illustrate this
point; the first stating, "The current concept does not have a j oint movements center, nor a joint
transportation board at the JTF level. Rather, these functions are conducted at the combatant
commander's JLMC. Lack of these two functions, in my opinion, contributes to a lack of
awareness amongst the JTF as to force flow and closure."
The second comment reported, "The status of the deployment does not appear to be
followed in detail. Effects of enemy actions and other constraints to strategic movements do not
appear to be fully considered." Their comments indicated the lack of delineation of deployment
planning responsibilities. Additionally, the 12-13 hour experiment day with limited night-shift
activity may have exacerbated this situation.
The comments related to branch planning and the close-in focus of this JTF are similar to
those mentioned above concerning wargaming and COA analysis. Several SME comments
illustrate this point. The first reported, "No one is doing branch planning for the JTF.
Consequently, the JTF is reactive and not proactive."
Another SME comment stated, "There is no planning for events in the 48-96 hour
window," he said. "This should be branch plans and what ifs. The current ops should be
executing the plans and planning 24-48 hours out. The future plans needs to be linked with the
combatant commander for plans 96+."
A third comment stated, "What is falling through the cracks is the long term planning
guidance. Focus is on 72 hours." SMEs thought this was likely due to participant focus on the
experimental concepts, and not a disregard or recognition of the importance of branch planning.
Fact: SJFHQ reduced the ad hoc nature of JTF headquarters activation.

Data for this fact was developed by a number of surveys that asked participants and
SMEs to rate the value added by the SJFHQ in getting the JTF headquarters up to speed, to
indicate the contribution of the SJFHQ's attributes to this, and to indicate how critical the SJFHQ
was to the overall JTF operation.

A SME and a participant survey in Spiral 3 and a SME execution survey explored the
value provided by the SJFHQ in getting the JTF headquarters up to speed. Of 369 respondents,
approximately 90 percent indicated the SJFHQ was either' Somewhat' Valuable or Very
Valuable in getting the JTF headquarters up to speed. The responses between Spiral 3 and
execution were nearly identical.
Two senior participants said, "There is a lot of value to the SJFHQ. They brought
tremendous situational awareness to the fight," and "It is truly the way to do joint business. It has
allowed the staff to focus on the warfighting piece without having to build the database." Two
other participants, key members of the JTF plans group indicated, "The JTF could not be at this
level this soon without the plug in of the SJFHQ," and, "SJFHQ is a great plug to bring an ad-
hoc staff together."
As shown in figure 71, not everyone agreed that SJFHQ was valuable. Approximately 10
percent of respondents concluded there was no value from the SJFHQ because it did not provide
an individual to their particular functional area within the JTF. This comment was seen in a
number of surveys where little or no SJFHQ value was indicated.
Other participant comments
Value provided by SJFHQ in getting JTF HQ up where 'little value' was seen
to speed seemed to center on the exchange
of information between the SJFHQ
100% -r-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------,
and JTF headquarters staff.
80% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - j
One participant stated, "We
60% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - j liVery valuable were and still are missing a lot of
III Somewhat valuable
40%
pertinent information and
D Not valuable
knowledge on some of the
20%
databases that we are supposed to
0% use and military issues with
Participant SME Total
n=369 regards to specific info in the
exercise."
Figure 71: SJFHQ was valuable to standup of JTF HQ Another stated, "We still
have the same requirements for
information gathering. If every time you submit an RFI, the SJFHQ folks just tell you to go to
the ONA and find the answer, I'm not really sure there is any value added."
Some of this may have been due to the nature of the experiment where much of the rest
of the world was scripted and there was a desire to fully explore the experimental concepts;
however, they are important indicators of the personality factor that will influence the amount of
value the SJFHQ can provide. Interviews with senior participants illustrated that the members of
the SJFHQ must be perceived as experienced by the receiving JTF. They must have the
personality and maturity to recognize when they should act as leaders within the JTF HQ and
when they should transition to a support and/or mentor role as the JTF headquarters comes up to
speed.
Further indication that the SJFHQ quickened the learning curve of the JTF is found in
insights developed in the Army Transformation Experiment (ATEX) conducted in parallel with
MC02. One of the ATEX focus areas was to explore how a corps commander and his staff took
on the role of a JTF commander. The ATEX data collection and analysis effort indicated the
knowledge base provided by the SJFHQ staff and the ONA enabled earlier situational awareness
in the JOA and facilitated more rapid transition of a Corps into a JTF than previously possible.
F OR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V 177

Insights developed in ATEX indicated the SJFHQ brought about the situational awareness
through the integration of its members into the key JTF cells. While serving as members of the
JTF commander's staff, the SJFHQ personnel also trained and mentored other members of the
staff and served as the "go to" guys when additional information was required. The time
normally used to develop an understanding of the opposition, critical nodes within the AOR, the
political, economic, information, infrastructure, military, and social strengths and weaknesses of
the opposing forces was greatly reduced when the information was readily available upon
activation of the JTF. The
knowledge base provided by the Did attributes of SJFHQ quicken JTF HQ learning
SJFHQ was key to achieving this curve?
objective.
The JTF commander,
during an AAR, said that he was 80%+----
provided an "80 percent" solution 60%+----
going in." The SJFHQ and the
40%+----
ONA concept provided this 80
percent. 20%+----
During Spiral 3, the SMEs 0% + - - - -

were asked to judge whether the Quickened Did not quicken n=38
attributes possessed by the SJFHQ
quickened the JTF headquarters Figure 72: Attributes of SJFHQ quickened the JTF HQ learning
learning curve (See Figure 72). curve
Their responses indicated to a high
degree that the SJFHQ did quicken the learning curve. This is consistent with the data on the
previous graph where over 80 percent of the respondents found there was at least some value
provided by the SJFHQ in getting the JTF headquarters up to speed.
SME comments from this survey provided several examples of how the SJFHQ attributes
helped the JTF headquarters with the learning curve. One SME stated, "The ability of the JTF
headquarters to leverage the corporate knowledge and gain insights from the combatant
commander's staff is a significant plus to beginning the planning process. Numerous questions
and research which would normally have to be done is already completed."
Another SME said, "In
SJFHQ criticality to JTF HQ MC02, the SJFHQ's familiarity
with the collaborative tool set and
100% -r--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------,
80% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 ~----~
their development of the
II Very critical
60% + - - - - - - - CONPLAN made them a go to
II Somewhat critical
40% asset for the JTF as they rolled into
20% o Not critical
the building and began planning in
0%
earnest."
A senior SME concluded
the prior experience of the core of
n=207 the JTF to which the SJFHQ is
augmenting would be a factor for
. . .. perceived SJFHQ value-added. He
Figure 73: SJFHQ considered critical to JTF HQ reported, "The SJFHQ
understanding of the EBO processes, and concepts and to some degree joint operations

quickened the learning curve of the core staff and service augmentation; especially in the
implementation of the SOP. This is especially the case with a core headquarters that does not
normally have or train to a JTF mission." He concluded his remarks by indicating some
resistance to the SJFHQ was seen during MC02 Spiral 2, which was played with an experienced,
contingency trained JTF staff. In the few instances where SMEs indicated no value added by the
SJFHQ to quicken the JTF learning curve, one reason stated was that the SJFHQ did not contain
certain functional specialty representatives, such as combat engineer or medical plans. The
SJFHQ concept envisions the expertise in these specialties would come as plugs from or through
reach-back to the combatant commander's staff.
Another indicator of the value provided by the SJFHQ to getting the JTF headquarters up
to speed was explored by asking SMEs and participants to rate the criticality of the SJFHQ to the
JTF headquarters. This was done with two SME surveys, one in Spiral 3 and one in execution,
and one participant survey near the end of the experiment (See Figure 73). Of 207 respondents,
approximately 93 percent indicated the SJFHQ was either 'Somewhat' or 'Very Critical' to the
JTF headquarters, with 63 percent of these indicating 'Very Critical'.
Within the participant respondents, the perception of SJFHQ criticality was stronger than
among the SMEs. One respondent who selected 'Very Critical' stated, "They are part of the
combatant commander staff. They have already worked the plan for the AO and can bring us up
to speed far quicker than starting from the beginning to prevent confusion." Another reinforced
his selection of 'Very Critical' by stating, "Beyond a doubt. Need a standing force of
knowledgeable personnel to incorporate the JTF in the theater." In a participant response where
only 'Somewhat Critical' was selected, the relationship of time to SJFHQ criticality was noted.
As
Value of SJFHQ Attributes in Quickening JTF Learning Curve indicated by this
and other
100% -r--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------, comments, SJFHQ
90% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l
80% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l
criticality was more
70% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l ~----~ notable at the
60% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l liVery valuable outset of the event,
50% - t - I I I I I t - - - - - - - - - - - I I I t - - - - - _ . . . . _ - - - - - - - - - i II Somewhat valuable
"JTF personnel had
40% D Not valuable
30% earned their water
20% wings in Spiral 3,
10%
and were able to
0%
work without
constant direction
from SJFHQ
during MC02,
n>193 unlike Spiral 3,
where JTF
Figure 74: Value of SJFHQ attributes in quickening JTF learning curve
personnel leaned
hard on SJFHQ."
This also influenced the roughly 10 percent increase in the 'not critical' response by
SMEs during execution. The SJFHQ concept should be further developed to address the
continuing role of the SJFHQ with the JTF as a crisis matures. Specific areas for development
include greater specificity as to the duration of SJFHQ involvement, the role of the SJFHQ in the

transition to the post-conflict environment, and provisions for the SJFHQ should a second crisis
situation erupt within the combatant commander's area of responsibility.
The few participants who indicated the SJFHQ was not critical came from the JTF
headquarters operations group. A senior participant who selected "Not Critical" remarked on the
time relationship to SJFHQ criticality, but also noted there was a personality dynamic that
affected his assessment. He stated, "They were very critical during the spin-up phase of Spiral 3,
but became non-critical during execution. In some cases, they were actually counterproductive
because as conditions and processes changed, a few held to their opinions and old processes,
rather than evolve with the JTF."
This indicates that expertise and situational understanding alone do not determine the
value of the SJFHQ, but that maturity and the ability to recognize the transition of the SJFHQ
role as the JTF comes up to speed are also important.
A participant survey, near the end of the experiment, further documented SJFHQ
attributes. Situational awareness was described by respondents as the most important attribute
brought to the headquarters. The attributes dealing with reach-back and habitual relations to the
lAC and with subordinate commander staffs scored lower (See Figure 74 above). This can be
partially attributed to the fact that SJFHQ was not part of a real combatant commander staff prior
to the experiment from which habitual relationships would have been established. Additionally,
reach-back was difficult to demonstrate since most of the rest of the world was simulated by the
control cell. This is especially pertinent to the lAC relations attribute, which was difficult to
demonstrate because interagency participation occurred primarily in execution, with little in
Spiral 3. The primary interface with the interagency participants was through the Joint
Interagency Coordinating Group, operating in the experiment control cell. Other indicators of
SJFHQ criticality, such as the high degree of reliance by the JTF on the SJFHQ for task
performance, are described in the next fact.
The analysis regarding the
SJFHQ Enhanced EBO and UJTL Task Performance JTF challenge, Combined/Joint
Task Force (C/JTF) headquarters
100%
Activation and Augmentation,
90%
provided in the MC02 baseline
80%
report states, "Most of the
70%
challenges we face in training at
60% .Enhanced
the JTF headquarters level stem
50% Degraded
o Had No Effect from the "ad hoc" manner in
40%
which we organize the
30%
headquarters. The lack of a
20%
'center of excellence' for
10%
exercising the organizations,
0%
EBO Total UJTL Total TOTAL n=42 processes, and technologies
necessary to carry out operational
Figure 75: SJFHQ enhanced task performance level headquarters functions led to
inefficiencies in almost every
aspect of headquarters operations.
Without a truly joint group that trains together with familiar processes, the amount of
time, that any augmented headquarters will need to get traction on the myriad tasks that have to
be performed, will be relatively long. In order to achieve the efficiencies desired (not to mention

what will be required to carry out Rapid Decisive Operations [RDO] concept), the Standing JTF
Headquarters is a required component." The SJFHQ and its concept of employment directly
address this challenge. As described above the SJFHQ is the command and control element that
reduced the ad hoc manner in which the JTF was activated and augmented.
Fact: The SJFHQ enhanced JTF's performance ofEBO and UJTL tasks.
SME responses to four surveys regarding task accomplishment, two in Spiral 3 and two
in execution, provided the data for this fact. The survey respondents were asked to consider
SJFHQ enhancement to overall JTF performance of a group of EBO tasks and similarly overall
JTF performance of a group of OP level UJTL tasks.
A high degree of SJFHQ enhancement to task performance was reported (See Figure 75
above), with SJFHQ enhancement to the performance of the EBO tasks slightly exceeding the
enhancement to the UJTL tasks. The high degree of enhancement was noted in both Spiral 3 and
execution.
SME comment responses indicated the SJFHQ enhancement was particularly beneficial
in that it brought the JTF up to speed at the early phases of JTF planning and execution. One
respondent reported, "I believe the SJFHQ started the EBO tasks moving. Without them,
valuable time would have been lost trying to perform these tasks; especially ONA and ETO
update, ETO production and employing collaborative tools." Another indicated the SJFHQ was
invaluable in initially getting the
JTF Reliance on SJFHQ for EBO and UJTL Task Performance
JTF going in the right direction
and providing the combatant
100% -r..................................................................................................................................................................................................,
commander direction and
90% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
knowledge of the situation.
80% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
Comment responses indicated that
70% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
as the JTF headquarters confidence
60% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 IIIIA great deal level rose, the SJFHQ became an
IIIISome
50%
o Little integral and indistinguishable part
40% oNone of the JTF headquarters.
30%
A high degree of JTF
20%
reliance on the SJFHQ for task
10%
performance was also reported by
0%
EBO Total UJTL Total TOTAL
the SME survey respondents, with
...._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . approximately 80 percent reporting
n=_37
some or a great deal of reliance on

Figure 76: JTF Relied on SJFHQ for Task Performance
the SJFHQ. JTF reliance on the
SJFHQ for the performance of the EBO tasks was stronger than for the UJTL tasks.
Similar to the responses to the question about SJFHQ enhancement of task performance,
reliance on the SJFHQ by the JTF appeared to be strongest at the outset of JTF activity. One
SME reported, "I observed that the JTF relied a great deal, initially, on the SJFHQ to get their
situational awareness, after about day four to day five, the SJFHQ was more in a supporting
role." Another SME responded, "The JTF relied on the SJFHQ to perform these tasks initially,
but quickly gained experience and expertise so that shortly after hostilities commenced, the JTF
and the SJFHQ were functioning as a completely integrated team."
The personality of the JTF headquarters staff may have had a significant impact on the
amount of reliance on the SJFHQ. One SME reported, "Frankly, the SJFHQ successfully

integrated into the III Corps JTF organization far more successfully than it had with the XVIII
Airborne Corps, who, with more traditional JTF experience than III Corps, had more corporate
memory of 'this is how we handled this before. '"
This point was also evident to analysts who observed MC02 Spiral 2, Spiral 3, and
execution. This seems to further demonstrate the importance of the training role with potential
JTF headquarters staffs that the SJFHQ could fulfill when in-garrison as an element of the
combatant commander's staff. It also seems to indicate the SJFHQ could enable a larger of pool
of potential JTF staffs.
Fact: The SJFHQ contributed to the continuity demonstrated by the MC02 JTF.
Data for this fact was
SME assessment of JTF continuity in planning developed by a question
and operations concerning the amount of
continuity observed in planning
100% -r--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------, and operations posed to SMEs
80% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - j once during MC02 Spiral 3 and
60% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - j once during execution. It was
possible to explore continuity
40%
because approximately five weeks
20% elapsed between the end ofMC02
0% Spiral 3 and the start ofMC02
High Moderate Low
n=55
execution.
The SMEs were also asked
Figure 77: SME observed continuity in JTF planning and to estimate how much the SJFHQ
operations presence contributed to the amount
of continuity observed (See Figure
77). The vast majority of responses indicated that the SJFHQ provided at least a moderate level
of continuity to JTF operations and plans groups.
Of those responses reporting a moderate or high level of continuity in Spiral 3, one-third
said they saw a high level of continuity, while two-thirds a moderate level. During execution, the
reports of moderate and high levels were nearly even, indicating continuity seemed to improve as
the JTF headquarters obtained
JTF HQ enhanced by SJFHQ enabled joint more experience in the
force to establish and maintain IS experiment.
SME comment responses
100% ,-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------,
to this question indicated the
80% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 SJFHQ played a significant role
60% IIIlIVery valuable for continuity demonstrated by
IIIlI Somewhat valuable this JTF headquarters. One typical
40%
D Not valuable
SME observation was, "The
20%
SJFHQ was relied on heavily
0% throughout. They were well
Component SME Total n=138 integrated and were used to
provide the continuity. Even when
Figure 78: SJFHQ expertise was valuable to JTF establishing and the situational awareness was up
maintaining Information Superiority on the staff, the SJFHQ experts

were still used as integral staff members."

Another SME responded, "The SJFHQ provided the backbone." A key factor was the
SJFHQ's familiarity with the experimental concepts. "Continuity was pretty good because the
SJFHQ understood the experimental processes/products and because they were using (as a loose
guide) an SOP that they wrote. Therefore, they had an idea of what 'right looked like' and
continued on the path that would get them there."
Several comments indicated the SJFHQ contribution to continuity was most beneficial
early in the experiment, which tracks with other indicators of SJFHQ value-added to the JTF.
The amount of SJFHQ
Value of SJFHQ expertise in enabling JTF to contribution to continuity was
establish and maintain Info Superiority also likely increased because of
the split nature of the MC02
100% experiment. A senior SME
-r.................................................................................................................................................... !
recognized this and reported,

80% +-----------------------~
"SJFHQ continued to plan
60% +-----------------------~ liVery I.9luable 'keep their head in the game'
II Somewhat I.9luable
40% during the break between
o Not I.9luable
Spiral 3 and execution. III
20%
Corps had to go back to their
0% service staff responsibilities.
SA &ONA. Collab Reachback EBO
n>167 SJFHQ was very effective."
While this time-split may not
Figure 79: SJFHQ was a force multiplier for the JTF and a valuable be typical in actual JTF
tool in establishing and maintaining IS operations, it does point to the
value of the SJFHQ in bridging
any potential gaps or transitions in JTF command and control activities.
The comment responses indicated there was another factor to the amount of continuity
observed in this JTF. Comments concerning the importance to continuity of the use of a CIE
appeared in the MC02 execution responses to the continuity question.
Two SME comments in this regard were, "The CIE enhanced the ability of the JTF to
ensure continuity of plans. SJFHQ
ensured that initial plans were adapted Value of SJFHQ expertise in enabling JTF to set
to operational considerations, rather conditions for decisive operations
than reinventing the wheel," and "The
CIE allowed for a very high level of 100% -r...................,
continuity. 80% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i
There was initially some
60% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i III Very valuable
confusion with regard to exactly who III Somewhat valuable
was to receive information, but that 40%
D Not valuable
was quickly worked out." It appears 20%
that the attributes brought to the JTF by
0%
the SJFHQ plus the attributes of the SA & ONA Collab Reachback EBO
n>160
CIE were instrumental to the
attainment of a significant degree of
continuity in the planning and Figure 80: SJFHQ expertise was valuable to JTF setting
operations of this JTF. conditions for decisive operations.

Fact: The presence of the SJFHQ provided value-added to the JTF's

accomplishment of the MC02 experiment objectives.
The presence of the SJFHQ in the MC02 JTF and the resultant access to the knowledge,
expertise and other attributes
possessed by the SJFHQ had a
100% , . beneficial impact on the JTF's
80% +-------------------------~ ability to accomplish the five
60% liVery valuable MC02 objectives.
II1II Somewhat valuable These objectives, as related
40%
D Not valuable in Chapter 2, were 'Establish and
20% Maintain Information Superiority',
0% 'Rapidly Set Conditions for
Component SME Total n=133 Decisive Operations', 'Execute
Assured Access', 'Conduct EBO',
Figure 81: SJFHQ was an enhancement to the JTF for setting
and 'Sustain The Force'. Data for
conditions for decisive operations this fact was based on the results of
two SME surveys and two
participant surveys conducted during MC02 execution. Two of the surveys asked JTF
headquarters participants and SMEs to rate SJFHQ's value-added. They were to measure the
worth of each of four primary SJFHQ attributes to each of the five experiment objectives.
The four SJFHQ attributes respondents assessed were situational awareness and
knowledge of ONA, expertise in collaborative processes, habitual reach-back relationships, and
Value of SJFHQ expertise in enabling JTF to JTF HQ enhanced by SJFHQ enabled joint
execute assured access force to execute assured access
100% T....................................................... , 100% T ....................................................... ,
80% +----------------------1 80% +----------------------1

III Very valuable 60% III Very valuable
60% +----------------------1
III SomelMlat valuable III SomelMlat valuable
40% 40%
o Not valuable o Not valuable
20% 20%
0% 0%
SA & OI\J,Ll., Coliab Reachback ESO n> 154 Component SME Total n=112
Figure 82: SJFHQ expertise was valuable to the JTF in its requirement to execute "assured
access"
JTF HQ enhanced by SJFHQ enabled joint
Value of SJFHQ expertise in enabling JTF force to conduct EBO
to conduct EBO
100% T ....................................................... ,
80% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i
~---~
80''10 +-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - j III Very valuable

60%
liVery valuable III Somewhat valuable
Wlo i- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - j
.. Somewhat valuable 40%
40%
o Not ",Iuable
[] Not valuable
20%
20%
0%
0%
SA & DNA Collab Reachback EBO Component SME Total
n=121
n>158
Figure 83: SJFHQ expertise was valuable to the JTF, while conducting EBO
184 FOR OFFICIAL USE ON.,Y

knowledge of effects-based operations. The other two surveys asked component participants and
SMEs to rate the value added by the three primary MC02 JTF enhancements, SJFHQ, ONA, and
EBO to each of the five experiment objectives.
Moderate to high levels of value-added by the SJFHQ were indicated in all objective
areas. Figures 80 thru 85 illustrate the reported value of SJFHQ with regard to the five MC02
objectives.
For each objective, the percentage of respondents who indicated the SJFHQ was not
valuable to objective accomplishment was similar between the response group made up of
component participants and SMEs, and the group made up of JTF headquarters participants and
SMEs.
This indicates value-added by the SJFHQ appeared to be recognized not just within the
JTF headquarters, but also throughout
100% T......., the JTF. However, these groups
80% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i
differed somewhat in their assessment
of the strength of the value-added
60% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i IIIIIVery valuable
II1II Somewhat valuable provided by the SJFHQ. Of the
40% D Not valuable respondents perceiving value, the
20% percentage indicating the SJFHQ was
0%
very valuable to objective
SA &ONA Collab Reachback EBO n>136 accomplishment was consistently
higher across the five objectives within
Figure 84: Value of SJFHQ in enabling JTF to sustain the the group made up of JTF headquarters
force participants and SMEs than it was in
the group consisting of component
participants and SMEs. This can be partially attributed to the fact that the SJFHQ was fully
integrated into the JTF headquarters early during Spiral 3 and their presence was often
indistinguishable to participants external to the JTF headquarters. This is regarded as "good
news" since it indicates the integration of the SJFHQ into the JTF headquarters was complete
and transparent to those outside the JTF headquarters.
Considering the four primary ..............................................................................................................................""'""II1II
SJFHQ attributes in totality across the 100% -r.............................................................................>
five experiment objectives revealed that 80% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1

the respondents believed certain SJFHQ 60% II1II Very valuable
attributes were more valuable than III Somewhat valuable
40%
others were. The average percentage of D Not valuable
20%
response across all obj ectives for each
attribute and each level of value is 0%
Component SME Total n=102
indicated in table 18, below. The data
indicates the SJFHQ expertise with the
collaborative process employed in
MC02 was most valued, followed Figure 85: SJFHQ enabled the "Sustain the Force" mission
closely by the situational awareness and
knowledge of ONA the SJFHQ brought to the JTF. On the other hand, the SJFHQ reach-back
relationships were deemed to have somewhat less value to overall objective accomplishment.
This was likely because there was minimal opportunity for the SJFHQ to demonstrate this
FOR OFFICIl'. . L USE ONI,Y 185

attribute since the experiment control cell simulated the combatant commander staff and the rest
of the external world.
Review of the comments accompanying these survey responses provided numerous
examples of SJFHQ value-added to objective accomplishment.
Table 18: SJFHQ value added considerable in all areas by most accounts
Very
42% 48% 33% 39%
valuable
Somewhat
50% 45% 50% 50%
valuable
Not valuable 8% 7% 17% 11%
Said one participant, "SJFHQ knowledge of the collaborative process and ONA database was
instrumental in rapidly building a JTF team and in keeping them on task and purpose." From a
SME, "SJFHQ were the experts on knowledge and understating of the ONA, EBO." Said
another, "SJFHQ was very
valuable in rapidly bringing the
Forming a JTF Today JTF up-to-speed, after which, the
SJFHQ functioned as a fully
Matrixed organized
Technology enabled
integrated part of the JTF."
Builds knowledge of blue & red There were a number of
comments that indicated the
benefit of the examined SJFHQ
attributes was most perceived in
the earlier stages of the event.
#ed Fleet Comments such as these appeared
MEF
Corps
in each of the five objective areas,
"The usefulness of the SJFHQ
Provide:
:-:iCiiili"i!xperience diminished as the experiment
Area I functional experience
Links to external organizations progressed and the JTF became as
Provide depth in operational capability
familiar with the systems and the
adversary as the SJFHQ was," and
Figure 86: Forming the JTF today "Initial planning was relevant, and
provided the backbone of the
eventual operation. However, as the operation progressed, ONA data became dated, and thus
situational awareness degraded."
In cases where "Somewhat Valuable" or "Of No Value" was seen, some of the associated
comments seemed to indicate the reason was respondent perception that the JTF did not achieve
the objective against which the SJFHQ attribute was examined or the experiment condition did
not sufficiently exist to demonstrate the value of the examined SJFHQ attribute. To illustrate this
point, one participant in assessing the value of SJFHQ situational awareness and knowledge of
ONA in enabling the joint force to conduct EBO, stated, "The value should have been there, but
experiment construct and scenario did not allow us to fully explore it! We had the initial piece,
but never really got back to it or continued it once action started. We hit all around it, and got
some insights, but missed the full mark on this objective."

As shown previously, the

lowest perceived value added of
the SJFHQ was in the area of Knowledge-Centric
Cross-Functionally Organized
reach-back relationships. This Updates Knowledge of Blue & Red
was due in large part to a lack of
opportunity to demonstrate this
attribute.
A comment that keenly
#ed AEF IW
illustrates this was, "The only #ed Fleet
reason this is not a "Very MEF
Corps
Valuable" response is that the Operational planning begins pre-crisis
Draws from an in-place knowledge base
reach-back organizations were a 1I'-I---mU . ~::I~f~~gs~int C2 element to facilitate
little thin." Another comment experience
Focus on virtual collaboration
Leverage reach-back and collaboration to
echoed this by stating, "There Area I functional experience minimize augmentation required to
Links to external organizations become aJTF
was not reach-back to all Provide depth in capabi Leveralaes a cross-functional organization
~~~b~~~~!!!!!!:~~1 knowledge and information
organizations that could have
contributed, probably more due to
experiment constraints."
Figure 87: Forming the MC02's JTF
Fact: The organizational structures described by the SJFHQ concept and used in
MC02 enhanced the function of the JTF.
The SJFHQ concept calls for the SJFHQ to be organized on a functional basis, as
opposed to a traditional numbered staff basis such as the Jl, J3, and J5. The SJFHQ as used for
MC02 was organized into the following five groups: command, operations, plans, information
superiority, and knowledge management. Even though the SJFHQ is capable of merging into a
traditionally organized JTF headquarters, for MC02, the JTF headquarters was organized using
this structure. The only component staff to similarly organize was the JFLCC. The use of the
group-based structure allowed an
Did Effects Based Planning falter due to organizational
problems?
opportunity to explore if this structure had
an effect on the JTF.
Similarly, the SJFHQ concept
80% +-----------------~ envisions the use of 13 'boards, centers,
60% + - - - - - - - - - - -
cells, and working groups' (BCCWG) by
which the JTF would conduct its business.
40% + - - - - - - - - - - -
Current doctrine describes 35 BCCWG
20% +---
for potential use by a JTF. Even though it
0% +--- is unlikely all 35 would be used,
Yes No n=23 experience indicates somewhat more than
13 are generally convened. The MC02
Figure 88: Effects-Based Planning didn't falter due to JTF used the BCCWG structure as
organizational problems described by the SJFHQ concept. This
also allowed the opportunity to examine what affect this structure had on the function of the JTF.
Figures 86 and 87 above illustrate this discussion by comparing the traditional JTF headquarters
organizational construct to MC02.
These issues were explored in MC02 Spiral 3 and execution, using survey input gathered
from SMEs, who were asked if effects-based planning seemed to falter due to organizational

problems and if the group-board-center-cell-work group structure enhanced JTF headquarters

operations. Each of these questions is explored in the following paragraphs.
SMEs were asked during Spiral 3 and execution if effects-based planning seemed to
falter due to organizational problems. The overall result, by nearly a 3: 1 margin, was that
Effects-Based Planning did not falter due to organizational problems.
Over half of the responses from the SMEs to this question included comments. Most of
these dealt with the impact of the organization on effects-based planning. Two SMEs who
indicated the organization did not cause effects-based planning to falter responded, "My
perception is that organizational problems have not adversely impacted EBP," and "I did not
observe any real problems based upon the organization. Most difficulties were based on the use
of the tools." A SME who stated the planning faltered said that even though logisticians were
imbedded in the plans and operations groups, true synchronization of those efforts was not
evident.
Other SME comments on this question seemed to point to higher-level issues impacting
on the conduct of effects-based planning. Two examples are, "Problems I observed with EBO
were related to the lack of cultural acceptance ofIO as a potent warfighting area. 10 was not
integrated into the planning/execution ofEBO until later in the event, when CJTF identified 10
as a major focus area," and "I think the problems came up because the staff was focused in the
present, vice in the future. The battle rhythm was brought over from a Napoleonic way of doing
things, and no one (me included) realized the impact of doing that was to force a production
oriented process on an organization that needed to be knowledge based."
Another SME reported, "Cultural norms and a rigid component structure inhibited the
full spectrum application ofEBO. The current component system is designed primarily to
provide deconfliction of tasking
BCCWG structure effect on JTF HQ and coordinated command and
operations control. The JTF has not yet
evolved into a truly synergistic
organization capable of integrating
75% III Enhanced all aspects of combat power. EBO
50% III Had No Effect promises to bridge this gap, by
providing commanders with a
25% DDegraded
framework for cooperation and
0% integration, and a focus for joint
Spiral 3 Execution Total n=56 efforts. In the early planning
stages, most individuals, and cells
attempted to use the EBO
Figure 89: BCCWG structure enhanced JTF HQ operations
framework. However, upon
execution, the emphasis shifted from experimentation with the new system, to achieving
assigned tasks."
SMEs were also asked during Spiral 3 and execution to assess if the group-board-center-
cell-work group (BCCWG) structure used in MC02 enhanced JTF headquarters operations. Of
56 SME responses, an overall 79 percent reported the group-board-center-cell-work group
structure enhanced JTF headquarters operations. A senior SME reported that the board-center-
cell-work group structure used in MC02 ensured good cross staff integration and helped to
prevent stove piping. A number of the SMEs, who thought the structure enhanced JTF
headquarters operations, also credited the collaboration and collaborative environment as having

a significant enhancement on the JTF headquarters. Only five comments were associated with
the selection of "Had No Effect" and six with the "Degraded" choice. Some of these seemed to
indicate that the amount of time spent in the meetings associated with these structural entities
degraded JTF headquarters functions, while several other responses indicated the focus on
producing products within these entities degraded the attainment of a knowledge-based state
within the JTF headquarters.
Fact: The function of the forward headquarters was enhanced by the presence of a
portion of the SJFHQ.
The JTF forward headquarters during MC02 seemed to be fully engaged in the command
and control of the joint force during the entire time of its deployment, which occurred 30 July to
2 August 2002. Data gathered through the administration of SME and participant surveys during
MC02 execution indicates the SJFHQ provided benefit to both the function of the forward
headquarters and the amount of time needed for its establishment. Since deployment to the
forward headquarters site aboard USS Coronado only occurred during execution, these surveys
were not administered during Spiral 3. From these surveys, two questions formed the basis for
this Fact. One asked if the presence of SJFHQ members enhanced the function of the forward
headquarters, and the second asked if the presence of the SJFHQ helped to reduce the time
involved in setting up the forward headquarters.
A total of 31 individuals responded to the question, "Did SJFHQ presence at the JTF
headquarters forward enhance the function of the forward headquarters?" A strong majority
reported that the presence of the SJFHQ enhanced the function of the forward headquarters while
a very small percentage indicated the SJFHQ presence was a detriment. Approximately one-
quarter of the respondents believed there was no effect on the forward headquarters function
from the SJFHQ. Our two SME responses were split between "Enhanced" and "Had No Effect";
neither reported that the SJFHQ presence degraded the forward headquarters function.
There were 26 comments received in the responses to this question. The majority of these
were associated with the response indicating the SJFHQ enhanced the function of the forward
headquarters. The reasons indicated by the respondents as to why the SJFHQ enhanced the
function of the forward headquarters were similar to those seen elsewhere in this analysis. The
amount of knowledge, situational awareness and understanding of the experimental concepts
possessed by the SJFHQ were
SJFHQ Effect on Forward HQ Functions cited. The SJFHQ contribution to
the resolution of technical reach-
back issues and its mentoring were
80% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - j also cited and are consistent with
the overall experience possessed by
60%
this SJFHQ. Even in the cases
40% where no effect was reported, there
did not seem to be a pejorative
20%
view of the SJFHQ. Rather, it
0% appeared that SJFHQ contribution
Enhanced Had No Effect Degraded
n=31
was indistinguishable because it
was already fully integrated into
Figure 90: SJFHQ enhanced the function of the forward HQ the JTF headquarters staff, and
because the non-SJFHQ members

of the JTF forward headquarters possessed a greater amount of situational awareness by the time
the deployment occurred. This too is consistent with other portions of the analysis that indicate
the SJFHQ value was most felt in the early stages of JTF headquarters operation. The key
comment coming from a respondent who thought the SJFHQ presence degraded the forward
headquarters function was that the SJFHQ could have been used to maintain the battle rhythm at
the JTF main. Only certain SJFHQ members were part of the forward deployment, which means
SJFHQ knowledge and experience was available at the main headquarters. In addition, there was
no indication that the battle rhythm at the main headquarters faltered during the forward
deployment. Therefore, little emphasis should be placed on this concern.
Responses from 35 participants and two SMEs were recorded when asked if the presence
of the SJFHQ members on the deployment team helped to reduce the time involved in setting up
the forward headquarters. Respondents indicated SJFHQ reduced by one-half the forward
headquarters set-up time. Both SMEs indicated SJFHQ presence helped to reduce the set-up
time.
An examination of the comment data associated with this question indicates the amount
of benefit to reducing the time to establish the forward headquarters from the SJFHQ may be less
than that indicated by considering only the distribution of the Yes/No responses. Thirty-two of
the 37 survey respondents provided comments with their selection, 19 associated with the
selection of "Yes" and 13 associated with "No. " Many of those, who responded that the SJFHQ
reduced the time needed, did not credit the usual SJFHQ virtues seen elsewhere in this analysis,
instead indicating the SJFHQ value was in helping resolve software and hardware issues and in
making the collaborative tool functional. Likewise, the "No" responses were characterized by a
number of comments that the contribution was in the technical arena, that the JTF headquarters
staff was becoming mature in its
Presence of SJFHQ reduced Forward HQ set-
ability to function, and that the
up time
SJFHQ was fully integrated into
100% -r........................................................................................................................................., the SJFHQ instead of a separate,
but accompanying entity.
80% +-----------------------------------~
At the time of deployment
60% +---- to the forward headquarters, the
40% +---- SJFHQ and the JTF headquarters
20% +----
had been together for several
weeks, counting Spiral 3 and the
0% +----
first week of execution. The non-
Yes No
n=37 SJFHQ members were becoming
more accomplished in handling
Figure 91: SJFHQ presence reduced Forward HQ set-up time issues and using the experimental
processes.
Other data indicates the impact of SJFHQ value softens as the JTF headquarters becomes
more established. Additionally, this forward headquarters was established aboard the USS
Coronado to prepare for the arrival of the forward headquarters element. The forward element
also maintained situational awareness and executed joint force command and control during
transit to and from the ship with the use of the Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal
System Near Term (JEMPRS NT). These elements likely had the most impact on the time
required to establish the forward headquarters. It is believed that while the presence of SJFHQ

members was of some value, it was not a critical factor to reducing the set-up time of the forward
headquarters.
Finding Although the SJFHQ provided value added to the JTF, continued refinement
of its organization and composition is warranted.
SJFHQ Organization. The SJFHQ organization needs refinement, but not a major
overhaul, according to analysis ofMC02 data collected. MC02 participants were asked, "Are
there changes or improvements that should be made to the SJFHQ organization or positions?"
The question was intended to specifically address the SJFHQ organization. However, after
reviewing the data, some (60 of 461) of the responses were more relevant to the JTF
organization, which mirrored that of the SJFHQ, during the experiment. All respondents, who
indicated that changes or improvements were needed, provided comments. The responses were
mapped to the SJFHQ or to the JTF based on the subject matter. Only the SJFHQ organization is
discussed below. The CJTF organizes the JTF based on requirements.
Changes and Improvements needed for SJFHQ?
60
50
_ 40
!:
G>
~ 30
G>
a.. 20
Ijjjjj Participants (n=348)
10
Ijjjjj SMEs (n=53)
o
Major Change Minor Change No Change
o Combined (n=401)
Figure 92:Changes and improvements needed for SJFHQ
The SJFHQ is organized into five groups - command (CmdGrp), plans (PG), operations
(OpsGrp), information superiority (ISG), and information/knowledge management (KMG).
Results of analysis indicate that the SJFHQ organization is considered optimum by most
observers. Eighty-five percent of respondents indicated that if any changes were needed they
would only be minor, suggestions include:
Adding expertise not currently available
Adding or deleting some currently available expertise
Relocating expertise from one group to another
Changing the mix of military and civilians
Ensuring SJFHQ members have certain attributes
Ensuring the SJFHQ come with certain products
The make-up of the SJFHQ as stated in the SJFHQ concept is generalist-centric, while
some of the changes suggested in the experiment data are more expertise-centric. Specific minor
changes and improvements, by respondent group, are discussed below.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY_ 191

SMEs noted that the SJFHQ needed expertise in additional areas. They also emphasized
the importance of habitual relationships and being able to reach-back to the combatant
commander's staff and COEs. Forty-nine percent recommended minor changes and
improvements, (34 percent indicated that no changes are required) including:
Add personnel planner
Add engineer
Add medical planner
Add joint fires expertise
Add SOF expertise
Add deployment planner
Add log director and planner
One SME stated, "need a 'joint fires' expert in the SJFHQ and need to clearly identify
deployment planning expertise in plans to include JF AST expertise." Another SME remarked, "It
looks like it is about right as long as there is good collaboration with the rest of the combatant
commander staff during pre-crises and effective reach-back during the crisis." Finally, a senior
SME noted, "The SJFHQ will not be and never should be the be-all, end-all organization. The
resources required to achieve an all-capable SJFHQ are too high for the value added. The 80-90
percent solution is the key. Each mission and JTF will be different. There will never be a
standard."
Comments from the senior mentor/concept developer indicate that the SJFHQ concept is
good and has proven itself. They said that the SJFHQ has become an essential feature of DoD
transformation, and that combatant commanders need a SJFHQ. However, they are not sure
about the organization. They indicate that the organization needed minor refinement,
recommending that the combatant commanders have the latitude to organize the SJFHQ.
The one recurring comment from senior mentors was the need for lAC personnel resident
within the SJFHQ. "SJFHQ is good and must be standing - concept proven; not sure about the
structure," said one senior mentor. Another senior mentor stated, "SJFHQ needs an interagency
person or two. There is too much below combatant commander Blue that needs political-military
sensitivity." Another added, "As the JIACG concept is refined, a JIACG staffer should be
identified to be part of the SJFHQ, and usually to deploy with it."
The UJTL baseline report information regarding the subtask, "Coordinate and Integrate
JointlMultinational and Interagency Support" (OP 5.7), indicated that identifying the agencies
available to support the JTF was difficult. The SJFHQ directly addresses this issue with its
habitual relationships with and reach-back to the lAC, COEs, and other external agencies. In
addition, respondents and senior mentors noted the need for an lAC representative in the SJFHQ.
These relationships and capabilities were not well exercised during MC02 because of the
experiment design. As noted previously, the combatant commander's staff intended only to
participate with representatives in the JECG. However, if implemented as defined in the SJFHQ
concept this will not be an issue.
Approximately 50 percent of participants indicated that no changes were required to the
SJFHQ organization, while 36 percent said that the SJFHQ needs only minor changes. Their
input included all extremes and everything in between. Participants indicated that the SJFHQ
needs to add expertise not currently available, to add more of and to delete some currently-
available expertise, to relocate expertise from one group to another, to change the mix of military
and civilians, to ensure SJFHQ members have certain attributes, and to ensure the SJFHQ come
192 FOR OFFICIAl, IISE ONLY

with certain products. The recurring comments from participants recommend the following
changes:
Add communications expertise - J6 types
Add medical planner
Add personnel planner
Add engineer expertise
Add fires expertise
Add more military - less civilians
Add KMOs - managers not IT people
Add a future operations cell - mix of people from plans and operations
Participants emphasized that SJFHQ members should have certain traits, specifically
joint experience, experts in functional area, collaboration tools expertise, and coaching and
mentoring skills. During Spiral 3, participants needed better definitions of positions and skills
required. In addition, there was a noticeable concern about the mix of military and civilians, and
who was in charge or directing whom. A participant stated, "The number of personnel should be
greatly reduced. Many SJFHQ members had very little to do during the buildup to MC02.
Additionally, military SJFHQ should be organized to eliminate situations so military and
government personnel are not subordinate to civilian contractors."
Other comments include, "More military/uniform personnel," and "Less civilians more
military." Another participant said, "lfI had only one additional position, I would add ajoint
fires person, ifI had two additional slots, I would add two joint fires people." Another remarked,
"The concept for the SJFHQ is absolutely right on target. I would definitely add an operations
officer to assist the SJFHQ KMO with centers, boards, and cells to include managing the JTF
operations page and archives. Stick to the concept and let the SJFHQ perform." "I don't know if
more KMO or better procedures were necessary ... I think the SPPS folders and methods should
have been set. I would have liked to see standard data reports files set up by the SJFHQ team.
For example: items of high interests to the JTF commander should be in clearly identified folders
that can be updated by those who have the right knowledge," said a JTF staff member.
Regarding reducing the SJFHQ, one JTF staff member stated, "Scale down the size of
the SJFHQ. There is no need for a RW [rotary wing] planner, and many other planners. If the
function is a component function and you do not own the assets at the JTF level, you do not need
a planner at this level for it.
Only 15 percent saw the need for major changes. These changes included deleting and
adding groups, returning to the Joint Staff organization model, and allowing the combatant
commanders to organize the SJFHQ based upon requirements. The preponderance of suggested
major changes centered on ISG, KMG, 10, and a logistics/support group.
Questions addressing the ISG and KMG included: "Should these groups remain or be
eliminated and group members distributed to the PG and OpsGrp?" "What are the roles and
functions of these groups?" and "Who is responsible for the members distributed to other
groups?"
Additionally, respondents indicated support for a logistics support group, transfer ofIO
people to the PG, and an information operations organization, either at group level within the
SJFHQ organization or at task force level, such as the joint information operations task force
(JIOTF). Each group is addressed separately below.

Those that recommended major SJFHQ organizational changes, suggest elimination of

the ISG. The group experienced problems synchronizing and integrating intelligence assets and
providing the necessary support for operations and planning. According to these respondents, the
ISG did not meet the needs of the JTF or fulfill its roles and responsibilities. The group became
two groups, intelligence, and 10 when the CJTF pulled out the 10 supervisor to be his
spokesman. The group split and it never came together again. This adds credence to the
suggestions that 10 should not be in the ISG, but rather 10 should be its own entity. In addition,
JTF ISG participants indicated that the limitations of the experiment impacted the group's
effectiveness.
One SME suggested the major changes to the ISG, "There are significant problems with
the organization of intelligence elements within the SJFHQ/JTF. The change from the original
SJFHQ concept to take intelligence support assets from both the operations and plans groups,
along with information operations assets, to form a new information superiority group (ISG) was
not exactly a resounding success.
"In some ways, it was a real failure," he said and continued, "The lack of a complete SOP
that ensured the various ISG entities knew what support they needed to provide to the plans or
operations groups created conditions where insufficient information was provided, often in the
wrong format or at the wrong time. Even worse, some critical intelligence support was not
provided at all. Recommendation - eliminate the ISG.
"All personnel associated with current intelligence support, effects assessment and
coordination of collection should be shifted to the operations group. The ONA analysts'
positions, if they should be physically located at the JTF level, remains a topic for debate. I
would say all ISG personnel associated with planning, such as the ISR planner, and the EA
planner, would join the plans group. The ISG personnel would be more effective at the
combatant commander's level and thus other current ISG members such as the ONA supervisor,
would become unnecessary."
A SJFHQ member in the ISG recommended that the SJFHQ should consist of two
groups, operations and plans and that the personnel in the IS and KM groups reintegrate back
into plans and operations. He considered that there would be support personnel, such as logistics
officers, in each group, place one officer in charge of all similar personnel in both groups. He
also believed this would simplify the problems of synchronizing efforts across the groups. Other
participants indicated that they were not sure of the value of the ISG because it did not provide
the synchronization it was envisioned providing, it failed in the area of 10, and it was out of
touch with the needs of the OpsGrp and PG - they recommended disestablishment of the group.
Conversely, participants also supported the ISG. They indicated that the ISG should
remain a group with command and control of all ISG assets across the JTF staff. To be effective,
the ISG must control its assets and receive information from higher headquarters elements, they
said.
One JTF staff member stated, "First of all, resist any attempts to disband the ISG. Initial
problems were due to no command and control. The director must have C2 of all ISG members
distributed across the staff to ensure situational awareness, integration, and synchronization. This
would result in better products, better orchestration, better integration, better synchronization,
and reduce duplication. For this to work, the director must have control. Not sure about 10, not
sure of the plan to elevate or stay in ISG. The 10 lead was an 06; we were pulled apart early and
never got back together. CJTF wanted to talk directly with the 10 lead and he wanted a
spokesman, such as the PAO. IfIO stays with ISG, the lead should probably be an 04/05 billet to

better facilitate C2." Another JTF staff member remarked, "The ISG is a valid group and should
not be disbanded. ISG was hurt by having no C2 of assets and the experiment - lack of products
from higher echelons (JECG). The ISG lead must control all assets to synchronize and
appropriately integrate throughout the staff, and must receive or be able to acquire info from
higher elements. There are no problems with ISG - the problems were with the experiment."
In summary, the ISG is a viable group that needs tweaking to improve effectiveness. The
group leader needs C2 of all assets for situational awareness, integration, and synchronization
purposes. In addition, the group needs access to and information feeds from JTF -external
sources. Better understanding of the ISG's roles and functions is also needed.
KMG was another group that, according to those who suggested major SJFHQ changes,
had problems and should be eliminated. The focus or understanding from many of the
participants and the KMG was on technology-knowledge was not managed. The KIMP stated
that knowledge management was the responsibility of each warfighter. That statement assumed
warfighters understood knowledge management to include the business rules, knew what
knowledge should be managed, and knew how to use the management tools.
This proved to be a bad assumption because warfighters did not understand knowledge
management and because the business rules were dynamic. The expertise of the KMOs was in
the area of information technology. The group needs more operators who understand the needs
of the JTF to manage the knowledge and to ensure knowledge is available to all staffs. Group
status is not necessary ifKMOs are distributed throughout the staff with a node in the CmdGrp.
A SJFHQ KM member stated, "We need better understanding and organization in the KM/IS
area, at least better alignment of organizations and expectations. As a KM, nearly everyone had a
different expectation of my role. It led to disappointment in many and frustration on my part."
Another participant remarked, "KM is weak. We had no managed knowledge. Either
disband the group and distribute the personnel throughout remaining groups or give the KM lead
responsibility for all KM people so he can focus efforts. The KM Lead should probably be an
operator with a strong tech person as his deputy."
A SME provided the following comments: " ... Document control is problematic. The
number of broken links and dead subscriptions continues to rise. Document naming conventions
and storage locations are slowly shifting. Procedures are changing, sometimes dramatically, and
SOPs are not being updated. Without adequate KM embedded in each cell, it is difficult to
sustain adherence to the KM plan. Moreover, it is even more difficult to capture and analyze the
unique new processes, procedures, and conventions operators are developing to meet their needs.
Additional KM should be added to the manning document and embedded in each cell. These
individuals would be able to manage personnel, keeping the operators inside the range, but
permitting them enough leeway to experiment with processes, procedures, and conventions.
More important, these individuals could capture the best of these new ideas and share them
across the organization, creating new and improved SOPs." Another SME stated, " ... The KMO
needs to be operationally savvy, with the ability to talk to technicians, and must have superb
computer skills to translate the needs of the commander into useful web pages, outlook
organization, and functional collaboration nets."
The KMG is a viable group that needs more operators and to focus more efforts toward
managing knowledge. The group leader needs C2 of all KM assets for situational awareness,
synchronization, and consistency. Better understanding of the KMG's roles and functions is also
needed.

Another said that 10 should be separated from the ISG and elevated to group or
component level. Comments regarding 10 indicate that 10 was not well understood by many
players and those who did understand, said that 10 was misplaced under ISG, and not well
integrated throughout the staff, but 10 planners were definitely needed in the PG. Respondents
stated that to facilitate 10 success:
Define 10 and educate DoD and external agencies
Refine 10 responsibilities and provide appropriate authorities and resources
Establish 10 as a group if not a component
Add 10 experts throughout the staff, especially in the PG
There is no agreed upon definition ofIO within DoD. The 10 spectrum is very broad and
inconsistent across military agencies. One SME indicated, "A major USJFCOM recommendation
coming out ofMC02 should be that the SecDef should commission and approve a DoD-wide
definition of 10 and fix
responsibility for it within DoD."
Another SME stated, "10 should
90 be its own entity, not part ofISG
80
70 and it should have the clout to
60 make things happen prior to
CCIl 50
...CIlC.J 40 hostilities."
c.. 30 The CJTF concurred with
20 that thought, elevating his own
10 IiiD Participants (n=393)
0
information officer to group level,
IiiD SMEs (n=99)
Yes No Don't know early during the experiment. He
o Combined (n=492)
also split the ISG group into
Figure 93: Participants were unsure of the correct number and intelligence and 10 cells, which
distribution of 10 planners with the SFJHQ enhanced the effectiveness ofIO.
A participant remarked, "If gaining and maintaining info superiority is a primary objective, it
will never be reached by burying 10 under IS. 10 if it is to be successful has to have its
responsibilities refined, appropriate authorities, and resources assigned." A recommendation was
provided to separate 10 from ISG and elevate it to a group or component level. The SJFHQ chief
of staff stated, "We should improve the 10 focus by creating a significant functional stand-alone
area vice treating 10 as a briefing item. It is already almost a functional component."
On this same subject, a participant indicated that 10 integration was inadequate and he
recommended creating an 10 command with full component status. Senior mentors also
supported component status and more 10 personnel to effectively leverage the 10 spectrum. A
JTF staff participant, said, "First, move 10 out from under IS. Second, dedicate an 10 planner to
the plans group. Third clearly identify the skills in 10."
Figure 93, reiterates the lack ofIO understanding. Participants and SMEs were asked
during Spiral 3 and execution, "Is the number and distribution of 10 planners across the JTF
headquarters correct?" Only 25 percent of respondents (Combined) indicated a "Yes" or "No"
answer, or understood 10 well enough to answer the question. The chart doesn't depict a need for
more or a better distribution ofIO. However, comments from "No" respondents, participants and
SMEs, indicate a need for more 10, specifically in the PG. Some "Yes" respondents also noted
that the PG needs 10 planners.

The percentage of "Yes" and "No" responses for both, participants and SMEs, increased
from Spiral 3 to execution, by 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively. This indicates some 10
understanding was gained as the experiment progressed.
In summary, 10 was not well understood and not well integrated throughout the staff. A
better understanding ofIO is needed, to include the role and functions ofIO personnel. Further
study is needed also to investigate the establishment of an 10 group or task force.
The analysis regarding the JTF challenge, 'underdeveloped information operations',
provided in the MC02 baseline report stated:
While many JTF staffs attempt to optimize 10, they are confronted with the
reality that the high impact 10 actions are usually not at the discretion of the JTF
commander. Those decisions and actions are at the combatant command level and higher.
There is a training issue focused on tactical level 10 personnel, who are placed at the
operational level and then asked to orchestrate a coherent, operational-level 10 plan. Very
seldom is that done
Change in 10 Respons
effectively. Additionally, the
Spiral 3 to Execution
lack of simulations that
reward 10 play makes it 35
30
difficult to effectively
integrate it into training - 25
:ii 20
events. ~ 15
D.. 10
5
The SJFHQ attempted to 0
address this challenge by including

five 10 planners in the ISG and one Figure 94: Change in 10 responses
10 operations member in the
OpsGrp. However, 10 had similar problems during MC02 in that not enough knowledge and
experience, not well integrated in the right places, and not synchronized across the spectrum,
especially in the special access areas. The CJTF elevated 10 from under ISG and gave it needed
command emphasis, which enhanced effectiveness.
A point noted in the
comments of those who suggested
70
maj or changes, and in the
60 comments and recommendations
50 from other respondents was to add
~ 40 a logistics/support group
~ 30 (LogSptGrp) to the SJFHQ
c.. 20
10
organization. The absence of a
o LogSptGrp proved to be
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly significant and problematic, as
agree disagree
o Combined (n=248) reported by respondents.
Participants noticed confusion and
Figure 95: Most agreed that logisticians in plans enhanced JTF duplication of effort between
logistic planners and operators.
Logisticians were not in the core/main planning cell and their absence was reflected in COA
development. A SME noted some COA development was logistically short; it was
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V 197

missing an assessment oflogistic feasibility. Logisticians were left out and not consulted
on some operations; however, this seemed to have minimal impact on the progress of the
experiment. Moreover, one participant indicated that some logistic problems did not receive the
necessary visibility to get resolved, and that a logistics director was needed. The director would
have been able to coordinate, synchronize, and maintain visibility of logistic functions.
A SME stated that a J4 would have helped coordinate/oversee logistical requirements
between the OpsGrp and PG. Another SME said, "While the embedding of logisticians in the
groups has shown great potential, the logistics operations director (LogOpsDir) in the operations
group spent a great deal of time within the plans group's logistics plans section during Spiral 3.
This individual's ability to provide logistics planning oversight will be greatly diminished once
deployment and operations begin and, as his focus shifts.
"To create better oversight oflogistics planning and operations as well as more logistics
visibility across the JTF staff, recommend creation of an 0-6 logistics director position at the
special stafflevel." A senior mentor stated, "The ETO did not have sufficient granularity and
resolution for the logistics problems, so I could not link forces. The G-3/G-4 personalities fit, but
personalities should not determine how we operated. For many of the log sustainment things, I'd
normally deal with the COSCOM commander. But, I couldn't because there was no joint
logistics commander."
Another senior mentor indicated that we need more logistics integration.
All respondent types supported adding a group to oversee logistics planning and operations, to
increase logistics visibility across
the JTF, and to house other support
functions as required. Many
70 respondents made comments such
60 as bring back the J4, create a
50 separate logistics element, add a
~ 40 log directorate, and, give logistics
~ 30
c.. 20 equal footing with other groups.
10 A support/logistics group
o should be developed that has parity
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly with the other groups, but not at
agree disagree o Combined (n=230)
the expense of removing all
logistics personnel from the
Figure 96: Logisticians in operations enhanced JTF OpsGrp and PG. Logistics
representatives should remain in
these groups, but maybe in fewer numbers. A participant remarked, "Logistics is too important
not to be an entity in itself. There most definitely need to be Logistics participation in planning
and operations and it needs to be more than a simple LNO representation."
"The vertical staff processes in the logistics arena lacked sufficient definition given that
there was no true logistics staff to coordinate with. The JTF needs a dedicated logistics cell, even
as logisticians remain embedded in both ops and plans directorates. The ability to flow forces,
coordinate sustainment, and manage host nation requirements necessitate an educated logistics
cell," added a combatant commander staff member. If added to the SJFHQ, the support group
should include specialists in logistics, personnel, engineers, medical, SJA, P AO, and contracting.
During execution, participants and SMEs were asked iflogistic personnel, embedded in
the PG and OpsGrp, enhanced JTF operations. Figures 95 and 96, above, indicate that log

planners and log operators enhanced JTF operations. In all cases, over 79 percent of respondents
agreed that logistic personnel located in operations and plans enhanced operations. This suggests
logistic personnel should remain embedded in the PG and OpsGrp.
The analysis regarding the JTF challenge, contingency contracting and host nation
support (HNS),
Did Group Structure Enhance JTF Operation provided in the
MC02 baseline
100 report states that a
limited number of
80
events have been
- s::::
~II)
60 conducted, centered
on J-4 specific
Il..
40
training in this area.
20 The SJFHQ assists
with this challenge
o
by providing the
Enhanced Degraded Had No Effect 0 Combined (n=56)
situational awareness
and understanding of
the JOA, the ONA
Figure 97: Group structure effect on JTF operations
knowledge, and
habitual relationships and reach-back to COE and other external agencies. During MC02,
respondents indicated the need for an lAC representative in the SJFHQ and the need for a
support group, including contracting, SJA, and PAO expertise. If the group is added with the
recommended expertise, the SJFHQ will provide a means to overcome this challenge.
During Spiral 3 and execution, SMEs were asked if the group structure enhanced JTF
operations. Throughout the experiment, SMEs indicated that the SJFHQ group structure
enhanced JTF operations-88 percent during Spiral 3 and 72 percent during execution. The
cross-functional group structure facilitated good staff integration and helped alleviate stovepipes.
It allowed planning to occur rapidly and formed the framework for collaboration.
The MC02 experience
showed that CIE and the SJFHQ Did Group Structure Enhance Component
are inextricably linked and have a Interaction w/JTF H Q?
synergistic effect to enhance JTF
80
operations. Another important 70
60
aspect is that the JTF staff 5j 50
embraced the structure, which ~ 40
a. 30
allowed the benefits to be realized. 20
10
The difference in SMEs saying o
"Degraded" during Spiral 3 (4 Enhanced Degraded Had No OSMEs (n=64)
Effect oCombined (n=484)
percent = 1 SME) and those giving
the same response during
execution (16 percent = 5 SMEs) is Figure 98: Group structure effect on component interaction
noted. Their comments are more
relevant to BCCWGs than the group structure and were considered in the BCCWG finding
below.

To address structure enhancement from a different perspective, during Spiral 3 and

execution SMEs were asked also if Effects-Based Planning/Operations (EBP/O) faltered due to
organizational problems. Seventy-four percent of respondents indicated that the organization did
not cause the EBP/O to falter. Only two of the six SMEs who responded, "Yes," provided
comments regarding the structure. One SME indicated that logistics was not well integrated and
synchronized. He noted also that
Did Group Structure Enhance C logisticians were in the PG but not
Interaction w/JTF H Q?
embedded in the core, planning
70 cell. The other SME stated, "There
60 was not adequate representation of
50
~ 40
information operations in the JPC
~ 30 planning efforts. The JPC core
a. 20 plans cell needs an 10 planner."
10
Theses concerns are a repeat of
o
information presented in the 10
and Logistics/Support Group
Figure 99: Most thought structure was an enhancement to sections above.
JTFHQ-component interaction. JFACC/JPOTF mixed. The JTF staff including
SJFHQ members, component
staffs, and SMEs were asked if the group structure enhanced component interaction with the JTF
headquarters. The JTF staff and SMEs, 76 percent and 75 percent respectively, indicated that the
organizational structure enhanced component interaction with the JTF headquarters. The
component staffs as a whole were not so impressed. Only 51 percent of these respondents
indicated that the structure had enhanced component interaction. However, interesting to note is
that the JFLCC staff, which was the only component organized similar to the JTF, was most
positive. Sixty-three percent of JFLCC staff indicated the structure enhanced component
interaction.
JFLCC respondents credited the similar structures as the reason for enhanced
effectiveness and interaction. One JFLCC respondent remarked, "The identical structure of the
JFLCC and JTF enhanced our effectiveness because there was a clearly identified source that we
could coordinate and collaborate
with to resolve problems and Effectiveness of JTF HQ and Component
ensure situational awareness was Interaction (n=132)
maintained. "
70
At the other extreme are
60
the JF ACC respondents. Over 70 50
percent of the JF ACC staff C 40
~
responded, "Degraded" and "Had ~ 30

a.
No Effect." JF ACC respondents 20
noted that the structure was 10
confusing, that the JTF staff was

too involved in tactical planning, Very Effective Somewhat Somewhat Ineffective
that the number and length of Effective Ineffective
collaboration sessions were
detrimental to component Figure 100: Most thought interaction between JTF HQ and the
planning, and that the location of component staffs was effective

information was not logical based on expectations. A JF ACC respondent stated, "RFls were sent
to KM vice IS resulting in answers delayed for days. Structure [is] confusing and cumbersome
for those brought up under Jl, J2. They did not understand who was doing the traditional J staff
roles. Structure did not seem well defined as KM seemed to be tasked with things that IS should
be doing. Structure breaks traditional expertise roles and waters them down into functional areas
not requiring that expertise or underutilizing it." A JSOTF staff member indicated that the IS
structure just added layers of complexity to the Intel process.
Over 80 percent of component respondents indicated that the interaction between the JTF
headquarters and components was effective. Respondents stated that the CIE played a major role,
that situational awareness was always high, and that collaboration enabled unfiltered
communications-there was immediate access, vertically and horizontally.
Combatant commander staff interaction with JTF headquarters was also enhanced by the
organizational structure, according to the JTF staff and SJFHQ. However, three of the six
combatant commander staff respondents (See Figure 101 below) indicated that the SJFHQ
organization degraded their interaction with the JTF headquarters and one indicated the
organization had no effect. The small sample size of combatant commander staff negates
significance, but responses and comments are noted and listed below.
Combatant commander comments associated with the selection of the "Degraded"
response included, "The combatant commander J3 and J5 did not mirror the SJFHQ structure
and at times this caused confusion," and "Just talked to combatant commander J2 rep; info is
taking longer to get to right people because intel folks at JTF have been divested to IS cells."
Another participant commented, "This merits additional research. The experimental staff
structure varied by component (i.e. JFLCC mirrored JTF) and this caused some vertigo at the
combatant commander and component level. This lack of consistency may just be a training
issue, but I believe that the
Did Group Structure Enhance CC Staff Inte complexities of staff interactions at
HQ? the operational and strategic level,
mandate simplistic organizations
80
70 with very defined TTPs."
60
_ 50
A combatant commander
"~ 40 staff member, who reported there
~ 30 was "No Effect, " stated, "Because
20
10
of the combatant commander staff
o experiment design - J3 one person,
Enhanced Had No Effect J5 one person, etc., the effect was
minimal. However, a robust
Figure 101: JTF and components thought structure enhanced
combatant commander staff ready
interaction between the combatant commander's staff and the to go to war would have presented
JTF staff. Combatant commander's staff disagreed. a different interaction picture."
SJFHQ composition is
defined as the number of members, mix of skills and knowledge, and products brought to the
activation of the JTF. All respondents were asked, "Are there additional skills, knowledge, or
products you believe the SJFHQ should bring to the activation of the JTF?" Sixty-four percent of
responding SMEs answered, "Yes" and provided comments regarding additional skills,
knowledge, and products needed. Only 41 percent of 393 participants (JTF staff and SJFHQ)
provided comments. In addition, group directors were interviewed by analysts and asked specific
FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONI,V 201

questions regarding the composition of their group. Key individual attributes and each group will
be discussed separately. Additions, which are relevant across all groups are discussed in the
"Others" paragraph below.
The name "headquarters" is deceiving because the SJFHQ is a command and control
element, not a headquarters. For that reason, many comments are not relevant to the SJFHQ
organization and are more pertinent to a headquarters (JTF). The CJTF organizes the JTF based
on requirements. The comments below are specific to the SJFHQ full-time organization, not the
JTF as a whole. There is some overlap with the "organization" section above, which emphasizes
some importance.
A good lead-in comment to this section, as stated by an SJFHQ member is, "We need to
be very careful about adding more positions to the SJFHQ. The SJFHQ manning is already a
huge bill for the combatant commander to pay for a "peacetime" planning organization. The
SJFHQ is part of the combatant commander's headquarters and derives much assistance from the
combatant commander's staff for skills not resident in the SJFHQ. Remember, the concept calls
for augmentees, plugs, and liaisons before we go to war."
Individual Attributes and Knowledge. People are the key to effectiveness and success.
Attributes such as knowledge, and experience of the SJFHQ members were most mentioned by
participant survey respondents, who were adamant that the traits were needed to establish
credibility. Traits of the SJFHQ
model member are listed below: Additional Skills, Knowledge, and
Mature, professional - SME needed from SJFHQ? (n
in assigned area
Experience injoint and service 70
operations, and crisis action 60
50
planning 40
Trainer, mentor, coach with 30
interpersonal skills 20
Understand group dynamics 10
Understand concepts and Yes No

combatant commander's Intent
and Perspectives
Knowledge ofCONPLANs, Figure 102: Additional skills, knowledge, and products needed
CONOPS, SOPs, and TTPs from SJFHQ
Situational awareness and
understanding
Knowledge of the ONA and the adversary
Knowledge of Effects-based Planning/Operations
Expertise with collaborative tools
Habitual relationships with combatant commander's staff, component staffs, and other
external agencies
One JTF participant stated, "The SJFHQ's credentials are very important keys to the
success of the JTF staff. The SJFHQ billets should be reserved for retirees with substantial joint
experience, and very experienced, highly competitive military with some longevity and stability.
They must be mature, professionals with human dynamics. The MC02 SJFHQ had situational
awareness, expertise injoint operations and the collaborative tools, knowledge of ONA,

knowledge of the theater, knowledge of effects-based planning, relationships with lAC and COE,
and understood the combatant commander and his intent. LTCsIMAJs, out ofservice/joint
schools will not work-no experience and no credibility." Another JTF participant remarked,
"The SJFHQ members must bring with them situational awareness and understanding,
knowledge of ONA, proficiency with collaborative tools, combatant commander's intent and
perspectives, joint operations experience, and most important maturity and group dynamics."
SMEs agreed, as noted in the following comment, "For the long-term, for SJFHQ to
remain a viable entity, I recommend that the personnel assigned to SJFHQ have operational
experience at the combatant command and the JTF level. Contractors need to maintain currency
or over-time their operational experience may become dated. There is a lingering perception
(right or wrong), that staff-college graduates, in organizations such as this, lack the credibility
and experience of workinglteaching at the combatant and JTF level. They are going to have a
tough time "plugging in" into a HQ without the requisite hands-on time.
"Likewise, you will need quality guys with initiative, who can produce products, and are
willing to handle multiple tasks. Currency and credibility will be key. Otherwise, over time, the
SJFHQ will be marginalized. Bottom line, you will need quality people that understand how
planning is done throughout the JTF - from the HQ to the components to the MSC. Then SJFHQ
must have enough hardware to deploy with, to support the entire JTF staff (to include
components), a technician staff to support it, and an instruction package with instructors to train
the rest of the JTF."
Finally, a participant provided a relevant comment regarding stabilization of SJFHQ
members, "SJFHQ positions should be stabilized for a period of about six years (no less).
Nevertheless, we in operations should also have that core staff of members rotate through
different combatant commanders so that they get a broadening of experiences and perspectives
that will cross-pollinate other combatant commanders. Rotations should be staggered so that we
can retain the functions that have been working well."
The UJTL baseline report information regarding the subtask, Assess Operational
Situation (OP 5.2), indicates that assessments completed by the JTF staff tended to be
compartmented and were not maintained to incorporate
operational updates, which in turn made it difficult for the
staff to maintain situational awareness. (This was not a
problem during MC02.) The SJFHQ members joined the
JTF HQ with situational awareness and situational
understanding. They understood the combatant
commander's TEP and all approved plans related to the
JTF mission. Integrated throughout the JTF staff, the
SJFHQ members passed this knowledge and understanding
to other JTF staff members. In addition, the JTF staff continually updated assessments and made
them available on the collaborative tools.
Command Group (CmdGrp) Composition

The CmdGrp provides the JTF with four (4) personnel providing traditional C2 functions.
Specific duties assigned to these billets may change depending on whether performing peacetime
responsibilities, crisis planning, deployed during hostilities, or transition operations. In addition,
resident in this group are the CJTF's personal staff (staff judge advocate, chaplain, surgeon, and
public affairs officer) and support personnel (aide, driver, security, senior enlisted advisor). The

size of the elements comprising the SJFHQ can be expanded through augmentation to match the
intensity of operations.
Respondents did not specifically indicate additions or deletions to this group. However, if
ISG and/or KMG are eliminated and members are distributed to other groups, POCs for
intelligence and knowledge management can reside in this group. Additionally, there are
numerous comments regarding the need for a logistics director and an lAC representative. These
persons also can be members of this group. The CmdGrp's mix and number of members are
adequate and the group met the needs of the JTF.
Plans Group (PG) Composition

The PG consists of seventeen (17) personnel. The purpose of the group is to provide the
CJTF with a more integrated approach to the Effects-Based Planning focused in future
operations. It also forms the basis for an expanded, interactive joint planning center (JPC), linked
through the collaboration network to conduct operational planning. The PG informs and advises
the commander, and plans, directs, and integrates intelligence. It extracts meaningful information
from the intelligence, leads the collaborative development of operational plans based on that
information, and directs the execution of the commander's decision through an Effects Task
Order (ETO). The PG can be used as augmentation to a Service or other headquarters designated
to perform the JTF functions, during crisis response planning and execution to provide continuity
in pre-crisis planning, situational understanding, and Effects-Based Planning.
The mix and number of members in the PG need minor refinement, including the
following:
Add personnel planner [SME/SJFHQIParticipant]
The group structure is about right; add provost
marshal (PM) expertise for EPW planning/movement;
add some 10 planners; add fires planners [Participant]
Add medical planner [SME/SJFHQIParticipant]
Add engineer planner [SME/participant/SJFHQ]
Add 10 (remove from ISG)
[SME/SJFHQIPartici pant]
Add ONA and SOSA (delete from ISG) [SJFHQ]
Add force protection planner or TMD planner (need
one of each not one dual-hatted) [SME]
Add deployment JOPES planner with sealift and
airlift expertise [SME/SJFHQIParticipant]
Add civilian PollMil with lAC experience
[SJFHQ/senior mentor]
Add a coordinated (with national level agencies)
PollMil planner [SME]
Add a virtual (no personnel additions) J35 cell to
handle the PG hand-off to OpsGrp [SJFHQ]
Add more future ops capability [Participant]
Add STO planner [SJFHQ]
Add communications planner [SJFHQ]

The analysis regarding the JTF challenge, 'TPFDD, plan forecasting, and scheduling
strategic airlift', provided in the MC02 baseline report states, "This is a constant theme.
Primarily, it is a training and leadership development issue. There is a lack of understanding by
senior leaders that the prioritization of the flowing of assets into the JOA must be accomplished
by operations personnel to ensure that the right things show up, at the right time. Without the
prioritization, accomplishing the commander's intent and supporting the sequencing of the
operation may be impossible. Lack of understanding of JOPES leads senior personnel to shy
away from total involvement in the process."
The SJFHQ attempted to address this challenge by including deployment and sustainment
members in the PG and transportation and sustainment members in the operations group.
However, deployment had similar problems during MC02-not enough deployment planners
with JOPES/TPFDD knowledge and experience; not enough involvement from planners and
operators in the deployment process; and not enough integration of deployment planners in the
COA development. Also, the UJTL baseline report information regarding the sub task, 'Project
Future Campaigns and Major Operations' (OP 5.2.3), indicates some past JTFs did not elect to
form a J-35 future operations section, and JTF SOPs did not specify how functions associated
with future operations were to be accomplished or what staff section was responsible. The MC02
JSOP clarifies the methodology to be used to accomplish these functions and establishes
responsibility for future operations. However, the JTF did not establish a future operations cell
until late in the experiment, after the noticeable disconnects with the PG's handoff to the
OpsGrp. JTF future operations were identified as a problem during MC02.
Operations Group (OpsGrp) Composition

The OpsGrp consists of 14 assigned personnel, who support current operations activities
for the CJTF. Additionally, the OpsGrp assists the ISG, developing the ONA of combatant
commander-designated areas, as part of their day-to-day 'in garrison" or pre-crisis activities.
Once a contingency or crisis begins to develop, the OpsGrp,
as part of the SJFHQ, focuses their efforts on the crisis. As an
augmentation to an exiting operational headquarters, that
forms the JTF; the OpsGrp provides continuity in pre-crisis
planning and situational understanding, and EBP. Within the
JTF, the OpsGrp's primary responsibilities in the JOC are to
distribute the commander's guidance and intent, and monitor
the execution of the current operations. When necessary, the
OpsGrp revises or directs changes to an existing ETO based
on the situation, through issuance of changes to that ETO.
The mix and number of members in the OpsGrp are
considered optimal by most, but some still see the need
minor refinement. Such possibilities include:
Add fires officer [SME/SJFHQIParticipant]
Add a virtual (no personnel additions) J35 cell to handle
the PG hand-off to OpsGrp [SJFHQIParticipant]
Add second ISR OPS [SJFHQ]
Add 10 (from ISG) [SME/SJFHQ]
Add NBC expertise [Participant]
Add space operations expertise [Participant]

Add METOC officer (Weather Officer) [SME]

Add SOF LNOs during pre-hostilities [SJFHQ]
Delete air operations and ground operations officers [SME]
Information Superiority Group (ISG) Composition

The ISG consists of 13 personnel and is responsible for the coordination of activities that
contribute to building information, knowledge, and decision-making superiority within the JTF.
The ISG conducts an initial assessment of the information environment and our ability to achieve
and maintain IS. Based on this assessment, the ISG designs an IS campaign plan in collaboration
with the JTF staff. The desired outcome of the IS campaign is to create an imbalance of
knowledge in our favor, in order to understand the adversary while denying him the ability to
gather and exploit information on friendly forces. The ISG consists of an intelligence cell and an
10 cell.
The intelligence cell maintains situational awareness for the CJTF, conducts effects
assessment, prepares and maintains the ONA, and
determines collection requirements. The 10 cell
prepares the overall 10 plan and integrates 10
capabilities into the ETO process. The ISG will
normally be used as a plug into a service or other
headquarters designed to form a JTF, as well as,
augment the J2 staff with the ISG pre-crisis
understanding of the crisis area.
As noted above, there is some support to
eliminate the ISG and distribute members to the PG and
OpsGrp. However, if the ISG is maintained in the
SJFHQ organization respondents offered suggestions for
improvement:
Delete 10 - 10 should be its own entity, not part of
the ISG [SMElParticipant/SJFHQ]
Delete 10 (to OpsGrp) [SME]
Delete EA (to JISE) [SME]
Add 10 expertise in EW, PSYOP, OPSEC and deception [SME]
Add two for ISR collection, OIC planner, OPS; delete SA analyst; change intel supervisor to
ISG executive officer (XO); change IS concept mentor to deputy director ISG; delete 3 of 5
10 planners - only need 2 in ISG [Participant]
Add one ISR; all IS personnel should be put in ISG [SJFHQ]
Add EA [SME/SJFHQ]
Delete EA assessment analyst [Participant]
Add SOSA billets [SJFHQ]
Delete ONA and SOSA (add to PG) [SJFHQ]
Add all ofKM (ifISG remains) [SJFHQ]
Consolidate all intel functions under ISG [Participant]
Enhance understanding ofIO [Participant]
206 FOR OFFICIAL

InformationlKnowledge Management Group (KMG) Composition

The KMG consists of seven personnel, who provide knowledge management and
technical support to JTF planning and execution. Three of the seven are technically oriented and
serve as both the network planning/control section and the technical support section, ensuring
that the SJFHQ has the connectivity and systems availability necessary to support operations.
The remaining four are knowledge management officers, who support the SJFHQ by facilitating
the dynamic creation, discovery, manipulation, and provision of the right information, to the
right people, at the right time, in the right format. This group may be used either as augmentees
or as a plug to an existing operational headquarters.
The mix and number of members in the KMG need refinement. As structured the group
did not meet the needs of the JTF in the area of knowledge management - need more KMOs
(operator types not IT) to manage knowledge. Noted comments calling for additions and
deletions to the SJFHQ are listed below:
Delete KM and merge with ISG [SJFHQ]
Add KMOs [SME/SJFHQ]
Add more technical/communications/automation support positions [SJFHQlParticipant]
Need in-depth knowledge information management plan
(KIMP) in JSOP and KM TTPs [SME]
The UJTL baseline report information regarding the

subtask, 'Communicate Operational Information (OP 5.1.1)',
indicates the joint forces experienced some difficulty managing
information. The SJFHQ's KMOs and support technicians
placed across the JTF staff, directly address this issue. In
addition, the KIMP, located in the JSOP, should have provided
the "who, " "what, " "when, " "where, " "why, " and "how" to
manage information. The keys to this solution are ensuring that
the right mix of operators and technicians are available, the number is sufficient for each staff
group, and that the KIMP is incorporated in the JSOP with sufficient details.
This paragraph includes noted skills, knowledge, and products that are relevant across all
groups or relevant to a LogSptGrp, if a LogSptGrp is added to the SJFHQ organization.
Change name - should not be called a headquarters [Participant]
Ensure senior SJFHQ member is the joint CoS or deputy CJTF [Participant]
Ensure SOP clearly defines the roles, functions, membership, leadership and POCs, and
relationships of each group and each BCCWG; provides a KIMP and the CIE structure with
business rules; and establishes TTPs [SMElParticipant]
Add logistics director (LogSptGrp) [SMElParticipant/SJFHQ]
Ensure all SJFHQ members have reach-back to combatant commander staff, lAC, COE, and
other external agencies [SMElParticipantlSJFHQ]
Provide SJFHQ LNOs to components [Participant]
Create government positions (GS) to provide continuity and to affect habitual relationships
[SME]
Include fewer civilians and more military [Participant]
Ensure the COP has current Blue and OPFOR ground, air, naval graphics in near real time
[Participant]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLy 207

Create format for products, database for managing data, and processes/agenda for BCCWGs
- put on CD [Participant]
Replace or upgrade ADOCS [Participant]
Include a deployable set of communications equipment [SJFHQ]
MC02 participant surveys also yielded the following suggestions:
Change the name of SJFHQ from "Standing Joint Force Headquarters" to "Standing Joint
Force Command and Control Element"
Maintain the current SJFHQ organization - command group, plans group, operations group,
information superiority group, and knowledge management group
Further study to investigate the substantial concerns that suggest dissolving the ISG and
KMG into the PG and OpsGrp
Clearly define IS and KM responsibilities, and refine the SOP/TTP to reflect revisions
Further study to investigate the establishment of a logistics/support group to coordinate,
synchronize, and integrate logistics and other support functions in pre-crisis activities,
planning, and operations
Keep logistics personnel in the PG and OpsGrp
Further study to investigate the establishment of an 10 group or task force - JIOTF at the
combatant command level. Clearly define 10 in the SOP, and educate DoD and external
agencIes
Add fires officer to OpsGrp - officer also provides fires expertise during planning
Add STRATLIFT, personnel, and engineer expertise to PG. Augmentees or LNOs, with
expertise in other functional areas not resident in the SJFHQ, should be available no later
than the beginning of the planning process - make extensive use of reach-back capabilities
for pre-planning activities
Add, at least, an lAC LNO to the SJFHQ - the PollMil planner in PG could perform this
role if directly linked to JIACG at important
Identify a virtual J35-like, future operations cell to coordinate and synchronize the PG hand-
off to OpsGrp - Assign members from PG and OpsGrp.
Add senior SJFHQ member, flag officer, to command SJFHQ (CmdGrp) - GOlFO can also
fulfill deputy CJTF or JTF CoS billet
SJFHQ Organization and Composition Summary.

SJFHQ organization and composition need minor refinement-no major overhaul
Structure enhanced JTF operations and JTF HQ interaction with components and combatant
commander staffs
15 percent of respondents recommended maj or changes to the organization:
Dissolve ISG and KMG into PG and OpsGrp
Elevate 10 to group or task force
Establish a logistics/support group
Composition: See Table 20: SJFHQ Manning, at Appendix A to Assessment Area 6, for a
summary of SJFHQ manning
SJFHQ members' attributes and knowledge are key to credibility and success
Groups need expertise not currently available-either additions or transfers from
other groups

Change the mix of military and civilians

Assign PG and OpsGrp handoff responsibility
Finding The SJFHQ concept's boards, centers, cells, and working groups provided a
suitable structure from which the JTF staff could control the joint force.
The SJFHQ concept defines BCCWGs as formal, non-standing organizations with
designated membership, meeting as required to conduct their business. Boards provide input to
centers and the CJTF. Centers are formal, standing organizations that meet and regularly conduct
business (planning or operations) with the JTF headquarters. Once established, centers normally
operate on a 24-hour basis. Cells are formal, non-standing, functionally oriented organizations
that meet on a regular basis to provide input to boards and centers. Working groups are informal,
non-standing, mission-tailored organizations for a specific event or action. Working groups
provide input to boards, centers, and cells.
The JTF staff, SJFHQ members, component commanders' staffs, SMEs, and senior
mentors and concept developers provided data that addressed the BCCWGs.
Members of individual BCCWGs and SMEs were provided three questions, rating the
effectiveness ofBCCWGs and how it met the needs of the JTF-"Adequacy of the Interval at
which that BCCWG
Did BCCWGs Enhance JTF
convened," "Adequacy of
the Mix of experiences and
100 competencies possessed by
the members of that
80 BCCWG," and "Sufficiency
- r::: 60
~ 40
of the Number of persons
assigned to that BCCWGs."
Q)
a. Respondents were also
20 asked to suggest any
changes to BCCWGs
o structure, to note if any
Enhanced Degraded Had No Effect 0 Combined (n=56)
BCCWGs should be added
or deleted, and to rate the
Figure 103: BCCWG had a positive effect on JTF operations effect of BCCWGs on JTF
operations and JTF
headquarters interaction with component and combatant commander staffs.
Respondents completed survey questions issued during Spiral 3 and execution, and
participated in a post-execution working group session. Analysts interviewed senior mentors and
key JTF staff members, to include the group directors, during and after the experiment. Analysts
also observed all after-action reviews and in-focus sessions, and reviewed senior mentor notes
for relevant comments.
Did BCCWGs enhance JTF operations? According to 79 percent of SMEs, BCCWGs
enhanced JTF operations as well as facilitated improved situational awareness and understanding
for all participants, helped to prevent staff section stovepipes, and enhanced horizontal and
vertical communications for the combatant commander, JTF, and the component staffs.
BCCWGs ensured good cross-staff integration.
One SME stated, "Definitely enhanced [JTF OPS], but a majority of the time there were
constant meetings that could have taken away from the ability to conduct detailed analysis by
FOR OFFICIAl, lISE ONLY 209

planners (especially in the EAC)." Another SME added, "Much higher situational awareness
than normal, faster flow of information and knowledge throughout the force. This of course was
greatly aided by the CIE." However, one SME indicated that the lack of structure and length of
time ofBCCWG virtual sessions degraded the process.
Did BCCWGs enhance component staff interaction with JTF headquarters? SMEs and
participants (78 percent) indicated that the BCCWGs enhanced component interaction with the
JTF headquarters. (See Figure 104) Several SMEs stated that the BCCWGs were beneficial and
greatly enhanced component situational awareness; however, the many meetings affected the
battle rhythm of some of the components by not allowing them enough time to conduct internal
planning. One SME added, "Great
Did BCCWGs Enhance Component Interaction horizontal and vertical
w/JTF HQ?
collaboration. Components were
100
involved in all elements,
80
simultaneously." Participants
~ 60
stated that the BCCWGs were
~
CIl 40
great, allowing a better
c.. understanding of the CJTF' s
20
o priorities-no guessing required.
Enhanced Degraded Had No III Participants (n=436) One participant said, "Future
Effect o Combined (n=500) chiefs of staff will need to regulate
who goes to meetings in a more
rigid fashion; while it's all well
Figure 104: BCCWG effect on component interaction
and good to have 500 guys
listening to the CO, you have to have somebody minding the store."
Another participant provided a negative comment saying, "Due to the ability to
collaborate and get near real time data to all levels of command (everyone sees the same picture),
JTF was repeatedly involved in fighting at the tactical level. As a result, component planning
was stifled, to some extent, based on JTF directed COAs."
The UJTL baseline report information regarding the subtask, 'Acquire and Communicate
Operational Level Information
and Maintain Status' (OP 5.1),
Did BCCWGs Enhance CC
indicates that BCCWGs place a
w/JTF HQ?
heavy time demand on the JTF
staff, becoming 100
counterproductive and some 80
cases overwhelming. As
~ 60
described above similar ~
CIl 40
problems were experienced c..
during MC02. The JTF CoS 20
needs to establish control o III Execution (n=141)

measures and business rules for Enhanced Degraded Had No Effect 0 Combined (n=253)
BCCWG sessions.
Did BCCWGs enhance Figure 105: BCCWG effect on combatant commander staff
combatant commander staff interaction
interaction with JTF
headquarters? Eighty-two percent of responding participants said that the BCCWGs enhanced
210 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,v

combatant commander staff interaction with the JTF headquarters. Participants did not provide
many comments because of the staff experimental design. They noted that the concept had great
potential, but it was not fully explored because the experiment lacked full participation from the
staff (See Figure 105). Only seven of the 253 respondents were staff members. A participant
stated, "[BCCWGs] allowed for concurrent and horizontal planning and rapid decisions."
Another participant added, "Because of the staff design and the number of BCCWGs, some just
had to be uncovered. While you can virtually be in multiple sessions, the ability to keep track is
degraded."
The following sections provide analysis for each of the BCCWGs prescribed by the
SJFHQ concept. The format is the same for each and begins with a statement of purpose,
followed by a statement of the adequacy of the interval at which the BCCWG was convened, the
adequacy of the mix of experiences and competencies possessed by the members of the
BCCWG. The sufficiency of the number of persons assigned to the BCCWG, and whether the
BCCWG met the needs of the JTF follow.
BluelRed Cell (BRC)

Purpose. The BRC provides insight into the adversary's political and military objectives,
and his potential COA in response to real or perceived Blue actions or intentions. During
execution of Blue COAs and effects, the cell helps assess the adversary's response to applied
effects and tasks. Additionally, it helps identify possible Blue vulnerabilities and potential
operational miscues that an adversary may exploit, and thus, use to ultimately frustrate the
objectives and tenets ofRDO.
Interval. The interval at which the cell convened was adequate. The BRC convened often
internally and participated in numerous daily collaboration sessions. Participants and SMEs
stated that the BRC met as required and because of the JTF OPTEMPO, several members were
continuously working inside larger
BluelRed Cell boards, cells, and centers.
Mix. The mix of
120
experiences and competencies was
100 also considered inadequate. The
-s:::
CII
~
80
60
cell consisted of two SJFHQ
members and two augmentees.
~ The augmentees were an Army
40
20
captain and a Marine lieutenant
with no experience. A SME stated,
0
Adequate Inadequate o N.mDer (n=6) "The SJFHQ folks were OK, the
two augmentees were not -junior
officers with no experience - not
Figure 106: Blue/Red cell interval, mix and numbers were the right folks." Two of the three
considered adequate
participants, who said, "Adequate,"
remarked that the augmentees had no experience and that more experience is better.
Number. There were questions regarding the number of people assigned to the cell. Four
of the six respondents indicated that the number ofBRC members was sufficient. One participant
stated that the four members performed well and were able to cover the working groups, but only
four might become a problem during 24-hour operations. Another participant remarked, "Four
might be enough for short term, assuming the two augmentees have broad and significant

experiences. Two company grade officers, no matter how well motivated, are a limiter to the
potential this cell could have brought to this experiment."
Fulfilled JTF
B lu e/Red Ce II needs? Respondents
indicated that the BRC
70 fulfilled the JTF's needs
50
better during Spiral 3 than
50 during execution. Four
'ECIl 40
!::! percent of responses during
CIl 30
c.. execution were "Did Not
20
10
Fulfill," whereas during
0
Spiral 3 there were zero
Completely P artia Ily Did Not Fulfill I!ll!JS pira I 3 (n=74) "Did Not Fulfill"
Fulfilled Fulfilled
I!ll!JExecution (n=72) responses. JTF OPTEMPO
Fulfill JTF Needs? oCombined (n=145) and the number and length
of collaboration sessions
Figure 107: Blue/Red cell fulfillment of JTF needs are potential causes for the
difference. Comments
made during Spiral 3 include, "This is a critical cell and they did a great job," "Great job of
representing an alternative view and making all think," and "One of the best things about the
SJFHQ." During execution, one participant stated, "This group seems to be duplicating the
traditional intelligence function of providing possible enemy courses of action. They may have
fulfilled their mission, but I'm not sure that is a good thing." Another participant remarked, "This
cell (or the portion that relates to intel) needs to be under ISG. The dissection of this organization
from the ISG caused disconnects." The right mix of experiences and competencies will improve
the effectiveness of the BRC.
Effects Assessment Cell (EAC)

Purpose. The EAC
Effects Assessment Cell
conducts a fully integrated
assessment process to effectively 120
and in a timely manner assess
100
critical effects at the strategic,
80
operational, and tactical levels. 'ECII
The cell conducts an on-going ~ 60
CII
c..
assessment to determine if the 40
desired effects occurred, their 20
overall impact to the j oint effort, 0
and why the tactical action and/or Adequate Inadequate
applied capabilities fully achieved,
partially achieved, or failed to Figure 108: Effects assessment cell attributes
achieve the desired effect.
Interval. The interval at which the cell convened was adequate. The EAC met formally
twice a day-morning and afternoon sessions. All respondents indicated that the interval at
which the cell convened was adequate.

Mix. The mix of experiences and competencies was adequate, but not the best. The two
SMEs and five of the eight participants indicated that there was a good mix of experiences and
competencies. However, the SJFHQ members of the EAC indicated that the mix was inadequate.
One SJFHQ member stated, "Need more ops/plans representation. Current cell membership is
composed almost entirely of intel personnel, which limits the ability to determine operational
impacts of assessment."
Another SJFHQ member remarked, "We knew that this was going to be a problem.
Component selection ofEAC representatives was driven in part by their perspective that the
EAC was an "intel thing." This perspective was in part because the EAC was buried within the
intelligence structure. In addition, given the complexities and operational significance associated
with EAC decision-making and recommendations, the experience level ofEAC representatives
from the components and JTF JISE were frequently unable to provide operationally relevant
perspectives within the construct of the EAC formal sessions. Efforts to improve this situation
were basically unsuccessful."
Number. The number ofEAC members was insufficient. Seven of the 10 respondents
indicated that the five members assigned to the EAC were insufficient to do the job correctly.
Their comments include, "Double," "Probably could use two more personnel," and "Needed two
to three more bodies - did not have time to coordinate much." A SME stated, "EAC's five
members are insufficient in relation to the amount of situational awareness needed and all the
meetings they take part in. The two main players were from SJFHQ and they, non stop, attended
one meeting after another on EA."
Fulfilled JTF needs? The EAC fulfilled the JTF needs. Over 94 percent of respondents
indicated that the EAC at least partially fulfilled the needs of the JTF (See Figure 109). A SME
stated, "Excellent j ob given the information they have to deal with. Components have passed
little information during the EAC WG meetings ... Lack of timely BDA inputs was a weak link
in the EAC process. Never the less the EAC has been very proactive in pulling assessment from
components, SOSA cell, and JISE. EAC has been very open to different perspectives and have
held their ground even if
their assessment woul d lead E ffe ct sAss es s me n tee II
to a no-go for maj or
operations." A participant 60
remarked, "EAC was able 50
to assess effects each day _ 40
prior to the kickoff of the
JPG and long before the
~ 30
~ 20
JCB. This allowed daily
planning efforts to reflect 10
current assessments. The o

process was only hindered Completely Partially Did Not Fulfill mSpiral3 (n=77)
Fulfilled Fulfilled
by the inaccuracy of m Ex ec uti 0 n (n=73)
Fulfill JTF Needs? oCombined (n=150)
combatant commander
DISUM [Daily Intel
Summary], which was Figure 109: Effects assessment cell fulfilled JTF's needs
necessary for assessment
purposes."

The EAC was not without problems, as noted by two participants. "My responsibilities as
future planner was to look out 96 hours and beyond - effects assessment never got out that far,"
and "EAC needs better BDA or we needlessly re-shoot targets." Additional people, more
participation from operators and planners, and better BDA will improve the effectiveness of the
EAC.
Information Operations Cell (IOC)

Purpose. The 10C is primarily responsible for the development of an 10 plan and
associated 10 synchronization matrix, 10 inputs to the ETO, and execution monitoring.
Interval. The interval at which the cell convened was adequate. Meeting once a day, 83
percent of respondents indicated that the interval at which the 10C convened was adequate. It
was constantly manned and provided immediate coverage.
Mix. The mix of experiences and competencies was inadequate, however. Over 40
percent of respondents indicated that the mix was inadequate and only "Inadequate" comments
were provided. The requested mix of people was not provided, but the cell needed more
specialists and generalists, according to a SJFHQ member of the cell. A participant stated, "We
had one EW expert and one PSYOP expert, one junior Navy crypto type. The two SJFHQ
personnel had a good mixture of background, but the rest of the team had little experience in the
general field of 10-a larger problem than the experiment." Another SJFHQ member of the cell
Information Operations Cell
90
80
70
-
r:::
CI)
~
60
50
CI) 40
D..
30
20
10
0
Adequate Inadequate D Number (n=12)
Figure 110: Information operations cell considered adequate by most
remarked, "Mix is good. Unfortunately, the people providing OPS personnel did not provide the
mix. Most people placed into the 10 cell had no, I say again, no 10 experience."
Number. The number of members in the 10C was insufficient. Fifty percent of the
respondents indicated that the number of members in the cell was inadequate. The 10C needs
more people with 10 expertise to meet the demands of the cell. A SME stated, "Due to the heavy
tasking of this cell, I recommend increasing its size. Key areas needed are MMIC team leader
(now filled by PSYOP planner), PA (now on loan from PAO), deception, and an additional IW
planner. Also suggest an imbedded intel analyst and a KM person with 10 experience."
The 10C partially fulfilled the JTF's needs during Spiral 3. Problem areas identified:
10 was not well integrated in planning
10 was not integrated with special technical operations

10 lacked the necessary tools to track component actions

10 needed more trained and experienced 10 planners
10 was not able to determine assessment of 10 effects on nodes due to limitations.
Information Operations Cell
60
50
1: 40
e
CI)
30
~ 20
10
o
Completely Partially Did Not IiDDJ Spiral 3 (n=74)
Fulfilled Fulfilled Fulfill
IiDDJ Execution (n=65)
Fulfill JTF Needs? o Combined (n=139)
Figure 111: Information Operations Cell fulfilled of JTF needs
A participant said, "A cell that worked unto itself and did not have visibility with the JPC
where it should be integrating their process, a particular area that needs to continue to be
integrated into the planning process. It's not there yet." There was noticeable improvement as the
experiment progressed from Spiral 3 through execution. Fulfillment of JTF needs (combined
completely and partially) increased from 85 percent during Spiral 3 to 94 percent during
execution.
The UJTL baseline report information regarding the subtask, 'Coordinate Operational
Information Operations' (OP 5.6), indicates the ability of the JTF 10C to support operational
planning is impaired. There were not enough trained and experienced 10 personnel. As described
above the 10C had similar problems plus others during MC02. 10 needs more definition,
refinement, resources, and command emphasis to enhance effectiveness.
Joint Coordination Board (JCB)

Purpose. The JCB is established at the discretion of the commander using internal assets
and is tasked to perform broad oversight functions. It is ajoint virtual decision support network
composed of subordinate commanders and principal staff from the JTF headquarters, combatant
commander's staff, IAC/COE, components, and other agencies designated by the commander.
The board ensures that the commander's intent is accurately translated into desired effects to
meet the commander's concept of operations. It links effects to the overall objectives.
The JCB's oversight encompasses all component operations and on-going joint
operations. The board provides the commander's guidance and priorities to the JPC for future
operations planning and to the JOC for current operations execution. Products include COA
recommendations, JPEL, guidance, and apportionment priorities, and battlespace coordination
measures as required.
Interval. Ninety-five percent of respondents said that the interval at which the JCB
convened was adequate. The board met once daily and additionally at the direction of the CJTF.

Mix. According to respondents, the mix of experiences and competencies was adequate.
A participant noted that in fact the mix and number are unlimited when the board is conducted
on IWS and most staff members are listening. Expertise can be added for any session from any
location if IWS is available.
Number. Eighty-nine Joint Coordination Board
percent (89 percent) of
120
respondents indicated that the
number of JCB members was 100
sufficient. Again, on IWS the ... 80
r:::
number is unlimited. The number CP
~ 60
of members can increase or CP
D.. 40
decrease as the situation dictates.
A SME offered that the number of 20
component members was o
insuffi ci ent. Adequate Inadequate D Number (19)
Fulfilled JTF needs? The
JCB fulfilled the needs of the JTF.
Fulfillment of JTF needs increased Figure 112: Joint Coordination Board met everyone's
expectations
from Spiral 3 through execution.
Ninety-eight percent of execution respondents indicated that the JCB at least "Partially Fulfilled"
the JTF needs, up from 92 percent during Spiral 3. "Completely Fulfilled" responses jumped 20
percent from Spiral 3 through execution. Most comments were attached to "Partially Fulfilled"
responses. Recurring comments from respondents were that the JCB was useful, but too long and
that it never seemed to proceed as designed - most often turned into a second commander's
update. A participant stated, "The
JCB was an evolving process and Joint Coordination Board
was directly related to the comfort
70
level of the Operation. As the JTF 60
commander became more 1: 50
CD 40
comfortable with the different eCD 30
aspects of the operations the JCB n. 20
10
began to become much more o
effects focused. Completely Partially Did Not Fulfill IlllI Spiral 3 (n=108)
Fulfilled Fulfilled
"The JCB was definitely III Execution (n= 124)
Fulfill JTF Needs?
necessary, serving as both a great D Combined (n=232)
collaborative tool, as well as, a

course check for the JTF." Another Figure 113: Joint Coordination Board's performance improved
participant noted, "I never saw the between Spiral 3 and MC02 execution
synchronization of JISR assets
with attack assets as they related to the effects and effects assessment." A SJFHQ member
indicted that it seemed to satisfy the commander; however, it did not accomplish the intended
purpose regarding the fires and targeting portions of the operation.
And finally, a SME remarked, "The JCB could have been better if they had some
predictive analysis of what the enemy would be doing beyond 72 hours. 1 am not sure cutting out
the J2 and J4 is a good thing. IWS is great." The JCB was effective and met the needs of the JTF.

Joint Coordination Board Working Group (JCBWG)

Purpose. The JCBWG provided the input to support the JCB. It coordinated activities of
JTF cells and working groups, and reviewed staff and component products and presentations for
integration. This working group resolved or documented conflicts for JCB presentation.
Interval. All respondents indicated that the interval at which the JCBWG convened was
adequate (See Figure 114 above). The working group met once daily to prepare for the JCB
during which the group was able to
Joint Coordination Board Working Group synchronize products and react to
emerging issues before they
120 reached the CJTF level.
100 Mix. All respondents
...c 80 indicated that the JCBWG's mix of
CII experiences and competencies was
!:! 60
CII
D..
adequate. The core and supporting
40 members provided the necessary
20 mil Interval (n=4) expertise for the group to fulfill its
0 responsibilities. IWS allowed the
Adequate Inadequate D Number (n=4) group director to tailor the mix as
the situation required.
Number. One hundred
Figure 114: The JCB Working Group received wide acclaim
percent of responses are
"Sufficient." The number of core and supporting members was sufficient to meet JTF's needs.
Fulfilled JTF's needs? The JCBWG fulfilled the needs of the JTF. Fulfillment of JTF
needs increased from Spiral 3 to execution. There was a significant improvement in "Completely
Fulfilled" responses from Spiral 3 through execution, from 42 percent to 61 percent. Only three
percent of the respondents, during execution, indicated that the JCBWG "Did Not Fulfill" the
JTF's needs - down from eight
Joint Coordination Board Working Grou percent during Spiral 3 (See
Figure 115).
70 The prevalent comment
60
1: 50 regarding the JCBWG was that
GI 40
it was a slide rehearsal for the
~ 30
a. 20 JCB and a huge time drain for
10
o many people-not really a
Completely Partially Did Not Fulfill Dill Spiral 3 (n=1 00) working group. One participant
Fulfilled Fulfilled noted, "The JCBWG spent too
II Execution (n=94)
Fulfill JTF Needs? D Combined (n=194) many sessions fine-tuning
presentation format and not
Figure 115: Joint Coordination Board Working Group saw synchronizing the combat power
effectiveness ratings rise between Spiral 3 and MC02 execution being discussed. We need to get
into warfighting issues here to
better prepare for the JCB." Another participant stated, "This group needs greater authority to
make decisions and streamline the extremely long briefs to the CG. Too many people watch the
JCB to permit the tremendous amount of excess time spent on less than essential issues in the
JCB." The JCBWGwas effective and met the needs of the JTF.

Joint Collection Management Cell (JCMC)

Purpose. The JCMC identified, prioritized, and coordinated collection requirements to
support ONA, effects assessment and Effects-Based Planning and Operations. The JCMC
assigns responsibilities and synchronizes collection tasking to efficiently and effectively support
all aspects of Effects-Based
Joint Collection Management Cell
Planning and Operations, including
the ETO. 120
Interval. All respondents
100
indicated that the interval at which
the JCMC convened was adequate. C
80
The cell met formally once per 12- ~ 60
CII
hour shift and the staff met a. 40
internally three times per shift.
20
Mix. The mix of
experiences and competencies was o
adequate. Eighty-three percent of Adequate Inadequate D Number (n=5)
respondents indicated that the

JCMC's mix of experiences and
Figure 116: Joint Collection Management cell attributes
competencies was adequate. The
cell had a good mix of Army and Air Force skill sets and required full-time collection managers.
A participant noted, "Good range of experiences. I think an argument could be made to have the
cell headed by an 0-5. This would be generally senior to most component ISR reps (and ensure
cooperation, responsiveness), but junior to their "2" rep to the ISG.
"Additionally,
provide an 0-4 rep from
Joint Collection Management Cell
each service to help
60
inform/guide the JCMC
50 and its JTF leadership
C 40 regarding JTF collection
CII
u
.... 30 planning efforts." A SME
CII
a. 20 stated that some of the
10
0
component collection
Completely Partially Did Not Fulfill Illll Spiral 3 (n=65)
managers were not full-
Fulfilled Fulfilled
Illll Execution (n=49)
time collection managers
Fulfill JTF Needs? D Combined (n=114)
but were assisted by the
JISE and other members of
Figure 117: Respondents considered some cell shortcomings
the cell. Another participant
indicated, "A
lead/supervisor, a planner (w/plans) and a JTF collection manager fielding collection
management issues are absolutely required."
Number. According to 80 percent of respondents, the numbers of members in the JCMC
was sufficient. Again, respondents emphasized the requirement for full-time collection managers
to ensure sufficient people are available to fulfill the cell's responsibilities.
Fulfilled JTF needs? The JCMC fulfilled the JTF needs much better during execution
than during Spiral 3. There was a significant increase in the percent of "Completely Fulfilled"
and "Partially Fulfilled" responses from Spiral 3 through execution, from 77 to 96 percent.

A SME stated, "The JTF was provided with continuous, timely intelligence collection
that met the standing requirements and quickly adjusted to emergent requirements levied by the
CJTF." However, participants noted integration problems. One participant remarked, "Not
completely
integrated into what
JTF and
components needed
90 based on the ETO."
80
In addition, another
70
-c:
60
G> 50
U
10.
G> 40
participant stated
that the cell was not
integrated well with
a.. 30 plans. After a rough
20 start the JCMC
10 improved
0 effectiveness to
Adequate Inadequate o Number (n=10) meet the needs of
the JTF.
Figure 118: Joint Fires Element Working Group attributes
Joint Fires Element Working Group (JFEWG)

Purpose. The JFEWG provided the input to support the Joint Fires Element. It was a
virtual network of JTF, component, and reach-back SMEs responsible for developing PEL
targeting guidance, selecting ONA-derived critical nodes and vulnerabilities, and providing
Eighty-two percent
of respondents
p------------------------.
priority target list oversight.
Interval.
.Joint Fires Element Working Group
indicated that the 70

interval at which 60
the JFEWG
convened was -c
CI)
50
40
e 30
adequate (See CI)
D..
20
Figure 118 above).
10
TheJFEWG 0
convened twice a Corrpletely Partially Did Not I!!!lI Spiral 3 (n=73)
day, after the Fulfilled Fulfilled Fulfill
III Execution (n=71)
commander's Fulfill .JTF Needs?
o Corrbined (n=144)
update and after the
JCB. The interval
was adequate, but Figure 119: Joint Fires Element WG met JTF needs
the timing affected
participation by the components. Because oflengthy commander's updates and JCBs, the
JFEWG rarely started on time. A SME stated that the JFEWG could be conducted once a day,
which will allow more time for staff to work.
F OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 219

Mix. The mix of experiences and competencies was adequate, but not the best. Seventy
percent of respondents indicated that the mix of experiences and competencies was adequate.
The requested mix was about right, but the JFEWG experienced attendance problems and lacked
adequate representation from components. One participant stated, "The mix of experiences was
about right, unfortunately ensuring all those folks showed up for the session was hit and miss."
Another participant remarked, "The JFEWG often did not have the proper representation from
the components. Members from the components must be able to discuss strategy, targeting, and
ops issues. If a single element from a component cannot provide views and positions for the
component, then other reps must also participate in all sessions."
Number. The number of members was sufficient. Eighty percent of respondents indicated
that the number of JFEWG members was sufficient. The number of participants was sufficient
despite competing requirements. It also was dependent on the issues being worked and how
many people the components could afford to attend. A participant noted that the number was not
as important as the ability to contribute and represent Component or organization.
Fulfilled JTF needs? Fulfillment of JTF needs decreased from Spiral 3 to execution. Six
percent of the respondents, during execution, indicated that the JFEWG "Did Not Fulfill" the
JTF needs - up from one percent during Spiral 3. The recurring comment was that the JFEWG
spent too much time collaborating and not enough time on products. A SJFHQ member stated,
"JFEWG was supposed to reorganize nodes based on changes in effects priorities and nodes that
had been hit and issue a new three-paragraph PEL daily. The WG turned into a target organizer
and never issued another PEL that updated node priorities." Component representation also
hindered the effectiveness of the JFEWG. Another participant noted, "The JFE at the JTF
headquarters was well balanced
with the right mix of military
experience. However, component
120
membership in the JFE working
100 group was inadequate. JF ACC was
80 represented primarily by
c
~ 60 targeteers. JF ACC strategists
CII
a. 40 eventually began to sit in
periodically, but not every session.
20 In addition, they rarely had an
o operations rep. This frequently
Adequate Inadequate prevented the group from
coordinating or resolving a variety
Figure 120: Joint Info Superiority Center attributes adequate of issues. We repeatedly requested
that the components ensured that
there was a lead representative present who could either work the issues or quickly bring in the
person who could." With the right mix of participants from components and better
synchronization of sessions, the JFEWG could improve its ability to meet the needs of the JTF.
Joint Information Superiority Center (JISC)

Purpose. The JISC integrated intelligence, information operations, and information
systems activities and deconflicted competing requirements. It identified and synchronized IS
tasks for the ETO.

Interval. The JISC operated around the clock; therefore, there is no reference to the
convening interval.
Mix. The mix of experiences and competencies was adequate according to four
respondents.
Joint Information Superiority Center
Number. The four
respondents - three participants
70 and one SME - indicated that the
60
50 number of JISC members was
i: 40
~ sufficient. The core and supporting
CD 30
n. 20 members provide a sufficient
10 number of members to meet the
0
Completely Partially Did Not Fulfill l1li Spiral 3 (n=80) needs of the JTF.
Fulfilled Fulfilled
III Execution (n=64) Fulfilled JTF needs? The
Fulfill JTF Needs? D Combined (n=144) JISC did not fulfill the needs of the
JTF. Not only did the fulfillment
Figure 121: Joint Info Superiority Center met JTF needs
of JTF needs decrease from Spiral
3 (93 percent) to execution (84 percent), 16 percent of respondents indicated that the JISC "Did
Not Fulfill" JTF needs (See Figure 121). This is the highest "Did Not Fulfill" rating, during
execution, across all BCCWGs.
There were problems with 10 issues, synchronization, integration, and unity of effort for
the intelligence functional area. One participant stated, "This venue was wholly inadequate for
10. In general, 10 RFls were ignored, not understood and never actioned in my experience until I
prodded the JISC for action. This venue was almost exclusively ISR focused." Another
participant noted, "JISC was not integrated with 10 and intel. Maybe these shouldn't be grouped
together. They really have enough different in their basic functions to require 10 and intelligence
as separate groups, or work to find a way to better integrate all of 10 and intelligence into the
same group." "This group failed to ensure unity of command/effort for the intelligence functional
area vice the J2," remarked another participant.
The one positive comment, regarding the JISC, provided by respondents during execution
states, "The intelligence watch was created to fulfill the operations-intelligence function, and it
was a huge success story. The
JISC became the detailed Joint Operations Center
research and analysis forum. Our
100
experience strongly suggests you
need to separate these two 80
functions based on the volume of 5l 60

information being shared and the !::!
~ 40
differences in timeliness of the
information." 20
No "Completely o
Fulfilled" comments were Adequate Inadequate
provided. The synthesis of the
responses and comments is similar Figure 122: Joint Operations Center personnel mix and number
to that of the ISG - respondents considered adequate
suggest that the JISC should be
eliminated. A good summary provided by a participant concludes that the JISC was sub par, and

needed work. "The JISC was a poorly executed concept," he said. "It never pulled in all the
various pieces or spoke with one voice - needs to be reworked."
Joint Operations Center (JOC)

Purpose. The JOC monitored the operations of the JTF. The JOC was the focal point for
coordination and synchronization of the current operational matters, to include intelligence,
assessment, execution, integration, and logistics. It was responsible for status updates,
dissemination of CJTF' s guidance, assessments, ROE, and AARs. The JOC released all ETOs
for the JTF and monitored and synchronized the execution of all ETOs. The JOC was both a
physical and virtual collaborative organization composed of operations representatives from the
JTF headquarters, combatant commander's staff, component staffs, and other agencies
functionally oriented to the JTF
mIssIOn. Joint Operations Center
Interval. The JOC operated
70
around the clock, therefore, there 60
is no reference to the convening i: 50
interval. ~ ~
CD
n. 20
Mix. Ninety-two percent of 10
respondents indicated that the mix o
Completely Partially Did Not Fulfill Iiiil Spiral 3 (n=109)
of experiences and competencies Fulfilled Fulfilled
Iiiil Execution (n=1 05)
of the JOC was adequate. One Fulfill JTF Needs? o Combined (n=214)
participant suggested that a
medical logistician and preventive
Figure 123: Joint Operations Center met the JTF needs
medicine officer be assigned to the
medical section of the JOC. The mix of core and supporting members is adequate to fulfill the
JOC's responsibilities.
Number. Eighty-two percent of respondents indicated that the number of JOC members
was sufficient. Several respondents noted that there were too many members in some areas-
watch officers, ops officers, LNOs, lawyers. One participant stated, "Actually, functions should
be handled by 50 percent fewer people - exploiting collaborative tools and reach-back should
be able to achieve the same result." Considering 24-hour operations, the number of core and
supporting members is about right. The JTF will add and delete based on requirements.
Fulfilled JTF needs? There was a significant improvement in fulfillment of JTF needs
("Completely Fulfilled") from Spiral 3 (39 percent) to execution (62 percent). Only four percent
of the respondents, during execution, indicated that the JOC did not fulfill the JTF needs, which
was down from 11 percent during Spiral 3. The JOC executed well. It synchronized, maintained
visibility, and provided good situational awareness on current operations across the area of
operations. A SME stated, "JOC is doing a good job providing current awareness but is not
providing the "so what" analysis." In addition, a participant noted, "I think the JOC often became
a TOC demanding almost instantaneous information from the components This was very
counterproductive because the information was almost never refined and it made it very difficult
to paint an accurate picture." The JOC was effective and its effectiveness will improve with the
addition of a future operations section between the operations group and PG.
The UJTL baseline report information regarding the subtask, 'Synchronize and Integrate
Operations' (OP 5.4.4), indicates JTF JOCs have difficulty planning for requirements associated
with integrating and synchronizing JTF operations. As described above the JOC did not have this

problem during MC02. The JOC met the needs of the JTF and was quite effective. Its ability to
gain knowledge of, integrate, and synchronize component operations was enhanced by the
collaborative tools. In addition, the UJTL baseline report information regarding the subtask,
'Establish, Organize, and Operate a Joint Force headquarters' (OP 5.5), indicates that JOCs have
difficulty maintaining situational awareness. This was not a problem during MC02. As described
above the JOC synchronized, maintained visibility, and provided situational awareness on
operations across the area of operations. Again, the JOC met the needs of the JTF and was
effective.
Joint Planning Center (JPC)

Purpose. The JPC conducted JTF crisis action planning (CAP) and performed future
operations planning. During pre-crisis and contingency operations, the JPC supported the
development ofCONPLANs. It
Joint Planning Center
was the focal point for ETO
development, mission refinement,
100
planning guidance, COA
80 development/analysis, and
C 60 ETO/OPORD coordination. The
~ JPC made recommendations to
~ 40 JCB and provided input to the
20 CROP. It was composed of
planning representatives from the
o
Adequate Inadequate
JTF headquarters, combatant
commander's staff, component
staffs, and other agencies
Figure 124: Joint Planning Center attributes
functionally oriented to the JTF
mission. The JPC employed a collaborative network on a continuous basis to develop ETOs as
required to meet the CJTF's desired effects and objectives.
Interval. The JPC operated around the clock, therefore, there is no reference to the
convening interval.
Mix. Ninety-one percent of respondents indicated that the mix of experiences and
competencies of JPC members was
adequate. However, some Joint Planning Center
members lacked joint operations
70
and planning experience. A 60
participant stated, "We had all of "E 50
~ 40
the correct competencies except CD 30
n. 20
too few people with experience in 10
joint operations, staff operations, o
Completely Partially Did Not Fulfill IlllI Spiral 3 (n=113)
and collaborative skills." A SME Fulfilled Fulfilled
II Execution (n= 104)
remarked, "Core planners were Fulfill JTF Needs? D Combined (n=217)
outstanding. We were a little light
in the log, TPFDD, 10, and
Figure 125: Joint Planning Center met JTF needs
intelligence expertise. I know they
were available, but not being embedded."

Number. The number of members was sufficient, but not the best. Seventy-six percent of
respondents indicated that the number of JPC members was sufficient. In fact, some respondents
noted that the JPC had more people than needed and could scale back. Others indicated that the
JPC members could not sustain in a more robust 24-hour operation, including a future operation
cell and more involvement from the combatant commander's staff.
A participant noted, "As the exercise progressed and we became more competent with the
tools we needed fewer people and could do more. We learned whom it was that got things done
and made things happen and others were marginalized, as in real life. Clearly, there are
economies of personnel as a beneficial side effect of these processes and technologies."
A SJFHQ member of the JPC stated, "More staff is needed to attend all of the planning
groups and cells. Sessions
meeting simultaneously
Rules of Engagement Working Group
stretches the limits."
Fulfilled JTF
120
needs? Fulfillment of JTF
100 needs ("Completely
80 Fulfilled") increased from
60
Spiral 3 to execution.
During execution, 60
40 percent of respondents
20 indicated that the JPC
0 "Completely Fulfilled"
Adequate Inadequate D Number (n=8)
JTF needs, while only 50
percent gave that response
during Spiral 3.
Figure 126: ROE Working Group attributes
As the JPC
matured and became more skilled with the tools, its effectiveness improved. "Early in the
experiment the JPC seemed outdistanced by the CJTF and mired in ways and means of decade
old methodology," noted one participant. The plans to OPS handover was weak and the JPC
needs to more effectively integrate other members, especially IS and 10. Another participant
stated that the 10 and IS relationship with plans was dysfunctional. The JPC's effectiveness will
improve with the addition of a future operations cell and better integration of other staff
members.
The UJTL baseline report information regarding the subtask, Prepare plans and Orders
(OP 5.3), indicates JTF branch planning did not completely meet the needs of the JTF,
specifically parallel planning was degraded and planning sessions were conducted without
representation from other key staff entities. During MC02 the CIE and LNOs facilitated parallel
planning - not a problem.
However, as described above, the JPC needed to integrate other staff members more
effectively in the planning process. In addition, the UJTL baseline report information regarding
the subtask, 'Compare Courses of Action' (OP 5.3.6), indicates also that COA teams lacked the
capability to develop COAs because they did not possess requisite expertise in such functions as
Fires, 10, and CMO. Again, during MC02 similar problems were evident. Respondents identified
the need for fires, 10, logistics, deployment, medical, personnel, engineer, and PollMil expertise.
224 ~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Rules of Engagement Working Group (ROEWG)

Purpose. The ROEWG is a virtual, web-based network of SMEs responsible for
developing ROE recommendations as input to the ETO to support current and future
operations/plans.
Interval. The interval at which the working group convened was adequate (See Figure
126). All respondents indicated that the interval at which the ROEWG convened was adequate.
The group met only once during the experiment. Most ROE issues were coordinated and
resolved by the legal working group, which met daily. The legal working group consisted of
legal planners from each of the components and the combatant commander staffs, PollMil
planners, and representatives from CJCS legal office and DoD Office of General Counsel. In
addition, ROE issues were
Rules of Engagement Working Group common topics in the JPCs.
Mix. Eighty-nine percent of
70
60 respondents indicated that the
_ 50
:Ii 40 ROEWG's mix of experiences and
~ 30 competencies was adequate. The
If. 20
10 mix of core and supporting
o members was adequate to fulfill
Completely Partially Did Not Illll Spiral 3 (n=68)
the ROEWG's responsibilities.
Illll Execution (n=56)
Fulfill JTF Needs?
Number. Eighty-eight
D Combined (n=124)
percent of respondents indicated
Figure 127: ROE group judged a big success that the number of ROEWG
members was sufficient. The
number of core and supporting members was sufficient to meet the needs of the JTF.
Fulfilled JTF needs? The ROEWG at least "Partially Fulfilled" the JTF needs according
to over 95 percent of respondents. There was a small increase, one to four percent, in "Did Not
Fulfill" from Spiral 3 to
execution. One participant noted,
"This was an excellent tool and I
120
thought ROE development and
100
implementation was a strong
point during this experiment." C 80
Another participant stated, "This ~ 60
CII
is a great group!" Conversely, a. 40
another participant said, "The 20
group's leadership style prevented o
discussion of issues by all Adequate Inadequate o Number (n=11)
members, and resulted in lack of
consideration of civil military Figure 128: All were satisfied with the mix and number of
operations." Finally, a SME personnel working in the time sensitive targeting cell
remarked, "Especially impressive is the ownership of this organ by the operators vice the judge
advocates. The deputy JOC chief ran this pup from beginning to end, with a clear agenda, and
input from all appropriate players." The ROEWG was effective and met the needs of the JTF.
The UJTL baseline report information regarding the subtask, 'Provide Rules of
Engagement' (OP 5.4.3), indicates the ROE process did not adequately support JTF operations.
It states also that mission specific ROE were developed by the SJA staff that did not include

operational expertise. This was not a problem during MC02. The SJFHQ BCCWGs include a
ROEWG, which is responsible for developing ROE recommendations as input to the ETO to
support current and future operations and plans. As described above, the MC02 ROEWG, led by
the operations director, was effective, and met the needs of the JTF.
Time Sensitive Targeting Cell

Purpose. The TST cell was a virtual network linking the JTF, components, and
appropriate reach-back departments/agencies. Time sensitive targets are those that pose a present
or near-future danger to friendly forces, or are highly lucrative, fleeting "targets of opportunity."
The cell recommended engagement planning guidance and priorities to the JCB. It is activated
when the JTF was notified of the existence ofa TST.
Interval. All respondents
Time Sensitive Target Cell
indicated that the interval at which
60 the TST cell convened was
50 adequate (See Figure 128). The
1: 40 TST cell met as needed to address
~ 30
:. 20 issues and changes to the TST list.
10 A participant stated, "The cell was
o 'up' all the time, working TSTs. If
Completely Partially Did Not IlllI Spiral 3 (n=59)
Fulfilled Fulfilled Fulfill a special need for a session
IlllI Execution (n=67)
Fulfill JTF Needs? D Combined (n=126)
occurred, the fires watch would
convene a meeting."
Figure 129: time sensitive target cell met JTF needs Mix. One hundred percent
of respondents indicated that the
TST cell's mix of experiences and competencies was adequate. The cell had the correct mix to
fulfill its responsibilities. A participant noted that the JTF SOP should be refined to include all
participants.
Number. Again, all respondents indicated that the number of TST cell members was
sufficient. A participant noted that the number was more than sufficient and that supporting
members and others should be invited as required.
Fulfilled JTF needs? The TST cell fulfilled the needs of the JTF. Fulfillment of JTF needs
increased from Spiral 3 to execution. The TST cell at least "Partially Fulfilled" the JTF needs,
according to survey respondents. The cell effectively identified and nominated new targets,
confirmed old targets, and reorganized the priorities of targets on the list (See Figure 129).
However, one participant stated, "The TST cell did not react well to targets identified by the JTF
staff. It essentially required components to nominate targets." The TST cell was effective and
met the needs of the JTF.
Logistics Action Response Board (LARB)
Purpose. The LARB coordinated all logistics, transportation, and deployment-related
requirements at the operational level. The LARB acts as the log action clearinghouse and
information hub in support of j oint forces. It matched logistics support requirements with
capabilities; identified and coordinated action for medical, civil engineering, and host nation
support issues; and provided advice and recommendations to the joint theater logistics manager.
Interval. The interval at which the LARB convened was inadequate, according to a SME
and other participants. They indicated that the board needed a second session or a working group
226 FOR OF F ICIAL USE ONLY

to handle routine staff work and to allow more time to manage, integrate, and synchronize
logistics.
Mix. The mix of experiences and competencies was adequate, but not the best. The
LARB needed more participation
from the OpsGrp. A SME stated, Logistics Action Response Board
"The board was attended
primarily by logisticians and 60
transporters. The board was 50
looking at changes to the ~ 40
CII
~ 30
deployment flow, which had ~ 20
direct impact on current and 10
future operations. There were o
virtually no operators in Completely Partially Did Not IiiiiI Spiral 3 (n=60)
attendance at these meetings." IiiiiI Execution (n=56)
Another participant remarked, Fulfill JTF Needs? o Combined (n=116)
"More membership from the ops
side would have provided a good Figure 130: Logistics Action Response Board met JTF needs
ongoing check and balance to
keep the LARB decisions optimal."
Number. The number of core and supporting members was sufficient to meet the needs of
the JTF. A SME indicated that while the core and supporting membership equaled approximately
20 people, 60-80 routinely attended the sessions.
Fulfilled JTF needs? More than 90 percent of respondents (See Figure 130) indicated that
the LARB at least "Partially Fulfilled" the JTF needs - "Completely Fulfilled" increased from
45 percent during Spiral 3 to 57 percent during execution. There was a small increase, three to
seven percent, in "Did Not Fulfill" from Spiral 3 to execution. According to respondents the
LARB concept was validated. The
Add/Delete BCCWGs? board was informative and a great
vehicle to exchange logistical
80
information. Again, SMEs noted
70
60 that the LARB spent valuable time
'E 50 on routine staff work. They
~ 40 (SMEs) indicated that a working
~ 30 group should be established for
20
10
IiiiiI SMEs (n=50) action officers to work these
o IiiiiI Participants (n=209) actions and to allow the LARB to
Yes No o Combined (n=259) focus on critical and complex
issues as designed. The LARB was
Figure 131: Participants were satisfied with the mix of boards,
effective and could improve with
centers, cells, or working groups and wouldn't delete any the establishment of a LogSptGrp
or logistics director, and more
operations group participation.
A participant said, "The only reason the logistics planning and coordination worked was
because of the personal capabilities of the III Corps G4 and not the organizational setup. In fact,"
he went on, "it does not appear the logistics planner (LogOPS coordinator) actually conducted

any logistical planning. Instead, he was immediately identified to reassume his role as the J4."
The LARB was effective and met the needs of the JTF.
BCCWG Additions and Deletions. The BCCWGs, formed during MC02 and discussed
above, are the same organizations, which the SJFHQ uses when it operates as a JTF. They are
only a starting point for the JTF. The CJTF and his staff add and delete BCCWGs based on
requirements.
Survey respondents recommended additions and deletions to the SJFHQ working group
structure below. The list indicates those BCCWGs, which were added by the JTF during the
experiment. Less than 30 percent of respondents recommended additions and or deletions.
Additions:
Deployment Istrategic lift working group (was added) [SMElParticipant]
Engineer working group (was added) [SMElParticipant]
Force protection working group (was added) [SMElParticipant]
Civil/military cell [SME]
Transition cell [SME]
Host nation support working group [SME]
Medical working group [SME]
Joint personnel reception center [SME]
Joint intelligence support element (was added) [SME]
Military media information cell (was added) [Participant]
Weapons of mass effects working group (was added) [Participant]
Joint knowledge information management board (was added) [Participant]
Deletions:
Delete JISC [Participant]
Delete BRC (integrate into JISE) [SME]
Delete EAC (integrate into JISE) [SME]
In summary, the SJFHQ working structure used in MC02 is optimal, according to
analyses of survey responses. Most met the needs of the JTF, however, there is room for
improvement. CIE was essential to the effectiveness of the BCCWGs. JTF will make minor
refinements, and add and delete as required. BCCWGs enhanced JTF OPS and JTF HQ
interaction with the combatant commander and component staffs. The UJTL baseline report
information regarding the subtask, 'Acquire and Communicate Operational Level Information
and Maintain Status' (OP 5.1), indicates there is confusion within the JTF staff as to what
information should be communicated between staff sections.
The SJFHQ groups and BCCWGs structure ensures activation of the organizations
required to effectively control JTF operations. Each organization has a designated purpose,
members, and products. The SJFHQ organizations use collaborative tools, with virtual
communication capabilities, to communicate across the JTF, component, and combatant
commander staffs. As described above the SJFHQ organizations met the needs of the JTF during
MC02, enhanced JTF operations, and enhanced the JTF's staff interaction with component and
combatant commander staffs.

BRC A IA S- Y
EAC A A- IS Y
IOC A IA IS Y
JCB A A S Y
JCBWG A A S Y
JCMC A A S Y
JFEWG A A- S Y
JISC N/A A S N
JOC N/A A S Y
JPC N/A A S- Y
ROE A A S Y
TST A A S Y
LARB IA A- S Y
A = Adequate S = Sufficient Y=Yes

A- = Adequate w/concerns S- = Sufficient w/concerns N=No
IA = Inadequate IS = Inadequate N/A = Not Applicable
Finding The SJFHQ presence and effectiveness altered the role of component
command LNOs at the JTF.
Traditionally, liaison officers (LNO) facilitate the communication maintained between
elements of a JTF, ensuring mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. LNOs
doctrinally perform several critical functions that are consistent across the full range of military
operations.
The LNO has four traditional functions: monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist. The
SJFHQ presence, using the CIE, alleviated the need for LNOs to continuously establish and
maintain close, continuous, physical communications between component commands.
SME and participant responses to survey questions regarding roles and value-added of
LNOs provided the data for this sub-finding. The survey respondents were asked to contrast the
use ofLNOs in MC02 to previous exercises and experiments and similarly, LNO impact on JTF
performance.
Respondents reported two primary differences in LNO roles in MC02 as compared to
previous exercises and experiments. These differences were LNO facilitation of JTF and
component command members attending collaborative sessions and LNO readiness to revert to
the traditional liaison role only as a backup in the event the CIE failed. One SME described the
new LNO functionality, "He was the traditional representative of subordinate or higher
command, but [now] diminished activity due to immediate vertical and horizontal access through
collaboration."
Another SME responded, "LNOs have been used to act as the conduit between the JTF
and the component commanders in the absence of, or as a result of a failure in the CIE."
Regarding the collaborative environment facilitation role, one SME stated, "Far from being
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 229

redundant, I would argue the LNO is even more critical, although not as often as in a traditional
JTF, where he is the 'go to' for JTF component collaboration."
The high degree of change in the traditional roles of the LNO was noted in both Spiral 3
and execution. The traditional role of component command LNOs at the JTF was altered to some
degree by the presence of the SJFHQ. It is clear from comments that other factors, including the
CIE and CROP, also contributed to the change in LNO roles. SME comment responses indicated
the "back-up" role was particularly necessary to synchronize the actions of their commands with
those of the entire force and improving staff-to-staff communication channels during times of
CIE outage/failure. Comment responses indicated that with the SJFHQ present and as the
reliability of the CIE rose, the LNOs became less essential as part of the JTF HQ. Most of those
commenting on enhancement of JTF operations mentioned or inferred a new backup and CIE
facilitation role. Similar to the responses to the question about roles of the LNO, reliance on the
LNOs by the JTF appeared to be strongest at the times when the CIE was not operational. One
SME reported, "LNO duties became less and less important as the staff stood up and were linked
with the JAOC staff in IWS." Another SME responded, "They provided the face-to-face
coordination that will always be required. They provided physical back-up when servers went
down, which is critical to their duties and responsibilities for parent organization to JTF."
Unlike previous exercises, liaison activities did not enhance the JTF commander's ability
to orchestrate the activities of the JTF. Effective physical liaison was not needed to facilitate the
synchronization of the warfighting functions within the JTF. The CIE itself enabled the
coordination of efforts with adjacent units, the component, or Joint Force headquarters. Liaison
normally needed to provide situational awareness to focus combat power, ensuring cooperation
and understanding between echelons of command, became less important. However, when the
CIE failed, LNOs enabled detailed planning, information management, and understanding of
implied or inferred coordination measures. During MC02, rather than liaison officers, it was
principally the SJFHQ involvement, CIE, and CROP that insured that commanders remained
aware of the tactical situation. Commanders were provided with information, verification of
information, standing operating procedures, TTPs, and clarification of operational questions.
Additionally, the personality of the LNO was no longer cited as a key factor in his/her value-
added to the j oint force commander.
MC02 LNOs were needed less frequently than in past experiments and exercises to
provide the critical link to effectively coordinate and execute JTF operations. The MC02 LNO,
empowered with the CIE, was able to keep informed of the situation of his own unit and make
that information available to the commander and staff of the unit to which he was sent. The LNO
was able to use the CIE to find out the JTF mission, unit locations, future locations, and
commander's intent. The unobtrusive CIE allowed the MC02 LNO to accomplish his mission
without interfering with the operations of the headquarters to which he was sent. The LNOs used
the CIE to report to their parent commands on those matters within the scope of their mission.
They were able to inform the appropriate supported JTF staff officer or commander about
significant problems being experienced by their parent unit that could affect operations of other
commands and they were able to make suggestions to enhance the effective employment of their
parent unit.
During MC02, the SJFHQ and use of the CIE facilitated a reduction in the workload of
the traditional LNO. The CIE served as a substitute for face-to-face communications and the
SJFHQ provided an in-place understanding and experience in joint operations. However, the
demands of working within the CIE generated process-related work and demanded

unprecedented amounts of time for the LNO. LNOs had to attend battle updates, decision
briefings, and mission analysis and then participate in BCCWG meetings to gather and provide
information. The use ofLNOs in MC02 was clearly different from past exercises, experiments or
operations. Unlike previous exercises with sequential physical meetings one at a time and the use
of secure phone or face-to-face coordination, the MC02 collaboration tools required LNOs to be
in planning sessions, monitor current operations, and push/pull data from the SharePoint Portal
Server (SPPS) near simultaneously. When the CIE was down, component LNOs were used in
their traditional roles as the primary conduit for RFls and as the direct representative of their
commander and became a critical piece of the planning process when communications to
components went down. This on-off role for the LNO made it even more important that the
LNOs were experienced with the full confidence of his commander and a solid understanding of
their command's plan.
During MC02, LNOs acted as CIE facilitators to ensure functional staff members were in
the right virtual meeting place at the right time. In this new role, LNOs were expected to run
collaborative meetings and get them into the appropriate CIE building and room. LNOs routed e-
mails from JTF staff members that could not collaborate with their functional component,
worked tool problems, and made sure all key briefings, meetings, and calendar events had
component representation. The CIE and presence of the SJFHQ enabled the LNOs to perform
tasks more quickly, speeding up the planning and execution process. One example being that
LNOs were able to provide detailed weapons system capabilities during JTF planning sessions
allowing the JTF planners to quickly rule out use of certain systems for a particular target set.
Assimilation of the complex collaborative cyber-information environment placed a premium on
the LNO's capability to obtain, correlate, and discriminate relevant data.
In conclusion, the increased tempo, brought on by faster, better, and more accurate data
validated the importance of well-trained LNOs with analytical skills necessary to process the
data and discern what was important and when actions needed to be taken. This coupled with the
necessity for the LNO to perform his traditional roles when the CIE went down, showed a
potential increase in the importance of the LNO and the absolute necessity of the LNO being the
commander's representative with his full trust and confidence.
The UJTL baseline report information regarding the subtask, 'Develop Joint Force
Liaison Structure' (OP 5.5.2), indicates LNO personnel within the JTF were not effectively used.
During MC02 respondents noted, that the activity level of the LNO was reduced by the CIE, but
the role of the LNO was more critical. LNOs were engaged throughout the JTF staff and ensured
their respective headquarters maintained situational awareness outside of the CIE. It is
imperative that LNOs are properly resourced - adequate number with the right credentials to
represent and speak for their commands.
Other Observations
None

The SJFHQ concept interacts with and impacts all other concepts and objectives. SJFHQ
members were directly involved with each concept and objective. Initially, the SJFHQ members
were considered the SMEs and were the "go to" people. In many areas, the SJFHQ maintained
this title throughout the exercise.
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- SJFHQ develops, maintains, and updates the ONA
Conduct Decisive Effects-Based Operations (EBO)

- SJFHQ enables EBO by rapidly integrating situational awareness and understanding,
knowledge, ONA, effects assessment, IS, and ETO development; by exploiting CIE tools and
reach-back; and by providing continuity in planning and operations-pre-crisis through response
and termination

- SJFHQ and CIE are inextricably linked. SJFHQ members are the CIE experts. They have the
knowledge of and ability to exploit the tools and processes. SJFHQ uses the CIE to facilitate
building situational awareness and understanding across the RCC, JTF, and component staffs,
and external agencies; to facilitate simultaneous planning; to maximize knowledge and
information technology; to leverage reach-back and minimize augmentation; and to link to
external organizations
Joint Inter-Agency Community Group (JIACG)

- SJFHQ develops and maintains relationships with JIACG members that provide expertise in
specific areas and specialties. SJFHQ uses a robust reach-back system to link the headquarters to
the JIACG to provide needed expertise for a knowledge-centric, precise response to each
contingency
Sustain the Force (SF) and Joint Theater Logistics System (JTLS)
- SJFHQ logisticians, embedded in the PG and OpsGrp, provided the two groups with organic
sustainment and deployment planning and operations capability, to include knowledge oflogistic
systems. The SJFHQ personnel on the LARB enhanced the board's ability to synchronize,
prioritize, direct, integrate, and coordinate logistics functions, optimizing support to the joint
force
Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (JISR)

- SJFHQ personnel and relationships in the OpsGrp and ISG manage collection requirements;
integrates and coordinates intelligence functions; ensures effects have desired/planned impact on
adversary-determines need to reengage, readjust, or terminate; and manage employment of ISR
assets
Establish and Maintain Information Superiority (IS)

- SJFHQ is a knowledge-centric element, which leverages information-based technology-CIE
tools and processes-to obtain IS and to counter adversary actions
Set Conditions for Decisive Operations (DO)

- SJFHQ is a key component of DO. Successful rapid response requires a headquarters that has a
detailed understanding of the area of operations and is immediately responsive to the RCC for
crisis response planning and execution. The SJFHQ provides an ability to rapidly integrate
precise knowledge and understanding of the adversary and effects-based orientation into early

planning and operations of the JTF headquarters, providing the degree of continuity in planning
and operations that enables execution of DO
Assured Access (AA)

- SJFHQ, with situational awareness and understanding, ONA, CIE, reach-back relationships,
and knowledge ofEBO, enhances the ability of the JTF to set and sustain the battle space
conditions necessary to provide sufficient freedom of action to achieve desired effects

- The relationship to baseline analysis information related to this assessment area is contained
with the Findings above
DOTMLPF Linkage
An overall observation based on MC02 is the development of SJFHQ and CIE
capabilities must coincide. The CIE and the SJFHQ are inextricably linked and together they
enhanced JTF operations; the benefit of one without the other is unclear. In addition,
participation in SJFHQ training and education programs by the interagency community external
to DoD is critical. An on-going relationship is required to foster, encourage, and coordinate
participation, and ensure policies do not inhibit lAC participation. Specific DOTMLPF
recommendations include:
Doctrine
- Develop SJFHQ doctrine - establish SOPs for the organization and all employment options,
which clearly define the roles, functions, membership, leadership and POCs, and relationships of
each group, each BCCWG, and each SJFHQ member; provide a CIE structure with business
rules; define the relationship and integration with lAC; define the SJFHQ's role in ONA
development; establish TTPs; and include document formats
- Develop j oint doctrine and SOPs/TTPs for employment of new systems to support SJFHQ and
JTF, specifically ONA, JIACG, and CIE systems and tools
- Revise joint doctrine to incorporate SJFHQ concept
Organization
- Adjust the organization of important staffs to include SJFHQ structure, tailored to regional
requirements
- Adjust the organization of important staffs to include a JIACG
- Adjust the organization of important staffs to include an element responsible for the ONA
- Incorporate the linkage with lAC, COE, and other external agencies to facilitate SJFHQ reach-
back to/habitual relationships with these agencies
Training
- Develop and conduct periodic joint training at important, JTF, and component Command level
in order to exercise employment of SJFHQ and enabling concepts (CIE, ONA, EBO, JISR,
JIACG)
- Develop/conduct development training necessary to prepare leaders for joint duty, particularly
as a member of a combatant command SJFHQ -leaders must be SMEs on the enabling
concepts (CIE, EBO, ONA, JISR, JIACG)
FOR OFFICIi.. L USE ONLY 233

- Establish SJFHQ Mobile Training Teams - conduct periodic training at JTF and component
levels
- Facilitate integration ofIAC, COE, ONA Developers, and other appropriate external agencies
in SJFHQ training with all levels
- Develop an Individual and Collective training curriculum for SJFHQ to develop and maintain
proficiency with concepts and tools
Material
- Provide the necessary materiel and resources to establish, and sustain a SJFHQ and enabling
concepts (CIE, EBO, ONA, JISR, JIACG)
- Provide the necessary materiel and resources to employ all use options of a SJFHQ
- Noteworthy is the self-contained SJFHQ employment option because of its materiel
requirements
- Provide designated components Commands -land, air, and sea - the necessary materiel and
resources to receive, integrate, and sustain a SJFHQ on all respective platforms
Leadership and Education

- Assign GOlFO (0-8) for each SJFHQ
- Establish Leadership Development Programs, which will provide the necessary experience,
training, knowledge and understanding, and expertise for leaders to feed the SJFHQ organization
- Revise joint and service school curricula to include SJFHQ, CIE, EBO, ONA, JISR, and JIACG
concepts
- Educate DoD and non-DoD communities on the key elements of the SJFHQ, CIE, EBO, ONA,
JISR, and JIACG concepts
Personnel
- Add 55 (+/-) personnel (military, civilians, contractors) to important staffs
Adhere to the SJHFQ member model listed below:

- Mature, professional - SME in assigned area
- Experience in joint and service operations, and crisis action planning
- Trainer, mentor, or coach with interpersonal skills
- Understand group dynamics
- Understand concepts and Combatant Cdr's Intent and Perspectives
- Knowledge ofCONPLANs, CONOPS, SOPs, and TTPs
- Situational awareness and understanding
- Knowledge of the ONA and the adversary
- Knowledge of Effects-based Planning/Operations
- Expertise with collaborative tools
- Habitual relationships with combatant commander's staff, component staffs, and other external
agencIes
- Conduct a manpower study to validate skills, to identify sourcing (military - Officers, NCOs,
Reservist; civilian; contractor) and to identify unique requirements for each designated
combatant command
- Examine current j oint personnel policies that impact SJFHQ manning, including those
governing minimum tour lengths for SJFHQ assignments

Facilities
- Attempt to use existing facilities at important locations. If not available combatant commanders
should determine requirements for military construction. The SJFHQ personnel and equipment
must be collocated as a unit and if feasible physically separated from the important HQ elements
to focus efforts on developing crisis areas
- The SJFHQ facility must be a SCI environment
Recommendations
1. DoD, field prototype SJFHQ to each combatant commander using MC02 model as base. ~
2. JFCOM/SJFHQ, update SJFHQ concept of employment (CONEMP) to include KIMP and
integrated PollMil plan as pre-crisis products to be provided by SJFHQ prior to activation of the
JTF.~
3. JFCOM/SJFHQ, update JSOP to clearly define the qualifications, duties, and responsibilities
for each position. ~
4. JFCOM, investigate the continuing role of the SJFHQ with the JTF as the crisis matures, to
include duration of SJFHQ involvement, role of the SJFHQ in transition to post-conflict, and
provisions for the SJFHQ should a second crisis erupt. ~
5. JFCOM, change the name of SJFHQ from "Standing Joint Force Headquarters" to "Standing
Joint Force Command and Control Element" to clarify its role. ~
6. JFCOM, maintain the current SJFHQ organization-command group, plans group, operations
group, information superiority group, and knowledge management group. ~
7. JFCOM/SJFHQ, investigate dissolving the IS group and KM group into the plans and
operations groups to provide better support to planning and operations functions. ~
8. JFCOM/SJFHQ, investigate the establishment of a logistics/support group to coordinate,

synchronize, and integrate logistics and other support functions in pre-crisis activities, planning,
and operations, but keep logistics personnel in the plans group and operations group. ~
9. JFCOM, investigate the establishment of an 10 group or task force-JIOTF. Clearly, define
10 and educate DoD and external agencies. ~
10. JFCOM/SJFHQ, add fires person to operations group-person also provides fires expertise
during planning. ~
11. JFCOM/SJFHQ, add STRATLIFT, personnel, and engineer expertise to plans group. ~
12. DoS, DoD, and JFCOM, ensure PollMil planner in plans group is a civilian with regional
expertise and lAC experience, and is directly linked to JIACG at important. ~
13. JFCOM/SJFHQ, assign responsibilities to several SJFHQ members in plans group and
operations group to coordinate and synchronize the plans group hand-off to operations group. ~
14. DoD and JFCOM/SJFHQ, add a flag or general officer, to command SJFHQ (command
group). Upon integration of the SJFHQ into the JTF, the GOlFO can fulfill Deputy CJTF or JTF
CoS duties. ~

15. JFCOM/SJFHQ, maintain SJFHQ BCCWG structure, but let JTF add and delete BCCWGs
as required. ~
16. JFCOM/SJFHQ, rework the JISC to improve effectiveness. ~
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Appendix A to Assessment Area 6
Table 20: SJFHQ Manning. The table below provides a summary of SJFHQ Manning.
(CmdGrp) Joint Operations As Asst Deputy of Staff

Center Chief below
Admin Support Admin Support
Coordinator Coordinator
Admin Support Admin Support
Coordinator Coordinator
Asst Deputy of Staff **
4
Plans Plans Director As Plan Concept Plans Director

Mentor below
(PG) Intel Analyst Intel Analyst In ISG
Intel Analyst Intel Analyst In ISG
Planner Planner Planner
Log Coordinator Log Coordinator Log Coordinator
Log Deployment Log Deployment Log Deployment Planner
Planner Planner
Log Sustainment Log Sustainment Log Sustainment Planner
Planner Planner
Blue/Red Planner Blue/Red Planner Blue/Red Planner
Blue/Red Planner Blue/Red Planner Blue/Red Planner
Pol/Mil Planner Pol/Mil Planner Pol/Mil Planner
Civil Affairs Planner Civil Affairs Planner
Ops Law Planner Ops Law Planner Ops Law Planner
Force Protection Force Protection Force Protection Planner
Planner Planner
Future Planner * STRATLIFT Planner *
STO Plans Officer * Personnel Planner *
Plan Concept Mentor ** Engineer Planner *
17 19 18

I Group Concept(8aseIine) IMC02/ ReportRecommendation

Operations Ops Director As OPS Concept Ops Director
Mentor below
(OpsGrp) Current Intel Current Intel Integrator In ISG
Integrator
ISR Ops ISR Ops In ISG
Land Ops Land Ops Land Ops
Land Ops Land Ops Land Ops
Maritime Ops Maritime Ops Maritime Ops
Maritime Ops Maritime Ops Maritime Ops
Aerospace Ops Aerospace Ops Aerospace Ops
Aerospace Ops Aerospace Ops Aerospace Ops
SOF Ops SOF Ops SOF Ops
SOF Ops SOF Ops SOF Ops
10 Officer 10 Officer In ISG
Deployment Ops Transportation Ops Deployment Ops
Sustainment Ops Sustainment Ops Sustainment Ops
Planner * Fires Ops Officer *
OPS Concept Mentor
**
14 15 12
Information IS Coordinator As IS Concept Mentor IS Coordinator

Superiority below
(ISG) ISR Collection ISR Collection Planner ISR Collection Planner
Planner
Intel Supervisor Intel Supervisor Intel Supervisor
SA Analyst SA Analyst
Assessment Analyst Assessment Analyst Assessment Analyst
Assessment Planner Assessment Planner Assessment Planner
10 Supervisor 10 Plans Chief 10 Supervisor
10 Planner 10 Planner 10 Planner
ONA Network ONA Network Analyst ONA Network Analyst
Analyst
ONA Effects Analyst ONA Effects Analyst ONA Effects Analyst
ONA Supervisor * Intel Analyst (from PG)
IS Concept Mentor ** Intel Analyst (from PG)
Current Intel Integrator
(from Ops Grp)

Knowledge KM Coordinator As Deputy KMO be/ow KM Coordinator

Management
(KMG) KMO KMO KMO
KMO KMO KMO
KMO KMO KMO
Joint Network Control Joint Network Control Joint Network Control
Officer Officer Officer
Support Technician Support Technician Support Technician
Support Technician Support Technician
Deputy KMO **
7
Concept (Baseline) MC02 Report

Recommendation
55 59 60
59 =55 + 4*** 60 =55 + 5****
* New position and not accounted for elsewhere
** Position name change from Concept
*** Accounts for 55 in Concept
**** Accounts for 55 in Concept w/o bill payers--potential bill payers shaded/highlighted in
green

Figure 132: Command and Control is the emphasis in MC02
240 "FOR OFFICIAL I ISE ONLY

Assessment Area 7 - Operational Net Assessment (ONA)

ONA has the potential to be the knowledge foundation underlying EBO and a concept-
supporting pillar that doctrine developers are looking for. ONA showed a spark and
demonstrated to participants and observers in MC02 that it was beneficial for military operations.
By providing a more thorough understanding of the adversary,
ONA made a positive contribution to the Blue force and
demonstrated that with further refinement and development of
critical enablers, it could be the knowledge foundation
underlying EBO.
ONA is shaped to provide the foundation of knowledge
and understanding about an adversary needed by a commander
to successfully execute RDO. It provides knowledge in
sufficient detail to apply integrated diplomatic, information,
military, and economic (DIME) friendly actions decisively
against an adversary's political, military, economic, social,
infrastructure, and information (PMESII) systems. This
knowledge base includes systems analyses that identify critical
adversary vulnerabilities and potential friendly DIME actions
with the goal of causing desired effects. It is a product of
collaboration among a wide variety of organizations, which
informs decision makers from strategic to tactical levels. The
ONA reveals the effects-to-task linkages supporting EBO.
However, ONA is not well known outside of
transformation circles and many operators came to the
experiment with differing understandings of what ONA meant
and what it could do. The ONA concept embodied both a
process and a product. Together they were a valuable resource,
accessed with tools, to be used as a planning and operational
reference point. Finally, to facilitate development of ONA for
the experiment there was an organizational aspect of the concept; a system of systems
headquarters cell (SOSA cell) that designed, built, and updated the ONA knowledge base.
The process for development and update of ONA described a persistent interaction
between many military and civilian centers of excellence. The expectation was that the
interaction, as well as the data collected, would expand user knowledge. The product was the
knowledge base of assembled ONA data amassed from process activity. Product also could
include relationships or plans derived from the ONA knowledge base. For planners, the ONA
knowledge base was a resource that could be used to assist plan development. It had tools needed
to facilitate access to the knowledge base information, but these posed a serious challenge for
experiment participants to use.
As there was not a common understanding of ONA among experiment participants, there
was a varying degree of expectation from participants with regard to ONA's intent, its scope, its
content, and utility. Training conducted before the event failed to bridge this gap of unrealistic
expectation of what ONA was to provide for the experiment and the result was somewhat
inhibited use of ONA data and information. Based on limited understanding of the concept and
FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONLY 241

limited exposure, the use of complex ONA tools was also problematic. This was further
exacerbated by integral ONA databases that were not fully populated.
The tools developed to access the ONA database and to use the planning features were
not intuitive and proved difficult for most participants to use. Intended to be relevant and useful
from strategic to tactical levels, the experiment confirmed there were different perceptions of
ONA utility for each level and community of interest. Compounded with inadequate
understanding of the ONA concept, perceptions ranged from a near view that the ONA needed to
be focused and narrowed in scope to a far view that the ONA scope should be expanded to
include current intelligence and targeting information.
The term visualization was used frequently during the experiment with regard to
understanding ONA. The need for a user to visualize the ONA knowledge base analysis was
identified prior to the event and was substantiated by experiment observations and analysis.
There was general agreement among experiment participants with the requirement for ONA
visualization; there wasn't general agreement, however, on what that image ought to be.
The ONA user community was not uniformly aware that the ONA knowledge base was
being updated regularly. Updates to the database were, in fact, continuous; the ONA executive
summary was updated daily, and adversary systems summaries were updated only when
significant changes to the adversary system were evident. Survey question responses and
comments confirmed the clear requirement for an up-to-date knowledge base and an ability to be
notified of updates. Participant feedback was that ONA's database up-date rate did not meet their
needs.
Blue forces recognized ONA's benefits in supporting the conduct of Rapid Decisive
Operations during MC02. Survey responses indicated ONA was useful in preparing for board,
center, and cell sessions; PMESII was understood and was useful; ONA provided good
situational awareness; and enabled by ONA, the JTF acted faster and with better knowledge.
The ONA concept did not lend itself to direct comparison with current military plans and
operations activities. A concentrated ONA repository of analyzed and raw data, focused on a
specific topic or geographical area, did not exist. Cost benefit trade-offs between the way
planning and operations are conducted versus the way they could be conducted with an ONA
available could not be done. Instead, measured value judgments, made by senior concept
developers, and experienced SMEs provided perspective for the level of decision support ONA
might offer. These judgments and estimates, as well as experiment participant survey responses
provided the measure of improvement.
Based on review of task accomplishments that supported the concept's two warfighting
challenges, analysis found the challenges were met. The first challenge was to construct and use
an ONA knowledge base to develop an effect-based strategy; the second challenge was to use
ONA to enhance decision-making. An ONA knowledge base was constructed and used to
support development of an effects-based strategy. ONA was used and it enhanced decision-
making.
Methodology
A dendritic dissection of the two ONA warfighting challenges was made based on
concept development documents. (The ONA dendritic matrix is included at Appendix A - ONA
Data Collection Matrix) The resulting matrix (data collection outline) was used as the data
generator for ONA analysis. This layered depiction of the tasks, measures of these tasks, data
requirements needed to examine the measures, and the individual data elements that were part of
242 F'OR OFFICIAL lISE ONLY

the measures served as the map for consideration and analysis of the ONA concept. Review and
analysis of this data produced ONA findings.
The experiment offered three sources for data. They were: 1) Likert scale response results
and supporting comments from web based surveys presented to participants during the
experiment 2) discussion and comment from structured senior concept developer (SCD; retired
senior military officers) In-Focus (morning), Azimuth Check (afternoon) and three After Action
Review sessions and 3) access counts and activity levels from participant use of the ONA
knowledge base.
Participant surveys and review of ONA database access were the primary sources of data.
Individuals from the experiment's JTF headquarters, its air, land and sea components and a
governmental interagency group were selected for survey receipt based on their expected
involvement with ONA during the experiment. SMEs were also presented surveys. Generally, all
surveys included questions with Likert scale answer options. They also offered the opportunity
for follow-up comments. Some questions asked only for comment response (no Likert range).
The Likert responses were reviewed using graphed depiction of the replies. Comment responses
were grouped by topic for consideration of their impact on ONA. Of the data collected, only
survey Likert scale responses and knowledge base access count and time intervals had statistical
analysis potential. Comments and observations offered by the SCDs, SMEs, and JTF participants
were anecdotal and stood alone. Both execution and Spiral 3 survey results were analyzed. Spiral
3 was primarily a JTF planning event and ONA was used in support of that phase.
Survey questions were built for analysis of the warfighting challenge matrix. Questions
were developed and targeted against the warfighting challenge tasks. To ensure thorough
consideration, all survey question results were reviewed in relation to each challenge for
assessment of task accomplishment. If a question applied to more than one task, it was aligned
with each of them. This process provided a pool of data to assess tasks and identify findings.
When support for a task was not unanimous, conflicting question results were used to
present the dissenting view and the differences weighed. Histogram charts were used for better
understanding and perspective. For some questions, extreme and moderate Likert scale replies
were grouped and the "'Don't Know'" or "N/A" replies dropped from the chart. This was done
to show the focus of the response when accompanying comments supported this approach.
The second source of data was the ONA knowledge base activity recorders. An audit log
of the structured query language (SQL) server that housed the ONA database was used to collect
participant access of the stand-alone ONA relational database. This log identified who used the
database and, if changes (updates) were made, what parts of the database were changed. Web
Trends software was used to review participant access of the other ONA knowledge base
components: ONA Today, database login, ONA Matrix, ONA References, and ONA products.
This capability revealed who accessed what and for how long. Detailed analysis of this data
source is included at Appendix F - ONA knowledge base Access and Use.
All of these collected data were matched against the tasks that supported the warfighting
challenges to see if the challenges were achieved. They were also used to clarify findings as they
emerged.
Additional supporting data that emerged from discussions conducted during daily In-
Focus and Azimuth Check sessions were the primary instigators for findings not closely
connected with the warfighting challenge matrix. These facilitated discussion sessions were
monitored and the SCD as well as other participant observations and comments captured. The

three facilitated after action reviews held during the experiment were also sources of supporting
data and were used to collect SCD and participant ONA concept perspective.
MC02 provided a venue for proving the ONA concept. However, the experiment also
included the SJFHQ, EBO, and other concepts. The SJFHQ and EBO concepts were closely tied
to ONA. Despite the conceptual interrelationship of ONA and SJFHQ, the ONA knowledge base
was not developed exactly as detailed in concept support documents. Training and manning
challenges for the headquarters did not allow the entire SJFHQ to participate in ONA
development; there wasn't really a "pre-crisis" period where persistent collaborative
relationships between SJFHQ ONA developers and centers of excellence could be developed.
The concept tasked the SJFHQ for ONA development during a pre-hostility period. This was to
afford headquarters personnel the chance to develop and build person-to-person collaborative
regimens with reference centers.
There wasn't a national fusion center of information as depicted in the ONA concept
available for reference that could offer the combined expertise of our national government.
Current government department and agency policies did not facilitate exchange of data and
information; limited knowledge base information was obtained from diplomatic (D), information
(I), and economic (E) national capability. Appropriate tools were not available to support
database development, use, and update.
None-the-Iess, the ONA knowledge base that was developed for the experiment did offer
sufficient substance to evaluate ONA's potential contribution to conflict resolution. The ONA
"product" produced for the experiment had some flat spots and they were considered in analysis
methodology.
Training too was a consideration for ONA analysis methodology. It impacted each of the
findings. The mobile training teams sent to support III Corps and components did not have the
ability to offer students keyboard "hands-on" instruction. The ONA and EBO concepts were new
and not known by the students. They had no experience base to build on or to fall back to. On-
line instruction introduced the concepts, but not the depth of learning needed to master concept
use neither was the participant training robust enough to overcome the operators inexperience.
Critical Enablers. A number of ONA critical enablers were identified through limited
objective experiments and ONA development experience. The enablers were briefed prior to
MC02 Spiral and execution events. Some of these critical enablers were recognized as being
beyond the capability ofUSJFCOM to actualize prior to execution. Consequently, they were
emulated by the experiment's White cell to facilitate assessment of the basic concept.
Two enablers were notionally employed. They were the SJFHQ and the JIACG. The
SJFHQ provided the focal point for conducting ONA at the theater commander level, during pre-
hostilities, and formed the core of the rapidly forming JTF. The interagency community was
supported with a JIACG in the theater commander's headquarters during execution, but it was
not a part of a continuous ONA process leading up to execution.
The following critical enablers were not present during the event and impacted the
fidelity and utility of ONA in MC02:
Full cooperation of the interagency community in sharing, common, interoperable database
elements of information required by the operational commander
Establishment of a network of centers of excellence to conduct detailed analysis in each
operational domain (ONA required a collaborative environment promoting a culture of
sharing information across all levels )

A national information fusion/assessment capability to prioritize, process, and integrate

collaborative analysis into a shared, common, understanding
Advanced analytical tools to deal with the volume of information and to understand potential
cause and effect linkages
A set of models, simulations, and intelligent software agents to support effects-based analysis
and course-of-action evaluation
Leadership, education, and training that foster an effects-based thinking mindset and would
apply that mindset to a complex and collaborative analytical process
Warfighting Challenges
The ONA concept depicted two discrete challenges for ONA. They were: 1) the ability to
build and use an ONA database to support development of an effects-based strategy and 2) the
ability to use the database to enhance decision-making. Simply, the concept said, construct a
knowledge base and use it to support EBO and make improved decisions.
The first warfighting challenge dealt with developmental struggles. Structure of the
MC02 experiment caused Spiral 3 to be the primary opportunity to collect data on this ONA
challenge. A summary of the database development process, as it evolved for MC02, is included
at Appendix D - ONA Database Development for MC02. Experiment execution did offer some
opportunities for the developmental challenge but it was better suited for collecting data on the
second challenge.
ONA viewed an adversary as a system of systems; that is, a number of related systems
that together formed potential capability that an adversary could use. These systems of systems
were represented by PMESII categories. Capabilities to counter these systems were identified as
DIME national power potential. Analysis of both PMESII and DIME and their interrelationships
were depicted in the database. Once included, this analyzed information had to be kept current.
In addition, automated tools were needed as a part of the database capability to manipulate and
use the extensive information. Tasks that accomplished these developmental actions were
evaluated during analysis of warfighting challenge one.
The ONA process represented the complex nature of the 21 st century security
environment by portraying a potential adversary as a complex adaptive system. It also attempted
to gain a unique perspective on ourselves by institutionalizing a "Red versus Blue" war-gaming
process to assess how we might be viewed through the eyes of an adversary. It created a shared
information space in which our national capabilities in the DIME areas could be networked and
synchronized. The ONA process also was intended to provide:
Actionable knowledge that enabled faster planning, better decisions, and decisive effects
A product produced by persistent, habitual collaboration among subject matter experts from a
wide variety of centers of expertise
A system of systems analysis, serving as the centerpiece for understanding the adversary, this
system methodology was to generate understanding of the systems and linkages that gave the
adversary its capacity to act against Blue interests. It was to allow identification of key
relationships, dependencies, and vulnerabilities both within and across systems. Using a
holistic approach, it would then enable understanding of how the environment could be
manipulated to decisively affect the behavior of an adversary and the potential outcome of
actions
Wargaming intended to attain decision advantage (Fundamental to the ONA process is
anticipating the adversary's actions, reactions, and counteractions)

Information and knowledge that would assist an operational-level planner/decision maker

with shaping operations to influence, deter, coerce, or compel the adversary by identifying
actions that could change adversary behavior.
Collective intellectual power and advanced technologies that could allow users to make
better decisions faster than an adversary.
According to warfighting challenge two, use of the ONA database should have
complimented the JTF staff s normal functions; identified adversary vulnerabilities; pointed out
primary, secondary, tertiary, and potential unintended effects that could result from proposed
actions; supported course of action prioritization and selection; and allowed operation within the
adversary's decision cycle. Data associated with these tasks were collected primarily during
experiment execution.
All four tasks of warfighting challenge one were completed. However, ONA update was
not uniformly recognized by experiment participants as having been accomplished. All of the
warfighting challenge two tasks were accomplished. The preponderance of data supported the
finding that both ONA warfighting challenges were successfully accomplished.
Findings and Observations

The six ONA findings and three observations that emerged from analysis ofMC02
collected data are listed below. Each is discussed, analyzed, and supported in the sections that
follow. The sequence generally presents perceived order of importance.
1. There is not a common understanding of what to expect of ONA; its capability and use
need to be clearly articulated.
2. ONA was useful during the experiment and shows great potential for military
operations.
3. Visualization is a major consideration for the ONA concept and its components.
4. Better tools are needed to develop, manage, and convey ONA data and information.
5. Requirements for the ONA are different at each command level.
6. Lack of understanding of the philosophical intent, relationship, and application of the
ONA concept impacted its use.
Observation
1. Users were not uniformly aware that ONA was being updated, which led to an
unwarranted decrease in confidence in ONA information.
2. Both ONA warfighting challenges were met.
3. It was observed that the experiment's ONA Knowledge Base did not include Blue
force logistics data or information.
Recommendations
Review of the Findings produced proposed recommendations for action designed to
address the noted deficiencies. The ONA Recommendations are listed below; expanded
explanation is included in the Discussion of Recommendations section.
1. JFCOM, define the intended use of ONA.
2. JFCOM, establish a section within j oint experimentation that designs visualization
models for its concepts.
3. JFCOM, focus ONA development on the command level for which it was designed.

4. JFCOM, develop a PME template that guides development of joint and service ONA
concept education and training.
5. JFCOM, design ONA knowledge base tools that are intuitive to use and dynamically
support developers and users.
6. JFCOM, in conjunction with a combatant commander, develop a prototype ONA.
Finding There is not a common understanding of the capability and use of the ONA.
The ONA concept came into MC02 with, possibly, more expected of it than any of the
other concepts addressed in the experiment. It wasn't necessarily known by all, but for those who
had heard about it, there were great expectations.
At the conclusion of Spiral 2 when XVIII Airborne Corps was serving as the JTF, their J2
stated that he needed to rethink his understanding of ONA. He found that it did not present the
intelligence planning answers that he had expected. When III Corps was named as the JTF for
the experiment, they completed the self-training modules available via the web and received
briefings and training sessions from USJFCOM. Their expectations for ONA were part of the
decision process that determined a JIPB wasn't needed for the event. The ONA was expected to
supplant it. Components as well as III Corps "understood" what the concept was to do;
unfortunately, not many really understood the concept.
All knew what it was and no one knew what it was. In addition, they were not aware of
what ONA would be able to offer in the experiment. There were almost as many understandings
as there were participants. A common thread among them seemed to be that there would be a
database of information just a keystroke away that would provide whatever specific information
was needed. Spiral 3 and execution survey results and comments reflected these perceptions.
There were no significant changes made to the knowledge base between Spiral 3 and execution.
A detailed description of the ONA knowledge base used for MC02 is available at Appendix E -
ONA knowledge base information.
This lack of common understanding; for some, ignorance of the concept altogether; and
the "freshman" version of ONA all contributed to mixed MC02 ONA concept appreciation.
However, the lack of a common understanding of what the concept was to provide was the
pacing issue that mandated better articulation of the ONA concept's capability and use.
If the ONA concept is to be implemented near to mid-term, then there must be clear
understanding of what ONA has to offer and how it is to be used. Survey results and participant
comments reflected inconsistent understanding of the concept. ONA's menu of advertised
capability needs to be understood.
The concept of pre-conflict analysis of an adversary as a system of PMESII systems,
countered by friendly DIME capabilities, was embraced by the exercise participants. It was the
factors bearing on these relationships that the various specialties expected to have available that
caused misunderstanding and allowed expectations to exceed reality.
ONA was criticized for being a planning tool and not an employment tool (the concept
considers ONA useful for planning and operations)
ONA was criticized for not having current intelligence information available (the concept
does not suggest ONA be a source for current intel)
ONA was criticized for not having data available for targeting specific nodes (targeting
information is not a part of the ONA concept)
ONA was criticized for not having data on current effect results (inclusion ofBDA is not part
of the ONA concept)

ONA was criticized for containing "old" information (the concept envisions ONA be
continuously updated)
At some point in the future, technology and organizational relationships may permit
inclusion of some or all of the ideas presented above, but in the near to mid-term, the concept's
design of a database with focused and pre-analyzed adversary information that looks to an area
of combatant commander concern, offers tremendous military potential. The ONA concept needs
to be solidified, presented, and understood. The ONA concept needs an "advertising" campaign
that presents its "what's
and how's. "
100%
Shown in figure
90%
133, are multiple execution 80%
participant survey replies 70%
that identified participant 60%
thoughts on a primary 50%
focus for ONA. The focus 40%
areas were presented as 30%
20%
statements and the
10%
respondents asked to agree 0%
Disagree
Agree
or disagree with them. . ONA should be ONA should be
Should ONA be
Looking at results phase of a ri~:~:g~:~ use designed as a designed as a designed as a
conflict? P . Y source for current source for current
planning tool?
of the two graphed dunng combat
operations
BDAstatus?
. Intel?
questions, participants said execution.
n = 94 n = 112 n = 112 n = 114 n = 118

ONA was useful for the
defeat phase of conflict and
Figure 133: Majority feels ONA should be designed to support a broad
for "non-combat" phases.
range of specialties.
Together, they said it was
useful for the entire conflict spectrum. Results showed respondents thought ONA should be a
source for current BDA status as well as intelligence information. There was almost unanimous
support (92 percent to eight percent) for ONA to be used as a planning tool shown by the results
of the fifth question in the graph. Together these replies exposed the broad range ofMC02
participant understanding and expectation for ONA.
Figure 134 depicts additional participant-desired ONA characteristics and categories.
These "characteristics" might be based on the respondents' desired improvements and/or,
possibly, a lack of concept understanding. During the final week of the experiment, participants
were asked what they would like ONA to provide. The question did not specify a selection;
rather it was open-ended. Their replies were grouped into these "buckets." Again, when
respondents selected a characteristic it could be inferred they believed it was missing from the
current ONA version. In fact, other than visualization, all of the characteristics were included in
the existing ONA concept.
Information currency was the leading characteristic desired; respondents placed high
importance on it. As with many of the experiment survey responses, the "Don't know" replies
were a major response category. For these responses, those with comments included usually
referenced some level of training inadequacy as the reason for the response. This training issue is
addressed in Finding 6. The "Visualization" column is addressed in Finding 3. Update currency
comments are included with Observation 1.

Participant comments from Spiral 3 and execution surveys provided a variety of

expectations for ONA. Sometimes the words pointed out limitations of the MC02 ONA. At other
times, they offered new variations for ONA concept development. The comments that follow
present the wide range of participant thoughts and understanding. They highlight the need for
better depiction of the concept. Their tone convincingly supported the chorus that ONA needed
to be succinctly defined and articulated. The first observation quickly frames Finding 1. There
are further comments supporting the finding at Appendix C - Additional Observations and
Comments.
SCD Observation: "Make a deliberate decision whether ONA is designed only to support
planning or whether it is intended as an execution tool as well."
SCD Comment: "I believe ONA to be a "tool" to be used by the commanders and their
staffs to aid in the decision making process. As such, it requires a great deal more development."
Participant Comment: "ONA needs to be everything. It needs to include all the critical
nodes for the enemy, the predicted enemy COAs, etc. It needs to be updated continuously so
asking a question about whether or not 1 should be informed when the ONA is updated is very
wrong. BDA and combat assessment should change the ONA in that it changes the COAs still
open to the enemy and changes his perception of the battlespace."
Participant Comment: "The ONA provides great situational awareness during the early
phases of a crisis when planners interact to create the effects, node and action linkages. It helps
in the ETO build to
Desired ONA Characteristics develop plans to
10,.........................................................................................................................
~~ ................................ F\ I
accomplish effects.
Without prior
9
knowledge of the
8
ONA however, the
7 learning curve is very
6'" steep and it would
~ 6
." Q) certainly help, but it
~ 5
co
J::
would be a blind help
U 4
'5
'It
without good
3
situational awareness
2 of what you are
doing. Once
o
hostilities commence,
Update
Currency
User
Friendly
More Info Visualiza- Don't Know Accurate
tion Detail
More
Analysis Awareness
Situational Better
Focus
Tgting Info
n = 56
the ONA usefulness
decreases. "
Figure 134: Desired ONA Characteristics Participant
Comment: "The ONA concept should be redesigned in accordance with some organizing
principle which is less grand than a desire to know everything about the world."
Participant Comment: "ONA should not, repeat not, be used as a source for current
intelligence. You could not possibly plan (as proven here) for the possibilities for current
intelligence. As an intel guy, this is a bad idea."

Finding ONA was useful during the experiment and shows great potential for military
operations.
Participants and senior mentors made comment of the potential benefit ONA offered.
Support was not unanimous, but it was pervasive. The results of survey questions displayed the
positive impact ONA had for Blue during the experiment. In its initial experiment, ONA, while
not fully developed, demonstrated utility by enhancing JTF capabilities and mission execution as
well as supporting EBO. Although the ONA process could not be executed as envisioned due to
the lack of critical enablers, the MC02 JTF used it to enhance their activity. The concept of
140
120
II)
(II 100
II)
r:::
0
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80
II)
(II
60
...0:::
0
'I:t 40
Strong Iy d isag ree
20
0
Theo~~~:~~~~SIS ONA provides good

shared awareness Use of the ONA
capabilities vs. Red (understanding) of Knowledge base knowledge base
PMESII systems is the battlespace supported supported
thorough and understanding of
understanding of
useful. Blue's goals,
Red's goals,
intentions,
intentions,
strengths, and
strengths, and
weaknesses.
weaknesses.
n = 129 n = 194 n = 85 n = 95
Figure 135: ONA Beneficial for Blue
having a repository of relevant information readily available for all levels involved in a national
defense challenge was very appealing for experiment participants. Supported with existing and
the promise of new information management technology, participant comments indicated the
concept was ripe for exploitation. The "how, " "what, " and "when" still required resolution, but
the potential benefits were believed to be enormous.
The survey questions results combined in figure 135 were used elsewhere in this
assessment area. They were presented together here to emphasize the positive impact ONA had
on Blue and its efforts during the experiment. The survey questions were presented to different
experiment participant groups on different dates and resulted in different survey response
populations. As noted in figure 135, 80 percent (401 of 503) of the respondents with an opinion
stated ONA and its analyses had a beneficial impact on Blue; it was useful for Blue.
250 FOR OFFICIAL USE QN.,Y

There were several survey questions in the ONA warfighting challenge and in the task
accomplishment matrix analysis (ONA Data Collection Matrix), which dealt with ONA's use
and its potential. Shown in figure 136 are the results of two very specific ONA-use questions that
also indicate ONA potential (effectiveness). The relatively high percentage of respondents
without an opinion on the questions was consistent with many of the replies to other survey
questions presented during the experiment. It was probably indicative of participant unfamiliarity
with the new concepts and associated reluctance to make a decision. As shown, 47 percent (80 of
172) of respondents indicated ONA offered effectiveness for planning action against facilities
and leaders.
Only eight percent (14 of 172) indicated ONA would be ineffective. Forty five percent
(78 of 172) did not have an opinion. When the segment of respondents was parsed to those
having an opinion, as displayed in figure 136, 85 percent (80 of 94) stated ONA would be
effective; 15 percent (14 of 94) believed ONA would be ineffective. The "Effective" percentage
indicated significant potential for ONA.
ONA Effectiveness
45
40
# 35
of 30
Re
sp 25
on
ses 20
15
10
How effective is the ONA in

How effective is the ONA in
providing sufficient detail to plan
providing sufficient detail to plan
surveillance and reconnaissance of
surveillance and reconnaissance of
adversary C2 facilities?
adversary leaders in the C2 chain?
n =86
Figure 136: ONA Effectiveness
A particular event took place during the experiment that showcased ONA's potential. It
involved the Special Operations Force component commander and the JTF commander. Based
on information derived from ONA, the JSOTF proposed a SOF mission against a current
intelligence-based node that could obviate the need for a force assault against that node. ONA
information was used to convince the commander of the economies and benefits for using the
SOF force vice the invasion force. The incident also "sold" the JTF commander on ONA's
potential; it made him a believer in the concept. (JTF CC: "I was making a bad decision by

attempting to apply conventional combat power over a period of days rather than select a one
night raid that had high potential to change the way .... ").
Listed below are some of the senior concept developer, subject matter expert data
collector, and senior participant comments and observations that dealt with ONA's utility for
Blue during the experiment and its future potential. They support the successful proof of concept
consideration for ONA during MC02. Additional comments are available at Appendix C -
Additional Observations and Comments.
JFCOM CC Comment: "I believe we validated the concept, although the tool might not
be perfect."
SCD Observation: "The ONA concept shows great promise. In MC02, it added
significant value during the planning phase. It enabled commanders to develop a more
comprehensive mission analysis, to establish a pertinent set of desired effects, and to define
effects.
SCD Comment: "Enabled by the ONA and collaboration, the JTF conducted rapid
decisive planning. The ability of the JTF to execute rapidly and decisively was not confirmed."
SCD Observation: "The CJTF selection of desired effects to achieve the combatant
commander's campaign objectives derived exclusively from the ONA."
SCD Comment: "There is an art to understanding ourselves and the enemy, to 'how we
perceive the enemy and perceive ourselves.' Commanders fall along a bell-shaped curve. ONA
can move the whole curve to the right, make a commander more artful, if the commander can
inquire and get better answers."
SME Comment: "Ref: AAR on 31 July 02 where JSOTF CDR commented on using ONA
to assist him in a targeting proposal. My interview with one of the persons present yielded this
short summary: 'JSOTF commander approached JTF CDR for permission to launch a SOF DA
mission. From the ONA, JSOTF found a target of opportunity that would have second and
possibly third order effects.' JTF commander had difficulty understanding the value of such a
mission until JSOTF presented the evidence drawn from the ONA. The JTF commander not only
approved the SOF mission, but finally grasped the value of ONA."
Participant Comment: "The ONA contributed to the overall success of components and
the JTF throughout the experiment because it provided a basis for almost every collaborative
session. The greatest benefit of the ONA is that it allows commanders and staffs to quickly focus
on the problem and gain immediate situational awareness leading into mission planning and ... "
Finding Visualization of information is key to use of the ONA concept and its
components.
As the experiment progressed, the word "visualization" was voiced more frequently. Its
use in relation to the concepts was not surprising.
Because of the limited understanding of the concepts and their implementation SCDs,
SMEs, and participants suggested visualization as a solution for the frustration of expressing
exactly what was occurring or what was needed.
The dictionary definition of "visualize" offers several statement variations for the word.
They all support the need of grasping or understanding and using the ONA concept. The Webster
Dictionary defines visualize as, to recall or form mental images or pictures, to form a mental
image of, or make perceptible to the mind or imagination.

Before any of these three mental events can take place for ONA, an initial depiction of
the concept is necessary. There were slides that graphed input, output, and process, but there was
not a common depiction. There wasn't a model that displayed ONA's use and operation.
ONA is a complex concept; visualization would simplify this complexity by aggregating
the disparate views that exist and bring them into a more common focus. Words can paint a
picture for a group of readers, who tend to interpret the concepts individually; if the same group
were shown a picture, the commonality of interpretation would tend to be much greater.
However, an easily
Ease of DNA Information Update and Maintenance understood model is needed
before visualization can
occur. It is needed before
changes or modifications
can be made to the concept.
ONA can't be changed if
there isn't a clear
of understanding of what it
those who getwrite.permiSsions
Institute. a .requiremellt that all
changes to ONA go Immediately
was and what it is being
throughacentraJ collection and
disseininatiollofficer... changed into.
When senior
mentors spoke of ONA,
each added their slight
n =28
"bend" to the pathway for
ILJlVery easy III Somewhat easy DSomewhat difficult OVery difficult
I
ONA use and cautioned
Figure 137: Ease of Information Update and Maintenance about the importance of
visualizing the course.
During an IS group after-action discussion of the ONA database, it was agreed there was a
problem with database visualization. Discussion group members also said they had difficulty
understanding how the tools functioned. Relationship of second and third order effects and
unintended effects were identified as particular problems. During the same session, the remark
was made that a diagram system showing the relationship between ONA, the SOSA cell, and the
BluelRed cell was needed: a visualization of these organizational relationships was necessary.
The same comment could have applied to all these concerns.
There was general agreement among experiment participants with the requirement for
ONA visualization; there wasn't general agreement on what its image was.
The comments listed below provide an indication of what the MC02 audience thought
about visualization.
SCD Comment: "We are conscious of the need to visualize effects but we cannot do that
today."
SCD Comment: " ... visualization can't be normalized; it needs to be personalized."
SCD Comment: 'What visualization we provide needs to be tailored for the individual so
he or she can set filters and make better decisions without being overwhelmed with data."
SCD Comment: " ... (We) need more tools that help you visualize ... "?
SCD Comment: "It is all about visualization. We have to visualize effects achieved."
SME Comment: "There needs to be a way to visualize the ONA nodes. It is difficult to
comprehend how a series of nodes relates to one another and effect."
SME Comment: "ONA needs a better way to visualize all the links between the nodes."
FOR OFFICIl'"L USE ONLY 253

Participant Comment: "The ONA tool does not communicate the information it contains.
It needs a graphic visualization of nodal analysis. But it at least needs to contain a complete
nodal analysis of the information systems and it must show how the system will morph when
nodes are affected or removed."
Finding Better tools are needed to develop, manage, and convey ONA data and
information.
Even for the small-scale contingency played out in MC02, the ONA knowledge base
contained extensive information. For this information to be accessed, updated, and used, tools
that accommodated these actions were needed. An "ONA" tab displayed on SharePoint Portal
Server (SPPS) web pages took users to the ONA Current Summary (ONA Today) page. From
there, additional tabs permitted access to the ONA Matrix, ONA References, and Related
Products pages. All information included on these pages was located on the SPPS.
A tab transferred
Ease of Information Retrieval from 0 users to the stand-alone
ONA database.
60, ~
Manipulation of the
SPPS pages was
50~--------------------------~.
straightforward. Links
within these pages to
40
~-----------
'""
supporting documents
"'"aiF 30 ~----------- supplied additional
"
0:: background and
..
'0
20~-----1
reference; the operation
was essentially "typical"
and intuitive. The ONA
10+---
database was the primary
source for effects-based
n = 120
plan development
lovery easy Somewhat easy o Somewhat difficult OVery difficult I support. It contained
linkages to provide a
Figure 138: Ease of ONA information retrieval
range of options to
achieve an effect; nodes;
actions; resources; references; PMESII systems; secondary effects; and conflict phases. Users
could select these components to support development and modification of plans as well as
decision-making. However, the actions required to do the mixing and matching were not
obvious. Even using the attached user's guide did not help smooth operations for many
experiment participants. Their survey comments indicated it took too long to review the help
information and even when they did, use of the database was still confusing.
Figures 137, 138 and 139 detail the experiment participants' thoughts during Spiral 3 and
execution on manipulation of the ONA database. Participant responses to a survey question
concerning the ease of information retrieval from the ONA is depicted first, followed by the ease
of filtering and sorting, and, finally, responses to ONA database maintenance and update.
Although the easy/difficult responses are about evenly divided in all three situations, the 50
percent (or so) of participants, who found the database tool relationship difficult to use, were at a
disadvantage.
254 FOR OFFICIl'"L USE ONI,V

Figure 138 displays the ease or difficulty experiment participants had using the ONA
knowledge base during MC02 execution. They were asked to rate their estimate of the ease of
information retrieval from the ONA knowledge base. Forty nine percent of the survey responses
stated it was
difficult (59 of 120) Ease of ONA Information Filter and Sort
and 51 percent
stated it was easy 45,71...................................................................................................................................
(61 of 120). The 40

results were
essentially divided 35
evenly, but the 59 30

participants who II!
<II
II!
reported it was 5 25 + - - - - - /
Co
II!
difficult could not ~ 20 + - - - - - - - - \

<II
'0
contribute as 'It
15 + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
productively to the
JTF's effort 10 + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
because of their
5+---------------
challenge with
ONA. o _L
n = 93
During
LIVery easy .Somewhat easy o Somewhat difficult OVery difficult
I I
Spiral 3, a survey
asked recipients to Figure 139: Ease of ONA Information Filter and Sort
respond to the
statement, "rate the ease of ONA information filter and sort." Shown in figure 139, 49 percent of
the survey responses stated, that it was difficult (46 of 93) and 51 percent stated it was easy (47
of93); the opinions were essentially evenly divided. Half of the respondents said the tools were
difficult to use for filtering and sorting database data. Relating figure 138 to figure 139, there
was no change of opinion percentages about the tool design between Spiral 3 and execution.
Whether filtering and sorting or retrieving information, the percentages were the same between
events.
During Spiral 3 survey, recipients were asked to respond to the statement, "Rate the ease
of ONA information update and maintenance." Depicted in figure 137, 54 percent of the survey
responses stated it was difficult (15 of 28) and 46 percent stated it was easy (13 of 28).
This survey question was really asking about the support offered by the ONA tools.
Almost half of the respondents found the tools difficult to use for ONA database update and
maintenance.
Listed below are comments that emphasize the challenge participants had with ONA
tools.
Participant Comment: "I do not really know how to use the ONA tool so 1 am not sure of
the analysis that it provides."
Participant Comment: "ONA tools are very time consuming."
Participant Comment: "The ONA tool does not communicate the information it
contains."
Participant Comment: "ONA tool needs more database input and more refinement in
terms of data relationships. The ONA process has potential but needs significant refinement to be
F'OR OFFICIi..L USE ONLY 255

useful, including a change in institutionalized processes which disregarded the ONA in favor of
more familiar methods."
Clearly, the tools designed to use the MC02 ONA Knowledge Base presented a challenge
for some of the participants. As noted earlier, experiment designers acknowledged the tools were
less than desired going into the experiment but they also were considered workable. In fact they
were; the ONA was used enough for participants see it's potential. However, the experiment did
demonstrate how important tool support was for ONA. It is an aspect of the concept that
deserves considerable attention.
Finding Requirements for the ONA are different at each command level.
The ONA concept was described in development documents as being applicable from
strategic to tactical levels of command. A positive consideration for this broad relevancy was the
opportunity to have a common reference source for all. Experiment participants indicated a
desire for specific ONA capabilities at the operational level and tactical levels. Inadequate
training and lack of concept understanding probably supported the perception. Although not
specifically spelled out, the ONA concept documents suggested ONA was a theater capability.
The perceived different ONA requirements would create multilevel ONA information needs that
had to be created and satisfied.
ONA should be designed as a source for current BOA status?
20
18
16
14
C/l
CIl
C/l 12
c:
0
c..
C/l 10
-
CIl
r::t::
0 8
'II:
0
Disagree
Agree
JTF HQ- JTF HQ-
oPS n = 95
PLANS
Figure 140: Should ONA be a source for current BDA?
Senior concept developer comments and participant survey comments suggested a single
ONA from strategic to tactical command levels was inappropriate. Results from two survey
questions also took exception to a "one size fits all" conceptual approach. The chart below and

the one that follows provide an indication of the difference of opinion on information
requirements between the JTF and component command levels. The replies show there are
differing views for unique requirements at these two levels. The experiment did not offer an
opportunity for data collection above the JTF level or down to the tactical level.
Shown in figure 140 are results of an execution survey question that asked if ONA should
be a source for current BDA status. At the component level the JF ACC and JSOTF had more
respondents who indicated ONA should not be a source for BDA status. The majority of JTF
headquarters respondents said ONA should be a source ofBDA status. Overall, 62 per cent (59
of 95) agreed that ONA should be designed as a source for current BDA status; 38 percent (36 of
95) disagreed. The significance of this chart is the difference of opinion on ONA design (the
ONA requirements for the command level) between just two levels of command.
In response to the execution survey question as to whether or not ONA should be a
source for current intelligence information, figure 141 shows that at the component level JF ACC,
JFMCC, and JSOTF did not believe current intelligence should be included within ONA. The
JTF headquarters respondents reported it was appropriate for their level.
ONA should be designed as a source for current Intel?
25
20
C/l
CIl
C/l 15
c:
0
c..
C/l
-
CIl
r::t::
0 10
'II:
o
Disagree
Agree
JTF HQ-
n = 98
PLANS
Figure 141: Should ONA be designed as a source for current intelligence information
Again, the message of figures 140 and 141 is not so much the response to the specific
survey question, but rather that the JTF staff and the component command level respondents said
they had different information requirements. Concept understanding and training may have
influenced these replies.

The following observations and comments address ONA concept design that depicts a
single ONA for all levels of command; that is, that a single ONA accommodates all command
levels. The preponderance of comments supported the finding that users perceived different
ONA requirements for different command levels. Additional comments are available at
Appendix C - Additional Observations and Comments.
SCD Observation: "One limitation of the experiment ONA, even during planning phase,
was that it was more useful to the JTF staff than it was to the components."
SCD Observation: "Continue to refine the concept in future exercises and experiments. In
particular, improve its pertinence to component commanders."
SCD Observation: "The JTF HQ consumer (ONA) requirements are different than the
JIACG requirements."
Component Comment: "ONA was not very useful at the component levels. We need hot
links to target folders. We also need better visualization and diagrams to help us interpret data
and information."
SME Comment: "A component will want more fidelity in the ONA than a regional
commander. "
Participant Comment: "If you refer to 'ownership' of the database, believe ONA
management is better suited at the 'combatant commander' level."
Participant Comment: "The only concern with this (the same version of an ONA) is that
certain information is more important to one level than it is to another. The intent of the ONA is
to provide information to the Common Relevant Operational Picture development. Each level
will glean from the data, that which is important to it. Therefore, more emphasis must be placed
on correctly populating a database where a 'one size fits all'."
Finding Lack of understanding of the philosophical intent, relationship to traditional

staff actions, and application of the ONA concept impacted its use.
Understanding the philosophical intent of ONA, its interrelationship with EBO, and how
the JTF could use ONA to accomplish its mission was an experiment breakdown that first
emerged during Spiral 3, but became most apparent during MC02 execution. Concept education
(vice training) wasn't considered a factor bearing on ONA during development of the data
collection matrix, but it should have been.
Senior mentors addressed the education issue during In- Focus and Azimuth Check
sessions. Their comments stressed the need for future leader development, education, and
training on the use of the experiment's new concepts. In their view, a different manor of 'leader
thinking' would be needed and the onus would be on the professional military education system
to pick up the torch. In their view, future leaders would have to be educated to ask the right
questions within the context ofEBO and ONA; their questions would need to be couched within
the context of the new concepts. Essentially a changed culture would "underpin" their thinking.
In addition to senior leaders becoming comfortable with the concepts, junior (staff)
officers also would also need to be proficient with the philosophically, new capabilities. They
would need to mature with an understanding of the new warfighting culture and know what was
needed and where to find it. The new language for prosecuting a conflict would have to be
understood by all. An educational effort would be needed to develop language and culture and
thus equip these military members with a new basis of operation. Likewise, training programs on
the application of tools supporting the concepts would be needed.

The challenge of training participants in the concepts and use of the many new tools first
became evident during Spiral 3 as training programs clashed with other experiment and non-
experiment duties. Time management conflicts frequently were resolved at the expense of
thorough training particularly when conflicts involved senior people. Then not all personnel, who
were trained during Spiral 3, returned for the main experiment a month later. (Details of the
MC02 training program are included at Appendix B - ONA Training). Many participants
indicated in survey comments during Spiral 3 that they were not prepared to use ONA. Day-to-
day activities, late notification for participation, and incomplete training were some of the causes
cited for their not being prepared. These training difficulties were not surprising or unique to
MC02
As noted in Finding 1, many participants had inflated expectations for ONA; it was
thought to offer "solutions for all problems." Referring to the first finding's figure 133, pre-
Adequate ONA Training
80
70
60
C/l 50
CIl
C/l
c:
0
It 40
-
CIl
r::t::
0
'II: 30
20
10
0
Agree Disagree n = 127
Figure 142: Less than half of MC02 participants thought they were adequately trained on ONA
experiment training failed to match participant expectations with ONA capabilities. Another
indicator of training shortcomings impacting MC02 was the number of 'Don't Know' responses.
A good example can be found depicted in Finding 1, figure 134. 'Don't Know' was the response
selection of choice in that particular survey question, highlighting the fact that respondents
weren't adequately trained. If they had been trained, they would have had an opinion.
Tools for using the ONA database were not as simple, effective, or intuitive as desired.
Mentioned in the Methodology and Critical Enablers sections, this was acknowledged prior to
experiment start. Experiment participant comments indicated effective tool training should have

included "hands-on" opportunities. Again, the training enabler was known to be less than desired
going into the experiment. Difficulty using these tools engendered an intimidation factor that
probably tended to steer some participants away from ONA and this too could have impacted
data collection. None-the-less, for those who were trained and exposed to them, ONA tools did
allow productive application of database information.
The overarching education topic of "new think" was not included in the MC02 training
program. Therefore, participants didn't have the level of understanding or an ingrained ONA or
EBO concept operations experience base to draw upon. The frustration of trying to use and apply
the new concepts-that really weren't understood-was woven through participant comments.
Even if the need was recognized, the relationship and philosophical application education
for just the ONA and EBO concepts probably could not have been accomplished in the pre-
experiment time available. Realistically this level of education was probably needed for all
concepts that were included in the experiment. In general, participants did not have the necessary
education, training, or experience needed to properly use (get the most out of) the new concepts
they were asked to employ in MC02.
Shown in Figure 142 are the results of an execution survey question about ONA training.
It asked for agreement or disagreement with the statement, "I was trained adequately to use ONA
for this experiment." The Likert scale options offered for response to the statement included two
levels of agreement and two for disagreement; there was also a 'Don't know' option. For this
depiction, the 10 'Don't Know' responses were included with the 'Disagree' replies as it was
assumed, that if respondents were adequately trained, they would have known it. As shown,
more participants indicated that they were not adequately trained than those who responded that
they were adequately trained.
Spiral 3 participant survey comments concerning training presented a similar view of the
training challenge. A JTF plans participant provided the following comments that generally
summarize the common thrust of them all. He offered, "Having not been trained, or informed
properly about the ONA system or even understanding the premise upon which it is based, I am
not qualified to answer this."
Previously, figures 138 and 139 presented the difficulty ONA tools offered experiment
participants. As discussed with the critical enablers and also mentioned in Finding 4, these tools
were acknowledged to be less than desired before the experiment began, but a thorough training
program could have compensated for many of their weaknesses. Based on survey results,
training was not sufficient to solve the problem.
During execution, participants were asked to rate the ease of information retrieval from
the ONA database. That was, "How well did the ONA tools allow you to obtain information
from the database?" or, stated another way, "Did your command of the ONA tools allow you to
obtain desired information from the ONA database?" Negative replies would tend to indicate a
lack of tool command that in turn was probably tied to inadequate tool training. Shown in Figure
143, the respondents with an opinion were about evenly divided between "Easy" and "Difficult."
Even so, the 49 percent responding with "Difficult" translated into 59 of the 120 survey-group
respondents, who possibly lost the use of ONA and the perspective it presented. Lack of training
prevented them from participating at the same level as the others.
In a Spiral 3 survey, participants were asked to rate the ease of ONA information update
and maintenance if they had "write permission" (See Figure 144). There were constraints as to
who initially had ONA database modification authority (write permission) to control the
information accuracy. Of the 28 who responded, 54 percent (15 of28) indicated it was difficult.
260 FORO ONLY

To add further context to this response, participants with authorized write permission in this
phase of the experiment had been using the ONA database prior to Spiral 3. Probably more of a
statement about tool use difficulty, the replies still provided evidence of a shortcoming that
training was not able to overcome.
The following observations and comments discuss SCD, SME, and senior participant
Ease of Information Retrieval from ONA Knowledge Base
50+_----------------------------------~
40+_--------------------
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~30+_-------------------
-
~
o
'II:
20 + - - - - - 1
10 +_-----
n = 120
II!'l]Veryeasy Somewhat easy o Somewhat difficult OVery difficult I
Figure 143: Information retrieval received mixed grades
thoughts' about participant ONA education and training. The discussion above about education,
a new "culture," and a requirement for military members to develop a new way to think when
using MC02 type concepts and tools was needed when reviewing the comments. Between the
lines of the comments was respondent frustration of not being culturally prepared to employ the
concepts. Additional observations and comments concerning training and education are included
at Appendix C -- Additional Observations and Comments.
SCD Comment: "These knowledge workers (ONA analysts) must be inquisitive, they
must have holistic perspectives, and they must be "paranoid" about the opponent tricking or
deceiving them. We need a balance between analytic thinkers and some people who rely more on
synthesis for their thinking. We must prepare these mental skills in our Service and joint school
systems."
SCD Comment: "Future leaders will have to learn to think differently than we do today,
more relationally than we do today. ONA is promising because it is relational. We will no longer
have to break information into piece parts and analyze the information for trends. Today we
analyze information. In the future, we will have to synthesize disparate data, and build

combinations, relationships and to do that we'll have to start earlier and teach commanders and
key staff to think relationally. The education will be a long-term challenge. Training will take
place later, but it will be equally important to teach people to use the relational tools."
Participant Comment: "I wasn't really 'trained' to use ONA. Someone showed me where
Ease of ONA Information Update and Maintenance
C/l
CIl
~ 8 +------/
o
c..
C/l
~ '''R,ecornmelnd tighter control of

'0 6 +-------'"-------- those who get write permissions or
'II:
institute a requirement that all
changes to ONA go immediately
through a central collection and
4+----------- dissemination officer."
2 +----
o~---
n = 28
Il!'l]veryeasy Somewhat easy o Somewhat difficult OVery difficult I
Figure 144: Ease of Information Update and Maintenance in ONA Knowledge Base
to find the database and I figured it out from there. Maybe I don't know all it can do?"
Participant Comment: "If you don't know what u (you) want it is a little daunting as a
database to learn and find what u (you) want out of it."
The predominant symptoms of inadequate training were participant ONA tool criticism
and inhibited use of the ONA knowledge base and its database (See Appendix F: ONA
Knowledge Base Access and Use Details Participant Use Of ONA). Survey comments from
Spiral 3 and execution spoke to the lack of inadequate tool training. The concept education issue
was not as obvious. The requirement existed, but most participants simply didn't notice it. They
didn't know what they didn't know.
A senior concept developer summarized the education and training challenge finding for
MC02, "It is also clear that we do not yet have the training competency to understand how to get
into, update, and employ the ONA. Today we don't come at stuff that way. There is benefit when
people can employ ONA. However, there is no benefit when people are using the system they
grew up with instead of ONA because they can't reach intuitive conclusions. In the future, we
will require an entirely different way to train. We don't yet understand the power of the ONA."

Other Observations
Observation 1: Users were not uniformly aware that ONA was being updated, which led to
an unwarranted decrease in confidence in ONA information.
Maintaining information update and currency would be a challenging effort for any
system that supports a dynamic situation. For ONA to provide the support described in the
concept papers, its data and analysis had to be continuously updated. This was expected to be a
difficult challenge for ONA. In addition to effecting the changes, notification of update was an
additional challenge for the ONA during the experiment. As noted in the analysis methodology
section, tools that would
Important to be Notified of ONA Analysis Updates
complement ONA were not as
/ sophisticated as desired.
60T ..............................................................................~ ............................. I~,
Experiment participants could

50
"subscribe" for notification when
context information was changed
40

(ONA Today; matrix; etc.) and
they could scroll to the bottom of
~ 30
'" database pages to check currency
20 of that page (who changed; when
changed; what changed).
10
U sing the first tool
generally meant a steady stream of
n =126 screen alerts as updates were made
I CJ Strongly agree II Agree 0 Disagree 0 Strongly disagree I
and participants did not long
tolerate the ensuing interruptions.
Figure 145: Important to be notified of ONA analysis updates
Nevertheless, even though
reviewing each page in the ONA
relational database was tedious, that was how the tools provided change notification to the
operator.
A process for ONA change and update was included in SJFHQ TTPs; individuals were
identified to make the changes. During Spiral 3, ONA update was not noted as a problem, but
during execution, user comments reflected decreasing confidence in ONA when information was
thought to be outdated. Review of
Can Tell W he nON A has bee n Update d ONA database access and change
7Or7------~--_7r_-------------------------,m activity indicated that changes
60 (update) actually were made
50
during execution, but most users
were not aware they had been
made. ONA information currency
10
20 +-----------t+_[}~
+------------- ~
did not satisfy the users.
Inadequate training might have
been part of the reason
participants failed to take n "' 100
I
I
ICJStrongly agree _Agree DDisagree DStrongly disagree
advantage of these notification
Figure 146: Can tell when ONA has been updated capabilities
The charts here and that
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI IV 263

follow indicate the importance ONA users placed on database currency and update. ONA users
endorsed the currency requirement. Survey responses suggested the ONA knowledge base
(including the database) was not continually updated to reflect battlespace change. The update
process seemed to operate correctly from the view of those involved with the process, but
because of the notification tool challenges, the currency actions taken (updates) were not seen by
participants. The result, participants did not see ONA update as adequate.
Execution participant responses to the statement, "It is important to be notified of ONA
analysis updates," were definitely supportive. In figure 145, 88 percent (Ill of 126) of
respondents with an opinion agreed; 12 percent (15 of 126) disagreed. Of those who disagreed
(15 survey recipients) seven provided comments. Five of these seven respondents based their
disagreement on the assumption ONA would be continuously updated and therefore notification
was not needed. Essentially, they were in agreement with the statement and their position
increased the percentage of actual agreement from 88 to 92 percent.
During Spiral 3, as shown in Figure 146, 81 percent (81 of 100) of survey respondents
Total Spiral 3 ONA Database Changes
700,....................................................................................................................................................................... 1
600+-----------------------------------~ ~i~--------------------------1
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-- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I"- Ol
..... ..... 0 ..... N M ~ CO Ol 0 ..... ..... N M ~ in <0 I"- CO Ol 0 ..... ..... ..... .....
..... ..... N ~ M
N N N N N N N M M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 147: ONA database changes
with an opinion stated they could not tell when the ONA had been changed or updated ("Can you
tell when ONA has been updated?"); 19 percent reported they could tell when changes or
updates were made. As previously discussed there was no built-in update notification feature
associated with the ONA database; ifusers wanted to see currency status they had to initiate
notification action. Pre-experiment training may have contributed to the situation.
These results combined with those of figure 145 showed the importance experiment
participants placed on ONA update and notification.

Figure 147 indicates a gradual increase in the ONA database daily cumulative data
changes as Spiral 3 approached but a gradual decrease in the cumulative data changes in the
ONA database as Spiral 3 progressed. This decreasing data change trend occurred because the
SOSA cell was tasked for information by the plans group and did not have time to maintain their
pre-Spiral 3 data change tempo. It should also be mentioned that the gross number of changes
may have decreased during this period but, after checking with SJFHQ members who made
changes, those that were made had high impact and relevance for the users.
Figure 148, below, displays a gradual increase in the number of changes to the ONA
database as the start of the experiment approached, but a gradual decrease in the cumulative data
changes in the ONA database as execution progressed. Once again, the changes made were to
nodes, actions, and links that were of great interest to the users. As planning events (shown in the
text boxes at the top of the graph in Figure 148) lead to operations, effect-node-action
relationships were impacted and changed.
Changes were made to the ONA and the participants placed high importance on that, but
they could not tell when it had been changed.
Total Execution ONA Database Changes
1200 JTF Mission
1000
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IOJFACC DllJFLCC OJPOTF DllJTF IIIIISJFHQ I
Figure 148: Total execution ONA database changes
Observation 2: Both ONA warfighting challenges were met.

Analysis of the challenge, task, measure, data requirement, and data element ONA
matrix, which is included at Appendix A - ONA Data Collection Matrix Analysis, determined
that these warfighting challenges were met.

Observation 3: It was observed that the experiment's ONA knowledge base did not include
Blue force logistics data or information.
All of the Blue logistical support data and planning information was available from the
Log CROP, but the Log CROP could not be accessed through the ONA knowledge base because
the Log CROP had a separate portal page on the common experiment server. This architecture
was contrary to the ONA concept's depiction of an integrated intelligence, operational, and
logistics information warehouse that supported effects-based planning and ultimately produced
an ETO. The suggested relationship was intended to create routine interaction between the three
specialties that would also produce more efficient and effective use of resources. Implementation
of the logistic portion of the ONA knowledge base requires further definition.

Within the context ofMC02, ONA directly impacted experiment objectives one and four.
Indirectly the concept impacted and was impacted by each of the objectives.
- Experiment objective 1, 'Establish InformationlKnowledge Superiority', contained two
warfighting challenges; ONA knowledge was needed for successful accomplishment of both
- Experiment objective 4, 'Conduct Decisive, Effects Based Operations', had three objectives
and all used ONA information. In fact, there were SCD statements that said EBO was not
possible without an ONA and they must be discussed together

- There was no baseline data available with which to compare ONA. SMEs offered some
comments on their estimate of ONA impact on JTF performance. These were founded on their
personal experience and perception from the training environment and were not made in relation
to a historical baseline
DOTMLPF Linkage
The ONA DOTMLPF package included five training related recommendations. They
were:
Development of ONA Training Plan
Evaluate Training Strategies
Development ofPME Strategies
Evaluate and Implement Methods to Incorporate ONA Education Programs into Existing
Intelligence Training Programs
Services Incorporate ONA Education Strategies
- MC02 Final Report, ONA Finding 6 (Lack of understanding impacted ONA use), links with
each of these DOTMLPF training recommendations. However, before moving too far along with
them, response to MC02 Final Report ONA Finding 1 is needed. Without a clear definition and
understanding of what ONA is to do; what it includes; and how it is to be used, training
programs cannot be developed. The ONA concept needs clear articulation
- Another ONA DOTMLPF package recommendation was to, "Continue SJFHQ
Experimentation Efforts to Determine Requirements for ONA Development. " That

recommendation links easily with ONA Findings 1,2, and 5. Once again, the considerations of
ONA Finding 1 need to precede this DOTMLPF recommendation
- Finally the DOTMLPF recommendation for, "DARPA 'ONA for EBO' Tool Development"
tracks with ONA Finding 4. The ONA Finding stresses the importance that tools supporting
ONA need to enhance a "mind's eye" view of the information in the knowledge base
Recommendations
1. JFCOM, define the intended use of ONA. ~
- ONA's warfighting contribution must be detailed and "packaged" for universal understanding.
The concept currently presents ONA as having a range of options for all conflict and command
levels. Technology can or will support many variations of a knowledge base but until the
military's intended use for the ONA process and product is understood, implementation will be
disrupted. The ONA message needs to be articulated; USJFCOM must design and implement a
campaign that does it. ONA is "very young" and can generate more questions than answers at
this point; it needs a trace that connects its dots. USJFCOM must specifically define what ONA
is to be used for; the command level it is to serve; how it is developed and maintained; and the
type of information it will offer. These decisions need to be made before ONA development can
move forward and supporting elements like tools and training can be shaped. Based on the
results of an internal development effort, USJFCOM can shape understanding of ONA and
sponsor further experimentation. The process can prepare the command for other questions
critics of the concept will have waiting.
2. JFCOM, establish a section within joint experimentation that designs visualization models for
its concepts. ~
- Participants voiced frustration with not having common understanding of the ONA concept. A
visual depiction of ONA needs to be built that provides a clear unambiguous mental picture for
all. This same approach needs to be used for the other joint experimentation concepts.
3. JFCOM, focus ONA development on the command level for which it was designed. ~
- There may be aspects of ONA that can have relevancy for several command levels without
particular specialization. If so and ONA is available to them, these aspects should be exploited
by the various levels. However, if ONA is to be implemented it must be focused on the level
specified in the concept (operational). Current technology may permit distribution of ONA from
strategic to tactical command levels, but the information (the "programming") will still have be
designed and broadcast for the primary level. Other levels will have particular interests that are
pertinent for them. The information can be used as needed for perspective. However, at this point
in its development, ONA needs to be focused; its applicability can be expanded as training and
technology mature with the concept.
4. JFCOM, develop a PME template that guides development of joint and service ONA concept
education and training. ~
- This template should describe the concept and then propose the new manor of leader thinking
that will be needed to employ it. For all future experimentation with ONA, participants must be
prepared as much as possible for the different way of thinking these concepts will require. They

must be trained and proficient with them. They will need the training background to use the
ONA concept correctly. USJFCOM needs to identify training building blocks and present them
so other joint organizations and the services can build unambiguous PME training courses that
place ONA in context.
5. JFCOM, design ONA knowledge base tools that are intuitive to use and dynamically support
developers and users. ~
- Complaints about the tools supporting ONA most often cited them as not being intuitive to use.
Access and manipulation tools must be straightforward and simple to employ. Additionally,
artificial intelligence process tools will be needed to identify pertinent information from the
bundles of data that are reviewed. They will need the ability to continually read, categorize
(taxonomy), and organize (index) large quantities of documents across file systems, web sites
and databases using artificial intelligence data/web crawlers. The tools will also need the ability
to notify users via various avenues when content or concepts are changed according to
predefined rules. Once the significant pieces of information are developed, they will need to be
pushed to the appropriate users. Developmental tools that perform these functions as well as
decision support tools need to be built and incorporated with the concept. They will need "push"
from USJFCOM. Relationship of the elements included within the ONA database-planning tool
was another concern. They asked for a process that would permit visualization of how these
ONA elements related to each other. To address the need for Effect-Node-Action visualization
requirements, the tool needs a graphical application that could visually portray interrelationships
and linkages of the relevant concept information being categorized and indexed. This visual
capability needs to be built into ONA support tools. JFCOM needs to oversee a coordinated
process that causes all of these tool capabilities to be developed. Until ONA is fielded,
USJFCOM must keep the ONA tool development and integration effort moving.
6. JFCOM, in conjunction with a combatant commander, develop a prototype ONA. ~
- An ONA knowledge base prototype must be cast. A defined group that would be expected to
develop an ONA should construct this prototype. It should address a real world circumstance and
be available for real world use when completed. Development and update tools, employment
procedures, and other knowledge base components can be refined and improved by using it as a
test-bed. Technology and experience will shape changes but the prototype will be the common
starting point.
268 FOR OFFICIAL USE ON.,y

Appendix A - ONA Data Collection Matrix Analysis

The context of the exercise/experiment did influence both of the ONA warfighting
challenges. For the first challenge, combatant commander Blue's strategy for the experiment was
developed outside of scenario play but within the bounds of the experiment's ONA. JTF Blue
employed this strategy. The experiment developed ONA was used for reference and support.
Tasks associated with the second challenge were successfully completed using ONA during the
experiment. ONA supported enhanced decision-making.
ONA Warfighting Challenge 7.1: Ability to construct and use ONA knowledge base
to support development of an effects-based strategy
Challenge 1 Supporting Tasks:
Develop an ONA knowledge base
Analyze Red's PMESII systems (for tangible and intangible strengths and weaknesses)
Continually update the ONA to reflect battlefield change
Employ automated tools to virtually and collaboratively access, manipulate, and maintain the
ONA knowledge base
Task 7.1.1: Develop an ONA knowledge base

An ONA knowledge base was developed by JFCOM J9 for the MC02 experiment. It was
not as robust as the product included in concept description documents, but was complete
enough to effectively stimulate experiment activity. The ONA knowledge base was defined to
include all ONA related data and information presentations (ONA Today; ONA Matrix; ONA
References; ONA Products; ONA Database) available to experiment participants. The ONA
database provided support for effects-based plan development and revision.
Review of database development and change was conducted by using a Structured Query
Language (SQL) database audit log. SQL triggers made entries to the audit log when certain
events occurred in the ONA database tables. The audit log essentially recorded or "counted" user
activity. The ONA database contained detailed data tables on nodes, effects, actions, resources,
references and Effects Based Operations (EBO) plans. Manipulation of these tables could be
made relative to the conflict phase Deter and
national power capability (DIME),
and adversary systems (PMESII).
When a change was made to an
EBO based plan, the activity was
added to another table titled
Selected NAE (Node-Action-
Effect) Link. This provided
indication of plan change activity.
When a document was linked to
an Effect, Node, Action or
Resource it too was noted and
recorded within the Reference
table. Review of the count totals
provided insight as to how the
database was used and by whom. Figure 149: ONA desktop snapshot
Spiral 3 and execution

count and survey results indicated task 7.1.1 was completed. The several charts that follow detail
this finding. Database change activity and survey result information were used to support the
conclusion that an ONA knowledge base was developed. Figure 149 is a screen capture of the
browser-based user access page to the ONA database from which the audit log (mentioned
above) derived its data.
The following four figures depict the browser-based ONA database data changes
(additions, deletions, corrections, updates, etc.) and database viewings that were made during
development of the ONA database. While all participants had "viewing" privileges, some
participants had "write" privileges to the ONA database. The pre Spiral 3 activity levels starting
17 May are included to show a relative level of effort before the experiment start. Unfortunately,
not all of the knowledge base development in March and April was captured because the audit
log had not been created.
Pre Spiral 3 ONA Database Changes By Effect-Node-Action-Resource-

Reference
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
o
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Figure 150: Pre Spiral 3 ONA Database Changes
Information in the ONA database was linked to the categories Effects, Nodes, Actions,
Resources, and References. The category titled "Selected N-A-E (Node-Action-Effect) link"
shows the level of change activity in the Effects Based Operations (EBO) plans area of the ONA
database. These database categories could be changed. Whenever an addition, deletion,
correction, update, or other plan modification action was made, the database audit log received a
count. Figure 150 breaks out the categories and their amount of data change activity from 17
May to 2 June. Nodes and Selected N-A-E links were the predominant areas where data was
being changed. Changes to Effects, Actions, and Resources data were minimal.
Figure 151 displays ONA database change actions prior to and during Spiral 3 that was
principally a planning evolution. During the 17 May to 2 June period, the System of Systems
Analysis (SOSA) cell conducted data change activity (additions, deletions, corrections, updates,
270 FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONI,V

etc.) within the ONA database. This modification and development action presented database
development just prior to Spiral 3. Discussion with members of the SOSA cell confirmed this
pattern of database development was typical for their entire build process.
It was not a smooth straight-line development effort. As information was developed and
matured, it was added to the database. Some days seemed more productive than others did, but
this productivity wasn't
necessarily related to the Total Spiral 3 ONA Database Changes
effort expended for the
day. The bar graph 700
depicts a gradual 600

increase in the
cumulative data changes 500
(development) in the '"

~ 400

0
ONA database as Spiral

u
~
3 approached and a
~ KMission.Anal sisv ~ v>----
"li
.. 300
c
modest, but decreasing ,.'0
level of data change 200
activity during the
T
100 c--
o~ ~~
mission analysis and
course of action (COA) 0 El ill m rn ill m
phases of Spiral 3 '"~ '"~ '"~ '"e '"~ '"~ '"~ '"~ '"~ '"~ '"e '"e '"~ '"~ '"~ '"~ '"~ '"~ '"~ '"~ '"~ '"e '"~ '"~ '"~
~ ~ ~ ~
i'ii 0i'ii !:! !:! !:! !:! !:! !:! !:! !::! !::! e e e e e e e e e iii iii iii iii iii
planning development 0 0
III
0 0
III
0
III
0 0
III
0
III
0 0
III
0
III
0 0 0
III
0
III
0 0
CD
0
CD
0
CD
0
CD
0 0
CD
0
CD
0
CD CD CD
process. One
contributing factor to the Figure 151: Pre Spiral 3 ONA Database Changes
"apparent decline" in
activity was that the SOSA analysts were heavily engaged in creating thousands of links between
the various effects, nodes and actions and, unfortunately, this linking activity had not been
programmed for capture by the audit log during Spiral 3 or execution. The collection
requirement is being programmed for future experiments.
Figure 152 also presents perspective on database development. All participants had
"viewing" privileges, but some participants had "write" privileges to the ONA database as well.
Due to the constructs of the ONA audit log, participants making changes to the data were also
counted as viewers since access was browser based. Figure 152 depicts the cumulative viewing
of the ONA database by all experiment participants via their web browser before and during the
Spiral 3 periods. The May 17 - June 2 period activity represented SOSA cell viewing activity for
the continued ONA database population just prior to Spiral 3.
All viewing activity by experiment participants and SOSA analysts' during Spiral 3 (June
3-14) was as shown by the vertical bars. Potentially, each time the database was viewed a change
could have been made and additional database development conducted. As with the database
change chart, figure 152 shows a gradual increase in the cumulative participant viewing (and
potential development) of the ONA database as Spiral 3 progressed through the mission analysis
and COA phases of the JTF planning development process.
Figure 153, on the next page, depicts the cumulative viewing of the ONA database by all
experiment participants via their web browser just prior to and during MC02 execution. This
chart is included with this first challenge task (7.1.1) to support the challenge requirement of not
only constructing an ONA database, but also "using" it.

The figure displays two increase and decrease cycles in the cumulative viewing of the
ONA database as the execution scenario progressed. During the first cycle, there did seem to be
some correlation between PJIanmng an d t h e IeveI0fvIewmg ' actIvIty. Al t h ougJh t h e vIewmg
peaked after
Total Spiral 3 ONA Database Web Viewing
planning had
begun, it may 3500
have been used to
confirm courses 3000
of action
2500
presented in the
plans or to J!I
:i: 2000
follow-up on <II
guidance received '"'" 0..

r:1
'0 1500 I--- f- f-
I'L
from the 'It
'U Pre I /1r:J /
Spiral 3 Mission II1~Si~ eOA
commander 1000 f- f- "-
during the
planning review 500 f- f- f- f- f- f-
1
-
process.
After the
0 fl
N N
m
N N
~
N
R
N N N N N N N
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CJTF emphasized !::!
.... ~ ...!::!!::! ~ ~ !::! !::! !::! !::! !::! ~ !::!
;;;
~
!::! !2 iD iD
N
'"iD iD ....iD iDCD 00
~ ~
to the staff (and '" '" '" iD iD
components)
during Figure 152: ONA Database Viewing
collaborative
review sessions the need to use ONA, there does appear to have been a direct correlation in the
second cycle between planning activity and ONA database viewing activity.
Note the
Execution ONA Database Viewing by Group SJFHQ and JTF
viewing activity
3500 I I JT.::;n ~ Hos~tart ~I Planning W M E H Planning Op
remained fairly
Planning Sites Seizure Jo~nt St~
3000 +----------i~T-S C2
I JTF Focus on Planning Islands I "--/
~eizur~r----------
constant during
execution; so the
-~ ""~
2500 t----:;;r=-====;-.i CJTF Emphasizes
PlanningWME I
Sites Seizure r - - - - - - - - - changes in viewing
J!I /'1J Pre I ONA Use
:E ~Execution.1 amplitude was
~2000+---~====~ ~if-~~---------~=---------
'"
Co
generally
.c
~ 1 5 0 0 + - - - -__~5f_~~ i~~-~__--~__~__~5f_~------- attributable to the
'0
'It
viewing activity of
1000 + - - - -__ ~5f_1UU!l_~- - - BI-I"I-___ ~ - - - -
the components. In
500
-I addition, a portion
of this viewing
0
-N "'"N N
;:; ~ N ;;; ~
0 0
N
0
N
0
N N N
iD ;:: co a; ;:; ~
0 0 0
N
0
N
0
N N N
e
N
e
N
e
~ !::! !2 :;t !!1 !e !::: se !11
N
e e
N
e e
!!
e
N N N
activity was due to
changes made to
;:: ;:: ;:: ;:: ;:: ;:: co
N N N N N N N N N C'? C'?
;:: ;:: ;:: ;:: ;:: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
the ONA database.
IOJFACC IilIIJFLCC OJFMCC IilIIJPOTF DJSOTF DJTF .SJFHQ I
These changes also
resulted in viewing
"counts or hits."
Figure 153: execution ONA Database Viewing by Group

Key to ONA knowledge base development was pre-analyzed PMESII and DIME data.
Figure 154 shows that development was thorough enough that the analysis was understood by 84
percent (76 of91)
of survey
respondents. 60, I ~~,
Execution
survey group 50+_----------------
members were
asked to consider 40+_----------------
the statement, III
Q)
III
"ONA analysis of "o

~30+_----------------
Q)
a:
Blue DIME vs.
Red PMESII is
'5
20+---
..
understood. "
Figure 154 10+---
shows that
respondents with o ~
n = 91
an OpInIOn
I LJ Understand completely III Somewhat understand 0 Somewhat don't understand 0 Don't understand at all I
indicated the
MC02 knowledge
Figure 154: ONA analysis is generally understood
base presented the
DIME and PMESII analysis well enough that it was understood by more than 84 percent of
them. Some 16 percent reported they did not understand the analysis.
Another indicator of database development adequacy was the database's utility. In
ONA ANALYSIS of Blue DIME vs. Red PMESII is Thorough & Useful
50,............................................................................................................c.......................................................................... / / .................................................. 1
45+_-------------------
40+_-------------------
35+_-------------------
:ll
II)
30 + _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
r::::
o
~25+_-------------------
~
'0 20 + _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
'It
15+_-------------------
10 + _ - - - - -
5 +_-----
o .....................
~
n = 76
I !ill] Strongly agree !ill] Agree D Disagree D Strongly disagree I
Figure 155: ONA analysis is thorough and useful according to majority

addition to being understood, figure 155 shows that during MC02 execution the pre-analyzed
PMESII and DIME data were thorough and useful for 75 percent (57 of 76) of the respondents,
who agreed or disagreed, 25 percent (19 of 76) of this group disagreed. Twenty-five percent of
the total population surveyed indicated they did not know how to respond to the statement. Those
who included comments with the "Don't know" said insufficient training was the reason for their
response.
Shown in figure 156 is another measure of ONA database development adequacy. The
ONA concept portrays a knowledge base that contains analysis of both Blue and Red data.
Results of a Spiral 3 survey question asking for response to the statement, "ONA analysis of
Blue information is useful," indicated the majority of respondents from the population with an
opinion (51) agreed the analyzed Blue information was useful; but almost as many from the
population (49) didn't know (weren't sure) about the statement. At this point in the experiment
(Spiral 3), the uncertainty of so many respondents probably reflected their initial exposure to the
ONA concept and associated inadequate training. Of those who agreed or disagreed, 51 percent
agreed with the statement. The results say there was an operative ONA developed.
Finally, development of ONA (among its other contributions) was to provide situational
awareness. Presentation of shared battlespace awareness was a desired ONA attribute and an
indicator of knowledge base development adequacy. In figure 157, three times as many survey
respondents (66) agreed that the ONA knowledge base presented a shared awareness of the
battlespace as those who disagreed (21). These numbers said 76 percent (66 of 87) agreed and 24
percent (21 of 87) disagreed. Fifteen percent (15 of 102) of all respondents said they did not
know.
Review of database change activity, total viewing of the database, viewing of the
database by participant organization in relation to on-going scenario activity, and participant
responses to database understandability and utility questions all support the assessment that task
7.1.1 was developed (and use) of an ONA information database, was successfully completed.
ONA Analysis of Blue Information is Useful
60, ~~ /~ /
50+-----------------~~--
40+-----------------~.
'"
Q)
"'o"
~ 30+---------------
Q)
0::
'0
'It
20 +--------i
10 + - - - -
o L ..............................
n = 105
IlliiStrongly agree .Agree lliIOisagree lliIStrongly disagree 1III00n't Know I
Figure 156: ONA analysis of Blue is useful

Task 7.1.2 Analyzes Red's PMESII systems for tangible and intangible strengths and
weaknesses.
Central to the ONA concept is available, understandable, and useful analyzed adversary
data. Because of the pre-experiment real world circumstances, the ONA knowledge base
Understanding ONA Analysis of Red PMESII Systems
80
70
60
C/l 50
CIl
C/l
c:
0
It 40
-
~
0
'II: 30
20
10
0
n =121
I E!!I Understand completely. Somewhat understand D Somewhat don't understand D Don't understand at all I
Figure 157: Eighty-two percent of respondents said they understood ONA analysis of Red PMESII
developed by JFCOM tended to be militarily flavored. However, there was sufficient cross
culture breadth and depth of the Red PMESII spectrum included, that a sense of interagency
involvement was established within the database. Survey results for questions that addressed task
7.1.2 indicated it was accomplished successfully. The three charts that follow detail the measures
that supported completion of this task.
Figure 157 depicts execution respondent understanding of the ONA Red PMESII
analysis. Eighty-two percent (99 of 121) of the survey respondents with an opinion indicated
they understood the analysis; the response comments said the analysis was comprehensive
enough for their purposes. Twenty-two respondents (18 percent) reported they 'somewhat' or
'completely' did not understand the Red PMESII analysis.
Utility of the Red PMESII analysis for experiment participants was also an indication of
how well the Red PMESII systems were analyzed. Spiral 3 (when contingency planning was
conducted) participants were presented with the statement, "ONA analysis of Red PMESII is
useful." In figure 159, on the next page, 90 percent (91 of 101) of the respondents who agreed or
disagreed reported the Red PMESII analysis was useful and 10 percent (10 of 101) indicated it

wasn't useful. Nineteen percent (23 of 124) of the total population surveyed did not have an
OpInIOn.
Successful analysis of Red PMESII systems within the ONA was largely measured by its
identification of Red
ONA Analysis Supported Understanding of Red Goals, Int ..,nt,,,,n,,,_ goals, intentions,
Strengths and Weaknesses
strengths, and
80, ,~
/
weaknesses. Spiral 3
survey recipients
were asked to agree or
60 + _ - - - - - - -
disagree with the
~50+-------- statement, "ONA
"'"o~40+_------- analysis supported
'"" understanding of
OPFOR goals,
20 t-------l intentions, and
weaknesses. "
10+----
Shown in
figure 158 there was
lemstronglyagree _Agree em Disagree em Strongly disagree
n = 95
strong respondent I
agreement (82
Figure 158: ONA analysis of OPFOR goals, intentions, strengths, and percent; 78 of 95)
weaknesses among those
agreeing or disagreeing that the ONA analysis did provide the noted OPFOR information; 12
percent (17 of 95) disagreed. The 38 respondents who answered N/A to this survey question
represented 29 percent (38 of 133) of the total survey population. There were only two of these
NI A responses with
comment and they ONA Analysis of Red PMESII is Useful
indicated ONA was not f
80T............................................................................................ ,-~................
used. This was normal

for NIA question 70+_------------=~
responses provided to
60 + _ - - - - - - -
other survey questions
and for other surveys. ~50t---------
(f)
Again, these responses "o

~40~~~~~~--
probably reflect Spiral 1'1.
'0
3' s initial exposure to 'It 30
the concept and the

20+_--
participants training. "I haven't had any
need to use theONA"
Participants were asked 10+_--
if they understood the

o ...............................
~
ONA analysis of Red

n = 101
PMESII; if the analysis I em Strongly agree _ Agree em Disagree em Strongly disagree I
of Red PMESII was

useful; and if the ONA Figure 159: ONA Analysis of Red is Useful
analysis identified OPFOR's goals, intentions, strengths, and weaknesses. Their replies were
positive for each. Based on the responses, task 7.1.2 was assessed as accomplished.

Tasks 7.1.3 Continually update the ONA to reflect battlespace change

Maintaining information update and currency would be a challenging effort for any
system that supports a dynamic situation. For ONA to provide the support as described in the
concept papers, its data
ONA Analysis Supported Understanding of Red Goals, Intentions, and analysis would
Strengths and Weaknesses have to be
80, " -......... /
continuously updated.
Update was expected
70+_--------------------------~
to be a difficult
60 + _ - - - - - - - challenge for ONA.
~50+--------
During Spiral 3, ONA
'""o update was not noted
~40+--------
as a problem. During
'" execution, user
20 +_---1 no'hingmuch
comments reflected
decreasing confidence
10+---- in ONAwhen
information was found
n = 95 to be outdated. Review
I ICJ Strongly agree ICJAgree o Disagree o Strongly disagree I
of ONA database
access and change
Figure 160: ONA Analysis of OPFOR Goals, Intentions, Strengths, and activity indicated that
Weaknesses
changes (update) were
actually made during execution, but it seems that they were not readily apparent to the
participants and did not keep pace with participant expectations for the scenario activities.
A process for ONA change and update was included in SJFHQ TTPs; individuals were
identified to make the
changes. None-the- ONA Provides Good Shared Awareness (understanding) of the
less, currency response 8attlespace
that satisfied the users

was not achieved. For
instance, the ONA did 60+_--------------------------~~
not provide a site for

50+_-------
review of impacts on
the opposition because '~40+_-------
" Q)
o
of Blue attacks. There a.
'" Q)
were model/simulation ~30+--------

'It
environment realities
20+_-------
that contributed to the
update challenge. 10+_-------
As noted in the
following quote of a o~--
JFMCC participant, n = 87
Clstrongly agree .Agree ClDisagree Clstrongly disagree
I I
ONA currency did not
always "trickle-down" Figure 161: ONA Provides Awareness of 8aUlespace
to the component level;

"At the component level it (ONA) wasn't dynamically updated causing a static planning
environment. "
The charts that follow indicate the importance ONA users placed on database currency
and update. Database access information and participant survey responses suggested the ONA
knowledge base (including the database) was updated to reflect battlespace change but not to the
degree of participants' expectations or ability to recognize the changes. For this reason, ONA
update was found to be marginal.
Figure 162: The number of ONA

Total Spiral 3 ONA Database Changes
changes depicted during the
June 3-14 period represents all 700
of the Spiral 3 data change

600
activities by participants and
SOSA analysts. The figure 500
indicates a gradual increase in
~
the ONA database cumulative fi 400
data changes as Spiral 3 ~

approached and a gradual .~ 300
~ ~MissionAn~sX COA>---
decrease in the cumulative data " 200

changes in the ONA database
as Spiral 3 progressed. One 100 -
contributing factor to the

"apparent decline" in activity N N
1m
N
I III
N N N N N
rI
N N N
n
N N N
mnllmmn
N N N N N N
~ i !2
~
~ ~ ~
~
was that the SOSA analysts !2 !2 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i !2 ~ ~ ~
were heavily engaged in iO ~ ~ ~ Sl ~ 0~ 0~ ~ 0~ 0~ 0~ 0~ (0 (0 (0 (0 (0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
creating thousands of links

between the various effects,
nodes and actions and, References, Nodes, and selected N-A-E links continued
unfortunately, this linking activity to be the predominant data items that were changed. The peak
had not been programmed for activity on June 4 reflects "last minute" additions to the
capture by the audit log during database by the SOSA cell.
Spiral 3 or execution.
Sp raI 3 ONA Database Cha1ges by Effect-l\Ic:Jde-ktion-R:!srurce-

~rence
Figure 163: The figure displays

the pre-execution (July 8-24)
data change activity in the ONA
database. Nodes and Selected
N-A-E Links (indicative of plan
change) categories saw
moderate levels of data being
changed. Effect and action
items were described in very
broad terms within the
database. As a result, they
generally did not need to be
changed. Changes to effects
and actions data were minimal
during this period Spiral 3 ONA
Database Changes.

Pre Execution ONA Database Changes By Effect-Node-Action-

Resource-Reference
350
300
250
200
Figure 164 above: Depicts the pre-execution database and Figure 165 below depicts the execution
database changes. The execution data change activity in the ONA database from July 22 to August 10
is shown in Figure 164. Again, nodes and selected N-A-E links (plans activity) saw a moderate level of
data being changed. Changes to effects and actions data were also minimal during this period; they
were written in broad language that needed little modification as execution progressed. The plans
activity change spike on Aug 6 may be explained by the joint operation strike planning that was
occurring at the time. Average planning (selected N-A-E links) changes increased from 27 changes per
day during Spiral 3 to 103 changes per day during execution. Average node changes increased from
41 changes per day during Spiral 3 to 62 changes per day during execution. This change activity,
modest as it is, supports the task to continually update the ONA.
Execution ONA Database Changes by Effect-Node-Action-
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
Selected n ae link is indicator

of ONA Plans activity

Execution Effect Phases

(Influence, Coerce, Deter, Compel, Defeat, Transition)
Figure 166: All effects in the ONA database were also tagged with "phase of
engagement" meta-information (influence, coerce, deter, compel, defeat and transition).
The figure breaks out the amount of phase-related data change activity for effects during
execution.
Action DIME
10
Figure 167: Execution ONA action DIME changes. All actions in the ONA database are also
tagged with DIME meta-information. This graph breaks out the amount of actions DIME-related
data change activity during execution. Changes to actions were minimal, sporadic and no trends
were noted.

Action Phases
Figure 168: Execution ONA

action phase changes. All
Actions in the ONA database
are also tagged with phase
meta-information. The
graphs breaks out the
amount of actions phase-
related data change activity
during execution. Changes
to actions were minimal,
sporadic and no trends were
noted.
While figures 162-169, all show there were changes made to the ONA database,
participants generally believed the database was not presenting current information.
Node PMESII
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
o
Figure 169: Execution ONA node PMESII changes. All nodes in the ONA database were also
tagged with "PMESII" meta-information. This graph breaks out the amount of nodes PMESII-
related data change activity during execution. It was anticipated that the nature of data changed
in the database might reflect the phases of engagement with OPFOR. Changes to the nodes
were extensive, but predominantly military and information in nature. A minor change increase
trend noted across all the PMESII meta-information, especially political, economic, social and
infrastructure, around 7 August could have been caused by the transition to peace planning.

Execution participant response to the statement, 'It is important to be notified of ONA

analysis updates,' was definitely supportive. As shown in figure 170, 88 percent (Ill of 126) of
respondents with an opinion agreed; 12 percent (15 of 126) disagreed; and seven percent of all
participants replying to the survey (9 of 135) did not know about the correctness of the
statement.
Important to be Notified of ONA Analysis Updates
60 T ......................................................................................................... A~ ......................................... {~ ............. /
50 +--- -
40 +--- -
~

iF 30 +--- -
&
'6
" 20 +--- -
10 +--- -
n = 126
IEJStrongly agree _Agree DDisagree DStrongly disagree I
Figure 170: Majority thought notification of ONA analysis updates important
Of those who disagreed (15 survey recipients) seven provided comments. Five of these
seven respondents based their disagreement on the assumption ONA would be continuously
updated and therefore notification was not needed. Essentially, they were in agreement with the
statement and their position increased the percentage of actual agreement from 88 to 92 percent.
Can Tell When ONA has been Updated
70,..................................................... /,............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. ,
60+------'---
50
tJ)
Q)
~ 40 +-zc=~=-t
o
a.
tJ)
Q)
0::
'0 30 + - - - - - - - - \
'It
20+---------------~
10+---------
0 1 ======~
n = 100
I lIT'! Strongly agree. Agree D Disagree D Strongly disagree I
Figure 171: Most participants could not tell when ONA was updated
282 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

During Spiral 3, as shown in figure 171 above, 81 percent (81 of 100) of survey
respondents, with an opinion, indicated they could not tell when the ONA had been changed or
updated; 19 percent reported they could tell when changes or updates were made. There were
built-in update notification features associated with the ONA database, but users had to subscribe
to each page of interest. Fifteen percent of all respondents, who replied, were unable to agree or
disagree (no opinion).
Did ONA training improve the participants' ability to recognize ONA updates? Figure
ONA Training vs. Can Tell Wlen ONA has been Updated
~~~~~"r ...........................~
I was
trained
adequately
touseONA
Disagree forthis
Agree ecperirrnnt
I can tell when ONA kn<mlmge base infonmtion
has been updated
n=41
Figure 172: ONA training vs. recognizing ONA updates
172 shows that those participants who believed they had adequate training still could not tell
when information in the ONA had been updated. These results, combined with those of figures
170 and 171, showed the importance experiment participants placed on update and notification.
The results of database change activity and consideration of two very specific survey
questions indicate that the participants placed high importance on database currency, but could
not tell when it had been changed. Task 7.1.3 was accomplished from the SOSA analysts'
perspective, but not from the participants' perspective.

Task 7.1.4 Employ automated tools to virtually and collaboratively access,

manipulate, and maintain the ONA database
Even for the limited contingency environment ofMC02, the ONA knowledge base
contained extensive information. To allow this information to be accessed, updated, and used,
tools that accommodated these actions were needed. An ONA tab displayed on SPPS web pages
took users to the ONA Current Summary (ONA Today) page. From there, additional tabs
permitted access to the ONA Matrix, ONA References, and Related Products pages. All
information included on these pages was located on the SPPS. There also was a tab that
transferred users to the stand alone ONA Database. Manipulation of the SPPS pages was
straightforward.
Links within these pages to supporting documents supplied additional background and
reference; the operation was essentially "typical" and intuitive. The ONA database was primarily
intended to support effects-based plan development. It contained listings of effects; nodes;
actions; resources; references; PMESII systems and conflict phases. Users could select these
components to support development and modification of plans as well as decision-making.
However, the actions required to do the mixing and matching were not obvious, even using the
included User's Guide. Their survey comments indicated it took too long to review the help
information and even when they did, use of the database was still confusing. Manipulation of the
database was not intuitive for many experiment participants.
Ease of Information Retrieval from ONA Knowledge Base
60,.................................................................... ~
50+---------------------------------~
40+---------------
~
I/)
c:
o
~30+_--------------
Q)
a::
'0
'It
20 +-------1
10 +----
n = 120
I []IVery easy Somewhat easy []I Somewhat difficult []IVery difficult III Don't know I
Figure 173: Ease of information retrieval from ONA knowledge base
Training on use of the database seemed to be an equalizer for ease of ONA tool use.
Comparison of training received with understanding ofPMESII vs. DIME relationships
284 FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONLY

suggested the more training; the more this aspect of ONA was understood. However, when the
training received was compared with information retrieval and information filter and sort, the
same correlation was not there. Survey respondent comments stated hands-on training and
practice allowed them to effectively use the database. Participants indicated ONA's use
enhanced Spiral 3 plan development; therefore, the tools must have provided some level of ONA
access and database manipulation.
Even though the tools developed for ONA received less than complimentary comments,
they did do what was intended. Pre-experiment training did influence use of the tools. The charts
that follow detail the challenge experiment participants had with ONA tools.
Figure 173, above, displays the difficulty experiment participants had using the ONA
knowledge base during MC02 execution. They were asked to rate their estimate of information
retrieval ease from the ONA knowledge base. Easy (51 percent; 61 of 120) and difficult (44
percent; 59 of 120) survey replies from those with an opinion essentially divided evenly; 10
percent (14 of 134) of all respondents indicated they did not know what to say about the
statement, "Rate the ease of retrieval from the ONA knowledge base" during execution. The
same survey question was offered during Spiral 3. The response then was 45 percent chose easy
(vs. 51 percent) and 41 percent (vs. 44 percent) said information retrieval was difficult, while 14
percent (vs. 10 percent) did not know. Instead of Spiral 3 experience increasing the number of
easy replies during execution, there was a three percent movement from not knowing to the
difficult category (41 to 44 percent). Both sets of numbers point to the challenge experiment
participants had during Spiral 3 and execution using the tools developed for the ONA database.
Shown in Figure 174 are Spiral 3 results when survey recipients were asked to respond to
Ease of ONA Information Filter and Sort
40+----------------
35+----------------
30+----------------
C/l
CIl
C/l
25 +----------------
c..
C/l
CIl
~ 20 +----------------
o
'II:
15 +----,r"IExc.,lIent
10 +------1
5 +------===============
n = 134
Il!'l]veryeasy Somewhat easy o Somewhat difficult OVery difficult III Don't know I
Figure 174: Participants split on the ease of retrieving ONA information via filter and sort functions

the statement, "Rate the ease of ONA information filter and sort." The easy and difficult
categories were essentially equal (35 percent; 46 and 47 responses of 134); 30 percent (40 of
134) had no opinion. Based on comments associated with other survey questions, training and
familiarly were identified as important reasons for ease of ONA exploitation. The structured pre-
experiment training was not specialized for individual groups. Many of the SJFHQ members
who augmented the JTF headquarters were familiar with the ONA tools and incidentally helped
JTF headquarters members with them. This ad hoc training was considered as a possible fix for
training deficiencies and thus produced the even distribution of easy and difficult responses for
this and the previous question. However, as depicted in the next chart, further examination of the
pre-experiment training seemed to say this training possibly was not the pacing factor for
information retrieval, filter, and sort difficulty.
Training vs. ONA Information Retrieval
30%,~ y ...................................................................~~................. ,
20%
15%
10%
5%
Training
0% Adequacy
Easy
Ease of Information Retrieval n = 65
Figure 175: Training vs. ONA Information Retrieval
Responses from the execution information retrieval question (previously discussed) were
matched against those of a second survey question that was answered by the same respondents.
The objective was to see how participants estimated their pre-experiment training impacted their
use of ONA. The second question asked for a response (adequate; inadequate) to the statement,
"I was trained adequately to use ONA for this experiment." The first question essentially was
asking if the respondents could use the ONA tools. The results shown in figure 175 show that of
those who reported retrieval was easy, 29 percent indicated they had received adequate training
and 26 percent responded their training was inadequate and that was only a three percent
difference. The same puzzling relationship existed with those who stated information retrieval
286 FOR OFFICIAl! lISE ONLY

was difficult. Twenty-five percent said they were adequately trained yet retrieval was difficult
and 20 percent said it was difficult and had received what they thought was inadequate training,
only a five percent improvement.
These results do show that, for a segment of the experiment population, the ONA tools
were difficult to use and training did not seem to make a difference. On the positive side, the
tools did function and the ONA information was retrieved and used.
Ease of ONA filter and sort survey question responses were also matched against the
adequately trained survey question. Here too the formal training did not appear to be the
discriminator for easy and difficult replies. As shown in figure 176, of the easy replies, 30
percent indicated they had been adequately trained and 25 percent reported their training was
inadequate. Twenty seven percent of the difficult respondents said they were adequately trained
Training vs. ONA Information Filter & Sort
35%,_-,................................................... ,~................... 1
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
Training
0%
Adequacy
Easy
Ease of Information Filter & Sort n = 56
Figure 176: Training VS. ONA Information Filter & Sort
and 18 percent indicated their training was inadequate.

In spite of the training challenges, approximately half the respondents still indicated
retrieval and manipulation of ONA knowledge base information was not easy. Whether it was in
fact a training problem or not was not determined. However, the MC02 participants did use
automated tools to virtually and collaboratively access, manipulate, and maintain the ONA
database. Assessment of task 7.1.4 indicated it was completed successfully.
With the possible exception of task 7.1.3, (continually update ONA to reflect battlespace
change) assessment indicated all tasks supporting ONA warfighting challenge one were

successfully completed. Although currency/update is important, it is still assessed that in spite of

this shortcoming discussed earlier, challenge one of the ONA concept was met.
ONA Warfighting Challenge 7.2: Ability to use ONA to enhance decision-making.

If ONA was to enhance decision-making, it had to be used. This aspect of the concept
was confirmed in challenge 1 analysis. In the circumstance of a Joint Task Force (JTF) operating
with ONA, use of the ONA database should have complimented the JTF staff s other functions.
ONA Usefulness in Prioritized Effects List Development
50,....................................................................................................................................................... ,~c j.~ .................... f
45+-----------------------------------~
40+-------------------
35+-------------------
~ 30+-------------------
r::::
o
~ 25 + - - - -
;;.
'5
=II:
20 +----
15 +----
10
o .L...
n = 82
llillill Very useful Somewhat useful Iillill Of little use D Of no use I
Figure 177: ONA was useful in PEL development

Better operational decisions normally would have considered more than tunnel vision, primary
effects; ONA was intended to help identify adversary vulnerabilities as well as secondary,
tertiary, and potential unintended effects that might result from proposed actions.
ONA should have supported course of action prioritization and selection. Finally, if the
ONA concept was to produce better decisions, the using organization (JTF) should have been
able to operate within the adversary's decision cycle. It should have kept the adversary
responding and not initiating.
Listed below are the tasks that describe the second ONA challenge. Analysis of the five
tasks indicated they were successfully completed and the second warfighting challenge was met.
Challenge 2 Supporting Tasks:

Determine if the ONA products compliment JTF staff actions
Identify adversary's vulnerabilities, intentions, and key nodes
Identify potential second and third order effects for contemplated actions
Prioritize and select potential courses of actions
Use ONA to operate within adversary's decision cycle

Task 7.2.1: Determine if the ONA products compliment JTF staff actions
The addition of a new process or tool should not complicate existing staff functions, but
rather it should compliment and improve. This staff activity should help increase decision
quality, as well as improve the time needed to make a decision. Experiment survey results tended
to confirm both criteria were enhanced. The four charts that follow detail this improvement.
ONA Value During ETO Development
60,..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... / I,
50+-------------------
40+-------------------
<J)
3l
r::::
o
g-
Q)
30
0:::
'0
"" 20 -l-=====iiBEiii
10+---
OJ
n = 86
IIJII Very valuable. Somewhat valuable D Not very valuable 0 Of no value I
Figure 178: ONA was valuable to ETO development
Spiral 3 participants were asked to rate the utility of ONA in development of the
Prioritized Effects List (PEL). Shown in figure 177 above, of the respondents that had an
opinion, 84 percent (69 of 82) reported ONA was useful in working this JTF staff action; 16
percent (13 of 82) indicated it was oflittle or no use. Build of the PEL was a very important JTF
staff action. This
survey response Usefulness of ONA for Board/Center/Cell Preparation
provided
80,.......................................................................................................................................... ~~......................1
confirmation of
ONA's positive 70+----------------
impact on this
60+----------------
early staff
activity.
r::::
50 r---------------- *
During o
~40+---------------
Spiral 3, &!
'0
experiment #30+----------------
participants were 20+---

asked to rate the
10+---
value of ONA in
development of OJ
the effects n = 113

II2illI Very useful III Somewhat useful 0 Of little use 0 Of no use I
tasking order
(ETO). Shown in
Figure 179: ONA usefulness for board/center/cell preparation.
FOR OFFICIl'. . L USE ONLY 289

figure 178, of those offering an opinion, 87 percent (75 of 86) said ONA was valuable in
accomplishing this staff action; 13 percent (11 of 86) said it was of little or no value. This staff
action was another high priority activity needed quickly after JTF formation. Again, participants
believed ONA made a valuable contribution.
Dynamic conduct of JTF boards, centers, and cells occurred during MC02 execution.
Participants were asked to rate the utility of ONA in preparing for these meetings. Shown in
figure 179, 86 percent (97 of 113) indicated ONA was useful; 14 percent (16 of 113) said it was
of little or no use. This was another plus for ONA and its contribution to JTF staff activity.
ONA Supports Better, Faster, Enhanced Decision Making
14
12
(/) 10
CD
(/)
f::
8. 8
(/)
tl. 6
ONA supports making

better decisions, faster. Does ONA enhance Strongly
decision making? agree
n = 12 n = 15
Figure 180: ONA supports enhanced decision-making
MC02 execution members of the Joint Coordination Board (JCB) were presented two
questions aimed at the core of ONA Warfighting Challenge two. First, they were asked for
agreement or disagreement with the statement, "ONA supports making better decisions, faster."
Next, they were asked for a simple yes or no response to the question, "Does ONA enhance
decision making?"
The results of both survey questions shown in figure 180 indicate strong endorsement (89
percent; 24 of 27) by these members of the JCB for the supposition that ONA enhanced and
speeded-up the staff decision process. Anecdotal comment by the JTF commander also provided
the same support.
Based on positive participant response to survey questions asking their opinion about
ONA's support of PEL development; ETO building; board, center, cell preparation; and
enhanced decision making, task 7.2.1 was completed. ONA did compliment JTF staff actions.
290 FOR OFFICIAL TISE ONLY

Task 7.2.2 Identify adversary's vulnerabilities, intentions, and key nodes

A critical part of JTF staff planning was to identify adversary vulnerabilities, intentions,
and key nodes. The commander looked for the staff to develop and update this information. The
charted survey results and analysis that follow show ONA supported this JTF staff action.
During execution, experiment participants were asked to agree or disagree with
statements of ONA' s utility in identifying adversary intentions, key nodes, and vulnerabilities.
Figure 181 shows the combined results of these three questions. Eighty three percent (72 of 87)
reported ONA was useful in identifying these three adversary items; 17 percent (15 of 87)
disagreed.
ONA support of adversary intention identification was also displayed by response to the
ONA Analysis for ETO of Red Intentions, Nodes & Vulnerabilities
70
60
50
II)
(II
II)
r:::
0
D..
II)
(II
...0::
0
30
'I:t
20
10
o
ONA was useful in identifying ONA was useful in identifying
adversary INTENTIONS that were adversary KEY NODES that were ONA was useful in identifying
.
addressed In the ETO. addressed in the ETO. adversary VULNERABILITIES that n = 87
were addressed in the ETO.
Figure 181: ONA analysis for ETO
two questions shown in figure 182. In Spiral 3, participants were asked to agree or disagree with
the statement, "ONA was useful in identifying adversary intentions that were addressed in the
ETO." During execution, they were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, "The ETO
addressed ONA analyzed Red intentions." The combined results show that eighty three percent
(65 of 79) of respondents with an opinion agreed that ONA identified and addressed adversary
intentions. Eighteen percent (15 of 79) disagreed.
Survey question results during both Spiral 3 and execution indicated ONA did identify
adversary vulnerabilities, intentions, and key nodes. Task 7.2.2 was completed.

Task 7.2.3 Identify potential second and third order effects for contemplated actions
A JTF staff is expected to provide second and third order as well as unintended effects for
contemplated actions. ONA supported this staff action.
During
ONA Analysis Useful in Identifyi
execution,
respondents were
70 asked to agree or
60
disagree with the
statement, "ONA
50
derived second and
"5'"'" 40 third order effects
a.
'"" were included in the
..
'"'0
20
decision process
when considering
10
action against Red. "
As shown in figure
o 183, replies
DNA was useful in identifying
The ETO addressed ONA analyzed
adversary INTENTIONS that were Red intentions.
indicated 86 percent
addressed in the ETO. n =79
(56 of 65) agreed
with the statement
Figure 182: ONA analysis useful in identifying red intentions and supported this
task.
Although,
there were tactical level instances where it appeared that the ONA failed to provide second order
impacts or ONA was not used to consider these impacts when planning an action, respondents
did acknowledge the importance of this ONA capability. This capability should be included in
development of ONA. Task 7.2.3 was completed during the experiment.
Task7.2.4: Prioritize and select potential courses of action

Another important JTF
ONA 2nd & 3rd Order Effects Used in Decision Process
staff task was to offer potential
courses of action and to offer
60r .......................................................................... ,~cl
50+_------
proposed prioritization of effects.
ONA assisted both during the
experiment.

40+_------
o
o
During Spiral 3, SME
~30+-------
observers were asked how an
'"'0
" 20+_------ ONA impacted the course of
action selection. Although the
10+_------ number of individuals surveyed
was small, their experience and
expertise were considered
n =65
superior and their opinions
lEI Strongly agree IIAgree 0 Disagree 0 Strongly disagree I
respected. They essentially
looked over the planner's
Figure 183: ONA 2nd & 3rd order effects used in decision process shoulders while staff planning
292 F OR OFFICIAL lISE ONLY

was on going. They had first hand knowledge of ONA' s impact on COA selection. As shown in
figure 184,67
percent (4 of 6) of How does having an ONA knowledge base impact the course of action
these SME observers selection?
indicated ONA 4 , //
supported better
COA selection but
not necessarily faster 3
COA selection.
Spiral 3
participants were 2 +-----=------\
asked if ONA was

useful in their
development of the
PEL. This valuable
tool established the
O~-------~----
commander's Faster eOA Selection Better eOA Selection Don't Know n=6
thinking and
intentions early in the Figure 184: ONA impact on eOA selection
experiment. Support
of its development
suggested great ONA Usefulness in Prioritized Effects List Development
potential for ONA. 50, ~_ I

As shown in 45+--------------~
figure 185, 84
40+--------
percent (69 of 82) of
35~-------
the Spiral 3
~30~-------
respondents with an
"o
opinion indicated ~25+---
ONA was useful '"

~20+---
during production of 15+---
the PEL. Sixteen

percent indicated it
was of little or no use o L ............................
when developing the n = 82
PEL. Initial course of ILWlVery useful IIlISomewhat useful DOf little use DOf no use I
action development Figure 185: ONA usefulness in PEL development

was a Spiral 3 JTF
staff action supported
with a PEL with the commander's PEL. Results of survey questions presented during Spiral 3
suggest ONA supported COA development. Task 7.2.4 was completed during the experiment.
Task 7.2.5 Use ONA to operate within adversary's decision cycle

It was expected that if Blue operated within the adversary's decision cycle it would
dominate. ONA should have contributed to this capability if it improved planning and force
employment. The three charts that follow support the ONA contribution.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~ 293

During execution, the three questions included in figure 186 were presented to
experiment participants. Each was intended to elicit some indication of JTF ONA use to get
inside of the adversary's decision cycle. Of the respondents with an opinion, 88 percent (90 of
103) agreed ONA (information) was used to interrupt the adversary's ability to communicate
Of those participants that

80
had an opinion, 88% felt
aNA information was used
70
to interrupt Red C2,
Communication and ability
60
to execute its mission.
~
I/)
c:
o
~
Q)
40
a::
'0 30
'It
20
10
o
ONA was used to identify ONA was used to impede
interrupt Red command and nodes that facilitated Red's
control. Red's ability to execute its
ability to communicate with assigned mission.
its forces.
n = 103
Figure 186: How ONA was used
with its forces and conduct intended activity. Twelve percent (13 of 103) disagreed. Twenty
percent of all participants surveyed indicated they did not know if ONA supported interruption of
this capability. Overall ONA did support this aspect of accelerating ahead of the adversary's
intended acti vi ty. Elements of JTF on Offensive due to Specific Support from ONA
During execution,
participants were asked to respond
to the statement, "Elements of the
JTF are on the offensive because of
specific support from the ONA."
As shown in figure 187 above, 49
percent (65 of 132) of the
respondents said there was some 20+------\
ONA support; five percent (six of
10+------
132) said ONA never was a factor;
and 46 percent (61 of 132) did not
know. In retrospect this large 1121 I
132
Always III Often D Sometimes 121 Never IlIII Don't know
n =
number of 'Don't Know' replies

probably reflects a poorly worded Figure 187: Elements of JTF on Offensive due to specific support
from ONA

survey question. Taken at face value, these results indicated survey respondents believed ONA
was used to support offensive operations with the expectation of operating inside the adversary's
decision cycle.
During execution, survey participants were asked to respond to the statement, "ONA has
provided specific support to elements of the JTF that enabled their operations within the
adversary's decision cycle." This survey question directly addressed the task issue about using
ONA to operate within the adversary's decision cycle. Of the respondents with an opinion, as
shown in figure 188,94 percent (66 of 70) reported ONA provided support; six percent (four of
70) indicated ONA never supported JTF operating within the adversary's decision cycle. Survey
responses indicated ONA was used to interrupt adversary command and control and interrupt its
mission performance.
They also said that ONA did provide support for units with the intent of their getting
inside of the adversary's decision cycle. Task 7.2.5 was completed.
Both ONA challenges were met within the context ofMC02 and the dendritic matrix.
Task accomplishment during Spiral 3 and execution supported these two warfighting challenges.
This was the first
ONA Provided Support Elements of JTF Enabling Operation within experiment
Decision Cycle
opportunity to
examine the
concept using a
relatively
"finished" ONA
product. As noted
earlier the
database was not
the robust product
the concept
10+---------------
demands, but it
did demonstrate
the potential of
what might be
possible with a
n = 70
IClAlways .Often ClSometimes ClNever I mature and active
ONA process.
Figure 188: ONA Provided Support to Elements of JTF Enabling

Appendix B - ONA Training

Participant training on ONA presentations and tools was conducted as a part of the MC02
XC 4I training effort. USJFCOM's charter was to teach functional use of IWS, ADOCS, and
SharePoint Portal Server in 12 classroom hours. It was conducted in a classroom setting by an
"in-house" team at JFCOM's Joint Training and Simulation Center (JTASC) in Suffolk, VA and
a mobile training team (MTT) on the road. The MTT visited each of the component sites at least
once; on-site or in-house training was conducted at the JTASC steadily from January to
execution, in July. This training was in addition to the USJFCOM academic on-line concept
training modules that were to be completed prior to the start of class. These modules were
available on the USJFCOM J9 home page as well as USJFCOM academic computer-based
training disks distributed at all MTT sites. Both training programs included definition of key
terms associated with ONA such as system-of-systems, PMESII, and DIME. Students were also
introduced to the nodes, actions, effects, and resources relationship of the relational database.
The conflict stages were also included in this training.
Several experiment issues impacted the effectiveness of the MC02 C4I training.
Foremost, it was evident that most "on the road" students had not completed the USJFCOM
academic modules prior to the start of class. (The exception to this was at the Fort Hood site
where J9 and 17 staff simultaneously conducted systems and concept training.) The intent of the
MTT and in-house training was to familiarize students with the functionality of core MC02 C4I
tools, not provide in-depth training ofMC02 concepts. Also, it was expected that only a few
individuals would be permitted to add ONA records during experiment activity; therefore, this
activity was generally not covered during MC02 C4I tools training (it was not discussed at all at
the component level during MTT training). Additionally, the majority of the personnel attending
class had not yet been assigned exercise billets at the time of training and thus had little
appreciation as to how ONA would be applied to their daily experimental duties and
responsi bili ti es.
To fully exploit ONA, the participants required extensive hands-on experience, as well as
in-depth training and mentoring by ONA-experienced personnel. This level of instruction was
impractical for military personnel, who simultaneously had real-world obligations and
responsibilities that limited their time available for classroom instruction.
JTASC training and the MTT helped exercise participants access the ONA knowledge
base through the SharePoint Portal Server. Players were shown the ONA informational pages
(Executive Summary, et al) and the relational database. Within the database, report capabilities
were used to reinforce the concept's effects, actions, nodes, and resources relationships. The
effects-based planning support that allowed these items to be matched and linked was not
included in the course syllabus because it was not available until Spiral 3. JTASC training on
SPPS was conducted when server connectivity was available. The MTT servers contained an
unclassified version of the ONA information and database that was available for all classes.
The practical exercise of the course highlighted ONA concepts. Students were given a
fictitious ONA scenario with four nodes and a desired effect, and divided into virtual teams.
Using the tools available (ADOCS, IWS, SPPS), each team was required to choose a node
(which was also associated with a conflict phase - influence, deter, coerce, compel, or defeat),
and then produce a "quad" joint tactical action/resources chart based on their node assignment.
The chart consisted of:
An image of the node assigned
A desired effect
296 FOR OF FICIAL USE ONLY

Blue actions
Blue resources required by the actions to produce the given effect
The exercise was intentionally fictitious, and had no significant tactical or strategic value.
Its intent was to exercise and practice functionality of the C4I tools and not to review the
academic concepts.

Appendix C - Additional Observations and Comments

Concerning Finding 1-
SCD Observation: "The ONA problem is ultimately turning data into knowledge into
understanding."
SCD Comment: "The ONA causes me to raise a couple questions. What is "knowledge?"
Is it data? Is it information about the outside world? These are very different things. I'd spend
time on definitions before I spent $130M. It is easy to criticize the current ONA, but the problem
is the concept. What will we do with it as a nation? Do we know what kind of knowledge we
need to deal with our challenges? Does it fit with our national strategy?"
SCD Comment: "People are confused about the ONA. But if we build one using the
SJFHQ and CIE, we'll have an example."
Component Comment: "The databases between ONA and MIDB were not reconcilable.
We had to use MIDB because targets were not in ONA."
SME Recommendation: "Concepts such as 'ONA' and 'EBO' and related terms must be
explained and understood down to the tactical level ifETO's are going to be used to write Op
Orders and Frag Orders. Even with the translation from ETO to OpO, there will be some bleed-
over of new joint terminology."
SME Comment: "82nd ABN DTAC at Fort Irwin, CA received FRAGO #1 from 82nd
ABN TOC at Fort Bragg on or about 26 July 02. FRAGO contained HHQ Cdr's intent, which
referenced Nodes and Effects. These terms were not understood at the tactical level as
discovered with interviews with DTAC watch officers."
Participant Comment: "A better definition of exactly what ONA stands for is required-
the concept has often led members of the JTF and components (and JECG) to believe that the
ONA should or will have just about all possible types of information included in it - in basis of
all knowledge requirements for every elements on the JTF/component staff. While it is going to
grow and improve, unless some expectation management and definition is provided, the ONA
evolves from the concept into real-life in the coming years and will never meet the expectations
of future users."
Participant Comment: "It should be used as a research tool in order to provide decision
makers the data that they need. It is difficult to maintain, and also is still just one source."
Participant Comment: "Needs to support planning and execution."
Participant Comment: (In response to, What should ONA contain?) "All relevant
information, real time, and inherently easy to locate."
Participant Comment: "Should be used in all phases, planning and execution."
Participant Comment: "Useful in planning prior to combat ops."
Participant Comment: "Most useful for planning."
Participant Comment: "It was most powerful during planning."
Participant Comment: "It is a good planning tool. In concept it would work. It will take
work to become operationally useful. It is difficult to navigate and it isn't linked with the
targeting process."
Participant Comment: "The ONA helps facilitate/drive the mission analysis process. The
better the mission analysis the better chance for success you have."
Participant Comment: "As the chief of operations, I very rarely if ever worked with the
ONA. It is more of a planning tool than an operations tool."
298 FOR OFFICIAL USF, ONLY

Participant Comment: "In Spiral 3, before the enemy was engaged, ONA was a great
planning tool. We were all working with targets and concepts and data that the planners had
anticipated. Once operations commenced, ONA value decreased."
Boil Down Session Notes, Tuesday, 13 August 2002:
Component: "ONA is a good planning tool; the question is at what level of input and
maintenance it should be; combatant commander or SJFHQ or JTF should be responsible. ONA
should contain information down to the targets and fires level of detail."
Component: "ONA belongs at the component commanders' level and to the strategic
level beyond the combatant commander. ONA should not reside below the JIPB."
Component: "ONA has strategic and planning utility; other existing processes will take
over from ONA down to the target folder levels. ONA might be a tactical net assessment level
process."
Concerning Finding 2
SCD Observation: "The Operational Net Assessment continues to grow and mature. The
ONA has great potential, with one broad caveat. That is, the ONA is not a tool to satisfy all
knowledge requirements."
SCD Observation: "The CJTF selection of desired effects to achieve the combatant
commander's campaign objectives derived exclusively from the ONA."
SCD Observation: "The combination of the ONA and a focus on effects seemed to have a
positive impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning process."
SCD Comment: "There is an art to understanding ourselves and the enemy, to 'how we
perceive the enemy and perceive ourselves.' Commanders fall along a bell-shaped curve. ONA
can move the whole curve to the right, make a commander more artful, if the commander can
inquire and get better answers."
SCD Comment: "Assessors need to understand every level of our activity and processes.
We had too much IN and too little Ops."
SCD Comment: "ONA is a way of thinking that encourages emphasis on the whole rather
than a focus on the parts of the whole."
SME Comment: "Almost everyone in the 10 cell is using the ONA daily. JFMCC uses it
much of the time, but information is not detailed enough to be more than an azimuth check.
PSYOPIMMIC uses it to answer 1-2 questions/day. IW (information warfare) is a heavy user,
but only recently received training (not in Spirals). Others stated that they used ONA several
times a day to answer important questions."
SME Comment: "During discussion in JCB, WG, RM 101, 301530LJUL02, the targeting
of an airport in CJTF -S area that had not been targeted before was discussed. It would just
disable the use of the airport with minimal damage for possible return to GOR much later in the
conflict. Great job of following ONA. Minimal damage to GOR territory and receiving the
desired effect, no planes in the air to oppose BLUE forces."
Participant Comment: "ONA is a promising concept. It obviously takes a lot of work to
manage and keep current!"
Participant comment: "ONA provided viable nodes for attack that lead to
accomplishment of the JTF commander's desired effects."
SME Comment: "For those that use it, the ONA supports better, more informed
decisions."

Participant Comment: "The ONA process has potential but needs significant refinement
to be useful, including a change in institutionalized processes which disregarded the ONA in
favor of more familiar methods?"
SCD Observation: "Training should be provided to components on effects development
and submittal, so the entire joint force is operating from the same database."
SCD Observation: "The JFLCC considers ONA a useful tool also. They caution that
unless appropriate training occurs, the tool soon becomes useless. The training must be more
than 'buttonology'. By that, they mean the training must be more than learning how to physically
use the tool. It must include the significance of the database functions, and how they support
planning, operations, and effects assessment."
Component CC Comment: "We liked it but we wanted it to be dynamic when the fight
started. My planners had trouble updating it."
SME Comment: "Everyone stated that the ONA interface was cumbersome and the
amount of data provided was overwhelming. In spite of the large amounts of data provided, they
often found that their particular question could not be answered. They said that if the gaps could
be filled in, the tool would be much more useful."
SCD Comment: "Clearly, the training piece for ONA is critical. Senior leaders have to
ensure the operations center floor personnel understand more than "buttonology." At present,
most don't understand the significance of ONA and how they can use the tool to support
assessment. "
Participant Comment: "No formal training in the system so that made it harder to retrieve
info in my ... "
Participant Comment: "ONA use needs to be sustained and improved; need a better tool
to make the use be sustained and improved."
Participant Comment: "Had a lesson, but didn't have time to practice using since I didn't
have access to the info."
Participant Comment: "Didn't use it, wasn't trained in it."
Participant Comment: "The training method and training documents are terrible. I
probably could not access 111 00 of the potential because most of my training with ONA and the
database was OJT (even though I went through the class, which lasted about 1 hour at the
most)."
Participant Comment: "I was taught the basics but when time allowed I learned more on
my own."
Participant Comment: "Most of my knowledge of how to effectively use the ONA was
done by myself through trial and error."
Participant Comment: "Last minute assignment into the slot did not allow for training
time."
Participant Comment: "We had a lot of process (training) but little, very little
application."
Participant Comment: "No training at all, learned it the old fashion way by just searching
through the database."
Participant Comment: "Found it hard to navigate around."
Participant Comment: "Too complicated. If information is not a click away, it is
worthless in a dynamic and fast flowing environment."
300 FUR OFFICIAL USE ON.,y

Participant Comment: "No one really has in-depth knowledge on how to use the tool.
There has to be a longer training course for this tool, something like a whole day. The same
should be true for ADOCS."
Participant Comment: "ONA is like the internet. It is out there somewhere but it may
take you a month to find it."
Participant Comment: "Once we trained ourselves to get by the spatial problems, it
worked pretty well."
Participant Comment: "Cannot update the ONA using other documents/spreadsheets or
databases. ONA has to be manually updated, which in anything but a very low scale crisis would
be impossible to maintain current."
Participant Comment: "It is not user friendly enough."
Participant Comment: "Needs work. People who use ONA need to sit down with
programmers and help develop. ONA needs to be more operator friendly, rather than reflecting
intelligence analysts comfort level."
Participant Comment: "The database needs to be exportable to allow easier sorting for
CC objectives."
Participant Comment: "ONA is very hard to get useful information out of. While the
information is valuable, it takes a long time to find it."
Participant Comment: "I have a couple of graduate degrees and it hurts my head to figure
it out. Get some simple thinking guys to produce a database that any person can understand.
Otherwise, no one will use it and go out of their way to shy away from it."
SCD Observation: "Unfortunately, without education and training on these advantages,
the components may fail to fully exploit the ONA assessment, may not contribute to ONA
upgrade and enrichment, and in fact may be unable to understand the enemy."
SME Comment: "Yes, but only ifit (DNA) is robust enough to provide a fine degree of
granularity of detail and breadth of subject areas."
SME Comment: "Overall the single version of the ONA makes sense for several reasons.
Management of multiple databases could get difficult and promote conflicting information. It is
additionally important for the components to get the view of what the higher headquarters has to
deal with in regard of the DIE. (It is) having a database that allows you to probe the virtual mind
of the CJTF and the combatant commander."
Participant Comment: "The ONA provided basic insights. However, it did not fulfill its
fundamental promise of tying specific facilities to various nodes. In my view, the value of the
ONA is in shaping the operational strategy to meet strategic goals and objectives. It loses its
value when it attempts to become a tool to define tactical objectives and tasks. These need to be
derived from the JFC's guidance and objectives based on his desired effects. The ONA allows
the JFC to better frame his/her strategy by shaping the desired effects."
Participant Comment: "The Operational Net Assessment (ONA) database and construct
was not synchronized or readily adaptable with the component's targeting databases and nodal
analysis tools. The BE numbers and geo coordinates used by components did not always match
with the ONA."
Participant Comment: "As a planner, I use the ONA to research potential ECOA."
Participant Comment: "I used ONA. Mostly during spiral 3 for planning and only when
searching for specific critical mission related data during execution."

Participant Comment: "I wanted to use the ONA to gather technical information
concerning RED."
Participant Comment: "I used ONA to understand personal relationships with the
adversary leadership, very useful."
Participant Comment: "Bird's eye view, depiction of overall progress of efforts
(graphical?). Order of Battle Bean-Counting correlated to Phase 2 (maybe Phase 1) BDA."

Appendix D - ONA Database Development for MC02

Development of the ONA knowledge base for MC02 was initiated in August 2001. In
keeping with the intent of the ONA concept, USJFCOM attempted to include governmental
departments other than the Department of Defense. Intelligence and law enforcement
departments and agencies tentatively agreed to participate but, following the September 11, 2001
attacks, they were forced to withdraw committed support. Some informal involvement did
continue. The USJFCOM Blue cell personnel (the system-of-system analysis [SOSA] cell) led
the effort to develop knowledge and understanding of Red.
A series ofUSJFCOM J9 staff experiments (STAFEX) were conducted from September
through November 2001 by the Blue cell to help focus attention on the task of identifying
potential effects, nodes and actions. The cell members then used all available research avenues to
enrich the knowledge base information and analysis. The project was a daunting effort that grew
larger as progress was made. The project was further hindered by the absence of adequate
analysis, assessment, and information management tools. Each effect required a range of node-
action pairs that varied by phase and situation. Each variation tended to reveal another that
produced an additional array of potential effects, nodes, and related actions. An ONA limited
objective experiment (LOE) in October 2001 provided concept clarification and confirmed the
concept requirement for an integrated effort of government departments and agencies to
construct a knowledge base.
Development of the knowledge base continued through Spiral 3. The resultant product
included: the ONA summary, six PMESII system summaries (for both Red and Blue), 15
regional country assessments, some 300 potential effects, 700 nodes and the appropriate actions
and resources tied to them. The ONA was base-lined for country Red and subsequently tailored
to the MC02 scenario setting for the experiment. The ONA knowledge base with its associated
database provided sufficient clarity and options to respond to scenario situations. It was a solid
introduction of a concept proposal.

Appendix E - ONA Knowledge Base Information

Intended Use. For MC02, ONA is an operational support tool intended to show joint
commanders effects-to-task linkages, which is based on systems analyses of the adversary's
political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) elements of
power. Within the context of the concept, ONA is a product of collaboration between strategic,
operational, and tactical levels, providing a common knowledge base and available to decision
makers from the national strategic level to the tactical level. The development process builds
situational awareness and understanding that supports planning and execution ofEBO. ONA
embodies a philosophy that continuously drives a process to produce actionable knowledge.
ONA is developed by the SJFHQ and it is this headquarters' IS group that has the overall
responsibility for coordinating the ONA among the plans, operations, and knowledge
management headquarters' groups.
ONA Knowledge Base. The ONA knowledge base includes the knowledge gained
through focused research and analysis of a potential adversary. Context and actionable
knowledge are the key components that are collectively referred to as the knowledge base. For
the MC02 experiment, context access was provided through SPPS to the ONA Summary page
and the ONA Matrix page. Actionable knowledge access in the relational database is also
provided through SPPS. This database provides the specific effects-to-task linkages, as well as
rationale and potential consequences of actions.
First, the ONA Summary page provides a high-level context and an overall net
assessment of Red and Blue objectives. The Matrix page provides a single page table with
hyperlinks to the PMESII summaries, PMESII vulnerabilities and diplomatic, information,
military, economic (DIME) objectives from both a Blue and Red perspective. Additionally,
assessments of regional perspectives are also presented with more detailed hyperlinks embedded.
Relevance to the developing situation is the key attribute of establishing context.
The actionable knowledge in the ONA database is the linkage between effects, nodes,
actions, resources, (EIN/AIR) rationale, and potential consequences of selected actions. For a
desired effect in development of an effects-based plan, the commander presents a range of
actions and key nodes for consideration.
SPPS ONA Summary Page. The ONA Summary page is an executive-level synopsis of
Blue and Red objectives and a net assessment of the evolving situation. The summary provides a
short assessment of ongoing activity and evaluates both complimentary and conflicting
objectives to illuminate potential avenues for achieving Blue objectives. It is the result of a
collaborative effort between the Blue Red cell and PollMil planner in the plans group and the
information superiority group.
SPPS ONA Matrix Page. The ONA Matrix page is a tailored selection of links to
various executive level documents. The links include assessments from both Blue and Red points
of view and allows the user to drill down to detailed documents supporting the assessment and
the database. The matrix also allows selection of DIME strategy and presents a comparison of
DIME intentions and Red vulnerabilities. Further, the Matrix page provides a collection of
regional states and entity assessments that provide insight into how they might respond to Blue
activities.
ONA Database. ONA includes an action-oriented process that provides a continuous
stream of knowledge from desired Blue effects to adversary vulnerabilities to potential actions.
Potential effects along with Red and Blue perspectives are captured from SJFHQ war-gaming

sessions. Within the database, effects are referenced to supporting strategic guidance and
engagement plans.
As described within the concept key nodes are developed through system-of-systems
analysis. Node selection requires an understanding of the adversary as a set of interdependent
PMESII systems. This understanding is developed through in-depth research, analysis, and
reach-back to centers of excellence. The operational net assessment development process relies
upon habitual, persistent, institutionalized collaboration and integration to leverage a wide
variety of experts from a wide variety of organizations to build a coherent knowledge base.
Nodes descriptions and significance statements are presented in the database as well as links to
supporting documentation.
Actions are based on the DIME capability construct that reflects the range of national
power elements. Actions are linked to nodes where the combined action-node pair has the
potential to achieve the desired effect. Each effect-node-action combination is supported with a
rationale and identifies potential secondary effects or consequences. The ONA database provides
multiple node-action pairs that may achieve an effect and are presented for planning
consideration and command decisions.
Tools. As designed, ONA is a tool to support effects-based planning and commander
decision-making. The ONA Summary and Matrix pages establish the context for understanding
the adversary. The relational database captures the core information (EIN/ AIR) and linkages
identified in the analysis process. It reflects the potential cause and effect relationships for
planning and decision use.
A planning module within the database brings together the effects, nodes, actions,
resources, and secondary effects and presents a range of options to build an ETO. The planning
module then provides a method to task components for selected effects as well as to prioritize
and sequence effects and nodes. Changes to any effect, node, action, resource, or secondary
effect are immediately reflected in plans based on those elements.
The ONA database offers an extensive reporting function. All aspects of the ONA
database content are available as user selectable fields for generating reports.
Analyst Notebook is an analysis tool that provides a canvas for presenting, viewing, and
understanding associations between entities. For better perspective, many diagrams using
Analyst Notebook have been developed in the ONA analysis effort and are linked to the ONA
summaries and database nodes.
In developing the ONA knowledge base for MC02, analysts used several models to
further understand the adversary (Red). They include the Structured Evidentiary Argumentation
System (SEAS), Situational Influence Assessment Model (SIAM), and Critical Intent Model
(CIM). Built during ONA development, these models are manpower intensive. They do facilitate
identification of interactions between PMESII categories, maj or influences on the adversary
leadership, and critical activities required to conduct some threat operations.
The ONA database underwent minor improvements following Spiral 3. Most of the
changes were designed to improve utility and consistency between the modules.
As presented within the experiment, the ONA knowledge base contains the knowledge
developed in assessing the real world and overlaying the MC02 scenario. The real world
provided the necessary fidelity to understand the cause and effect relationships that are expressed
as effects/nodes/actions/resource linkages in the database. ONA is intended to provide a focused
introduction for conducting effects-based operations and must be continuously updated by
current operations and current intelligence.

Appendix F - ONA Knowledge Base Access and Use

The following charts display MC02 participant access to ONA Knowledge base items
contained in the SPPS. The data was extracted using the Web Trends tool. Access and use of this
information was far more intuitive than the database information. The tools provided were
considered adequate by participants.
on t'li? to The
on the Global economy
Figure 189: ONA Portal Page on SPPS. Figure is a screen capture of the ONA portal (entryway) page
on the MC02 SPPS. The ONA portal was also used as the ONA Today Executive Summary page. As
such, this Executive Summary and portal page recorded more visits than the other ONA pages
because users predominantly used it to transit to their destination page(s). The ONA Portal logged
2,051 visits during the three-week execution period.
306 FOR OFFICIAL lISE ONI,V

Figure 191: Screen capture of an ONA Database login page, 1,539 users visited the Login page
during the three-week execution period
Figure 192: Screen capture of ONA reference pages. One hundred thirty users visited the
References page during the three-week execution period

Figure 193: A screen capture of the ONA Related Products page on the MC02 SPPS.
Sixty-nine users visited the Products page during the three-week execution period.
Number of Visitors on All ONA Pages
600
500
Pages decrease with

400 time during
Execution. Possible
~ correlation to
.s'iii planning events.
:> 300
'0
'It
200
100
0
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
e
CD
e
..... e00 ea> e0 e e eN eM ~ ~ e
CD
e..... e00 ea> e0
N N N N M M ;5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
;::: ;::: ;::: ;::: ;::: ;::: Ci5 Ci5 Ci5 Ci5 Ci5 Ci5 Ci5 Ci5 Ci5 Ci5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 194: The cumulative number of visitors to all the ONA pages on SPPS per day. There
appears to be a correlation between the major planning activities shown in the text boxes at the
top of the chart with the cumulative number of visitors to the ONA pages.

400
350
300
~ 250
.s'iii
:> 200
'0 150
=It
100
50
0
N N N
~
0
0
a; ~
~
~
Ci5 Ci5
0 0 0
Figure 195: Visitors on specific ONA pages. This

graphic breaks out the various ONA pages to Today .Db Login o Matrix o References III Products
show that the ONA Today (Executive Summary
and portal) and the database login pages were
the pages most often visited. There appears to
be a correlation between the major planning
activities shown in the text boxes at the top of
the chart with the number of visitors.
Average Minutes on
35.0 ,,,===--=-<=::<l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r.:..-:;==W.~, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I.,-;-:=~:\ ,,---,............ J
30.0
25.0 +-------i
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....~ ....~ ....~ ....~ ....~ ....~ eco eco eco eco eco eco eco eco eco ~
Ci5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FOR OFFICIAL lISE ONI,V 309

Total Minutes on ONA Pages
1400
I~ities Start I ~Planning,~.~_E I ~Ianning
Op
I ........ ~ Sites Sei~ Joint trike
JTF Focus on I Planning
1200
I~T-S~ ,s,an~.k--1--7~
~-
1000
J~T~~~'~::"I ~~~~i[l<
VI
.2l
:::l
.!:
:;:
800
600
0
+---------l
-
~
r-- _,I----f~____I
~ _
r-- 1I!iI-------j
L_t\7l
f-- IIH---iii11}----i
Figure 197: Total minutes on
ONA pages shows the '"=
o f-- f-- f-- f-- RH ----1'1II r-----l f-- f--
cumulative number of minutes
spent on all the ONA pages on
0 I 1111 i
SPPS per day. There appears
to be a correlation between the
major planning activities shown
N
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~
0
N
e.....
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0
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0
in the text boxes at the top of

the chart with the cumulative
number of minutes on the ONA Figure 198: Total minutes on specific ONA pages breaks out the various
pages but it is less clear than minutes spent on the various ONA pages to show that the ONA Today
the previous figures. It should and the Database Login pages were again the favorites. There still
be noted that the data does not appears to be a correlation between the major planning activities shown
differentiate productive from in the text boxes at the top of the chart with the number of minutes on
non-productive activity while each of the ONA pages but the correlation is less clear than the previous
spending time on the page(s). figures. More cumulative time was spent on the ONA Today page than
on the database login page. What was unexpected was the lack of use of
"" _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ the Matrix page that had the Blue on Red and Red on Blue perspectives
- as well as information on the various countries of the region .
Total Minutes on Specific ONA Pages
1000
900
800
700
~
..
VI
r::::
600
500
:iE 400
300
200
100
0
N N N
eID ~ ~
N
~
N N
e0
eco ~
~
0
~ ~ ~
~
co
0 0 0 0 0
llillill DNA Today Iillill Db Login D Matrix D References IIiIII Products I

Average Minutes on Specific ONA Pages
16.0
14.0
Average minutes
12.0 spent on aNA Pages
generally constant
during Execution.
10.0 Possible correlation
I/)
2::::s
c: 8.0
~
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
0 0
i ;:r In i
~ ~ ~ ~ !:2 !:2 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ......
r-- r-- r-- r-- r-- r-- co co co co co co co co co 00
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I- aNA Today - D b Login '~~~~~~~Matrix References -Products I
Figure 199: Figure shows the average number of minutes spent on each ONA page on SPPS per day.
This is the total number of visitors divided by the total number of minutes per day. There still appears to
be a correlation between the major planning activities shown in the text boxes at the top of the chart with
the average number of minutes on the ONA pages.
Visits to ONA Pages without 0-1 Minute Data Points
10- 11- 12- 13- 14- 15- 16- 17- 18- 19- 20- 21- 22- >
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 23
Visit duration (Minutes)
10 ONA Today. Db Login 0 Matrix 0 References III Products I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y 311

Figure 200, on the previous page, shows the number of visits categorized by the visit
duration in one-minute intervals for each ONA page on SPPS. Since the ONA Today page was
also the portal to the other pages, an assumption is made that the bulk of the 0-1 minute visits
were transitions to the other pages. The 0-1 minute category, however, represented 81 percent of
all duration categories.
Since the Database Login page did not require a user id or password but only a click of
the "Login" button, an assumption is made that the bulk of the 0-1 minute visits were transitions
to the SQL database (Web Trends looses track of activity, but the SQL audit log takes over). The
0-1 minute category, however, represented 89 percent of all duration categories. The Matrix,
References, and Products pages saw nominal use during execution, relative to the ONA Today
and Database Login pages. The 0-1 minute category represented 80 percent of all duration
categories for the Matrix page, 85 percent of all duration categories for the References page, and
84 percent of all duration categories for the Products page. The 1-23+ minute categories
represented 20 percent of all duration categories for the Matrix page, 15 percent of all duration
categories for the References page, and 16 percent of all duration categories for the Products
page.
SPPS ONA Pages Visits by Group
2000 Login pages were the most

visited ONA pages. JTF, SJ FHQ,
J FLeC and JFIVICC cons is tent Iy
J--~--l---
acco.mted for the greatest
number of visits.
IJ) 1500
:!::!
IJ)
:>
'0
=It 1000
500
o
ONAToday Database Matrix References Products
ImJTF .SJFHQ OJFLCC DJFMCC IIJSOTF .JIACG .NIVICC ONIIVIA .DOS [[INDU I
Figure 201: Figure breaks out the various ONA page visits by group to show that the ONA today
(Executive Summary and portal) and the database login pages were the predominant pages visited
consistently. The JTF, SJFHQ JFLCC, and JFMCC groups consistently made the greatest number of
visits to the various pages. Again, the lack of use of the matrix page that had the Blue on Red and Red
on Blue perspectives as well as information on the various countries of the region was unexpected.

SPPS ONA Pages Visit Percentages
ONA Today portal and Database Login

pages were the most visited ONA IDges.
50%
JTF, SJFHQ, JFLOC and JFMOC
consistently accoonted for the greatest
visit percentage.
.I!l
~ 40% +--L..----==. . . . .==="1
S
(l.
....o 30%~.~!.~----------~~ ~------~ __--------~ !B .~----------~.~!I----------
I/)
Q)
Cl
III
1: n =126 n=65
Q)
~ 20%
Q)
a.
10%
0%
ONAToday Database Matrix References Products
I L!]JTF .SJFHQ DJFLCC []JFMCC IIIJSOTF IJElJIACG NMCC 0 NIMA . DOS rn:u NDU I
Figure 202: This graphic breaks out the percentages of the various groups visiting the ONA pages to
show that the JTF, SJFHQ JFLCC and JFMCC groups consistently had the greatest percentage of visits
to the various pages.
The bottom line: The ONA today and database login pages received the preponderance of
visits / time spent and only scant attention was given to the matrix and other ONA web pages.

Appendix G - ONA Data Collection Matrix
Collection Collection
Collection UJTL
Data Collection Method Tool Frequency
Audience (Who) Connection
(How) (When)
SME I SVY I SCD I M&S Product.
ST2.2
OP 2.4.1
DR: ONA users' understanding of Blue DIME capabilities

versus Red/adversary PMESII systems analyses
Plans, Info S, &
JDCAT
DE: 1.Survey question(s) S P Cmd Gps.; JIAC; 7 Jun.
Survey
Compo
DR: Utility of Red/adversary DIME/PMESII system analysis for ONA
users (thorough; correct; shallow; wrong)
Plans, Info S, &
JDCAT
DE: 2.Survey question(s) S P Cmd Gps.; JIACG; 7 Jun.
Survey
Compo
DR: ONA users desired Red/adversary DIME/PMESII system analysis
information missing from ONA knowledge base

Collection Collection I
Collection UJTL
Data Collection Method I Tool Frequency
(How) (When)
Plans, Info S, &
JDCAT I
DE: 3.Survey question(s) I SI PI Cmd Gps.; JIACG; 10 Jun.
Survey
Compo
DE: 4.Count of JTF Hq DIME/PMESII Plans, Info S, Cmd I RFI
system analysis requests for S P & Ops Gps.; Tool/log I As occurs
information (RFI) JIACG; Compo
execution
Is the Blue information in the ONA knowledge base useful?
DR: Utility of Blue information included in ONA knowledge base for ONA
users (thorough; correct; shallow; wrong)
, , , , ,
Plans, Info S, &
DE: 1.Survey question(s) I JDCAT I 7 Jun.
SI PI Cmd Gps.; JIACG; I
Survey
Compo
DE: 2.Frequency count of ONA Plans, Info S, Cmd
ONA
knowledge base accessed for Blue S P & Ops Gps.; audit log I As occurs
information JIACG; Compo
DR: ONA users' desired Blue
information missing from ONA
knowledge base
Plans, Info S, &
DE: 3.Survey question(s) I JDCAT I 10 Jun.
SI PI Cmd Gps.; JIACG; I
Survey
Compo
Does the ONA knowledge base provide awareness of the JOA? OP 2.5
DR: ONA knowledge base contribution

to battles pace awareness for JTF staff

Collection UJTL
(How) (When)
Plans, Info S, Cmd JDCAT
DE: 1.Survey question(s) 9 Jun.
& Ops Gps. Survey
to battles pace awareness for
components
DE: 2.Survey question(s) Comp JDCAT I 9 Jun.

Survey
to battles pace awareness for
interagency
DE: 3.Survey question(s) I sl pi JIACG I

JDCAT I
Survey
9 Jun.
execution
Does the ONA knowledge base support ETO development?
DR: JPC's understanding of adversary's goals, intentions, strengths, and

weaknesses using the ONA knowledge base
JDCAT
DE: 1 .Survey question(s) S P JPC 12 Jun.
Survey
DR: Time it takes JPC to develop
course of action packages
DE: 2.Time course of action planning Data
P S JPC 8 Jun.
initiated Sheet
DE: 3.Time course of action planning Data
P S JPC 8 Jun.
approved Sheet

CoII ecrIon I Collection

To I
Collection I UJTL
Data Collection Method I Frequency
Audience (Who) (HO:) Connection
(When)
JDCAT
DE: 4.Survey question(s) I JPC I 9 Jun.
SI PI Survey
DR: Determine the utility of the ONA
knowledge base in building an ETO
DE: S.Survey question(s) I sl pi JPC I

JDCAT I
Survey
9 Jun.
JDCAT
execution
OP 2.4.1
How comprehensive was the ONA knowledge base analysis of Red PMESII? OP2.4.1.1
DR: ONA users' understanding of Red

PMESII analyses
Plans, Info S, Cmd
JDCAT
DE: 1.Survey question(s) S P & Ops Gps.; lAC; 9 Jun.
Survey
Compo
DR: ONA users' impression as to how robust the Red PMESII system
analysis was (thorough; correct; shallow; wrong)
Plans, Info S, Cmd
JDCAT
Survey
Compo
DR: ONA users' opinion as to what was
missing from the Red PMESII analysis
Plans, Info S, Cmd
JDCAT
Survey
Compo
FOR OFFTPTAT, TT~F, ONT,V 317

Collection
Collection UJTL
Data Collection Method
Did the ONA knowledge base present nodes as critical that Red felt were
OP2.4.1.1
critical?
DR: Identify number of adversary nodes in ONA knowledge base identified as critical and that
adversary felt were critical/high value
DE: 1.Survey question(s) S P S OPFOR JDCAT I 6 Jun.

Survey
DE: 2. Extract critical/high value
adversary nodes from ONA knowledge S PIA n/a Data I 6 Jun.
Sheet
base
Did the ONA knowledge base present nodes as vulnerable that Red felt were
vulnerable?
DR: Determine number of adversary nodes in ONA knowledge base identified as vulnerable and
that adversary felt were vulnerable
DE: 1.Survey question(s) S P S OPFOR JDCAT I 6 Jun.

Survey
DE: 2.0NA knowledge base
identification of vulnerable adversary S S PIA n/a Data I 6 Jun.
Sheet
nodes
Did the analysis of Red PMESII in the ONA knowledge base promote
OP 2.4.1.2
understanding of Red's goals?
318 ]{OR OFFTPTAT, TT~F, ONT,V

Collection UJTL
(How) (When)
DR: Percent of adversary goals

correctly identified by JPC using ONA
DE: 1 .Survey question(s) I sl pi OPFOR I

JDCAT I
Survey
6 Jun.
DE: 2.Survey question(s) S P JPC JDCAT I 6 Jun.

Survey
DE: 3.Compute JPC percent correct Data
identification of adversary goals
PIA nla Sheet
6 Jun.
DR: Percent of adversary goals correctly identified by Joint Interagency

Coordination Group (JIACG) using ONA
DE: 4.Survey question(s) 1 SI pi I I I OPFOR I

JDCAT I
Survey
6 Jun.
DE: S.Survey question(s) S P JIACG JDCAT I 6 Jun.

Survey
DE: 6.Compute JIACG percent correct Data I
identification of adversary goals
PIA nla Sheet
6 Jun.
Did the ONA knowledge base correctly identify Red's self-perceived strengths?
DR: Percent of adversary strengths

DE: 1 .Survey question(s) S P OPFOR I JDCAT I 6 Jun.

Survey
DE: 2.Survey question(s) S P JPC I JDCAT I 6 Jun.

Survey
DE: 3.Compute JPC percent correct Data I
identification of adversary strengths
PIA nla I Sheet
6 Jun.
DR: Percent of adversary strengths

correctly identified by JIACG using
ONA
~F"'\.T't F"'\.~~T""i.T TT~n L'"lt..,..,TT ' T

1'01'" 01'1'ICIHL
.... T
U~. Vl~L I 319
CoII ecrIon I Collection

To I
Collection I UJTL
Audience (Who) (HO:) Connection
(When)
JDCAT
DE: 4.Survey question(s) I SI PI OPFOR I 6 Jun.
Survey

Survey
DE: 6.Compute JIACG percent correct Data I
identification of adversary strengths
PIA nla Sheet
6 Jun.
Did the ONA knowledge base correctly identify Red's self-perceived

weaknesses?
DR: Percent of adversary weaknesses

DE: 1 .Survey question(s) I sl pi OPFOR I

JDCAT I
Survey
6 Jun.
DE: 2.Survey question(s) S P JPC JDCAT I 6 Jun.

Survey
DE: 3.Compute JPC percent correct Data I
identification of adversary weaknesses
PIA nla Sheet
6 Jun.
DR: Percent of adversary weaknesses

correctly identified by JIACG using
ONA
DE: 4.Survey question(s) I sl pi OPFOR I

JDCAT I
Survey
6 Jun.

Survey
DE: 6.Compute JIACG percent correct Data
identification of adversary weaknesses
PIA nla Sheet
6 Jun.
111\1 Ilnrf~t", th, I

OP 2.6
Did the ONA knowledge base provide current information as changes occurred in the battles pace?
320 lilA AlillillPI 11 I I T'iiilf' ANI V

Collection UJTL
(How) (When)
DR: Identify number of times ONA
updated
DE: 1.Count of ONA knowledge base ONA As they
P S n/a
updates for incorrect information audit log occur
DE: 2.Count of ONA knowledge base ONA As they
P S n/a
updates for missing information audit log occur
DE: 3.Total ONA knowledge base ONA As they
P S n/a
updates audit log occur
DE: 4.JTF functional member who ONA As they
P S n/a
makes update audit log occur
. riMA
Did ONA users trust the ONA knowledge base currency?
DR: Number of ONA users that knew it

had been updated
Plans, Info S, Cmd
JDCAT
DE: 1.Survey question(s) S P & Ops Gps.; 12 Jun.
Survey
JIACG; Compo
How long did it take to update the ONA knowledge base?
DR: Individual responsible for deciding what JISR information should be

added to ONA knowledge base
Plans & Info S. JDCAT I
DE: 1.Survey question(s) 12 Jun.
Gps. Survey
DR: Determine how information is
passed from JISR to ONA for update
Plans, Info S. & JDCAT
DE: 2.Survey question(s) S P 12 Jun.
Ops Gps. Survey
DR: Determine time required to update
ONA after new node information
available
DE: 3.Survey question(s) I sl pi I EAC,ISG;JOC,JPC I

JDCAT I
Survey
12 Jun.

Collection
Collection UJTL
Data Collection Method
OP
5.1.4
Did the ONA knowledge base tools provide adequate information retrieval?
DR: Ease of information access for

ONA users
Plans, Info S, Cmd
JDCAT
Survey
JIACG; Compo
DR: Ease of information manipulation
for ONA users
Plans, Info S, Cmd
JDCAT
Survey
JIACG; Compo
Did the ONA knowledge base tools provide adequate capability for knowledge base maintenance?
DR: Determine ease of information

maintenance/update for ONA analysts
Plans, Info S, Cmd
JDCAT
Survey
JIACG; Compo
How often was the ONA knowledge base accessed?
ONA
S P As occurs (tot. ea. wk.)

Collection UJTL
(How) (When)
How long did it take ONA knowledge base users to find needed information?
DR: Identify time it takes ONA users to find

needed information in ONA knowledge base
Plans, Info S, Cmd
JDCAT
Survey
JIACG; Compo
Did the ONA knowledge base support board, center, cell activity, and other staff actions
adequately?
DR: Determine if the ONA knowledge base

enhanced board, center, and cell preparation
Plans, Info S, Cmd
JDCAT
Survey
JIACG; Compo
DR: Determine if the ONA knowledge base enhanced JTF staff actions other than
board/center/cell preparation
Plans, Info S, Cmd
JDCAT
DE: 2.Survey question(s) I Sip I & Ops Gps.; 12 Jun.
Survey
JIACG; Compo
Did the ONA knowledge base contain the information its users needed?
DR: Identify number of times ONA users' desired information
1+AU AT+T+TPTAT. TTQJt ANT V 323

Collection I UJTL
Connection
(When)
Plans, Info S, Cmd

SI PI & Ops Gps.;
JDCAT I 12 Jun.
Survey
JIACG; Compo
Did the ONA knowledge base provide adequate support for development of the PEL?

S P 10 Jun.
& Ops Gps. Survey
Did the ONA knowledge base provide adequate support for development of the ETO?
JDCAT
S P 12 Jun.
OP
2.4.1.2/2.4.1.3
Did the ETO focus on vulnerabilities identified by the ONA knowledge base? I 2.4.~.~
Plans & Info S. JDCAT

S P 12 Jun.
Gps. Survey
Was the ETO developed with the ONA knowledge base depiction of Red intentions?
324 RAil ARIHPTAT. TTiii;i,1+. ANT.v

Collection UJTL
(How) (When)
Plans & Info S. JDCAT
12 Jun.
Gps. Survey
Was the ETO developed with the ONA knowledge base depiction of Red key nodes?
JDCAT
S P 12 Jun.
OP 5.3.6
What percent of ETOs included second and third order effects for nodes selected for
attack?
DR: Determine percent of ETO effects

that include second and third order
effects
DE: 1.ETO effects with second and Data
P S S JPC; JOC 11 Jun.
third order effects included sheet
Data
DE: 2.Number of ETO effects P S JPC; JOC 11 Jun.
sheet
DE: 3.Compute percentage of ETO
Data As
(and updates) effects with second and PIA nla
sheet needed
third order effects
How often were second and third order effects considered by the JFC and staff when considering
actions against Red?
DR: Determine number of times JFC refused proposed COA because of second and third order
effect information
JDCAT
DE: 1.Survey question(s) S P S Plans & Cmd Gps. 9 Jun.
Survey
DE: 2.Survey question(s) S P S Plans & Cmd Gps. JDCAT 9 Jun.
lilA AlillillPI 11 I I T'iiilf' ANI V 325

Collection UJTL
(How) (When)
DR: Instances of JFC using second and third order effect

information in his decision process
DE: 3.Survey question(s) S
DR: Instances of JFC disregarding second and third order effect

information in his decision process
OP 5.3.6
How often did the JFC and staff use the ONA knowledge base as a reference source for prioritizing
courses of action?
DR: Criteria JFC uses to prioritize

proposed courses of action
JDCAT
DE: 1.Survey question(s) S P S Plans & Cmd Gps. 8 Jun.
Survey
DR: Identify number of times JFC used
ONA information to prioritize COA
How often did the JFC and staff use the ONA knowledge base as a reference source for selecting
courses of action?
326 FOR OFFTC'TAT, TT~F, ANT,Y

Collection UJTL
(How) (When)
Did Blue use ONA knowledge base information to interrupt Red force command and
control?
DR: ONA impact on adversary's ability

to command and control its forces
DE: 1 .Survey question(s) S P OPFOR JDCAT I execution

Survey
DR: ONA impact on adversary's ability
to communicate with its forces
DE: 2.Survey question(s) S P OPFOR JDCAT I execution

Survey
DR: ONA impact on adversary forces
ability to execute their assigned
mission
DE: 3.Survey question(s) I sl pi OPFOR I

JDCAT I execution
Survey
JDCAT
P Plans & Cmd Gps. execution
Survey
How often did the JFC and staff feel Red had conducted a successful action against I OP
them? 5.4.4

S P S execution
& Ops Gps. Survey
How often were the JFC and staff surprised by Red actions?
1+AR A1+1+IPI A I . I T"'1+ ANI .V 327

Collection UJTL
(How) (When)

S P S execution
& Ops Gps. Survey
What percent of the time did the JFC and staff feel they were operating within Red's decision
cycle?
DR: Determine JFC and staff estimate of percent of time they were operating within the
adversary's decision cycle
Plans, Info S, Cmd JDCAT I execution
DE: 1.Survey question(s)
& Ops Gps. Survey
DR: Adversary's estimate of percent of
time they were on the offensive
DE: 2.Survey question(s)
& Ops Gps. Survey
DR: Adversary's estimate of percent of
time they were on the defensive
(reactive)
DE: 3.Survey question(s) S P
& Ops Gps. Survey
DR: Blue's perception of consistently
being on the offensive
DE: 4.Survey question(s) S P
& Ops Gps. Survey
DR: Blue's perception of consistently
being on the defensive (reactive)
DE: S.Survey question(s)
& Ops Gps. Survey
How useful was the ONA knowledge base for Blue to operate within Red's decision
cycle?
DR: Determine JFC and staff estimate of ONA contribution to

Collection UJTL
(How) (When)

Figure 203: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is briefed by Commander USJFCOM, Gen William F. Kernan during the
Secretary's visit to JFCOM's Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center, Suffolk, VA during Millennium Challenge 2002

Assessment Area 8 - EffectsBased Operations (EBO):

Planning and Assessment
The EBO Planning and Assessment concept demonstrated strong potential for future
Department of Defense application and could similarly benefit other government departments,
providing better, more timely integration of department and
agency responses to contingency situations.
Effects-Based Planning's (EBP) contribution to Blue
force operations was showcased during MC02 and the ability to
conduct the EBP warfighting challenge was met. The CJTF
selection of desired effects to achieve the combatant
commander's campaign objectives was derived exclusively
from the ONA. Desired effects were translated into essential
tasks for functional components. The components then framed
their tactical actions in the context of desired effects and
essential tasks even though the linkage between desired effects
and key nodes, and synchronization between tactical actions
and resources were not always apparent.
The process for assessing achievement of effects,
however, did not work effectively and needs refinement. In
some collaborative sessions, one or more components, the JTF
staff, and the combatant commander reported different
assessments of a specific effect. While it is not surprising that
perceptions would diverge at different levels of command, there
needs to be a process for identifying the reasons behind the
divergence.
Not only is it a tremendous challenge to collect all the
data and information necessary to conduct effects assessment,
visualization of the knowledge thus gained is a serious
mechanization (tools) challenge in its own right. In any case, it
was clear the assessment process was either not understood or needs refinement.
Methodology
Participant surveys, SME surveys, SME observations, and comments from participants
and SMEs were used as data collection tools. Additionally, senior concept developer
observations and comments, In Focus sessions, Azimuth Checks, and out-briefs or 'boil-down'
sessions, with the senior JTF and functional component planners were used as a means of
collecting data to gain perspective on the EBP and the effects assessment concept. To aid in
understanding specific participant grasp of the concept, the SMEs and analysis personnel also
reviewed JTF and component planning and assessment products.
Warfighting Challenges: Ability to conduct Effects-Based Planning; and ability to conduct

Effects Assessment

Finding Operating in a CIE, JTF planners were better able to understand the
operational situation and develop better-reasoned courses of action.
The CIE tools provide the planner with greater access to information, while the use of
IWS allows the free flow of information, and other more non-traditional players are brought into
the planning process. Thus, planners can more fully understand the intended and unintended
consequences of their actions because they have access to more information and insight. It was
difficult to assess the ability of the planners to identify key nodes and vulnerabilities using the
ONA. Most of the planners found the ONA tools incomplete and hard to work with.
JTF level planners indicated the CROP enhanced the EBP process. Component level planners
did not feel as strongly, however, their level of acceptance improved somewhat from Spiral 3
to the end of the execution phase.
Desired effects were identified and taken into consideration at all levels of the planning
process. This construct allowed for a more informed mission analysis.
Except for identification of key nodes in the adversaries' system, the ONA as implemented in
this experiment for JTF and component planner use in conducting joint operational mission
analysis did not live up to participant expectations.
Based on observations and comments from the SMEs and responses to surveys
administered to the warfighters, the consensus was that the CIE and CIE tools improved the
planners' ability to assess the operational situation and develop better-reasoned COAs. The CIE
tools provided the planner with more access to information than could be attained previously. In
addition, the use of IWS allowed the free flow of information within the EBP process, and
brought other more non-traditional players into the process, enabling the planners to more fully
understand the intended and unintended consequences of their actions.
However, this additional information can cause 'information overload' and does need to
be carefully screened in order not to inundate the planners. It may be necessary to assign a
skilled operational planner to this screening task to ensure JPC members do not waste their
valuable time. Education and training are keys to successful implementation of the CIE into the
joint operational planning process.
Many problems encountered using ADOCS, IWS, SPPS, and other planning tools
introduced during MC02 will be resolved as planners become more experienced and comfortable
with using the tools, and implementation TTPs are developed for the tools' use. By its very
nature, the increased level of participation and information in the planning process can lead to a
slowing down of the process. However, the increased time needed to assimilate the information
into a cohesive and well thought out plan can be more than offset by the planners' ability to
produce a better-reasoned COA.
JTF level planners thought the CROP enhanced the EBP process. Component level
planners did not feel as strongly, however, their level of acceptance improved somewhat from
Spiral 3 to the end of the execution phase. Planners said that the CROP was difficult to use. As
the experiment progressed, they became better at using the CROP, but information was hard to
find, it was duplicative, and somewhat inconsistent.
Planners also cited planning time constraints and the personal time required to participate
in virtual collaborative planning sessions as restricting their time available to use the CROP. A
JFMCC planner expressed a common frustration, "The only situational awareness provided to
future planners is provided through monitoring of briefings and planning sessions conducted
over IWS."

The areas of the CROP identified as most useful by the JTF and component planners was
access to planning documents 60%
via SPPS, graphic
representation of the battle-
50%
space via ADOCS, and access
to the ONA.
When asked what 40%
information was not available

on the CROP, planners listed: 30%
thorough and authoritative
written documentation of 20%
key collaborative sessions
real reach-back to centers
10%
of excellence
tools to better facilitate
assessment 0%
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
COA analysis and war-
gammg JTF Components
space planning tools I_ Spiral #3 I][J S/1 I][J SIS I

plotting of nodes and nodal
relationships Figure 204: Access to the CROP enhanced the ESP process
chronological file of
significant and analyzed intelligence
An overwhelming number of JTF level planners indicated collaboration helped to

develop a better-reasoned COA. Component level planners were not as enthusiastic, though, as
the competing demands for time and attention between internal and external planning activities
overwhelmed some of the operators. As such, planners, thus pressed for time, were not able to
reflect on their work and conduct thorough collaboration, as they would have preferred.
Evidence suggests courses of action were developed in sidebars and vetted in
collaboration. In the words of one component planner, "[CIE] brings more brainpower to the
fight, but you need to have a staff product to help maximize the collaborative process, you
cannot start with a blank page, and the collaborators need to see the information ahead of time to
adequately prepare for quality collaboration."
JTF level planners also thought the use of collaboration helped them develop COAs more
quickly. Again, component level planners were not as supportive of the faster COA idea. Some
stated horizontal collaboration was problematic and that too many people were participating in
the process, creating delays in decision-making. Planners' comments suggested virtual
collaborative sessions must be driven hard to be timely. Planners also suggested it was very
difficult to develop COAs through virtual collaboration, but collaboration worked well in
reviewing COAs with distant headquarters.
A majority of JTF level planners agreed that additional demands on the planners' time
resulting from EBP was significant. Planners reported this was particularly true at the component
level, where they were more sparsely manned yet had the greater burden, having to collaborate
with more locations (higher, lower, and laterally). Some planners suggest the additional demands
on time did not necessarily result from EBP, but from a lack of reasonable analytical support-

the analysis tools and products planners normally use were not available. Again, planners said
that a significant amount of time was lost in collaboration because facilitators' failed to keep the
sessions on track and did not have a clear idea of what results the session should be trying to
accomplish.
Despite the significant increase in time spent using EBP in a virtual, collaborative
information environment, the majority of the planners indicated the benefits derived from the
virtual collaboration far outweighed the additional time spent. Planners cited lack of joint
planning experience, the need for better time and session management, and better participant
management as reasons for the increased amount of time demanded spent in collaboration.
The majority of SMEs
90%
surveyed during the
experiment agreed that the 80%
additional demand on a
70%
commander's time resulting
from EBP was significant-53 60%
percent agreed and 47 percent
50%
disagreed.
SMEs commented that 40%
the additional demands might
30%
come from commanders
feeling driven to playa more 20%
detailed and important role in
10%
the planning process. Although
doctrine calls for command 0%
involvement, and has for Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
sometime, commanders have JTF Components
varying preferences in their
I_ Spiral #3 1Dl8/1 1Dl8/8 1
approach to this requirement. .
The virtual
collaborative environment
during MC02 required the Figure 205: The CIE helped to develop better COA's
commander's focus and
attention. As noted by one of the SME's, "If the commander wants to make a quick, accurate
decision, this process speeds up that process. If he wants to procrastinate until he has every piece
of information, then he can ask questions until the cows come home; the process will allow him
to do that. Ultimately, Effects-Based Planning [in a virtual collaborative information
environment] amplifies both of these commander tendencies - the good and the bad."
A majority of SMEs surveyed during the experiment agreed that the benefits derived
from virtual collaboration out-weighed the additional demands on a commander's time. The
survey showed 83 percent agreed and 17 percent disagreed. As reported by one senior officer,
"The commander has to strike a fine balance between the amount of time spent in virtual
collaboration and being able to physically meet with component commanders and staff members.
The collaborative environment has allowed the decision cycle to speed up greatly. This requires
more commander involvement in the sessions in order to pass on guidance, intent, and make
decisions. One pitfall is the commander can reach down and micromanage subordinates easily.
The collaborative environment is "sexy" and the commander must fight the temptation to

monitor all of the boards, centers, cells, and meetings so that he can continue to future-focus his
efforts."
Based on a review of
the ETO prepared by the JTF 80%
during the experiment,
70%
desired effects were
identified and taken into 60%
consideration at all levels of
the planning process. This 50%
construct allowed for a more
informed mission analysis. 40%
The planners identified the

30%
effects in terms of changes to
the adversaries' actions or 20%
behavior, the desired level of
change, and the scope and 10%
distribution of the effects.

0%
Timing and duration of the
effects was not apparent in
JTF Components
the documentation examined.
This omission has the I_ Spiral #3 .8/1 0818 1
potential to cause the PEL to
be viewed as a sequenced
prioritization list. Rather, the Figure 206: The CIE helps develop COA's more quickly
PEL probably should provide
the necessary timing to allow planners to take into account sequencing and the enabling
actions/tasks in order to achieve the higher headquarters effect and/or objective. All of the
desired effects listed in the PEL were present in the baseline ONA.
Based on examination ofETO 001 dated 12 June 2007 and its associated PEL, ETO
001A dated 26 July 2007 and it's associated PEL, and ETO 002 W ARNORD dated 3 August
2007 and its associated PEL, JTF planners:
Stated desired effects in terms of adversary action or behavior to be changed, created, or
prevented
Stated desired effects in terms of the desired level of change, (e.g., create, prevent, develop,
disrupt, deny, or neutralize)
Stated desired effects in terms of the desired scope and distribution of the effect, (e.g.,
geographic, organizational, political, and cultural)
Did not state the desired effects in terms of the intended timing of the effect, (i.e., time when
manifestation is desired or intended), and duration of time the effect is desired or intended to
exist
All of the desired effects identified in each of the approved PELs were present in the
baseline ONA. There were seven prioritized effects in ETO 001 and 001A. ETO 002 contained
six prioritized effects, retaining three from the original ETO 001 list and adding three new
effects.
FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONLY 335

Subject matter experts agreed, that prioritization of effects such as use of the PEL, assists
the development and adaptation of COAs. They added that the prioritization of effects, along
with commander's intent and other command guidance, helped with developing and adapting
COAs. At the functional component level, the PEL tended to drive the planning process.
Some additional observations offered by the SMEs include, "Although the PEL identifies
priority of effort, it does not integrate and crosswalk links and key common nodes that should be
the basis for COA development." "Prioritization of effects may actually hinder the development
of a JTF level COA. The focus of planning becomes the priority effect and not the key nodes and
links that may not be in that effect, but impacts on the entire operation or is the center of
gravity."
Except for identification of key nodes in the adversaries' system, the ONA, as
implemented in this experiment for JTF and component planner use in conducting joint
operational mission analysis, did not live up to participant expectations. Planners, during the end
of experiment out brief, suggested that, "with ONA, we're removing strategy. We're losing the
operational art. We can still have objectives with ONA. CoGs help campaign planners determine
desired effects. Objectives help focus the effects."
Most survey respondents found the ONA and JIPB incomplete and hard to work with.
Some had no training in the use of either of these tools. A few of the respondents found the ONA
to be overwhelming in the scope of the information it made available to the planner and found
accessing the information cumbersome at best. Questions also arose concerning the quality and
timeliness of the information. Like the CIE and its tools, experience and training are the keys to
successful use of the ONA
70%
and JIPB.
Component SMEs
60% believed the ONA contributed
to identification of key nodes
50% in the adversaries' systems,
but the JTF SMEs did not
40% share that predominant view.
The ONA assisted in the
30% identification of nodes, but
actionable levels of detail
20% were lacking. Some of this
lack of detail was probably
10% due to classification
restrictions required for work
0% at the Secret level.
Furthermore, the
JTF Components experimental ONA was not as
fully developed as the concept
I-S/1 IFlJs/sl
envisioned. Planner focus
remained on adversary
Figure 207: Demands on planners' time was significant military systems with little
work done on diplomatic,
information, or economic aspects, especially at the functional component planning level.

That said, this is a controversial topic and SMEs commented extensively on this question.
Said one participant, "The ONA data provided initial identification of some of the key nodes. As
discussed in the Azimuth Checks, the data was not fully complete and left significant holes in the
intelligence picture," he said. "This resulted in two problems: 1) the holes had to be filled from
other sources of information. The information was hard to find and was located in over seven
different locations, each with a different layout and search method. The data from the other
sources was hard to verify - its origination, its time sensitivity, and its context. 2) The
development of the JIPB is essential to discerning an enemy's COA and intent."
"The ONA was
extremely difficult to use," 70%
said another. "Its structure and
lack of search capability made 60%
finding information very
difficult and limited its 50%
usefulness in identifying
targets. For the most part the 40%
ONA was like reading a DIA
country manual. Although a 30%
lot of information was
available, it was of such a 20%
general nature that it provided
little real time, actionable 10%
information.
"Although the concept 0%
of the ONA is a good one, it is
highly questionable that a JTF Components
single SJFHQ in each theatre
could develop multiple or
even a single ONA robust
enough to meet the needs of Figure 208: Participants disagreed with the statement, 'Demands on
EBO." planners' time outweigh collaboration benefits'.
"We really couldn't
tell [if the ONA identified key nodes and vulnerabilities]," said another participant. "You cannot
access whether the key nodes that were identified were correct, there was no assessment made
because the effects could not be determined. I see it as an OK planning tool, but what it fails to
do is identify the key nodes that get at the centers of gravity, not the systems that allow the
enemy to prosecute his campaign. If the ONA is not perfect in its understanding, then it is just a
tool for planning, if you will, that allows us to think logically about setting the conditions to take
this enemy down, sooner than later.
"For the time we take to build it, let alone maintain it, it is not worth the effort. As for the
lone success story with the JSOTF, that was by accident. He had a target he had to take out, then
he went back to look at the nodes that were associated to the target, and saw the bang for the
buck. The nodes did not lead him to the target; the target led him to the nodes," he said.
SMEs were about evenly split (11 - yes; 9 - no) in believing that anyone used the ONA
to identify key links between nodes in the adversaries' systems. As with the previous question,
component SMEs were much more supportive of this observation than were those working at the

JTF level. Furthermore, comments indicated ONA was used even less during the execution
phase.
Said one participant, "Although in the planning, it was determined that the [CJTF-S] was
the center of gravity, the nodes did not lead you or tie you to that end-state." During Spiral 3, of
22 responses received from SMEs, the majority (20) had no comments in regards to this question
and indicated it was not being Table 21: ONA survey questions and responses
addressed in the event.
A majority of SMEs also did
not believe the ONA contributed in
any substantial manner to the
identification of adversary
leadership decision making
Did the ONA contribute to ID of KEY NODES 72% agree
processes. SME comments included in the adve
statements such as "The ONA did Did the ONA contribute to ID of KEY LINKS
not appear to be in-depth enough ... " BETWEEN NODES in the adversary 55% agree
and "Identified who the key systems?
leadership was, but did not drill Did the ONA contribute to the conduct of
down far enough to identify center of gravity and critical vulnerability 44% agree
decision making processes." Of the analysis?
22 Spiral 3 responses received from Did the ONA contribute to ID of adversary
35% agree
SMEs, 19 of them were neutral, leadership decision-making processes?
saying ONA contribution to this Did the ONA contribute to ID of friendly
strengths and weaknesses relative to the 35% agree
effort was not observed.
adversary?
Continuing this trend, a
SME Responses N z 18-22
majority of SMEs did not believe
JTF or functional component planners used the ONA as a serious contributor to identification of
friendly strengths and weaknesses relative to the adversaries. A recurring theme in the SME
comments includes" ... users of the ONA database at the [component] are not pleased with the
utility of the ONA. Too slow, too many clicks to get anywhere, and people can't find what they
want. Most give up in frustration." "Since the enemy COA and intent could not really be
developed with the data in the ONA, it was significantly more difficult to use the ONA to
determine enemy and friendly strengths and weaknesses."
Finding The JTF required extensive experience with EBO before it was able to
adequately analyze intended and unintended effects.
Some improvement was noted during the execution phase. Since individuals and small
groups, did in fact, do this level of analysis, the JTF task to use EBP to develop and analyze
COAs has potential. The "DIME" and "PMESII" thought structure was weak except for "M"
effects. In this experiment, the JIACG was integrated into the combatant commander's staff, and
worked through the JTF Joint Planning Center (JPC) pol/mil planners to influence operational
level planning. Influence models and predictive analysis tools are not sufficiently available to
assist in the COA development and COA analysis process. Simultaneous, parallel, horizontal
planning between the components, which were assigned multiple, supported, and supporting
effects-based missions, is difficult and extremely challenging, even to the most experienced of
joint planners. A common sentiment among the JTF planners was that the EBP process idea of
338 FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONI,V

predictive analysis seemed like a good idea, but needed work and time for planners to accept.
When used, it appeared to make a difference.
Numerous aspects of effects-based thinking, as applied to the joint operational planning
process of developing a COA, helped planners develop a better-reasoned COA. Consideration of
intended and unintended potential outcomes, causal linkages, indirect effects, and outcomes
outside of the local area add value to the planning process.
However, use of these aspects of effects-based thinking in conjunction with influence
models and predictive analysis, as applied to the joint operational planning process to analyze
COAs, was not well understood and even less well applied in MC02. Training, education, and
maturing of ONA and COA analysis DSTs will help mitigate this challenge.
Aspects of effects-based thinking such as the JIACG, DIME, and PMESII had little
visibility at the JTF planner level, which was not surprising since the JIACG was designed into
the experiment at the combatant commander level.
Use of collaborative planning tools greatly assisted the components in horizontally
integrating their tasks and actions. The JTF and functional component EACs however must be
appropriately staffed to participate in both effects assessment and planning activities in order to
properly link effects assessment to adaptation of plans for future execution.
The JTF EAC demonstrated the capability to identify assessment requirements, but
translation of those assessment requirements back into the JTF and component level planning
centers for branch and sequel planning in an anticipatory manner was extremely difficult.
Operational level war-gaming of the approved JTF-level COA by the JTF and functional
component planners, using the CIE, was poorly done during this event. The JTF planners
believed the in-depth war-gaming at the component level was sufficient to meet this task
requirement. The component tactical level war-gaming, however, did not suffice for operational
level synchronization and integration.
Except for identification of key nodes in the adversaries' system, the ONA as
implemented in this experiment for JTF and component planner use in developing and analyzing
joint, operational level COAs did not live up to participant expectations.
Based on observations from the SMEs and responses to surveys from the warfighters, the
consensus was that numerous aspects of effects-based thinking, as applied to the joint operational
planning process developing a COA, helped planners develop a better-reasoned COA.
Consideration of intended and unintended potential outcomes, causal linkages, indirect effects,
and outcomes outside of the local area add value to the planning process. However, use of these
aspects of effects-based thinking in conjunction with influence models and predictive analysis, as
applied to the joint operational planning process, analyzing a COA is not well understood and
even less well applied. Training, education, and maturing of the IT support tools will help
mitigate this challenge.
Manual analysis and Blue-Red cell deliberations were the primary methods used to
consider adversary potential COAs and potential responses to friendly action, and it was done
primarily at the JTF headquarters-level. SMEs did note an application of the ONA visualization
tool, with promising results, during component led planning for one of the major operations. This
planning group then worked with the JIACG to discuss possible mitigation of undesired effects
and identification of possible unanticipated effects. JTF headquarters level SMEs reported a
trend to not conduct war-gaming at the operational level.
The components conducted tactical level war-gaming, with the JTF synchronizing the
operation in terms of task, purpose, time, space, and resources. The JTF did not conduct

action/reaction/counteraction war-gaming at the operational level. Functional component-level

SME comments confirmed this tendency.
A majority of JTF and component level SMEs agreed, despite the lack ofIT support tools
and using only manual analysis techniques, predictive analysis helped the JTF produce a better-
reasoned COA. This success is due mostly to the efforts of the Blue-Red cell. However, since the
EAC participation in the JPC sessions to war-game the action/reaction/counteraction possibilities
was viewed by the SMEs as minimal, this cell did not contribute to the effort as much as
anticipated. EAC SMEs cite
insufficient manning levels as the Table 22: SME survey questions and responses
most probable cause for lack of
EAC participation in the planning Does pred ictive
process. analysis, whether a
Members of the war-fighting manual process or
25% 70%
staff were asked to rate the EBP assisted by knowledge 77% agree
agree agree
management tools, help
process' usefulness in predicting the the JTF planners to
direct and indirect effects (intended produce a beUer-
and unintended) of proposed tactical reasoned eOA?
actions. Of the 183 surveyed Were intended and
members, 61 percent agree to some unintended potential
100% 70%
level of usefulness with 22 percent outcomes examined for 64% agree
agree agree
each of the planned
choosing to abstain because they did
effects?
not participate in this activity. A
Were the causal
number of them commented that the linkages (between
JTF seemed to be more reactive nodes) through which 100% 50%
64% agree
than proactive, or they could not actions create effects agree agree
discern a clear linkage. The most examined for each of
common reason cited was an I-t_h_e....:.p_la_n_n_e_d_e_ff_e_ct_s_?_-+_ _ _+-___-+-____---1
unresponsive effects assessment SME responses N =4 N = 10 N = 13
process in turn due to slow BDA from the experiment's M&S systems. A common sentiment can
be summarized as "A good idea, needs work, and needs time for planners to accept. Where it was
used, it seemed to make a difference."
Members of the war-fighting staff were then asked to comment on what tool(s) most
enabled them to conduct predictive analysis. Of the 183 surveys returned, 84 contained
comments responding to this specific question. The most common "helpful" tool cited was the
ONA, followed closely by the CIE. Several planners had very strong feelings regarding this topic
with comments.
"None of the tools enabled predictive analysis in any way. The ONA, in fact, was a
hindrance because of the missing linkages between effects and nodes."
"I like collaboration because one can hear the reasoning behind the analysis; tends to be
more acceptable retaining most of the human element. Stand alone databases tend to lack
credibility."
Most SMEs agree intended and unintended potential outcomes were examined for the
effects published in the PEL. Multiple reports suggest unintended, second, and third order effects
were a matter of routine discussion during the daily EAC working group deliberations. Such
examinations however, are viewed as more of a JTF HQ task than a functional component task.

SMEs also agree the causal linkages between nodes were examined to determine those
actions needed to create desired effects. Reports also suggest the current manifestation of the
ONA did not permit the detailed analysis necessary to reduce and focus the JTF operational
efforts.
Table 23: SME survey questions and responses
Were indirect outcomes considered for 100% agree 60% agree 62% agree
each of the planned effects?
Were outcomes outside of the joint 50% agree 60% agree 38% agree
operations area considered for each of
the planned effects?
Did the ONA help the JTF planners in 75% agree 70% agree 62% agree
conducting predictive analysis?
SME Responses N=4 N = 10 N = 13
SMEs agree the indirect outcomes for each of the planned effects were considered;
however, many commented some serious possible outcomes (e.g., adversary preemptive attack,
adversary media manipulation), in hindsight, did not receive a proper discussion.
Consideration of outcomes outside the JOA was problematic for members of the JTF
planning staff. Mention is made regarding deliberations of non-military effects outside the JOA,
but these discussions were mostly restricted to macro-level discussions of economic and media
impacts. Many planners saw this discussion primarily at JTF or combatant commander level with
guidance passed down to planners for their use, or as participation by the political-military
planners in the various planning centers.
SMEs agree the ONA helped the JTF planners in conducting predictive analysis, with
Interagency participation in the ESP process was useful in 52% agree

developing better-reasoned branch and sequel COAs?
Center of Excellence (COE) participation in the ESP process was 23% agree
useful in develo better-reasoned branch and uel COAs?
SME responses N = 183
strong agreement at the JTF level and weaker agreement at the functional component level.
Dissenting comments included, "ONA does not have the degree of detail, up to date information,
and information reliability to be a useful planning or analytical tool," and, "ONA was only good
for an overall, if inaccurate, picture of the military situation. It was seriously lacking in the D, I,
and E."
As noted earlier, newer aspects of effects-based thinking, such as the JIACG, DIME, and
PMESII, were not well understood and had little visibility at the JTF planner level. Those ideas
have even less visibility at the functional component planner level and most non-military
planning information was routed through the PollMil planning staff, which was embedded in
the JTF HQ staff. It was this group that is credited with success for this aspect of effects-based
thinking as used in the joint operational planning process.
JTF and functional component planners agreed interagency participation in the EBP
process was useful in developing better-reasoned branch and sequel COAs at the JTF level.
Numerous comments were received, as well.

"Very useful at JTF level-Not appropriate for the component commander level," said a
participant. While another participant was unaware of significant JIACG involvement, "the only
IA participation I was aware of was the [PollMil] planner, and I don't know how linked in he
was." "We were able to engage with (a member of the group) yesterday," said one officer, "and
his input and collaboration was extremely helpful."
Were the actions planned for 75% agree 40% agree 69% agree
execution selected based on their
impact against adversary pressure
points?
Were MoP developed by the 75% agree N/A 54% agree
components for each task and/or
action?
SME Responses N =4 N =10 N =13
"This would have been helpful from the beginning. Daily interaction is necessary.
Helpful when we got it, but there are still many questions hanging out there and little current
input. The JTF needs direct access to lA, not through the combatant commander - too slow in
RDO."
During development of the eOA (s), were all 50% agree 60% agree
aspects of PMESII considered?
Were all military and non-military (DIME) effects 25% agree 30% agree
specified in the current ETO properly synchronized
in time and space?
During development of the eOA (s), were the 50% agree 60% agree
capabilities of all elements of national power
(DIME) considered?
SME Responses N =4 N = 10
One participant thought the group's participation grew as the experiment progressed,
"The interagency participation actually seems to be increasing/improving. It seemed fairly
limited in Spiral 3 and between Spiral 3 and the experiment execution," he said. "They seemed to
be very useful to the plans process as a whole, but I found that I had little access to this
resource."
Few JTF and functional component planners observed the participation of centers of
excellence in the EBP process, hence, were unable to rate their usefulness in developing better-
reasoned branch and sequel COAs. This result was expected as robust COE participation was
eliminated from the experiment's design due to IT costs and scenario sensitivities. Comments
were almost exclusively positive.
"Although I did not use them, I believe the concept is good," said one. "If we'd had any
input, it would have proven useful. However, we had no COE players in 10." "Never heard from
them or used them. Too bad they were not available to support an exercise of this scope. Tum the
concept into reality."
SMEs were asked to report observations of JIACG, COE, NGO, or other non-traditional
participants in the effects-based planning process. Their reports indicate they saw little use of

these organizations at the JTF planner level and even less use at the functional component level.
As indicated previously, the JIACG was integrated into the combatant commander's staff during
the experiment, and worked through the JTF JPC PollMil planners to influence operational level
planning.
One participant said, "I believe the lAC is the most important part of this experiment,
however, if they do not possess the understanding of how a CJTF prosecutes his campaign, and
how their expertise and efforts facilitate that process, then we need to start over." While another
MC02 participant said, "The lack of play with these elements significantly detracted from our
ability to experiment with DIME." These comments were representative of the whole.
Few SMEs thought all aspects ofPMESII were considered during development of the
branch and sequel COAs. Although 60 percent of participants at the JTF JPC agreed, comments
clearly indicate this concept was sparsely used. "Some were just touched upon," said one SME.
Another added, "lip Service was given to PMESII." Added another, "I saw very little of anything
but the M in PMESII considered." Most SMEs indicated the JTF planning emphasis was
primarily focused on the military element of national power, with little if any focus on the other
elements of national power.
"Very little if any D, I, and E coordination and synchronization were evident," said one
observer, while another noted that there was some discussion at the macro level, but the
discussions never reached the operational level of detail.
Based on observations from the SMEs and responses to surveys from the war fighters,
data suggests use of collaborative planning tools greatly assisted the components in horizontally
integrating their tasks and actions. The JTF and functional component EACs, however, must be
appropriately staffed to participate in both effects assessment (EAC) and planning (JPC)
activities in order to properly link effects assessment to adaptation of plans for future execution.
Most SMEs at the JTF EAC and at component planner level believe the actions planned
by the components were selected based on their impact against adversary decisive points. SMEs
at the JTF planner level disagreed, saying, "Most actions were planned to accomplish a mission
and not really based on desired effect. Take islands ... Capture WME sites ... What's different?"
This disagreement is due in most part to observations regarding the appropriate level for effects
planning and assessment.
During MC02 execution, functional components were given supported commander (or
main effort) responsibilities to plan and executive effects level missions, thus JTF operational
level planning for these effects was minimal. Additionally, JTF EAC SMEs observed
components developing measures of performance for each task or action planned, primarily
based on their attendance at JTF EAC working group meetings. Linking the EAC work to the
planners was problematic, however, since most assessment personnel were gainfully employed
with assessment tasks and were not able to actively and robustly participate in planning sessions
at their respective levels.
Members of the war-fighting staff were asked to comment on the usefulness of the
collaboration system in helping the components synchronize their horizontal planning, (i.e.,
component to component planning.) Of the 183 surveys returned, 74 percent responded the CIE
was useful in this endeavor. Comments included:
"Yes, we still have a way to go with this to get the right synchronization. In some ways
by bringing them in too early, we bog down the process and might send them into needless
planning. We (JTF) need to be involved in horizontal collaboration to keep it synched with our
plan so we have an understanding of their planning and to provide guidance if required."

"The lower the level of command, the more assumptions had to be made to plan
concurrently. This becomes a liability."
"The power of this was that the functional components could lead the planning effort and
have the same information available that the JTF had. This process really brought the power of
functional components to the forefront."
The JTF EAC demonstrated the capability to identify assessment requirements. However,
translation of these assessment requirements back into the JTF and component level planning
centers for branch and sequel planning in an anticipatory manner is extremely difficult. As stated
in the previous task, the JTF and functional component EACs must be appropriately staffed to
participate in both EAC and planning (JPC) activities in order to properly link effects assessment
to adaptation of plans in anticipation of adversary action(s).
The SMEs observing the JTF EAC gave high marks to the JTF's ability to accomplish the
'identify assessment requirements' task, a critical component of using the EBP process, to
develop and analyze courses of action. Accomplishment of this task was given much lower
marks at the JTF JPC and at the component planning levels. The lower marks resulted because
Are all component actions and/or tasks 100% agree 60% agree 90% agree
traceable back through the desired
effects to higher-level strategy
(objectives)?
Were MOE developed for each JTF level 100% agree 60% agree 60% agree
desired effect?
Were the MOE developed for the JTF 75% agree 60% agree 60% agree
level desired effects tied to theater
objectives?
level desired effects reliable?
level desired effects observable?
SME responses N =4 N = 10 N = 10
the SMEs were looking for branch and sequel adaptations of the plan, based on assessment (and
accomplishment) of the JTF prioritized effects.
In fact, the combatant commander or the CJTF directed much of the branch and sequel
planning based on his own assessments and, in some cases, political realities. Said one observer,
"I never got the impression the requirements were reviewed and examined to see if desired
effects were achieved - particularly in the 10 arena." Another observer said, "Since some of the
tasks lacked clarity as to what effect was really desired, the assessment cell was unable to rate
the JTF's effectiveness in reaching those goals."
Operational level war-gaming of the approved JTF level COA by the JTF and functional
component planners using the CIE was not well demonstrated during this event. The planners
believed the in depth war-gaming at the component level was sufficient to meet this task
requirement. The component tactical level war-gaming, however, did not suffice for operational
level synchronization and integration. Had resources been more constrained in this experiment,
this would have been much more evident.
344 FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY

Collaboratively analyzing the JTF level COA across the JTF HQ staff with functional
component participation is a complex task and presented a serious challenge to the JTF JPC. As
the tabulated data below indicates, the SME's favorably viewed participation in the Blue-Red
cells. OPFOR reactions to Blue actions (more difficult) were considered, but not as vigorously at
the operational level. Blue counteractions to potential OPFOR reactions (even more difficult)
were less well defined and largely ignored at the operational level. JTF EAC and JPC SMEs
were evenly split on their agreement of whether or not the JTF planners conducted effective war
gaming using the CIE. Components were supportive of the position that planners had effectively
war-gamed their COAs, but during this event, the lion's share of the war gaming was done at the
tactical level by the component planning staffs.
With respect to the 'value-added' of Blue-Red cell participation, one observer noted,
"The Blue-Red cell tends to be macro in their analysis of the enemy. The planners will tell you
that they are not getting the fidelity in possible enemy COAs that they need." Another agreed
that the Blue-Red team brought value to the deliberations, but added that the old J2 used to do
the same thing, so where is the quantum leap in change, he said, asking "what's the difference?"
Finding The ETO process can be effective at both the JTF and the functional
component commander level.
The process ofETO preparation enhances effectiveness of planners at both levels.
Synchronization issues are common and need careful attention at both the JTF and component
levels.
Most participants at both the JTF and functional component levels understand preparation
of the ETO. The relationships and effects, both supporting and supported, were clearly
understood. Initially, the task to prepare, synchronize, and issue effects tasking orders went
smoothly, but the large number of fragmentary orders issued during the experiment tended to
confuse many personnel as time passed.
Does participation of the Blue-Red cell N/A 70% agree N/A

enhance the COA analysis process?
Were potential Red reactions to Blue N/A 60% agree N/A
actions considered?
Were Blue counteractions (branches) N/A 40% agree N/A
planned for these potential Red
reactions?
Did the JTF planners effectively war 50% agree 50% agree 67% agree
game the COAs using the CIE?
SME responses N=4 N = 10 N = 13
The CIE did enhance cross component planning, there were individuals in charge of the
process, and there was a beneficial synchronization of the planning process.
The joint integration matrix (JIM) did not add much to the component planning process.
This document was intended to address the ISR and operations synchronization challenge. Its
limited use thus led to serious challenges keeping ISR synchronized with the effects-based
planning and assessment processes.

Issuance of the ETO was straightforward. Not all of the components were using the same
planning procedures or tools, however, and the resulting variations led to some desynchronized
actions.
SMEs overwhelmingly believe Table 29: SME survey questions and responses
effects-based orders issued by the JTF to
functional components were clear.
"Crystal," said one expert, Were effects-based 100% 100%
"Collaborative environment allows the mission orders clear to the agree agree
commander to immediately confirm/deny components?
with subordinates, and as important, all Were "supported" and 80% 86%
"supporting" command agree agree
levels of staffs." Similarly, they also
relationships clearly
believed the supported and supporting understood by the
command relationships were clearly components?
understood by the functional components. A Did the collaborative 100% 100%
few cautions were noted, however. planning process agree agree
"There is still an unclear picture as contribute to the joint force
to who claims responsibility for fires in the and component integration
and synchronization of
JOA. Supported and supporting command
capabilities?
relationships tend to cloud the picture even
SME responses N = 10 N = 13
further when it comes to who is responsible
for fires," said one participant. While another noted, "As the term 'main effort' got thrown
around more and more, relationships got confusing." "Would have been better with establishing
directives."
During the boil-down session with the JTF and component planners, they suggested the
supported and supporting command relationship during MC02 was not a problem because
resources were not constrained. They further suggested that if resources were constrained, " ...
we probably would have come up short in some areas."
Likewise, SMEs overwhelmingly supported the assertion that the collaborative planning
process contributed to the joint force and component integration and synchronization of
capabilities. Again though, a caution: a SME noted, "It both contributed to and detracted from
the planning process. The unstructured nature of many of the collaborative sessions delayed
actual planning efforts and in some cases caused confusion and misinformation. On the other
hand there was better situational awareness Table 30: SME survey questions and responses
and when sessions were established with
specific goals they contributed to and
enhanced the process." Were military actions of 80% 79%
The majority of SMEs agreed the the functional components agree agree
synchronized in time and
military actions of the functional space to maximize
components were synchronized in time and capabilities?
space to maximize capabili ti es. As cauti ons, I---D--'id-t-h-e-J-O-in-t-In-t-e-g-ra-ti-o-n--+-1-0o-yo--1---1S-o-yo-----l
SMEs indicated, "The operational and Matrix enhance the agree agree
tactical commands may not completely component planning
integrate properly. Some operational staff f---=--p_ro_c_e_ss_?_._ _ _ _ _ _-+-_ _ _-+-_ _ _ _-----j
seem to be thinking at the tactical level and SME Responses N =10 N = 13
losing the 'long term' operational view." SMEs also believe 10 was not as fully integrated as
possible: "Although the 10 campaign does strive to get the themes of the JTF commander out to

the public and take advantage of information opportunities, I don't feel that the 10 effort has
been fully incorporated into the operational plans and execution effort."
Finding The organization that owns the effect must be able to accomplish and assess it.
Because the JTF adopted the 'effects' from the combatant commander's CONPLAN, a
number of those' effects' were beyond the ability of the JTF to assess and achieve given the
context of this experiment. Compounding the problem, the JTF assigned effects to the functional
components that were likewise beyond their ability to completely accomplish and assess. The
resultant gaps were not properly addressed in the execution of the JTF effects assessment
process.
The EBO concept envisions the JTF as the' owner' and' assessor' of operational level
'effects', but it may be appropriate, on occasion, to designate a functional component as the
'owner' and' assessor' of an operational level 'effect'.
The process by which a force's progress in achieving the full range of operational effects
(DIME) is monitored is conceptually sound. However, this experiment was heavily "M" oriented
and needed to expand to include "D, I, and E."
The deficiency analysis processes, (assigned tasks and actions are being executed to
standard [MOP], however, the desired effect is not being realized [MOE]) did not work
particularly well and the construct of the MC02 ONA contributed to this shortcoming. First, it
was deficient with respect to its handling of key links between nodes. Second, center of gravity
and critical vulnerability analysis was not handled well. Third, the adversary leadership decision-
making process was not supported well enough, and fourth, friendly strengths and weaknesses
relative to the adversary were not broached. Hence, "targets" may have been leading to nodes
rather than nodes leading to "targets." Mitigating factors included M&S' lack ofBDA
timeliness, accuracy, and completeness. In addition, the joint information superiority center
(nSC) may need a predictive analysis and fusion cell to enable the anticipatory requirements
necessary to "lead turn" the adversary.
In the design of this
<t E394 experiment, the concept and
z
0 E844 analysis teams expected the JTF's
I::
E847 JPC, in cooperation with the IS
-"C
QI
n:s
I::
.-
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OIl,/)
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for each of the approved JTF level
I,/)..c
c_n:s E841
QI
desired effects. Additionally, they
... n:s
QlC
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E
::::J
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-z
~
u E836 the nSR collection plan. Noting
that there was no data being
w E823
collected that was aimed at
0 2 4 6 8 determining whether the MOEs
#ofMOEs were adequately developed, a SME
said, "MOE are not being collected
I El ETO-01 ETO-01A El ETO-021 against. MOE assessment is the
analytical effort that is the result of
Figure 209: Effect number designated in the ONA database the collection effort against PIR and
vs. the number of Measures of effectiveness
DE [desired effects]." He added,

"Currently the collection plan appears to be focused primarily on DE. Looking at the posted
collection plan, no PIR are depicted. My understanding is that this is a work in progress and
future collection plans will reflect collection against PIR." (D-Day)
Figure 209 depicts the ETO developed by the JTF with associated desired effects and
corresponding number of MOEs selected for the effect published in those respective orders.
Furthermore, the matrix form of the effects with associated MOEs developed for ETO-02 clearly
indicate an intent, to at least attempt, to assess each MOE on a day by day basis. ETO-Ol and
ETO-OIA did not contain any such matrices.
Seventy-five percent of the members of the JTF JISE responded positively to a survey
question asking if the additional workload created by the effects assessment process was
significant. EAC and supporting organization staffing levels need to be reviewed to ensure the
JTF is capable of properly assessing MOE and desired effects in an anticipatory fashion.
SMEs were asked daily to comment on what direct and indirect effects were actually
produced because of tactical actions and did the JTF correctly assess them.
Survey results included:
"Little to no BDA, but decision process is very logical. EAC is using all components, 10,
SOSA, BRC in making assessments." (D+4)
"Assessment always seems to be 'in progress.' As a result, no direct or indirect effects
are actually assessed within the current day's execution cycle." (D+9)
"The EAC assessed the JTF actions in a very logical manner and presented the best
assessments possible based on information and experience available. SOSA cell was very helpful
in these assessments." (D+ 12)
In a related question, SMEs were asked daily to comment on what direct and indirect
effects were actually produced because of Blue tactical actions. Comments were anecdotal, and
for the most part, generally tactical in nature, suggesting that the JTF was struggling with the
process of gathering together the collective results of component force actions on the battlefield
and relating them to the measures of effectiveness. And, reflecting those MOE "measurements"
back to their respective desired effects and the follow-on lashing of collective desired effects
back to their respective campaign objectives became difficult.
We were also interested in how the component combat assessments were passed to the
EAC and how much of this BDA did the EAC really use. SMEs observing the assessment
process said that the EAC received BDA inputs from components and the JISE through the CIE.
SMEs further said, "Component BDA was not getting to the EAC or the JISE [in a timely
manner]. The lack ofBDA negatively affected EAC ability to assess; they defaulted to worst
case [mission failure; assessing effects accomplishment as unacceptable or red on a stoplight
chart]."
EAC SMEs responded overwhelmingly (100 percent) positive to the follow-on question,
asking 'if MOP were useful in assessing MOE,' but then noted that most meaningful inputs came
out during the JCB. Concept and analyst teams expected this work to be routinely accomplished
in the daily collaborative EAC working group meetings. The JCB is the intended recipient of the
EAC's assessment work, not the intended generator of the effects assessment.
Were all the effects resulting from JTF and component actions anticipated (planned for)?
This question was asked daily to SMEs in the JTF EAC, the JTF JOC, and JTF JPC during the
period D-2 thru D+ 13. The survey results showed that effects were anticipated 29 percent of the
time by the EAC, 60 percent of the time by the JOC, and 37 percent by the JPC.

Responding to a follow-on daily question, EAC SMEs said that the MOEs developed for
each desired effect were correctly focused to best observe that effect just 27 percent of the time.
Below are a number of effects assessment questions posed during the experiment.
The collaboration system used in the effects assessment process was useful in producing
more accurate assessments [agree, Disagree, Did Not Use]
Interagency participation in the effects assessment process was useful in producing more
accurate assessments [agree, Disagree, Did Not Use]
Centers of Excellence participation in the effects assessment process were useful in
producing more accurate assessments [agree, Disagree, Did Not Use]
What non-traditional player brought the most value to the effects assessment process
[Comment, No Comment]
The prevailing response to all four questions was either "Did Not Use" or "No
Comment," indicating these aspects of the concept were not visible or not used by the EAC.
Did the EAC provide centralized management of the effects 75% 60% N/A
assessment process? agree agree
The CROP visual display of effects assessment was useful in did not 77% 61%
providing adequate detail and clarity to enable me to maintain use agree agree
good situation awareness.
Even though a majority of SMEs agreed that the EAC provided centralized management
of the effects assessment process, the comment, "Saw several levels of effect assessment, -
don't think the JTF cell was one-stop shop for effects assessment, " was supported by analysts'
observations. Interestingly, the JTF EAC did not use the CROP as an effects assessment or
situation awareness tool. Instead, the EAC used collaborative sessions during the EAC working
group meetings as the forum to determine current affects assessment status. JTF JOC personnel,
on the other hand, were supportive of the CROP as an effects assessment or situation awareness
tool, with less support from the JTF planners. Since the JOC was much more "today" focused
than the planners were, this divergence would be expected.
Finding Assessment and prediction are separate and distinct functions, and may
require separate cells within the JTF to properly address both of these process functions.
The EAC performed the effects assessment function, but their efforts fell short of the
mark as they failed to anticipate adversary behavior and were not able to influence the JTF COA
execution. Although the Blue-Red cell is assigned this task, their involvement in COA
development, analysis, and effects assessment may have been too much work for such a small
group.
Effects assessment had little impact on the adaptation of JTF plans during this particular
experiment, according to SMEs observing JTF operations in the EAC, JPC and JOC. The experts
were asked to determine if the effects assessment process assisted in development of branch
plans, sequels, and adaptation of CO As (See Table 32). Additionally, members of the JTF JPC
were asked if effects assessment was completed and posted to the CROP in a timely manner to

impact planning for future operations. Although 56 percent of the respondents believe this was
true, the respondents were very vocal with their impressions as follows:
"I agree, but we had problems with timeliness. Mostly fumbling with new systems."
"This is a process which requires much examination and work. Assessing the progress of
the 10 battle, difficult at best [with] the lack of metrics in many areas, did not occur in a manner
that allowed for timely redirect of the battle. The "fog" of war played a big part in this, but the
ability of a technologically advanced adversary to readjust his communications paths in near real
time fashion will require a similarly speedy reaction on our part. Assessment must be speedier
than we currently see."
"No. Information was not posted in a timely fashion. More important, it was not posted
in a visible fashion. The traditional TOC map is still a good idea. Situational awareness would be
enhanced if graphics of the battlefield were maintained and updated regularly, and the changes
were linked to a pop-up or permanent display on each terminal. Probably needs to be a different
slide for different staff groups, but everyone should be able to see and know 'where the fight
is' ."
"As the deputy director of plans, I have no idea where they were posted. I only saw them
when briefed to the commander. These were not vetted through us so I have no basis to judge if
they were accurate or not."
Were the set of tactical actions employed to achieve a desired 20% 26%
effect changed as a result of deficiency analysis? of the time of the time
Was the approved eOA adapted (branch plan) to respond to an 14% 28%
unanticipated effect or enemy action? of the time of the time
Did the effects assessment process influence ETO execution when 48%
unanticipated effects or enemy actions were discovered? of the time
Were military and non-military (DIE) effects maintained in 45%
synchronization in time and space? of the time
"As the future planner, I was never able to read an assessment, that reached out more than
96 hours, and that appreciably affected planning. The partial reason is that the JTF focus dropped
to within 48 hours. Secondly, sufficient MOE planning and ISRT tasking does not appear to have
been successful, or JECG could not provide the background for assessment that far out in this
experiment. "
In a related question, JTF war fighters were asked if the JTF was able to maintain the
initiative relative to the adversary. Respondents from the EAC offered no observations. Members
of the JOC overwhelmingly (100 percent) agreed that the JTF maintained the initiative, "With
the exception of the initial attack. I believe that we had the initiative for the entire operation and
[the] enemy forces were reacting to our actions (albeit in asymmetrical ways)." On the other
hand, the OPFOR believed they maintained the operational level initiatives in the movement and
position ofWME warheads and in the conduct of their 10 campaign and analysts agreed with
this interpretation.
How did the CIE enhance the planning, execution, hand-off, assessment, and adaptive
planning battle rhythm? Members of the JOC (100 percent) and the JPC (74 percent) agreed that
the collaborative environment enabled the JTF HQ to maintain a more efficient battle rhythm.
Many of the responses were qualified with comment. A review of the comments led analysts to

conclude that experiment participants believed the CIE enhanced the execution, hand-off, and
adaptive planning functions during this event, but hindered the planning and assessment
functions. A representative sampling is provided as follows:
"[If] efficient means 'fight the war faster,' maybe. [If] efficient means 'accomplish the
normal work with less time or energy,' then, NO, it's not efficient."
"Not as efficient as it will be, but as we get better and more practiced, we will be more
efficient."
"Collaborative environment complicated personal battle rhythms. Trying to synchronize
battle rhythms was next to impossible."
"However, CIE allows you to attend more sessions because you don't have to physically
attend and as a result you are pulled to more sessions and it is difficult to perform your primary
duties."
"The JTF ran faster than expected and was more productive! The components had trouble
keeping pace-better organization is required for them to support the joint benefits to
warfighting that we can achieve-what a great way to get inside the enemy's decision cycle."
"Initially started out OK, but soon drifted back to giving briefings despite the best
intentions/efforts of a lot of people. We then became locked into the time of briefings (briefings
stressed)/meetings as opposed to what the concept said (i.e. JFE WIG should meet about one
hour after JCB). Well, the JCB
lasted two hours and quite 90%
often 1+30. So, did we move 80%

the WIG back to allow an hour
for the components to meet 70%
and discuss the guidance? No, 60%

the JFE W /G met immediately
or five minutes later after the 50%
JCB. Another example, later in 40%

the experiment, (the JTF) was
dispensing with the battle 30%
rhythm entirely to focus on the 20%

island campaign, part two.
Why would you delete the 10%
very thing designed to add 0%
rigor and help with planning Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
and managing? We should JTF JOC JTF JPC
have been able to do what the
commander asked within the
battle rhythm."
Figure 210: Most thought the CROP was useful in tracking progress
"This goes without
saying. This new paradigm has exceptional potential. We are just beginning to scrape the surface
of what could be possible in the future. We were able to understand intent and monitor
discussions. I think it dramatically improved our situational awareness and staff work."
"However, we need to establish better data management by using the technology more in
line with its capabilities. Data collection and dissemination needs to be done with databases as
opposed to e-mail, chats and spreadsheets."

"Collaboration worked well. I am not sure I see a relationship with the collaborative
environment supporting the battle rhythm. I see it the other way. The battle rhythm is a method
to manage the collaborative environment by scheduling participation and directing the timing for
the sessions."
Sixty-one percent of the functional component planners said it was easy to know when
the ETO had been changed. Several comments include:
"Not immediately obvious to a guy slugging out 10 different e-mails, monitoring two
briefs and fielding phone calls."
"If you do a routine walk through all the data pages."
"Maybe an auto alert on all critical messages would be key to 100 percent awareness.
Most of the time got the word through JCB's."
"I often only stumbled upon changes to the ETO. The numbering convention still
confuses me. I never felt up to speed on this."
Other Observations
Observation 1: Functional component assessment of measures of performance is adequate,
given the observed latencies in BDA reporting.
Except for the JFLCC, as noted during various JCB sessions, there appeared to be no
linkage of the measures of performance to associated measures of effectiveness. In turn,
measures of effectiveness appeared to play little or no role in the assessment of campaign
objectives and end state, or in the deficiency analysis process for possible modifications to JTF
operational level ETOs.
The JTF EAC SMEs, who observed and documented the process developed by the JTF to
support the assessment of combatant commander and/or JTF objectives, provided the following
comments:
"The process to support assessment or effects (as opposed to objectives) is pretty much
per experiment SOP. PEL is established, components develop MOP to support DE, JTF
(EAC/JISE) develop MOE for DE, and the subsequent assessment (stoplights) are reviewed
during the EAC and presented at the JCB. During the JCB, the EA analyst also presents an
assessment of JTF success relative to combatant commander objectives."
"The EAC met twice a day with the components, 10, Red/Blue cell, ISR planner,
PollMil, ONA effects/assessment, members of SOSA cells. Cell discussed components MOPs,
recommendations, and issues. The EAC chief would make a subjective assessment and present to
CJTF during the JCB. One area where assessment seemed watered down was the amount of
competing assessments that was presented to the CJTF at the JCB. Example of assessments
given: EAC, intelligence, components, Red/Blue, COM-Blue, 10 assessments-so to some
degree there was no fusion of assessments given to the CJTF."
"Component commanders provided reporting that assessed status of assigned actions
against nodes in support of JTF effects. This reporting was consolidated at the JTF level in order
to evaluate success or failure with reference to meeting combatant commander and JTF
objectives."
A maj ority of JTF JOC personnel agreed, that the CROP visual display of progress
toward combatant commander and/or JTF objectives, was useful in providing adequate detail and
clarity, enabling maintenance of good situational awareness. JTF JPC personnel were not as
enthusiastic, and became even less enthusiastic as the experiment went along.

In this event, the CROP seemed more useful for use in the close fight and was found
lacking in its usefulness in anticipating requirements for future operations and plans. Even from
those war fighters that agreed to some usefulness, comments included such things as:
"Tools were not adequate for ground planning and situational awareness."
"It's not there yet, too much pull and not enough push-too much data mining."
"Most situational awareness was obtained in the briefs that were conducted and tracking
the comments in the JOC room. ADOCS did not provide a picture detailed enough to keep up on
all happenings in the JOA."
"The concept is a good one, however, relative to providing adequate detail and clarity to
enable me to maintain good situational awareness, not so."
SMEs, especially at the functional component level, supported the idea that collaboration
processes enhanced and/or influenced the collective accomplishment of assigned objectives and
effects.
"The collaborative process supported the planning and execution process in not only the
horizontal/linear plane, but vertically as well. It allows instantaneous decision making from the
combatant commander down to the component level."
"I'm not sure that we necessarily plan faster, although depending how complex the task,
one could argue either way. I think the issue is the planning effort is able to assimilate much
more information and make more valuable judgments and decisions as a result."

EBP and EA are processes (methodologies, ways of thinking) designed for use at the JTF
headquarters and functional component headquarters during the conduct of the MC02
experiment. As such, operational level implementation was dependent upon a number of other
objectives and concepts being tested and/or observed during this event.
Assessment Area 2: Setting Conditions, (i.e., a "product" of the EBP and assessment process)
Assessment Area 3: Assured Access, (i.e., a "product" of the EBP and assessment process)
Assessment Area 4: Conduct Effects-Based Operations, (i.e., a "product" of the EBP and
assessment process)
Assessment Area 5: Sustain the Force, (i.e., a "product" of the EBP and assessment process
supporting effects-based operations, assured access, and setting conditions)
Assessment Area 6: Standing Joint Force Headquarters, (i.e., the physical organization of the
JTF headquarters implementing the EBP and assessment process)
Assessment Area 7: Operational Net Assessment, (i.e., the knowledge base upon which the
SJFHQ drew its information and knowledge in order to conduct EBP and assessment)
Assessment Area 9: Collaborative Information Environment, (i.e., the physical information
systems used by the JTF and functional components to actually execute the EBP and
assessment process)
Assessment Area 10: Interagency, (i.e., the "organization" the JTF collaborated with to
integrate all elements of national power during the EBP and assessment process in order to
conduct effects-based operations, assured access, and setting conditions)
Assessment Area 13: JISR, (i.e., the primary mechanism to physically plan and conduct
effects assessment in order to design and adapt operational plans using the EBP process)


- There was no baseline data available with which to compare EBP&A. USJFCOM SMEs
offered some comments on their estimate ofEBP&A impact on JTF performance. These were
founded on their personal experience and perception from the USFCOM training environment
and were not made in relation to a historical baseline
DOTMLPF Linkage
- There is no DOTMLPF package associated with this Assessment Area
Recommendations
1. JFCOM, explore reach-back in future experiments and exercises as a feature of virtual
collaborative planning and assessment to define potential reach-back agencies that enhance
future operations. ~
2. JFCOM, develop decision support tools for effects visualization and modeling. ~
- They are desperately needed to assist planners in their understanding of the relationships
between and amongst the various DIMEIPMESII nodes and links contained in the ONA. DSTs
must support mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis, and the effects assessment
process.
3. JFCOM, modify the EBO concept to include effects timing in the PEL in addition to
describing desired effects in terms of changes to the adversary's actions or behavior, the desired
level of changes, and the scope and distribution of the effect. ~
- This will allow planners to take into account sequencing and the enabling actions and tasks in
order to achieve the higher headquarters' effect and or objectives.
4. Joint Staff J7, establish, through the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC), the
requirement for joint and Service professional military education institutions to incorporate the
effects-based concept into their curricula. ~

Figure 211: Line handling evolutions onboard USS Coronado (AFG11) flagship for
Commander Joint Maritime Forces Component Commander and deployed headquarters
for the Commander Joint Task Force during Millennium Challenge 2002

Assessment Area 9 - Collaborative Information Environment

(CIE)
The objective, 'Establish and Maintain a Collaborative Information Environment', was
accomplished in an effective and meaningful manner during the experiment. The three major
concepts that made up the CIE, the common operational picture (COP), the enterprise
information portal, and the collaborative tool, which was used
to communicate in the CIE, were all effectively established at
the start of the experiment and were maintained in a operational
status for 98 percent of the experiment period.
Among these concepts, the use of the collaborative tool,
both for planning functions and for command and control
functions during execution, was clearly demonstrated as a
useful and desirable capability for a future Joint Task Force
headquarters. The CROP, incorporating a collaborative
information portal, was also found to be a useful and desirable
means for rapidly disseminating important information, for
storage of multitudes of JTF and component generated
products, and, to a lesser degree, for searching and retrieving
needed information residing outside the direct control of the
JTF and its components. The COP received mixed reviews for a
variety of reasons, but, in general, was able to present a timely
and accurate depiction of the forces in the Joint Operating Area
for use at the operational level. As a whole, this portion of the
experiment demonstrated that a JTF commander, his staff, and
components sharing information in the CIE could achieve and
maintain a detailed and timely level of situational awareness.
The experiment also showed that j oint forces could use this
shared awareness to collaborate effectively in both planning
and execution phases, and that they could synchronize their
efforts at the joint, operational level to a degree beyond
traditional deconfliction activities.
Methodology
USJFCOM built a CIE for use in MC02, using a series
of surrogates, as no existing integrated system was available.
The architecture was based on a wide area network (WAN),
which included both the JTF and combatant commander's
headquarters, co-located at the JTASC in Suffolk, Virginia, and
the functional component headquarters located at Nellis AFB,
NV (JF ACC); Camp Lejeune, NC (JFLCC); onboard the USS
Coronado (AGF-II) (JFMCC) homeported in San Diego, CA;
and at Naval Base Norfolk, Norfolk, VA (JSOTF).
Also in the WAN were external agencies including the Department of State, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Justice, all participating out oflocations in Washington,

D.C. The WAN was built within the DoD SIPRNET and it carried the extensive data
communications necessary to integrate numerous models and simulations, as well as live-force
reporting data (See Chapter 5 for more details).
A common suite of experimental tools was provided for all participating MC02
organizations. These tools served as surrogates for tools that were projected potentially to be
Figure 212: CIE architecture at the time of MC02 execution
available for use by all JTF's by the year 2007, the hypothetical setting of the experiment. This
suite of tools, with its linking communications, was referred to as the Experimental Command,
Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence (XC 4I) System. It must be re-emphasized
that the XC 4I system used in the experiment was a surrogate for a future system. It was built
from commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) systems to test the
experimental concepts. To the extent that the concepts proved viable, the surrogate components
are a potential point-of-departure for creating a prototype system for detailed development. XC 4I
is not and never was intended for immediate deployment. For example, the XC 4I system was
constructed to be as "open" as possible to facilitate getting it to work properly with the resources
available. A future prototype operational system would incorporate security features that would
not be practical to develop and install for experimentation.
For the COP, the standard military Global Command and Control System (GCCS) was
used. The architecture was as follows:
This architecture included inputs from live forces participating in the western ranges and
from various models and simulations distributed across the country. These inputs entered the
system at the component level, or below. When these inputs and all their potential formats are

considered, the level of complexity involved increases significantly. COP architecture,

hierarchical by design, was fashioned to synchronize and disseminate the picture to all
participants.
The COP synchronization tool (CST) was incorporated into the system at the JTF level so
that a single, synchronized view of all tracks and units in the JOA was available to every
parti ci pating headquarters.
ALL AIR
TADIL-J
Figure 213: COP architecture at the time of MC02 execution
Figure 213, above, illustrates the complexity of the COP as it was integrated into the
models, simulations, and live forces that it depicted. The CROP and the collaboration tools can
be described as a flattened, wide area network "cloud" with all the participants having access to
the system servers in a client-server environment. There were some work-arounds necessary to
get the surrogate systems in the XC 4I to function properly.
One such adaptation involved the size of the associated server farm. The collaborative
tool required a server farm to handle the volume of activity. While the system size required eight
servers, the available technology limited the IWS server federation to six local LAN servers. The
result was that two locations, USS Coronado (JFMCC) and Camp Lejeune (JFLCC), had servers
that were confederated into the system, but were not integrated. This adaptation, while
functional, resulted in degradation in the quality of performance at those locations as the IWS
server federation traffic experienced unrecoverable errors due to long-haul encrypted WAN
links.
The COP, which was viewable through any appropriate "viewing" software, used
Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) to display its data. ADOCS, chosen
based on its performance during a previous year's LOE, had capabilities such as 3D terrain
viewing, ATO visibility, and fires planning and execution modules that were desirable in a
graphic depiction of the battlespace. These modules were believed to have the potential to
improve operator situational awareness.
For the CROP, the XC 4I tool was Microsoft's SharePoint Portal Server (SPPS). This tool,
a COTS product, provides users with a web-enabled capability to post and retrieve their staff
products. It also incorporates a search engine that enables users to search the web for

information, as well as a local configuration capability that allows users, at all levels, to structure
their portal windows to meet their individual or group needs. The collaborative tool used in the
experiment was another COTS product-the InfoWorkSpace (IWS) tool.
In addition, every XC 41 workstation was provided with the Microsoft Office (2002) suite
for document production. This suite included the Microsoft Outlook application for sending and
receiving e-mail.
MC02. M&S/C4ISimu lation Data . Flow
Figure 214: A depiction of how data flowed from the components' response cells to the Log
CROP
Tool selection, made by the JFCOM staff following the Unified Vision 2001 experiment
(May 2001), was based on several factors, including cost, user acceptance, known or identified
functional capabilities, operational requirements, training requirements, and known or identified
configuration requirements. To meet the requirements of the experiment, the staff selected a set
of tools that readily conformed to the CIE concept and that could be adapted for use in the XC 41
system, could be acquired with the funding available, and that could be available early enough in
sufficient quantities to meet the training requirements. Both the JTF and the functional
component staffs required training on the tools.
To experiment with the CIE, analyst developed a series of experimental issues or
Warfighting Challenges that addressed the basic functionalities required by the concept as well
as what the surrogate tools could be expected to produce in a networked environment. These
functionalities were developed from the USJFCOM concepts of joint interactive planning (np)

and the CROP, and later, from the concepts described in Understanding Information Age
Warfare, by Dave Alberts, John Garstka, Richard Hayes, & David Signori (2001) from the DoD
Command and Control Research Program (CCRP).
Analysts, working with the concept developers, then dendritically broke down the
warfighting challenges into supporting tasks and subtasks. At the task and subtask level,
appropriate data requirements were developed against which experimental data could be
collected. This effort was finalized in the form of an experimental matrix that contained all the
necessary information to support the data collection plan.
A data collection method was developed for each data requirement associated with the
Figure 215: XC I wide area network running the CROP
tasks and subtasks. Many questions associated with the tasks and subtasks were subjective. To
gather data on those subjective questions, a series of surveys were prepared. During the
experiment, these surveys on the COP, CROP, and collaborative tool were sent electronically to
both participants and subject matter experts, who functioned as experiment observers and data
collectors across the JTF and components. Also incorporated into the experiment design was the
use of a group of very senior retired officers, retired three-and-four-star generals and flag officers
as well as former ambassadors, who were brought together on a daily basis to share their
observations and insights on the experiment. Both formal and informal notes were taken of these
meetings and used as sources of data for the experiment analysis.
For data collection and analysis of the COP, a tool was developed through a contract with
the U.S. Army Electronic Proving Ground to capture ground truth data from both simulations
and instrumented live forces and perceived truth as contained in the GCCS database. This tool,
the Digital Collection, Analysis, and Review System (DCARS), was used throughout the

experiment to collect the specified data. Other objective data collected in the course of the
experiment included video tapes of approximately 100 collaboration sessions held at all levels
during the experiment, logger data from both the collaborative tool servers and the CROP
servers, and records of e-mail transactions.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to establish a valid COP and build the CROP in a CIE
The first CIE warfighting challenge focused on the friendly force's ability to establish,
maintain, and display a graphical depiction of available data on both friendly and adversary units
and platform locations. This challenge also addressed how the friendly force developed
information on the status of their own units, as well as, how the friendly force developed and
displayed their opponent's locations, capabilities, and intentions. Additionally, this challenge
covered the JTF's capability to collect, store, and disseminate information as a means of
increasing force situational awareness.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to plan collaboratively in a distributed joint C2

environment
This warfighting challenge was postulated because of the belief that the simultaneous
involvement of the combatant commander's HQ, the Joint Force commander, the JTF, and the
component commanders and their staffs in the planning and execution activities should result in
the following:
A better understanding of the commander's intent, better unity of effort, and reduction of
planning-cycle times
Providing the Joint Force commander a significant, asymmetric advantage over his
adversary, saving time, and enabling an efficient use of information from the CROP
Finding The Joint Task Force was able to establish a persistent collaborative
environment across all echelons of command.
The data and observations on collaboration provided by the SMEs, participant surveys,
the objective record of respondents' use of the collaboration tools (IWS server logs), and the
knowledge management and collaboration working groups' results were analyzed. This analysis
indicated that the CIE was established at the start of the experiment and remained in place, with
no major disruptions (except for a few technical problems, short audio outages and short,
infrequent losses of network connectivity). The collaborative environment was operational
approximately 97 percent of the time.
IWS, the surrogate collaboration tool used in MC02, was a web-based system owned by
Ezenia Corporation. A commercial, server-based software system, it offered a bundled package
of collaborative tools such as whiteboard, virtual workplaces in rooms and auditorium, audio and
text chat, and distributed viewing of the same presentation to facilitate on-line communication,
data access, and knowledge management among its users. IWS uses a physical metaphor of
buildings and meeting rooms in which users can virtually assemble in order to conduct
collaboration activities. This physical arrangement adds context to the virtual environment
enabling participants to plan, develop courses of actions, and present briefings to other members.
IWS was selected as the experimental collaboration tool because it met three warfighter needs:
It allowed large-scale meetings across the enterprise
It allowed users to be present in more than one virtual location at once
FOR OFFICI A I, lISE ONI,V 361

It allowed users to conduct "sidebar" chat sessions with others in the enterprise
There were two types of IWS sessions. First, IWS provided a virtual conference center in
large auditorium rooms where users could present a fully interactive on-line presentation for
hundreds of audience participants. Second, it offered numerous small group-size meeting rooms
where 25 or fewer participants could hold a meeting for the exchange of information or
synchronous collaboration activities using IWS tools.
The IWS tool set used in MC02 consisted of the features listed below:
Audio
Public and private text/audio chat
Collaborative rooms (large auditoriums and small meeting rooms)
File transfer
Whiteboard
Application sharing (shared view)
Document storage of Word, PowerPoint, images and other documents in a file cabinet
located in the small meeting rooms
Polling (online voting, survey construction and analysis of results)
These tools provided the necessary capabilities and functions to support the warfighters'
collaborative sessions in a virtual environment. These tools and their uses were outlined in the
concept of operations for the CIE publication.
Nearly 1,300 unique MC02 participants used IWS, to share information and collaborate
across all echelons at some time during the experiment. Over the course of the experiment,
however, a large portion of these participants, approximately 489 participants each day, did not
log onto IWS (See Figure 216). These infrequent users ranged from a low of 416 on C+7, to a
high of916 participants on C+ 17, the last day of the experiment.
Participants with 0 Hours logged onto IWS
1000
900
800
. 700
I
'0
600
.
i 500 1'-'--'0
.
Hours I
0
.c 400
5
z 300
200
100
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
~~~~~,~~##~#####~
Day of MC02 Experim ents
Figure 216: The number of participants that were logged onto IWS was fairly constant until the
last days of the experiment

The majority of the "active" MC02 participants logged onto IWS between three to four
hours a day. The average was 3.71 hours, over 17 days of the experiment, with a low of 2.7
hours, on the first and third days and a high of six hours on C+ 12 (See Figure 217).
Participants, surveyed on their use of the time they spent in the collaborative
environment, indicated that they spent 48 percent of their time in collaborative sessions, and 43
percent of their time in informal briefings. Over 70 percent of the participants surveyed indicated
that they opened eight or more collaborative Avg Time on System (Hrs)
sessions on IWS every day. A majority of
participants reported that the time spent in 7
6
the collaboration session was beneficial in
~ 5
terms of task completion and product :::c 4
~
production (See Figure 218). 013 -+- Avg Time
Participants were informed of the > 2 on
schedule for daily meetings by the MC02 System
battle rhythm (See Figure 219) and from o (Hrs)
daily meeting announcements published on 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
the JTF calendar (See Figure 220) and other Experiment Day
calendars.
To function properly in a Figure 218: Avg. duration (in hrs) participants were
collaborative environment, a battle rhythm active on IWS. The graph is in one-hour increments
must be disciplined. There was a pre- from zero through seven hours.
experiment expectation that with
collaboration there would be more potential scheduling flexibility. It was found, however, that
the battle rhythm
established by the JTF
Effectiveness of IWS 2.5 also had to be used by
the components, higher
60% HQ, and the
50% interagency community
to plan participation in
40%
JTF sessions, as well as
30% to develop their own
battle rhythms. Both
20%
the meeting schedulers
10% and meeting
participants had to
0%
remain flexible. It was
Very Effective Somewhat Somewhat Ineffective
observed that changes
effective ineffective
to the daily battle
rhythm (meeting time
Figure 217: IWS considered effective by most
or location changes,
delays in meeting start
times, or postponed or cancelled meetings) were made informally and not disseminated through a
formal procedure. Meeting leaders often posted a change announcement on the IWS bulletin
board, or, if in the auditorium, posted a change announcement on a slide so those entering the
auditorium would see the change and go to the new location at the appropriate time. The other

informal method was by word of mouth. These procedures appeared to work satisfactorily once
participants became familiar with them.
Center Center
Figure 219: A depiction of the JTF Battle Rhythm used in MC02
11 12 13 14 15 16
18 19 20 2 1 22 23
25 26 27 28 29 3D
SMTWTFS
1234567 1 Z 3 4
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 6 7 8 9 10 11
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 13 14 15 16 17 18
2223121]25262728 20 21 22 23 24 25
2930 27 28 29 30 31
1 2 123456
3456789 8 9 10 11 12 13
10 11 12 13 1'1 15 16 151617181920
17 18 19 20 21 2223 22 23 24 25 26 27
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 29 30 31
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 fl 9 10 11 234567
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 9 10 11 12 13 14
Figure 220: Snapshot of MC02 CJTF standing schedule of events
364 FOR OFFICIAL USF, ONLY

Finding The COP provided an adequate picture for situational awareness at the
operational level.
As part of the effort to establish a valid COP and build the CROP in a CIE (see diagram 3
below), three major areas of COP data accumulation and display were examined. The data and
display of enemy ground forces were looked at. The data and display of enemy air and naval
units and track data
Objeclive2. Sit Map ..... ADOCS 2200Z 31 JUL were reviewed.
Lastly, the data and
display associated
with both friendly
units and tracks of
platforms were
studied.
Opponent
ground force or unit
information (unit id,
location, and time) in
the Modernized
Information Database
(MIDB) was readily
displayed on the
Figure 221: Snapshot of ADOCS mapping during the experiment COP. Numerous
views were collected
throughout the course
of the experiment to show the information being provided to friendly forces on opponent ground
forces by the COP. Spot checking of this data against the times that it was posted in the COP
How does the CROP

Relate to Tod 's Pictures?
Logistics, Support,
Infrastructure Data
OB-Friendly Surface
Subsurface Uni
Tactical In
Aerospace
Sen
Weapon "A"
Diagram 3: CROP relationship

indicated that the information displayed was the latest contained in the MIDB. An example of
these views is shown. In this view, various opposition units can be seen to the west, east and
south of the friendly forces
near JTF objective 2 (See
Was the enemy location and status
Figure 221).
information presented in ADOCS timely
A major problem
with the information Enough for your needs?
contained in this view, and
~ 100% ~---------------------------------------
with the use of the COP Q)
~
during the experiment, was r::: 75% +-----------------------------------------
o
the timeliness and a.
50% +-----------------------
~
Q)
accuracy of the enemy c::
....o 25% +-----------------------
position updates. New
information on opposition 0%
forces had to be processed, Unacceptable Somewhat Somewhat Completely
fused, and entered into the unacceptable acceptable acceptable
MIDB by someone before Perception

N=108
the display was updated.
This was not always done Figure 222: Enemy location/status timeliness in ADOCS
and responsibility for this
process was never clear. Intelligence personnel were reportedly trained to perform this function
in accordance with the MIDB replication concept of operations prior to the experiment. It is not
clear why they were unable to do this.
The non-contiguous,
Was the enemy location and status information presented in
non-linear battlespace no longer the ADOCS detailed enough for your needs?
clearly distributes the
responsibility for unit updates 100% , . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
as a function of component
areas of responsibility (AOR),
75% +-------------------------------------
the way it was done in the past
on the linear battlefield. Since "'"'c"
o
no one "owns" the battlespace ~ 50% +---------------------
except the JTF, how are tactical "'"
level reports of enemy activity
25% +---------------------
placed into the picture in a
timely and coherent way?
Surveys indicated the timeliness 0%
Completely Somewhit Somewhat Completely
of the COP display was Unacceptable Unaccectable Acceptable
Acceptable
Particip8frt Response
acceptable (See Figure 222), but
N=111
their written comments
indicated that the update process Figure 223: Enemy location/status detail in ADOCS
was too slow.
The level of detail on opponent forces available in the COP was regarded as acceptable
by participants at the operational level as shown in survey results (See Figure 223). Many
participants also indicated that they expected a COP view that was more useful at the tactical

level. In particular, the responsiveness of both the update procedures and the system itself
appeared to be too slow for use in command and control of forces at the tactical level.
Opponent track information (naval surface/subsurface and air) was displayed on the COP
in a timely and accurate manner for operational-level situational awareness. Participants also said
that these displays were adequate for situational awareness at the operational level. However, as
with the ground unit data,
the picture was not Blue SA on OPFOR Subs
accurate or timely enough 27 JUL 1100-1500
for those making Sub 2

decisions at the tactical Detected! Tracked
level.
Spot-checking of
track data indicated that it
was updating on a regular
basis. Using the DCARS
tool, data was collected
from both simulations,
including ground truth,
and GCCS data files used
by the participants. Snap
shots were compared. The
result indicated that for
both OPFOR air and sea Figure 224: OPFOR submarine tracks in GCCS
tracks, there was sufficient
information available to maintain situational awareness for making operational-level decisions.
For example, OPFOR submarines were regarded by both the JFMCC and the JTF
commander to be operational level threats. Blue forces hunted these vessels before fighting
began and subsequently tracked them down and destroyed them as a high priority. The DCARS
graph at figure 224 depicts ground truth simulation tracks and the COP data available on the subs
at all levels for situational awareness and decision-making.
Components were able to generate their own friendly picture of units and tracks, pass that
picture to the combat support
Was the friendly location and status
information in ADOCS detailed enough for
team (CST) at the JTF and
your needs? receive back the necessary data
to build a timely and accurate
C/l 100% friendly force picture at the
CIl
C/l
c: 75% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - operational level. However,
o
c..
C/l 50% -~--------------------
again, the picture was not
-~
o 25% +---------------------
sufficiently timely for making
tactical level decisions. Survey
responses indicated that a
Unacceptable Somewhat Somewhat Completely majority of participants thought
unacceptable acceptable acceptable
the friendly force information in
N=109 Perception
the COP met their needs, at least
Figure 225: ADOCS information was only 'somewhat acceptable' minimally, for detail, timeliness,
with regard to level of detail and accuracy as seen in the charts

(See Figures 226-228).

However, the survey responses also indicate that the Blue COP suffered from slow
update rates hard to maintain tracks. Track information was sometimes incomplete or erroneous,
Was the friendl)' location and status information such as duplicate tracks
presented in ADOCS timely enough for your needs? or ship tracks traveling at
excessive speeds.
100% - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
However, the COP was
useful for situational
75% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - awareness at the
"'"'"c
operational level.
~
o
50% + - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Numerous
"'" examples of the COP
displays were collected
25% + - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
such as the amphibious
ready group situation map
0% at figure 228, below.
Completely Somewhat Unacceptable Somewhat Acceptable Completely
Unacceptable Acceptable Participants, in some
P"rticip"'" Response
N=99 cases, and particularly at
Figure 226: ADOCS information was only 'somewhat acceptable' with the JFLCC, fell back to
regards to its timeliness the use of paper maps to
track units or maintain
situational awareness on friendly or opposition force contacts of interest. Reasons for doing so
included a perception of greater confidence in the information displayed.
There was also an apparent sense of frustration with the difficultly of maintaining the
COP. The difficulty was partly due to a lack of adequately trained personnel, and the perception
that available information, such as the anticipated results of overflights by UAVs, was not
getting to the COP displays with accuracy and timeliness.
Again,
DCARS was used to
Was friendly location and status information
compare ground
presented in ADOCS accurate enough for your
truth to GCCS
data-the results needs?
were mixed. There
were observable 100%
problems such as C/)
G>
tracks not reporting C/) 75%
c:
0
in the COP or c..
C/)
reporting as multiple G> 50%
0::
tracks in the COP. ....0
However, 25%
~
many of the "
problems appear to 0%
be attributable to a Unacceptable Somewhat Somewhat Completely
lack of operator unacceptable acceptable acceptable
training and N=106 Perception
expenence. Figure 227: ADOCS displayed information was only 'somewhat acceptable' with
regards to accuracy
368 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~

Of all the XC 4I tools used in the experiment, operators received the least training in the
COP. Training classes were limited to "buttonology" familiarization and application training.
There was no pre-experiment activity to provide appropriate track and unit feeds to GCCS to
allow operators to practice their skills at manipulating COP filters in a dynamic environment.
Only during the last day of Spiral 3 were there hands-on operational sessions in which units and
tracks appeared in the COP in a coherent manner. These two practice vignettes lasted three hours
each and incorporated only a minimal number of tracks and track activity.
Nevertheless, training issues aside, comparisons of GCCS tracks on the COP and ground
truth indicated that for both air and sea tracks a majority of the tracks were reasonably accurate.
In figure 229, the USS Boxer, USS Comstock, and USS Duluth are underway in the same relative
formation in both the simulation and the GCCS track data. This indicates that an accurate and
Figure 228: Naval forces chart displayed in ADOCS
timely picture of these ships was available to anyone who had the COP with filters properly set.
In figure 230, GCCS and simulation tracks for both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft
participating in the action against JTF objective 2 on C+6 are displayed. This view also shows
that most of the simulation tracks were in the GCCS database and therefore were potentially
visible with acceptable accuracy to everyone who had access to the COP and had properly
adjusted their filters.
In an effort to determine the quality of the picture that was potentially available in GCCS,
an analysis was conducted, comparing friendly naval surface tracks with ground truth from the
simulations. Locations of ships were determined for the same period (1500Z - 1700Z) every
other day beginning C+2. The study concluded that, on average, 75 to 85 percent of the tracks
were displayed accurately and reflected the current ship locations for every track in the force.

Specifically, and as can be seen in table 33 on the next page, not all ships in the
simulation appeared in the COP. On any given day, some ships appeared in the COP without
appearing in the simulation during the sampling period. There was also a subset of those ships
appearing in both the simulation and the COP, during the daily sampling period. While there is
substantial variability from day-to-day, about 78 percent of the unique ships are simultaneously
present in both databases some
time during the period.
F or determining the
quality of the COP, an analysis
of the correlation of the
simulation and COP tracks was
conducted. To be considered
correlated the two tracks had to
be within one-tenth of a degree
of both latitude and longitude or
about six miles apart during at
least two, ten-minute periods of
the two hours of sample data.
This evaluation period was
centered on 1530Z and 1630Z
Figure 229: Ground truth and simulation locations were relatively
accurate as displayed here. whenever the data allowed.
As shown in table 33, it
was found that an average of 86 percent of those ships present in both databases could be
considered correlated for operational level situational awareness purposes. If we take the ships in
the simulation database as ground truth, then the percentage of COP tracks, that are correlated,
averages 75 percent.
Amore
detailed and
extensive analysis
might adjust these
figures somewhat.
However, the 25
percent difference
between the COP
display and ground
truth is probably the
reason why the
operators expressed
concern with the
quality of the COP.
It must be noted that
this level of track
Figure 230: JFLCC attack on objective two showing both ground truth and the accuracy is likely
GCCS display acceptable for
situational
awareness, planning and decision-making at the operational level (combatant commander, CJTF,

JFMCC), but is not acceptable for use at the tactical level. However, for some operational assets
such as JISR, greater capability is necessary to coordinate day-to-day activities.
Finding The JTF was able to maintain command and control of on-going operations
using the collaborative tools.
Maintaining command and control in the MC02 CIE was determined to be successful
and effective. There was a consensus among participants, SMEs, and senior observers that the
situational awareness and common understanding resulting from the C2 sessions in the virtual
joint operations center (JOC) in IWS were acceptable.
Face-to-face, synchronous collaboration is the ideal form of collaboration. Virtual
collaboration appears to be the next best substitute when face-to-face collaboration is not
feasible. However, there remains a perceived need for improved collaboration tools and
Table 33: Comparing data between the SIM and COP databases
C+2 38 43 43 38 31 82% 82%

C+4 41 34 44 31 27 87% 66%
C+6 35 32 40 27 25 93% 71%
C+8 31 30 32 29 27 93% 87%
C+10 30 29 31 28 27 96% 90%
C+12 19 26 29 15 15 100% 79%
C+14 29 26 30 25 19 76% 66%
Average 32 31 36 28 24 86% 75%
processes for use by the joint force. Virtual collaboration during MC02 never appeared to reach
its full potential. Some observations indicated that virtual collaboration appeared to increase the
time required to do certain tasks. Some participants reported that virtual collaboration was harder
for them to execute than traditional methods and was not effective for all types of activities. It
was noted that virtual teams could not sense nonverbal cues from other participants in a
collaborative session. Such problems, however, did not appear to degrade the usefulness of the
collaborative tool in executing command and control of the joint force.
Finding To enable operational and tactical-level situational awareness, COP unit icons
must be linked to status information such as posture, activity, and readiness.
A linkage between a track displayed on the COP and databases that contain current,
accurate information on that track (unit or platform) is needed to provide adequate situational
awareness. Such linkages were put forward for use as part of the COP during MC02 planning,
but were not available to incorporate into the system. Participant survey comments indicated that
they needed more, current information for planning and decision-making. Because the necessary
FOR OFFICI AL I ISE ONLY 371

information was not always available in COP linkages, they turned to the CROP (SPPS) and
made inquiries within the information portal. Failing that, the operators went directly to other
staff participants via synchronous or asynchronous means to get the information they needed.
The most sought after information was related to combat readiness. Such information
could be automated and presented to the viewer in the form of drop down windows displayed
whenever the user clicked on a COP icon. Information available on the MC02 COP included
platform identification, course, speed, and altitude. Other items needed could include time on
station, anticipated time remaining on station, current weapons and ammunition status, fuel
status. For units, the information available might include unit authorized strength, current
strength, ammunition status, fuel status, time since last rest or maintenance period, or current
engagement status.
This use of the COP also highlights the apparent convergence injoint force operations
between the operational and tactical levels of war. During MC02, the JTF generated and
executed plans in which relatively small units, normally regarded as tactical units, were used
with speed and precision to create effects that were intended to have an impact at the operational
and even strategic level. This was particularly true of ground actions aimed at seizing or
neutralizing weapons of mass effect in the battlespace. Planning and execution of these actions at
the joint level required more detailed planning than what would normally be expected for JTF
operational level planning and execution. As operational level actions move toward a model
based on speed and precision, the level of detail, accuracy, and timeliness required in the COP
Increases.
This requirement was also reflected in participant comments to the COP survey.
Participants needed tactical level detail for planning and executing MC02 activities. While it
must be noted that the context of the experiment, small-scale contingency in a high threat
environment, drove the planning and execution in this direction, the trend running from previous
military actions to MC02 is clear. Despite the much discussed potential that the availability of
detailed information systems will enable the higher headquarters to jump echelons in the chain-
of-command, there is increased evidence that the precision and speed inherent in future joint
operations will require a widely disseminated tactical COP with appropriately improved levels of
detail, accuracy, and timeliness to be fully successful.
Finding The collective bandwidth requirement for a JTF using C 41 tools similar to the
4
XC 1 tools used in the MC02 experiment is approximately 15 Mb/s with a sustained surge
capacity to 25 Mb/s. This order of bandwidth usage is much greater than that which has
been available to JTFs to date.
Data for this analysis was based on XC 4I application bandwidth usage over the Soft
Permanent Virtual Connections (SPVC) that linked the major participant locations (See Table
35). Because SPVC usage could not be collected by application this analysis is limited to the
total reported usage.
The MC02 experiment used five major command centers each with one or more server
hosts for each of the XC 4I applications. Permanent virtual path (PVP) circuits provided WAN
connections between them.
W AN connections, for command and control systems between the components and the
JTF headquarters, were accomplished by 13 SPVC subdivisions ofPVP links. A SPVC may
travel through more than one PVP to complete the assigned route as depicted in figure 231. A
SPVC was not used to connect the JFMCC aboard the Coronado. Instead, an eight Mb/s Ku

Band VSAT link from Navy's Fleet Training Center - Pacific, in San Diego, California
(FTCPAC) was used instead. Since the SPVC's to FTCPAC contained both M&S and C2 traffic,
the VSAT link report was used. Unfortunately, only two days of data had been received for this
analysis. The level of usage for the two days was so similar that the two-day average was used
on all other days in the period D-2 to D+ 12 in order to account for the traffic to and from the
JFMCC.
Each SPVC had a capacity in mega bits per second assigned. The automated
enforcement of the capacity was varied. In the case ofMC02, exceeding the capacity for short
periods was allowed.
Some design decisions were made early on in the planning process in order to help
conserve bandwidth and to enable degraded operations (contingency mode) in the event of link
failures. The location of servers, pre-positioning of data and means of updating were part of the
early design choices. Some of the asynchronous bandwidth requirements and link reliability
requirements were unclear.
Early in the building of the WAN, measures were taken to help conserve bandwidth and
to support contingencies. The considerations and measures taken were similar to what would be
encountered in the real world, addressing trade-offs associated with deployed configurations
when it comes to data integrity, reliability, and synchronization. The JTF had three SPVC to
component locations and the KU Band VSAT link to the JFMCC.
Table 34: Command level participants
JTF, lA, combatant commander 427

JFACC 235
JFLCC 313
JFMCC 298
JSOTF 73
Total 1346
Table 35: SPVC identifiers and associated bandwidth
0-169 JFACC 6.000

0-259 JFLCC 20.000
0-261 JSOTF 4.000
Ku Band JFMCC 8.000
Table 36: Four secondary PVC linked mainly to the JFLCC
0-168 JTF to Langley 3.000
~OR OFFICIAL TISE ONLY 373

0-262 Langley to JFLCC 1.000

0-269 JFLCC to ARFOR 20.000
0-270 JFLCC to JSOTF 1.000
Table 37: The remaining SPVCs were as follows:
0-260 JTF to ARFOR 20.000

0-179 Langley to JFACC 1.000
0-263 Langley to ARFOR 1.000
0-279 Ft. Irwin to ARFOR 8.000
0-280 Ft. Irwin to JFLCC 3.000
A synchronous bandwidth requirement (intel video distribution) was presented after the
network had been designed and put in place. The synchronous bandwidth demand would have
been 64 Mbit/Sec (worst case) as defined by the intelligence requirement. Significant steps were
C2 SPVC's by PVP's in
The MC02ATM Backbone
Figure 231: MC02 permanent virtual pathways (PVPs) with soft permanent virtual connections
(SPVCs) supporting command and control applications

taken in order to keep video data from overwhelming the network. The video distribution system
essentially cut back on the frame rate, dropping from 4Mb/sec to 256 Kbit/sec per source. Seven
SPVC's were dedicated to this streaming video traffic. Since the traffic and resolution of the
products on these PVC's was not realistic, the statistics for these PVC's were not collected.
Data
CBi Iy Average PVC Rote s: 25 Juyto 8 Aug Tda Ccj:a:ily' IT 131irl<s: 93 rvb's collection was
E'Edl~ accomplished by the
~,-_____________________________ =~=2b=~~1=2~~~ffiW~ Spectrum Network
~g TrcrrrrisSmR:te 81H14J3tis Management
14,[IIl,ClIl t------------------------..---------Sld TrmrrisSm Rte 1, ~Effi tis application.
~g Rm::iveRte 8,674:IBtis Spectrum Network
~+----~--~ : ~-----------
- - - - - S I d Rm::ive Rte 1, ~Effi ti:: Management is a
network management
software program
developed by a
commercial firm,
_DailyAW!:tageReceiW!Rate
Aprisma. Spectrum
was configured with
the ATM Circuit
Manager, providing
accurate recording of
ATM related
Day statistics. For the
experiment both
Figure 232: average bandwidth usage (transmit & receive) for each hour over receive and transmit
the entire experiment (14 days) throughput were
recorded per PVC.
Polling intervals were generally set to one poll every 30 seconds, recording every poll. The
actual statistics were derived from standard calculations of PVC throughput provided by the
ATM Circuit Manager application. Approximately 15,000 observations of transmission and
receive rates per SPVC were collected.
For each SPVC a table of the average and maximum transmission and receive rates for
each day was computed. A table adding all the SPVC's together was then produced. For each
SPVC, two tables were calculated, one each for transmission and receive, showing the average
rate for each hour for each day D-2 through D+ 12 and overall. From these, daily totals were
calculated (See Figure 232).
The overall average transmission rate was 9.8 Mb/s. The average receive rate was 8.7
Mb/s. Figure 233 shows the overall averages by hour. This reveals that when the JTF was
actively operating as a full staff, they were using 15 Mb/s for transmission and 10 Mb/s receive.
This would suggest having 15 Mb/s collective capacity. However, the usage, according to
intensity of operations, has to be considered.
The total of daily averages shows that D+7 and D+8 were the days of the greatest overall
usage (See Figure 234 and Figure 235, respectively).
A review of the combatant commander's Daily Update, on 3 and 4 August, show these
two days were some of the most intense, being the climax of combat operations, and the period
in which the "main effort shifted to the JFMCC at 1300Z". The usage observed on these two
F OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 375

days should be held as representative of the bandwidth requirements of a JTF, using the C41
envisioned for the year 2007. Usage begins to build mid-day on D+7 and peaks at the 20 Mb/s
range in the 0700 to 0900 hours on D+8.
Taken as a whole, the above data indicates that a JTF, using an XC 41-like system in a
Tctal capacity of 131inkl 96 M15

M:Il2 Ct:rnTal:I am [brtml PVC U rk; each w CIy'.
HOJrty AVElCIg= RaEs 0-2 tIl D+12Averaq:
for M:Il2 (0-2 tIl D+12) Avg Transrrission Rie 9,769,403b1s
std. Transrrission Rae: 1 ,447,ffE bls
25,orn,[[[J A VTl RocPivP Rllio R r;74:1lR hi
std. RecEive R3IE 1 ,M7,ffE b'~
3J,orn,[[[J
15,orn,[[[J r- r-
IIIb's
1o,orn,[[[J - r- - r- r- r-
5,orn,[[[J I-- I-- - I-- I-- -
o IIIIII
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
11 11I
18 19 3J 21 22 23
Hour of the Day
~Q8 Roc8IR Rate EI AIRrEge TrarGmission Rate
Figure 233: Average Bandwidth Usage (Transmit & Receive) For Each Day (14 Days)
CIE, will require a continuous bandwidth capacity of 15 Mb/s and a surge capacity of 25 Mb/s
over a sustained (6+ hour) period. This bandwidth requirement is larger than traditional
bandwidth. The XC 41-like system bandwidth requirements were derived in an unconstrained
environment. In actual operating Tct3lC3p3Cityof 13110fs 861vb's
IvKTI2 ctmnnJ am Cbrtml FVCUrJ.s ea:flwa.;
environments, constraints will I-turtyAVff"J'R1E
mlrJDt-12AveraC!'
exist. In order to retain the full forC8y'Dt-7 AV1J Trarsmsson Rte 8,768,4Ctl tis
Tramrri",;on Rte 1,447,606 tis
CIE capability, C41 system
9Jj.
2S,om,1ID 6,,, RR74 'llRhi ~N"'" RrtP

Fe""" RltE it"
bandwidth requirements can be 9Jj
no larger than available 2J,Om,1ID
bandwidth given the constraints

15,om,1ID f---=--- r------- r-----
of real world operations. fl'b's
Users and systems internal lo,om,1ID
to the CIE must take advantage of
bandwidth compression 5,om,1ID
opportunities. These opportunities

may reside in process changes,
~ II~ ~I I
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
application of business rules or !-bur of the [By
adoption of new technologies.

IIAI8'<gE! TrEllmissiQl Rae
Finding Interoperability Figure 234: average bandwidth usage (transmit & receive) for
problems prevented effective each hour for day d+ 7
376 FOR OFFICIAL lISE ONI,Y

COP database management.

The JFCOM Joint C4ISR Battle Center (JBC) addressed technical problems with the COP
as part of an assessment they
conducted. JBC performed a MJJ2 ctnmrd am Cbrtrul PJCUrlG Total Glpamy of 131U11<; Ell Mis
follow-on assessment to a 1999 I-hrfy A",Olgc RIlE ~ve earnwa{
forDDtll mID Dr12AyeraJ8
J oint Intelligence Interoperability
Board (JIIB) Systems Baseline 25,rno,orn
Assessment (JSBA) in which they
A"!I ReceMe RIlE
9IJ ~YERIIE
)l:'
2O,rnO,orn
examined the progress made to
date in improving systems 15,rnO,orn
interoperability, including the
systems that provided the MC02 1D,rno,orn
COP. The JBC found that the
5,rno,orn .Jl
JIIB systems (GCCS-M, GCCS-
A, TBMCS, GCCS-B) were
technically able to share a stable o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
]1 III ~
and dynamic COP between the !-bur of the [8:y
JTF and component headquarters. II AI.eI<ge Ttalirrissioo Rae CI AI.eI<ge Ttalirrissioo Rae I
They noted however, that there
are still problems with database Figure 235: Average Bandwidth Usage (Transmit & Receive) For
exchange and database replication Each Hour for Day D+8
that remain to be resolved, particularly between the Army's All-Source Analysis System (ASAS)
and other systems in the COP. The JBC report noted that while interoperability enhancements
allowed the ARFOR to have a near real-time COP, the maintenance of enemy ground order of
battle at the joint level was still cumbersome. In particular, they noted the continuing
requirement for manual injections of data as a requirement to properly maintain the picture.
The JBC report further said that, GCCS-B, GCCS-M, and TBMCS all shared the same
basic database during MC02. This allowed the JTF to confederate database maintenance. The
result allowed key components to maintain and update a portion of the shared database for others
to use. JBC regarded this as a major improvement in interoperability with the potential for the
JF ACC to maintain the air order of battle for the entire force using TBMCS and for the JFMCC
to maintain the naval order of battle through GCCS-M. The Army's ASAS system, however,
could modify data automatically only within its own Oracle-based all source correlated database
and, therefore, needed to send data updates manually by USMTF messages to the rest of the joint
force via GCCS-A.
Survey respondents also noted that the amount and level of training received on the COP
was less than that received on the other portions of the CIE and was inadequate in their view. As
discussed earlier, COP training was mainly focused on "buttonology" and applications. There
were very few pre-experiment opportunities to work with the COP and perform the tasks
required to maintain the databases needed to keep the COP picture up-to-date and accurate.
There appeared to be a lot of on going "cross pollination" type training between individuals on
the COP during the experiment. This activity was helpful for many, but survey comments
indicate that many participants never were able to acquire the necessary skills to adequately
configure or shape their own COP to meet their needs.

Finding Systems maintenance and the operational battle rhythm have to be closely
integrated to maximize system performance at critical points in the battle.
Two post event workshops were held on the subjects of knowledge management and
collaboration. Knowledge managers from the SJFHQ, the JTF, the components, and several JTF
and component staff principals attended. The workshops noted that application restarts for IWS,
SPPS, and GCCS/ADOCS were often a surprise to the JTF staff and frequently occurred at the
worst possible times. During the course of the experiment, there was improvement when
recurring maintenance actions began to follow a routine schedule. However, specific operations
requiring exceptions to the routine remained a problem. For purposes of analysis, the
maintenance issues with SPPS were examined in detail.
For example, a request was made by the JFMCC on 29 July to reschedule maintenance
that evening in order to support the arrival of the JTF commander on the Coronado. Although
the JFMCC KM received a positive response, the adjustment did not happen and the
performance of SPPS was degraded. In addition, that same night, special operations against
WME required maximum availability of systems, again scheduled maintenance could not be
coordinated, and system availability was degraded.
The JFMCC KMO raised the maintenance scheduling issue at the 30 July daily KMO
meeting. The time of the back up was supposed to be 2200 (PST). Instead, with only 30 minutes
warning it was advanced to approximately 30 minutes before the JTF commander's arrival. The
JFMCC KMO indicated that the JFMCC alternate procedures required at lease two hours
warning with four hours lead-time being best. The JSOTF KMO echoed the same complaint
saying that the four hours of down time (the JSOTF experienced) right in the middle of the
previous night's operations was unsatisfactory. This discussion occurred in the KM collaboration
room using both text chat and audio.
KMOs also observed system degradation in conjunction with peak periods of document
publication to SPPS. This observation was made regularly at the deadline times for posting new
ETOs and FRAGOs. Altogether, there were three ETOs and 52 associated FRAGOs. The
FRAGOs consisted of one document. The three ETOs contained 47, 52, and 53 documents,
respectively. System administrators on seeing the performance loss and not understanding the
cause would restart the SPPS application. In several cases, work was lost. Listed below is a
summary review of performance and availability issues submitted by the SPPS system
admini strator.
Table 38: Maintenance Activities Impacting on SPPS Availability and Performance

Application Unplanned Before caching was turned on the SPPS server would
restarts: maintenance: became unresponsive. The condition was corrected when
the liS Web server service was stopped and restarted. The
administrators observed the liS was waiting for something
to happen. All four processors would slow down to one
percent or less activity for an extended period. On a few
occasions, the administrators waited 20 or 30 minutes and
the Web server would "come back" and resume normal
operation. The restart was the appropriate protocol for this
condition as a restart could be completed faster than the
20-30 minute wait. Microsoft prescribed turning on the
cache utility to avoid this problem.
378 FOR OFFICIAL I ISE ONLY

After caching was turned on, the SPPS server would

become unresponsive in a different way. The users would
see a Microsoft liS Server-side error instead of a decline in
the Dashboard performance. To get the server to respond,
the administrator had to recycle (stop/restart) the Microsoft
Exchange Web Store
At night, after the Share Point Exchange Online
Routine service defragmentation routine ran, the administrators would
recycling: receive an hourly error message indicating the Share point
Exchange Web Store was fragmented. If that particular
series of hourly error messages was seen in the morning,
the Web store was recycled.
Server reboot A couple times after recycling the web store the service did
not restart. The server had to be rebooted
Temporary Performance Degradation Performance was degraded noticeably when coordinators
modified a dashboard while users were trying to view the
dashboard. Users viewing the Logistics CROP while
coordinators worked (changing web parts) on the logistics
CROP complained of slow response time.
MC02 was originally designed for a 12-hour experiment day, but operators altered the
regime to a 24-hour day (although limitations were placed on operations in the later half of the
workday). Technically, however, the experiment was still on a 12-hour clock and the twice-daily
interruptions to SPPS availability (bracketing the 12-hour experiment day) previously planned
were not addressed. Since no adjustments were taken for this change in workday regime, the
routine maintenance had a significant impact that had to be planned around. The XC 4I desk
recorded these and the unplanned events in a journal. The journal entries recorded 15 non-routine
losses of SPPS availability.
The overall result was that normal issues of systems availability and serviceability
negatively affected the experiment. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance requirements
imposed synchronization and surge management challenges on the CIE. These challenges would
have to be addressed through either technology improvements or changes to processes and
procedures that would reduce the impact of scheduled and unscheduled systems down time.
Finding The Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System- Near Term
(JEMPRS-NT) was effective in enabling the JTF commander and his staff to collaborate
while traveling between command posts.
The JTF commander was able to accomplish all planned tasks, while airborne and
enroute to the theater. He used the JEMPRS-NT to enable mission planning via use ofIWS while
enroute to NAS North Island, CA, and the USS Coronado. He and his staff traveled together
aboard a special operations low level (SOLL-II) C-17 aircraft.
While in transit, the CJTF and staff used 13 workstations loaded with CIE tools for
conducting two joint coordination board (JCB) virtual meetings and to maintain continuous
situational awareness. The JTF commander personally used JEMPRS-NT to participate in two
collaborative sessions. The first virtual meeting was on C+5during the transit to California. The
second meeting was on C+8, on their return flight. The CJTF participated in the JCB virtual
meetings with the JTF main headquarters and interagency community in attendance. For these

meetings, they used the main IWS conference center, auditorium room 101, which was the
normal virtual meeting location for the JCB.
The time required for completing the session during the first JCB virtual session was 85
minutes, beginning at 1730 (EST) and ending at 1855 (EST). During this session, audio and
video problems were experienced during the latter part of the event. Communications with the
CJTF were lost for five minutes between 1829 and 1834, during which the deputy CJTF ordered
a pause. During this session, briefing charts displayed in IWS could not be seen by many of the
JCB participants probably due to bandwidth limitations. Very detailed ADOCS screen-capture
slides were slow to load. At 1847, the audio with the aircraft was lost. The IWS collaboration
session was observed to have "locked up" at 1853. The session was finally terminated at 1855
after it was determined that most of the work required was accomplished.
The second JCB meeting was 94 minutes in length. The session started at 1730 and ended
at 1904. A pause occurred to allow time to restore the communications with the aircraft around
1830. Communications were restored and the session ended at 1904.
Most of the warfighters responded positively to survey inquiries regarding the
effectiveness of the JEMPRS-NT for use injoint enroute planning. Those surveyed about the
ability to use JEMPRS-NT to perform required staff tasks and activities responded with 17
percent endorsing it as excellent, 44 percent as good, and 22 percent as adequate. One drawback,
noted by these users, was the communications data transfer rate. Thirty-seven percent indicated
the data rate as partially adequate, 17 percent rated it as adequate, 28 percent as good and only
five percent said it was excellent.
Other Observations
Observation 1: The anticipated value of the portal for sharing information and situational
awareness was not fully realized because of shortfalls in KM expertise, distribution of KM
responsibilities, tool skills, application standardization, establishment of KM billets, and
KIMP development.
In the CIE concept, the CROP is both a repository of information and an access point to
the global information grid (GIG). The GIG was unavailable to the MC02 experiment, but in lieu
of the GIG, a substantial amount of information was created or, where possible, assembled to
provide the JTF with the data and the information required for planning and execution. This
limited repository was the defacto "virtual warehouse" of information for the experiment. The
evaluation approach was to determine ifusers could subscribe to needed information, search the
system for needed information, publish information products, and make others aware of
Table 39: Warfighters Choice for Most Useful Information Tool
42.8% 24.4% 13.8% 9.1 % 6.3% 3.8%

availability of information using the information management and distribution system (the
portal). Users were able to subscribe, search, and publish, but not as effectively, as was desired.
The portal did not supplant e-mail, the traditional asynchronous collaboration method.
Survey results (see table 39) showed that participants found the portal to be a distant third
to the experimental collaboration tool IWS and to E-Mail in providing the most useful
information. The results from 321 respondents to the question, "In your billet which of the tools
listed provided you with the most useful information" show the collaboration tool IWS was

considered the most valuable information tool with nearly 43 percent of the votes and e-mail was
ranked second by just over 24 percent of the respondents.
Analysis of the application logs also showed that significantly fewer participants used the
portal on a daily basis than either the collaboration tool or e-mail. The average number of
participants using a tool at least once a day is shown below in table 40.
Figure 236 illustrates the daily usage for each of the tools, Microsoft SharePoint Portal
Server (SPPS), the CROP, IWS collaboration tool, and e-mail:
The CROP was established by fielding the surrogate technology, the web portal, in the
Table 40: The average daily number of users 26 July through 8 August 2002
E-Mail 720 31 26
IWS 618 35 46
SPPS (CROP) 467 30 29
form of the SPPS, and by developing and implementing applicable sections in the KIMP. The
web portal provided the functionality that supported the creation and synchronous sharing of
information. The KIMP provided the policies and procedures for establishing and using the
CROP. The concept of operations in the KIMP placed knowledge management responsibilities
for many KM tasks on individual members of the JTF and component staffs. Together, the portal
and the KIMP had important implications.
As seen above, SPPS is a web portal that implements Microsoft Digital Dashboard
technology and is described as a
900 dashboard site. Figure 237 is an
BOO
example of an SPPS web portal
page. As a dashboard site, it
700 - - - - - - - - -
contains a number of page links,
600 - - - - - - - - -or dashboards, and includes
customizable pages and custom
500 - - - - - - -
#ofUsers
web part forms. The dashboard
400 site distributes information to
300
workspace users through a web
browser. It provides a web-type
200
view of the workspace and enables
100 users to search for, view, and
manage documents in the
workspace as well as to search for
lospps ~IWS I
DE-MaO
and view content from other
Figure 236: E-mail was the tool of choice for MC02 participants,sources. Users can find a variety
but experimental networking tools such as the InfoWorkSpace and of information on the dashboard
the Shared Point Portal Server were afforded a tryout. site, including group or enterprise
news, announcements, links to
other sites, personalized notifications regarding changes to documents, and more. The digital
dashboard technology makes it relatively easy for the coordinators and users to add and

customize the web parts that make up the visible content of the dashboards and thereby more
effectively bring users the information they need.
These features also allow for the distribution of portal building and management
responsibilities. The KIMP implemented and supported this distribution of responsibilities and
the knowledge managers supervised the configuration of the portal interfaces, accordingly.
Activation of the MC02 portal began before activation of the JTF. In accordance with the
SJFHQ concept, the SJFHQ staff populated the portal with information and built the required
dashboards. This was done without access to the real-world GIG and was a first of its kind
Figure 237: Web Portal Page - Logistics

endeavor. The JTF was activated at the start of Spiral 3 (3-14 June 2002). The building of the
portal continued during and after Spiral 3. The knowledge demands of the commanders and their
staffs occurred at such a volume and frequency that, to be effective, the CROP applications had
to operate at maximum availability. Additionally, the application functions had to achieve
exactly what was required, and the participants had to comply proficiently with the KM tasks and
practices as defined in the KIMP. Participants also had to apply practiced IT tool skills in order
to get the job done. This did not happen to the required degree.
With notable exceptions, the participants did not follow the processes and procedures in
the KIMP nor did most participants have the high KM and/or IT skills needed to perform their
functions in accordance with the KIMP. Furthermore, the experimental portal application
encountered periods of both availability and performance degradation. For those using the
382 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL)7

CROP, MC02 was actually a high-pressure exercise and not an experiment. As a result of these
problems and the resulting pressures the participants tended to fall back on what they were
comfortable and confident with, that is, reliable and familiar e-mail.
Experiment data indicates
Figure 9.2.5 Summary of Voluntary Comments from SME SPPS Survey that participant e-mail usage
jumped to 10,000 messages per
day on the second day of the
experiment and never dropped
below that level until 7 August
when participant attendance and
the pace of information sharing
activity started dropping off
significantly. A baseline of e-mail
usage for a similar sized JTF
operation without a portal would
provide an interesting comparison,
but a record of such usage has not
Question Response been located.
Figure 238: Surveys/comments on SPPS elicited 103 positive E-mail was the primary
and 108 negative responses. Eighty-three of the positive IWS adjunct information-sharing
responses contained negative comments in the response tool. E-mail carried the bulk of
narrative notifications, searches, and was a
key to the distribution of information. The total number of participant messages was 175,569.
Twenty-three percent or 41,240 of all e-mail messages are estimated to have carried attachments.
These messages varied in number of addresses from one to over 1,000. Messages with
attachments functioned as a means for distribution or publication of documents. The pre-
experiment expectation was that these tasks would be accomplished via publication on the portal.
Voluntary comments (See Figure 238) explain the users' preference for e-mail. The
comments noted that SPPS information was often too difficult to access or locate due to the large
volumes of information present on the server, apparently a form of information overload. In
addition, comments indicated there was too little time for conducting searches and, that they
could find information easier via IWS or e-mail. Additionally, experiment participants indicated
that they did not have enough experience working with the portal. They said that documents
were often moved or replicated in the course of updating, that credibility of the information was
uncertain, that documents developed using the collaboration tool (IWS) were belatedly or
sometimes never posted in the CROP, and that information needed for their jobs was not always
available. A third of the comments from those in strong agreement on the positive impact of the
portal qualified their endorsements by pointing out a fault.
The comments and recommendations application on the portal was examined and all
submissions containing the words portal, SPPS, or CROP were reviewed for observations
directly addressing the portal (See Figure 239). Eighty-seven comments submitted during the
MC02 event were found. For each submission, the drafter had to select an indicator for the
observation as favorable, somewhat favorable, neutral, somewhat unfavorable, or unfavorable.
The voluntary nature of making such a submission indicates extra motivation on the part of the
submitter. Overall, the critical comments outnumber the positive comments two to one. Two-
thirds of the comments labeled neutral were also found to be critical when reviewed. Ten of the
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL'Y 383

16 favorable and somewhat favorable comments addressed the Logistics CROP (dashboard). A
thorough examination of the MC02 portal showed this dashboard to be the most developed. An
informal poll of the logistics staff showed a high degree of satisfaction with this dashboard.
Analysis of the portal logs showed this dashboard and its included web parts to be the fifth most
used content group. Logistics
Figure 9.2.6 Summary of Voluntary SPPS Comments and Recommendations During MC02
documents were a close sixth Event
and combined the logistics 45
pages were the most visited 40
content group in the CROP. The 35
implication-a well-developed 30
portal/web page had a positive 25
impact, whereas a poorly 20
developed page did not. 15
While the CROP as used 10
in the experiment had many

shortcomings, it was not
rejected as a failure.
Eliminating the shortfalls found Contributor's Description of Submission
in KM expertise, distribution of
I I
CI Critical Observations 0 Positive Observations
KM responsibilities, tool skills
training for every day users, Figure 239: Eighty-seven voluntary comments on SPPS were 2:1
application standardization, critical of the tool. Only the Logistics page got strong reviews
establishment ofKM billets, and KIMP development may improve the acceptance and
usefulness of the CROP and reduce the observed reliance on e-mail.
Observation 2: Vertical collaboration between the JTF and components was easier to
perform than horizontal collaboration between components.
Two distinct types of collaboration emerged during the experiment-vertical
collaboration and horizontal collaboration. Differences in users' satisfaction between vertical and
horizontal collaboration in the CIE were noted. The JTF staff provided a more positive
endorsement of the collaboration process than did the components. The components' lower
endorsement of IWS as a useful tool was because of difficulties encountered during horizontal
collaboration between the staffs.
Collaboration was operationally defined in MC02 as activity involving two or more team
members working together to solve a common problem. It generally resulted in a shared situation
interpretation or course of action and a final product that was an improvement over its original,
pre-collaboration session form. This collaboration definition is based on definitions in the book,
Understanding Information Age Warfare, by Dave Alberts, John Garstka, Richard Hayes, &
David Signori (2001) of the DoD Command and Control Research Program (CCRP). Another,
more precise, definition of collaboration is needed for the future and should be phrased in terms
better understood by the layman and aimed at the warfighter.
Collaboration among members of the joint force consisted of using appropriate electronic
and physical communication and information sharing tools in standardized military planning and
mission execution processes, such as during crisis action planning, within the CIE. For virtual
collaboration, the CIE was a robust and interactive technical architecture, offering 100 percent
connectivity between forces (especially among distributed sites). It was implemented and scaled
to the needs of the users.

Vertical collaboration occurs when information is exchanged between two or more

organizations at different echelons such as between the CJTF and the JFLCC. Horizontal
collaboration occurs when knowledge and information is shared among co-equal participants
within a single organization or between teams, such as between the JTF boards, cells and centers
and from different organizations. The relationship between vertical and horizontal collaboration
processes used by the joint force commander and the JTF are illustrated in figure 240 below.
Post-experiment collaboration workshop discussions on vertical and horizontal
collaboration revealed reports of insufficient time for components to do all activities required of
them. The requirement for components to collaborate among themselves, that is, horizontally,
needs to be explored.
Participant responses indicated that the primary reason for collaboration being difficult to
execute was insufficient time being available to perform all the required tasks. In particular, the
horizontal collaboration required between components to synchronization their actions as part of
EBO, were an additional burden that stressed their resources.
It was also noted that when operations and crisis action planning occur simultaneously,
the collaborative system must be capable of supporting both horizontal and vertical activities at
the same time. Key staff may be required to provide critical inputs to both crisis action planning
and mission execution. Attendance of these individuals at both types of collaboration sessions
may be essential to mission success. The collaboration system makes this possible if the
individuals in question have the ability to deal with simultaneous attendance in multiple sessions.
During the experiment, certain individuals were observed, who appeared to be able to attend
such multiple sessions successfully.
Me OlCoDaooratioD
Figure 240: Vertical and Horizontal Collaboration as done during MC02

In future experiments, participants should have a longer planning cycle. The planning
time available during MC02, particularly during Spiral 3 when a significant amount of
collaboration was required, was too short. The lack of time affected the participant's perception
of the usefulness of the collaborative system. When operations and planning are occurring at the
same time, participants needed to strike a balance between vertical and horizontal collaboration
duties. Vertical collaboration is usually a one way, top to bottom (leader to subordinate) effort,
while horizontal collaboration was less structured, but more complex and required more time.
There was also a tendency to want to have the same key people continuously participating in
. .
many on-gomg seSSIOns.
MC02 participants were asked to rate both the effectiveness of the collaborative tool and
the concept behind it. The message from 90 to 95 percent of the IWS users was that collaborative
tools were effective. More important, this effectiveness supports the horizontal and vertical
coordination efforts necessary to synchronize the joint actions on the battlefield.
Some issues were identified in after-action reviews that addressed differences and
difficulties experienced by the MC02 participants in collaboration performance between the JTF
and components.
JTF interface with components. The components were slower starting their collaborative
activities and often changed principal points of contact. This created collaboration problems and
slowed the JTF's ability to get needed feedback for situational awareness. Most observed
collaboration was vertical with information passing from the JTF to components unless the
components were requesting information. The collaboration rooms were used by the
components, but a more direct interface as part of activities, such as effects assessment, would
probably have improved situational awareness for all.
Battle rhythm, in the face of manpower shortages, needs to be realistic. Discussion
comments during post-MC02 collaboration workshops indicated that participants were worn out
from performing 24-hour operations. The experiment was not intended to be conducted on a
round-the-clock operations cycle, however, that was what occurred. This change had an impact
on the experiment and the experimental results. For example, system maintenance time was
planned for slack periods to keep the collaboration tool working properly, but on some days,
there was no slack time. Many of the components' night shifts were not manned adequately for
24-hour operations. Mission creep was also noted. There was a tendency to continuously do
more with less.
Senior leader participation. In the JFACC, the commander personally spent over 10 hours
a day in collaboration sessions, which was not his command style. He indicated there was no
time to "walk the terrain" or get a sense of the operation. Commanders need some time out of the
collaborative environment for deep thinking.
Collaboration improved as the experiment progressed as participants became more
familiar with the process and therefore asked fewer "how-to" questions, and learned out how to
find and disseminate the information they needed on the portals without having to ask for it.
Observation 3: MC02 training had a positive impact on the collaboration performance of
the JTF and component staffs. The amount and type of training received impacted the
participants' ability to collaborate.
Training on collaboration systems and tools had an impact on the performance of the JTF
at the start of the experiment. The MC02 mobile team training that was provided to participants
during May-June 2002 was effective. The training investment paid off during execution with the
incidence of fewer training related calls for help on collaborative tools.

The digital rules of engagement were developed with the intention of facilitating
collaboration and of documenting meeting transactions and decisions. The rules were briefed and
explained prior to MC02 execution, however, it appears that many of the MC02 participants
ignored these rules and supporting procedures. The JTF and KMO leadership made no
significant effort to enforce the rules. Problems encountered with collaboration and use of the
COP and portal could have been reduced if the rules had been followed more closely.
Approximately four to five days of intense hands-on activity in the collaborative
environment were needed by the MC02 participants to fully understand and master the
collaborative tool set in the CIE. Observations indicate that on about C+4 of execution,
participants began to reach a steady state of performance, knowing what to do, how to use the
right application, understanding how to perform their jobs in a collaborative environment, and
understanding the strengths and limitations of the CIE architecture.
Part of the value that collaboration added to the experiment was how it enhanced the new
concepts being tested. For example, while the steps used in the coordination process for IS, C2,
ONA, EBO, or lAC, they all still shared such common features as gathering information, sharing
information in a virtual setting, building products, problem solving and forming group
consensus.
In his Techniques and Strategies for Virtual Teams publication, CPT Joshua Frank
(March, 2000) outlined the successful steps for migration of the collaborative process. He
theorized, "The successful migration of one's processes in a collaborative environment depends
on several factors:
Buttonology- Knowing how to use the collaborative tool
Leadership-Competent leaders with a knowledge of collaborative technology are critical to
long term success
Virtual Team Development Training-Understanding how the processes we use on a daily
basis are transformed in a virtual arena and how to maximize the benefits of the technology
to support your end objectives
Senior Management Buy-in-This is probably the most critical factor. You can plan, conduct
exercises, and buy a server, but without direct support from senior management,
collaborative technology will fail to be viewed or used as a key process in your organization"
(Frank, March 2000, p. 8)
The accomplishment of the above four steps are critical. The training program conducted
with the MC02 participants was excellent. However, more training on how to collaborate could
have been done to make the MC02 participants ready and enabled to collaborate among
themselves and others from the start.
Observation 4: A clear, concise, actionable knowledge management concept is required in
order to successfully operate in the CIE.
The CIE MC02 CONOPS established an information/knowledge management
organization to enable CIE. In the course of executing the KM tasks, the knowledge managers
discovered the need for development of a concept to guide the execution of knowledge
management. Paragraph one of the Millennium Challenge 2002 Joint Task Force Knowledge &
Information Management Plan (KIMP), 15 July 2002, final coordination draft stated,
"Knowledge management includes all processes involved in the creation, receipt, collection,
control, dissemination, storage, retrieval, protection, and disposition of information. KM also

includes processes used to organize information and determine its applicability to a specific
person, element, or larger process. In general, the goal ofKM is to ensure the best information is
available when needed to commanders and staffs as they execute command and control. In short,
the right information needs to be available to the right person at the right time."
The KIMP provided the CJTF and his staff with the necessary guidance to accumulate
information, create knowledge, and disseminate a product throughout the JTF. The KIMP was a
tool for warfighters to conduct JTF -wide KM. Each warfighter had a knowledge management
responsibility. This plan specified how to conduct a unified KM effort. The KIMP mapped all
processes to ensure that current, correct, complete, and germane information were available for
command and control. The goal of the KIMP was to operationalize knowledge and information
management in the JTF.
The MC02 KIMP established that the concept of operations for execution ofKM was that
the war fighters would conduct the KM and explained how they were to accomplish this
function. The goal was to have the right information available, to the right person, at the right
time.
The purpose was to satisfy the information needs of the commander and staff, so they can
execute command and control. This purpose manifested itself in a continuous avalanche of
"need" windows of short duration after which the issue passed. The avalanche of short duration
needs created a premium on the readiness of the staff to conduct KM and use the tools and the
data warehouse.
The MC02 participants were not generally ready to execute this concept. In the post
experiment working groups it was noted, "The KIMP tried to empower the users with a SPPS
and allow them to address their own information needs. JTF knowledge managers did not dictate
how to do information storage, publishing, and retrieval."
The trouble was the users were not uniformly able to use the tools and procedures, or had
the skills and understanding of what knowledge management is all about. Preparation of a well-
developed concept of knowledge management for each JTF ought to be completed early and
used to guide the preparations for future experiments. Knowledge management theory
progressed during the experiment and this body of experience should be referenced when
developing new concepts. The MC02 KIMP should be available as a model for future JTFs.
Observation 5: Data collection in the CIE was facilitated by the various internal system
capabilities.
During MC02, analysts used a variety of tools and techniques in the CIE to collect a
breadth and depth of data that is not readily available when collecting data solely in the physical
environment using traditional means. The CIE allowed MC02 data collectors to have a
comprehensive knowledge of experiment/exercise battle spaces, battle rhythm and overall
situational awareness regardless of physical location to include red and white cell events and
activities; 24x7 access to all data/information posted within the CIE; and awareness of technical
issues affecting experiment/exercise play. Use of the CIE also increased member interactions
with fellow data collectors and other SMEs, such as JFCOM data analysts, red and white cell
members, and computer systems and network support technicians.
These advantages are thought to have enhanced the overall quality, quantity, and validity
of the MC02 data collection process. Although no data was gathered during MC02 to provide
empirical support for this assertion, the paragraphs below discuss how the use of specific CIE
tools enhanced team member interactions and improved MC02 data collection process.

Increased knowledge of the MC02 battlespace, battle rhythm, and situational awareness
were gained using specific CIE tools and capabilities. During the experiment, data collectors
adopted similar methods for posting and sharing data and used business processes similar to
those being used by Blue cell team members. Specifically, these tools and capabilities provided
access to all portal content, situational awareness, and battle rhythm postings at all military
echelons and levels no matter where the data collector was physically located. This allowed for
data comparisons and analysis not usually experienced in solely a physical environment. The
tools also increased awareness of all (both physical and virtual) meetings being conducted at
every military and interagency echelon and level, including detection of battle rhythm changes
due to meeting postponements and cancellations.
These capabilities also allowed data collectors to "tag" specific documents,
announcements, and other related portal content, so that an automated alert system would notify
them when previously posted items had been modified or deleted. This allowed them to quickly
identify changes and pending trends in situational awareness and battle rhythms. Data collectors
were also able to gather data almost exclusively in an electronic format, making it easier for
them to collect a more comprehensive data set (both text and graphics) in shorter periods. Much
of the data derived from text applications within IWS and SPPS captured the players' MC02
situational awareness and use of battle rhythms (e.g., IWS file cabinet documents, bulletin board
notes, text chat, and question logs created in IWS auditoriums). Graphics capabilities provided
by IWS whiteboard and ADOCS screen captures, and SPPS graphics such as PowerPoint slides,
image displays, and IWS room snapshots. It also enhanced the effectiveness of the data
collection process.
The CIE allowed data collectors to monitor multiple virtual meeting rooms at the same
time, enabling them to "shift focus" to more active IWS rooms and cells when activities
decreased or ceased in a given room. Multiple room monitoring also helped data collectors to
gain a greater overall awareness of how well the player cells were working together as an
organized group. It also allowed data collectors to conduct more comprehensive analysis of the
data by allowing them to search announcements, web links, files, and other portal content posted
on SPPS for all MC02 sites. Furthermore, it allowed data collectors to understand the
progression of concept development using the SPPS documents versioning capability. As each
new version was posted, data collectors had a greater awareness concerning where players were
having difficulty working through the concepts, and gained insight into how well players
understood the significance of specific experiment MSELS and events.
The CIE also significantly increased interaction among the data collectors and SMEs
(internal staff) and interactions with the white cell team members (external staff). It allowed data
collectors to fully use CIE tools and techniques to work together as a team regardless of the
physical locations of individual team members. Specific examples of how CIE tools helped to
foster effective team member activity are cited below:
Data collectors used a private IWS room to conduct meetings for all staff members
regardless of physical location. This facilitated staff vertical and horizontal collaboration,
reduced data analysis conflictions, and improved coordination of team member activities before,
during and after experiment/exercise execution. Documents, bulletin board notes, and text chat
helped team members to maintain a heightened awareness of their own internal activities and
events throughout the MC02 environment.
Data collectors had greater situational awareness by being able to contact white cell
members to clarify data points, and to talk with technical support administrators (no matter

where they were physically located) to discuss experimental technical issues such as CJTF travel
using the JEMPRS-NT, and his USS Coronado visit.
Data collectors had a more comprehensive understanding of data being presented in the
IWS virtual rooms due to an increase in the number of data collectors able to attend each
meeting (due to the distributed CIE). Most meetings had three or more data collectors in the
room that could compare notes concerning the collected data.
More experienced data collectors were able to mentor novice data collectors located
throughout the CIE to ensure the data collection process was being conducted properly. Novice
data collectors contacted more experienced data collectors and managers to receive clarification
concerning duties/task, and to ask questions concerning data being presented within the cells.
Data collectors created and populated their own internal SPPS portal page that allowed
all data collectors (regardless of physical location) to view/download daily, intermediate, and
final data analysis/reports. This portal page provided common data storage for all data collectors
since no shared drive capability existed for users in the distributed virtual environment. This
page was especially valuable post-MC02 for the continuation of data sharing and analysis
amongst the team members at the distributed sites.
Data collectors were able to identify and report problem areas or "weak spots" in the data
collection process earlier in the game by being able to access all information within the CIE.
This increased oversight into the data collection process, allowed data collection managers to
refocus team efforts quickly and address shortfalls effectively.
In addition to the impact on data collectors, use of CIE tools and technologies also
elicited similar player behavior and responses in the areas of MC02 computer/network technical
support and experiment/exercise control (white cell) personnel. For example, help desk
technicians used IWS to monitor collaboration meetings for technical problems, decreasing
technical response time, and improving technical coordination and troubleshooting across the
distributed environment. MC02 change configuration requests, lessons learned, and trouble
reports were posted to a SPPS portal page for internal team review. Team members set up Alert
subscriptions to learn when updates occurred. MC02 white cell members monitored blue cell
collaborative meetings, and searched file cabinets, bulletin boards, and SPPS portal pages to
determine players' response times (regardless of physical location) to specific MSEL events,
ground truth interpretation, and other activities critical to effective experiment play. Using this
information, white cell members adjusted experiment play to properly stress the MC02 concepts.
In summary, CIE played an extremely important role in the exchange of data at every
level of the experiment among all staff players (data collectors, white and blue cell team
members and technical support administrators). It allowed players access to a wider breath and
depth of knowledge then previously experienced working in a 'non-virtual' experiment/exercise
environment. Consequently, CIE revealed itself as a "force multiplier" in many areas ofMC02
administration.

SJFHQ
- The concept of the CIE is a basic component to the functioning of the SJFHQ concept. The
capabilities that the CIE provides are prerequisites for the SJFHQ to perform the tasks of a JTF
HQ with its limited number of personnel. Likewise, the SJFHQ personnel are a prerequisite for
forming a JTF HQ from a service operational HQ because they will be the primary training cadre

to ensure the transition to the use of the CIE. The two concepts are tightly interlinked and require
one another to be successful
ONA
- ONA will exist as a computer-based system. Access to it will be through the CIE or some
similar method. The use of SPPS in MC02 indicated that the placement of ONA as a link in the
CROP was practical
EBO
- The ability to be able to conduct EBO including planning, execution, and assessment tasks in
an efficient manner is based on having a CIE-like capability available. The MC02 results show
that the situational awareness and collaboration needed to conduct EBO are greatly enhanced by
the use of the CROP and collaborative tool. Conducting EBO tasks without a CIE would appear
to be exceptionally difficult
Sustainment
- The ability to share information, achieve shared awareness, and collaborate real-time both
vertically and horizontally contributed to the JTF staff s ability to coordinate logistics issues
during MC02. Use of the CROP/SPPS display for the logistics watchboard set a standard for the
use of that capability throughout the JTF. Continued use of the CIE to support logistics planning
and execution activities appears to be advantageous
Interagency
- Again, the capabilities of the CIE were fundamental to the execution of the interagency concept
activities. To be a part of the planning, execution, and assessment processes of either the JTF or
the combatant commander's HQ the interagency coordination group requires a CIE-like
capability. While they could participate in meetings via videoconferences and teleconferences
without a CIE, they would not have the ability to be active, continuous participants in
collaboration and decision-making that they can be with the CIE
JISR
- As with the above areas, the CIE provides a means by which JISR planners and operators can
readily synchronize their activities and thereby become more productive

Baseline findings that are relevant to the CIE concept were extracted from the
information management and command and control sections of the baseline, Annex B. These are
listed below.
- In general, experimental observations compared favorably to baseline findings. A high profile
difference between the baseline findings and the MC02 experiment results is that knowledge
management emerges as an effective information dissemination capability
Table 41: Comparison of baseline findings and experiment observations
1M is a critical element of successful JTF Knowledge management has been added as a

headquarters operations. That success depends critical element for successful JTF headquarters
on a well developed IMP and a capable IMO. operations. Success appears to be related to a

The inverse is also indicated; JTF staffs struggle well-developed KIMP and dependent upon skilled
when the IMP and/or the IMO are weak or KMOs and the 1M skills and initiative of individual
lacking. JTF members.
Having all commanders at a single meeting for Cross-component situational awareness was
back-briefs facilitated cross-component routinely achieved with commanders at distributed
understanding of each other's plans, and HQs using IWS, with the same result.
identified cross-component coordination and
interoperability issues.
"The extraordinary success that the JTF Of the four key factors, three of them were
experienced in handling, analyzing, and improved or expanded upon: the JTF homepage in
providing critical information to the commander the form of the SPPS portals, accessibility to the
can be attributed to four key factors: commonly commander, and the RFI process.
understood 1M processes, employment of a JTF The contents and process described in the KIMP
Homepage, accessibility of the commander, and were not commonly well understood.
a manageable RFI process." The processes associated with the CIE appeared to
have been commonly understood.
The task of disseminating information was not
The task of disseminating information is difficult
difficult during MC02.
even when all conditions are met. Rapid
In general, technology did not cause information to
advances in, and unfamiliarity with, available
become inaccessible; the opposite was true.
technology often cause information to be
In cases where it was inaccessible, it was due
misrouted or inaccessible, which may result in
primarily to a lack of a discipline in storing
required actions not being taken. When using
information.
web-based technology for disseminating
It was still necessary to ensure data was not buried
information, it is necessary to ensure that the
too deeply. The search functions did not overcome
data is not buried too deeply in the system.
this.
No change. In addition, during this experiment the
JTF information managers had to constantly JTF KM organization was heavily burdened with
review, evaluate, and prioritize information on maintaining the systems. This interfered with the
the web pages to ensure that information was ability to execute the planned KM processes. The
current and not buried under layers of JTF KM organizations were not resourced with
directories. standard tools to execute the review, evaluate, and
prioritize processes.
No change with respect to Web-based technology.
Web-based technology does not replace active
The collaboration system did effectively support
command and control (C2).
and supplement command and control.
Access and security issues also hinder This problem was not encountered in the
execution of a good IMP. In exercises and experiment because allies and coalition partners
operations that include allies and coalition were not part of the experiment. There was no
partners, problems often arise with gaining indication that this challenge would be overcome by
access to U.S. systems. adoption of the concepts.
IW activities were accomplished in the The JTF experienced similar problems in
J3Command and Control Warfare (C2W) cell. developing and integrating information warfare
As course of action (COA) development operations. The CIE concept did not contribute to
progressed, the commander decided to form resolving them.
another organization to address IW. He had
several options: 1) form a J31W element as part
of the operations Directorate; 2) create a Joint
(J) (lW) Directorate on a par with the other "J"
codes; 3) form functional component Joint
Information Warfare Centers (JIWC); 4) create a
Joint Information Warfare Center (JIWC).
392 FOR OFFICI AL lISE ONLY

Baseline Finding I ExperimentObservation

Boards, centers, cells, and agencies placed a No change. An additional, similar burden was
heavy time demand on the JTF staff, in some placed on commanders who participated in many
cases becoming counterproductive. sessions.
The joint force had trouble in the use of video Minimal VTC usage. VTC requirements were
teleconferencing (VTC). replaced by collaboration tool.
The Air Force forces (AFFOR) liaison officer
(LNO) to the joint force air component
commander (JFACC) and the Joint Task Force
Use of the collaboration tool appeared to resolve
(JTF) staff did not communicate during most of
many of these communications problems.
the exercise. This lack of communication led to
a delay in JTF understanding of AFFOR actions,
primarily in airlift and tanker constraints.
There was confusion within the JTF staff as to
This confusion appeared to have been minimized
what information should be communicated
by use of the collaboration tool.
between staff sections.
The JTF had success in handing off critical
information to the JFC due to excellent
information management (1M) processes, JTF
No change.
homepage, JFC accessibility, and a
manageable request for information (RFI)
process.
The JTF was successful in handling, analyzing,
and providing information to the JFC and key No change.
JTF staff members.
No bias observed despite the CJTF being a
The JTF plans/operations were biased toward
nominally a land commander. Collaboration
land operations.
appeared to have reduced this problem.
The Army forces (ARFOR) and JFACC could
not directly interface, as Service tactical decision ARFOR and JFACC had uninterrupted connectivity
support systems did not link across Service when required via the collaboration system.
lines.
It was difficult to ensure that each organization
No change. KM processes planned for the portal
was using the same version of a document. It
should have reduced this problem. They were not
was also often difficult to locate specific
used on a regular basis.
documents.
The joint force had trouble in disseminating This was minimized by the use of both the
information through use of web pages. collaboration system and the portal.
The joint force disseminated information without This was minimized by the use of the collaboration
regard to the level of importance. system
Collocation of the JTF headquarters and the
Collocation requirements were reduced by the
JFACC proved to be an effective method of
persistent, distributed CIE.
organizing the joint force.
The joint force had trouble in managing
No change.
information.
Having all commanders at a single meeting for
back-briefs facilitated cross-component
This was reinforced with the use of the
understanding of plans, identified cross-
collaborative tool.
component coordination issues, and
interoperability problems.
The JTF had trouble with internal information No chanqe. KM processes planned for the portal

flow. should have reduced this problem. They were not

Use and management of the homepage proved No change. KM processes planned for the portal
difficult for the JTF. should have reduced this problem. They were not
Assessment completed by the JTF staff tended
This was minimized by the use of the collaboration
to be compartmented and was not updated to
system.
incorporate operational updates.
The JTF had trouble in formulating an The exact opposite was true. The CIE facilitated
assessment of the operational situation. situational awareness at all levels.
The JTF had trouble in completing mission
Mission analysis was facilitated by the use of the
analysis.
CIE and particularly horizontal collaboration.
The OPG planning effort lacked focus. This was not the case.
The JTF staff spent a disproportionate amount
of time on one COA during
This was not the case.
development/analysis of COAs. This COA was
eventually selected as the best COA for the JTF.
COA teams lacked the capability to develop
COAs because they did not possess requisite
expertise, e.g., there were not enough This was minimized by the use of a collaborative
"specialists" in fires, information operations (10), tool.
civil military operations, etc., to support three
teams.
Lack of coordination, and subsequent lack of
visibility of the joint special operations task force
(JSOTF), caused significant confusion on the The collaborative tool minimized this problem.
joint force land component commander (JFLCC)
and combatant command staffs.
The JSOTF capabilities were not fully used by
This was not the case.
the JTF.
The JTF JOC had difficulty planning for
requirements associated with integrating and The collaborative tool minimized this problem.
synchronizing JTF operations.
The JOC had difficulty in maintaining SA. The exact opposite was true. The CIE facilitated SA
The JFC guidance was not translated effectively
The exact opposite was true.
into staff action.
Common C/JTF Standing Operating Procedure The KIMP and SJFHQ SOP for KM were intended
(SOP); Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures to resolve the problems described here. There were
(TTP), and Collaborative Tools. It is imperative measures in place to use the available hardware
that an information management plan that and software to push and pull information. They
clearly defines guidelines on how information is were only partially successful primarily due to not
to be handled is essential. What can be called being used or adhered to as written. KMs were
the "push/pull dilemma" has stifled many JTF. diverted from addressing this shortfall because they
"Pushing" too much information overloads staff were forced by default to become deeply involved
personnel and "information overload" makes it in the administration of both hardware and software
impossible for the staff to separate the important systems. Keeping the experimental systems
from the mundane. Posting information on working on a continuous basis was not their
homepages and expecting personnel to "pull" intended purpose but it had to be done. The result
the information usuallv leads to information not was that the KMs did not have time to devote to the

getting to the proper individuals because they do processes and procedures for moving information
not know where to find it or that it even exists. and knowledge.
Hardware, software, and processes that solve
this problem must be identified. Additionally, the
database tells us that the battle rhythm of the
JTF must serve the process of delivering
products and the information needs of higher
and lower headquarters and the timing of
product delivery to both. An information
manager within every major division of the JTF
staff is a requirement for efficient operations.
Common Operational Picture (COP). The COP
is not used in the JTF staff very often. This is
because commanders and staff at the JTF staff The COP was used extensively for operational level
level do not use it to make decisions. Mention is situational awareness. Participants indicated that it
made of inaccuracies in the COP being caused was insufficient with indications that they needed a
by lack of trained operators to keep it updated. system that was timely and detailed enough for
The COP is obviously important, but at the JTF tactical level planning and execution.
staff level, it has not been used for decision-
making.
"Initially, information was difficult to locate on the
Homepage. Many documents were filed within 4
The XC 1system using the portal appeared to
the file structure of the originating staff rather
reduce this problem somewhat. However, the file
than under a topical label. For instance, the
structures and the instructions on the creation of
exercise IMP was filed on the exercise
Meta-data required by the KIMP were not followed
Homepage under J-3 Current operations instead
with the result that documents could not be readily
of under IMP. For staff members who did not
located. This continues to be a problem.
know the origin of documents, it took
considerable time to locate them."
"Using the Homepage as the primary means of Data indicated that difficulties encountered in the
disseminating information, the training audience use of the portal resulted in a heavy reliance on e-
was exceptionally effective in handling, mail to move information both point-to-point or
analyzing, and providing critical information to broadcast. Since the portal is easier to use than a
the JTF commander and key decision makers." web page, the cited finding is somewhat suspect.
"Recommend that the component command
further develop and document 1M processes. It
No change. A KIMP that can be adapted by the
is vitally important that procedures be
components is a requirement. Processes and
standardized and practiced to achieve a smooth
procedures require training and hands-on
transition to unified operations under the IMO,
experience before they can be effectively used.
and to integrate augmentees, liaison, and
coalition members into the IMP."
DOTMLPF Linkage
- The CIE assessment supports on-going DOTMLPF CIE submissions. In particular, it shows
that there is a significant value in using a XC 4I-like system for both planning and execution
activities at the operational level, It also points out that there is a need to further refine the
technology and the processes and procedures so that the same system can be used effectively at
the operational level, as well. The results of the CIE portion of the experiment also support
DOTMLPF linkage with the same use of the CIE such as SJFHQ, ONA, and JISR

Recommendations
1. JFCOM and the Joint Staff, use the MC02 XC 4I system as a baseline for immediate
development of a prototype C4I system to support future joint operations. ~
- Such a prototype system should include the necessary hardware and software as well as the
organizational structure required to operate it. The prototype should also include the training
program required to bring operators up to a satisfactory skill level to use the system successfully.
2. JFCOM, develop decision support tools to support EBO. ~
- This will mean a significant JFCOM effort in locating appropriate tools and adapting them such
as was done with the XC 4I system for MC02. Or, if necessary, JFCOM should develop new
decision support tools that will meet the needs of j oint commanders at the strategic, operational
ant tactical levels. ~
3. JFCOM, and the Joint Staff, use the MC02 XC 4I network as a model to connect the JTF with
its components and combatant commander. ~
- Based on the results of MC02, JFCOM should develop a wide area network capability that can
provide a continuous bandwidth capacity of 15 Mb/s and a surge capacity of 25 Mb/s over a
sustained (6+ hours) period.
4. JFCOM, consolidate and streamline common CIE tools. ~

- A consolidation of tools for C4I in the JTF is a recurring theme among warfighters, SMEs, and
SCDs. Organization, training, leadership, and materiel are key DOTMLPF areas which would
benefit tremendously from the consolidation of C4I equipment used by JTFs. In this case, the
reduction in the number of systems used to conduct PE would directly contribute to increases in
JTF effectiveness and efficiency. CJF ACC mentioned that we need business rules to impose
discipline and ensure we minimize time spent in collaborative sessions. A single DoD
collaborative system is required.

Appendix A - Top Comments Group
JTF Current Ops 1,921,216 5,157

2 %
25.51
JTF Info Superiority 958,902 3,509
3 %
JTF Plans 64,540 1.71 % 3,399

4
5 Logistics Dashboards (JTF & ComponentsO 63,024 1.67% 3,294
Logistics Documents 57,499 1.53% 3,247
JTF Orders 213,202 5.67 % 2,368

7
ONA Dashboard (Current Summary) 24,150 0.64 % 2,342
8
Search Dashboard 9,419 0.25 % 2,297
9
ONA References via Document Library 16,790 0.44 % 2,162
10
News 7,506 0.19% 1,600
11
JTF Command Group 42,782 1.13% 1,500
JTF Boards 56,855 1.51 % 1,436

13
ONA Database 1,945 0.05 % 1,382
14
Document Library 2,552 0.06 % 1,355
15
Reference Dashboard 40,667 1.08% 1,233
16
Categories 4,800 0.12 % 1,091
JTF KM 18,114 0.48 % 739

18
KR/RFI 4,222 0.11 % 684
19
ONAMatrix 9,107 0.24 % 513
20
Manage Personal Subscriptions 987 0.02 % 351
21
ONA Matrix: Blue View Of Red 7,253 0.19% 349
22
ONA References 834 0.02 % 122
ONA Matrix: Red View Of Blue 222 0.00 % 66

24
ONA Related Products 425 0.01 % 64
25
26 ONA Matrix: Country Profiles 683 0.01 % 63

JTF Battle Board 2,594 0.06 % 35

27
ONA Matrix: Blue Effects Focus 54 0.00 % 30
28
ONA Matrix: Red Vulnerabilities 47 0.00 % 21
29
ONA Matrix: Blue Actions 35 0.00 % 16
30

Appendix B - SME CROP Survey Questions

The 17 questions are listed below. [SME CROP Survey]
1:Friendly unit status info posted in the CROP (SPPS) was AVAILABLE when needed
by the users.
2:Friendly unit status information posted in the CROP (SPPS) was SUFFICIENTLY
ACCURATE for planning and operational level decision-making.
3 :Posted weather information in the CROP (SPPS) was accurate for operational level
planning and/or C2 of execution.
6:The CROP (SPPS) information provided to participants was COMPLETE.
7:The CROP (SPPS) information provided to participants was CORRECT.
8:The CROP (SPPS) information provided to participants was TIMELY.
9:The CROP (SPPS) information provided to participants was CURRENT.
10:The CROP (SPPS) information provided to participants was ACCURATEIPRECISE.
11 :The CROP (SPPS) information provided to participants was RELEVANT.
12:The CROP (SPPS) information provided to participants covered physical features of
the JOA in sufficient depth and detail.
13 :The CROP (SPPS) information provided to participants covered enemy OOB in
sufficient depth.
14:The CROP (SPPS) information provided to participants covered relevant/needed
POLITICAL information in sufficient depth.
SOCIAL information in sufficient depth.
ECONOMIC information in sufficient depth.
INFORMA TION (MEDIA) information in sufficient depth.
18:The methods used for collecting, storing, and retrieving information in the CROP
(SPPS) were useful participant's purposes.
20:The search capability provided in the CROP (SPPS) was satisfactory.

Figure 241: USAF AC 130 pilot prepares his aircraft for operations in support of MC02

Assessment Area 10 - Enhance Interagency Perspectl"e

within the Joint Force Headquarters
The Millennium Challenge 2002 experiment confirmed the benefits of the concept of
enhanced interagency perspective within the joint force headquarters. Experimental conditions
prevented the assessment of the concept as envisioned in the
subject white paper. However, the MC02 experimental
approach applied to assess the utility of a Joint Interagency
Coordination Group (JIACG) confirmed the benefits of
enhanced interagency (IA) perspectives to support Effects-
Based Planning and Operations. Guided by the concept
described in the white paper, "Improving US Interagency
Operational Planning and Coordination, "the IA Assessment
Team (IAT) collected sufficient data to assess JIACG efficacy
in a small-scale contingency that resulted in j oint military
forces conducting combat and transition operations. Key
personnel and participants in MC02, with extensive experience
in the strategic and regional-level interagency coordination and
adequate visibility to judge the performance of the MC02,
responded to five surveys administered over the three-week
experiment. By a three to one margin, these respondents
expressed a favorable opinion of the JIACG in support of the JTF, combatant commander, and
participating members of the interagency community. Most respondents recommended further
concept refinement and experimentation. In addition, respondents surfaced IA issues described in
other MC02 assessment areas pertaining to information operations, EBO, ONA, and SJFHQ.
Methodology
The focus ofMC02 interagency assessment was on the Joint Interagency Coordination
Group (JIACG) nested in the important headquarters. The JIACG consisted of participants
located in Suffolk, VA and at three sites in the Washington, DC area (virtual members). Due to
real-world requirements, the "virtual" members participated in scheduled collaborative sessions,
depending on the subject and the availability of the individual. They used the MC02
Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) components InfoWorkSpace (IWS) and the
SharePoint Portal Server (SPPS) over the SIPRNET. Participants represented the Department of
State, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Departments of Justice and
Defense (OSD-SOILIC and Joint Staff). These members served as subject matter experts (SMEs)
during several collaborative sessions.
The data collection focused on "how" the JIACG interacted with the SJFHQ, the
combatant commander staff, the JIACG "virtual" members, and the IA SMEs in Washington,
DC. Data collectors in Suffolk observed the JIACG, the Director of the JIACG, the SJFHQ, and
JTFHQ pol-mil planners. Data Collectors in Washington, DC focused on Virtual and SME
participants at State, the Pentagon, and at the National Defense University. Suffolk participants
completed surveys in JDCAT and provided Comments and Recommendations in SPPS. Senior
participants provided written or oral responses to "Questions of the Day," which were then

added to the JDCAT database. Data collectors in Washington, DC surveyed or interviewed

participants, adding the results to the mCAT database.
The IAT reviewed, reduced, and collated the survey comments, comments/
recommendations, and data collector observations with the warfighting challenges, tasks, and
sub-tasks. The IAT reviewed and collated SCD comments from in-focus sessions, azimuth
checks, and after action reviews. The IAT identified the insights throughout the collation of the
reduced data.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to quickly achieve and maintain cohesive relationships with
the lAC.
The first challenge in enhancing interagency perspective within the joint force
headquarters was the 'ability to quickly achieve and maintain cohesive relationships with the
lAC'. The tasks required to assess this warfighting challenge were to establish a JIACG,
establish an interagency CIE, and develop secure processes and protocols among the IA
participants to enable effective collaboration. The rationale was that the implementation of the
three tasks would enable the achievement and maintenance of the cohesive relationship between
the combatant commander's staff and the other members of the lAC.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to improve interagency campaign planning and execution.

The second challenge in enhancing interagency perspective within the SJFHQ was the
'ability to improve interagency campaign planning and execution'. The tasks required to assess
this warfighting challenge were to implement pol-mil plans, and to provide continuity in
coordinated planning and operations from pre-crisis through execution and transition with the
JIACG. The rationale was that the implementation of the two tasks would enable improved
interagency campaign planning and execution throughout the continuum of conflict. The benefits
accrued to all members of the IA with equities in the crisis scenario. The context was the national
prosecution of a RDO.
The IA participants executing the National Security Council Advance Planning Process
crafted a strategic approach for the scenario region. As the crisis emerged, the IA participants
prepared a comprehensive pol-mil plan for approval by a notional deputies committee. The pol-
mil plan identified 18 mission areas and the respective responsible departments and agencies.
The scenario required the failure of pre-crisis efforts in order to allow the full examination of the
supporting concepts. Though the military solution was a forgone conclusion, the IA participants
leveraged the opportunity to explore potential contributions to the combatant commander's
planning and execution, and particularly to transition.
Finding The JIACG enabled the combatant commander to harmonize operational

plans with national policy decisions and guidance.
The idea of synchronizing IA efforts with the combatant commander's efforts was
essential in the concept white paper. During the spirals and execution, the participants agreed
that "synchronization" would be difficult, if not impossible. The word "harmonize" became a
more realistic and, therefore, a more achievable standard. During a discussion of the application
of the ETO, one SCD commented, "We want to ensure the military components' actions are
harmonized with the interagency efforts, and not vice-versa." Another SCD added, "When you
402 FOR OFFICIAL USE uNL Y

said synchronize, the most you probably can achieve is harmony, but you can't synchronize
diplomatic activities. We work on common guidance and consensus, not synchronization."
The IA participants produced a comprehensive pol-mil plan during the months leading up
to the experiment. The CJTF had the benefit of being able to incorporate this plan into the JTF
planning process. However, the JTF pol-mil planner cautioned the SCDs that it may be
unreasonable to expect the scope and quality of that pol-mil plan in real-world operations,
"From where I sit, we have a detailed political-military plan embedded in the JTF plan. The JTF
knows what is in it. But we may have created a false expectation ofIAC play," he said.
The two planning areas where the JIACG would be most valuable are the development of
the theater engagement plan (TEP) and in the transition-planning role for the combatant
commander. In the inter-crisis period, the focus will be on the harmonization of interagency
actions in development and refinement of the TEP. Harmonization of transition plans becomes
more important as a crisis evolves to the extent that a military course of action becomes
inevitable. A JTF planner commented on transition planning, "I see this as an area where the
reach-back to the JIACG and the centers of excellence is so important. We began with an ONA
in peacetime, and the groundwork that leads you in, can lead you out as well. Coordination
therefore is very important. We must link tightly with the JTF and the combatant commander's
staff. There is a clear link between transition and re-deployment."
The CJTF offered that during transition, where the DI&E piece reasserts itself, where
other departments and agencies reassert their dominance, the ONA and the collaboration, at that
point, may be more important than in combat. "This may be the missing link that explains why
we win battles, but lose wars," the commander said. "We're desperately seeking guidance. Ten
years later, people will second-guess not how we fought, but how we extracted ourselves." The
SCDs recognized the utility in transition planning early in the crisis.
Finding The JIACG concept, as it was implemented for the MC02 warfighting
scenario, was most properly positioned to operate at the combatant command level, since
most of the non-military effects are at that level of responsibility.
Five IA senior mentors responded to the question, "Where should the JIACG be located?
With the combatant commander's staff, elsewhere in the region, or in WashingtonINCR?" All
senior mentor respondents agreed that the JIACG must be located with the combatant
commander. Senior concept developers provided several reasons. They mentioned access to
other staff elements as an area where their capability would be most useful. Further, the face-to-
face dynamics of human interaction between the JIACG and the combatant commander provide
maximum effectiveness. One IA mentor stated, "Any other location would dilute its purpose of
giving the combatant commander greater awareness of the IA policy process." During an SCD
session, a member offered that the JIACG should be an "autonomous entity like any of the other
J (staff) functions."
The SCD added that the JIACG should operate under the combatant commander chief of
staff's direction. Additionally, the JIACG should be "able to ask for support from other J-staff
elements, and should be able to be asked to support other J-staff elements." This SCD continued
that the JIACG should coordinate requests from within the command and JTF for information
and assistance from elements of the Washington lAC. Additionally, the group should be a
'funnel' into the command for data needed by the Washington lAC for actions where policy is
already set. After stating, "If the concept is to work, the JIACG must be just as much a part of
F'OR OFFICIAL lISE ONLY 403

the combatant commander's staff as any other staff element," an SCD asked, "Would you design
a J5 not co-located with the combatant commander? A J2?"
Real-world concerns prevented the "virtual" members' full time participation in the
experiment. This concern is a result of the experimental conditions agreed to by the Washington
area participants. While the participants were instrumental to the success of the IA collaborative
sessions they attended, their
absence was felt as well. Use Does the JIACG provide relevant IA policy-operational level
of part-time "virtual" JIACG insights and understanding to the Combatant Cornman r
and his staff? Provide any
members can reduce the
effectiveness of the
collaboration with the
combatant commander staff
5
and engaged agencies. One
JTF HQ planner noted the 4
requirement for more JIACG 3

Resp#
involvement and more 2
"higher HQ" JIACG
meetings with State, Justice,
o
and other Washington
elements. This planner said, JTFHQ-
"during the diplomatically- PLANS
driven, pre-hostilities phase,

we need more such meetings Figure 242: JIACG was positively viewed at JTF HQ
in order to more quickly
resolve the usual pol-dip (diplomatic) issues that control the pre-hostilities phases-over flight,
ISR, NOTAMs (Notice to AviatorslMariners). It still took too long to get answers to these issues;
JIACG should expedite." In a dynamic environment, waiting for a time when the part-time,
'virtual' member is available to service the issue will hamper the overall planning effort. The
virtual membership concept was expedient for near-term implementation. It should be studied
further.
Finding A compatible CIE linkage to engaged agencies is essential for the effective
harmonization of IA actions.
The following questions and comments facilitated the analysis of Task 10. 1. 2-Establi sh
USG IA Collaborative Information Environment (CIE). Twenty-five participants responded to
the question, "Does the JIACG provide relevant IA policy-operational level insights and
understanding to the combatant commander and his staff?"
Out of the 25 that responded, 21 responded positively (84 percent, see figure 242). The
next chart (See Figure 243) shows the distribution of answers of the various groups. Within the
JTFHQ (CDR, IS, OPS, & Plans) 10 of 13, or 76.9 percent, stated, "JIACG provided relevant IA
policy, operational level insights and understanding." Typical comments from those giving a
negative response were "'Don't Know'," and "much room for improvement." One SJFHQ
planner stated that the JIACG provided only strategic level insights. Typical comments from
those giving positive comments indicated the value of the advice provided to the JTF
commander.
404 FOR OFFICI AL I ISE ONLY

One senior member of the JTF command group said, "The advice given to the
commander has been extremely beneficial. It has kept the CJTF sensitized to the interagency
challenges." An observer made a similar observation during Spiral 3. He observed the JIACG's
Does the .JIACG provide relevant IA policy-operational level

insights and understanding to the Combatant Commander and
his staff? Provide any recommendations.
10
8
6
# of resp
4
2
o
Figure 243: Does JIACG provide relevant IA policy-operational level insights and understanding?
participation in a mission analysis briefing that included a slide called "Interagency Support
Actions" with lead agencies annotated. This was beneficial to the CJTF because it provided the
opportunity to review ongoing actions in the diplomatic, information, and economic areas. If
CJTF had any questions, the JIACG director was present to answer.
Still others on the JTF staff indicated an appetite for more, by stating that "Commanders
rely on JIACG to 'read the tea leaves' in their areas of expertise and provide concrete guidance
about what to expect-
Given JIACG/IAC CIE in MC02, is the physical detailing of and when-in the pol-dip
departmental and agency LNO's e CC er'sstaffstill
areas, such as demarches,
over flight rights, and
NOT AMs," he said. "It
took too long to get these
answers, especially when
6
the pre-hostility phase
was so uncertain. Great
4
Resp # uncertainty here merited
2
more JIACG meetings
o and more concrete
JIACG guidance."
Not necessary
detailing
(minor face to
Figure 244 details
face) survey responses from IA
senior mentors in Suffolk
Figure 244: Physical detailing of JIACG IA LNO's is still necessary (i.e., JIACG director,
FOR OFFICIl'",L lISE ONLY 405

and a number of former POLADs) and a limited number in Washington, DC. They were
asked, "Given the JIACG/IAC collaborative environment in MC02 is the physical detailing of
departmental and agency LNO's to the combatant commanders still necessary?" Although IWS
CIE provides a key linkage between JIACG/combatant commander staff and lAC, "face-to-face"
interaction, is viewed to be a key requirement in order to have an effective JIACG/IAC
operation. According to all senior mentors, "physical detailing is still required. " Two of the
senior IA mentor comments are provided for added clarification. "While IWS and other tools are
helpful in reducing time/space constraints, and the JIACG could not be fully integrated into the
combatant commander staff unless its lead elements at least were physically with the combatant
commander. If the concept is to work, the JIACG must be just as much a part of the combatant
commander's staff as any other staff element," said one mentor.
The second mentor added, " Yes. The collaborative environment can reasonably be
expected to make steady progress over the next several years, but for the time being - until the
principal users gain sufficient familiarity with it-nothing beats the eye-to-eye/personal
handshake, particularly when one begins to transgress from "data" issues to "policy" issues."
Two other IA senior mentors were asked how could JIACG improve this operational
coordination and integration? (See Figure 247) The virtual JIACG identified the IWS (CIE) as a
way to improve coordination and integration. The core JIACG identified "old boy/girl network"
and "the IWS enabler-a collaborative tool. " One participant commented that the ability for the
JIACG/IAC to collaborate real time on a secure system is a priority one for many of the IA
departments and agencies. The lack of such a system in today' s environment (Information age) is
troubling and needs to be corrected as soon as possible. Another SCD described the teamwork
aspect. "This operation involves more than JTF-Blue. Commander Blue and our national
leadership have an oar in the water, as do the coalition partners." One SCD provided another
concern, that we must include guidance and knowledge from all elements of our national power
structure without inhibiting the military C2 structure.
Finding The JIACG composition should be based on the combatant commander's

regional requirements.
Several senior mentors recognized that the JIACG should be "tailored to the specific
circumstances of the specific command," and that there "cannot be a one-size-fits-all model for a
JIACG." Another agreed, "We can't be too prescriptive as to how the combatant commander has
to organize. We need to let each combatant commander decide how the theater requirements lead
him to organize." The SCD explained that EUCOM with NATO would be configured very
differently from SOUTHCOM or CENTCOM. Another SCD gave an example stating,
"SOUTHCOM may in fact have the largest JIACG, though it is a small theater. The
SOUTHCOM JIACG is heavily weighted to DOJ and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms. The JIACG will have to be very fluid in design and execution to ensure the combatant
commander gets legitimate peripheral vision."
Finding The combatant commander's ability to plan and execute RDO requires a rapid
and decisive national policy determination process.
This finding surfaced during Unified Vision 01 when a SCD said that you couldn't have
RDO without rapid decisive "policy. " During MC02, an SCD commented, "The interagency has
to be rapid when we are rapid, and vice versa." Then as now, the implementation of this idea is
outside the realm of the JFCOM and DoD. The obstacles to implementation of this concept are

rooted in the bureaucracies of the executive branch of the u.s. Government-in the manner in
which it executes its foreign policy responsibilities.
One SCD with Department of State experience said, "There are various mechanisms
(some run by the NSC), but history suggests we should not be optimistic about frequent and
uniform policy emanations. What we do have is an executive branch with various departments,
one of which, the Department of State, is profoundly opposed to planning. Its great strength is
policy development."
What benefit would participation in the JIACG provide to your

orga n iza tio
6
5
4
Resp # 3
2
Coordination &
relationship
Experts with legallinternatio Pol-Milissues
counterparts nal
Figure 245: Improved insight into the JTF and combatant commander decision process was listed
as the biggest benefit from the IA point of view, while access to the pol-mil debate by the military
staff was the greatest benefit seen by experiment participants.
He further likened the State Department to a soccer team that kicks the policy ball around
(instead of scoring policy goals). This paradigm is reactive, and is precisely what RDO is
intended to mitigate. Additionally, he pointed to the cautious nature of "real world" interagency
meetings, where "carefully prepared talkers from each department are presented that would have
to have [statements] screened at the policy-level first." All this exists to avoid the perception that
anyone was giving guidance to the combatant commander or CJTF other than SECDEF.
Accommodating all of the interests of the departments and agencies increases the time
required to react, allowing the crisis to worsen, and therefore increasing the risk. At the same
time, the SCDs recognized that the JIACG could not overreach with regard to relations with the
executive branch. They also recognize the concern that the JIACG is too commander-centric, and
there would be some potential to enhance the role of the combatant commander in policy
making. A former combatant commander allayed this concern by offering, "In my experience,
most combatant commanders don't seek a dominant (national) policy role. However, they do
realize they are marginalized to the extent that they don't have good policy insight. Few have

sought to unduly influence or control civilian agency resources, either. But we have to cultivate a
climate of greater trust and confidence and the JIACG, properly employed, and properly located,
would assist this effort."
One survey asked, "What benefit would participation in the JIACG provide to your
organization?" The response, in figure 245, illuminated the differences between the core JIACG
in Suffolk and the virtual JIACG in Washington, DC with regard to the potential for the JIACG
to overreach its combatant commander's responsibilities. The figure shows the results of the
question 'what benefit would participation in the JIACG provide to your organization?' The
participant responses are divided between the core JIACG and the virtual JIACG/IA. The Suffolk
group (core JIACG; combatant commander & staff) saw JIACG providing additional IA
coordination and expertise, and pol-mil understanding/focus on IA issues.
In contrast, the Washington, DC group (virtual group) saw JIACG providing insights into
JTF/combatant commander-RDO. Some SCDs, to include the senior mentors, suggested that
there is a greater probability that DC/lAC participants will get involved in planning and
Which best describes the advantage of the JIACG? (1. Enable CC into IA
operational process. 2. Enable lAC into CC planning &
1m prove CC access to IA stovepipes that feed IA
to IA advisors detailed to CC
8
7
6
5
Resp # 4
3
2
Figure 246: JTF staffers considered combatant commander access to the interagency to be a
significant capability, while the Washington, DC agency sought access to the commander's planning
and operations process.
execution, than will the combatant commander getting involved in lAC policy issues. This
suggests the overreaching is more likely to happen from the Washington, DC community into the
combatant commander/JTF, than from the combatant commander/JTF (military side) into the
national policy/lAC side. Given the potential for "overreach" in both directions, a rapid and
decisive national policy determination process is critical for successful combatant commander
RDO operations.
Historically, the military is wary of micromanagement by the civilian leadership. The
CJTF put this concern in context: "The real issue is how well the JTF can leverage this

information. In MC02, we have the preferred mode, but that may not be how the information
exchange structure will transpire. We in the military want [IA] involvement, but don't want
interference with lethal warfighting."
When asked, "Which best describes the advantage of the JIACG?" (See Figure 246) the
Suffolk participants reinforced the idea of military wanting IA involvement as selected by #3
"Improve combatant commander access to IA stovepipes that feed IA process. "Whereas, the
Washington, DC group selected #2, "Enable lAC into combatant commander planning and
operations process. " The long-term success of this concept will be dependent on the JIACG
adhering to its advisory role and bring the interagency perspective to issues vice trying to direct
How could JIACG improve this
Resp # 4
2
o
"old boy/girl
IWS type of
network" set earlier to
collaborative inclusion of
allow for more
tool other agencies
lAC time.
(e.g. CIA)
MOA/MOU
Figure 247: IWS was deemed an important collaboration tool, especially for the DC/lAC
or influence the lAC to meet current and future combatant commander specific plans. This last
area is the purview of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Finally, an SCD declared that JIACG concept was a clear winner that aids in the
development of the RDO and EBO concepts. He noted that JIACG-like organizations have been
established at each of the regional combatant commands, suggesting that the combatant
commanders have accepted this concept in some form. One SCD noted that the Deputy National
Security Advisor approved a six-month trial in the global war on terrorism. However, the trial
JIACGs are not focused on advance or deliberate planning. These JIACGs are focused on
execution. Further, the current posture depends primarily on temporary military manning.

Finding The JIACG's principal function is to focus on providing IA advisory support

to the combatant commander and staff, not on producing combatant commander plans.
One SCD provided a comprehensive description of the major issues with regard to the
principle functions of the JIACG. "But I don't share the view that planning should be a JIACG's
primary function, or that JIACG
MC02 stipulates certain functions for the JIACG. What functions would you planning should be embedded in a
recommend for the JIACG?
combatant commander's staff in
the way that a JS's deliberate
planning responsibility is, with
direct responsiveness to Joint Staff
deliberate planning." An SCD
said, "Total planning
responsibility would undercut a
JIACG's important advisory role
in providing the combatant
commander with Washington
rraking policy perspectives. To the degree
fielding LI\
guidance
(~ME)
that a JIACG is seen to be
engaged in formal planning, it
Figure 248: Participants agreed that IA advisory and guidance risks being viewed by Washington
role was successful and should be continued, melding with DIME interagency players, including both
state and the Joint Staff, as a threat
to their policy authorities rather than a value added policy insight into the regional combatant
commander's priorities and plans."
Another SCD expanded the scope of the discussion stating, "If the focus for a JIACG is
to try to plug into and identify
different views in Washington, or Does the JIACG provide relevant IA policy-operational level
to get parts of the interagency to insights and understanding to the Combatant Commander and
his staff? Provide any recommendations.
act on a discrete issue, the JIACG
will be effective," he said. "A
JIACG working for the combatant
commander can provide 20+---
invaluable information on what is c..
going on inside the beltway." II) 15 + - - -
Another SCD said,

&!
'0 10 + - - -
"JIACG serves an advisory
function to identify related issues. 5+---
This is a validated concept, but the
words you gave us do not all 0 +---
resemble the JIACG as we Yes No
practiced it for MC02. It is too
heavy on the planning side. It is Figure 249: Does JIACG provide relevant IA policy-operational
not possible to provide a level insights and understanding
'coordinated' position for
Washington decision-making. No one wants the JIACG to make policy!" One of the IA SCDs
responded, "The JIACG should make a significant contribution to the combatant commander's
410 FOR OFFICIAL lISE ONI,V

theater engagement and contingency planning, but I don't share the view that planning should be
a JIACG's primary function. I don't believe that JIACG planning should be embedded in a
commander's staff in the way that a J5's deliberate planning responsibility is, with direct
responsiveness to Joint Staff deliberate planning."
He went on to say, "Total planning responsibility would undercut a JIACG's important
advisory role in providing the combatant commander with Washington policy perspectives. To
the degree that a JIACG is seen to be engaged in formal planning, it risks being viewed by
Washington interagency players, including both State and the Joint Staff, as a threat to their
policy authorities rather than as a value added policy insight into the regional commander's
priorities and plans." Figure 248 reflects the sensitivity of the "policy making, combatant
commander planning, and combatant commander line authority role of the Suffolk and DC
community."
Other Observations
Observation 1: The JIACG should consist of senior level personnel with extensive regional
and Washington (strategic-level) experience.
Four IA senior mentors responded to the question "What Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities
are required in the JIACG Director?" Figure 250, shows the distribution of responses. All agreed
that the JIACG director should possess the rank similar to that of the other combatant
commander staff directors. The
JIACG director shoul d have the What Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities are required in the JIACGDirector
"temperament and managerial

qualities" to lead. The JIACG
director requires experience and
knowledge of the formal and
informal workings of the agencies Resp#
and departments most likely to be 2
involved in a potential crisis
action. One IA senior mentor
provided a concise list:
Must be a credentialed,
credible player in lAC
Have served in lAC,
preferably in NSC, and have
working knowledge and
Figure 250: Key skills and abilities of the JIACG Director are
facility in both the "formal" defined by the MC02 participants
and "informal" processes in
lAC
Credibility and access to [the] combatant commander/staff
Working knowledge and familiarity with combatant commander staff processes
Ability to travel and communicate "securely" on daily basis, not just a player in crisis
Another offered that the JIACG Director "should probably not have a tenured position or
be a permanent Civil Service employee, but must serve at the pleasure of the combatant
commander, and probably not have been around long enough to develop an 'I was here before

you and I'll be here after you' attitude toward the combatant commander." With regard to rank
and background, one SCD offered that the director should probably be an 0-7/8 SES 3/4
equivalent, preferably not from the State Department or Foreign Service. The IA senior mentor
reasoned that this would prevent overlapping competencies and possible competition between
the JIACG director and the combatant commander's POLAD.
Additionally, this source would reduce the possibility of too heavy a "State Dept" cast to
JIACG activities. Further, the JIACG personnel should rank at the 0-4/5/6 or GS-13114115 level.
It should have a higher density of civilians with experience in the Washington lAC.
Thirty participants answered the question, "Is the JIACG organization, composition, and
size about right for its desired functions?" Most said that the experiment did not provide the
opportunity to make a complete analytical assessment of the JIACG concept. However, several
saw a correlation between the size of the JIACG and its advisory role. The size and composition
as envisioned in the concept will support the advisory role. Several saw the JIACG's size
increasing should the role change from an advisory group to a product-oriented planning staff.
Observation 2: Habitual collaboration among JIACG, departments, and agencies provides
benefits to all participants by increasing the knowledge of one another's requirements,
culture, and procedures.
This lesson was learned during Service experimentation. Knowing an adjacent unit's
strength, capability, mission, and intent has been proven essential to successful operations.
Likewise, synergistic benefits of collaboration are evident in the business world. Knowledge is
the key. MC02 provided the opportunity for all participants to gain greater understanding of the
missions, capabilities and issues of the other engaged departments and agencies. The production
and dissemination of the 'strategic approach' and the 'pol-mil plan' stimulated great interest in
the potential of the concept. It also illuminated the many issues still requiring resolution. A better
informed combatant commander, familiar with the equities of the other departments and
agencies, is better able to engage the SECDEF to get his policy guidance.
Several SCDs commented on the value of collaboration with respect to working with
other members of the interagency community. One SCD observed the benefit working on a
single collaborative net, "The combatant commander has a long-term focus, and the JTF has a
very near-term focus. The JTF did have great situational awareness on Washington policy, and
the Washington community had better situational awareness on what was happening at the JTF
level. One collaborative environment is where you want to go."
Another offered comment on the value of active participation, "What they picked up from
the transition guidance allowed them to do a tremendous transition plan of their own. The JIACG
folks should know you have had a tremendous impact on the training audience. The take-away
by JTF commanders and staffs and components is extremely positive. We got a lot better because
they participated."
One of the observer-trainers noted the "huge need for pol-mil information" and the fact
that the JIACG provided it. One SCD added that the process stimulated the JTF's appetite for a
JIACG capability of its own; "There ought to be a cell as an extension of the JIACG at the JTF
level that could keep us appraised of key policies and guidance so the JTF could better
disseminate and synchronize. For example, we captured a key subordinate, but we've received
very little fallout from the interrogation for further exploitation. The interagency collaboration
might also have given us much needed insight into work on release for the captured A-Team."


The requirement to enhance interagency activities in operational level planning and
implementation affects all other objective areas. The JIACG will work closely with the SJFHQ
pol-mil planner cell. While the JIACG will not input the DIME elements of the ONA, it can
educate the staff proponent for lAC ONA policy and agency issues. The JIACG will use the CIE
to maintain habitual relationships with members of engaged departments and agencies and other
members of the combatant commander's staff. The JIACG will educate the combatant
commander staff on the lAC's programs and initiatives, and focus on IA execution of DIME
actions within the context of Effects-Based Operations.
With respect to JISR support during transition planning and operations, the JIACG plays
an essential advisory/planning role in coercive diplomacy, condition setting, access dominance,
and post hostilities transition. JISR has to continue providing feedback to the decision-maker
during the transition phase. Generally, JISR support to decision-making during transition
operations will be much more difficult than JISR support during earlier phases. Regardless, the
commander still has to make effective decisions-these decisions now involve a wider range of
people, organizations, and stakes. Thus, feedback for actions leading to desired effects are often
much more complicated. This feedback usually involves intangibles and a wide variety of non-
traditional sources of data, information, and knowledge.
Often expertise required to tum information into knowledge is not with either the JTF or
the combatant commander's headquarters. Architectures, knowledge production roles and
missions, collaborative communities of interest and communities of practice, software and
hardware, access rights, and request for information channels have to occur early in planning
cycles for transition operations. Sharing of data, information, and knowledge in a CIE will be
different and important. This phase will find more of a focus on force protection, perceptions of
populace, and civilian populations of neutrals, coalition partners, and people in the United States.
The sources of data, information, and knowledge needed to design effects and assess their
effectiveness will often come from interaction with the national interagency community, such as,
Department of State professionals, and open source information existing on the internet. Human
intelligence sources will also be very important for force protection and perception manipulation
management of host nation people. The communications, automation, and collection
architectures to support transition will have to be planned by the SJFHQ before the execution of
operations.

- There is no baseline data for the JIACG assessment area
DOTMLPF Linkages
The following findings from the JIACG DOTMLPF package are consistent with the
findings of the MC02 experiment.
- A clear, cohesive NSC approved political-military plan is required to fully employ the totality
of national power against an adversary
- Military operations must include an interagency planning cell (JIACG) as part of the combatant
commander or JTF staff to bridge the gap between strategic and operational levels of planning

- The JIACG strategy/concept is the vehicle for coordinating the operational level planning
efforts between the civilian interagency community and the combatant commander or JTF staff
in the execution of the political-military plan
- Habitual, collaborative relationships between military planners on the combatant commander or
JTF staff and the interagency facilitates the planning process for both, and improves the quality
of the plans
- It is possible to define a core JIACG staff while also providing flexibility to the combatant
commander in the staffing of the JIACG based on specific missions and AORs
- A comprehensive pol-mil plan, and early collaborative planning is essential for the successful
conduct of military operations other than war
- A reliable and secure CIE is essential to leverage the knowledge and perspective found in the
military and civilian planning community
- Interagency participation in experiments and exercises, as facilitated by the JIACG, provides
valuable training for military and civilian planners, as well as the benefit of training in the use of
CIE tools
- Participants require extensive training on rules of engagement for complex, contingency
operations
- Results of experiments such as MC02 have shown the value of interagency collaboration as
facilitated by the JIACG, and guided military planners on incorporation of civilian agency input
into military plans
- Military planners need to better understand the interagency planning and coordination process
- Military planners need to understand how to collaborate with the interagency to produce more
effective campaign plans
- Professional military education at all levels needs to include an understanding of the NSC and
interagency process, and reflect the value of the interagency process to operational planning
- Lack of secure, interoperable communications systems inhibits effective interagency
collaboration as well as collaboration with combatant commander and JTF staffs
- For the JIACG to be effective, it needs a secure, collaborative communication system.
- DoD needs to consider the communication initiatives of other agencies to assure the
development of a collaborative information environment that is interoperable across the
executive branch of the interagency community
Recommendations
1. JFCOM, in conjunction with a combatant command, stand-up a JIACG prototype, in
conjunction with the SJFHQ, to refine doctrine, TTP, and manpower requirements. ~
2. JFCOM, refine roles and responsibilities, relationships, functions, vertical and horizontal
communication, and authority of a JIACG during peacetime, theater engagement, crisis
preparations, crisis response, transition, and recovery. ~
3. JFCOM, explore interagency contributions to the SJFHQ and it's enabling concepts (CIE,
ONA, EBO, and JISR). ~
4. JFCOM, explore coordination of civilian multinational entities, regional and international
organizations, and non-governmental organizations into the concept. ~
5. JFCOM and OSD, expand interagency play in j oint exercises. ~
414 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~

6. OSD, develop and field an interagency CIE to implement a secure CIE capability for use by
all departments and agencies with national security responsibilities. ~
7. JFCOM in conjunction with OSD, develop business rules such as TTP's, for collaborative
engagement internal and external to DoD. ~
Figure 251: Night operations at China Lake during MC02 field exercises

Assessment Area 11 - Joint Theater Logistics Management

(JTLM)
The MC02 experiment clearly demonstrated that there has to be interaction between
planners on all levels to successfully integrate deployment and sustainment planning into the
Effects-Based Planning process.
During Effects-Based Planning sessions, the combatant command-level Joint Logistics
Management Center (JLMC) and the logisticians embedded in the JTF groups combined to
significantly improve the process of integrating and
coordinating deployment, employment and sustainment actions,
and capabilities. Having the SJFHQ logistics personnel
embedded in the operations and plans groups was also
important to that integration process, improving the
coordination and synchronization of logistics and situational
awareness.
The experiment also examined the Joint Standard
Operating Procedures (JSOP) descriptions of the JTF logistics
positions, as well as, functions and essential elements of
logistics information. Further refinement of the functions and
information needs are required. The organization and structure
of the JTF logistics organization needs to be made more
functional and an examination of the skill sets involved is
needed. The roles and responsibilities of the JLMC, log plans
and log operations require some refinement in the JTF JSOP.
Additionally, there was support for a logistics support group,
putting the senior logistician in the JTF in parity with the
operations, plans, Information Superiority, and knowledge
management directors.
The collaborative logistics board, center, cells, and
working groups enhanced the performance and situational
awareness of all planners and operators in the JTF,
components, and the JLMC. The Logistics Action Response
Board (LARB) proved itself instrumental in the daily JTF and
component battle rhythm structure. Several key, functional
areas created their own collaborative cells and working groups,
increasing situational awareness (notably the deployment-
planning cell, engineer, personnel, and medical cells).
The experimental construct allowed the JTF the ability
to leverage decision support tools (DST) and other emerging technologies, to rapidly process
data and create operationally relevant logistics information. The web based Global Combat
Support System (GCSS) portal tool was the most useful and beneficial in gathering data for
planning and operations. Much of this information was assessable throughout the force through
links created on the Log CROP. The Log CROP successfully provided logisticians a single place
to find common information and achieve overall situational awareness. The log watchboard was

equally well regarded, although users could not tie the data to an actual database or receive
timely data updates.
Methodology
To analyze the first task in this concept, 'integrate deployment and sustainment planning as
an integral part of the Effects-Based Planning process', three specific areas were observed. First,
RDO construct to facilitate management of logistics functions. Second, the logistics C2 battle
rhythm, and third, how the JTLM reduced the logistics footprint in theater and in the JOA.
The second concept task, 'define the JTF logistics position functions and essential elements
oflogistics information', looked in detail at the functions, roles, and relationships of the
logisticians in the JTF operations and plans groups. The next task, 'leverage DST emerging
technologies to rapidly process data and create operationally relevant logistics information',
analyzed the tools to provide the JFC and subordinates the information required to determine the
logistics feasibility of operational actions. The logistics displays were also reviewed to
synchronize sustainment in support of RDO.
The final task in the concept, 'employ a networked sustainment distribution structure', was
assessed by determining how the following effected sustaining the force:
Tailoring intermediate staging and support bases (ISBs) to support to RDO forces
ISB management
Synchronization of tailored sustainment with deploying forces
Procedures and practices to support agile mobile forces
Data was collected, primarily, from the logistics participants and SMEs using automated
questionnaires and from the comments and recommendations provided by all participants,
various AARs and in-focus sessions. The locations and number of the logisticians follows: plans
group 14; operations group 12; SMEs 12; functional component 5; Joint Logistics Management
Center 16; and the Joint Experiment Control Group 17.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to Plan for Agile Sustainment

The warfighting challenge, 'ability to plan for agile sustainment', was postulated because the
current force requires a large, vulnerable infrastructure; mountains of materiel in theater; and
extensive time to establish. Therefore, it is unable to provide agile sustainment and delivery to
highly mobile forces in non-continuous operations. Metrics (tasks, subtasks, questions and data
elements), to evaluate this challenge, were developed based on information from several sources,
including:
operations (RDO, 2114/01)
Focused Logistics: Enabling Early Decisive Operations (FLEEDO, 10110/99), Strategic
Deployment (SD, 511 0/00) and RDO (311/02) White papers
Deployment & Sustainment in MC02 Concept of Operations (CONOPS, 3118/02)
Deployment & Sustainment in MC02 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs, 1/9/02)

The MC02 JSOP was also used to generate metrics, and was the basis for data collection
plan development. The data collection plan was vetted with the logistics concept developers and
other members JFCOM. The high order metrics included:
Task: Integrate deployment and sustainment planning as an integral part of the effects-based
planning process
SubTask: Determine the type and span of joint control that best facilitates
management of logistics functions
SubTask: Reduce the logistics footprint in theater and JOA
Task: Define the JTF logistics position functions and essential elements of logistics
information
SubTask: JTF operations positions
Sub Task: JTF plans positions
Task: Leverage DST emerging technologies to rapidly process data and create operationally
relevant logistics information
SubTask: Determine the tool required to provide the JFC and subordinates the
knowledge needed to assess the logistics feasibility of operational actions
SubTask: Determine the improvements needed to feeder and umbrella information
systems
SubTask: Employ a logistics display that enhances the JFC's ability to synchronize
sustainment
Task: Employ a networked sustainment distribution structure

SubTask: Leverage and tailor Intermediate Staging and Support Bases (ISBs)
SubTask: Tailor sustainment for synchronization with deploying and redeployment
forces
Sub Task: Determine the means of reducing the logistics footprint in JOA
SubTask: Ensure time-definite delivery
Finding The Log CROP was successful in achieving situational awareness.

The Log CROP provided logisticians a place to find common information and achieve
situational awareness. Participants judged the utility of the log watchboard 'tremendous'.
The Log CROP went beyond enhancing visibility of deployment and sustainment; it
encompassed all logistics functions including supply, maintenance, transportation, contracting,
and host nation services. The Log CROP is not perfect, but it is going down the right road. Early
in the experiment, units had a hard time getting the information they required from the CROP
due to a lack of training and familiarization with the tool. As the exercise progressed, however,
more personnel, including non-logisticians, were using the CROP to accomplish their missions
and gain situational awareness.
One subj ect matter expert commented, "Use of IWS and the virtual meetings enhanced
the logistics community. The tools facilitated the horizontal and vertical coordination and
synchronization of logistics issues and missions. The logistics CROP and the watchboard have
provided the virtual reporting and status of logistics assets and capabilities that have been needed
for years. "

Another SME commented, "The Logistics CROP and the watchboard were the model for
the rest of the JTF. It was praised virtually every day."
When asked if the information and the data links on the Logistics CROP were adequate
for their needs, over 90 percent of the survey respondents agreed they were adequate (See Figure
252). The surveys also
provided some valuable The Log CROP information and
information for future adequate for my posi
developments in the area of the
CROP and watchboard. Two 16
such comments: "Keep working 14
12
this though, we can do better. 10
Agree and very good. Just need 8
a knowledge manager to 6
4
oversee the log watchboard for 2
timely and accurate data and 0
Agree Disagree n =58
police component updates."
Not all reports were II1II Other
positive as a participant
commented that the medical Figure 252: Participants agreed that the collection of information
information and data links tools and links was useful in executing their mission
posted on the Medical CROP
needed more work, while another noted that the information and the data links on the Logistics
CROP were not adequate to meet the needs of engineer.
Seventy percent of experiment participants surveyed reported they had confidence in the
information they obtained (and that it was current) from the Log CROP (See Figure 253). The
components successfully accessed the JTF Log CROP to obtain required information, finding all
the information they needed. However, the components did question the data on the CROP,
stating it was not dynamic, throughout the experiment. Comments included:
"Information on the CROP is dependent upon when functional sections post their updated
data"
"In some situations, there
were redundant reports that Confidence in Information
were updated at different CROP
times by different people"
"Confidence is only based on 15
knowing the people entering
the data are up to speed" 10
"Rigor needs to be put into 5
the update process for future
operations. Various products o
such as air and sea schedules, OLog Plans
Agree Disagree n = 56
OSME
and various SITREPS, have to
II1II Other
be maintained by a dedicated
knowledge manager"
Figure 253: Most had confidence in information obtained from
The respondents were the Log CROP

asked whether the GCSS portal, integrated consumable item system (lCIS), joint logistics (JL)
tools, Joint Forces Capability Register (JFCR), and global transportation network were key data
sources for their position. Only seventy five percent agreed these programs, or portals, were key
to their jobs. Figure 254, below, illustrates that during execution the primary users of these tools
(as a part of the CROP) were in the JLMC and at the JTF.
Furthermore, most of the JTF indicated they did not use the logistics tools suite during
execution. However, the data and observations indicated that the players used programs or tools
specific to their job, but not necessarily all the tools in the suite.
Finally, the players were asked to respond to questions regarding the ease of use and the
intuitive nature of the CROP display. This aspect of the CROP also received very good reviews
from the users. Comments included:
"Very intuitive, can only get better, thought it was one of the better SPPS pages used during
this exercise" - JFLCC
"Great display however, it needs to be able to link to the IWS, so that we do not have to use
power point slides" -log operations group
"Very easy to use and very intuitive" - log plans group
"Very intuitive; it suffered from similar problems of other CROP pages, which is the
abundance of info on them, and the time it takes to sort what is there and where it is" - log
plans group
"Links on the CROP should be made back to the ONA to provide logistics back ground
information on all service
munitions, and equipment
types" - SME
"The CROP has proven to be
a valuable asset to my
15
mission. It enhanced my
situational awareness vastly 10
and enabled me to make on
5
the spot decisions towards
mission accomplishment" Log o
operations group
II Others
The development of the
logistics watchboard, for
reporting critical supply and Figure 254: Most agreed that the GCCS portal, JL Tools, JFCR
equipment requirements, greatly and GTN were key data sources
simplified reporting and provided
a good electronic visualization of the status of forces, supplies, and equipment. The information
presented in the watchboard was linked to an Excel spreadsheet that provided readiness
information on all supply classes in a color code for each functional component of the JTF. The
supply-class levels were updated daily and the color change (green/yellow/red) alerted operators
to a fall below an established level. This was one of the most controversial areas of the Log
CROP, because the processes and procedures took a long time to refine during execution.
The players were surveyed and asked whether the logistics watchboard enhanced
awareness and assessment oflogistics material and equipment readiness. The chart in figure 255
below shows that over 90 percent of the participants agreed with that statement and praised the

watchboard. However, most of the users also wanted to see it built around a central data
repository that accepted feeds from components, rolled them up, segmented them and provided
the data to higher headquarters in multiple, manipulative formats for tracking. Other comments
included:
"The CROP has to be developed to be user friendly. Components had a hard time updating it.
Also need to look at what is displayed in the watchboard"
"Another great tool for visibility. Provides a good "one over the world" look at logistics
status across the JTF, but does not provide any significant details on "show stopper" logistics
issues"
"The watchboard is a great start. There needs to be more fidelity in the M&S to generate log
data at the service level to properly populate the watchboard. Links need to be established
from the Services' watchboards / reports to automatically populate the watchboard at the JTF
and JLMC"
"The construct of the watchboard spreadsheets had errors which led to some
misinterpretation of readiness status. Daily adjustments to stock on hand were based on the
requirement rather than the previous day's stock level. One component was also not aware of
the option to UPGRADE the commander's assessment rather than going with the rating based
on pure numbers"
"Watchboard needs a lot of work in terms of how the services report data. It needs to be
standardized across the board (such as class V). Additionally, requirements need to be
articulated on the watchboard further out than 24 hours."
"Very useful and had a lot of great information on it. Size of the window where the status
board was located could have been bigger, though, in order to see more of it at the same time
without scrolling."
"To the engineer staff, the logistics watchboard was oflittle use. Although a civil engineer
tab existed it did not include any engineer data."
"Need a program that is dynamic and tied to Power Point for slide presentations and also
allow users to update simultaneously, in other words, Excel spreadsheets linked to Power
Point slides."
The Watch Board enhances awareness

material and equipment readiness
20
15
10
5
o n =56 OLog Plans
Agree Disagree
OSME
II1II Other
Figure 255: Most agreed that the watchboard enhanced awareness of logistics material
and equipment readiness

Finding The Effects-Based Planning and the deployment and sustainment processes
were not effectively integrated.
Deployment and sustainment was not effectively integrated into Effects-Based Planning
by the combatant command-level JLMC and logisticians embedded in the JTF groups. While
logisticians made every effort to maintain links to the various planning groups and significantly
improved the flow of information, the EBP process did not support the integration of deployment
and sustainment. The management and functional structure of the JLMC provided sufficient
support to the MC02 upper-end, small-scale contingency. Using the CIE, strategic and
operational lift issues were resolved and integration of strategic and theater movement control
functions accomplished. An upper end, small-scale contingency was, and can be, logistically
supported by augmenting the J4, lead service, executive agency, directive authority for a logistics
dominant user, most capable service or a combination of these support options.
Logisticians were asked a series of questions to validate the experimental JTLM concept.
The first question asked if strategic and operational level, joint logistics processes were
centralized and controlled at the combatant commander's JLMC, were the processes then carried
out with increased effectiveness, improved synchronization, and greater flexibility, with fewer
personnel. Just over half of the survey respondents reported that the experimental JLMC did help
to increase synchronization and added the following comments:
Reach-back was effective in several areas, specifically fuels and contracting. For example,
contracting support was set up for meals in the Blue portion of the JOA. Additionally,
substantial coordination was conducted in the area of aligning fuel supplies at various
beddown locations
The JLMC provided strong support to the JTF. Its support was enhanced by the situational
awareness provided by the Log CROP and the CIE
Those that believed the organization did not increase efficiency mentioned that the LARB
collaborative environment increased synchronization
Although the JLMC improved some sustainment operations, the organizational functions and
staffing needs to be spelled out in more detail in the JSOP. One obvious shortfall was the
lack ofDLA and fuels expertise to effectively work many sustainment issues
However, there were strong opinions that the JLMC structure, as it was designed in the
experiment, did not allow synchronization or flexibility (a result of fewer people). In fact, the
logisticians in the JTF reported more people were needed in log operations and log plans and that
a truly functional J4 type staff was needed to conduct and coordinate operations. Finally, it was
thought that the JLMC did not gain the same situational awareness as the JTF and remained in a
reactive mode, rather than being proactive as was envisioned.
A second survey question read, 'Given the JTLM coordination was accomplished prior to
MC02, during the combatant commander's normal theater engagement activities and
documented in Annex D of the CONPLAN, to include the logistics management structure, was
the logistics management structure in the CONPLAN sufficient to support the MC02 upper end,
small-scale contingency?' A little over half of the respondents believed the structure was about
right for the experiment scenario, but some common themes included
Additional personnel and skill sets are needed to make the JLMC a viable entity
The modeling and simulation design failed to generate the logistics workload needed to stress
the participants

JTF logistics manning was inadequate in several categories: engineer, personnel, medical,
and movements specifically
The skill sets and positions in the SJFHQ log operations and log plans need to be revisited
and refined
The breadth and depth of all the skills sets needed to operate in a SSC were not adequately
demonstrated
The JTF headquarters needs a designated J4 and all logisticians in that headquarters need to
work for him
Create a chief of support operations, who is directly responsible to the JTF commander for
joint logistics functions, that includes the planning and execution of engineer, medical,
sustainment and transportation support to the JTF
In the third area of this survey, logisticians were asked if the JTLM responsibility and
authority for transportation related activities was accomplished by a Joint Movement Center
(JMC) integrated into the JLMC. Was the JLMC able to resolve lift issues and accomplish the
seamless integration of strategic and theater movement functions? Fifty-seven percent of the
respondents thought the JLMC accomplished the mission and provided the following additional
comments:
The JMC functions must be retained at the JTF level
In RDO, transportation requirements dramatically increased with less lead-time
The Joint Planning Center (JPC) needs to work strategic movement and the Joint Operations
Center (JOC) needs to work the intra-theater movement
The CIE was instrumental in keeping situational awareness at the JTF and JLMC
The creation of the collaborative deployment cell was key in resolving numerous strategic
movement issues and helping in prioritizing TPFDD flow items
There was a lack of a Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Contingency Support Team (CST) in
the JTF
Procedures between plans and operations in order to watch the handoff and monitor the flow
of the TPFDD were not as they should have been
Big picture oversight of the TPFDD was problematic
A senior logistician,
possibly a logistics
Logistics Support Options
director, is needed in the
JTF to provide oversight
35
and to fully synchronize 30
operational logistics 25
C
functions both in CIl 20
planning and operations ~ 15
c.. 10
5
In determining the o
MC02 logistics support Augment Expand Lead DAFL Combination JLC
JLMC LRC Service/ EA n = 36
options, the following
insights were provided:
Most of the participants Figure 256: Support options that best supported RDO
said that the MC02
support structure would work for RDO-type operations (upper end, small-scale contingency)

Directed authority for logistics (DAFL), was not specifically delineated in MC02, the JTF
logisticians operated under that assumption, directing cross leveling between components,
changing lead Service to the most capable component and establishing priorities of support
Some participants believed that ajoint logistics command at the component level should be
established and the best terminology for this organization would be joint support command.
The type oflogistics support needed for MC02 was a subject of debate for the
participating logisticians (JTF, JLMC, components and the Joint Exercise Control Group). Figure
256 above represents the various support opinions the experiment participants thought best
supports RDO.
Finding The JTLM concept reduced the logistics footprint in the JOA.
Seventy percent of the logistics participants agreed that they saw several signs of cross-
service cooperation and that the LARB was the key forum for bringing complex logistics issues
to the forefront and working them. Examples follow:
During collaboration, JSOTF forces were offered to help JFLCC with upcoming missions if
the JLFCC equipment did not arrive in time
Cross-Service use ofHSVs in planning, but not in execution
The LARB was the forum for directing issues to the appropriate level, such as, strategic
issues to DLA or TRANSCOM, Theater level issues to the JLMC, and operational issues to
the JTF or components. Additionally, it eliminated a large portion of the log RFI process
The combatant commander J4, JLMC and JTF each contributed assistance Iguidance for the
allocation of strategic lift assets during the planning for the near simultaneous airborne
assault and a retrograde during a LARB session
The LARB membership encouraged the creation of daily collaborative deployment cell and
engineer working groups to provide a single point for planners (deployers) and engineers to
gain assistance and resolve intermittent or complex deployment or engineer issues. The
medical community also created a working group to resolve their various issues
Finding Embedding logistics personnel in the operations and plans groups improved
situational awareness across the JTF.
Embedding SJFHQ logistics personnel in the operations and plans groups was a success
in improving situational awareness in the JOA, although some participants believed that the
overall JTF manning was inadequate and some changes were necessary in some skills sets.
Log Operations.
Sixty-five percent of all the logisticians surveyed agreed that the embedding of the
logisticians was effective in integrating the deployment and sustainment processes. Those who
disagreed based their response on the logistics organization structure issues and not on the fact
that the logisticians were embedding in the groups.
Figure 257 below demonstrates the perceived importance of the logisticians embedded in
the operations group.
Though most participants agreed that embedded logistics personnel worked very well,
there was some feedback indicating that further experimentation may be needed.

Although many of the positions described in the Deployment and Sustainment TTP and
the JTF JSOP are common to JTF staffs, the make up of the SJFHQ logistics positions was
designed to find the skills that would be of the greatest benefit to the JTF when it was exported.
In Log operations, it was found that some skill sets did not match the functions necessary
to carry out their
Loggies in OPS provided better/quicker recommendations/adjustments mission. In the
to log priorities in JOA to JTF Commander makeup of the
100%
experiment
90% organization, it
80% was found the JTF
70% log operations
60% transportation cell
II1II Agree
50%
Ebisagree
did not have the
40% required expertise,
30%
functional
20%
sections, or
10%
numbers of people
0%
JTF HQ Cmd JTF HQ IS JTF HQ KM JTF HQ Ops JTF HQ Plans Tolal N=141
to perform the
mission in RDO.
Figure 257: Most agreed that operators provided better recommendations Oversight of all
common user
transportation assets should be in the JOC to include common user air, sea, helicopter, and
common user land movements.
Service representation is necessary for air (AP), sea (Navy), land, and helicopter (Army
or Marine). Additionally, procedures were also lacking early to allow for a handoff of
responsibility from plans to operations to track and monitor the flow of the TPFDD. The plans
shop continues to make changes and modifications to the validated TPFDD, which have impacts
upon force flow and subsequently, impacts upon operations. A future JSOP needs to address this
Issue.
Log Plans
The JPC was the (logistics) focus of both Spiral 3 and execution. The logisticians in log
plans made a valiant effort to support the operations through the logistic action response board
and deployment cell collaborative meetings despite limited personnel and a shortage of critical
skills. Figure 258 below illustrates the JTF's recognition of the contribution from the logisticians
embedded in plans to the success of RDO planning. The suggested changes to the skill set
embedded within the JTF log plans area are also provided.
It was suggested more medical and engineer-planning expertise needs to be inserted into,
or attached to, the SJFHQ. Additionally, log plans could use an additional transportation plans
officer. This individual could assist the current transportation plans officer with TPFDD
development tasks. As such, that officer would need detailed JOPES expertise. In addition,
according to participants, log plans needs an additional deployment member with sealift
expertise. It currently has an air and ground expert, but lacks anyone with sealift experience.
Finally, it was noted the core JPC did not include a logistics representative. Issues being
discussed off net, within the core JPC room, did not have logistics input, and logisticians outside
the room were not aware of the ideas being developed until far too late.

There was some procedural confusion within the plans group on force flow/deployment
planning and the TPFDD build. According to the JSOP, Chapter 5, page 5-A-4:
The deployment cell is responsible for deployment support planning in concert with
effects-based planning process. Their effort will lead to the development of a TPFDD
associated with the ETG. They help provide a transportation feasibility assessment to
support COA development. It is comprised of the JTF Movement Officer, Transportation
planner, Strategic Lift planner, Operations and plans group Representatives, Component
planners and JOPESITPFDD technicians.
This deployment planning process needs to be further clarified in the JSOP and
understood by planners to make this work. Operational planners should develop, coordinate, and
synchronize the TPFDD. Logisticians execute the TPFDD.
A separate recommendation was made for some type of synchronization tool or template
that the JTF
Loggies in PLANS enhanced effects-based planning, ETO development planners could use
and 10 of future LOG rqmts that linked effects,
100%
to forces, and to
90% deployment/emplo
80% yment time lines.
70% The logistics
60% planners were
50% given the task of
40% prioritizing the
30% force despite the
20% fact that the
10%
operational
0%
planners should
JTF HQ Cmd JTF HQ IS JTF HQ KM JTF HQ Ops Total N = 141
have been more
involved in this
Figure 258: Logistics personnel working in plans cells was a positive process.
Finding The organization of the SJFHQ and control of the JTF logistics activities needs
refinement to provide more functional specialty expertise.
A key area of analysis was the impact of the experimental log operations and log plans
organization on the JTF. Upon review, it was found that the JTF logistics organization needed to
be revisited to provide a more functional look. Numerous comments were made in favor of a
logistics support group that put the logistics director in parity with the operations/plans/ISIKM
directors.
When surveyed, three of the senior logisticians in the SJFHQ indicated they were
successful in MC02, but it was not necessarily because of the organizational structure. They each
indicated logistics could better serve the JTF if the entire logistics team was organized as a stand-
alone entity, for example as a logistics support group with a log director. This structure would
still allocate log planners and operators to the operations and planning groups. Two supporting
comments are provided.

"The embedding of the JTF headquarters logisticians in the operations group and the
plans group from an operational viewpoint is prudent. In most current JTFs, the J4 has
representatives in the JOC and JPG, which is similar to the current configuration of the
experimental JTF organization. In current JTFs, the J4 is the senior logistician and ensures that
logistics functions are fully synchronized in JTF operations. In the experimental JTF, there
appears to be an integration and synchronization of logistics functions problem in the plans and
operations groups.
"I feel the plans group has not fully synchronized the logistics tasks across the spectrum
of the PEL and ETO. A way to fully synchronize operational logistics functions both in planning
and current operations is to have a senior logistician in the headquarters that has oversight of all
logistics functions. The logistician would work directly for the JTF commander," a SME said.
"The SJFHQ logistical relationship with functional components and Services placed a
huge workload on the logisticians embedded in the SJFHQ design. As a result, the logisticians,
even with augmentation, could not meet both the needs of the plans or operations directors and
the requirements of the functional components at the same time. The components were confused
on where to go for medical, engineer, contracting, personnel, mobility, request for forces,
sustainment, ammunition, and other logistics requirements. The areas constitute a subset of the
21 logistics functions. The SJFHQ design needs to be revised so that their is a fifth cell / director,
called 'logistics support group'. The logistics operations director needs to be moved to head that
cell. Additionally, include a medical, personnel and engineer expert," said the combatant
commander's J 4.
Further, whatever organization is adopted, it would be prudent to identify a "gatekeeper"
for all Log plans and Log operations to receive and prioritize tasks and distribute the workload.
There is a great need for a knowledge manager (KM) type position to manage the Log CROP,
handling the information flow, messages, RFI tracking, and other KM responsibilities. Finally,
the log operations director position appeared to be misaligned in this construct. This position
should be on a level with the plans and operations directors. Some recommendations follow:
Create a chief of support operations, who is directly responsible to the JTF commander for
joint logistics functions, which includes the planning and execution of engineer, medical,
personnel, chaplain, contracting, sustainment and transportation support to the JTF
Change the organization to include a log director (0-6) to manage overall logistics. Then
appoint a log operations director (0-5) to manage log operations and have a log plans officer
(0-5) to orchestrate logistics plans activities
It is thought that a logistics support group, led by the senior logistician could be formed to
consume the other services/functions overseen by the current J4, as well as to maintain
command focus on the sustainment/movement of the JTF warfighters
Finding The collaborative logistics board, center, cells, and working groups enhanced
the performance and situational awareness of all planners and operators across the joint
force.
Several key functional areas created their own collaborative cells and working groups to
increase situational awareness at all levels. The collaborative logistics board, center, cells, and
working groups enhanced the performance and situational awareness of all planners and
operators in the JTF, components, and the JLMC. The LARB was instrumental in the daily JTF
and component battle rhythm. Several key functional areas created their own collaborative cells
and working groups to increase situational awareness at all levels.

The LARB was designed as a cross-functional, multi-discipline forum. LARBs are

supposed to accomplish three things - share information of general interest to the logistics/
deployment/ sustainment support community; conduct logistics and deployment planning in
support ofETOs; and address more complex log and deployment issues, especially short-notice
(Ops-related) issues, or those that involve coordination between three or more LARB
constituents in the joint force. In MC02, the benefit of the LARB to the logistics community was
summarized in a quote.
"The LARB continues to be a great medium for logisticians to synchronize the logistics
on the battlefield," said the JTF log operations director. That sentiment was echoed by a
component logistician saying, "The LARB was the most important meeting of the day. "
The participants were surveyed to compare the perceptions of the LARB from Spiral 3
through execution and to see if the LARB continued to meet the needs of the membership. Table
42 below is a summary of their answers and shows a high level of satisfaction with the conduct
of the LARB in terms of products produced, the situational awareness gained, and the
contribution to their job daily.
Products produced were useful 96 percent 89 percent

Performance of tasks was enhanced 95 percent 96 percent
Level of trust in LARS was high among 91 percent 94 percent
players
Time in LARS was useful 96 percent 89 percent
Situational awareness was gained/ 96 percent 92 percent
increased
LARS contributed to the performance of 92 percent 81 percent
their job
The interval the LARS was held was 88 percent 89 percent
adequate
The mix of the participants was 91 percent 98 percent
adequate
* =Percentage of respondents agreeing with statement
Spiral 3 "n" = 20 from Log OPSIPLANS and JIMC
MC02 "n" = 46 from Log OPSIPLANS, JIMC, and SME
The biggest product of the LARB was the facilitation of communication between the
components (horizontal) and between the components, JTF, and the JLMC (vertical). This
resulted in better logistics planning, fewer logistics, and transportation related missteps, and
faster response to log problems among the logisticians.
The LARB provided very good logistics situational awareness, as well as involvement,
for all affected parties. Products, that were more tangible, were identified as the development of
the concept of support briefs, Class VII Replacement Reporting Procedures, and LARB minutes
that could be reviewed by all.
Several participants said there was too much staff coordination and discussion performed
in the LARB. Because no other working groups were established to lay the groundwork for
synchronization, the senior logistics officers have to hear and help action officers do their staff
428 FOR OFFICIA I I ISE ONLY

I
work. Lower level collaborative working groups needed to be established to develop options and
recommendations for senior officers prior to the LARB, they concluded.
The "products" the LARB provided were interpreted differently, but the following
comments summarize its meaning.
The LARB was considered very effective at enhancing the performance and completion
of the logistics tasks required by the JLMC, JTF, or component. At an after action review,
component representatives stated, the LARB was a very instrumental forum for enhancing their
performance. They reported this collaborative session increased their situational awareness of the
JTF's actions and helped resolved issues. A component log director said, "JLMC was a real force
multiplier-having a direct line through the LARB to the combatant commander J4 was terrific.
It also gave components confidence because they knew that their log issues were being worked
at the highest levels." A few participants mentioned that the LARB worked some issues that
were not logistic management issues. An example of this was deployment issues. The discussion
of deployment often got into force selection and priority for flow between a few players. The
LARB was not the place to solve these issues and eventually this subject was moved to a
collaborative deployment cell.
Other LARB suggestions:

The publishing ofLARB minutes and action items enhanced JTF, JLMC, and component
performance
The LARB agenda should present future JTF activities at 24,48, 72, and 96-hour points with
a projection of resources needed at these time points and a comparison with future
operations. Quad charts and / or synchronization matrixes were recommended
The engineer community noted that when their issues or plans needed to be approved, the
LARB served as a very good forum. However, they found the majority of the interactions
between the JTF, JLMC, and component / service level had to be worked in an "engineer
cell" they instituted. The medical community also had a "medical cell" for their day-to-day
Issues
How effective was your time in the LARB? This was one of the most discussed issues
during the spirals and execution and the answer depended upon where you were sitting. Most of
the JTF and component players indicated the sessions were not too long, because many issues
discussed affected them both directly and indirectly. However, the JTF leadership and the JLMC
thought the sessions were too long and often without direction.
One participant thought there was undue concern about the lengths of the meetings. "We
continually received pressure to 'speed up the meeting', as if shortness of the LARB was a
criteria for excellence," a logistics coordinator said. "This obviously isn't the case, since a five-
minute LARB that accomplishes nothing would not be 'excellent'. Instead, the LARB was
designed as a cross-functional, multi-discipline forum, and as such, there are liable to be any
number of issues raised that might not be of interest to 90 percent of the participants. Rushing
through the meeting is not the proper solution, but perhaps narrowing the participation in the
LARB is, if that is what is desired. But instead, the advantages of having a diverse group of
experts participating in the LARB is worth the possibility that LARB meetings will take a little
extra time," he concluded.
Many of the participants in a position to know, reported that the LARB got even better
when the logistics operations director instructed that operational issues (log operations) be

discussed early in the agenda before the plans issues. Most believed the timing and interval of
the LARB in the battle rhythm was effective. However, many indicated the LARB spent too
much time doing action officer coordination. They requested an action officer-working group
prior to the LARB to develop options for resolving issues, as well as, recommendations to the
log operations director and JLMC director. The logistics coordinator disagreed, stating, "It gets
away from the intent of the meeting, which is to provide a forum that goes both vertically and
horizontally across command lines and the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict."
The 'participant-mix' in the LARB was a subject of much debate. Comments from JTF
members were generally positive, such as 'the mix was excellent' and 'the experience base was
outstanding'. In addition, with the broad base of experience and skills, there always seemed to be
an expert in the LARB.
The logisticians at all levels indicated a need for the participation of the employment
planners in the LARB and deployment cell sessions, especially when planning. In addition, the
strategic lift and deployment planner should be in the plans cell and be integrated with the
employment planners to understand the lift restraints and constraints of an operation.
Deployment is an operator requirement, but logisticians have been doing it for years. But,
while only the operators know what combat power they need to satisfy a mission, it's the
logisticians, who know what is needed to support those forces selected. It must be a team effort
to insure the right combat/support forces are selected to get the job done.
Another participant said deployment is not a LARB function and should be done in the
JPC.
Some valuable LARB recommendations were received through comments and after
action reviews. Comments included the following:
Change the name of the LARB to the 'logistics coordination board'
Log plans should be using ajoint logistics coordination board to coordinate with the
combatant commander and the components during planning
The LARB should be the log operations group forum to resolve real time logistics
issues/shortfalls
The LARB membership is about right, as is the interval the LARB met. The interval is based
on a 12-hour experiment day, not a 24-hour experiment day
Joint rear area coordinator (JRAC) representative should be added as a core member
The medical planner should remain as a core member and consideration should be given to
add an engineer planner as a core member
A separate collaborative logistics cell called the deployment cell developed and matured
during MC02. It was established to discuss movement and deployment, TPFDD, and
transportation concerns. The key participants included: JLMC log planner, JLMC movement
officer, log plans officer, log coordinator, deployment / transportation planner, log operations
movement officer, and component log planners. This cell should involve, and be subordinate to
the 'core' operational JPC planners whose input is needed for force movement decisions. The
deployment cell was very useful for developing the TPFDD and working the strategic
deployment / lift / movement issues. Finally, it is recommended the deployment cell be codified
in the SJFHQ concept.
Future guidelines were proposed by MC02 participants to define the deployment cell's
responsibilities. Two such guidelines included keeping operators involved in the process as
planning progresses and that the deployment cell should meet daily, with attendance required by

ALCON until the TPFDD was complete; then, personnel could attend on an "as needed" basis.
Deployment cell issues to address would include:
Movement prioritization
Force selection for EBO
Selection/prioritization for theater lift
The cell leadership would be ready to address "how to do" theater lift
Identify common-user airlift assets
Appoint executive agents
Schedule and prioritize
Table 43: Recommended Deployment/Redeployment Cell membership:
Deployment Planner Transportation Ops JFACC

Strategic Lift Planner JTF Movement Off
DIRMOBFOR/AMD DIRMOBFOR/AMD JFLCC
Log OPS Director Log OPS Director
JLMC Strategic Movement JLMC Strategic Movement
Operator (Plans Group) Operator (Plans Group) JFMCC
Plans Director JOC Chief
The second, collaborative logistics cell created was the engineer cell. It was established
because the LARB did not provide the medium to resolve all complex, sophisticated engineer
issues. Additionally, the participation in the LARB did not facilitate coordination of engineering
support to ETO planning and current operations. As the operation got underway, interaction with
the engineers increased, to include information on beddown at ISBs. The engineers used this
forum to generate alternative engineer recommendations and actions. The collaborative
discussions were helpful in generating recommendations or actions. The functionally coordinated
issues or recommendations could then be brought to the LARB for action. This cell provided
several valuable recommendations to be considered for future experiments.
Finally, a third collaborative cell established was the medical cell. This cell met daily in
the JTF operations/command/support/medical room. The participants were the JTF medical staff
in the command / operations / plans groups; Service components; JLMC, and the JECG (onsite
and offsite). The purpose of their meetings was to discuss medical issues that may have an
impact on the warfighter. Topics included medical surveillance (e.g. Tularemia outbreak),
casualty evacuation process, and medical concept of support from the Service components. The
information shared within this collaborative environment was taken back to the medical planners
and operators for their actions and inclusion into the warfighting plans/operations.
Overall, the logistics boards, centers, cells and working groups operated as envisioned in
the TTP and JSOP. Figure 259 summarizes the participation and status of the members in their
assigned boards, center, cells, or working group.
In the first bar of the graph in the chart, JTF logistics personnel responded positively to
the question, 'Is your participation in a virtual board, center, or cell, in accordance with
applicable TTPs and SOPs?' Over 75 percent of the JTF clearly understood their role in a
collaborative session. A majority of the "no" responses were from assessors and the JLMC.

In the second bar of the graph, JTF logistics personnel responded to the question, 'During
Me02, has your participation status (active / inactive / other) changed in any board, centers,
cells or work groups? Ifyes, what was the change?' Ninety two percent of the logisticians state
they did not have an assignment change, indicating the assignment of personnel to the various
collaborative sessions was about right. Three JTF players changed status when they were no
longer required to monitor an effects assessment cell.
Finding Logistics decision support tools provided to the JLMC, JTF, and components
enhanced planning and decision-making.
Several logistics tools were
provided to the JLMC, the JTF,
Logistics Collaborative BCC
and the components to enhance
planning and decision-making in
100%
the determination the logistics
feasibility of operational actions. 80%
GCSS provided a user-friendly 60%
access to logistics information
40%
I_Yes I
over a broad spectrum of sources; DNo
however, many times it lacked 20%

detailed information from its 0%
queries and drove the "miners" of lAW JSOP Status Change
information to use the actual
sources. Fortunately, these sources
were available via GCSS links. Figure 259: Over 75 percent of the JTF players clearly
Most believed these were powerful understood their role in attending the appropriate collaborative
session
tools and certainly the way ahead
for logistics. However, most of the joint logistics tools required training that is more extensive.
Additionally, one limitation of both GCSS and JOPES was the need for a SIPRNET PKI
certification. The individuals that used these systems were required to obtain the PKI from their
respective Service or command. Some Services were not prepared to do this PKI certification
prior to the experiment and this limited the number of people that could access the tools. A
second limitation was each individual system in the GCSS suite and the logistics Tool suite
required a separate password, which could be a big drawback if required to use several of these
tools.
In summary:
Global Transportation Network Exercise System (GES)
Value:
GES provided the JTF the ability to pull the air and sea movement schedules,
and allowed the posting of data to the Log CROP for all to see. It also proved
to be useful for tracking movements and providing APOD/SPOD summary
data. The program should continue to be developed for future exercises.
Problems:
The system was down a lot. The participants did not like the fact that GES did
not match JOPES and was unable to support TPFDD changes as they
occurred.

Joint Operations Planning and execution System (JOPES)

Value:
- M C02 proved the need for a reali sti c TPFDD in joint exerci ses. The joint
training gained during the experiment was invaluable in improving the joint
deployment process.
- JOPES ADP procedures are still the best method for handling the force
deployment issues.
Problems:
- Working with an operational TPFDD was problematic because certain forces
and equipment was selected for movement at the end of Spiral 3. These forces
were being moved by the M&S prior to execution and the experiment actually
began in D+ 16. Neither the components nor the JTF could change those
movements prior to execution. Once execution began and retasking was
required, it had become quite evident that JOPES was just not the flexible tool
required for this fast paced, crisis action planning environment.
- The 96-hour validation window was not an M&S effect employed to
reposition aircraft.
- Additionally, JOPES skilled personnel were in short supply for the
experiment and there is a need to continue training for this skill.
- JTF personnel needed access to manager's tools, displays, and query
functions in JOPES. Online JF AST capability would have been helpful as
well.
Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV)

Value:
- JTF sustainment used JTAV exclusively to determine asset position and
availabili ty.
- JTAV was very useful for MC02 planning, particularly for the analysis of
prepositioned and munitions.
Problems:
- The system could be more user friendly.
- It is a real world system and was not useful in the experiment operations
because its experiment inventories did not exist.
- JTF sustainment could not get total asset visibility with this tool.
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)

Value:
- Very useful, basic infrastructure information to aid in beddown assessments
- The site was easy to navigate and a great resource for operational planners.
- Provided pictures of aerial ports and seaports making it easier to discuss and
determine capabilities at certain areas.
Port and Airfield Collaborative Environment (PACE)

Value:
- It provided good visibility on capacity and capability of potential APOD and
SPOD locations.

- It provided very good imagery and was a useful tool.

- It is more user friendly than NIMA.
Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JF AST)

Value:
- USTRANSCOM supported MC02 strategic (inter-theater) and tactical (intra-
theater) airlift scheduling requirements by using JF AST. JF AST was used to
develop TPFDD-based schedules that were fed to the Global Decision Support
System for simulated execution. The USTC team provided tremendous
support with JF AST and realistic assessments of recommended courses of
action.
- The JTF planners found the JF AST products very helpful for TPFDD
assessments. MC02 was resourced where JF AST was only available at the
JLMC level. Because JF AST is a PC-based application, it could be made
available to all levels of planners, with training required.
- The log operations personnel made use of the CROP to display the JFAST
output depicting estimated transportation closure for air and sea schedules
based on the specific criteria used to develop the schedules. They displayed
current movements plus 24 hours by ULN.
Problems:
- The JTF players requested access to the program, but did not receive it.
- JF AST operators were assigned at the JLMC level, but did not provide the
needed products to log plans.
Sustainment Generator (SUSGEN)

Value:
- SUSGEN was intended to run a sustainment review and build applicable
sustainment packages to apply to the TPFDD after the locking of the Spiral 3
TPFDD. The extended deployment planning precluded the use of planning
this sustainment.
Problems:
- The program is a part of JFAST and was only available (by exercise design)
at the JLMC level. With JF AST being a PC based application, it could be
made available to planners at all levels-training was required.
Integrated Consumable Item (lCIS)

Value:
- ICIS is a must-have tool for petroleum logistics planners from the JTF's
service components all the way through the combatant commander's JPO and
DESC headquarters. The program takes TPFDD data and computes
consumption factors for all troop locations. It was a very useful tool.
Problems:
- The program was available to all the users requesting access and those that
did have the program got it late in the experiment. The JLMC had the most
exposure to the program.

- Future work to make ICIS more user friendly is necessary for the more
novice petroleum personnel that may be assigned to the JTF or Service
component headquarters.
Joint Force Capability Register (JFCR)

See Assessment Area 2 for details on the JFCR.
Capability Assessment (CA)

The capability assessment tool saw very limited use in the experiment. It was deemed to
be user-friendly and flexible and provide good capabilities.
Joint Electronic Battlebook (JEB)

JEB also saw very limited use in the experiment. A good tool, but the database needs to
be expanded to all military units.
Sustainment Visibility (SV)

SV also got very limited use in the experiment. It was used by the JTF for sustainment
information and was valuable as a back up tool to JTAV.
Force Browser (FB)

FB was used to analyze the contents of the TPFDD as it developed. It was viewed as one
of the most popular of the JL tools.
Other Observations
"Rapid, collaborative and dynamic planning and execution have reinforced and
highlighted the need for improvements in our processes, procedures and philosophy toward the
inter-related and inseparable functions of force deployment, employment and sustainment," said
one senior concept developer.
One emerging insight from the experiment was that rear area operations could no longer
be considered an economy of force operation. Force protection and force projection were areas
that needed to be refined in the assured access concept, according to senior mentors and senior
participants. It was noted that the JFLCC commander assumed the oversight role for joint rear
area operations in the experiment, but the cell that was established had to come out of the JFLCC
staff resources.
The JFLCC commander was well aware that his staff wasn't structured to support the
force protection mission. "With regard to force protection, as the JRAC, I recognized I was not
structured to do that," the commander said. "We built the JRAC and small staff out of hide. We
all recognize the rear area goes back to CONUS. But in future JTF's, we should think about a
functional component that has the resources and the people and not treat JRAC as an
afterthought," he said. Although the JFLCC was able to accomplish the mission of maintaining
security of the force, future experiments/ missions needs to be resourced appropriately.
Two recommendations were presented from the senior concept developers and the senior
participants for the MC02 Interim Report. First, begin an assured access concept that
encompasses force protection, employment, deployment, and sustainment from the continental
United States to the joint operations area. Second, revise joint doctrine on the essential elements
and roles and responsibilities of j oint rear area operations.

A second observation was that the experiment's ONA knowledge base did not include
Blue force logistics data or information. All of their logistical support data and planning
information was available from the Log CROP. The Log CROP was not accessed through the
ONA knowledge base; it had a separate portal page on the common experiment server. This was
contrary to the ONA concept's suggestion for an integrated intelligence, operational, and
logistics information warehouse that supported effects-based planning and ultimately produced
an effects tasking order. The suggested relationship was intended to allow routine interaction
between the three specialties that would also produce more efficient and effective use of
resources. Implementation of the logistic portion of the ONA knowledge base requires further
definition.

Assessment Area 11 impacted several other experimental concepts and assessment areas.
The ones affected are discussed below.
SJFHQ
- Functions of personnel in log operations and log plans positions in SJFHQ
ONA
- Database research for facilities and infrastructure to support logistics operations in JOA
EBO
- Develop logistics concept of support for Effects-Based Operation(s) and future branches and
sequels. Execute logistics operations to sustain forces conducting effects-based operations
Sustainment

and sustainment, horizontally and vertically as in the LARB
Interagency Agency
assistance
JISR
Joint Initiatives
- Introduction and experimentation of new joint logistics tools
Assured Access


The JTLM warfighting challenge relates the performances described for three UJTL tasks
in the baseline report
- UJTL Task: OP 1. I-Conduct Operational Movement. The deployment branch was not manned
to handle assigned responsibilities and the branch staff did not have relevant experience or
technical expertise
-MC02 Observation: When MC02 began there was no structured deployment branch of the JTF.
As the experiment evolved, a deployment room was established in the collaborative system to
coordinate deployment issues. This proved to be very effective
- UJTL Task: OP 4. I-Coordinate Supply of Arms, Munitions, and Equipment in the JOA. The J-
4 was not able to adequately track key trigger points throughout the operation, or monitor major
changes during the campaign
- MC02 Observation: There were no predictive tools in the experiment to provide trigger points
- UJTL Task: OP 4.4-Coordinate Support for Forces in the JOA. The JTF requested and received
directive authority for logistics, enabling the JTF to direct or assign common user items and
services to specific components. The resulting continuous flow of support was crucial to mission
accomplishment
- MC02 Observation: A combination of logistics support options, including directive authority

for logistics, was used in MC02 proved to be adequate
DOTMLPF Linkage
- Organization. The logistics personnel embedded in the groups were successful and increased
the situational awareness for all players. A support operations group was recommended, as well,
for further evaluation that integrates all logistics and support functions under a single director
equivalent to the group directors. Additional research is required to determine if engineer or
medical positions are needed in the SJFHQ. There is a need for ajoint movement center to
maintain visibility over cargo and assets. A deployment cell is needed in the JPC to correctly
handle priority of forces and cargo in the TPFDD.
- Training. In-depth training is required for future leaders in conduct planning and operations in a
CIE. Wide spread training in JOPES and its products is needed for logistics and operations
personnel
Recommendations
1. JLTC, continue to refine the roles and responsibilities of the JLMC positions in the
deployment and sustainment TTP and JSOP in future LOEs. ~
2. JLTC, in future LOEs and work shops, investigate the roles and responsibilities for a JTF
support operations group that integrates all logistics and support functions under a single director
equivalent to the plans and operations group directors. ~

- A change to the SJFHQ organization that elevates the senior logistician (0-6) to log director for
overall management oflogistics and create an 0-5, log operations director to manage log
operations and an 0-5 log plans officer to orchestrate logistics plans activities.
3. JFCOMlSJFHQ, consider a logistics battle rhythm change that establishes a lower level
(action officer) collaborative working group to develop options and recommendations for senior
officers prior to the LARB. ~
- The engineer and medical functional areas continue to establish collaborative cells to address
their detailed planning and resourcing issues prior to raising issues to the LARB.
- Change the name of the LARB to the logistics coordination board (LCB).
- Change the LARB agenda to present data points in 24,48, 72, and 96-hour increments to show
the projection and status of resources necessary to meet future operations (branch and sequels).
This should show a status of resources not a status of airflow.
- A deployment cell be codified in the SJFHQ concept, TTP and JSOP with guidelines, structure
and membership and added to the JPC to ensure the priority of forces and cargo flow is correct.
Table 44: Operations and Plans Groups logistics positions
I RecommendedPositionfSkilI togPlans I [ogOPS IJTFPlug

Deployment Planner - Sealift Experience X X
Transportation Plans Officer X X
Log Director X
Log OPS Director - 05 X X
Log Plans Director - 05 X X
Joint Movement Center (JMC) - Air
X
Expertise
JMC - Sea Expertise X
JMC - Land & Helicopter Expertise X
Knowledge Manager X X
DLA Contingency Team X
Personnel Planner X
Medical Planner / Logistician X
Engineer X
Note: The JTF participants identified the positions and skills shown in table 44 above during MC02
execution. Most of these positions are identified as JTF plugs to fill out the JTF and can be placed in log
plans or log operations as required by the Log Director. The skill sets and positions indicated in Log
operations and log plans should be revisited and refined by the SJFHQ (P).
4. JFCOMlJLTC, improve logistics decision support tools and logistics tools to meet the agility
demands of RDO. ~
- DLA should modify JTAV so that it can be tied to an experiment inventory or a database.
- Refine JOPES procedures to be changed to meet the agility demands ofRDO.
- Refine JOPES processes to speed the entry and validation of TPFDD changes.
- Combatant commanders and Services should ensure that trained JOPES operators are available

at all levels.
- Combatant commands and Services should streamline the PKI certification process.
5. JFCOM, develop an assured access concept to encompass force protection, employment,

deployment and sustainment from the continental United States to the joint operations area. ~
6. JFCOM, review joint doctrine regarding the essential elements and roles and responsibilities
of j oint rear area operati ons. ~
7. JFCOM, experiment with a CONOPS specifically targeting j oint rear area operations. ~

Figure 260: Special Forces operations at sea in support of Millennium Challenge 2002

Assessment Area 12 - Joint Initiatives

The MC02 joint initiatives process was established to provide a systematic, objective
review and evaluation of proposed joint initiatives in experimentation from the various
governmental and service sponsored proposals. The process provided a multi-level review of
initiatives with command-wide involvement supplemented by interagency and service
representation. The initiative approval process objectively compared each proposed initiative to
the overall experiment objectives as well as applicability to the joint environment. Additionally,
the process provided continuous tracking and addressing of associated issues throughout
preparation for the event. The joint initiatives process provided a two-way communication
between the individual initiative sponsors and the MC02 Experiment planning and integration
teams.
The review process provided for three examination sessions with each being
progressively more detailed and requiring higher-level endorsement for proceeding. Phase 1 was
the initial review by subject matter experts from the functional and experimentation communities
that screened submissions against Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) objectives and MC02 joint
environment objectives. As part of Phase 2, a "Council of Colonels" was formed to review the
recommendation of the operational/technical panels and forward its findings to the third stage
(Phase 3) - a general officer/flag officer panel.
Many service proposed initiatives were not approved for joint integration due to their
singular, service-oriented nature. This prototype initiative process is planned for use in future
major experiments to ensure a standard and formal procedure exists for vetting new ideas and
technologies into the joint experimentation process. The joint initiatives are discussed in detail in
Annex K of this report.
The 20 joint experimentation initiatives are:
1 - Collaboration Tool Suite (InfoWorkSpace 2.5 (IWS 2.5))

2 - Global C2 System - Integrated Intelligence and Imagery (GCCS-B)
3 - Joint ISR Management Tools (nSR Tools)
4 - ONA Tool Suite
5 - Logistics Tools Suite (LTS)
6 - Theater Medical Integration Planning - Joint (TMIP-J)
FOR OFFICIl'"L USE ONLY 441

7 - Joint Fires Initiative (Automated Deep Operations Coordination System) (JFI ADOCS)
8 - Automatic Network Information Flow (ANIF)
9 - Network Security Management Correlation & Display (NSMC&D)
10 - Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System-Near Term (JEMPRS-NT)
11 - Maneuver Control System-Tactical Combat Operations (MCS-TCO)
12 - Global Strike Task Force (GSTF)
13 - Joint Public Affairs Ops Group (JPAOG)
14 - National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) Initiative
15 - Command and Control for Space, Information Operations Forces (C2 for Space, 10
Forces)
16 - Unmanned Sensor Support to Special Reconnaissance (US Support to SR)
17 - JSOTF reach-back/Special Operations Mission Planning Environment (SOMPE)
18 - Joint Automated Target Folders (JATF)
19 - Joint Automated Single Guard Solution (JASGS)
20 - Joint Special Technology Operations (STO)
Near Term Fieldable Technologies

Some of the joint technical initiatives submitted for participation in MC02 were identified
as having near-term fielding potential in the course of the j oint initiatives vetting process
conducted by USJFCOM. These technologies were those that supported MC02 objectives and
upon fielding, could begin the process of transformation toward MC02 long-term goals. These
technologies truly defined a unique MC02 product: near term fieldable technologies (NTFT).
There were six of these technologies: Joint En-route Mission Planning and Rehearsal
System, Near Term (JEMPRS-NT), Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
(ADOCS), Maneuver Control System-Tactical Combat Operations (MCS-TCO) interface,
Automated Network Information Flow (ANIF), Network Security Management Correlation and
Display (NSM C&D), and Joint Automated Single Guard Solution (JASGS)/Interdomain
Transfer System (ITS). JEMPRS-NT, ADOCS, ITS and MCS-TCO were assessed during the
course of the MC02 spirals and in the execution event itself using the USJFCOM Joint C41SR
Battle Center (JBC) assessment process. ANIF, NSM C&D, and JASGS were assessed by the
JBC just prior to MC02 initiative selection. ANIF was integrated into the MC02 infrastructure
along with NSM C&D and ITS, while JASGS was demonstrated in stand-alone mode. All of
these technologies were recommended for near-term fielding with DOTMLPF packages prepared
and submitted to USJFCOMjoint interoperability and integration (JI&I) for presentation to the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
The assessment results for these technologies are summarized in the near-term fieldable
technologies annex, along with the full report of the JBC MC02 Task Force that did the
preliminary analysis and technical maturity/feasibility assessment on all of the joint initiative
submissions in support of the USJFCOMjoint initiative vetting process.
442 FOR OFFICIl'",L lISE ONLY

Assessment Area 13 - Joint Intelligence~ Surveillance~ and

Reconnaissance (JISR)
The JISR concept displayed great potential, but requires further development and
experimentation. This was significant given that the concept and the supporting tools were
considered relatively immature. They had not undergone any
previous experimentation. There were areas where JISR clearly
and significantly improved the JTF performance, but its
effectiveness in others could not be adequately measured. The
concept should be more fully developed and given increased
scrutiny in a limited objective experiment.
Methodology
More than 196 experiment participants selected by their
duty positions in relation to the JISR concept evaluated JISR
via survey. The participants received a series of 48 questions
for evaluation. In addition to the questionnaires, other sources
evaluated the utility of JISR. Subject matter experts reported on
the performance of JISR on a daily basis. Senior concept
developers discussed JISR and provided comments. Experiment
participants submitted observations and recommendations, 36
comments were collected. Technical collection to assess the use
of the ISR Database was included in the collection plan.
Difficulties arose that prevented proper analysis of the
complete JISR concept process. The task of information
collection and some subsequent tasks could not be assessed due
to the modeling and simulations environment not providing the
ISR data at the level needed or in the formats required. Just days into the experiment, a 51-page
document on work-a-rounds had to be published to keep MC02 running.
The planning aspect of the JISR concept could not be conclusively determined to be the
cause for the improvement in reaction to emergent targeting, reaction to emergent information
requirements, and planning because of the large number ofISR assets provided in the scenario.
Senior concept developers, JECG personnel, and participants agreed that the scenario was
excessively ISR asset-rich.
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to provide relevant intelligence to the commander

Task: Plan and direct ISR operations
Subtask: Link collaborative planning and execution
Subtask: Apply JISR management
Subtask: Synchronize operations and ISR
Task: Collect information
Task: Exploit information
Subheading: Improve reaction to emergent targeting
Subheading: Improve reaction to emergent information requirements

Task: Produce operational intelligence

Task: Disseminate operational intelligence
Finding JISR improved integration of ISR with operations.

In surveys to the members of the Joint Operations Center, the Joint Task Force and the
component commands, over 80
percent of those expressing an ISRlOperations Synchronization
opinion, agreed that there was
improved synchronization due to 90%
80%
JISR (See Figure 261).
70%
"There was mutual sharing
60%
of information," said one
~u 50%
participant. "Collection for ~ 40%
c..
planned operations and TST 30%
events appeared to be well 20%
synched," according to another. 10%
"JISR was seated directly behind 0%
the BWC and provided a Agree Disagree

n= 48/30
comprehensive, accurate and
precise picture to the BWC. JISR Figure 261: ISR and operations were synchronized
fed directly into JFE and NFN-EX,
and, as a result, both of those initiatives were very effective."
Finding JISR improved ISR support to operations.

Again, this data comes from members of the JOC, from the JTF and components. Over
90 percent of those expressing
opinions and over 70 percent JISR Enhanced Support to On"'r"'TI"~ J/SR enhanced
overall agreed that JISR had supporl to Ops!
100%
increased ISR support to 90%
operations (See Figure 262). One 80%
member of the JOC commented 70%
that while the JISR worked well, C 60%
the model lacked the necessary ~ 50%

8. 40%
fidelity to produce meaningful 30%
intelligence information. While 20%
10%
two others noted, "Coverage was 0%
wonderful. JISR is invaluable in Agree Disagree
n= 47/30
providing the detection and
tracking of TCTs." Figure 262: JISR enhanced operations
Finding Collaboration was the key to JISR's successes and performance.

Three-fourths of the JISE personnel with an opinion thought that interactive multiple
intelligence source collaboration was effective. JISR collaboration aided in the answering of
urgent information, according to more than 80 percent of JTF and component personnel selected
from the JOC that expressed opinions (See Figure 263). Additionally, it was declared that JISR

collaboration enabled targeting, according to over 75 percent of those expressing an opinion

agreed.
Seventy percent of those
JISR Collaboration was Effective
in the Joint Collection
Management Center (JCMC) 90%
indicated that nSR collaboration 80%
was effective. This number grew 70%
to 81 percent by August 6. 60%
However, the number of ISR

assets available makes it unclear
whether the concept or the 20%
number of assets caused this to 10%
occur. 0%
The JCMC personnel Agree Disagree

n= 40/40
initially did not consider nSR
collaboration efficient-60 Figure 263: JISR collaboration was effective
percent concluded (See Figure
264). The vote changed, however, to 60 percent agreement later in the experiment. The swing
probably reflects the learning curve with the tools considering the large number of new,
inexperienced personnel that had not participated in earlier Spirals.
There was great confidence in the CIE tools by participants. This was best expressed by a
participant when he was looking at a manning problem and stated, "We need additional
personnel, but may not necessarily
need them at the JTF. If! have JISR Collaboration was Efficie
reach-back to a [Theater] J2 staff
70%
and nc, much or what I need can
60%
get accomplished in the rear."
50%
Finding A lack of collection ~ 40%

C.J
management experience :uc.. 30%
detracted from JISR 20%

integration. 10%
0%
Almost 70 percent of
Agree Disagree
participants said that additional
training in the collection
Figure 264: JISR collaboration efficiency improved over the
management discipline and on the course of the experiment
nSR concept was required due to a
lack of background, service education, or failure to attend previous MC02 training.
An Air Force player considered 'training' a Service problem that needs resolution,
"Speaking from an Air Force and AOC perspective, collection managers require highly-
specialized training. The growing complexity of ISR assets and enemy capabilities demands that
we should be given advanced training," he said, adding, "it is a severe oversight that the Air
Force doesn't have a collection management training course to train its collection managers to
use AF ISR platforms, let alone a career path."
Many others considered skill sets, education, and lack of prior attendance a detriment.
One participant said that since Spiral 3, his group had a large turnover, "66 percent of my group

were new players. Many of the MC02 execution JISR players were not here for Spiral 3 and had
zero exposure to concepts or tools. I had to train two officers at the JTF JOC."
"Many component players needed instruction on IWS, JISR-M, SPPS, and ADOCS DTL
were some subject areas," said another.
Finding Tool functionality as emulated did not support the JISR concept.
Software tools, for manipulating the JISR, was the subject of widest discussion among
experiment participants. In general, the participants saw the need for a more user friendly, more
functional, and comprehensive tool suite. As described in figure 265 below, by the end of the
experiment, 90 percent of the JCMC personnel surveyed agreed that additional tools or tool
functionalities were required.
Said one, "In order to perform effective JISR, we desperately need a suite of advanced
collection tools. The JISR process, as envisioned, does not have any tools that support it. The
process is way ahead of the system
development timeline." Additional Tool Functionality Required
One participant provided a
100%
shopping list, "we need comprehensive, 90%
flexible visualization tools that show 80%
70%
tracks, swaths, targets, coverage, and 1: 60%
Qj
accesses. We need a tool that will take 50%
~ 40%
Co
multiple inputs (submissions), fuse 30%
them, and provide optimization, de- 20%
10%
confliction, and synchronization 0%
options." Agree Disagree
General, negative comments

included: Figure 265: Most agreed that additional tool functionality
was required
"JISR tools were horrible--essentially
JISR was the 'Pong' of available ISR tools, they provided no value to the JISR process"
"JISR visualization capability does not exist. Collection management tools were insufficient"
The same comments came from the senior concept developers and were also less than
complimentary.
"The tools were inadequate in their ability to demonstrate planned ISR activity with that
which was actually flown," said one. Others complained of poor displays, inability to work with
ADOCS and TBMCS. Lastly, a participant noted that the collection manager had to resort to
using an EXCEL spreadsheet because the tools were either unsatisfactory or not available to
meet his needs.
Finding No clear defining system to establish priorities was available to Collection

Management
Confusion as to what the priorities were for collection caused problems determining the
collection focus. We asked participants if priority intelligence requirements (PIR) were the
priority for collection. We also asked if effects were the priority for collection. Initially, 70
percent of participants agreed with effects and 65 percent agreed with PIR. When asked again a
few days before the end of the exercise, these numbers had both dropped. Effects were down to

60 percent agreeing with an increase in "don't know" responses. PIR was down to 58 percent
with an increase in "disagree" responses (See Figure 266).
The uncertainty is demonstrated by a comment from an exercise participant who said, "it
was very difficult for our analysts
Collection Priority
and others to consistently link
their requirements to effects-in 80%
most cases it was left to the 70%
collection managers to pair 60%
targets to effects. We did the best 'E 50%
we could with what we were ~ 40%
given." CIl
c.. 30%
Another noted that he had 20%
problems with the process as it 10%
was employed saying, "I do not 0%
think it is possible to make a Agree Disagree Don't Know
n= 40/40/40/40
good collection plan based on the
PEL alone; no I&W." He added, Figure 266: Collection priorities weren't clear
"I do think it should be possible
to make a solid plan based on the PIRs, SIRs, and IRs because they should encompass the PEL
and the I&W deck. I also think the PIRs should be prioritized-III CORPS treats them as all
equal. You can't prioritize based on all equal and when your PIRs are really broad, you'll end up
with an incredibly large deck of all PRI 1s."
Others said that a more clear relationship was needed between PIRs and the PEL and how
they affected the collection plan. They also suggested that the commander needed to settle on
which was to be the foundation for establishing priorities. "I struggled with the linkage between
the CJTF priority intelligence requirements, verbal guidance, and the PEL," the JTF collection
manager stated.
The key ISR SME said, "The commander is changing priorities on the fly, and
intelligence is making adjustments." The senior concept developers noted during the experiment
that, "JTF ISR staff right now is frustrated attempting to apply ISR capability against
requirements devoid of a broader context. The PEL is not a sequenced prioritization. The
prioritization must take into account sequencing and the enabling effects, in order to reach the
higher effect/objectives."
Other Observations
Observation 1: All ISR personnel should be assigned to the Information Superiority group.
This was illustrated in the August 9 JTF JISR after action review. The panelist identified
the break-up between operations ISR and the ISG as a significant problem. There was an
inability to get feedback from operations even though there were tremendous accolades from the
group with regard the performance of operations ISR in TST and dynamic re-tasking. It was a
violation of the unity of effort and command principle, in the panel's opinion, to have this
position reacting to operations rather than the ISG. There had been a similar problem with plans,
but the ISG had managed to pull the position and make it an ISG ISR planner working in plans.
ISR personnel deemed this a major success. The ISR planner remarked, "By splitting the team
into two sections, we degraded our collection efficiency," he said, "something that was not

readily apparent because of the breadth and depth of collection capability, and the inadequacy of
the simulation drivers."
The issue came up again in the August 12 ISG after action review. The group thought
that the intelligence personnel in plans and operations should be ISG personnel. This would
allow these personnel to have reach-back and provide the ISG essential feedback to keep
intelligence synchronized between the three groups. The panelists also noted that the Blue-Red
cell should be in the ISG, as it was producing intelligence documents and was relying on
intelligence personnel in plans to support them. An ISG member pointed out that the Blue-Red
cell role is actually a traditional intelligence role in the Army.

- Collaboration was the maj or factor in the success of JISR, according to many of those
providing experiment comments, and that provides links to Assessment Area 9, the CIE. EBO's
lack of definition with regard to its position in the hierarchy of planning caused confusion on
collection priorities. There are indications that there needs to be an increase in ISR personnel in
the SJFHQ

- Baseline entry: Intelligence collection requirements should drive national and theater posture
and focus, as well as tactical assets that belong to the JTF
- MC02 observation: The JISR concept utilizing a joint collection management cell brought all
information requirements, tactical to theater, together for tasking determination
- Baseline entry: A collection manager, with direct interface with the theater is essential.
Functions that collection managers are responsible for must include collection planning for all
requirements, collection tasking, and synchronization
- MC02 observation: The joint collection management cell brought all collection managers from
component to theater, together for collection planning, tasking and synchronization
- Baseline entry: Well-planned and orchestrated collection management is one of the keys to the
success of intelligence support of operations. The theater collection management plan must be
completed and disseminated
component to theater, together for collection planning, tasking and synchronization. This drove
the requirement for dissemination of collection plans horizontally and vertically in a timely
manner
- Baseline entry: The planning cells should contain representation from all components to better
provide a complete analysis of the situation

component to theater, together for collection planning, tasking and synchronization
- Baseline entry The JTF must ensure that procedures are in effect to provide intelligence
information to the personnel that require that information
- MC02 observation: Over 90 percent of those expressing opinions and over 70 percent overall
agreed that JISR had increased ISR support to operations. Comments included, "Coverage was
wonderful. JISR is invaluable in providing the detection and tracking of TCTs"
DOTMLPF Linkage
- It is anticipated that the results from this assessment area will influence the development of a
future JISR DOTMLPF package
Recommendations
1. JFCOM, make the emulated tools user-friendlier with increased functionality. ~
2. JFCOM, conduct a limited objective experiment in an ISR asset constrained environment with
modeling and simulations that adequately supports a continuing series of ISR experiments. ~
3. JFCOM/SJFHQ, move all ISR personnel to the IS group. ~

(This Page Blank)

Chapter 8 - Summary and Conclusions

Based on the analysis from a series of experiments culminating in Millennium Challenge
and previous national level guidance, we feel our efforts are on track. We believe that many of
the RDO enabling tools we advocated and examined in MC02 - effects-based philosophy,
Operational Net Assessment, Standing Joint Force Headquarters, Collaborative Information
Environment, and enhanced interagency collaboration - have relevance across the range of
political-military-economic operations, including homeland defense and anti-terrorism, as well
as to major theater war and SSCs. Several war games, seminars, and experiments culminated in
Millennium Challenge 2002, which spotlighted RDO in this decade. The future includes the
Olympic Path series, which will focus on implementing the SJFHQ and the Pinnacle Path series,
which will transition RDO into a broader joint warfighting concept and investigate our ability to
execute this concept in the next decade.
However, we cannot afford to wait until our long-term plan is accomplished to begin
making important recommendations to our political and military leaders. In fact, field
commanders are using some ofUSJFCOM's basic concepts even as they are being refined.
Nevertheless, we are not satisfied with the status quo. We expect to further refine what is now in
experimentation, and make both near- and long-term recommendations for even more innovative
ways to transform the U.S. Armed Forces for operations in a chaotic world.
We are facing a new environment where adaptive adversaries have learned to avoid our
strengths, anticipate our well publicized moves and to challenge us asymmetrically with means
such as terrorism, cyber warfare, advanced surface to air missiles, anti-space weapons, WME,
and WMD. RDO responds to these challenges by providing a conceptual vision of a transformed
way of operating - one that emphasizes superior knowledge and integrates all instruments of
our national power.
The RDO Concept is a smart way to think about j oint warfare regardless of the strategic
environment in which we operate and the threats we face. The concept described here, exercised,
and experimented with in MC02, is an evolving construct for conducting RDO in a high-end
SSC in the next decade. It is a vehicle for transforming "Jointness" and for realizing the JV 2020
vision. It provides a joint context for Service experimentation efforts. Concepts and doctrine
drive organization, which should, in turn, drive the development and acquisition of combat,
support, and lift systems and platforms.
The development of an effective capability for future joint operations is a journey rather
than a discrete objective and Millennium Challenge was a step taken down that road. There is
now a limited capability to conduct RDO. Improvements in doctrine, training, and organizations,
as documented in MC02, will further improve the speed and effectiveness ofRDO and expand
the scenario sets in which it can be achieved. The establishment of an experimental standing joint
command and control element is the next initiative to help realize joint force transformation.
Development of collaborative planning tools and a functional CROP, as well as enhanced ISR
and a truly integrated and accessible intelligence system, will significantly enhance decision
superiority. Strategic mobility concepts, such as "ready off the ramp," and new deployment
means, will enhance rapid force deployment. These and other joint and Service technologies,
processes and concepts, will enhance RDO as they come on line.
Our experimentation efforts to date and the version of the RDO Concept demonstrated in
MC02 focused on a high-end SSC. Future versions of this concept will move toward ajoint

warfighting concept applicable to the entire range of joint operations. Millennium Challenge has
played out its role injoint transformation.
Figure 267: NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE, Nev. (AFIE) -- An F-117 Stealth Fighter flies over the Nevada desert Aug. 6
during Millennium Challenge 2002.
++++

Annex A - Glossary/Acronyms
These definitions are taken from Joint Pub 1-02, various USJFCOM J9 Experimentation
Directorate concept papers, and other references supporting MC02
Adaptive Joint Command The ability to adjust to a given situation and exercise authority
and Control (AJC2) and direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned and attached j oint forces in the accomplishment of the
mISSIOn.
Assured Access (AA) Access to the battlespace in all dimensions by u.s. forces and
allies contributes to the joint force commander's freedom of
action. This does not necessarily mean that the battlespace is
accessible from any direction, but that sufficient air and sea lines
of communications for movement of forces and sustainment
packages exist and can be protected successfully from
interdiction.
Asymmetric Warfare The waging of unbalanced or un-proportioned armed or
unarmed war against the enemy.
Augmentees Additional personnel who enhance existing capabilities of the
SJFHQ. Personnel could come from the supported combatant
commander staff or components, and supporting combatant
commander staff and components.
Automated Deep Operations A situation awareness tool, which integrates a broad number and
Coordination System type of Service C4ISR systems, enabling horizontal and vertical
(ADOCS) integration and C2 actions. It makes the same information
available to all users regardless of echelon and allows them to
filter the information to their specific mission environment.
Battle Damage Assessment The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the
(BDA) application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a
predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be
applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air,
ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout
the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is
primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and
coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is
composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage
assessment, and target system assessment. See also bomb
damage assessment and combat assessment.
Boards Formal, non-standing organizations with designated membership
that meet as required to conduct their business. Boards provide
input to centers and the CJTF.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A-I

Bomb Damage Assessment The determination of the effect of all air attacks on targets, such
as bombs, rockets, or strafing. See also battle damage
assessment and combat assessment.
Cascading Nature of Effects Indirect effects can ripple through an enemy target system, often
influencing other target systems as well. Typically, this can
influence nodes that are critical to multiple target systems. Most
often, this cascading of indirect effects flows from higher to
lower levels of war. As an example, when destroying an enemy
central headquarters, the effects cascade down through the
enemy echelons to ultimately disrupt numerous tactical units on
the battlefield.
Cells Formal, non-standing, functionally oriented organizations that
meet on a regular basis to provide input to boards and centers.
Centers Formal, standing organizations that meet and conduct major
planning or operations business with the JTF Headquarters on a
regular basis. Once established, centers normally operate on a
24-hour basis.
Centers of Excellence (COE) Institutions possessing special knowledge or expertise in a
particular area of concern and incorporated into the collaborative
environment to facilitate development of the products supporting
SJFHQ and JTF functions and operations, such as academia,
industry, banking.
Centers of Gravity (COG) Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a
military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or
will to fight. Critical capabilities are resources and means that
support the center of gravity. From among these are identified
critical vulnerabilities. They link to the center of gravity via
casual links, such that destroying, degrading, or denying a
critical vulnerability will cause a substantial degradation of one
or more of the adversary's center of gravities.
Civil Affairs (CA) Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units
organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil
affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. See
also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations.
Civil Affairs Activities Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1)
enhance the relationship between military forces and civil
authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2)
involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in
areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance
conduct of civil-military operations.
A-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Ci vil-Mili tary Operati ons The activities of a commander that establish, maintain,
influence, or exploit relations between military forces,
governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and
authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or
hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations,
to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-
military operations may include performance by military forces
of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the
local, regional, or national government. These activities may
occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions.
They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military
operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by
designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a
combination of civil affairs and other forces.
Collaborative Information The information backbone that provides warfighters the ability
Environment (CIE) to enhance organizational effectiveness and reduce hierarchical,
serial planning timelines through information and idea sharing
and parallel planning.
Collateral Nature of Effects Collateral effects are unintentional or incidental direct or
(CNE) indirect effects causing injury or damage to persons or objects.
Evaluation for potential collateral effects should normally
include a consideration of second- and third-order levels of
damage, such as the collateral effect of jamming or destroying a
communications facility that disrupts civilian air traffic control
or disrupts power to a local hospital. Collateral effects can
become a maj or factor in determining whether or not to attack a
target. Collateral effects can be further defined as additional and
collateral damage.
Combat Assessment (CA) The determination of the overall effectiveness of force
employment during military operations. Combat assessment is
composed of three major components, battle damage
assessment, munitions effects assessment, and reattack
recommendation. The objective of combat assessment is to
identify recommendations for the course of military operations.
Command and Control (C2) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned and attached forces in the
accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions
are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling
forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
Commander's Intent The stated purpose or desired end state of a commander in the
accomplishment of the assigned mission.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A-3

Common Operational Picture A single identical display of relevant information shared by

(COP) more than one command. A common operational picture
facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to
achieve situational awareness.
Common Relevant A presentation of timely fused, accurate, and relevant
Operational Picture (CROP) information that can be tailored to meet the requirements of the
joint force commander and the joint force and is common to
every organization and individual involved in a j oint operation.
Computer Network Attack Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information
(CNA) resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers
and networks themselves. Electronic attack (EA) can be used
against a computer, but it is not CNA. CNA relies on the data
stream to execute the attack while EA relies on the
electromagnetic spectrum.
Computer Network Defense Defensive measures to protect and defend information,
(CND) computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or
destruction.
Computer Network Intelligence collection and enabling operations to gather data
Exploitation (CNE) from target adversary automated information systems (AIS) or
networks.
Computer Network Comprised of computer network attack (CNA), computer
Operations (CNO) network defense (CND), and computer network exploitation
(CNE), collectively.
Concept of Operations Plan A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a
(CONPLAN) commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or
series of operations. The concept of operations is frequently
embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter
case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected
operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The
concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It
is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also
called commander's concept.
Course of Action (COA) 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may
follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander
that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of
the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish ajob or
mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of
the Joint Operation Planning and execution System concept
development phase.

Cumulative Nature of Effects Cumulative effects result from the aggregate of many direct or
indirect effects. This may occur at the same or at different levels
of war as the contributing, lower-order effects are achieved.
However, cumulative effects typically occur at higher levels of
war. As an example, increased operational-level air superiority
would be the cumulative effect of destroying numerous surface-
to-air-missile (SAM) sites at the tactical level.
Decision Superiority The ability of the commander, based upon Information
Superiority and situational understanding, to make effective
decisions more rapidly than the adversary, thereby allowing one
to dramatically increase the pace, coherence, and effectiveness
of operations.
Decisive Operations Those operations assigned to or undertaken by the U. S. military
in which there is a firm or conclusive resolution.
Defeat Mechanisms The best arrangement of ways and means to destroy the
adversary's coherency and achieve our Rapid Decisive
Operations campaign objectives.
Deficiency Analysis Analysis of the tools or means employed in Effects-Based
Operations.
Desired Effects Physical, functional, or psychological outcomes, events, or
consequences which a commander desires that result from
specific military or non-military actions to achieve a specific
strategic, operational or tactical end state.
Desired Operational A concept based statement of the ways and means to satisfy a
Capability (DOC) JFC's capabilities requirements. A fully articulated DOC
identifies subordinate tasks, associated conditions, and criteria
for measurement.
Diplomatic, Information, Areas of national power that are leveraged in "Effects-Based"
Military and Economic Operati ons against an adversary's vulnerabili ti es i dentifi ed by
(DIME) Operational Net Assessment, and targeted against his will and
capability to conduct war.
Direct Effects Direct effects are immediate, first-order effects, the results of
military actions with no intervening effect or mechanism
between act and outcome, and are usually easily recognizable.

Dominant Maneuver (DM) The ability of j oint forces to gain posi ti onal advantage with
decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the
achievement of assigned military tasks. Widely dispersed joint
air, land, sea, amphibious, special operations and space forces,
capable of scaling and massing force or forces and the effects of
fires as required for either combat or noncombat operations, will
secure advantage across the range of military operations through
the application of information, deception, engagement, mobility,
and counter-mobility capabilities.
Effect The physical, functional, or psychological outcome, event or
consequence that results from specific military or non-military
actions.
Effects Tasking Order (ETO) Formalizes output of JTF virtual collaborative planning. It is the
means to task and synchronize the actions and orders required to
achieve the commander's intent. ETOs replace the current
operations orders (OPORDs) and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs)
issued as required to support current and future operations. They
do not replace component execution planning and execution
orders.
Effects-Based Operations A process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or "effect"
(EBO) on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and
cumulative application of the full range of military and
nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic
levels
Effects-Based Planning An operational planning process to conduct EBO within RDO.
(EBP) EBP is results-based vice attrition-based. EBP closely mirrors
the current j oint planning process, yet focuses upon the linkage
of actions to effects to objectives. EBP changes the way we view
ourselves and the enemy, and what is included and emphasized
in the planning process. EBP uses a flexibly structured battle
rhythm that leverages a collaborative knowledge environment
and capitalizes on the use of fewer formal joint boards. It
employs virtual, near-simultaneous planning at all echelons of
command.
Effects-Based Strategy The coherent application of national and alliance elements of
power through effects-based processes to accomplish strategic
objectives.

Effects-Based Targeting The focus of the targeting process is to produce COAs that will
change the enemy's behaviors and compel him to comply with
our will. The behavioral changes we attempt to create are the
result of effects that flow from the employment of our lethal and
non-lethal capabilities. Thus, effects-based targeting is
distinguished by the ability to generate the type and extent of
effects necessary to create outcomes that facilitate the realization
of the commander's objectives.
Effects-Based Warfare The application of armed conflict to achieve desired strategic
outcomes through the effects of military force.
Electronic Warfare (EW) A component of information operations (10). Any military
action that involves the use of electromagnetic and directed
energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the
adversary. The SJFHQ should ensure coordination among EW
and other 10, intelligence, and communications support
activities for maximum effect and to reduce electronic fratricide.
This coordination is necessary to ensure effective exchange of
information, eliminate undesirable duplication of effort, and
provide mutual support.
End State What the POTUS and SECDEF want the situation to be when
operations conclude - both military operations as well as those
where the military is in support of other instruments of national
power.
Expeditionary Aerospace The U.S. Air Force concept of an expeditionary force capable of
Force carrying out assigned air missions from forward deployed bases
or long-range missions from home bases.
Field Experiment Wargames conducted in the actual environment with actual
military units and equipment. As such, these experiments have
the highest applicability of results to real situations. Good field
experiments, like good military exercises, are the closet thing to
challenges of actual operations; the ability to isolate the true
cause of any detected change will suffer.
Flexible Deterrent Option A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision by
(FDO) laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin
with deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to send the
right signal. The flexible deterrent option is the means by which
the various deterrent options available to a commander (such as
economic, diplomatic, apolitical, and military measures) are
implemented into the planning process.
Focus Area That area of the commander's AOR identified for the SJFHQ to
focus its efforts in ONA development, based on ambiguous
indications of potential crisis.

Focused Logistics (FL) The ability to provide the joint forces the right personnel,
equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and
in the right quantity, across the full range of military operations.
Force Health Protection The health and medical portion of agile sustainment operations.
Fragmentary Order An abbreviated form of an operation order, usually issued on a
(FRAGO) day-to-day basis, which eliminates the need for restating
information contained in a basic operation order. It may be
issued in sections.
Full Dimensional Protection The ability of the joint force to protect its personnel and other
assets required to decisively execute assigned tasks. Full
dimensional protection is achieved through the tailored selection
and application of multi -layered active and passive measures,
within the domains of air, land, sea, space, and information
across the range of military operations with an acceptable degree
of risk.
Full Spectrum Dominance 1. The ability of US. forces, operating unilaterally or in
combination with multinational and interagency partners, to
defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full
range of military operations. 2. The interdependent application
ofDM, PE, FL, and full dimensional protection used in order for
the joint force to accomplish its mission.
Functional Components Composed of two or more military departments that may be
established across the range of military operations to perform
particular operational missions that may be of short duration or
may extend over a period.
Global Information Grid The worldwide information network currently being developed
by the US. that will link all data and communications networks
together in a seamless environment. The globally
interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities,
associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing,
storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to
warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel.
Hierarchy of Shows the general hierarchical flow as a warfighting concept
Experimentation moves from inception to maturity.
Indirect Effects Indirect effects are second- and third-order systemic effects that
are the results created through an intermediate effect or
mechanism to produce the outcome, which may be physical or
psychological in nature. Indirect effects tend to be delayed, may
be difficult to recognize, and are often a cumulative or cascading
result of many combined direct effects.
A-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V

Information 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form.

2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the
known conventions used in their representation.
Information Environment The aggregate of individuals, organizations, or systems that
collect, process, or disseminate information; also included is the
information itself.
Information Operations (10) Those actions taken to affect an adversary's information and
information systems while defending one's own information and
information systems.
Information Superiority (IS) That degree of dominance in the information domain, which
permits the conduct of operations without effective opposition.
The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying
an adversary's ability to do the same.
Information Superiority The desired outcome of the Information Superiority (IS)
Campaign campaign is to create an imbalance of knowledge in our favor, in
order to understand the adversary while denying him the ability
to gather and exploit information on friendly forces.
Information Superiority The group responsible for coordinating activities that contributes
Group to building information and knowledge superiority within the
JTF, enabling informed decision-making. The group conducts an
initial assessment of the information environment and the ability
to achieve and maintain Information Superiority.
Information System The entire infrastructure, organization, and components that
collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on
information.
Information Workspace A virtual collaborative tool engineered for groups that work in
(IWS) Version 2.5 multiple locations. It is based on a virtual environment. Each
virtual building can represent an actual location or group of
users. Within each building are floors, which contain several
rooms. These rooms can be organized as required to facilitate
access to information and people. Part of the Collaborative
Information Environment (CIE).
Integration Matrix Part of an effects tasking order that synchronizes component and
interagency community actions in time, space and outcome.
Intelligence The product resulting from the collection, processing,
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available
information concerning foreign countries or areas. In addition,
information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through
observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.
FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONI,Y A-9

Interagency Community Overall, term applied to those appropriate government and non-
(lAC) government organizations that are critical to conducting
"effects-based operations" from deliberate planning to execution
operations and transition operations. These interagency
organizations would be part of the "collaborative environment."
Intermediate Staging and A temporary location used to both stage forces and to locate
Support Base (lSSB) sustainment and maintenance support when anti -access
conditions and/or infrastructure in the JOA preclude early entry.
Joint Effects Area (JEA) An area of land, sea, airspace defined by a geographic
Combatant commander or Subordinate Unified Commander, in
which a JTF commander (JFC) integrates the military actions
required to conduct the full range of Diplomatic, Information,
Military, and Economic (DIME) actions necessary to achieve the
effects required to achieve a specific operational mission. The
JFC does not have to own an asset to exploit its employment
within the JEA, i.e., have COCOM, OPCON. Operations by
forces and capabilities assigned to the JFC are informed by, and
inform, those actions conducted by non-assigned organizations
or agencies operating within the JEA to achieve the same
operational mission. A Primary Area of Military Operations
(PAMO) may be established within the JEA to define and
confine the area of primary military action w/o restricting the
actions required outside this area to achieve the commander's
intent and mission.
Joint Experimentation Application of scientific experimentation procedures to assess
the effectiveness of proposed (hypothesized) joint warfighting
concept el ements to ascertain whether el ements of a joint
warfighting concept cause changes in military effectiveness.
Joint Force Commander A general term applied to a combatant commander, sub unified
(JFC) commander, or joint task force commander (CJTF) authorized to
exercise combatant command (command authority) or
operational control over a force.
J oint Intelligence Preparation The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to
of the Battlespace (JIPB) produce intelligence assessment, estimates and other intelligence
products in support of the joint force commander's decision
making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining
the total battlespace environment; describing the battle space's
effects; evaluating the adversary; and determining and
describing adversary potential courses of action.
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Joint Interactive Planning Planning between the different Service commanders in a joint
(np) environment that takes place through the utilization of multiple
electronic or communications systems in which responses are
direct and continual.
Joint Mission Force That military force that shares a common mission or goal that
will allow for the overall attainment or success in completion of
the assigned task.
Joint Network Control A member of the SJFHQ Information/knowledge management
Officer (JNCO) group who establishes the systems architecture to support RDO,
based on the JTF commander's operational architecture. The
JNCO is also responsible for coordinating network management
activities for the SJFHQ.
Joint Support Base (JSB) A tailorable, temporary location on land or sea, designated by
the JFC, used for the staging, sustainment, succor or
maintenance of forces inserting into, extracting from, or
conducting operations in a designated area.
Joint Tactical Actions (JTA) Specific actions/engagements planned and executed by a joint
force commander (CJTF, JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC) intended to
achieve an effect that requires the capabilities of more than one
Service or agency. JTAs are executed by mission-tailored joint
force packages normally formed as short-term formations.
Joint Tactics, Techniques, The actions and methods that implement j oint doctrine and
and Procedures (JTTP) describe how forces will be employed in j oint operations. They
will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services,
and Joint Staff.
Key Enabler That crucial element that supplies the means, knowledge, or
opportunity that allows for the success of an assigned task or
mISSIOn.
Knowledge 1. Familiarity, awareness, or understanding gained through
experience or study. 2. The sum or range of what has been
perceived, discovered, or learned.
Knowledge Network A set of concepts related to providing critical information to the
warfighter. It enables the most effective use of the information
in a collaborative manner to conduct multi-level planning,
execution, and assessment of military operations. It includes the
Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP), joint interactive
planning (np), and adaptive joint command and control (AJC2)
concepts.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A-ll

Leveraged Events A leveraged event is an experiment, exercise, or demonstration

"owned" by some other organization. Service experiments,
training exercises, or wargames frequently provide these
opportunities. While the event owner's objectives are always the
primary event driver, there frequently are opportunities within
those events to address JFCOM's experimental objective.
Liaisons Personnel responsible for maintaining contact or
intercommunication between elements of military forces or other
agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity or purpose
and action. Liaisons may be provided from and to government
agencies, nongovernmental organizations, international
organizations, and coalition partners or allies.
Low-Fidelity Experiments A low-fidelity experiment is one where there is an unknown or
little-trusted knowledge level in the execution or outcome of the
experiment.
Measures of Effecti veness Measures of effectiveness are most often subjective indicators
(MOE) that the outcomes of the "tactical actions" have achieved, or
contributed to achieving the desired effect. MOE articulate
where to look and what to measure in order to determine if the
desired effect has been achieved.
Measures of Performance The obj ecti ve metri cs of the" outcomes" of "tacti cal acti ons,"
(MOP) MOP are assessed at the component level as a result of the
"tactical actions" performed to achieve a desired effect, i.e.,
were the targets hit and what level of damage was achieved.
Military Deception A component of information operations. Actions executed to
deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to
friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby
causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that
will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.
Mission 1. The responsibility of the component commander assigned by
the ETO as the supported commander, who in coordination with
supporting component commanders, will conduct operations to
achieve the JFC' s intent and desired effect.
2. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the
action to be taken and the reason therefore. The component
commander assigns his tactical units joint tactical actions in
coordination with the tactical units of the supporting component
commanders.
Non-Contiguous Operations Operations where one or more of the subordinate operations do
not share a common boundary.
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Objective The physical object of the actions taken, e.g., a definite tactical
feature, the seizure of holding of which is essential to the
commander's plan. For purposes ofRDO and the description of
effects-based philosophy, the term objective is used in the
broader sense of end state rather than physical objective.
Obj ective Force The strategically responsive force that will result from the
Army's transformation process. The objective force, capable of
dominating at every point on the spectrum of conflict, will be
characterized by its responsiveness, deployability, agility,
versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability.
Open-Source Intelligence Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the
(OSINT) public. See also intelligence
Operational Level of War The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are
planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic
objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at
this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational
objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives,
sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives,
initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and
sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension
of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and
administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means
by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic
obj ectives. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war.
Operational Net Assessment A continuously updated operational support tool that provides a
(ONA) JTF commander visibility of effects-to-task linkages based on a
"system-of-systems" analysis of a potential adversary's political,
military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information
(PMESII) war-making capabilities. The ONA informs decision-
makers from strategic to tactical levels regarding the
complementary effects and supporting missions and tasks that
can be considered when applying the full range of diplomatic,
information, military and economic (DIME) actions to achieve
specific effects on an adversary's will and capability in support
of national objectives. ONA is a critical enabler for achieving
rapid decisive operations. It is an integrated, collaborative
product of Department of Defense and other appropriate
government and non-government organizations. Its purpose is to
identify key links and nodes within the adversary's systems and
to propose methods that will influence, neutralize or destroy
them and achieve a desired effect or outcome.
Operational-Level Effects Operational effects influence activities at the operational level of
war and focus on campaigns and operational objectives.

Operations Order (OPORD) A directive issued by the commander to subordinate

commanders for affecting the coordinated execution of an
operation.
Physical Attack Refers to the use of "hard kill" weapons against designated
information-related targets as an element of an integrated 10
effort.
Plug A cell of personnel that provide a specific mission capability not
organic to the SJFHQ.
Political, Military, Vulnerabilities identified by the ONA. These are researched as
Economic, Social, "systems of systems" networks that can be exploited by effects-
Infrastructure, and based operations to affect an adversary's war-making/
Information (PMESII) warfighting will and capability.
Precision Engagement (PE) The ability of joint forces to locate, surveil, discern, and track
objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the correct
systems; generate desired effects; assess results; and reengage
with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo as
required, throughout the full range of military operations.
Primary Area of Military An area defined and confined as that area in which primary
Operations (PAMO) military action is conducted without restricting the actions
required outside this area to achieve the commander's intent and
mISSIOn.
Psychological Operations A component of information operations. PSYOP are actions
(PSYOP) taken to convey selected information and indicators to foreign
audiences. They are designed to influence emotions, motives,
reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of the adversary.
Examples of PSYOP include distribution of leaflets, loud-
speaker broadcasts, radio and television broadcasts, and other
means of transmitting information that encourages adversary
forces to defect, desert, flee, or surrender.
Public Affairs (P A) Those public information, command information, and
community relations activities directed toward both the external
and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense.
PA activities expedite the flow of accurate and timely
information to the internal audience (the SJFHQ and the JTF)
and the external audience (the public). Increasing availability of
this information to these audiences may have a significant effect
on national will, political direction, and national security
obj ectives and policy. P A activities will not be used in support
of military deception capability or to provide disinformation to
either audience.

Rapid Decisive Operations Rapid Decisive Operations is a concept for future operations. A
(RDO) Rapid Decisive Operation will integrate knowledge, C2, and
operations to achieve the desired political/military effect. In
preparing for and conducting a rapid decisive operation, the
military acts in concert with and leverages the other instruments
of national power to understand and reduce the regional
adversary's critical capabilities and coherence. The US. and its
allies asymmetrically assault the adversary from directions and
in dimensions against which he has no counter, dictating the
terms and tempo of the operation. The adversary, suffering from
the loss of coherence and unable to achieve his objectives,
chooses to cease actions that are against US. interests or has his
capabilities defeated.
Relevant Information The full range of necessary information about friendly forces,
the enemy, the battlespace, and anything else that affects
operational decision-making.
SharePoint Portal Server An enhanced information management tool, part of the virtual
(SPPS) Collaborative Information Environment (CIE), streamlining
document management for the JTF.
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver The concept of maneuvering landing forces directly to
(STOM) objectives ashore in order to avoid the necessity of establishing a
beachhead and avoiding enemy defensive efforts.
Standing Joint Force Intended to provide each warfighting theater combatant
Headquarters (SJFHQ) commander with a trained and equipped standing, joint
command and control (C2) capability specifically organized to
reduce the lag time involved in setting up a JTF headquarters
ready to rapidly and decisively conduct operations in small-scale
contingencies.
Strategic-Level Effects Strategic effects influence activities at the strategic level of war
and focus on national and multinational military objectives.
Rarely will attacking a single target directly result in the desired
strategic effect. The limited exceptions to this rule involved such
exceptional circumstances as a successful action against a
uniquely irreplaceable center of gravity.
System Any organized assembly of resources and procedures united and
regulated by interaction or interdependence to accomplish a set
of specific functions.
System of Systems A grouping of organized assemblies of resources, methods, and
procedures regulated by interaction or interdependence to
accomplish a set of specific functions. For example, a "system
of systems" could include the economic entities in a nation such
as the banking system, production system, etc.
FOR OFFICIAL US A-IS

Tactical-Level Effects Tactical effects influence activities at the tactical level of war
and focus on battles and engagements to accomplish military
objectives.
Target An area, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability,
function, or behavior identified for possible action to support the
commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.
Targeting The process to detect, select, and prioritize targets; match the
appropriate action; and assess the resulting effects-based on the
commander's objective, guidance, and intent. Targeting is both a
joint- and component-level command function that selects
targets, which meet military objectives, determines desired
effects, and selects or tasks the means to achieve those effects.
Technologies 1. The application of science, especially to industrial or
commercial objectives. 2. The scientific method and material
used to achieve a commercial or industrial objective.
Time-Phased Force and Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority
Deployment Data (TPFDD) indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of
debarkation.
Time-Sensitive Targets Those targets which require immediate response because they
(TST) pose (or will soon pose) a clear and present danger to friendly
forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.
Transformation The creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum
of military operations - persuasive in peace, decisive in war,
preeminent in any form of conflict.
Unified Vision (UV) 01 UV 01 was a major concept-refinement experiment run by the
Joint Experimentation Directorate, U.S. Joint Forces Command
in May of2001.
Virtual Simulation Virtual experiments employ human-in-the-Ioop simulations. The
prototype virtual simulation is the flight simulator. In a
command and control virtual simulation experiment, a sensor
operator might receive real-time simulated sensor inputs and
makes real-time decisions to launch simulated weapons against
simulated targets.
White paper A white paper is the principal tangible product of concept
development and describes the concept in sufficient detail for
experimentation. It describes the desired capabilities necessary
to implement the concept. The white paper states the concept's
hypothesis for assessment through experimentation. It contains a
fully developed operational concept and an associated
experimentation strategy.

Working Group Informal, non-standing organizations that are mission-tailored

for a specific event or action. Working groups provide input to
centers, boards, and cells.
Acronyms
A
AAD Area Air Defense Commander

AAMDC Army Air and Missile Defense Command
ABCS Army Battle Command System
ABLS Airborne Laser Simulation
ACC Air Combat Command
ACE Analysis Control Element
ACO Airspace Control Order
ACT Analysis Control Team
ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
ADA Air Defense Artillery
ADOCS Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
ADP Air Defense Plan
ADS Advanced Distributed Simulation
ADSI Air Defense Systems Integrator
AE Army Experiment
AEC U.S. Army Evaluation Center
AECP Army Experimentation Campaign Plan
AFAMS Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AFC2TIG Air Force Command and Control Training Innovation Group
AFFOR Air Force Forces
AFIWC Air Force Information Warfare Center
AFRL Air Force Research Library
AFSERS Air Force Synthetic Environment for Reconnaissance and Surveillance
AFSPC Air Force Space Command
AlA Air Intelligence Agency
AJCOM Advanced Joint Combined Operations Model
ALERT Attack and Launch Early Reporting to Theater
ALSP Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol
AMDWS Air and Missile Defense Workstation
ANIF Automatic Network Information Flow
AOC Air Operations Center
AODA Attack Operations Decision Aid
AOR Area of Responsibility
APL Applied Physics Lab
APOD Aerial Port of Debarkation
ARFOR Army Forces
ARSPACE Army Space Command
FOR OFFICI AL I ISE ONLY A-I7

ARSST Army Space Support Teams

ASAS All Source Analysis System
ASIIIMCN AOC Simulation Interface
ASOC Air Support Operations Center
ASPO Army Space Program Office
ASSET Automated Scripted Simulator Exercise Trainer
AST ATEC System Team
ASTAB Automated Status Board
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
ATCCS Army Tactical Command and Control Systems
ATD Advanced Technology Demonstration
ATEC U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Center
ATECP Army Transformation Experiment Campaign Plan
ATEx02 Army Transformation Experiment 2002
AT! AWSIM-TBMCS Interface
ATLOS Acoustic Transmission Loss Sensor
ATO Air Tasking Order
AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network
AUTO SIGS Auto Synthetic Imagery Generation System
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
AWE Advanced Warfighting Experiment
AWSIM Air Warfare Simulation
BCC Battle Control Center

BCD Battlefield Coordination Detachment
BCT Brigade Combat Team
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
BFA Battlefield Functional Area
BFTT Battle Force Tactical Trainer
BMDN Ballistic Missile Defense Network
BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Office
BOS Battlefield Operating Systems
BRITE Broadcast Remote Intelligence Technology Experiment
C2 Command and Control

C3 Command, Control, and Communications
C2 IPS Command and Control Information Processing System
C2PC Command and Control Personal Computer
2
CW Command and Control Warfare
A-I8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONIIY

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence Gateway

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CAOC Combined Air Operations Center
CART Crisis Action Response Team
CAS Close Air Support
2
CATT C W Analysis and Targeting Tool
CCDA Command Center Decision Aids
CE Civil Environment
CEM Civil Environment Model
CEOI Communications - Electronics Operating Instructions
CGS Common Ground Station
CIE Collaborative Information Environment
CIS Combat Intelligence System
CIWS Close In Weapons System
CJTF Commander Joint Task Force
CMO Central MASINT Organ
CND Computer Network Defense
CNO Computer Network Operations
COCOM Combatant Command
COMINT Communications Intelligence
COMWX Computered MASINT Weather
CONOPS Concept of Operations
COP Common Operational Picture
CORBA Common Object Request Broker Architecture
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
CPX Command Post Exercise
CRC Control and Reporting Center
CRE Control and Reporting Element
CROP Common Relevant Operational Picture
CSIL Commercial Satellite Imagery Library
CSP Communication Support Processor
CSSCS Combat Service Support Control System
CST Common Operation Picture (C) Synchronization Tool
CSTAR Combat Synthetic Training Assessment Range
CT Capability Test
CTAPS Contingency Theater Automated Planning System
CTDB Compact Terrain Database
CUSP Coupled Urban Dispersion Model (UDM) and SCIPUFF
CWHS Carrier Weapon Handling System
DACP Division Assault Command Post

DAG Data Authentication Group

DAMA Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA)

DBCC Dynamic Battle Control Cell
DBM Database Manager
DBST Digital Battle staff Sustainment Trainer
DCARS Digital Collection, Analysis, and Review System
DCE Dynamic Communications Environment
DCGS Distributed Common Ground Station
DCSCD Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments
DCTS Defense Collaborative Tool Suite
DCE Division Capstone ExerciselDigital Force Coordination Cell
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DICE Distributed Information Warfare Constructive Environment
DIS Distributed Interactive Simulation
DISN Defense Information Systems Network
DJFN Digital Joint Fires Network
DLRC Digital Leader Reaction Course
DM Dominant Maneuver
DMPI Desired Mean Point of Impact
DMTIX Dynamic Moving Target Information Exploitation
DNBI Disease and Non-Battle Injury
DoD Department of Defense
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, People, and
Leadership
DP Dimensional Protection
DS 3 Distributed Sensor Simulation System
DSICS Distributed Signal Intelligence Collection System
DSN Defense Switching Network
DTC U.S. Army Developmental Test Command
DTDL Deployed Theater Downlink
D-TES Division - Tactical Exploitation System
DTF Digital Target Folders
DTLMOS Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Material,
Organization, Soldier
DTS DIS Tool Set
DTSS Digital Topographic Support System
DTSS-D Digital Topographic Support System - Deployable
EA Effects Assessment
EAB Echelons Above Brigade
EAC Echelon Above Corps
EADSIM Extended Air Defense Simulation
EBO Effects-Based Operations
EC Electronic Combat

ECC Exercise Coordination Cell

ECS Engagement Control Station (Patriot)
EFX Expeditionary Force Experiment
EIW -Light Enhanced Imagery Workstation - Light
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
EMPRS Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System
EMT Expert Missile Tracker
EPLRS Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
ESC Electronic Systems Command
ESG Expeditionary Sensor Grid
ESM Electronic Support Measures
ETC Exercise Technical Control
ETF Electronic Target Folders
ETO Effects Tasking Order
Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, Communications, and

Intelligence
FBCB 2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
FBE Fleet Battle Experiment
FCTC Fleet Combat Training Center
FDDI Fiber optic Distribution Data Interface
FDO Flexible Deterrent Options
FID Federation Implementation Document
FIRESIM Fire Simulation
FMS-D Flight Mission Simulator - Digital (Patriot)
FOM Federation Object Model
FON Freedom of Navigation
FT Functional Test
GALE-L Generic Area Limitation Environment - Lite

GAWSGIAC Analytical Workstation
GBS Global Broadcast Service
GCCS Global Command and Control System
GCCS-A Global Command and Control System - Army
GCCS- I3 Global Command and Control System - Intelligence,
Imagery and Information
GCCS-M Global Command and Control System - Maritime
GCN Ground Communications Node
GCSS Global Combat Support System
GDS Generic Data Server
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GEED Geophysical Environmental Effects Distributor

GES Global Transportation Network Exercise System
GIAC Graphical Input Aggregate Control
GISR-C GCCS Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Component
GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missile
GPS Global Positioning System
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
GSTF Global Strike Task Force
GTN Global Transaction Network/Global Transportation Network
HIMAD High and Medium Altitude Missile Air Defenses

HLA High Level Architecture
HRSS High Resolution Systems Simulator
HSV High Speed Vessel
HUMINT Human Intelligence
lADS Integrated Air Defense System

lAS Intelligence Analysis Station
IBIS Integrated Battlefield Intelligence System
ICC Information and Coordination Central (Patriot)
ICD Interface Control Document
ICE Interactive Constructive Environment
ICIS Integrated Consumable Item Support
IDM Improved Data Modem
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IIR Initial Imagery Report
1M Integration Milestone
lMETS Integrated Meteorological and Environmental Terrain System
lMETS -L Integrated Meteorological System - Light
IMINT Information Management Intelligence
IMO Information Management Officer
IMPACT Integrated Modeling Platform for Advanced Computational Technologies
INTEL Intelligence
10 Information Operations
10 Input/Output
lOS USMC Integrated Operations System (TCO & lAS)
IPIR Initial Photographic Interpretation Report
IPL Image Product Library
IPRNET Internet Protocol Router Network
IRDM Information Retrieval and Delivery Management

IS-C 2 Information Superiority Command and Control

IWEG Information Warfare Effects Generator
JASGS Joint Automated Single Guard Solution

JBC Joint C4ISR Battle Center
JBMI J oint Battle Management Integration
JCAS Joint Command and Control Attack Simulation
JCATS Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation
JCC JTASC Control Center
JCF J oint Contingency Force
JCSE J oint Continuous Strike Environment
JDCAT JBC Data Collection Analysis Tool
JDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JDPI Joint Deployment Process Improvement
JECEWSI J oint Electronic Combat-Electronic Warfare Simulation
JECG Joint Exercise Control Group
JECMT Joint Experimentation Collection Management Tool
JEFX Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment
JEMIS Joint Event Management Information System
JESNET JTASC Exercise Support Network
JETF Joint Electronic Target Folder
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC Joint Force Commander
JFI Joint Fires Initiative
JFL Joint Futures Lab
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JGG Joint Ground Game (JQUAD+)
JHU Johns Hopkins University
JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JICO Joint Interface Control Officer
JIMM Joint Interim Mission Model
JIOC Joint Information Operations Center
JIPB Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
JISR Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JISRM Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Management
JMedSAF Joint Medical Simi-Automated Forces
JMEWS Joint Medical Work Station
JNETS Joint Networks Simulation
JNIC Joint National Integration Center
JOISIM Joint Operations Information Simulation
JOTBS Joint Operational Test Bed System
JOVE Joint Operations Visualization Environment

JPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

JQUAD The System Consisting of: JCAS, JECEWSI, JNETS,
and JOISIM
JRAC J oint Rear Area Coordinator
JSAF Joint Semi-Automated Forces (NAVFOR simulation)
JSF Joint Strike Fighter
JSOP J oint Standard Operating Procedure
JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSS JSTARS Simulation
JST JWFC Support Team
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar System
JSWS JSTARS Work Station
JTA Joint Tactical Action
JTAV Joint Total Asset Visibility
JTAGS Joint Tactical Ground Station
JTASC Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center
JTC J oint Training Center
JTF Joint Task Force
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
JTMD Joint Theater Missile Defense
JTT-B Joint Tactical Terminal- Briefcase
JWFC Joint Warfighting Center
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
LAN Local Area Network

LAWS Land Attack Warfare System
LEAPS LOCAAS Engagement Analysis Program Simulation
LOGSIM Logistics Simulation
LRSD Long Range Surveillance Detachment
LVRS Lightweight Video Reconnaissance System
M&E Mapping and Enumerations

M&S Modeling and Simulation
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force
MAIS Material Acquisition Integrated SystemlMobile Automated
Instrumentation Suite
MARCI Multi-host Automation Remote Control and Instrumentation
MARFOR Marine Corp Forces
MASINT Measurements and Signatures Intelligence
MATT Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal
MCE Modular Control Element (AN/TYQ-23)
MCM Mine Countermeasures

MCS Maneuver Control System

MDSIRPM Mission Database System
MDST Missile Defense Space Warning Tool
METOC Meteorological Operations
MIDB Modernized Integrated Database
MISREP Mission Report
MLST3 Multi Link System Test and Training Tool
MOUT Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MSC Mission Support Center
MSEL Master Scenario Events List
MSIM Master Simulation
MSTP MAGTF Staff Training Program
MTI Moving Target Indicator
MTO Maritime Tasking Order
MTIX Moving Target Information Exploitation
MUSE Multiple UAV Simulation Environment
MUST Multi-mission UHF Satellite Transceiver
NAVFOR Naval Forces

NJI Naval JSTARS Interface (GCCS-M)
NMC Network Management Center
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
NSC National Simulation Center
NTDS Navy Tactical Data System
NUWC Naval Undersea Warfare Center
NWARS National Wargaming System
NWDC Naval Warfare Development Command
o
OASES Ocean Atmosphere Space Environmental Services
OMFTS Operational Maneuver from the Sea
ONA Operational Net Assessment
OPCON Operational Control
OPFOR Opposing Force
OSD Operational Sequence Diagram
OTB OneSAF Testbed Baseline
OTH-G Over-The-Horizon, Gold
PAC2 Patriot Anti-tactical missile Capability, Phase 2

PAC3 Patriot Anti-tactical missile Capability, Phase 3

PATRIOT Phased Array Tracking to Intercept of Target
PC-SWAT Personal Computer Shallow Water Acoustic Tool Kit
PDU Protocol Data Unit
PE Precision Engagement
PEL Prioritized Effects List
PEGEM Post-Engagement Effects Model
POC Point of Contact
POL Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants
PSM+NAV Portable Space Model EnhancedlNavigation
PTW+ Precision Targeting Workstation
QC Quality Check
RBECS Revised Battlefield Electronic CEOI System

RC Response Cell
RDO Rapid Decisive Operations
RECCE Reconnaissance
RECCEXREP Reconnaissance Exploitation Report
RJMT Rivet Joint Mission Trainer
RPM Route Planning Module
RRF Ready Room of the Future
RTI Run Time Infrastructure
RTOS Reconfigurable Tactical Operations Simulator
RTSS Real Time Software System
RTV Rapid Terrain Visualization
S507L Blue Unit Report

SA Situational Awareness
SAA Situational Awareness and Analysis
SABRE Synthetic Aero Battle Research Environment (AWSIM simulation in an
HLAIRTI architecture)
SAC Simulation Analysis Center (@ USJFCOM J9 Building)
SALUTE Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment (Report)
SATS Stand-Alone TENCAP Simulator
SBIRS Space-Based Infrared System
SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SDF Simulation Data Flow
SDFD Simulation Data Flow Diagram
SHF Super High Frequency
A-26 FOR OFFICIAl, lISE ONLY

SIGS Synthetic Imagery Generation System

SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SITREP Situation Report
SJFHQ Standing Joint Force Headquarters
SLAMEM Simulation of the Location and Attack of Mobile Enemy Missiles
SMART Secure Messaging and Routing Terminal
SMAT Space Missile Analysis Tool
SMDBL Space and Missile Defense Battle Lab
SME Subj ect Matter Expert
SMV Space Maneuver Vehicle
SOJ Standoff Jammers
SOTVS Special Operations Tactical Video System
SPJ Self-Protection Jammers
SPOD Sea Port of Debarkation
SPPS SharePoint Portal Server
STAMPS Stand Alone Message Processing System
STO Special Technical Operations
STOM Ship-to-Objective Maneuver
STRED Standard Tactical Receive Equipment Display
STRICOM Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command
TACCSF Theater Air Command and Control Simulation Facility

TACELIN Tactical Electronic Intelligence
TACFIRE Tactical Fire Direction System
TACON Tactical Control
TACREP Tactical Report
TACSAT Tactical Satellite Terminal
TADIL Tactical Digital Interface Link
TADIL-J Tactical Digital Interface Link-J
TAIS Tactical Air Intelligence System/Tactical Airspace Integration System
TAOC Tactical Air Operations Center
TBA Theater Battle Arena
TBM Theater Ballistic Missiles
TBMCS Theater Battle Management Core System
TBMD Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
TCO Tactical Combat Operations
TCT Time Critical Targeting
TDDS TRE/TRAP Data Dissemination System
TEL Transporter, Erector, Launchers
TENCAP Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities
TES Tactical Exploitation System
TES-N Tactical Exploitation System - Naval
TIBS Tactical Information Broadcast Service
FOR OFFICIAL lISE ONI,Y A-27

TIMF TIBS Inter-computer Message Format

TIRT Tactical Imagery Rendering Tool
TIUIPC TIBS Interface UnitlPersonal Computer
TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TM T est Manager
TOC Tactical Operations Center
TPFDD Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TPS-75 Air Defense radar (USAF)
TR Trouble Report
TRAP TRE and Related Applications
TRE Tactical Receiving Equipment
TSIU Tactical Simulation Interface Unit
TST Time Sensitive Targeting
TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
TUAV Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
TV Technical Verification
TWS Tactical Weather System
TXC 4I Targeting Experimental C4I
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UAVSIM Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Simulation
UGS Unattended Ground Sensor
UHF Ultra High Frequency
UMS Unattended MASINT Sensor
USJFCOM US. Joint Forces Command
USMTF US. Message Text Format
VHF Very High Frequency

VIEW Virtual Interactive Environment World Space
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
VLF Very Low Frequency
VMF Variable Message Format
VPN Virtual Private Network
VSSGN Virtual Submarine
VSTARS Virtual Surveillance Target and Attack Radar System JSTARS
VT Vignette Test
VTC Video Teleconference
VV&A Verification, Validation and Accreditation
WALTS Weapons Analysis and Lethality Toolkit

WAN Wide Area Network

WG Work Group
WOC Wing Operations Center
WS Work Station or Workstation
x
XC 4I Experimental Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence

(This Page Blank)

Annex B - Baseline Report
This Annex is available from USJFCOMIJ9 to eligible DoD and other

government agencies only.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY B-1

(This Page Blank)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY B-2

Annex C - Assessment Plan
This annex depicts the Assessment Plan developed prior to MC02 Spiral 3. It was
executed as written, except in the area of data collection from live tactical actions. Live tactical
data was subsequently deemed unnecessary for the analysis of MC02 concepts and objectives,
and was not collected.
HQ, u.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488
Annex U to MC02 EXDIR Assessment and Reporting
References:
a. US. Joint Forces Command Experiment Analysis Plan, MC02
b. US. Joint Forces Command J9 Joint Futures Lab, RDO White Paper Version 2.0, A
Conceptfor Rapid Decisive Operations (Final Draft), dated 25 October 2001.
c. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04B, Universal Joint Task List Version
4.0, dated 1 October 1999
d. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, Guidance for USJFCOM Joint
Experimentation, dated 2 November 2001
1. General
a. Purpose. This Annex presents the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) plan for
assessing the joint field experiment on Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) in 2007, Millennium
Challenge 2002 (MC02). This Annex provides an overview of the intent, scope, concept, and
methodology for assessment of the j oint field experiment to meet JFCOM' s j oint experiment
objectives. A detailed assessment plan, the JFCOM Experiment Analysis Plan (JEAP), reference
(a), will be published to document the detailed methodology, data requirements, and reporting
plan for MC02. The Services and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) will develop
assessment plans for their experiment objectives as appropriate.
b. Background. The Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001 (Public Law 106-399)
required the Secretary of Defense to conduct a joint field experiment in fiscal year 2002 to
explore critical warfighting challenges at the operational level of war in this decade. MC02
fulfills this requirement.
2. Experiment Description
a. Experiment Overview. JFCOM, in conjunction with the Services and SOCOM,
SP ACECOM, and TRANSCOM will conduct the MC02 j oint field experiment from 24 July
through 15 August 2002 using computer simulation and live forces to determine the extent to
which the joint force will be able to execute RDO in this decade. The experiment will assess the
impact of three primary RDO enablers: Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), Operational
Net Assessment (ONA), and Effects-Based Operations (EBO) on future joint warfighting
operations. MC02 will also provide evidence to support doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) change recommendations that will enable the
joint force to meet future warfighting challenges at the joint operational level of war.
b. Experiment Hypothesis
If an Enhanced Joint Force Headquarters is informed by an Operational Net Assessment
and employs Effects-Based Operations, which use the full range of our national capabilities,
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then the 2007 joint force will be able to conduct Rapid Decisive Operations against a
determined 2007 adversary.
c. RDO Concepts. The "if' portion of the experiment hypothesis describes an
enhanced Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ). The experiment will assess the three primary aspects
of the RDO concept for an enhanced j oint headquarters: Standing Joint Force Headquarters
(SJFHQ), Operational Net Assessment (ONA), and Effects-Based Operations (EBO). Additional
aspects of the enhanced j oint headquarters will also be assessed: an experimental Collaborative
Information Environment (CIE), interagency (IA) collaboration, Joint Theater Logistics
Management (JTLM), and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR). These
RDO concept enablers are fundamental to the joint force's ability to accomplish the RDO
warfighting tasks. Workable concepts for an SJFHQ, ONA, and EBO are the three primary
experiment deliverables that will support the enhanced JFHQ. Each of the concept enablers will
be represented in MC02 in an experimental form with aspects of the individual capability
emulated because of difficulties representing 2007 capabilities in 2002. However, each of the
seven concepts will potentially yield DOTMLPF recommendations. The RDO concept enablers
are as follows:
(1) Standing Joint Force Headquarters. The joint field experiment will
examine the strengths and weaknesses involved in providing a pre-established SJFHQ
knowledge element to augment a deploying Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ). The
SJFHQ is intended to provide each warfighting theater combatant commander a trained and
equipped standing, joint command and control (C2) capability organized to reduce the time
involved in setting up a JTF headquarters ready to rapidly and decisively conduct operations.
The SJFHQ will provide continuity to the combatant commander's staff in planning and
operations necessary to support EBO and RDO. This 55-person cell will provide specific plugs
and augmentees to the designated JTF to enable it to support EBO planning and assessment
quickly.
(2) Operational Net Assessment. ONA provides the foundation of knowledge
and understanding about an adversary needed for RDO. It provides knowledge in sufficient detail
to apply integrated diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) friendly actions
decisively against an adversary's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and
information (PMESII) systems. This knowledge base includes systems analyses that identify
critical adversary vulnerabilities and potential friendly DIME actions with the goal of causing
desired effects. It is a product of collaboration among a wide variety of organizations and
informs decision makers from strategic to tactical levels. The ONA provides ajoint task force
commander and components visibility of effects-to-task linkages supporting effects-based
operations.
(3) Effects-Based Operations. The joint experiment will examine if the joint
force can plan, execute, and assess the results of EBO. The EBO concept defines a process for
obtaining a desired outcome or "effect" through the synergistic and cumulative application of the
full range of military and non-military capabilities at all levels of conflict. An effect is the
physical, functional, or psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from specific
military or non-military actions. The EBO concept envisions more comprehensive insight into
the adversary, ourselves, and the environment to facilitate the determination of desired effects,
the consideration of the full range of potential results of the appropriate application of power
from the full spectrum of military and non-military capabilities, an assessment of the resultant
outcomes, and rapid adaptation by the joint force.
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(4) Collaborative Information Environment. An experimental CIE will be

assessed that includes use of collaboration tools and an enhanced situational awareness through a
Common Relevant Operational Picture. The JTF headquarters depends on collaboration and
maximized use of collaborative tools in order to fully realize a truly "distributed" JTF C2
network linking the JTF, components, combatant commander, interagency, and centers of
excellence. This C2 network will use reach-back capabilities to access fixed base support and
other resources, which should reduce the need for a large forward C2 footprint. The results of
this experiment will support follow-on experimentation to identify a uniform organization; a
baseline joint command and control system; standard operating procedures (SOPs); and tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to support Combatant commanders in the establishment of a
SJFHQ element within their regions (reference (d)).
(5) Interagency. A Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) will be
constituted on-site at JFCOM with secure, virtual collaboration to JIACG interagency
participants in Washington, D.C. JIACG participants will coordinate in four areas: (1) strategic
guidance and a regional assessment, (2) political-military plan, (3) operational planning issues
and crisis response, and (4) interagency coordination during execution to support crisis response
and transition planning. Information to support interagency planning will be provided by the
ONA. The ONA will include collaboration with civilian and military departments and agencies
engaged in the collection, analysis, and production of estimates and assessments that support the
National Security Council (NSC).
(6) Joint Theater Logistics Management. The MC02 organization for JTLM
operates at two tiers. At the combatant commander level is a Joint Logistics Management Center
(JLMC) within the combatant commander J4 staff. The JLMC will operate in a CIE with the
logistics elements of the combatant commander's Service components, host nations, DLA,
TRANSCOM, coalition forces, other combatant commander "J codes," the country team, and the
logistics element of the JTF staff and those of the JTF functional components. At the JTF level, a
collaborative Logistic Action Response Board (LARB) is convened as required and is composed
of logisticians and other key personnel integrated into the plans and operations Groups of the
JTF staff as well as those in the functional component staffs. This experimental organization
concept is intended to provide distributed command and control for logistics and transportation
to carry out j oint logistics processes with increased effectiveness, better synchronization, and
greater flexibility with fewer personnel.
(7) Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. JISR is a joint
mission to produce relevant information from all sources in a dynamic, comprehensive,
responsive, timely manner enabling Information Superiority. JISR functions within the EBO
processes and includes ISR sensor management, collection operations, and the level of
processing and analysis necessary to support initial phase exploitation of collected information,
and the dissemination of this intelligence to the user.
d. Experiment Objectives. The following five experiment objectives reflect what the
joint force needs to accomplish in MC02 in order to conduct RDO as reflected in the "then"
portion of the experiment hypothesis.
Objective 1: Establish and maintain information/knowledge superiority.
Objective 2: Rapidly set the conditions for decisive operations by seizing and exploiting
the initiative, posturing the joint force, establishing the nature of operations, and shaping the
environment.
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Obj ective 3: Assure access into and through the battlespace to provide sufficient freedom
of action.
Objective 4: Conduct decisive effects-based operations.
Objective 5: Sustain itself, specifically to deliver sustainment to combat units in
synchronized non-contiguous operations.
e. Joint Initiatives. JFCOM issued a call for joint initiatives that supported the RDO
concept. Each initiative is a potential future RDO enabler for overcoming one or more
warfighting challenges associated with conducting RDO in this decade. Appendix U-l presents
the 27 sponsored joint initiatives.
f. Potential Change Recommendations. MC02 is expected to be the culminating
event for a number of potential DOTMLPF change recommendations. The findings of the
experiment, along with findings from previous experiments and other events, will determine
which of the potential changes have sufficient evidence to support a formal change
recommendation. JFCOM is in the process of developing approximately 20 potential change
recommendation packages that may have sufficient evidence after the completion ofMC02 to
support a formal change recommendation.
3. Experiment execution. The MC02 joint field experiment combines a military computer-
assisted headquarters event and a military field event that includes both live and simulated
forces, set in the 2007 time frame, focused on those joint warfighting concepts that enable RDO.
The setting is a small-scale contingency (SSC) against a determined, locally numerically superior
2007 adversary. The experiment includes four preparatory events (Spirals) and the concluding
field experiment.
a. Spiral O. Initial technical testing conducted 3 to 14 December 2001.
b. Spiral 1. A technical event, conducted from 28 January to 8 February 2002, to test
the core and ancillary models as well as the C4I systems fed by the simulations.
c. Spiral 2. An academic event, conducted from 18 to 29 March 2002, to discuss
U.S. Joint Doctrine and RDO Concepts, as well as Effects-Based Planning, operations, and
assessment. The academic event will be followed by a practical exercise, and continued technical
integration and testing.
d. Spiral 3. Conducted from June 3-14 2002. The JTF will develop the Effects
Tasking Order and component headquarters will develop the supporting component orders. The
JTF will conduct a rehearsal during the final two days.
e. Joint Field Experiment. The field experiment will be conducted from 24 July to
15 August 2002. The joint field experiment will include computer-simulation and live forces to
determine the extent to which the joint force will be able to execute RDO in this decade. It will
also include opportunities for Service-related experimentation. The MC02 joint field experiment
is designed to permit as realistic an operational warfighting environment as possible. It includes
a robust, adaptive, independent 2007 adversary, which will have its own objectives and
campaign plan. Both the Blue force and the adversary will be minimally constrained to enforce
the scenario boundaries. The control cell will ensure validity of all Blue-adversary actions and
engagements. The intent is to assess the concepts against a robust, adaptive, and independent
2007 adversary before making any recommendations. In order to keep the experiment from
terminating too soon, if one side or the other gets "too far" ahead, the control cell will make
adjustments, but only after the assessors have noted the successes and failures and their causes.
The control cell may have to "resurrect" or "protect" some adversary or Blue entities to continue
the experiment until all experimental objectives are achieved. The intent is to minimize the

intervention of the control cell and promote maximum free play for Blue and the adversary
within the scenario boundaries.
4. Assessment Strategy
a. JFCOM Assessment Focus. The JFCOM assessment and reporting will focus at
the joint operational level of warfighting. Accordingly, JFCOM data collection will focus on the
combatant commander HQ (response cell), the JTF Headquarters, and the Functional Component
Headquarters: JFLCC, JFMCC, JFACC, JPOTF, and JSOTF. A representative sample of data
will be collected at the tactical level during the live tactical actions to examine accuracy of
situational awareness at the joint operational level. The Services and SOCOM will execute and
report on their component-level experiments through their own reporting chains.
b. JFCOM Assessment priorities. The JFCOM assessment is organized into four
assessment tasks: two primary assessment tasks and two secondary assessment tasks.
(1) Primary Assessment Tasks
(a) TASK 1: Assess the capability of the experimental RDO concepts
to impact JTF HQs planning processes and coordination processes. This assessment task
examines the "if' component of the experiment hypothesis and answers the question: To what
extent did the concept enhancements to the joint force headquarters facilitate the Joint Task
Force Headquarters command and control processes and products?
(b) TASK 2: Assess the capability of the experimental RDO concepts
to impact Joint Task Force actions against a determined 2007 adversary. This assessment task
examines the "then" component of the experiment hypothesis and answers the question: to what
extent did the experimental concepts affect j oint force actions (influence, deter, coerce, compel,
and defeat) against a determined 2007 adversary?
(2) Secondary Assessment Tasks
(a) TASK 3: Assess the strengths and weaknesses of the RDO
sponsored joint initiatives in supporting the JTF planning processes and products.
(b) TASK 4: Provide lessons learned on joint field experimentation for
the next joint field experiment.
c. Warfighting challenges, Tasks, and Measures. JFCOM Joint Futures Lab Concept
Development Department has identified 22 potential warfighting challenges, which are presented
in the following paragraphs. Eleven are related to the JTF HQs planning process and 11 related
to the ability of the joint force to accomplish the five MC02 objectives in 2007. Planning tasks
have been developed for each warfighting challenge for the JTF HQ and operational execution
tasks were developed for the j oint force as a whole. Many of these tasks have been taken directly
or adapted from reference (c), Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Version 4.0. Measures of task
accomplishment have been developed for each task. When applicable, the measures have been
adapted from the measures provided in the UJTL. The 23 warfighting challenges are provided
below. The associated tasks along with the qualitative and quantitative measures for each of the
warfighting challenges are provided in Appendix 2 to this Annex.
(1) Assessment Task 1: Assess the impact of the primary RDO Concept
enablers on JTF Headquarters process and products. Appropriate warfighting challenges have
been developed for each of the three primary RDO concepts (SJFHQ, ONA, and EBO) and the
four supplemental components of an enhanced joint headquarters (CIE, interagency, JTLM, and
JISR). These warfighting challenges are provided below. The answers to these challenges will
indicate how each concept affected the planning process.

Standing JFHQ
Warfighting Challenge:
Quickly achieve cohesive C2 of a joint force

Warfighting Challenges:
Analyze adversary PMESII systems for tangible/intangible strengths and weaknesses
Use ONA to enhance decision-making

Conduct effect-based planning
Conduct effects assessment

Establish a valid COP/CROP
Maintain collaborative capabilities
Interagency
Ability to quickly achieve and maintain cohesive relationships with the interagency community
Ability to improve interagency campaign planning and execution

Plan for agile sustainment.
Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR)

Provide relevant intelligence to the commander
Appropriate tasks and subtasks were developed for each of the warfighting challenges. Each task
and subtask has associated measures that serve as indicators of task accomplishment. These are
provided in Appendix U-2. Comments from the senior mentors, SMEs, and JTF warfighters, and
data provided from the model federation, will help determine why the task could or could not be
accomplished.
(2) Assessment Task 2: Assess the capability of the Joint Task Force to
execute the RDO Objectives. Warfighting challenges have been developed for each of the five
MC02 objectives. These warfighting challenges represents an issue question pertaining to the
ability of the joint force to execute operations against a determined 2007 adversary.
Objective 1. Establish and maintain information/knowledge superiority

Provide situational awareness of JOA throughout the JTF
Use the CROP and collaboration to enhance JTF operational timelines

Objective 2. Rapidly set the conditions for decisive operations by seizing and exploiting the
initiative, posturing the joint force, establishing the nature of operations, and shaping the
environment
Establish advantageous positions for decisive operations
Decrease joint force vulnerability to disruption, especially ISR and logistic infrastructure
Objective 3. Assure access into and through the battles pace to provide sufficient freedom of
action
Provide selective dimensional superiority
Provide sufficient operational reach
Enhance force protection
Objective 4. Conduct decisive effects-based operations

Synchronize the application of the full range of j oint capabilities in order to engage decisive
points in time and space
Integrate full joint capabilities against tactical level objectives
Integrate execution of information operations into EBO
Objective 5. Sustain the force, specifically to deliver sustainment to combat units in

synchronized non-contiguous operations
Provide agile sustainment
The assessment strategy for Task 2 is similar to that for Task 1. Tasks with associated measures
were developed for each warfighting challenge. These are also provided in Appendix U-2. If the
tasks mapped to the warfighting challenges under a particular objective are accomplished, it
indicates that the joint force could execute that objective and that the pre-identified potential
warfighting challenge to that RDO objective could be overcome in 2007 provided the task
enablers are available in 2007. If, on the other hand, a substantial proportion of the tasks under a
particular RDO objective could not be accomplished, then this would indicate the potential
warfighting challenge associated with that the experimental RDO concept enablers might not
alleviate RDO objectives.
Comments from the SMEs and JTF warfighters plus model data will provide assistance in
determining the extent that the experimental concepts facilitated, or did not facilitate, the ability
of the joint force to execute its operational tasks. Senior mentors, (retired senior military
commanders) will also assess the extent to which the joint force accomplished each RDO
objective and accomplished the combatant commander mission objectives over the course of the
campaign. Additionally, the adversary team will be monitored to assess the extent to which the
joint force was able to influence threat capabilities and options over the course of the campaign.
Each objective task has been mapped to a concept. If the tasks mapped to a concept are
accomplished, it is evidence that the concept contributed to task completion and that causality
will be explored by the analysts, senior mentors, and SMEs.

(3) Assessment Task 3: Provide "warfighter comment" observations on the

RDO Concept Sponsored Initiatives. The sponsored initiatives will be assessed primarily through
warfighter and SME comments on operational functionality. Additional comments and
observations may come from the senior mentors. The sponsored j oint initiatives will be mapped
to the tasks that support the warfighting challenges. The assessment will use SME and
warfighters comments to determine the extent that these initiatives facilitated JF Headquarters'
planning tasks.
(4) Assessment Task 4: Provide lessons learned on joint field experimentation
for the next joint field experiment. Data will be collected from all participants and experiment
control personnel to document the lessons learned in the planning, execution, and reporting of
this joint field experiment. The lessons learned will be used to improve joint field
experimentation.
d. Data Collection Strategy
(1) Exercise Baseline Data. JFCOM 17 is developing an exercise database that
will provide baseline information on selected JTF tasks. This database encompasses over 100
exercise and real-world operations reports over the last six years. The reports have been entered
as individual task records corresponding to UJTL task identifiers. This baseline will provide a
history of task accomplishment or difficulty.
(2) Experiment Data
(a) JTF Warfighter Observations. Warfighters in the combatant commander response
cell, the JTF HQ, and the Functional Component Headquarters (JFLCC, JFMCC, JF ACC,
JPOTF, and JSOTF) will submit observations on specific processes and procedures. They will be
required to complete periodic surveys to capture their specific observations on the strengths and
weaknesses of the RDO concept capabilities employed to facilitate their warfighting tasks.
(b) SME Observations and Ratings. Manual, over-the-shoulder data collection will be
accomplished by SME data collectors. A majority of these SMEs are from the pool of the
Observer/Trainers and After Action Review Analysts from JFCOM 17 who are experienced in
conducting observations and collecting data during Joint Task Force training events. Service and
SOCOM functional experts will augment the JFCOM SMEs and will be trained in the
experiment concept. To the maximum extent possible, the SME teams assigned to the functional
components headquarters and to the live Service events will consist of functional experts from
multiple Services.
(c) Ground Truth for Situational Awareness. Ground-truth data are required for
comparison to the CROP/COP databases in GCCS to assess the validity of the CROP/COP at the
JTF Headquarters and at the Functional Component Headquarters (JFLCC, JFMCC, JF ACC, and
JSOTF). The majority of the "ground-truth" data will be taken from the experiment simulation
federation where the majority of the RDO campaign will take place. Limited ground truth on a
sampling basis will be taken from selected live operations. The resolution of ground-truth data
will be at the level necessary to assess the accomplishment of effects and their associated tasks.
(d) Joint Force Operations Outcomes (Simulated Forces). The primary quantifiable
data to support the joint force task accomplishment under the five Experiment Objectives will be
based on the achievement of effects-based operations and achievement of campaign objectives as
portrayed will be obtained from the simulated forces in the experiment simulation federation.
(e) Assessment Organization. The assessment team will be organized to accomplish
data collection and quality control of data consistent with the battle rhythm established for the
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experiment. Service and SOCOM analysts will be integrated into the JFCOM analysis team to
assist with the quality control of the data and interpreting the results.
(f) Model-Experiment-Model. A Model-Experiment-Model (M-E-M) process as a
proof-of-principle will determine the utility of using a constructive, analytical model to
overcome some of the limitations of conducting a large field experiment. The M-E-M
methodology will also establish the foundation of a continuous experimentation environment to
support future joint experimentation. Since MC02 joint field experiment does not have an "on-
the-ground" baseline to determine effectiveness gains, the focus in M-E-M is to build a
constructive baseline for comparison to a constructive RDO variation that has been calibrated to
the results of the field experiment. If the calibration of constructive to live is successful and time
permits in the post-experiment modeling phase, we also expect to conduct some sensitivity runs
on the major field findings. There will not be sufficient time for full-scale pre-experiment
modeling. The post-experiment modeling will calibrate the constructive models using the results
and insights gained from the field experiment to determine to what extent a constructive
simulation can replicate the MC02 2007 Blue force executing the same joint field Experiment
SSC. If the model can be calibrated to the field experiment results, a baseline excursion will be
attempted to determine if a 2007 Blue force executing a SSC without the RDO Concept enablers
can be modeled. Whenever possible, service high-resolution models, and study results will be
used in support of this proof-of-principle modeling effort. This M-E-M effort will not be used to
shape the experiment design or execution, but will be used to determine the process and potential
of doing so for future experiments.
5. JFCOM Reporting
a. JFCOM Joint Field Experiment Report. JFCOM will develop and staff the
JFCOMjoint experiment report for review and comment with Services and SOCOM. Services
and SOCOM will be requested to provide analysts to assist JFCOM in developing the joint
experiment report to provide insight and expertise pertaining to the functional components. The
report will focus on the results of the two primary assessment tasks. It will identify the degree to
which the primary RDO Concept enablers (SJFHQ, ONA, and EBO) were implemented in the
joint force headquarters and the contribution of these enablers to the joint force achieving the
fi ve RDO experiment obj ecti ves. The report will identify the strengths and weaknesses of these
RDO enablers to support future joint DOTMLPF considerations. For the additional RDO
sponsored initiatives, the report will provide functionality "insights." The JFCOM Experiment
Report will be made available in draft for Service and SOCOM review with anticipation for the
final signed report available for distribution in February 2003. The Services and SOCOM will
submit separate reports for component experiment-specific findings and recommendations
through their chain of command as appropriate.
b. Formal Joint DOTMLPF Recommendation Submissions. Based on the findings in
the JFCOM Experimentation Report, JFCOM will develop separate formal DOTMLPF
Recommendation Submissions to JCS who will staff them with the combatant commanders,
Services, and Agencies for review.
Appendixes:
1 - MC02 Joint Initiatives Integration Recommendation List
2 - Objectives, Warfighting Challenges, Tasks, Subtasks Matrix
FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY C-9

HQ, u. S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

Appendix 1 To Annex U To MC02 EXDIR

MC02 JOINT INITIATIVES INTEGRATION RECOMMENDATION LIST
Table 45: Summary of Joint Initiatives by Group
Experimental MSCTS/IWS2.5 Defense Integrates collaborative tools, USJFCOM (J9)

C4 1Systems Collaborative decision support tools, M&S,
Group Tool Suite and CROP.
Experimental GCCS-13 Global C2 Fused assessment and USJFCOM
4
C 1Systems System - battles pace visualization. (J29)
Group Integrated
Intelligence
and Imagery
Experimental JDISRM Joint Dynamic ISR Management Tool that USJFCOM
4
C 1Systems ISR feeds the CROP. (J28)
Group Management
Experimental ONA Tool Suite ONA Tool USJFCOM (J9)
4
C 1Systems Suite
Group
GENOA GENOA Structured argumentation
methodology for decision
support
AnalNB Analyst Visual investigative analysis
Notebook software
ArcView/lMS ArcView/lMS Multi-user geo-database
storage and management
Experimental LTS Logistics Suite of decision support USJFCOM (J9)
C4 1Systems Tools Suite tools that provide the ability
Group, Log to develop, assess, monitor
and visually display logistics
support
Experimental TMIP Theater Automated medical record USJFCOM (J9)
4
C 1Systems Medical data capture and medical
Group, Log Integration intelligence gathering.
Planning
Joint Fires JFI (ADOCS) Joint Fires Coordinates Joint assets on USN (NWDC)
Group Initiative time sensitive targets, USA (JPSD)
4
(Automated integrates C ISR.
Deep Ops
Coord Sys
and ADOCS
Presentation)
Federated TES-EJT Tac Exploit Direct target nomination to USA
Exploitation Sys (TES) both Army and Navy indirect (USAMDC)
Group Enhanced fire systems.
Joint

Targeting
Network ANIF Automatic Dynamic reapportionment of USJFCOM

Operations Network bandwidth (J8C)
Enhancement Information
Flow
Network NSMC&D Network Central database for USJFCOM
Operations Security correlation, analysis and (J8C)
Enhancement Management reporting of network status.
Correlation &
Display
Stand Alone JEMPRS-NT Joint Enroute Collaborative capability for USJFCOM
Msn Planning enroute SOCOM and Navy. (J8C)
and Rehearsal
Sys-Near
Term
(JEMPRS-NT)
Stand Alone MCS-TCO Maneuver Interfacing of Army and USJFCOM (J8)
Control Marine C2 systems
System-
Tactical
Combat
Operations
Stand Alone SAC Signal Comparison of emerging USA
Analysis national capabilities vs. (USASMDC)
Comparison legacy capabilities in support
(classified) of tactical operations.
Stand Alone Avalanche Avalanche - Software that provides an USSOCOM
(classified) intelligent agent to perform
data mining functions
Concept GSTF Global Strike Air Force rapid-reaction force USAF
Initiative Task Force package to meet anti-access (AC2ISR)
challenges.
Procedural JPAOG Joint Public A centralized PA office at the USJFCOM
Initiative Affairs Ops JTF HQ representing all (PAO/APAC)
Group Services.
Procedural NIMA-CART NIMA Crisis Reach-back to NIMA data, NIMA
Initiative Action products and Subject Matter
Response Experts.
Team (CART)
Procedural C2SpaceCno Command and Space cell embedded in JTF USSPACECOM

Initiative Control for HQ for reach-back to
Space and USSPACECOM
Computer
Network Ops
FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONI,V C-ll

Procedural UGS-TBM Unattended Small concealable sensors USSOCOM

Initiative Sensors help SOF locate TBM targets
support to
Theater
Ballistic
Missiles
Procedural JSOTF-JCTP JSOTF Link CONUS Subject Matter USSOCOM
Initiative Reach-back Experts to SOF Warfighters
Msn and SOF
Joint
Collaborative
Planning Tool
Tools for JATF Joint Automated interoperable USJFCOM (J9)
Showcasing Automated targeting tool.
Target Folders
Tools for JASGS Joint JTF and Multinational USJFCOM

Showcasing Automated viewing of multi-level (JBC)
Single Guard imagery, sensor data and
Solution GMI.
Service HSV High Speed 4000 ton, 3000 mile, USN (NWDC)
Initiative Vehicle Catamaran, Live ship USSOCOM
Service PEO-IP Program Fused assessment and USA (PEO

Initiative Executive battlespace visualization for C3S)
Office- time critical targets.
Interchange
Proposal
Service SB-BFT Space Based Space based system for USSPACECOM

Initiative Blue Force tracking and reporting on
Tracking status of friendly units.
Mission
Arch itectu re
Integration
Service COMWX Computered High-level weather gathering NRO/EUCOM

Initiative MASINT capability.
Weather
(COMWX)
ACTD
(classified)
Service UAV-Interoperability UAV UAV C2 and product USJFCOM
Initiative Interoperability dissemination from ground (J28)
stations.
Prioritization Legend:
Prioritization is the perceived level of importance to the j oint experimental obj ectives and
major focus areas (e.g. SJFHQ, ONA, EBO, RDO).
FOR OFFICI AL lISE ONI,V C-12

1. Primary (need or want): Closer to the primary objective ofRDO. This would significantly
impede the execution ofMC02 if removed.
2. Secondary (enhancers): High interest capabilities that appear to be strong enhancers of
the concepts and objectives, but may not be as key as the previous category. Enhances the
experiment but would not significantly impede the execution ofMC02 if removed.
3. Tertiary (nice but not critical): All have merit in their own right, but probably would not
influence the joint experiment to the same degree. It will not change any of the constructs
of the experiment if removed.

HQ, U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

Appendix 2 To Annex U To MC02 EXDIR

OBJECTIVES, W ARFIGHTING CHALLENGES, TASKS, SUBTASKS MATRIX
1. General
a. Assessment Strategy for Each Assessment Task. The Concepts Department of
USJFCOM has identified potential warfighting challenges facing RDO operations in 2007. For
each warfighting challenge, a number of JTF tasks and subtasks have been identified. These are
provided in Tab 1 to this Appendix. Many of the tasks and subtasks have been taken directly or
adapted from reference (a), Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Version 4.0. Measures have been
associated with each of the tasks and subtasks. Where applicable, the measures have been
adapted from the measures provided in the UJTL.
Tab 1:
General. This Tab contains the tasks, subtasks, and related measures for each
experiment warfighting challenge, organized by JTF HQ planning process and MC02
experiment objectives.
Objective #1: Establish And Maintain Information Superiority

Warfighting Challenge: Ability to provide Situational Awareness of JOA throughout the JTF
-Task: Maintain and distribute a timely and accurate relevant integrated picture of JTF units,
locations, status, and actions
Number of times each organization/staff is unable to obtain needed location information on
friendly forces from the CROP
Number of times each organization/staff is unable to obtain needed status information on
friendly forces from the CROP
Rating of Blue Forces ability to maintain and distribute a timely and accurate relevant integrated
picture of JTF units, locations, status, and actions
Instances in which organization/staff is unable to obtain needed location information on
adversary forces from the CROP
-Task: Use information to prevent surprises by the adversary

Instances in which organization/staff is unable to obtain needed adversary forces operational
capabilities information from the CROP
Instances in which organization/staff is unable to obtain needed adversary anticipated course of
action information from the CROP
Instances in which organization/staff is unable to obtain needed adversary intentions information
from the CROP
Rating of Blue Forces ability to determine and disseminate timely and accurate information on
relevant adversary's operational capabilities, location, courses of action, and intentions
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to use the CROP and collaboration to enhance JTF operational
instances in which organization/stajfis surprised by adversary actions, instances in which Blue
Force organizations raise issues that "challenge" the situation, rating ofBlue Forces ability to
use information to prevent surprises by the adversary
FOR OFFICIAL OSE ONLY C-14

-Task: Use shared awareness and collaboration to maintain operational tempo

Instances in which Blue Force commanders delayed making operational decision in order to
obtain additional information
Instances in which JTF submits RFIs to higher HQ for information
Instances in which approved ETOs or Op Orders are modified after they are approved
Rating of Blue Forces ability to maintain operational tempo
Number of unopened e-mails at HQ level
-Task: Use shared awareness and collaboration to facilitate synchronization of forces

Rating of Blue Forces ability to synchronize joint forces
Instances in which Blue Forces action are assessed as not synchronized
Objective #2: Rapidly Set Conditions For Decisive Operations

Warfighting Challenge: Ability to establish advantageous positions for decisive operations
-Task: Position combat-configured joint forces for decisive operations.
Subtask: Use joint force deployment planning procedures

Rating of effectiveness of j oint force deployment planning procedures
Rating of effectiveness of the JSOP on deployment planning procedures
Number of deployment requirements adjusted within seven days of movement by air and why
Rating of effectiveness of tailoring initial and follow-on logistics packages to reduce lift and
minimize footprint
Rating of effectiveness oflogistics procedures to develop and approve COAs (quicker) compared
to current procedures
Rating of the effectiveness of the experiment procedures and systems for sourcing, tailoring, and
validating the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD)
Subtask: Determine the impact of various Prep alternatives on the ability to rapidly close a
force
Rating of the effectiveness of Prep alternatives on the ability of the force to close rapidly
Subtask: Reduce JRSOI processing time

Rating of the effectiveness of the JTFs ability to shorten the JRSOI process by rapidly moving
and integrating the force compared to current RSOI process
Subtask: Assess deployment distribution structure

Rating of the effectiveness ofISBs to rapidly move and integrate deploying forces compared to
the current support concept
Rating of the effectiveness of different ISB locations
Rating of the effectiveness of information systems to synchronize deployment and redeployment
flow
Rating of the effectiveness of communications systems to synchronize the deployment and
redeployment flow
Rating of the effectiveness of tools (DSTs) to synchronize the deployment and redeployment
flow
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C-lS

Rating of the JFC's (JTLM) capability to divert assets based on the visibility of units, equipment,
and sustainment provided by the Logistics CROP
-Task: Conduct operational maneuver.
Subtask: Position j oint forces for operational formations

Percent of forces allocated to the JTF for planning that are actually deployed to theater
Instances of forces deployed to theater, but not used by the JTF
Subtask: Assemble forces in the joint operations area (JOA)

Percent of effects packages in designated assembly areas according to planned timelines
Percent of effects packages detected prior to reaching their designated assembly area
Percent of effects packages attacked prior to reaching their designated assembly area
Subtask: Provide operational mobility

Instances of friendly operational maneuver delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified due to
enemy emplaced obstacles
Hours that enemy obstacles delay movement of friendly forces
Subtask: Provide operational counter-mobility Instances of enemy major operations no

longer feasible due to friendly counter-mobility actions
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to decrease joint force vulnerability to disruption
-Task: Prevent hostile observation and disruption to operational forces

Instances of enemy or terrorist activity at APODs or SPODs
Instances of friendly operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified due to enemy or
terrorist activity at APODs or SPODs
Instances of enemy or terrorist activity at supply or ammunition receiving/staging sites
terrorist activity at supply or ammunition receiving/staging sites
terrorist exploitation of ISR.
Rating of the j oint force ability to decrease j oint force vulnerability to disruption
Objective #3: Assure Access Into And Through The Battlespace

Warfighting Challenge: Ability to provide selective dimensional superiority
-Task: Isolate and suppress adversary anti -access capabilities.

Rating of adequacy of enemy strategy to prevent friendly access to the theater
Rating of adequacy of friendly assessment of the enemy's anti -access strategy
Rating of adequacy of friendly strategy to counter enemy anti -access strategy
Instances of the movement of supplies or equipment to the enemy from outside JOA
Instances of enemy DIME support from outside the JOA
-Task: Achieve operational sanctuaries of space and time necessary to execute RDO.
FOR OF F ICIAL USE ONLY C-16

Friendly aircraft losses to enemy defenses (and enemy system engaging)

Friendly naval losses to enemy defenses (and enemy system engaging)
Friendly ground forces losses (forces in action) to enemy activity (and enemy system engaging
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to provide sufficient operational reach
-Task: Provide sufficient forces, capabilities, and sensor positioning mix to maximize operational
reach
Subtask: Optimize positioning to maximize operational reach (i.e., finding the adversary)
Percent of JTF units employed from their in-place theater locations
Percent of JTF units employed from staged locations
Instances of force positioning that does not take advantage of a units operational reach and
reason why
Subtask: Employ stealth capabilities (i.e., extending operational reach)

Percent of JTF air assets with stealth capability
Percent of enemy PMESII nodes attacked with stealth air assets
Subtask: Maximize sensor and weapon ranges (e.g., use of space)

Percent of information requirements covered by space assets
Instances of airborne sensor employment that does not take advantage of the asset's operational
reach and why instances of enemy PMESII nodes being attacked by a weapon when a longer
range and equally capable weapon was available
Instances of Blue stand off weapons use
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to enhance force protection
-Task: Provide protection for operational forces, means, and noncombatant in the JOA.
Friendly losses (troops and/or equipment not in action) resulting from enemy forces (ground or
naval), partisans, or terrorists
Damage to critical friendly infrastructure resulting from enemy forces (ground or naval),
partisans, or terrorists
Instances of friendly operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified due to attacks from
enemy forces (ground or naval), partisans, or terrorists
Percent of friendly ground forces assigned to rear area security
-Task: Protect systems and capabilities in the JOA.

Instances of compromise of friendly intentions causing j oint operations to be delayed, disrupted,
canceled, or modified
-Task: Provide operational air, space, and missile defense.
Subtask: Provide integrated air and missile defense

Time to establish an integrated friendly air and missile defense
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL)! C-17

Instances of friendly operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified due to enemy offensive
air or missile attacks
Subtask: Process/allocate operational aerospace targets

Percent of enemy offensive air threats engaged
Percent of enemy offensive missile threats engaged
Percent of friendly sorties devoted to air defense
Friendly support aircraft damaged or destroyed by friendly or enemy fires
Percent of enemy offensive air threats destroyed or neutralized
Friendly losses resulting from enemy offensive air attacks
Subtask: Conduct JOA missile defense

Percent of enemy offensive missiles destroyed in flight
Friendly losses resulting from enemy missile attacks
Subtask: Conduct tactical warning and attack assessment in the JOA

Percent of enemy offensive air threats detected
Percent of enemy offensive missile launches detected
Objective #4: Conduct Decisive Effects-Based Operations

Warfighting Challenge: Ability to synchronize the application of the full range ofjoint
capabilities in order to engage decisive points in time and space
-Task: Conduct j oint force targeting to support EBO.
Subtask: Use reach-back capabilities to enhance the targeting process

Rating of adequacy of the Joint Automated Target Folders (JATF)
Instances of issues concerning the relationship of the PEL to the JIPTL
Instances of issues concerning the cyclical targeting cycle and the non-cyclical ETO process
Instances of the usage of a High Payoff Target List (HPTL) and any issues over its relationship
to the PEL, JIPTL, and TST priority list
Rating of reach back capability in support of the targeting process
Rating of collaboration capability in support of the targeting process
Subtask: Establish joint force targeting guidance

For each desired effect in the ETO, the percent of available enemy PMESII nodes from the ONA
that are identified for "attack"
Subtask: Develop operational targets

Instances of enemy critical nodes discovered and attacked during ETO execution
Instances of joint force operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified awaiting operational
firepower support
Subtask: Conduct operational combat assessment

Percent of targets for which combat assessment is available
Percent of targets assessed as killed that are actually mission capable

Percent of targets unnecessarily reattacked

Average time to provide full combat assessment of attacks to JTF HQ
-Task: Attack operational targets to achieve desired effects.

Percent of enemy PMESII nodes successfully attacked (MoPs)
Instances of friendly actions having unintended effects that violate ROE or SECDEF guidance
Instances of collateral damage and fratricide
Percent of enemy nodes selected for attack that can be attacked using non-kinetic weapons
Percent of enemy nodes that are attacked using non-kinetic weapons
Percent of attacks using non-kinetic weapons that achieve desired effect
Subtask: Conduct precision engagement against time sensitive targets

Percent of TSTs detected, identified, and engaged by friendly assets
Percent of TSTs successfully neutralized or destroyed by friendly assets
Average target detection time
Average target ID and nomination time (time from initial detection to transmission of target able
location data)
Average engagement time (time from target ID and nomination to engagement)
Subtask: Document specific aspects of the TST process

Percent of TSTs detected, identified, and engaged by SOF assets
Percent of TSTs successfully neutralized or destroyed by SOF assets
Percent of TST BDA provided by SOF assets
Instances of TST missions being canceled by the JTF HQ
Instances of TST resource (sensor/weapon) issues that needed to be adjudicated by the JTF HQ
Instances of j oint force operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified due to TST mission
Document the TST guidance issued by the JTF commander
Instances of the usage of T ST pri ori ty categori es and their impact on T ST operati ons
Emerging joint collaborative planning lessons and requirements for future TST operations
Rating of collaboration processes for JTF and component planning of TSTs
Instances of degraded TST capability during transfer of TST responsibility from one functional
component to another
Rating of TST procedures used for MC02
Rating of functions of ADOCS as common targeting toolset
-Task: Coordinate and integrate joint / multinational and interagency support for EBO.
Percent of enemy nodes selected for attack that can be attacked using DIE actions
Percent of enemy nodes that are attacked using DIE actions
Percent of attacks using DIE means that achieve desired effect
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to integrate full joint capabilities against tactical level objectives
-Task: Synchronize and employ joint capabilities against key tactical objectives.
Instances of operational branches formerly closed to BLUE as options now feasible and
acceptable due to disrupted adversary

Instances of operational branches formerly open to adversary no longer feasible, suitable, or

acceptable due to disrupted adversary
Instances of adversary capability sufficiently disrupted to allow BLUE control of timing and
tempo of campaign or major operation
Instances of operational branches formerly open to BLUE no longer feasible, suitable, or
acceptable
Subtask: Conduct operations in the JOA

Instances of adversary surprised at initiation of BLUE actions
Instances of Blue surprised at initiation of adversary actions
Time for Blue to detect adversary's attack from execution of adversary action
Time for Blue to decide a new plan is required following detection
Time to prepare and disseminate the new plan following decision to act
Time for Blue to reposition to counter adversary's attack from plan dissemination
Subtask: Conduct Joint Tactical Actions (JTAs)

Percent of effects packages that are Joint Tactical Actions (JTAs)
Number of effects packages, which include support from, or support to, non-DoD organizations
Percent of JTA packages detected prior to concentration at decisive point
Percent of JTA packages attacked prior to concentration at decisive point
Percent of JTA packages executed by each functional component commander as the supported
commander
Percent of JTA packages executed by each functional component commander as the supporting
commander
Percent of functional component specific effects packages executed by each functional
component commander
-Task: Dynamically re-task effects packages for follow-on actions

Instances of effects packages, previously committed to action, not redeployed in response to
newly developing situation
Instances of JTF assets being double tasked
Number of effects packages supported by "forward presence" forces on or after C-Day
Number of effects packages supported by forces "transiting" the AOR on or after C-Day
Number of effects packages supported by "long range strike forces from the CONUS / other
AOR" on or after C-Day
Percent of effects packages under direct JTF HQ supervision
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to integrate execution of information operations into EBO
-Task: Execute offensive information operations, to include PSYOP and military deception.
Instances where appropriate 10 resources and capabilities are not factored into operational plans
and actions
Time to get approval for proposed operational 10 plans and actions
Instances of unintended 10 actions causing disruption or delay of operational plans and
objectives
FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONI,V C-20

Instances of operational 10 actions being delayed, defeated, or disrupted due to adversary

offensive 10 actions
Instances of operational 10 actions discarded due to timeliness of approval concerns
Percentage of operational 10 cell nominated "targets" struck during the timeframe planned for in
the ETO
Average time to provide full combat assessment of attacks to 10 "targets"
Percentage of operational 10 cell nominated "targets" restruck when called for after combat
assessment of initial strike
Percentage of preplanned targets successfully attacked
Percentage of operational 10 objectives verifiably achieved
Objective #5: Sustain The Force

Warfighting Challenge: Ability to provide agile sustainment
-Task: Rapidly process data and generate logistics knowledge by integrating sustainment as an
integral part of effects-based operations
Rating of effectiveness to collect, process and display full visibility of operations and logistics
information
Rating of effectiveness of displaying complex logistics information
Rating of effectiveness ofDSTs to ensure a "predictive" capability for logistics
Rating of effectiveness of how well DSTs assisted and synchronized the deployment flow in
accordance with the directions of the supported commander
Rating of effectiveness of the ability to acquire critical logistics information from the Logistics
CROP for planning and analysis and dissemination to subordinate logistics commanders
-Task: Employ a networked sustainment distribution structure to satisfy the JFC sustainment
requirements for RDO
Subtask: Tailor sustainment for synchronization with deploying forces

Rating of effectiveness of tailoring sustainment for synchronization with deploying forces
Rating of effectiveness of a networked sustainment distribution structure to satisfy the JFC
sustainment requirements for RDO
Subtask: Shape the logistics footprint in JOA to extend operational reach

Rating of effectiveness of shaping the logistics footprint in JOA to extend operational reach
Rating of effectiveness of the RDO procedures and practices to ensure time-definite delivery,
improve throughput and support agile mobile forces
Rating of effectiveness of using strategic lift to augment theater distribution
Rating of effectiveness of the combination of delivery platforms to ensure time-definite delivery,
Rating of effectiveness of employing a combination of delivery platforms to improve throughput
and provide the agility needed to sustain mobile forces while ensuring time-definite delivery
Subtask: Employ a combination of delivery platforms to ensure time-definite delivery,


Rating of effectiveness of the combination of delivery platforms to ensure time-definite delivery,

Rating of effectiveness of using strategic lift to augment theater distribution
-Task: Gain and maintain knowledge of force health status
Subtask: Track patients throughout the theater of operations and to CONUS

Rating of effectiveness of the ability to track patients throughout the theater of operations and to
CONUS
Rating of effectiveness of medical SITREP
Rating of effectiveness of the ability to monitor DNBI / combat casualty rates as related to force
readiness
Rating of effectiveness of the chemical/biological early detection and early warning
-Task: Provide battlefield medical care

Rating of effectiveness of advanced life support far forward
Rating of effectiveness of the ability to provide blood services in the JOA
Rating of effectiveness of the ability to transport seriously injured and unstable casualties
Rating of effectiveness of the ability to provide j oint medical theater logistics management
Concept: Standing Joint Force Headquarters
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to quickly achieve cohesive C2 of a joint force
-Task: Quickly establish a JTF HQ ready to conduct RDO.

Time required for the JTF HQ to commence effects-based planning.
Instances of difference between Battle Rhythm proposed by JSOP and that observed
Rating of SJFHQ value-added in surmounting the JTF HQ learning curve.
Subtask: Establish a Standing element of a Joint Force Headquarters
Difference between JSOP proposed SJFHQ structure to that observed.
Time SJFHQ was actually established and actually functioning as its mission was defined.
Percent of SJFHQ positions filled.
Amount of change to SJFHQ membership.
Rating of adequacy of scope of responsibility for SJFHQ positions
Subtask: Employ the SJFHQ to conduct pre-crisis planning

Comparison of JSOP proposed SJFHQ pre-crisis activities and products to those observed.
Instances of intentionally omitted pre-crisis SJFHQ activities or products.
Rating of pre-crisis SJFHQ product adequacy
Assessment of info available to allow development of pre-crisis products.
Rating that ADP tools were sufficiently available/capable to develop pre-crisis products.
Rating of workload within SJFHQ groups.
Rating of SJFHQ pre-crisis product utility.
Instances where JTF HQ needed/desired additional products from SJFHQ pre-crisis planning.
Rating of SJFHQ pre-crisis planning adequacy.

Subtask: Integrate the SJFHQ into the JTF HQ to perform RDO planning and execution
Rating of SJFHQ responsibility distribution as a result of integration.
Instances of recommended improvements to SJFHQ organization and positions.
Rating of the adequacy of SJFHQ support.
Rating of SJFHQ contribution to JTF HQ accomplishment of key elements of effects-based
planning and operations.
Instances of process help Corps needed/desired/requested from the SJFHQ.
-Task: Provide continuity in planning and operations from pre-crisis through execution and
transition.
Rating of SJFHQ contribution to continuity in planning and operations from pre-crisis through
execution and transition.
Subtask: Establish cell-organized JTF HQ around the SJFHQ structure and processes.
Rating of the ability to form JTF HQ according to JSOP.
Instances of JTF HQ organization and function differing from JSOP.
Rating of effectiveness of new JTF HQ organization.
Subtask: Use a SJFHQ architecture to establish a j oint force C2 structure

Instances of differences between JSOP prescribed Component participation on virtual boards/
cells/ centers/ working groups and that observed.
Assessment of affect Group/ Board/ Center/ celli WG structure had on Component participation.
Instances of differences between JSOP prescribed combatant commander participation on virtual
boards/ cells/ centers/ WGs and that observed.
Assessment of affect Group/ Board/ Center/ celli WG structure had on combatant commander
participation.
Subtask: Employ the SJFHQ to assist deployment of forward headquarters

Rating of utility of SJFHQ to support deployment of forward HQ.
Instances of difference from JSOP forward deployment process.
Subtask: Employ the SJFHQ to assist in the conduct of staff operations.

Rating of SJFHQ contribution to JTF HQ performance of key operational C2 functions.
Rating of the utility of the SJFHQ to JTF C2 functions over the course of the contingency.
Subtask: Employ the SJFHQ to assist in coordination and integration of interagency support.
Rating of the utility of the SJFHQ habitual relationship on JTF-IAC interaction.
Instances of difference between JSOP-envisioned lAC participation in virtual boards and cells
and that observed.
Rating of SJFHQ-IAC relationship over the course of the contingency.
Concept: Operational Net Assessment
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to analyze adversary PMESII systems for tangible and intangible
strengths and weaknesses
FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONI,V C-23

-Task: Develop an ONA information knowledge base

Rating of the adequacy of how Blue DIME capabilities versus Red/adversary PEMSII systems
comparative analyses are captured in ONA knowledge base
Rating of Blue information adequacy included in ONA knowledge base
Rating of the adequacy of how the ONA knowledge base provides a shared awareness of the
JOA
Rating of the adequacy of how the ONA knowledge base supports ETO development
-Task: Analyze Red's PMESII systems (for tangible and intangible strengths and weaknesses)
Rating of Red PMESII systems comprehensiveness included in the ONA knowledge base
Number of adversary nodes included in ONA knowledge base that adversary felt were
critical/high value
Number of adversary nodes included in ONA knowledge base that adversary felt were
vulnerable
Rating of the adequacy of PMESII analyses to promote understanding of adversary's goals
Rating of the adequacy ofPMESII analyses to promote understanding of the adversary's (self)
perceived strengths
Rating of the adequacy ofPMESII analyses to promote understanding of the adversary's (self)
perceived weaknesses
-Task: Continually update the ONA to reflect battlespace change

Number of times ONA updated after JTF formation
Rating of ONA update currency
Time required updating ONA knowledge base
-Task: Employ automated tools to virtually and collaboratively access, manipulate, and maintain
the ONA knowledge base
Rating of automated tools adequacy used for information retrieval from ONA knowledge base
Rating of automated tools adequacy used for ONA knowledge base maintenance
Frequency of ONA knowledge base information access
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to use DNA to enhance decision-making
-Task: Determine if the ONA products compliment JTF staff actions

Time needed by ONA users to find desired information in ONA knowledge base
Rating of adequacy of ONA use for board/center/cell preparation and other staff action
Number of instances information desired by ONA users but not included or not found in ONA
knowledge base
Rating of adequacy of ONA use in PEL development
Rating of adequacy of ONA use in ETO development
-Task: Identify adversary's vulnerabilities, intentions, and keynotes

Comparison ofETO focus of adversary's vulnerabilities with ONA depiction of vulnerabilities
Comparison ETO focus of adversary's intentions with ONA depiction of intentions
Comparison ofETO focus of adversary's key nodes with ONA depiction of key nodes
FOR OFFICIAl, lISE ONLY C-24

-Task: Identify potential second and third order effects for contemplated actions
Percent ofETOs developed with second and third order effects identified for tasked actions
Number of instances JFC and staff used second and third order effects in there decision process
-Task: Prioritize and select potential courses of action

Number of instances JFC and staff used ONA knowledge base as reference source to prioritize
COA, branches, and sequels
Rating of the adequacy of the ONA knowledge base as reference source to select COA,
branches, and sequels
-Task: Use ONA to operate within adversary's decision cycle

Number of instances ONA-supported Blue action interrupted adversary's ability to command and
control its force
Number of adversary actions considered successful by JFC and staff
Number of adversary actions unexpected by JFC and staff
Percent of time JFC and staff thought they was operating within the adversary's decision cycle
JFC and staff's rating of ONA effectiveness in support of operating inside of the adversary's
decision cycle
Subtask: Assess the operational situation using the CIE
Concept: Effects-Based Operations (Planning And Assessment)
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to conduct effects-based planning
-Task: Conduct operational mission analysis to support EBO.

Documentation of mission, intent, and planning guidance given to the JTF commander by the
combatant commander
Documentation of the Mission Analysis Brief
Rating of CROP value to effects-based planning
Rating of collaborative environment value to effects-based planning
Rating of the additional demands on the planners' time resulting from effects-based planning and
collaboration.
Rating of the additional demands on the commander's time resulting from effects-based planning
and collaboration.
Number ofIAC, COE, NGO, or other non-traditional participants in the mission analysis process
Instances of non-traditional participant contributions to mission analysis
Subtask: Identify desired effects

Assessment of ability of planners to state desired effects in terms of adversary action or behavior
to be changed, created, or prevented
Assessment of ability of planners to state desired effects in terms of the desired level of change
Assessment of ability of planners to state desired effects in terms of the desired scope and
distribution of the effect
Assessment of ability of planners to state desired effects in terms of the intended timing of the
effect
FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONI,V C-25

Percent of desired effects that were in the baseline ONA

Instances where prioritization of effects assisted or restricted COA development and adaptation
Subtask: Identify key nodes and vulnerabilities using the ONA and JIPB
Instances of ONAIJIPB contributing to identification of key nodes in adversary systems
Instances of ONAIJIPB contributing to identification key links in adversary systems
Instances of ONAIJIPB contributing to the conduct of center of gravity and critical vulnerability
analysis
Instances of ONAIJIPB contributing to identification of adversary leadership decision making
process( es)
Instances of ONAIJIPB contributing to identification of friendly strengths and weaknesses
relative to the adversary
-Task: Use effects-based planning to develop and analyze COA.

Documentation of the initial planning guidance given by the CJTF to his staff
Documentation of any warning orders issued by the JTF
Documentation of approved PEL, CONOPs, and COAs
Subtask: Conduct predictive analysis (examine anticipated potential outcomes of actions);

model adversary critical systems to identify and analyze anticipated direct and indirect
effects of actions
Rating of effectiveness of the process for consideration of the adversary's potential COAs and
potential responses to friendly action
Rating of effectiveness of the process for examination of intended and unintended potential
outcomes
Rating of effectiveness of the process for examination of causal linkages through which actions
create effects
Rating of effectiveness of the process for consideration of indirect effects
Rating of effectiveness of the process for consideration of outcomes outside of the local area
Number of indirect effects that were in the baseline ONA
Rating of the utility of modeling and simulation tools used in the identification of the pros, cons,
and alternatives to tactical actions
Assessment of the use of influence models to assist in the production of a better-reasoned plan
Rating of the utility of the ONAIJIPB to predictive analysis
Instances where predictive analysis assists in the production of a better reasoned COA
Rating of the value of predictive analysis
Subtask: Integrate input from JIACG

Rating of utility of non-traditional players to the production of a better reasoned COA
Instances of valuable contributions by non-traditional participants to the COA development
process
Rating of whether all aspects ofPMESII were addressed during development of the COA
Instances where military and non-military (DIME) effects were not synchronized in time and
space
Instances where the capabilities of all elements of national power (DIME) were not considered
during COA development
F OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C-26

Subtask: Components refine concept of operations and COA using the CIE
Rating of effectiveness of actions selected based on their impact against adversary pressure
points
Rating of collaborative environment value to cross component COA development
Percent ofPMESII nodes identified for attack that were contained in the baseline ONA
Instances where measures of performance (MoP) were not developed for each component level
task and/or action
Subtask: Identify assessment requirements

Instances where actions are not traceable back to higher-level strategy
Instances where measures of effectiveness (MoE) were not developed for each JTF level desired
effect
Assessment of whether MoE were meaningful, reliable, and observable
Subtask: Collaboratively analyze COA

Rating of effectiveness of the BluelRed cell contribution to the COA analysis process
Instances where potential Red reactions to Blue actions were considered
Rating of the wargaming process to produce branches and sequels
-Task: Prepare, synchronize, and issue effects tasking order (ETO)
Subtask: Prepare ETO

Rating of clarity of effects-based mission orders to the components
Rating of clarity of supported / supporting command relationships to the components
Number of effects given to each functional component commander for planning as the supported
commander
Number of effects given to each functional component commander for planning as the
supporting commander
Rating of utility of collaboration processes for component planning of joint tactical actions
Subtask: Issue and synchronize ETO

Instances where military actions of the components were not synchronized in time and space
Document who facilitated/directed the component planning process
Rating of how the integration matrix enhanced the component planning process
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to conduct effects assessment
-Task: Assess the progress of achieving the full range of operational effects (DIME).
Percent of time the JTF correctly assesses the effects achieved by their actions
Instances of effects that were not anticipated by the JTF
Average time to provide full effects assessment to the JTF
Instances of incorrect effects assessment due to missing or poorly constructed MoE
Rating of the collaboration capability in support of the effects assessment process
Rating of the interagency community (lAC) and centers of excellence (COE) contribution to the
effects assessment process

Instances of the JFC receiving different views of the success of the operation
Rating of CROP tool adequacy for displaying progress toward desired effects
Rating of the effectiveness of the process by which Combat Assessment is passed to the EAC
Rating of the usefulness of combat assessment to effects assessment
Rating of usefulness of MoP in assessing MoE
Subtask: Integrate effects assessment information requirements into the JISR collection plan
Percent of MoEs covered by at least one asset in the JISR collection plan
Rating of the additional workload created by the effects assessment process on the intelligence
organizations
-Task: Adapt COA based on effects assessment.

Instances of the JTF changing the set of tactical actions employed to achieve a desired effect as a
result of deficiency analysis
Instances of the COA being adapted to respond to an unanticipated effect or enemy action
discovered during effects assessment
Average time to adapt the COA and produce a change to the ETO
Rating of the value of effects assessment to the planning process
Instances of the ETO being adapted during execution due to an unanticipated effect or enemy
action discovered during effects assessment
Instances of military actions that were not maintained in synchronization with non-DoD actions
during COA adaptation
Rating of the CIE impact on daily battle rhythm
Rating of the ability of the players to recognize changes to the ETO
Rating of the JTF's ability to maintain the initiative relative to the enemy
-Task: Assess the contribution of effects to achieving the desired end state
Document the process to support the assessment of combatant commander/JTF objectives
Rating of CROP tool adequacy for displaying progress toward combatant commander/JTF
objectives
Rating of collaboration processes adequacy for collective accomplishment ofNCA assigned
objectives and/or effects
Number of operational objectives achieved by Blue actions
Number of operational objectives achieved by Blue actions within prescribed time lines
Number of operational objectives achieved by adversary actions
Concept: Collaborative Information Environment (CIE).
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to establish a valid COP and build the CROP in a CIE
-Task: Develop the Common Operational Picture (COP)
Subtask: Collect, Process Fuse, and Disseminate Information On Opponent Force

Percent of enemy ground forces correctly located and identified in the COP
Percent of enemy naval forces correctly located and identified in the COP
Percent of enemy air forces correctly located and identified in the COP

Timeliness of enemy ground force situation display in the COP

Timeliness of enemy naval situation display in the COP
Timeliness of enemy air situation display in the COP
Timeliness of status on enemy communication systems in the COP
Accuracy of status on enemy communication systems in the COP
Timeliness of status on enemy sensors in the COP
Accuracy of status on enemy sensors in the COP
Subtask: Generate Service-specific Friendly Integrated Tactical Picture

Timeliness of each Service's friendly single integrated tactical picture
Accuracy of each Service's friendly single integrated tactical picture (unit locations@ time)
Subtask: MergelFuse Component Tactical Pictures into a COP and disseminate to all
Echelons of the joint force
Timeliness of the fused picture disseminated to each echelon
Accuracy of the fused picture (unit locations & status) disseminated to each echelon
Rating of usefulness of the fused picture disseminated to each echelon
Subtask: Enable supporting/background data to be associated with tracks and cut and paste
between applications
Percent of attempts successful
Subtask: Manage track database to support valid/viable COP

Rating of adequacy of process and procedures used to maintain track database
-Task: Establish the "Virtual Warehouse" of information for the CROP
Subtask: Manage system enabling exchange of relevant information lAW the 1M Plan
Rating of adequacy of process and procedures used to exchange relevant information
Timeliness of friendly unit status information (personnel/equipment/supply) posted on CROP
(update schedule vs. actual time update complete)
Accuracy of friendly unit status information (personnel/equipment/supply) posted on CROP
(posted status vs. ground truth)
Timeliness of information regarding status of friendly information systems/communications
nodes
Accuracy of information regarding status of friendly information systems/communications nodes
Timeliness of information regarding status of friendly sensor systems
Accuracy of information regarding status of friendly sensor systems
Timeliness of enemy OOB status information (readiness/posture) posted on CROP (update
schedule vs. actual time update complete)
Accuracy of enemy OOB status information (readiness/posture) posted on CROP (posted status
vs. ground truth)
Document methods employed to collect, store and retrieve information
Subtask: Coordinate/manage collection, processing, and dissemination of information to be

"pushed" lAW commander's policy

Number and content of information products "pushed" to users during each 24-hour period
Timeliness of weather information posted on CROP (time updates available vs. actual time
update disseminated)
Ratings of usefulness of weather information posted
Timeliness and awareness of operational information (Mission, Commander's Intent, ROE,
ONA, ETO, ATO) posted on CROP (update availability time vs. actual time update disseminated
vs. actual time update
Timeliness and awareness of operational targeting information (Tgt Number, shooting platform,
time of engagement, effects assessment) posted on CROP
Timeliness and awareness of operational maneuver/attack information (Units participating,
supported/supporting relationships, objectives, time of action) posted on CROP
Ratings of the CROP for indicators of "richness"
Subtask: Coordinate/manage collection, processing, and dissemination of information to be

subscribed to lAW commander's policy
Number and content of information products "pulled" by users during each 24-hour period
Rating of usefulness of tools and processes used to collect, store, and retrieve information from
the CROP
Subtask: Implement a standard desktop configuration for the "joint" level of the CROP and
enable limited user tailoring
Ratings of accessibility/usefulness of standard CROP desktop configuration
Subtask: Enable users to be able to publish available information to the CROP lAW the 1M
Plan
Ratings of ability to publish to the CROP
Subtask: Enable users ability to advertise available information to the CROP lAW the 1M
Plan
Ratings of ability to advertise to the CROP
Ratings of ability to alert affected organizations to time sensitive information in the CROP
Subtask: Enable users to "search" for specific information requirements

Ratings of the adequacy of "search" tools in the CROP
Warfighting Challenge: Ability ta plan callabaratively
-Task: Conduct Planning, execution, and Assessment in a Collaborative Environment
Subtask: Establish a persistent Collaborative Environment Across Echelons of Command,

Interagency Participants, and centers of Excellence enabling formal and informal
collaboration sessions as well as large auditorium sessions
Number of collaborative sessions across echelons of command, interagency participants, and
centers of excellence
Length (time) of collaborative sessions across echelons of command, interagency participants,
and centers of excellence

Ratings of quality of Products produced by collaborative sessions across echelons of command,

interagency participants, and centers of excellence
Ratings of usefulness of collaborative sessions across echelons of command, interagency
participants, and centers of excellence
Ratings of impact of differences in culture among participants in collaborative sessions across
echelons of command, interagency participants, and centers of excellence
Ratings of ability to overcome problems encountered during collaborative planning sessions
Number of times (Instances) that misunderstandings occurred regarding current situation
Ratings of participants shared awareness provided by information available
Number of times that specified means of collaboration were observed
Number of times that specific types of collaboration occurred
Ratings of participants' confidence in information received via collaboration systems
Subtask: Conduct Joint Enroute Planning and Mission Rehearsal

Time required completing enroute planning
Ratings of effectiveness of joint enroute planning
Subtask: Conduct Command and control of on-going operations using collaborative

tool sfcapabili ti es
Number of collaborative C2 sessions across echelons of command, interagency participants, and
centers of excellence
Length (time) of collaborative C2 sessions across echelons of command, interagency
Ratings of usefulness of C2 planning sessions across echelons of command, interagency
Ratings of standing procedures for compensating for system problems encountered during C2
collaborative planning sessions
Concept: Enhance Interagency Perspective Within The JFHQ
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to quickly achieve and maintain cohesive relationships with the
interagency (IA) community
-Task: Establish Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)

Percent of JIACG manned lAW concept
-Task: Establish Interagency Collaborative Information Environment (IACIE)

Tool Availability Rate: time C4I tool used divided by the time tool required
Rating of adherence to the published C4I tool business rules.
-Task: Develop secure process and protocols among interagency participants to provide effective
collaboration.
Subtask: Establish interagency planning mechanisms that will guard internal security
information.
Frequency of Instances where IA security processes had an effect on IA collaboration

Subtask: Establish interagency planning mechanisms that will guard internal protocols
Frequency of Instances where IA protocol processes had an effect on IA collaboration
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to improve interagency campaign planning & execution
-Task: Implement Political-Military Plans
Subtask: JIACG coordinates with OSD and Joint Staff strategic planners.
Frequency of expanded coordination with NSC system (DCIPCIPCC) during parallel operational
planning and implementation.
Rating of effectiveness of the ability of the JIACG to coordinate with OSD and Joint Staff
strategic planners
Subtask: JIACG informs combatant commander/JTF staffs ofPCC's pol-mil guidance

Rating of effectiveness of the implementation of pol-mil guidance
Subtask: JIACG coordinates with other departments' and agencies' campaign planners
Frequency of expanded coordination with departments and agencies in parallel campaign
planning.
Rating of effectiveness of the JIACG to coordinate with other departments and agency campaign
planners
-Task: Provide continuity in coordinated planning and operations from pre-crisis thru execution
and transition with the Joint Interagency Coordination Group
Subtask: JIACG provides IA perspective on proposed flexible deterrent operations

Rating of participation by JIACG/IA departments and agencies providing perspective on FDOs
during the deterrent phase of operation.
Rating of effectiveness of the JIACG to provide IA perspective on FDOs
Subtask: JIACG coordinates potential desired effects with other departments and agencies
Frequency of the combatant commander/JTF collaboration process with departments and
agencIes
Rating of effectiveness of the JIACG to coordinate potential desired effects with other
departments and agencies
Subtask: JIACG provides combatant commander/JTF staffs IA operational concernsl

recommendations during execution of compel/defeat actions
Frequency of the combatant commander/JTF collaboration process with departments and
agencies during execution of compel/defeat actions
Rating of effectiveness of the JIACG to provide combatant commander/JTF staffs IA operational
concernsl recommendations during execution of compel/defeat actions
FOR OFFICIAL lISE ONLY C-32

Concept: Joint Theater Logistics Management
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to plan for Agile Sustainment
-Task: Integrate deployment and sustainment planning as an integral part of the effects-based
planning process.
Subtask: Determine the type and span of j oint control that best facilitates management of
logistics functions
Rating of effectiveness of the RDO construct to facilitate management of logistics functions
Rating of effectiveness of the logistics C2 battle rhythm
Subtask: Reduce the logistics footprint in theater and JOA

Rating of the effectiveness of (how) JTLM to reduce logistics footprint in theater and JOA
-Task: Define the JTF Logistics Position Functions and Essential Elements of Logistics
Information
Rating of the effectiveness of TTP and JSOP prescribed functions and processes for the logistics
operations positions
Rating of the effectiveness of TTP and JSOP prescribed high order logistics EEl for the logistics
operations positions
Rating of the effectiveness of TTP and JSOP prescribed boards, centers, cells, and working
group for the logistics operations positions
Rating of the effectiveness of TTP and JSOP prescribed functions and processes for the Logistics
plans Positions
Rating of the effectiveness of TTP and JSOP prescribed High order Logistics EEl for the
Logistics plans Positions
Rating of the effectiveness of TTP and JSOP prescribed boards, centers, cells, and Working
Group for the Logistics plans Positions
-Task: Leverage Decision Support Tool (DST) emerging technologies to rapidly process data and
create operationally relevant logistics information
Subtask: Determine the tools required to provide the JFC and subordinates the knowledge
needed to assess the logistics feasibility of operational actions
Rating of effectiveness of tools to provide the JFC and subordinates, the information required
determining the logistics feasibility of operational actions
Subtask: Determine the improvements needed to feeder and umbrella information systems
Rating of the effectiveness of feeder and umbrella information systems to improve asset
visibility
Rating of effectiveness of feeder and umbrella information systems to increase the capacity of
the logistics system, including both supply and transportation
Rating of effectiveness of feeder and umbrella information systems to improve control of supply
and transportation assets
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V C-33

Subtask: Employ a logistics display that enhances the JFC's ability to synchronize
sustainment
Rating effectiveness of a logistics display to synchronize sustainment in support of rapid decisive
operations
-Task: Determine and employ a networked sustainment distribution structure
Subtask: Leverage and tailor Intermediate Staging and Support Bases

Rating effectiveness of tailoring Intermediate Staging and Support Bases (ISBs) to support to
RDO forces
Rating of the effectiveness of the ISB management
Subtask: Tailor sustainment for synchronization with deploying and redeploying forces
Rating of effectiveness synchronization of tailored sustainment with deploying forces
Subtask: Determine the means of reducing the logistics footprint in JOA

Rating of effectiveness of the reducing the logistics footprint in JOA
Subtask: Ensure time-definite delivery

Rating of effectiveness of the procedures and practices to ensure time-definite delivery
Rating of effectiveness of the procedures and practices to improve throughput
Rating of effectiveness of the procedures and practices to support agile mobile forces
Joint Initiatives
Ability to employ joint initiatives to facilitate the planning coordination and execution of
Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO).
-Task: Employ Collaborative Tool Suite, IWS 2.5 to facilitate collaboration.

Rating of the ease of use ofIWS 2.5 (i.e. file sharing, posting to the whiteboard, holding
sidebars)
Rating of the effectiveness of IWS 2.5 tool suite in support of distributed collaborative planning.
Rating ofIWS 2.5's ability to help maintain an accurate CROP by the use of its various tools (i.e.
whiteboard, file sharing, audio collaboration, etc.).
Document user recommendations on the collaborative tool suite for XC 4I functionality
improvement.
-Task: Employ Global C2 System Integrated Imagery and Intelligence (GCCS-I3) to facilitate
assessment and battlespace visualization.
Rating of GCCS-I3 ability to access the collaborative tool via the web browser to validate critical
nodes in ONA.
Rating of GCCS-I3 ability to access information in the Image Management Database, Reference
Database, and the Naval Intelligence Database.
Rating of GCCS-I3 ability to access the required databases to collaborate with the ETO (and
ONA) development group using standard collaboration tools and the COP.

Rating of GCCS-I3 ability to access the Imager Manager and the Video Ingestor and/or the Java
Image Video
Exploitation capability to collaborate on combat assessment using saved or live streaming video
and imagery files.
Rating of GCCS-13 ability to access required databases and networks to collaborate with the
targeting tools and Electronic Targeting Folders.
Rating of GCCS-I3 ability to search, view and share information drawn from required databases
to demonstrate the capability to collaborate with targeteers and the ETO assessment
development.
Document user recommendations on GCCS-I3 for XC 4I functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ Joint Dynamic ISR Management (JDISRM) to enhance the passing of control of
assigned unmanned sensors between the military Services.
Rating of the ability of JDISRM to facilitate functional components in conducting mission
planning.
Rating of the ability of JDISRM to facilitate functional components in the development of
Operational Net Assessments.
Rating of the ability of JDISRM to facilitate functional components in maintaining enemy
situational awareness.
Rating of the ability of JDISRM to facilitate functional components in executing the planned
mISSIOn.
Rating of the ability of JDISRM to facilitate functional components in receiving or providing
targeting information.
Rating of the adequacy of established unit TTPs (how's, when's, what's, and where' s) on
coordinating the transfer or receiving of sensor control between sensors/Services.
Rating of the ability of JDISRM to facilitate functional components in coordinating with the
other functional components.
Document user recommendations on JDISRM for XC 4I functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ ONA SUITE (Genoa, AnalNB, ArcView/IMS) to facilitate structured

argumentation methodology for decision support, visual investigative analysis software, and
multi -user geo-database storage and management.
Rating of the ONA Suite's ability to enable assessments of strategies to counter crisis
progresSIOn.
Rating of the ONA Suite's ability to be used as a multimedia knowledge management tool for
organizing, presenting, and sharing diverse information in a notebook-centric paradigm.
Rating of the ONA Suite's capability to provide metadata search and editing of objects within a
Windows file system.
Rating of the ONA Suite's capability to perform as a structured tool for providing early warning
and situation assessments.
Rating of the ONA Suite's capability to function as a collaborative structured argument tool for
planning and analysis of uncertain situations.
Document user recommendations on the ONA Suite for XC 4I functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ Logistics Tool Suite (LTS) to facilitate logistics support.

Rating of effectiveness of tools to provide the JFC and subordinates, the information required
determining the logistics feasibility of operational actions.
Rating of effectiveness of displaying complex logistics information.
Document user recommendations on the LTS for XC 4I functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ Theater Medical Information Program (TMIP) to facilitate automated medical
record data capture and medical intelligence gathering.
Rating of the effectiveness of the ability to provide joint medical theater logistics management.
Document user recommendations on the TMIP for XC 4I functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ j oint fires initiative (JFI) Automated Deep Operations Coordinating System
(ADOCS) to facilitate the coordinating of joint assets on time sensitive targets.
Rating of ADOCS ability to timely and accurately exchange information between the SJFHQ
and the Component Services.
Rating of ADOCS ability to timely and accurately plan/coordinate the joint battlespace needs of
the SJFHQ (Airspace Deconfliction, ACO Visualization, LimitedlProtected Targets, and Kill
Box Management).
Rating of ADOCS ability to timely and accurately execute time sensitive targeting for the
SJFHQ (Weapon Target Pairing, Predictive BDA, Counter Fire COP).
Rating of the ADOCS ability to timely and accurately perform joint targeting missions for the
SJFHQ (ELINT Display/Analysis, Terrain Analysis, 3D Visualization, Radar Exploitation).
Documentation of how ADOCS was used for warfighting tasks.
Rating of utility of ADOCS for warfighting tasks accomplished.
Document user recommendations for ADOCS functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ Tactical Exploitation System - Enhanced Joint Targeting (TES-EJT) to facilitate
direct target nomination to both Army and Navy indirect fire systems.
Rating of the components capability to support the JTF when TES-EJT connectivity is lost.
Rating of the TES-EJT ability to view real-time pictures from another Service's system using the
Remote Terminal Console (RTC).
Rating of the ability of the JTF HQ to monitor tasking and reassign work priority (tasks) between
TES and TES-N.
Rating of the TES-EJT ability to accept and transfer data from another component's sensor data
(including UA V digital imagery).
Rating of the TES-EJT ability to "reach back" for additional ISR information from another
component's system to support missions.
Rating of the TES-EJT ability to hand-off the tracking of critical targets between component's
systems.
Rating of the TES-EJT ability to hand-off targets for nomination to another Service's fire control
system.
Rating of the ability to share ISR information between TES and TES-N overall.
Documentation of how TES-EJT was used for warfighting tasks.
Rating of utility of TES-EJT for warfighting tasks accomplished.
Document user recommendations for TES-EJT functionality improvement.

-Task: Employ Automatic Network Information Flow (ANIF) to facilitate the dynamic
reapportionment of bandwidth.
Rating of the ANIF ability to dynamically reapportion bandwidth.
Instances of significant difficulties with functionality of system as a Stand Alone.
Instances of significant difficulties with integration, transmitting, receiving of information
to/from the MC02 JDN (Joint Data Network).
Instances of significant difficulties with the speed and reliability of the system.
Instances of significant difficulties with availability of external support (e.g. Service, JFCOM,
Program Office, Contractor).
Instances of significant difficulties with any additional interoperability or integration problems.
Instances of Unexpected IERs (Information Exchange Requirements) or KPP (Key Performance
Parameter) requirements.
Rating of the usefulness of ANIF towards helping JTF HQ in completing its mission.
Documentation of how ANIF was used for warfighting tasks.
Rating of utility of ANIF for warfighting tasks accomplished.
Document user recommendations for ANIF functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ Network Security Management Correlation & Display (NSMC&D) to facilitate
the central database for correlation, analysis, and reporting of network status.
Rating of the NSMC&D ability to monitor the Service Components' and JFHQ's intrusion
detection/firewall sensors throughout the JTF enterprise, to cover the Computer Network
Defense aspects of the CROP.
Instances of significant difficulties with functionality of system as a Stand Alone.
Instances of significant difficulties with availability of external support (I.e. Service, JFCOM,
Rating of the usefulness ofNSMC&D towards helping JTF HQ in completing its mission.
Documentation of how NSMC&D was used for warfighting tasks.
Rating of utility ofNSMC&D for warfighting tasks accomplished.
Document user recommendations for NSMC&D functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ Joint Enroute Mission Planning & Rehearsal System - Near Term (JEMPRS-NT)
to facilitate the use of collaborative tools enroute to AOR.
Rating of the collaborative capability between the JTF Forward HQ element and the components
as it transitions to the area of operations.
Rating of the communications data rates in support of reach-back communications.
Rating of the information flow and process support capability to allow the warfighters to perform
required tasks without additional bandwidth demand.
Documentation of how JEMPRS-NT was used for warfighting tasks.
Rating of utility of JEMPRS-NT for warfighting tasks accomplished.
Document user recommendations for JEMPRS-NT functionality improvement.

-Task: Employ Maneuver Control System - Tactical Combat Operations (MCS-TCO) to

facilitate Army and Marine Corps Interface Command and Control/Situational Awareness
systems.
Rating of the ability to establish connectivity between the MCS and TCO.
Rating of the ability to accept situational awareness data from the other Service's system.
Rating of the ability to display graphics from the other Service's system.
Rating of the ability to populate ones system's databases with data from the other Service's
system via Auto-Post/Auto-Fill.
Documentation of how MCS-TCO was used for warfighting tasks.
Rating of utility of MCS-TCO for warfighting tasks accomplished.
Document user recommendations for MCS-TCO functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) to facilitate Air Force rapid reaction force
package to meet anti-access challenges.
Rating of the GSTF's ability to disseminate information to support the JTF ONA build.
USAF looking at additional Service specific measures.
Documentation of how GSTF was used for warfighting tasks.
Rating of utility of GSTF for warfighting tasks accomplished.
Document user recommendations for GSTF functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ Joint Public Affairs Operations Group (JP AOG) to facilitate the planning, and
command and control ofPA units.
Rating of the JP AOG' s ability to timely and accurately collect P A actions for the SJFHQ.
Rating of the JP AOG' s ability to timely and accurately collect and classify field reports for
public release.
Rating of the JP AOG' s ability to interface with mobile secure and non-secure sources.
Rating of the JP AOG' s ability to collaborate with military and civilianlNGOs on issues/requests
for information.
Rating of the JP AOG' s effectiveness in command and control of the various P A units in the pre-
deployment to early entry phases of the operation.
Documentation of how JPAOG was used for warfighting tasks.
Rating of utility of JP AOG for warfighting tasks accomplished.
Document user recommendations for JP AOG functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ National Imagery & mapping Agency Crisis Action Response Team (NIMA-
CART) to facilitate the reach back to NIMA data, products, and subject matter experts.
Rating of the NIMA-CART ability to establish and maintain communications with NIMA
centers.
Rating of the NIMA-CART ability to transfer and process imagery/geospatial information in
support of preliminary assessment analysis.
Rating of the ability ofNIMA CART to support and update ONA developments.
Rating of the ability to use NIMA CART to collaborate on combat assessment and target
selection using saved imagery files.
Rating of the NIMA-CART ability to enhance the capabilities of the SFJHQ.
Documentation of how NIMA-CART was used for warfighting tasks.

Rating of utility ofNIMA-CART for warfighting tasks accomplished.

Document user recommendations for NIMA-CART functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ Command and Control for Space and Computer Network Operations
(C2SpaceCNO) to facilitate the synchronization and coordination of Space/CNO/IO with other
fires.
Rating of the C2SpaceCNO ability to timely and accurately coordinate an exchange of
information between the Joint Task Force HQ and the USSPACECOM reach back element.
Rating of the C2SpaceCNO plans group's ability to provide relevant and timely information for
the Operational Net Assessment.
Rating of the input from the space and information operations element (SlOE) in support of
maintaining the CROP.
Rating of the responsiveness of the SlOE in providing space computer network operations and
information operations support to the JTF Headquarters.
Documentation of how C2SpaceCNO was used for warfighting tasks.
Rating of utility of C2SpaceCNO for warfighting tasks accomplished.
Document user recommendations for C2SpaceCNO functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ Unattended Ground Sensors support to Special Reconnaissance of Theater

Ballistic Missiles (UGS-TBM) to facilitate small concealable sensors help SOF locate TBM
targets.
Rating of the UGS/TBM ability to provide accurate and timely notification and location of
Theater Ballistic Missiles to the JF ACC and JTFHQ.
Rating of usability of the UGS/TBM system.
Documentation of how UGS-TBM was used for warfighting tasks
Rating of utility of UGS-TBM for warfighting tasks accomplished.
Document user recommendations for UGS-TBM functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ JSOTF-Joint Collaborative Planning Tool (JSOTF-JCTP) to facilitate reach back
capabilities.
Rating of the JSOTF -JCTP ability to facilitate functional components in conducting mission
planning.
Rating of the JSOTF -JCTP ability to facilitate functional components in developing courses of
action.
Rating of the JSOTF -JCTP ability to facilitate functional components in developing targeting
plans.
Rating of the JSOTF -JCTP ability to facilitate functional components in the military decision
making process (MDMP).
Rating of the ability of the JSOTF -JCTP to facilitate functional components in the development
of Operational Net Assessments.
Rating of the ability of the JSOTF-JCTP to facilitate functional components in executing the
planned mission.
Rating of the ability of the JSOTF -JCTP to target enemy locations, key terrain, facilities, and
infrastructure.
Documentation of how JSOTF -JCTP was used for warfighting tasks.
Rating of utility of JSOTF-JCTP for warfighting tasks accomplished.

Document user recommendations for JSOTF -JCTP functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ Joint Automated Target Folder (JATF) to facilitate Electronic Targeting Folder
Development for Time Critical Targeting
Rating of the JATF ability to facilitate functional components in developing courses of action.
Rating of the JATF ability to facilitate functional components in prioritizing enemy target list.
Rating of the JATF ability to facilitate the functional components in developing, maintaining,
and providing a common operational rating picture.
Rating of the JATF ability to facilitate the functional components to execute rapid
targeting/retargeting.
Rating of the JATF ability to facilitate the functional components to modify or adjust planned
missions, to include positioning/repositioning forces.
Rating of the JATF ability to facilitate the functional components to command and control
assigned units.
Instances of significant difficulties with availability of external support (i.e. Service, JFCOM,
Documentation of how JATF was used for warfighting tasks.
Rating of utility of JATF for warfighting tasks accomplished.
Document user recommendations for JATF functionality improvement.
-Task: Employ Joint Automated Single Guard Solution (JASGS) to facilitate the exchange of
information securely between networks of different classifications.
Rating of the JASGS ability to process unformatted information from the MC02 unclassified net
to users on the MC02 Secret net.
Rating of the JASGS ability to process unformatted releasable information securely from the TS
SCI JWICS network to users on the MC02 Secret network.
Rating of the shared view of multi-level security data such as imagery, track and sensor data, and
general military intelligence.
Documentation of how JASGS was used for warfighting tasks.
Rating of utility of JASGS for warfighting tasks accomplished.
Document user recommendations for JASGS functionality improvement.
Concept: Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR)
Warfighting Challenge: Ability to provide relevant intelligence to the commander
-Task: Plan and direct Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations.
Instances of adversary Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance nodes, links, and vulnerabilities in ISR prioritization
Instances of ISR planning addressing counter ISR and deception measures

Instances of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace/Operational Net Assessment

providing sufficient detail to plan and implement ISR operations
Instances of additional resources needed to perform JISR planning, analysis, and oversight
Instances of Universal Joint Task List task changes needed to accomplish ISR functions
Instances of additional training required to conduct JISR
Subtask: Link collaborative planning and execution.

Instances of efficient collaborative ISR planning
Percent of Component Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)lEssential Elements of
Information (EEl) covered in JTF collection plan
Percent of Priority Effects List Measures of Effect (MOE) receiving ISR coverage
Instances of ISR planner involvement in MOE development
Instances of effective ISR collaboration
Instances of Named Area of Interest (NAI) overlay improving collection planning
Instances ofNAI overlay improving situational awareness
Instances of sensor coverage overlay improving collection planning
Instances of sensor coverage overlay improving situational awareness
Subtask: Apply JISR Management.

Instances of ISR planners contributing to increased capability of ISR
Rating of ICSAS utility for JISR management
Rating of Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) utility for JISR
management
Rating of SharePoint Portal Server (SPPS) utility for JISR management
Rating of InformationWorkSpace (IWS) utility for JISR management
Number of times Integrated Collection Situational Awareness System (ICSAS) used to
determine sensor suitability
Instances of prioritization of coverage deviating from CDRs PIR and intent
Rating of Blue ISR Database adequacy
Number of times Blue ISR Database accessed
Subtask: Synchronize operations and ISR.

Instances of ISR supporting the operational plan
Number of retaskings to support current operations
Percent of ISR requirements not receiving coverage
Percent of ISR requirements receiving redundant sensor type coverage
Instances of unfulfilled component requirements in ISR plan.
Instances of insufficient ISR assets available to support operations
Instances of National, Joint, and Commercial ISR asset integration
-Task: Collect Information on the operational situation.

Percent of threat forces located
Percent ofPIRslEEls collected in time to meet operational needs
-Task: Exploit information to improve credibility and reliability

Subtask: Improve reaction to emergent targeting.

Percent of time ISR asset managers monitoring Joint operations Center
Instances of ISR collaboration providing positive input to emergent targeting
Percent of emergent targets affected
Percent of emergent targets identified
Number of Priority Effects coverage lost due to retasking for emergent target
Number ofNAIs losing coverage due to retasking for emergent target
Subtask: Improve reaction to emergent information requirements.

Instances of ISR collaboration providing positive input to emergent information requirements
Percent of emergent information requirements answered by latest time information is of value
Number of Priority Effects coverage lost due to retasking for emergent information requirements
Number ofNAIs losing coverage due to retasking for emergent information requirements
-Task: Produce operational intelligence.

Number of cross cueing ISR assets from other intelligence sources
Instances of interactive multiple Intelligence source collaboration being effective
Number of cross cueing ISR assets from other Services
-Task: Disseminate operational intelligence.

Rating of adequacy of processes for updating the Common Operational Picture (COP) from JISR
Assets
Rating of adequacy of JISR input to COP for join fires capability
Instances where JISR input was useful
Rating of ISR coverage and priorities reflected in the Common Relevant Operational Picture
Instances where JISR provided increased knowledge of the Battlespace
Rating of JISR contribution to view of the Battlespace

Annex D - Near Term Fieldable Technologies

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Annex E - Exercise Control Description
Purpose
This plan describes the concept, organization, functions, responsibilities, and procedures
for control of the MC02 experiment.
The MC02 experiments were conducted within the framework of an exercise to provide
the structure required to support and control the experiment. This approach took advantage of the
experience and abilities found in the training and exercise communities, while freeing the
experiment to focus on critical events required to assess the concept.
Experiment Overview
MC02 was one of a series of experiments designed to assess concepts for transformation
of forces into the Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 precepts and time frame. These experiments
include the Unified Vision, Millennium Challenge, and Global Challenge exercises.
Congressional language in the FY01 Defense Authorization Act directed JFCOM, the Services,
and US. Special Operations Command to demonstrate rapid, decisive operations in 2002, with
elements representative of their future force concepts.
MC02 was to assess US. capability to carry out Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) in this
decade. A number of related and supporting technical and conceptual experiments were included
in the exercise design, along with integration of Service live experiments conducted concurrently
with MC02.
An essential element for conduct ofRDO is development and sustainment of an
Operational Net Assessment (ONA), which encompasses input from the entire US. Government,
and issuance of effects-based orders. The ONA for MC02 was drafted during meetings and
seminars held among the interagency members in Washington, D.C., prior to the beginning of
execution, and were to be updated throughout the exercise. Additionally, updated technology in
the form of the CROP was to enhance rapid dissemination of information, coordination between
participants, and visualization of the battle space.
MC02 staged a high-end, small-scale contingency that had the potential to escalate into a
major theater of war. It overlaid a real-world military threat for which robust and realistic
databases are available to develop an operational net assessment. Both simulated and actual
forces participated in the conduct of the experiment. These forces operated on a terrain database,
which superimposed terrain from the contingency area over the western USA.
The total experiment was conducted through a series oflimited objective experiments
(LOE), Spirals (1 - 3) and a three-week execution phase. Spiral 3 was conducted for 10 to 12
hours per day, while execution, although originally planned for a 12-hour play day, was run on a
24-hour play day. Spiral 3 provided academic instruction for the JTF and components, an
opportunity for planning and orders development, and culminated in a full-up rehearsal of all
exercise elements. Technical testing of communications, C4I systems, and simulations took place
throughout the Spiral. Execution encompassed the major simulation supported experiment, and
Service experiments using live forces that were partially integrated into the overall scenario.
Control Overview
Exercise Control consists of a set of procedures used to guide the play toward
achievement of the exercise and experiment objectives. The Joint Experiment Control Group
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E-1

(JECG) controls the experiment through use of a Master Scenario Events List (MSEL), responses
to requests for information, the observer/trainer and data collection networks, role players, and
functional area controllers. Secure telephone and intercom, local and wide area networks, VTC
and periodic meetings provide the primary means for communicating instructions and
coordinating the efforts of all controllers. Controllers ensure tracking events are satisfying
objectives and participant reaction to MSEL and other injects, and then steering the experiment
as required retaining the focus on objectives. The goal was to have a realistic and consistent story
line and sequence of events so that control would be virtually transparent to the exercise
participants.
Primary control was located at the Joint Warfighting Center in Suffolk, VA with
component response cells and simulations located with each of the components. An integration
cell from the JECG was located within each Service Experiment control organization, with
reciprocal Service representation in the JECG, who were knowledgeable of the Service
experiment. The Senior Simulation Controller and Simulation Tech Control controlled
simulation forces at the JTASC.
The JECG was responsible for guiding the experiment and did so by orchestrating events,
and ensuring objectives were met. The chief controller was overall responsible for ensuring
satisfaction of the exercise and experiment objectives, and was the final approving authority for
all information flowing to the experiment participants from the JECG. He controlled the
experiment tempo and direction by injection of data and information as specified by the MSEL,
through responses to RFI's, and through information developed by role players in the JECG.
Each Service was responsible for designing, manning, and operating the control structure for its
own Service experiments, to include representation on the JECG.
The overall joint experiment force structure was an integrated organization including live
(Service experiment) and simulated forces. Central control of Service experiment live forces, to
Figure 268: NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE, Nev. (AFIE) -- An HH-60G Pave Hawk from 66th Rescue
Squadron here refuels from an MC-130E Combat Talon from the 711th Special Operations Squadron
at Duke Field, Fla., on Aug. 5 during Millennium Challenge 2002.
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include OPFOR, was restricted to agreed upon joint events. Outside of those events, Services had
full control over live forces. Control over all simulated forces (included in the joint experiment)
remained with the JECG.
Live forces were located primarily on ranges in the western United States (Fort Irwin,
Camp Pendleton, China Lake, and Nellis AFB) and the San Nicholas Sea Ranges off California.
In addition, component response cells with their simulations were located at Fort Bragg, Camp
Lejeune, Hurlburt Field, and Fleet Combat Training Center Pacific in San Diego. The
component commands were located at Camp Lejeune, NC, at Nellis AFB, NV, onboard the USS
Coronado, and at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado with a forward element on board the
JFMCC command ship. The JTF was located at the USJFCOM JTASC in Suffolk, VA with a
forward element aboard USS Coronado.
The Senior Simulation Controller and Simulation Tech Control at the JTASC centrally
controlled all simulation forces. The JTASC also controlled certain live forces participating in
certain key joint events supporting specific experiment objectives. However, central control over
live OPFOR and live forces during j oint events did not extend to control over these forces during
Service specific experiments and events.
Joint Experiment Control Group (JECG).

The JECG provided the experiment and exercise structure, provided close coordination
between operations and data collection on the experiment, and provided the control necessary for
overall direction of the exercise. The JECG also assured full integration of the separate Service
experiments into the joint experiment. Figure 269, displays the senior level of the control and
analysis structure, while Figure 270 Exercise Control Architecture, provides a more detailed
breakout of the principal elements of the Joint Exercise Control Group.
Subordinate component headquarter elements were represented in a response cell
responsible for operating the simulations and portrayed all organizations required by the
scenario. The players located in these cells interpreted the output from the simulations to provide
necessary reports to the component headquarters, and received direction/orders for input into the
Figure 269: Experiment Control Organization
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simulations. The group was a conduit for inserting events, and for monitoring the experiment.
The size and composition of each response cell depended on the nature and robustness required
to meet experiment objectives, such as planning activities, reports generation, size, and
organization of the forces represented.
A coordination cell, working directly for the JECG Chief Controller, provided a view of what
was taking place in the simulations and live force elements. The cell was responsible for
maintaining a status of forces, making recommendations on play changes to assure j oint events
took place in a seamless fashion, and providing a capability to give overview briefings to
distinguished visitors.
Figure 270: Experiment Control Architecture
Overall, coordination of OPFOR activities took place in the JECG for all events requiring
both live and simulated OPFOR forces. The Senior OPFOR Controller in the JTASC personally
controlled those OPFOR forces represented in the simulation. The Service experiment
representatives in the JTASC provided the channel for coordination of Live OPFOR activities
with the Service experiments. Service experiment senior controllers and Integration cell
personnel provided current information to the JECG regarding the location and activity of live
Blue and OPFOR forces. The OPFOR effort was enhanced by the DoD Red Team, which
focused on potential asymmetrical threat capabilities.
Role Players
Sufficient role players, response cells and control functions to provide the necessary input
to the experiment audience at the strategic level, and guide the activities of component Response
cells at the tactical level were provided to the JECG. The cells varied in size depending on the
number of SME' s needed to run the various functions/organizations. Examples of such
organizations include defense and other national agencies, other governments and their
militaries, and ambassadors. In addition, SMEs were needed to work in the areas of normal
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control functions such as scenario/MSEL, OPFOR, simulations, operations, intelligence,

information operations, and combat service support.
The MSEL cell maintains, modifies, provides injects, and executes events in the MSEL,
the exercise roadmap. Each event in the MSEL is harmonized across the entire exercise. The
MSELs act in concert, as catalysts to guide experiment player actions and evoke desired
responses. Within guidance from the Chief Controller, and in conjunction with other JECG cells,
the MSEL cell developed and coordinated additional scripted events to maintain the focus of the
experiment and assure objectives were met.
The CSS cell served as the focal point for all experiment logistics control and response
issues. CSS ensured that logistics play, to include medical, transportation, engineer and
sustainment issues, was realistic and controlled to support achievement of objectives.
The intelligence support cell provided the background information (to include the
database for the terrain, enemy forces and country infrastructure) leading up to the exercise, and
supported the experiment throughout with information on enemy activities.
Appropriate primary simulations were operated in a distributed fashion at each
Component Response cell site (Army - EAGLE/ONESAF, Navy - JSAF, Marine Corps-
JCATS, Air Force - AWSIM), with senior simulation control and technical control centralized at
the JTASC. The Services used additional models to support specific initiatives. The output of the
models, representing tactical actions on the part of the Service, were fed to the experiment
audience through appropriate Service command and control systems, or were provided via
scripted message prepared by Service role players. The role players injected orders from
Component headquarters into the models. Integration of Service experiment live-force operations
with model outputs took place at the Component level. The primary avenue for control of
experiment audience actions was through the control cell that was an integral part of each
component Response cell, and via injections inserted at that level, or through crafting of the
information provided up to the Component HQ. The size and composition of each Component
HQ and the component Response cell was driven by the level of fidelity required in orders and
reports that had to be prepared by those elements, the functional specialties that must be
represented, and the number of simulation stations the component had to operate.
Control is both a top-down and bottom-up process. The JECG inputs strategic and
operational information through scripting and role-playing down to the experiment participants.
This information consisted of initial and follow-on military information and event guidance and
orders from higher headquarters such as JCS and information from foreign governments, non-
governmental organizations, and international organizations. At the same time, tactical
information from the simulations, from scripting, and from role-playing were injected from the
component response cells as if it were coming from tactical units.
Control Communications
Primary JECG communications was through the Common Relevant Operational Picture
(CROP), secure telephone to include teleconferencing, secure intercom, and video
teleconferencing. To some extent, the audio/video capability available through the CROP
eliminated the need for frequent video teleconferences, and possibly the secure intercom. All
communications provided for the JECG were separate and distinct from, and not accessible by,
the experiment audience. Regular, structured conferences, between the Component Response cell
Site Managers and the Service Experiment Senior Controller and integration cells, were used to
assure all controllers had a common understanding of what had taken place, the direction the
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experiment was following, and the significant upcoming events that were to be initiated. Each
service experiment control cell was responsible for providing current information regarding live
Blue and OPFOR forces to the JECG.
Automated feeds from the models through Service C4I systems to the COP provided the
representation for simulated forces. The communications structure replicated all normal
communications available to the experiment audience, plus some experimental systems.
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Annex F - Adaptive Adversary
This annex summarizes the opposition force (OPFOR) organization, objectives, and
success in addressing RDO weaknesses. The credibility of the Red adversary is also analyzed in
terms of how it was fought, constraints placed upon it, and its ability to act as an adaptive
opponent for the RDO experiment.
The intent of the OPFOR assessment during MC02 was to support the JFCOM
Experiment Assessment Plan (JEAP) Primary Task 2. This was, "Assess the Capability of the
Experimental RDO Concepts to Impact Joint Task Force Actions against a Determined 2007
adversary." To address this task fully, assessments were required on both the Blue and the Red
sides.
The overall objective of the MC02 OPFOR was to provide a 2007-based, realistic,
adaptive opponent that would test the vulnerabilities of the RDO concept. In concert with the
MC02 scenario, the multi-faceted adversary portrayed to the Blue JTF provided a realistic 2007
threat environment in which the RDO concept could be explored. This allowed exploration of
ONA, EBO, SPACE, lAC, SJFHQ, and other supporting concepts/objectives. The JFCOM 17
Joint Warfighting Center Support Team (JST), in coordination with the J9 world-class adversary
(WCA) Team, provided the OPFOR.
Analysts from the J9 Analysis Division and subject matter experts (SMEs) from 17
assessed the OPFOR organization and campaign during MC02. This allowed for an in-depth
understanding of the successes and failures of Blue Effects-Based Operations. The assessment
team met with OPFOR senior leaders daily to review their operations, response to Blue efforts,
and self-assessment data.
The OPFOR senior leadership team included a senior member of the 17 JST, who played
the role of Joint Task Force - South (JTF-S) military commander, and a retired lieutenant
general, who initially played the JTF -S commander before assuming a role as an advisor six days
into the experiment. In addition, a former U.S. ambassador served as the Supreme Leader for the
Government of Red (GOR).
The MC02 scenario called for an upper level, small-scale contingency (SSC). As such,
the OPFOR organized into a multi-faceted group that included government, military, terrorist,
pirate, subversive, militant, and criminal elements. Each of these elements had their own
objectives and did not always work cooperatively. As such, they posed a considerable challenge
for the Blue JTF. Blue could only achieve success by taking full advantage of interagency
capabilities and looking beyond the JTF's internal assets.
Limited staffing was a problem for the OPFOR during MC02. Total staff support for all
OPFOR operations was approximately 90 personnel. At times, the small staffing level limited the
OPFOR's ability to be a fully adaptive adversary. The most obvious shortfall was a lack of an
intelligence staff. Total staffing for OPFOR intelligence operations was limited to four analysts,
who worked two on each shift.
To help maximize effectiveness for experimental play, the OPFOR divided into three
functional groups: GOR, JTF-S, and another non-governmental group that included terrorists,
pirates, and militants. This allowed separate, non-coordinated responses to be injected into the
scenario as needed. Each of the OPFOR elements is described in detail below.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY F-I

OPFOR Organization
JTF-S. The military organization faced by Blue. This was ajoint organization with air,
land, and maritime assets sized to reflect a high level SSC. It was not controlled by the
government but by a rogue military commander (CJTF-S).
Government of Red. This represented all governmental organizations for the country of
Red and provided an interface for all diplomatic communications. A former U.S. ambassador
who had a staff of one led the GOR.
Terrorist Network. The terrorists represented an international terrorist organization that
had ties with JTF-S and a regional militant group. The terrorist network provided an asymmetric
force capable of conducting "on-call" missions throughout the Blue AOR. Types of missions
included suicide bombings, assassinations, and threats against regional/world leaders.
Pirate Group. The group was a maritime criminal element that included members of an
international crime consortium. The pirates were linked to smuggling, narcotics, and arms
trading criminal organizations. Connections were also established with corrupt provincial
government officials. Funds generated through these criminal activities were laundered through
commercial business elements.
Fisheries Company (Private Company). A small, privately held company that operated
within the country of Red, was an affiliate of a larger corporation-Southern Fisheries Corp. The
business operated in collusion with corrupt officials within the country of Red's Ministry of
Industries. The company also provided money-laundering connections for the pirates and
terrorists.
Charitable Medical Non-Governmental Organization (NGO). A charitable medical
organization based in the region. This NGO provided medical relief to civilians throughout the
region. Skilled medical specialists were made available to countries if requested by the
government. The organization also took advantage of its trusted position to conduct surreptitious
biological operations against Blue and its allies.
Militant Group. A militant cell dedicated to the welfare of related minority groups
worldwide. They established an international educational system for their followers throughout
the region while their philosophical center was in a city in the country of Red. Ideologically, they
were aligned with JTF-S. They were connected to subversive elements in the terrorist network,
the charitable medical NGOs, and were supported by funds from criminal activities.
Criminal Clan. The criminal group was a large, powerful clan with a criminal history.
They controlled a large region in the country of Red and neighboring countries. As a part of their
operations, they were able to provide a transportation network that was used for arms smuggling,
trading, and narcotics trafficking among other criminal activities. They routinely circumvented,
challenged, and coerced law enforcement officials in the country of Red and neighboring areas.
OPFOR Campaign Objectives

The OPFOR Campaign Plan was written by the JWFC OPFOR to protect and expand the
Red regime. Signed by the CJTF-S, the campaign plan was the basis for actions by JTF-S forces.
However, since the various OPFOR related groups were not under a centralized command and
control scheme, they each had their own interests and objectives. In general, these objectives
were contrary to Blue's interests but were not always executed in a synchronized fashion. At
times, the OPFOR groups would take actions counter to each other's efforts. Given the multi-
player scenario, this was not extraordinary.
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Joint Task Force-South (JTF-S). Initial stated campaign objectives for JTF-S were
finalized during Spiral 3. The objectives were based on the pre-hostilities situation following the
earthquake. The achievement of these objectives was founded on strong military and information
capabilities with little economic and diplomatic
influence. There were seven campaign
objectives for the JTF-S, one of which had three
components. The first four objectives were the
same as for the GOR, but the JTF -S commander
had different interests than those of GOR.
During the course of the experiment, the JTF-S
commander rated his effectiveness in achieving
each national objective.
Overall, the JTF -S was prevented from
meeting all of its predefined objectives (See
Figure 271) but did find success in the following
unstated objectives:
Prevented Blue from free use of the Straits
Used WME as bait to damage Blue units
Accepted a fight for the disputed islands in
an effort to bloody Blue's forces vs. just
peacefully returning the islands as offered by
GOR
Successfully kept the CJTF -S alive until 5 August
Forces on the mainland were attrited but generally kept intact organizationally
Fought Blue, absorbed damage, and improved regional status
Successfully launched first strike against Blue
JTF -S Obj ective 1: Preserve the regime. The JTF -S focus was to preserve the strength
and unity of the country of Red through military strength and regional influence. The three
components of this objective were to "deter Blue military deployment," "limit Blue war aims,"
and to "restore internal cohesion." The JTF-S felt it possible that his military strength would
deter Blue from deploying its military. However, when Blue gave him an ultimatum, it became
clear to the JTF -S commander that he could not prevent Blue deployment. So he felt it necessary
to make a preemptive strike against Blue to help in achieving the second part of this objective,
limit Blue war aims. The successes he had with his preemptive strike caused him to increase his
rating in all three components of this obj ective to "neutral," "somewhat effective," and "very
effective" respectively. Once Blue started its military campaign against the JTF-S, his rating on
deterring deployment fell to "ineffective" throughout the remainder of the experiment. His rating
of Blue war aims was also lowered to "ineffective" and remained low through the end of the
experiment (some daily military successes temporarily raised the rating to somewhat ineffective).
The JTF -S commander tended to be a little more optimistic about restoring internal cohesion. He
felt the success of his preemptive strike and the pullback of Blue at WME site 1 helped to raise
the morale and cohesion of the people, giving him the confidence to rate this part of the objective
as "very effective." Once it became apparent to JTF-S commander, that Blue was on the ground,
he lowered his rating of internal cohesion to "somewhat ineffective." This rating remained at that
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level until five days before the end of the experiment, when he felt he had lost much of his
military capability to oppose Blue.
JTF-S Objective 2: Reduce Blue Presence. The JTF-S objective was to remove Blue from
the region and to declare itself victorious in its ability to reduce Blue presence. Initially, the JTF-
S commander believed his military was strong enough to deter and reduce Blue's presence in the
region. Once Blue entered the region, he lowered his rating to "ineffective. " After his
preemptive strike, he had some hope of reducing Blue presence and so raised his rating to
"somewhat ineffective. " Once Blue started the ground campaign, he no longer had confidence in
his ability to reduce Blue presence and therefore lowered his rating back to "ineffective" where it
remained through the end of the experiment.
JTF-S Objective 3: Develop regional influence. The JTF-S objective was to establish the
GOR and JTF -S as a strong regional power. The JTF -S actions to establish shipping tolls and to
control the flow of natural resources in the region were intended to further its regional strength.
JTF-S Campaign Objectives
Ve ry
Effective
Som ew hat
Effective
N e u tra I
Som ew hat
Ineffective
Ineffective
Figure 271: JTF-S effectiveness chart showed that over time the adversaries became less
and less effective.
Initially, the JTF-S commander believed the earthquake recovery was hindering their ability to
develop regional influence. Although he rated this objective as "somewhat ineffective" at the end
of Spiral 3, the additional earthquake recovery time at execution led him to believe there was
improvement and therefore rated this objective as "neutral" on the first day of execution. The
regional sister-state council demarche on the second day of the experiment denouncing the JTF-S
actions caused him to feel "ineffective" in his ability to develop regional influence. However,
two days later the JTF -S preemptive strike gave him confidence his military successes would aid
in developing regional influence. He rated the objective as "somewhat effective" until Blue's air
and ground campaign started to limit JTF -S capabilities.
JTF-S Objective 4: Speed economic recovery. The earthquake had caused considerable
damage to infrastructure and economic capabilities in Red. The shipping tolls and control of
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natural resources were used to help speed economic recovery, however, future actions were
focused primarily on military control and not on economic recovery. Over the course of the
experiment, as the JTF -S commander lost capabilities and his ability to speed economic
recovery, he lowered his objective rating to "ineffective."
JTF-S Objective 5: Champion ideals in Red. An additional objective for the JTF-S and
not the GOR, the JTF -S commander's desire was to
further the ideals of Red and to strengthen the importance
of Red in the region. The JTF-S commander initially felt
"very effective" in championing the ideals of Red. This
decreased over time to ineffective as he lost diplomatic,
military, and information capabilities.
JTF-S Objective 6: Control western access to
natural resources. An additional objective for the JTF-S
and not of the GOR, the JTF -S commander desired to
control natural resources in the region in order to help
achieve its other objectives of economic recovery and
championing ideals in Red. Initially the JTF -S commander was confident he could very
effectively control western access to natural resources with military and economic capabilities.
His preemptive strike encouraged him to continue to control natural resources in the region, as
did the mining and blockage of a strategic canal. Once the canal was re-opened, he began to
lower his rating of this objective. This decline continued as he lost military and economic
capabilities due to the Blue JTF actions.
JTF-S Objective 7: Gain Red stature. An additional objective to the JTF-S and not of the
GOR, the JTF -S commander desired to gain Red stature in order to strengthen its military and
economic powers in the region and the world. He initially believed he had the power and
capability to gain stature based on the natural resources reserves and regional position of Red.
However, once the air and ground campaign started to decrease his military capabilities, he
began to reduce his rating for this objective. This objective ended the experiment as somewhat
ineffective; indicating some hope, that Red's strengths would help to gain stature in the future.
Government of Red (GOR). The GOR focus was to gain control of the country of Red
and to restore its internal cohesion, without Blue intervention. Their long-term objective was to
gain additional status within the region. The Supreme Leader of Red and his staff defined four
national objectives for MC02 execution. These objectives are described below. During the course
of the experiment, the GOR rated itself daily on its effectiveness in achieving each national
objective. Overall, the GOR maintained its ability to achieve most of its objectives (See Figure
272).
GOR Objective 1: Preserve the regime. The GOR focus was to restore the strength and
unity of the country of Red through diplomatic and economic intervention. The three
components of this objective were to "deter Blue military deployment," "limit Blue war aims,"
and to "restore internal cohesion." The GOR quickly found it was incapable of achieving the first
part of this objective; deter Blue military deployment. On the third day of the experiment, GOR
believed Blue had deployed in the country of Red and therefore rated their ability to achieve this
objective as ineffective. The GOR did feel somewhat effective or confident that through
diplomatic means, they could limit Blue war aims throughout the experiment. In the last week of
the experiment, the GOR had proposed a peaceful solution to the island situation and hoped this

would deter Blue from using force to take over the islands. When Blue quit discussions with the
GOR, they started to rate their ability to limit Blue war aims as somewhat ineffective. After the
island attacks had occurred and Blue began a transition to let the GOR resume control, they
raised their rating to very effective in limiting Blue war aims. The third component of this
objective, restore internal cohesion, was rated by the GOR as somewhat effective to very
effective during the entire experiment. The main concern at the beginning of the experiment was
that the JTF -S commander might attempt to permanently take over the southern region. Once
Blue deployed in the region and started to attack the JTF-S forces, the GOR was no longer
concerned with CJTF -S and therefore raised its rating to 'Very Effective' in restoring cohesion.
GOR Objective 2: Reduce Blue presence in the region. The GOR desired to keep Blue
out of the region and to restore its regional power without Blue intervention. While Blue
remained in the region, the GOR would be limited in what actions it could take within the
country of Red and the region. At the end of Spiral 3, the GOR knew Blue was already in the
region and therefore rated this objective as neutral. This rating continued from the first day of the
experiment until the GOR believed Blue had gained access to the country of Red. On the second
day of the experiment, the GOR lowered its rating of the objective to somewhat ineffective. Two
days later, after the JTF -S commander had initiated an attack on Blue, the GOR raised its rating
to neutral with the belief that JTF-S action would impact Blue's ability to stay in the region. This
rating of neutral continued throughout the remainder of the experiment with the belief that GOR
could not control Blue's presence in the region.
GOR Obj ective 3: Develop regional influence. The GOR obj ective was to establish itself
as a strong regional power. The GOR, with its regional location as leverage, desired to gain
influence in the region by playing a strong role in the flow of natural resources. At the beginning
of the experiment, the GOR felt it was capable of developing regional influence through its
strong natural resources reserves. On the second day of the experiment, the GOR lowered its
ampaign Objectives
Very
Effective
Somewhat
Effective
Neutral
Somewhat
Ineffective
Ineffective
Figure 272: GOR Campaign Objectives
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rating on this objective to ineffective as Blue issued an ultimatum to the JTF-S commander.
Once the JTF-S commander attacked Blue on the third day, the GOR raised its rating back to
neutral with the expectation Blue would not intervene with Red. In addition, GOR began
diplomatic talks with Blue that helped to alleviate concerns by the GOR on Blue's long-term
intentions. Towards the end of the experiment, the GOR had received a letter from the President
of the US. that indicated the GOR was recognized as a regional influence. In addition, the GOR
was successful in negotiating a profitable contract for future natural resources sales. These two
indicators caused the GOR to finish the experiment rating this objective as very effective.
GOR Objective 4: Speed economic recovery. The earthquake had caused considerable
damage to infrastructure and economic capabilities. The GOR desired to re-establish its
communications and transportation links between the north and south in order to speed economic
recovery and to continue to influence the flow of natural resources in the region. Initially, the
GOR felt it was capable of improving economic conditions in the southern region. However,
once it appeared Blue would intervene with military action, the GOR lowered its rating to neutral
and then to somewhat ineffective as infrastructure damage resulted from Blue military actions.
Towards the end of the experiment, the GOR was more positive that Blue would not stay in the
region and that economic assistance may come from European countries. By the end of the
experiment, the GOR rated this objective as somewhat effective based on the new natural
resources contract and expected assistance.
Terrorists. The terrorist organization was

working along with the JTF-S commander to achieve
similar goals. Specifically, the terrorist organization
was interested in promoting the spiritual ideals and
unity of the religious element. The terrorists had
three objectives in order to achieve this goal: deny
Blue access to the region, attack opposing political
and religious organizations, and disrupt Blue
operations. The terrorist organization used asymmetric attacks to help achieve their campaign
objectives and as can be seen in figure 273, believed they were somewhat effective in achieving
those objectives.
Terrorist Objective 1: Deny Blue access. Throughout the entire experiment, the terrorist
organization conducted asymmetric attacks against Blue to deny them access to the region.
Although they were not successful in keeping Blue out of the region, they were able to
successfully limit Blue's ability to enter the region. Attacks included mining, a small boat bomb
against a Blue allied naval vessel, an attack against a US. navy oiler in port, the shoot down of a
commercial and a military aircraft, and the sinking of vessels near the entrance of a strategic
canal causing the canal to close for a period of time. Initially, the terrorists felt they were very
effective in denying Blue access to the region. As Blue began to establish itself, their rating of
this objective decreased to somewhat ineffective. This was temporarily raised to neutral on 3
August with the success of the two aircraft shoot downs, but again lowered to somewhat
ineffective two days later. On the last day of the experiment, the terrorist organization attacked
targets in the continental US. and so felt they still had capability to achieve this objective. The
rating at the end of the experiment was somewhat effective.
Terrorist Objective 2: Attack opposing political and religious organizations. The terrorist
organization attacked not just Blue, but also other countries that supported Blue and opposed
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their political and religious beliefs. This included the assassinations of the Foreign Minister of
Purple and the Deputy Prime Minister of Green; the attempted assassination of the President of
Purple, demonstrations within Purple and Green, a truck bomb at the royal palace in Brown, and
personnel attacks in Grey. The terrorists initially rated themselves as very effective in achieving
this objective and slowly decreased its rating to neutral as Blue began to attack their organization
and to take additional security measures. At the end of the experiment, the terrorists rated
themselves as somewhat effective, continuing to believe they had the capability to oppose
political and religious organizations.
Terrorist Objective 3: Disrupt Blue operations. The actions to deny Blue access to the
region also disrupted Blue operations. Other actions included an attack on water treatment
equipment, the scuttling of a ship carrying chlorine and ammonia, drive by shootings, and car
bomb attacks. The terrorists felt very effective in disrupting Blue operations, but lowered their
rating to somewhat ineffective towards the end of the experiment. On the last day of the
experiment, they raised their rating back to very effective as they saw Blue end their military
campaign against the JTF -S commander. Blue did not take away their capability to disrupt Blue
operations.
Pirates. The pirates operated in conjunction with the Fisheries Company with the sole
objective of making money. Prior to Blue intervention, the pirates attacked shipping in the region
and looted the cargo on the vessels. As shown in the terrorist objectives (figure 273), the pirates
rated themselves as very effective in making a profit. Once Blue began vessel escorts and had a
major presence in the region, opportunities for attacked vessels decreased. The pirates stayed in
port, thus rating the objective as ineffective. On 6 August, Blue stopped vessel escorts and
focused on the island attacks. The pirates took this as an opportunity to attack vessels waiting for
Terrorist / Pirate Campaign Objectives
Very
Effective
Somewhat
Effective
Neutral
Somewhat
Ineffective
Ineffective
Figure 273: TerrorisUPirate Campaign Objectives
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transit. They increased their rating to somewhat effective when Blue halted vessel escorts. At the
end of the experiment, the pirates rated their future ability to make a profit as neutral; believing
there would continue to be Blue control over shipping but also believing there would be
opportunities to attack shipping.
Charitable Medical NGO. This organization was a religious, fundamentalist aid

organization that operated in collusion with anti-western organizations and terrorists to prevent
or remove western influence from the region. Their goals were to provide humanitarian
assistance to the regional populous and others in times of natural or man-made disasters, support
disaster preparedness activities, and to assist in the supply, transportation, and treatment of
refugees and victims of man-made or natural disasters. This organization established tent camps
on the islands for temporary housing and to provide trauma and medical assistance, established
field sanitation centers and water purification facilities, encouraged dedicated religious faithful to
volunteer as aid workers and to provide funding, equipment, training, and facilities, to these
volunteers. They have also been known to provide research on effects of biological, chemical,
and radiological systems on the victims of such events and to develop antidotes or treatment
modalities to counter or cure the effects of CBR warfare. During the experiment, no obj ectives
were measured for this organization. Even though they played a role in helping the island
inhabitants, their role in attacking Blue was limited to information operations and some
biological operations against island inhabitants.
Other OPFOR groups. Other groups included a militant, conservative, religious group
with an extreme interpretation of religious law, and criminal clans. The involved criminal clan
was one of seven major criminal clans in the southeastern border area that controlled the coastal
area of Red. Their goals were to gain upward mobility for the regional followers in the southern
provinces of Red and to use illicit activities to fund social programs. No objectives for any of
these additional OPFOR groups were measured.
OPFOR Credibility
The OPFOR was tasked to be a credible adversary against the Blue force. This required
an OPFOR that was aggressive, adaptive, and capable of achieving its own objectives through a
variety of diplomatic, information, military, and economic actions. Resources and exercise rules
of engagement limited the OPFOR capability. Though the experiment was limited in the
robustness of some OPFOR operations, the impact on the actual concept assessments appeared to
be minimal. Throughout most ofMC02, the OPFOR was successfully able to identify and test
failure modes of Blue operational concepts. Success at stressing Blue was measured both as the
OPFOR attacked RDO concept vulnerabilities and as the OPFOR responded to Blue actions.
Daily Time Constraints. While the experiment ran around the clock, significant military
activity was limited to the period between 0900 and 2100 hours. The reduction in hours was a
result of limited manpower levels among the components. The OPFOR was allowed to re-
position forces at night, but not allowed to execute a major attack. This restricted the OPFOR
from conducting 2417 operations, but had minimal impact on stressing the Blue staff ability to
execute the concepts during the scheduled exercise period.
Rules of Engagement (ROE). Exercise ROE limited the type ofRedlBlue activities.
Modifications to the ROE were published by the JECG several times during the experiment.

Operational Limits. The ROE did constrain the OPFOR from using unconventional
warfare weapons such as WME in order to keep the experiment play within measurable
parameters. Though the ROE limited the OPFOR from using all its weapon capabilities, it did
not appear to unduly skew results or hinder the experimental hypothesis.
ROE Updates. As is common during exercises, the ROE was changed twice - early on.
These changes brought about some confusion and potentially provided Blue operational
advantages.
Master Scenario Event List (MSEL). Some of the experimental events were pre-
determined and documented into a MSEL. This list helped to direct the OPFOR play, set the
conditions to test the experimental hypothesis and achieve the overall objectives. The MSEL was
a living document that required many injects to be created during the experiment. The injects
helped guide the exercise play, while MSEL injects, that deviated from experimental objectives,
were not executed. The MSEL injects allowed for more free play early in the experiment than
toward the end. By the end of the experiment, the MSEL injects scripted the endgame situation,
allowing transition operations to be examined and bring some closure to the exercise. Major
MSEL injects were adjusted to reflect scenario deviations by either Blue or OPFOR forces. By
the end of MC02, 688 MSEL injects were executed.
White Cell. The Joint Experiment Control Group (JECG) or White cell served as the
experimental control that monitored game play by both Blue and OPFOR, assessed the impacts
or effects of various actions, and determined what feedback was provided back to Blue and
OPFOR units. Following each significant engagement the White cell would adjudicate the results
to counter experiment artificialities and to ensure the experimental assessment could continue. At
times, this adjudication resulted in selected forces being reinstated to the playing field on both
sides.
Game limitations and artificialities. Certain limitations or artificialities existed during
MC02 that required work-arounds in the OPFOR to ensure successful game play. These work-
arounds are common during large-scale exercises. The most significant adjustments included
lack of anti-access play, simulating time constraints with the models, determining detection
capabilities by the OPFOR, and effects assessment. At the start ofMC02, when the simulations
were initiated, the first 15 days of Blue force flow had already arrived in the JOA. This
artificiality prevented the OPFOR from fully exercising its anti-access campaign to stem the
initial flow of Blue resources into the region. Much later in the exercise, the OPFOR was
authorized by the JECG to launch some limited anti-access efforts. The delay was attributed to
real-world commitments associated with TRANSCOM's TPFDD processing system.
Free play. The OPFOR was initially allowed a greater degree of free play in its
warfighting operations, including being allowed to strike first and to follow-up an initial strike
with a second wave. Subsequent to those efforts, OPFOR operations became more directed.
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These limitations occurred primarily to support the simulation interface for Blue live play
operations and to ensure the experiment had an opportunity to explore all the objectives. Two
examples are described below.
Live Airborne Drop. To ensure the live airborne operation could proceed, the JTF
commander required that the battlefield be prepared properly. This required elimination of
OPFOR air defense assets along an air corridor and in the vicinity of the objective. The OPFOR
was directed by the JECG to position its air defense assets in the area such that they could be
destroyed by Blue. Those that were not destroyed were then directed not to engage Blue assets
passing through their area. Had this live event not occurred so early in the scenario these actions
may not have been required.
Live Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM). During the July 30 STOM attack, Blue had
not properly prepared the simulated battlefield before emplacing troops. This resulted in the
attacking force being fixed by OPFOR ground elements and subsequently attrited to a combat
ineffective state. OPFOR was directed by the JECG to cease its attacks and allow the Blue
element to be extracted. The involved Blue forces were then regenerated for future use to support
experimental objectives.
As the exercise progressed, the OPFOR free-play was eventually constrained to the point
where the end state was scripted. This scripting ensured a Blue operational victory and
established conditions in the exercise for transition operations.
Model Limitations. Generally, the models appeared to operate well from the OPFOR
perspective. Most instances of anomalous results were adjudicated by the JECG. Some unusual
results were allowed to stand as modeled and resulted in a reduced OPFOR capability. One
example was that the Blue models did not always appear to see incoming OPFOR missiles, but
were still successful in shooting them down. This limitation is considered to have minimal
impact on the experimental results.
Organizational Structure. The OPFOR staff consisted of approximately 90 personnel.
This reduced intelligence collection, planning, and analysis capability was not equal to the over
350-person Blue JTF. One significant shortcoming faced by OPFOR was the lack of an
economic player to help explore Blue's ability to influence the economic element of national
power. This ended up not being a serious shortfall in that Blue interagency efforts were more
focused on organization than actual scenario play. Maintaining close coordination with the JECG
generally compensated for these organizational shortfalls.
OPFOR Persona. The JTF -S commander and the Supreme Leader of the Government of
Red were expected by the JECG to play scenario-based personas. A lack of clarity in the
definitions of these personas caused some confusion during game play. The JFCOM J9 had
developed the leadership backgrounds for these roles and placed it in the ONA. OPFOR leaders
with regional expertise were hired to play these roles, but at times were considered by the JECG
to have stepped out of their defined roles.
Blue Post-2007 capabilities. Though MC02 was based in a 2007 timeframe, the Blue
force played a variety of post-2007 capabilities. OPFOR capabilities were held to the 2007
standard. While this did not have an adverse effect experimentally, it did have the potential to
unduly influence exercise play. Most of these post-2007 capabilities were required for Service
experiments. Some examples of post-2007 capabilities played included the Next Generation
(DDX) land attack destroyers, guided missile carrying (SSGN) submarines, high speed vessels,
an advanced deployable system theater-deliverable acoustic surveillance system, Standard
Missile-3 Block IB, Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), and airborne laser (ABL).
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The inclusion of these systems may have given Blue additional operational capabilities for
exercise purposes, but it did not hinder the assessment of planning and executing RDO in a 2007
environment.
Real World System Links. Several simulation models were tied to real-world systems. At
times, this could have hindered the OPFOR ability to employ its systems freely. One example
was the limitation on theater ballistic missile (TBM) play. All simulated TBM play was
restricted to specific pre-defined time frames so it could be coordinated through the Global
Command and Control System at USSPACECOM/NORAD. This methodology, used since
1996, was not viewed as a limiting factor by the JFCOM JWFC support team.
BluelNeutral Country Infrastructure. The lack of modeling for Blue and neutral country
infrastructure limited OPFOR's ability to directly attack these facilities and disrupt Blue
operations throughout of the JOA. Additionally, not including other country systems prevented
playing all diplomatic and economic effects of Blue actions.
Simulating Time Constraints. The models did not accurately reflect timelines associated
with some actions. Two examples are discussed below.
OPFOR Communications. The OPFOR was able to maintain communications through
non-standard, non-electronic methods such as couriers, face-to-face meetings, smoke, flags, and
religious sermons. Timelines associated with these forms of communications could not be
reflected in the game models during MC02, but were approximated by game participants.
Logistical Resupply. Blue maritime missile resupply timelines were not modeled. These
assets faced no capability degradation after firing a full load of missiles.
RDO Vulnerabilities Addressed

The MC02 Joint Experiment Analysis Plan (JEAP) documented two primary assessment
tasks that contained 23 warfighting challenges. The first task (contains 12 warfighting
challenges) focused on JTF HQ planning processes; none that could be impacted by the OPFOR.
The second assessment task (Assess the capability of the experimental RDO concepts to impact
JTF actions against a determined 2007 adversary) encompassed the remaining 11 warfighting
challenges within the five MC02 objectives. The OPFOR confronted Blue forces in an
ambiguous, non-cohesive, and determined manner that stressed the operational concepts by
attacking critical RDO vulnerabilities within these 11 warfighting challenges of the five MC02
objectives. The vulnerabilities decreased Blue's strengths, increased Blue's weaknesses, or
increased the OPFOR's ability to hinder Blue. The OPFOR conducted 114 actions that were
measured against those RDO vulnerabilities (See Figure 274). Several of these are discussed
below.
Decrease Blue Information Superiority. One of the premises ofRDO and an objective of
the MC02 experiment was to establish and maintain Information Superiority over the adversary.
Information superiority is critical to maintaining an accurate ONA and to developing effective
and efficient operations. The OPFOR campaign plan addressed actions to gain its own
Information Superiority and to deny information to Blue, thereby attacking this vulnerability.
During the experiment, the OPFOR executed 24 actions that were measured to hinder Blue in
achieving Information Superiority. Some significant events were:
Use of satellite windows. The OPFOR observed time windows when satellite coverage
was not available and made every attempt to execute movement and firing of missiles during
those windows of opportunity. This made it difficult for Blue to initially see or detect incoming
missiles while also giving the OPFOR time to hide missile launchers following the attacks.
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Movement ofWME. The OPFOR moved WME weapons from storage sites to disperse
the warheads and to make it difficult for Blue to find and destroy the inventory. This dispersal
required Blue to establish Information Superiority in order to detect the warhead locations. By
the conclusion ofMC02, not all WME assets had been located by Blue.
Decrease Blue Access. A premise ofRDO and MC02 experiment objectives was to
assure access into the battlespace to provide sufficient freedom of action. The OPFOR focused
its efforts to decrease Blue's access to the battlespace through asymmetric attacks and access
denial capabilities. Although Blue access to the region was scripted and conducted prior to
STARTEX, the
OPFOR still was able
to take 37 actions
against Blue to limit OPFOR Actions against ROO Vulnerabilities
their access in the 55 -
region. Some 50
- r--
significant events 45
include: ~40 r--
o r- -
- Mining Commercial tl35
III
r--
Waterways. The '030 _r-
r--
~25
r-
- r-- r--
OPFOR placed mines r-
20 r-- - r-- - - r--
in the straits prior to z
execution and then 15 r-- - r-- r-- r--
10 r-- - r-- r-- r-- r-- r---r-- r--
continued to mine
during MC02. This
hindered Blue and
5
o
r-- -
-1~ r-- r-- r-- r-- r-- r-- r--
White shipping that

operating in the mined
areas and resulted in
several ships striking
mines. This included
mining of a strategic
canal, which resulted
Figure 274: Each RDO Vulnerability was addressed by multiple OPFOR
in temporary blockage actions
and limited access to
the straits by the Blue navy.
- Terrorist Attacks. Numerous terrorist attacks against Blue hindered access to include fuel
contaminations and disruptions, strategic lift aircraft shoot downs, the attack on a Blue oiler in
port, and regional attacks on public officials.
Increase Blue Dynamic Tasking. The RDO concept requires Blue to have Information
Superiority on its adversary. This may require Blue to dynamically task its resources to take
maximum advantage over the OPFOR's vulnerabilities. OPFOR actions that caused dynamic
tasking of Blue resources impacted the operations and knowledge elements ofRDO and Blue's
ability to achieve MC02 experiment objectives. Dynamic tasking requires integrated planning
and execution to effectively accomplish high priority missions. During the experiment, the
OPFOR took 31 actions that provided Blue the opportunity to dynamically re-task resources.
Some significant events were:
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- Swarm Boat Attacks. Swarm boat tactics were employed by JTF -S forces to attack Blue naval
vessels and hinder Blue operations when possible. Fast moving boats would attack when the
opportunity existed but were vulnerable to Blue air and naval assets.
- Missile Attacks. Red missile attacks on Blue naval vessels and the country of Green required
rapid dynamic tasking of defensive weapons to shoot down the incoming missiles. This action
sometimes left Red mobile launchers vulnerable to counter-attack when Blue resources were
dynamically re-tasked.
Increase Blue Decision Cycle. The RDO concept requires Blue to think and act faster
than its adversary. To be successful, the Blue decision cycle needs to be shorter than the OPFOR.
Actions by the OPFOR to hinder or disrupt the Blue decision cycle attack RDO vulnerability.
The decision cycle impacts the operations element ofRDO and the ability to accomplish MC02
experiment objectives. During the experiment, the OPFOR took 10 actions against Blue's
decision cycle. Some significant events included:
- Reinforcement. The OPFOR was able to move ground forces to position themselves to defend
against Blue attacks on WME sites. The OPFOR also took advantage of its central position to
use interior lines for repositioning forces in country. This action hindered Blue in establishing
superior operational maneuver and in positioning joint forces for decisive operations.
- Movement. Daily movement of the JTF -S commander made it difficult for Blue to pinpoint his
location and set conditions to attack the OPFOR leadership. This resulted in several attempts to
locate the CJTF -S and one unsuccessful attack on the JTF -S command train. That attack resulted
in significant damage to a major tunnel and the primary rail lines leading into the southern part
of Red.
Increase Blue's Embarrassment. The OPFOR extensively used diplomatic, information,

military, and economic actions to embarrass Blue and to dissuade the public from further Blue
intervention. OPFOR actions that resulted in embarrassment impacted the operations element of
RDO and Blue's ability to achieve MC02 experiment objectives. During the experiment, the
OPFOR took 27 actions to embarrass Blue resulting in a credible information operations
campaign against Blue. Some significant events were:
- Deception. The OPFOR publicized the secondary effects of Blue taking out the power grid in
one locale to include the accidental release of a fatal chemical gas and the total loss of power in
area hospitals, both resulting in extensive loss of life. Though this was a deceptive effort, the
information warfare opportunity was exploited.
- Exploitation. The OPFOR maneuvering of troops around WME site #1 resulted in heavy
fighting and the eventual withdraw of assets by Blue. The OPFOR used information operations
to advertise the success of the JTF -S commander and their ability to stop Blue.
- Misinformation. The OPFOR information campaign painted Blue as preventing supplies from
reaching the islands resulting in suffering and death. When the JTF -S commander successfully
sent a supply boat to the island, he publicized his success at breaching the blockade and
providing humanitarian relief to the island inhabitants.
Increase Surprise on Blue. The OPFOR ability to surprise Blue is contrary to Effects-
Based Operations and accomplishment ofMC02 experiment objectives. With superior
knowledge and proper planning, Blue should be able to minimize surprise and be able to more
often anticipate OPFOR actions. During the experiment, the OPFOR conducted 37 actions in an

attempt to surprise Blue. In some cases, the OPFOR was successful in their actions. Some
significant events were:
- Initial Attack. The initial air and missile attack on Blue was a total, operational-level surprise
that resulted in the defeat of Blue naval assets. This action was taken by the OPFOR in response
to the ultimatum that Blue had given the CJTF-S. Additional missile attacks later in the
experiment also had some element of surprise, however, they were not as successful in reaching
their intended targets.
- Attack on Blue Ally. The small boat attack on one Allied warship and its success surprised
Blue. This action did seem to increase Blue's vessel security and render some future small boat
attacks unsuccessful.
- Air Attack. The last air attack by the OPFOR appeared to surprise Blue. Blue may not have
thought OPFOR could repair their runways in time to launch such an attack. Although
unsuccessful, with all but one OPFOR aircraft shot down, this was a surprise attack on Blue.
Increase OPFOR Deception. Deception attacks the knowledge element ofRDO and
hinders the achievement ofMC02 experiment objectives. Deception leads to false information in
the ONA and may ultimately lead to indecisive operations. The OPFOR use of jamming,
camouflage, decoys, and concealment were all taken in an attempt to deceive Blue. During the
experiment, 15 OPFOR events were observed that attempted to deceive Blue. Some significant
events were:
- Information Operations. The information operations campaign claiming Blue's action to cut
electrical power resulted in a chemical release killing thousands. This campaign continued until
Blue was able to refute it with evidence to show there was no release of hazardous gas and no
deaths from this.
- Decoys. The OPFOR used decoys with CDCM launchers, convoys, and emitters with limited
success, as the decoys were all destroyed by Blue.
Signature Reduction. The OPFOR gave daily orders to reduce the electronic signature of military
hardware in an attempt to deceive Blue.
Increase OPFOR Ambiguity. Ambiguity impacts the knowledge element ofRDO and the
ability of Blue to achieve MC02 objective 1. Ambiguity adds to the fog of war by placing
uncertainty with Information Superiority and in use of the ONA. The OPFOR took actions to
increase ambiguity in not only tactical operations but also in effects assessment. During the
experiment, 21 events were recorded where the OPFOR acted to increase information ambiguity.
Some significant events were:
- GOR and JTF-S Relationship. The relationship between the GOR and the JTF-S commander
was ambiguous in that the GOR would tell Blue their desires to rid themselves of the CJTF -S,
but then support the CJTF -S when he was successful against Blue.
- GOR Forces. The GOR mobilization of forces along the northern border of the southern region
was presented to Blue as preparations for taking control of the southern region. However, GOR
had indicated some interest in supporting the CJTF -S if Blue did not clarify its intent regarding
the disputed islands.
- Terrorist Relationships. The relationship between the JTF-S, the Fisheries Company, and the
terrorist organization were ambiguous and not clearly defined to hinder Blue in understanding
how to attack their command and control.
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Increase OPFOR information operations. The OPFOR conducted an extensive

information operations campaign against Blue to impact its operations and ability to achieve
MC02 experiment objectives. Through diplomatic and information capabilities, the OPFOR was
able to stress Blue capabilities within the JOA. During the experiment, 19 events were recorded
where the OPFOR conducted information operations. Some have already been discussed with
other RDO vulnerabilities (chemical release, power grid, retreat of Blue at WME #1). Some
additional events were:
- Misinformation. The JTF -S media claimed that Blue used WME against them on two
occasions. One incident involved reports of Blue troops around public wells with local citizens
getting sick afterwards. The second report was related to the chemical release and the claim that
Blue has used WME instead.
- Media Exploitation. The JTF-S media reported that several Blue Special Forces personnel were
captured and were to be tried as spies. The JTF -S media also reported that Blue military forces
were raping and murdering citizens as they went through the country and encouraged citizens to
resist Blue.
Increase OPFOR Mobility. OPFOR mobility makes it difficult for Blue to maintain
Information Superiority and to target high value assets. OPFOR mobility impacts the knowledge
and operations elements ofRDO and affects Blue ability to accomplish MC02 experiment
objectives. During the experiment, 12 events were recorded where the OPFOR increased its asset
mobility. Some significant events were:
- Nightly Movement. The OPFOR moved assets, C2 nodes, and the CJTF -S nightly to avoid
detection by Blue and to stay ahead of Blue in their Information Superiority. This included
movement ofTBM assets (actual and decoy), WME warheads, and the senior JTF-S leadership.
The OPFOR was able to extend the life of these high value assets and made it difficult for Blue
to find and attack time sensitive targets.
- Counterattack Forces. Major military units moved at night to reposition themselves for counter-
attack against Blue. The OPFOR was able to move two brigades over 200 km to take up
positions near WME sites. This movement occurred without attrition.
Increase OPFOR Asymmetric Attack. OPFOR asymmetric attacks disrupted Blue's

ability to set the conditions of the JOA, assure unimpeded access to the region, and to carry out
effects-based operations. Asymmetric attacks negatively impacted the operations element of
RDO and MC02 experiment objectives. During the experiment, 47 OPFOR asymmetric events
were recorded against Blue's conduct ofRDO. Military attacks included missile shots against
Blue and neighboring country assets, however most attacks were terrorist in nature aimed at
disrupting rear area operations. Some significant events were:
- Oiler Attack. The explosion aboard a boat near a Navy oiler at a port in Green damaged the
Blue vessel and hindered refueling operations for several days.
- Air Transport Attacks. The shoot down of a 747 and a C-5 by MANP ADS stopped military
airlift for a short period, as well as limited future operations.
- Biological Warfare. A biological agent was inserted at a Blue airbase that hindered future
operations at the site.
Increase OPFOR DI&E Dominance. Blue's overwhelming military capability could not
be matched by the OPFOR, so dominance in the diplomatic, information, and economic arenas
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needed to be achieved to minimize Blue's military usefulness. The OPFOR seemed to divide the
D, I, and E between its components where the GOR conducted most of the diplomatic play while
the JTF-S conducted most of the military and information play. There was little economic play
by the OPFOR ( or Blue) primarily because there was no one on the OPFOR staff that was
available to present the economic impacts of Blue actions. It should also be noted that the
experimental design for the JIACG effort focused on testing the concept and defining associate
processes during MC02 play. During the experiment, 53 OPFOR events were recorded in the
diplomatic, information, or economic areas to further OPFOR dominance in those systems. Some
significant events were:
- Diplomatic. The GOR played the diplomatic realm to limit Blue's attack on the country of Red.
In these efforts, it attempted to minimize Blue's destruction of Red infrastructure, was able to
negotiate the safe escort of one of JTF -S kilo subs, and was working to negotiate a peaceful
settlement of the islands.
- Information. The JTF-S led media did an excellent job in the information realm criticizing Blue
for every inappropriate action they took. They used deception and lies to make Blue look bad to
the people of Red, regional sister-states and to the world.
Appropriateness of OPFOR Actions to Blue Actions. The RDO white paper portrays the
OPFOR as a highly adaptive, forward thinking regional power that has asymmetric capabilities
to attack BLUE forces, allies, and interests. To accurately assess RDO and its supporting
concepts, the OPFOR must appropriately respond to Blue actions consistent with its capabilities
and the scenario. The response must take into account exercise constraints and work-arounds to
ensure a credible adversary.
- Timeliness. OPFOR actions were evaluated to ensure they were timely to current events and to
the scenario. All 114 actions recorded on the OPFOR were determined to be timely to the
experiment.
- Realistic. OPFOR actions must be realistic to the scenario in terms of its culture, doctrine, and
capabilities. Maintaining realism during the experiment is essential to ensuring the OPFOR acts
as a credible adversary. The Threat Impacts Analysis team evaluated each OPFOR action for
realism. OPFOR actions were generally viewed as being realistic for the scenario though there
was some confusion over the application of desired personas vs. expected actions as viewed by
regional experts.
OPFOR Mandates. With any experiment, the direction of play is controlled by the JECG
in order to meet experimental objectives. Sometimes this required the JECG to mandate or limit
certain actions by the OPFOR. Examples include the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons
and the pullback of forces against the Blue STOM attack. Mandates were primarily directed
through the ROE for both the OPFOR and Blue.
Conclusion
The OPFOR acted as a credible adversary by taking actions to attack the vulnerabilities
ofRDO. Of the 114 actions observed by the assessors, the OPFOR attacked RDO the most with
political, information, and economic dominance. The least attacked RDO vulnerability was
against Blue's decision cycle.
There are fundamental differences between exercise and experimental play. Exercises
should be conducted in a free play environment in order to maximize training opportunities.

Experiments require a greater degree of control to direct play towards testing experimental
concepts. MC02 had a combination of exercise and experimental objectives that required careful
control of the scenario play. Some actions were needed to set the stage for exercise play while
resource adjudication was required to experiment on RDO concepts.
The Government of Red was successful in achieving its campaign objectives, while the
JTF -S commander was not able to meet his obj ectives. The GOR was able to retain most of its
DIME capabilities though there was some degredation to GOR PMESII systems, particularly
involving infrastructure and economic systems. The JTF -S DIME and PMESII were degraded
across all areas of capability and systems.
Future experiments should provide more time to test DI&E elements of national power in
order to fully test RDO concepts and capabilities. The early scheduling of live military exercise
operations forced the scenario to develop into a military campaign without fully exploring the
DI&E elements of national power.
There are some issues with the OPFOR (such as ROE, 2007 capabilities, and 10) that are
addressed, but that had minimal impact on the ability to examine the RDO concepts.

Annex G - Range Integration Results

Since 1998, DoD has issued a number of policy documents directing Joint Forces
Command to find ways to improve distributed joint training. The Joint Warfighting Center
(JWFC) demonstrated this concept during MC02, in the form of an integrated multi-Service test
and training range network of live force activity on selected Service ranges. The intent was to tie
instrumented live force activity into one comprehensive picture shared by each range site and
USJFCOM. The main objective of the MC02 range integration effort was to define user
requirements for future linking of test and training ranges in support of test, training, and
experimentation objectives. This in tum supported the USJFCOM role to" ... articulate the joint
operational requirements to support the creation of a joint battlespace environment to support
training, experimentation and testing."
The specific MC02 exercise objectives considered are:

Demonstrate potential linkage of western ranges to show feasibility for the purposes of joint
training and experimentation.
Demonstrate integration of live and simulated actions in an environment that feeds situational
awareness at the operational level.
JFCOM's Joint Warfighting Center and an MC02 western range consortium, consisting
of participating ranges, pursued the concept development and systems design of a range
integration package to demonstrate a Joint Experiment Control Group (JECG) view of the live
forces participating in MC02. This effort supported the commander's intent that" ... the live
portion of the event will ... demonstrate the ability to link existing ranges within ajoint event ... "
The instrumented data fusion points at each range delivered participant track data to
software gateways. The software gateways, which were developed to standardize the various
data formats, fed the data through a computer network to the JTASC, where the live data was
fused with the picture from the model federation and COP data derived from the components.
This process was designed to provide a seamless, "ground truth" picture of the combined live
and virtual joint forces participating in the event. This display, available at the JTASC or any
other designated site on the network, provided the capability to view live action at any range,
with any instrumented participant viewable selectively through a CROP-type display (See Figure
275). Additionally, collaboration tools to coordinate range activities were included in the design.
The exercise objectives were mapped to required operational capabilities, which were used to
draw a system architecture.
The system components fell into three categories:
Instrumentation (live range sensors) and testing
Connectivity (network infrastructure)
Software
To the greatest extent possible, the design leverages existing range instrumentation and
connectivity capabilities, as well as ongoing efforts at providing data standards and data
exchange capabilities. Network connectivity was accomplished by leasing commercial (DISA
acquired) T-1 circuits. The circuits came through the Defense Research and Engineering
Network (DREN).
This effort provided the following legacy products:
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An initial integrated range capability, with dedicated assets, suitable for reuse during follow-
on experimentation and joint training events
A proof-of-concept of live and constructive event control, providing the first steps toward a
Joint National Training Center (JNTC) capability and the resulting requirements
The potential capability to support future joint interoperability testing, training, and
experimentation events
Insight and lessons learned on requirements and how to engineer more comprehensive live
and live/simulated joint force training events and experiments
Communications is critical to the success of range integration. USJFCOM envisions that

in order to properly develop the joint warfighter, a full integration of modeling and simulation,
experimentation, live training, distributed education, and test and assessment is required to
achieve the expected level of joint readiness. In order to ensure this capability, a robust,
networked data communications system is required. Test and training ranges provide an
impressive array of live and simulated event scenarios to the warfighter, and therefore are critical
in their contribution to a realistic training environment. Fully cognizant of the expense required
to establish a networked training communications system, USJFCOM advocates leveraging
BLUE FORCES
OPPOSING
FORCES
Command, Control,
Communications, Computers,
Inte_ru:e Feed
Figure 275: Network connectivity of the Range Integration demonstration during MC02 rehearsals and
the final execution. There were actually two parallel networks. The first was provided by DISA -
commercially acquired circuits, and the second was a network asset
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existing communications or data systems operating outside operational military command and
control networks-these include those communications and data systems currently used by the
test and training community. By combining existing or emerging networks within the training,
research and development, and experimentation community, ranges will be able transmit range
data through a high capacity environment and provide services to training and experimentation
without interfering with real world, operational networks.
The integrati on of ranges is vi tal to the successful development of a j oint training
program that incorporates the full spectrum of live and virtual systems. Once developed, this
system will enhance joint force readiness.
Background and Concept of Operations

As described earlier in Chapter 5, MC02 was conducted over four development and
integration test spirals and an execution event. The integration and test spirals progressively
included more systems and maturity of the respective systems in MC02 and examined
progressively greater levels of scenario complexity, integration, and interoperability.
The MC02 Range Integration Team included participants from the JFCOM J791,
NAWC-WD, and FI2010. The NAWC-WD staffled the development of the test plan for MC02
range integration and spiral testing. The live range integration CONOPS support requirements
from the JFCOM analyst community and training after action review
There are several views of the Range Integration CONOPS:

The requirements development, engineering and integration perspective
The execution perspective
The post execution analysis or after action review perspective
Requirements Development and Integration CONOPS

The initial requirements development and integration concept of operations was to have
the participating ranges' representatives provide a coherent design, integration and test plan to
integrate the respective range sensors and data into a common format for distribution among the
range facilities and the JTASC, and supporting coordination of range instrumentation assets from
the JTASC MC02 JECG cell. Initial contact was made with the JFCOM analyst community, but
few analysis requirements were levied on the live range integration effort. This was largely due
to relatively less focus on the live activities than on the joint headquarters activities at the
JTASC. Most of the live activities were Service- focused events within the MC02 context. While
the role providing a combined cooperative live ground truth and operational sensor perception
"picture" on a common system was identified for support to JECG live operations, most of the
range integration CONOPS focused on providing an initial proof of concept for range data
integration and distribution. The result of this focus was that less dialog and insight was
established between the operational participants, the JECG staff and the range integration staff
than was desirable. The limited understanding and coordination resulted in a proof of concept
that was technically very successful, but severely underused by the event operational control
staff and analytic staff. A lesson learned from hindsight here is that the live forces integration
requirements and capabilities followed the "chicken and egg" syndrome. Had the operational
staff been more involved in the requirements process, the range integration systems would have
been used to a greater extent. Moreover, had the range integration staff been more proactive in
involving the operations staff, the operations staff would have understood the range integration
FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONLY G-3

capabilities and may have been more involved. Clearly, more dialog must occur between the
event operations staff and the range integration providers, and it should occur as frequently as
possible.
While the technical capabilities could support range systems control and coordination
from the JECG, the execution operations did not occur as anticipated. The JECG did not use
these capabilities to any effect - although on balance, the proof of principal was established and
these capabilities could be used operationally in the future, given that they are incorporated into
the JECG operations.
Execution CONOPS
The execution concept of operations differed the most between the initial expectations
and the actual event. Initially, the execution CONOPS was that the ranges would coordinate to
provide with the Services on schedule and provide instrumentation assets, and "truth data" in the
common distribution format. Additionally, the ranges would take advantage of video and other
targets of opportunity to provide other data sources to the JTASC JECG. Initially, relatively little
emphasis was given to providing "real-time" briefings and to support various visitors and event
observers at the JTASC and at other locations. The initial execution CONOPS included
provisions to coordinate range systems operations via voice-over-IP (VoIP) capabilities designed
into the range integration architecture. The live range data provided to the JTASC was intended
to be concurrently merged with live operational sensor data and simulation "truth" data on a
common display in the JECG - providing the JECG insight into the live participants' physical
position and dynamics "truth" and the operations sensor perceptions of those participants.
As it turned out, relatively few of the actual live participants were instrumented. Data
obtained from the instrumented participants was good, but there were significantly fewer
participants reported through the range integration network than were actually in the scenarios.
This was due to the methods used to instrument the live participants (only one aircraft of a flight
may be instrumented, many aircraft (C130, AWACS, tankers, helicopters, etc.) were never
planned to carry instrumentation. The lack of understanding of percentage of instrumented
participants (and thus available for range integration reporting) and the affects on the range
integration system implementation was due largely to the limited dialog between the range
integration staff and the operational planning staffs. In addition, alternate methods (versus fixed
range sensors, aircraft IFF transponders, and participant tracking pods) to obtain cooperative
instrumentation on a greater percentage of participants (LINK-l 6 PPLI reporting, Army forces
VMF reporting, etc.) were not investigated in the scope of the MC02 effort. In addition, coverage
from fixed range sensors were not comprehensively analyzed against the MC02 operations
scenarios. This resulted in some data dropouts for reasons such as terrain masking, and range
sensor coverage. This resulted in a difference in operating "philosophy" between the test ranges,
assets and the training community operations; where test missions are usually much smaller in
scope and much more controlled for participants' routes and maneuvers, while training events
are relatively more dynamic and not as subject to rigid geography constraints within general
boundaries.
Post execution and Analysis CONOPS

This phase of the operation held to the initial expectations. There was no post event
analysis conducted other than a "self critique. " Consequently, post event range integration
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operations were conducted as expected. During the event, all range integration participants kept
notes and logs of anomalies, problems, and ideas to improve the process.
Range Integration CONOPS Findings and Recommendations

Future joint interoperability events involving live participants and live range integration
would benefit from early and continuous involvement with analysts and operations staff. This
involvement is critical during range integration requirements definition and should be continued
during testing to allow the development of a clear understanding of range integration capabilities
and how to use them during execution.
Establish clear RI naming conventions and protocols for radio sites, chat program names,
and voice communications and chat protocols. Not much formality is needed but enough to look
professional and emphasize the site and function rather than the person.
Establish and maintain good working relationships with the local sites' communications,
networking and security staff-always a good idea. Have these staff names and contact
information in the event the POC list is not available to the range integration staff, so that all
understand who to call for help when it's needed.
Determine "quick look" measures for analysis of the on-going operations. Put the results
of these "quick look" analyses in the daily logs or chat/whiteboard files and be ready to brief
them to analyst staff. Distributed operations always have a flavor of "real time" analysis - this is
a big plus for this type of operation.
During testing phases and execution, use a network chat and/or whiteboard to publish and
maintain: 1) the next day's plans/schedules, and 2) a running status of any metrics gathered. This
allows each distributed site to easily report and provide impromptu briefings and discussions to
visitors and to better coordinate among themselves. This also alleviates the need for daily status
reports-as the daily status reports are just cut and paste from the running status log. Establish
this format before the event. The form for the "next days plans" should migrate to the current
day's status on a daily basis-also making status reporting easier. Make this available for
manager and other functional staff to access so their understanding of the systems' capabilities
and operations are enhanced by direct use to obtain information.
Coordination with event operations (Air Tasking Order - ATO distribution, land forces
operations distribution, maintaining operational entity naming conventions, etc.) is critically
important to the range integration operations, as this information may be very fluid over the
course of the event. This is a key recommendation because this was a significant omission in
MC02.
The audio coordination tool was used to good effect, but an on-line chat service would
have been beneficial (this is similar to chat tools used in other live and simulation events like
JCIET, JEFX). The chat tool provides persistence of the coordination messages, (people don't
have to be on audio all the time), provides a "running log" of the operations, and is a convenient
way to document anomalies and problems. The chat tool can be very helpful in reconstructing
sequences of events and in coordinating actions and operations.
Establish a POC log and have it distributed to all range integration staff and placed on-
line.
Establish a clear POC responsibility understanding by all participants. Annotate the POC
log (phone book) with responsibilities.
Establish an on-line repository (with at least file transfer protocol- FTP - capabilities) for
log files and code distributions.
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Establish a clear, daily schedule of preparations and log them: get current ATO, put
relevant section on the chat/whiteboard, put any DV time on the whiteboard, discuss I document
any changes to the system and fixes made during the night.
Document any changes to the systems, networks, and configurations on the chat and
whiteboard.
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Annex H - Model and Simulation Federation
Preface
The Millennium Challenge 2002 modeling and simulation (M&S) federation is the
largest, most complex high level architecture (HLA) federation ever attempted. Technical and
operational tests have proven that large HLA events are possible, albeit with difficulty. A
dedicated band of developers and users, working in concert over the months of design,
development, and testing surmounted the challenges. The purpose of this annex is to provide a
small flavor of the complexity of the federation and an understanding of the functionality of the
federation and its component parts. It will also provide an appreciation for the richness and
robustness of the virtual battlespace environment.
There are three basic components of the federation. First are the core simulations (See
Figure 276). These simulations comprise the minimum essential set of simulations required to
create a full and robust environment sufficient to meet the experimental objectives ofMC02. The
second piece consists of the Services' tactical and operational simulations necessary to also
satisfy their unique experimental requirements, while still participating within the overall
framework of the MC02 battlespace. Finally, there are a set of special-purpose, stand-alone
simulations, simulators, and tools, which fulfilled a variety of necessary supporting roles, for
both j oint and Service experimentation.
This virtual environment will support over 30,000 battlespace entities distributed over 17
operating locations coast-to-coast, including one site afloat on the USS Coronado.
A bottom-up, requirements-driven, development process, with Service-input, was used to
create the simulation environment The Services selected the best simulations to represent their
capabilities; USJFCOM funded the improvements and integration necessary to form the HLA
federation. All participating simulations have adopted some changes, which resulted in a
significant leave-behind capability to support future Service events. While requirements drove
the build process, some ideas were too late to the table; the primary focus was therefore
concentrated on the high priority capabilities vital to success of the overall MC02 experiment.
Actual development, including code changes, was completed within a year, while
members of the development team (drawn from joint, Service, agency, and industry partners)
supported other Service exercises in the process. Over 400 trouble reports were opened and
closed during the ensuing year of testing.
The federation provided superb battlespace functionality based on predicted 2007 joint
and Service capability. It included similarly enhanced supporting environments for terrain, JISR,
jamming and communications, logistics, TBM, and infrastructure. The federation represents a
cooperative effort by a diverse uniformed, civilian, and industry cross-discipline team that fully
supported both the joint and Service experimentation objectives.
Air Force Synthetic Environment for Reconnaissance and Surveillance (AFSERS)

SPONSOR: Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation (AFAMS)
The AFSERS provides multiple UAV simulations. This is a human in the loop (HIL)
simulation, which can produce both video (RS 170 format) and reconnaissance exploitation
reports (RECCEXREP). RECCEXREP contain information from any air breather flown in
AWSIM. AFSERS is DIS-compliant. AFSERS is the Air Force specific version of the Multiple
UAV Simulation Environment (MUSE). AFSERS Video will be provided to the CAOC floor.
""FOR OFFICIl'",L lISE ONLY H-1

Air Warfare Simulation, AWSIM

AWSIM is the official U.S. Air Force theater-level wargaming model. The purpose of
AWSIM is to provide a training capability for the air warfare environment. In fulfilling this
purpose, AWSIM represents the air component of commander-level battle staff training for Air
Force conducted exercises, and the air portion of joint training exercises. AWSIM is an
interactive and prescriptive, computer-driven, time-stepped simulation of a theater air warfare
environment. AWSIM is latitude and longitude based and simulates day and night operations,
and limited weather conditions over a smooth earth (no terrain). It supports a two-sided scenario
where opposing sides define, structure, and control their forces. Modeled features include
aircraft, air bases, surface-to-air missiles, short-range air defense systems, ships, and radar sites.
AWSIM results include success of individual aircraft missions, munitions consumption, and the
systematic playing out of a scenario based on kill algorithms that determine the outcome of many
separate aircraft interactions.
Me 02 Federation Core Models
CLUTIER
NWARS
JW)S[M
(DBST SUITE)
F1RESIM
(DBST SUITE)
JOHS JOHS
M A
Figure 276: MC02 Federation Core Models
H-2 F OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

C2 Analysis and Targeting Tool (CATT)

SPONSOR: Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC)/453 EWS
CATT is a high fidelity simulation of an Integrated Air Defense System (lADS). It is
capable of simulating all levels of the lADS. CATT's uniqueness is its ability to implement the
C2 algorithms of an lADS and to provide operator-in-the-Ioop capabilities with manned consoles
or unmanned operation with synthetic operators. The Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC/EW)
and the Air Force Information Warfare (AFIWC/453 EWS) Center jointly developed CATT. It is
currently undergoing validation by the AFFTC.
Civil Environment Model (CEM)

SPONSOR: U.S. Air Force ESC/CXC
CEM is a model that is being developed as part of the National Air and Space Model
(NASM), and was used in MC02 to produce effects of attack on strategic civil targets and
infrastructure. The CEM is the part of JSIMS that simulates the flow of commodities to the battle
space.
Clutter/JSAF
SPONSOR: USJFCOM, J9
Clutter provides a large number of entities from a relatively few number of boxes. Three
thousand moving entities on a 733 MHz machine with 750 Mb ram is normal. Clutter was used
to represent civilians, and background military traffic. Its focus was to confuse sensors and
provide background clutter in the simulation for things like collateral damage play and road
clogging. Varying types of vehicles available: Blue/Red/Green, military combat and supply,
civilian.
Digital Battle staff Sustainment Trainer (DBST)

SPONSOR: National Simulation Center (NSC)
DBST is a federation of constructive Distributed Interactive Simulations (DIS) and other
state-of-the-art-technology that, collectively, simulate military operations. Primary models used
in DBST are FlRESIM and EADSIM. It uses information produced by the simulations to
stimulate C41SR systems in a unit's tactical operations center. DBST facilitates battle staff
collective training by requiring the staff to react to incoming digital information while executing
the commander's tactical plan. The targeted training audience is brigade and battalion battle
staffs, including functional command post (CP) training and full CP training. Battle staffs of
higher echelons may also employ DBST to achieve limited training objectives. DBST is a system
of systems simulation federation that includes a ground maneuver simulation (JCATS and/or
JANUS, SELS), interfaces from simulation to tactical systems (EPIU, ETSIU), a field artillery
simulation (FireSim), and an air defense model that incorporates sensors modeling (EADSIM).
Because DBST uses standard simulation protocols, HLAlDIS, any of the models in the
Federation can link with other simulations using these protocols. The DBST sensors being
played in EADSIM can "sense" the presence of other entities from any federate on the simulation
LAN. For MC02, DBST stimulated various Army Tactical systems by sensing entities from
entities in the MC02 Federation.
Distributed IW Constructive Environment (DICE)

SPONSOR: Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC)/453 EWS
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DICE simulates threat integrated air defense system sensors, weapons, and
communications. DICE provides an RF environment as input for intelligence collection
simulations.
Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM)

SPONSOR: Space and Missile Defense Battle lab.
EADISM was used in the DBST Federation to provide air defense models, radars, fixed
wing aircraft and various ground and air based sensors. EADSIM is linked to a tactical
simulation interface unit (TSIU) to provide C4I messages.
Fire Simulation (FlRESIM)

SPONSOR: Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle lab (DSABL)
The DBST Federation used FIRESIM to provide high-fidelity field artillery simulation
for Red and Blue, including artillery battlefield radar systems. It is linked to the Army Field
Artillery Tactical Data System (AF ATDS) via a protocol interface unit and receives fires from
C4I systems, provides feedback and is a primary simulation of the DBST suite.
JQUAD (JCAS and JOISIM)

SPONSOR: USJFCOM Joint Information Operations Center (HOC)
Joint C2W Attack Simulation (JCAS) simulates and produces bomb damage assessment
(BDA) on a wide array of fixed targets using the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM)
data, with the required designated mean point of impact (DMPI) level fidelity. Joint operations
information simulation (JOISIM) simulates the collection and reporting of intelligence
information from various air and space-based sensors.
Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) (A = Army / M = Marines/SOF)

SPONSOR: USJFCOM, Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), JW500 (M&S)
JCATS is a multi-service, multi-sided, interactive, entity-level, object oriented simulation
used by military and security organizations as a tool for joint training, analyses, experimentation,
planning and mission rehearsal. Current limits tested up to 25,000 plus entities on configurations
as large as 60 workstations. DIS links with VSTARS, CGS, DBST's FIRESIM, EADSIM, and
TSIU for U.S. Army Tactical C4I and operational information systems.
Joint Semi-Automated Forces (JSAF)

SPONSOR: USJFCOM, J9/Naval Warfare Development Center (NWDC)
Entity-based simulation of military units (all ground / sea / air and some space)
JSAF is a simulation system that generates entity level platforms, interactions, and
behaviors in a robust synthetic natural environment. All interactions within the battlespace are
resolved at entity level, whether the entity in question is an infantryman, a tank, a ship, an
airplane, munitions, a building, a sensor, or terrain modifications like tank ditches. The
individual entities are task organized into appropriate units for a given mission and controlled as
units or individual entities using a simulation interface.
Missile Defense Space Warning Tool (MDST)

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MDST simulates current and future space-based launch detection. It includes the
capability to receive threat input messages from external simulations and to generate output
messages in operational formats to external sites for exercise purposes.
Multiple Unified Simulation Environment (MUSE)

SPONSOR: Maritime Battle Center - Naval Warfare Development Center (NWDC)
The MUSE/AFSERS model consists of a payload visualization system, air vehicle and
data link simulation, and a configurable ISR ground station surrogate with tactical messaging
capability. The six-degree-of-freedom (6-DOF) air vehicle and data link model simulates the
dynamics of the ISR air vehicle and associated sensors controlled by operators at the surrogate or
tactical ground station. Tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUA V) generates 3D graphics display
of an unmanned aerial vehicle electro optical sensor output based on multiple data feeds from
various simulations. The generated image is exported as video for distribution to other C4ISR
systems.
National War Gaming System (NW ARS)

SPONSOR: National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
NW ARS simulates the
collection, reporting, and
dissemination of intelligence
from national assets by
providing realistic reporting on
simulated ground truth.
NW ARS was developed in
1989 to allow the warfighter to
exercise the use ofNRO
systems without expenditure of
valuable, real world resources.
Simulation of the Location

and Attack of Mobile Enemy
Missiles (SLAMEM)
SPONSOR: National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
SLAMEMis a
simulation designed to study Figure 277: Sailors unhook a battles pace planning autonomous
C4ISR and attack effectiveness underwater vehicle (BPAUV) during mine hunting and ocean
for locating and destroying mapping exercises conducted during the Navy's portion of
Millennium Challenge 2002.
mobile surface targets.
SLAMEM was designed for
analysis. It can model attributes and interactions of the battle-space: Mobile and stationary
targets, geographical features, sensors, and attack platforms. However, for MC02, SLAMEM
was used to model a notional 2007 national architecture and simulated the entire Tasking,
Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TCPED) intelligence cycle. SLAMEM
operators received tasking from the collection management cell and loaded it into SLAMEM
where a NRO developed notional 2007 architecture collected on the MC02 federation targets.
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SLAMEM uses classification matrices jointly developed by NRO and NIMA to determine
probability of detection and target identification. SLAMEM then generates target identification
and geo location messages in USMTF format for dissemination to the end user.
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP)

SPONSOR: Army Space Program Office
The TENCAP MUSE simulation system is part of a collaborative effort with the Army
and the Air Force to create a virtual ISR simulation. The Department of Defense uses it for
command and stafflevel training for joint services and stand-alone Army warfighting exercises.
The TENCAP MUSE can operate as an embedded or stand-alone ISR system trainer
communicating directly with the actual ISR ground system. The simulation can also emulate or
feed other Service TES-like systems such as the Navy's TES-N and the AF ISR-M, modeling
each of the Service's inherent ground system capabilities such as mission planning, dynamic re-
tasking, imagery exploitation, and dissemination of reports and exploited imagery of the ISR
platforms being exercised. The simulation allows exploration of different CONOPs to enhance
the capabilities of ISR platforms available to a theater commander. The model uses the Service
standard National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) products as the primary source data
for terrain visualization. The TENCAP MUSE derives target entities from the constructive
simulation and translates these entities in its libraries to create a virtual view of the battlefield.
While primary emphasis is on ground targets, cooperation between the Services is creating a data
library including aircraft, fixed structures, and naval vessels.
MC02 Technical Integration Database (MC02 TID):

The MC02 technical integration database (TID) is a distributed web-enabled
administrative database developed by the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Joint Futures Lab
(J9) Experimentation Engineering Department (EED) during MC02 to assist with configuration
management (CM) and development of the MC02 C\ XC 4I and M&S federation. The
unclassified version of the database is located at URL http://mc02db.je.jfcom.mil. A classified
version of the database was located on the MC02 experimentation local area network (LAN) and
could be accessed remotely by MC02 participants during the experiment. The core modules of
the database are systems, sites, and points of contact. These modules link systems to sites to
points of contact for each system and site used during MC02. Additional modules added to the
database include:
Trouble report module, which provides a collaborative environment for OPFOR testers, C\
XC 4I and M&S developers, and systems/simulation users to identify and document
federation development issues/problems
Change request module, which is used by the configuration control group to manage
federation changes
Platforms, munitions, and firing matrix modules, which are used for enumerations
development
Rules and workarounds module, which is used by the OPFOR testers to describe rules and
workarounds for order of battle scenario play beyond the capabilities of the federation
models
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Personnel and personnel groups modules are used to capture joint manning document
(JMD) personnel information to produce an electronic personnel locator and phone directories.
Virtual Surveillance Target and Attack Radar System JSTARS (VSTARS)

SPONSOR: Air Force C2TIG
The VSTARS workstation "stands in" for the JSTARS aircraft on the virtual battlefield. It
provides the same coverage area and radar model specifications as the real JStars aircraft. The
VSTARS receives DIS protocol data units (PDUs) over a computer network, processes through
the radar model, and creates MTI reports. The VSTARS can interface with other nodes through
simulated SCDL, NATO-EX protocol, and a limited set of JTIDS messages over a local area
network (LAN).
Airborne Laser Simulation (ABL)

SPONSOR: ABL Program Office
The ABL Operator in the Loop (OTL) simulation ran from the Theater Air Command and
Control Simulation Facility (TACCSF), Kirtland AFB, NM.
Automated Scriptor Simulator Exercise Trainer (ASSET)

SPONSOR: National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
ASSET allows an operator in the control group to script friendly and enemy force
movement and then simulate signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT)
collection against those forces based upon the scenario script. The ASSET system enables users
to graphically specify the activity of fictitious military forces and associate intelligence events
with them. ASSET transforms intelligence events into messages of a standard protocol and
provides chronologically based injections of messages directly into tactical data processors
(TDPs) or through the tactical related applications (TRAP) data dissemination system (TDDS).
ATLOS
SPONSOR: U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)
ATLOS simulation uses real-time ocean environment and acoustic propagation to model
short & long-range performance of sonar's.
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

SPONSOR: Theater Air Command and Control Simulation Facility (TACCSF)
The AWACS simulator models all surveillance and control functions of the AWACS.
The AWACS MTC is a warfighter-in-the-Ioop, virtual simulator that offers a realistic operator
interface, simulated TADIL-J data link implementation with distributed capability, and TADIL-J
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) message receive capability. The AWACS fleet maintains
simulator currency.
Battle Force Tactical Trainer (BFTT)

SPONSOR: PMS-430
The BFTT system provides simulation-based training support for Navy shipboard
personnel. BFTT connects fleet training facilities ashore with ships stationed in various
homeports, allowing them to train in a realistic tactical environment on actual shipboard combat
systems. It uses distributed network connectivity to provide this simulated environment to ships
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via the DIS. At each ship, the BFTT shipboard component, simulator/stimulator/on-board trainer
(OBT), serves as an interface between this DIS simulated data and input signals that drive
shipboard combat direction and fire control systems. Its functions include system control,
problem geometry, tactical data simulation, signal generation, environmental simulation, and
performance monitoring/fault localization. The BFTT operator processor console (BOPC)
normally provides simulation management for the BFTT system. JSAF provided the primary
simulation engine for BFTT during MC02IFBE-J.
The BFTT simulator/stimulator/OBT sends and receives a wide range of DIS PDU's.
These include standard DIS PDU's such as entity state, fire, detonation, and collision. BFTT
specific PDU's (such as BFTT Chaff, BFTT Jammer Data) and various experimental PDU's.
Processing these PDU's, the shipboard system can generate simulated radar targets, clutter, and
ECM displays for air and surface search radars. As the shipboard user operates controls in the
actual equipment, the BFTT shipboard system models the resulting actions and updates the
primary simulation of the action via the DIS protocol.
TheFBEHLA
federation was the
primary simulation
engine driving the
simulator/stimulator
OBT during
MC02IFBE-J.
Because this
federation uses the
HLA protocol, an
HLA-DIS gateway
translated between the
two simulation
protocols.
Cobra Ball
SPONSOR:
US. Air Force
The Cobra Ball Figure 278: The first production A-10A was delivered to Davis-Monthan Air
simulator combines Force Base, AZ., in October 1975. It was designed specially for the close air
sensor and reporting support mission and had the ability to combine large military loads, long loiter
and wide combat radius, which proved to be vital assets to America and its
technologies, which
allies during Operation Desert Storm. In the Gulf War, A-10s, with a mission
can be applied to TMD. capable rate of 95.7 percent, flew 8,100 sorties and launched 90 percent of
The advanced sensor is the AGM-65 Maverick missiles.
interfaced via DIS to
the simulated environment. This sensor system provides sensor detection and tracking data via
TIBS to the CAOC. The BIG SAFARI Program Office manages the COBRA BALL simulator.
CV-22
SPONSOR: US. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
Bell-Textron, Fort Worth, TX, operates the CV-22 virtual simulator. It will fly high
fidelity missions in support of special operations forces (SOF), primarily to assist the Blue Force
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Tracking initiative. The CV-22 is DIS compliant, and is integrated into the larger MC02 M&S
federation via a T-1 to TACCSF in Kirtland AFB, NM. The CV-22 Tactics Development
simulator incorporates all unique, specified enhancements over the MV-22. Enhanced situational
awareness displays allow the crew to penetrate a high threat environment at terrain following
altitudes down to 100' AGL in adverse weather. Exercise national asset and simulated broadcast
threat inputs and are fed via T -1 line to the aircrew for NRT planning, threat avoidance, and
mission execution/re-tasking.
Carrier Weapon Handling System (CWHS) [WARCON]

SPONSOR: US. Navy
CWHS models the build-up and transport of weapons within a Nimitz Class aircraft
carrier. Like the FDO model, it is a discrete event simulation implemented in Pro-Model. It is
responsible for publishing the state of all individual weapons and for handing over weapons to
the FDO model.
Dynamic Communications Environment (DCE)

SPONSOR: Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC)
The DCE system models the communications environment for an experiment or exercise,
and interfaces with IWEG to represent the effects of both lethal and non-lethal attacks on the
communications infrastructure. DCE maintains a mapping between logical communications
networks and the physical infrastructure. The DCE operator monitors "game truth" inputs, and
maintains status of the physical communications infrastructure. The IWEG system evaluates the
effects on the physical systems when physical attack or non-lethal engagements are detected. The
IWEG issues appropriate commands to CATT and/or DICE to alter communications within their
logical networks in response to such engagements.
Information Warfare Effects Generator (IWEG)

SPONSOR: US. Air Force
The IWEG system models the communications environment for an experiment or
exercise, and represents the effects of both lethal and non-lethal attacks on the communications
infrastructure. IWEG uses a Dynamic Communications Environment (DCE) to maintain a
mapping between logical communications networks and the physical infrastructure. IWEG
interoperates with CATT, DICE, JQUAD, and RJMT via DIS protocols. The DCE operator
monitors game truth inputs and maintains a status of the physical communications infrastructure.
When physical attack or non-lethal engagements are detected, the IWEG system evaluates the
effects on the physical systems and issues appropriate commands to CATT and/or DICE to alter
communications within their logical networks. CATT and DICE react to the network change and
RJMT can exploit and report these changes.
Flight Deck Operations (FDO) [WARC ON]

SPONSOR: US. Navy
FDO represents operations on a Nimitz class flight deck. The model is a discrete event
simulation implemented using the commercial Pro Model modeling package. It is federated into
the overall W ARC ON Joint Synthetic Battlespace using the DoD HLA. It receives weapons from
and returns weapons to the CWHS. It also launches aircraft, which are created and flown in
JSAF, and receives them back when they land.
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Integrated Modeling Platform for Advanced Computational Technologies

SPONSOR: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
IMP ACT uses weather, terrain database and agent release inputs to model dispersion of
the chemical/biological cloud across a geographic area overtime.
LOCAAS Engagement Analysis Program Simulation (LEAPS)

SPONSOR: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Division Newport RI
LEAPS is a real-time, distributed interactive simulation (DIS) system that simulates the
operational concept of the LOCAAS weapon system delivered to the threat area via TACMS.
LEAPS consist of three major simulation components: 1) mission planner, 2) launcher interface,
and 3) vehicle simulation. The mission planner (MP) provides the operator with a fast and easy
way to plan LOCAAS missions in response to planning requests received from LAWS. It
contains maps, threat and tactical overlays, terrain analysis tools, point-and-click interfaces, and
3-D flight preview capability. Within the MP, an automated mission generator calculates the
recommended dispense location, vehicle formation, search location and pattern, and threat attack
priorities. The operator can modify and/or approve the suggested mission. MP also doubles as a
target contact receiver capable of receiving and displaying LOCAAS target reports and images.
The second component, the launcher interface (LI), stores the LOCAAS missions sent by the MP
and automatically signals carrier missile launches to the third component, the vehicle simulation
(VSIM), upon receipt offi.ring reports from LAWS. The VSIM provides real-time simulation
and visualization of the carrier missiles and LOCAAS vehicles displayed on a virtual 3D
battlefield. VSIM combines aerodynamics, communications, and visual modules to accurately
simulate multiple vehicles operating simultaneously in all phases of flight, including carrier
missile fly-out, LOCAAS dispense, stabilization, search, redirection, and endgame attack. Of the
three LEAPS components, only the MP requires an operator.
Logistics Simulation (LOGSIM)

LOGSIM is a computerized logistics model designed to place realistic constraints on the
operations tempo of the air warfare simulation (AWSIM) during computer-assisted exercises
(CAX). The United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) Logistics Directorate conceived
LOGSIM for use in JF ACC and JTF training exercises at the Warrior Preparation Center (WPC)
in Einsiedlerhof, Germany. LOGSIM was designed using actual Air Force historical data and
responds to maintenance requirements during exercises, much like operational Air Force wings,
repairing aircraft as critical resources allow. In AWSIM, aircraft break or incur damage and,
using LOGSIM, require maintenance and spare parts as in actual flying operations. Mission
planners take into account losses and delays due to maintenance. Logistics personnel monitor
aircraft and equipment status, including spare part stocks, while providing status reports to their
leadership. LOGSIM continually updates a comprehensive set of reports that detail the current
maintenance status of AWSIM aircraft and equipment in LOGSIM. LOGSIM can operate in a
stand-alone mode allowing use in exercises where AWSIM is not employed. In this mode,
LOGSIM retains its original capabilities, but does not actively constrain air operations in an air
model. LOGSIM functions primarily as a report generator, but also continues to offer those
processes such as aircraft problem identification and equipment failure and repair, which are
unique to LOGSIM.
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Multi-LINK System Test and Training Tool (MLST3)

SPONSOR: Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC)
Link System Test and Training Tool (MLST3). The output of the MLST3 provides MIL-
STD LINK-11AIB (TADIL B) and LINK-16 (TADIL J) digital outputs. The TADIL
input/output is suitable for input/output to a Class II joint tactical information distribution system
(JTIDS) terminal. The ability to inject simulated representations based on the reporting oflive
assets over a LINK 16 network is also possible Link data can be transmitted from the simulation
to C 4I systems over SIPRNET or via serial connection. The link picture will be an aggregated air
and surface picture based on the location of both real and simulated radar assets. All link tracks
will display a common joint unit (ru) as the originating C2 unit. As discussed, Link data will be
produced and injected into the exercise GCCS-M. Live link information will be used by C3F
ships, supporting live flight operations. The simulated Link-16 and live link 16 will be
interfaced, so that the experiment audience will see a merged picture consisting of both real and
constructive tracks. The Link 16 air and surface picture will be produced and forwarded in an
aggregated state to the GCCS-M, representing the forwarding of a Link 16 air and surface picture
from constructively simulated Link units. The operational or experimental staff assigned ru
identification numbers to all units. Additionally, all constructively generated simulation units
were marked with an easily identifiable set of IFF codes (provided via the experiment ATO).
C3F provided the codes so that the simulated units were easily identified on GCCS-M. Specific
track block numbers were assigned to the simulated Jus IAW the OPTASK LINK.
Ocean Atmosphere Space Environmental Services (OASES)

SPONSOR: Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO)
OASES distributes 4D meteorological state data, to include clouds, wind, air and ocean
temperatures, sea state, salinity, and currents to the HLA federation. OASES is an HLA federate
that consists of a suite of applications for creating and updating run-time objects that encapsulate
the state of the ocean, atmosphere and space environments. Five separate applications comprise
the OASES system.
Environmental Data Ingestor (EDI)

The EDI imports environment forecast and now-cast data provided in either the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) gridded binary (GRIB) format or the synthetic
environment data representation and interchange specification (SEDRIS) transmittal format, as
generated by a numerical atmosphere, ocean or space model. The EDI converts the input model
data to the common geodetic coordinate system used internally by OASES, standardizes the units
of the data, and stores the data in a run-time-optimized format that is used by all of the OASES
applications.
Environmental Data Transformer (EDT)

The EDT uses a configurable and extensible set of transformation algorithms to augment
an existing OASES database with the derived environmental parameters required by client
simulations, but not provided directly by a numerical ocean, atmosphere or space model. The
EDT supports chaining of transformation algorithms such that the outputs of one transformation
may be the inputs to another transformation within the same program execution.
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Environmental Tailoring System (ETS)

The ETS is a GUI-based application for editing the contents of an OASES database. The
ETS provides two editing algorithms: 1) replacement at a point with Gaussian spatial and
temporal blending, and 2) the pressure field modification (PFM) algorithm for editing
atmospheric environments while preserving correlation between temperature, pressure, wind and
relative humidity.
Personal Computer - Shallow Water Acoustic Toolkit (PC-SWAT)

PC-SWAT uses real-time ocean environment and acoustic propagation to model short
and long-range performance of sonar.
Portable Space Model EnhancedlNavigation (PSM+INAV)

PSM+/NAV links through point-to-point interface with the JCAS portion JQUAD. PSM+/NAV
will inject simulated GPS data into the impact location, if GPS-guided munitions are launched in
AWSIM. PSM+/NAV constellation status, exercise weather, space environment, and jamming
events. PSM+/NAV data is based on the satellite-based navigation accuracy performance model
(SNAPM) GPS model augmented with total atmosphere-ocean -space services (TAOS) weather
and space environment information.
Rivet Joint Mission Trainer (RJMT)

RJMT will provide a high fidelity ground trainer for RC-13S RIVET JOINT
reconnaissance compartment personnel, using aircraft hardware and software. The trainer will be
equipped with signal generators to create and display a full range of radar and communications
signals to the reconnaissance crew. A complex, synchronized signal environment is presented to
the crew, permitting coordination, and exploitation of these signals. The trainer is equipped with
Link-II, Link-I6, and TIBS data links to train aircrew to effectively interact with other battle
management assets. The trainer is distributed interactive simulation-capable, permitting RIVET
JOINT participation in large-scale exercises such as MC02.
Simulation C 4I Interchange Module for Plans, Logistics, & Exercises (SIMPLE)

SPONSOR: Space and Missile Defense Battle lab
The MC02 DBST architecture uses the sim-C 4I interchange module for plans, logistics
and exercises (SIMPLE) to provide database synchronization between the tactical digital systems
and the DBST federate simulations. SIMPLE provides the unit level logistics roll-up and
provides the JVMF logistics message threads to CSSCS and FBCB2. SIMPLE also provides
KOS.I position reports for Blue situational awareness to the MCS and FBCB2. The SIMPLE
operator can manually inject other JVMF messages.
V nattended MASINT Sensor (VMS)

SPONSOR: Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC)
Unattended ground sensors are simulated by UMS. The DIS compliant, UMS simulation
was used to support time-critical targeting. UMS output was distributed onto the TIBS network
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via STU III dial-up to the TIUIPC located at the AFC2TIG, Hurlburt Field, FL. The UMS model
was located at the AFC2TIG.
Virtual Submarine (VSSGN)

SPONSOR: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, RI
The virtual SSGN functioned as a sensor, mensuration, and fires node in support of the
joint digital fires network. It was used to explore and support submarine provided preplanned
and time critical join fires during rapid decisive operations. The Warfare System Presentation
Facility (WSPF), located at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island
developed vSSGN. A modernized trident control room (CR), navigation center (NC), and missile
control center (MCC) mock up was created there. It was equipped with a range of tactical system
capabilities, and manned by a military crew of approximately 10 submarine-qualified officers
and enlisted men.
The vSSGN crew has the following tactical information system capabilities: LAWS,
GCCS-M, GISRC, RPM, PC-MDS, TTWCS, IKA, electronic officer of the deck log, Virginia
Onboard Team Trainer (OBTT).
The vSSGN used the interfaces inherent in the provided systems. One notable exception
was the unique Tomahawk route message generated by the vSSGN, which includes both over-
water and over-land waypoints. The uniqueness is in the fact that the vSSGN is providing it, and
how it is processed in LAWS and in the JSAF simulation and not in the message format itself.
The vSSGN entity simulation was linked to the JSAF simulation through the NWDC HLAIDIS
gateway and connected to the FBE Architecture through an encrypted SDREN network link.
Weapons Analysis Lethality Toolset (WALTS)

SPONSOR: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
WALTS is a HLA federate that models damage of weapons impacts based on
government-defined munitions models using physics-based calculations. It consists of two
components: the virtual interactive target (VIT) and the attribute server. The virtual interactive
target, or WALTS physics engine, provides a physics-based simulation of weapons effects, by
calculating structural damage to targets and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expulsion.
These effects are passed to the CUSP simulation for downwind propagation. The attribute server
provides the HLA interface to the VIT module. The module receives weapons impact data from
weapon fly-out simulations (i.e. JSAF), and publishes WALTS results to the federation.
W ALTS-VIT runs on a Silicon Graphics Octane computer with a 300 MHz IP30 processor and
at least 640 MB of RAM. The WALTS attribute server runs on an Intelx86 platform with
800mhz processor, with 512MB memory and an OpenGL accelerator graphic card wi 32MB on
board memory. During FBE-J, WALTS interacted primarily with OASES, CUSP, and JSAF. In a
typical scenario, OASES published weather information, while JSAF published entity
information. CUSP subscribes to weather information and any entity information with regards to
sensor objects. JSAF also publishes munitions detonation information, which WALTS subscribes
to with regards to targets that it is modeling. WALTS then publishes agent release information.
CUSP subscribes to this agent release information, and upon receiving an agent release
interaction, begins to model the dispersion of the agent. When a consumer exists, CUSP will
provide updates for sensor models, 2D, and 3D visualization.

Tools & Stand-Alone Models:

C 41 Gateway (C 4IGW)
The C4I Gateway acts as a communication gateway between JSAF and multiple C4I
systems via USMTF and OTH Gold message formats. It provides two-way communication
through direct TCPIIP socket connections and via e-mail, allowing JSAF to stimulate real C4I
systems such as LAWS and GCCS-M, as well as allowing these systems in turn to stimulate
JSAF entities to perform actions directed by the C4I systems. The C4I gateway is a JSAF-based
application that interfaces JSAF with real-world C4I systems using USMTF and OTH Gold
formatted messages. It simulates the function of reporting units entering reports into the GCCS-
M C4I system. It establishes a two-way interface with the LAWS weapon-target pairing tool,
simulates reporting unit functions for inj ection of mine detection and neutralization MCMREP
reports into MEDAL, and simulates reporting unit functions for dissemination of TACELINT
reports. To interface with these systems, C4IGW produces USMTF and OTH Gold format
messages, such as extended contact reports (XCTC), firing reports, and TACELINT reports. The
C4I Gateway communicates with JSAF via a TCP/IP connection to a JSAF Proxy machine.
The JSAF proxy machine contains "headquarters" emulating entities, which act as a
communications conduit for C4I messaging. Other Blue JSAF entities communicate over
simulated radio communications with the headquarters entities within the JSAF simulation. The
JSAF proxy then forwards these radio messages to the C4I gateway for injection into real-world
c4i systems. Asset tasking into the C4I gateway follows a similar path where the C4I gateway
injects the message into the JSAF Proxy and the simulated headquarters unit transmits the
message to the intended recipient over simulated radio communications. The C4I gateway
communicates with GCCS-M via TCP/IP, and with LAWS via SMTP. Each Blue surface and
subsurface entity issues a XCTC report reflecting that unit's position. XCTC reports update
friendlylBlue surface, subsurface, and tactical Tomahawk unit positions in GCCS-M. The
TACELINT reports are generated based on simulated flight paths and sensors of reconnaissance
aircraft. TACELINT reports are injected into the tactical data dissemination system (TDDS)
broadcast and tactical information broadcast service (TIBS) or sent directly to GCCS-M via
socket connections.
Chicken Little-Global Positioning System (CL-GPS)

SPONSOR: U.S. Air Force
CL-GPS is a PC used to convert GPS position data from Nellis range vehicles into DIS
entity state PDUs that can be used by VSTARS and AFSERS UAV simulations to detect
vehicles on the Nellis range complex.
Compact Terrain Database (CTDB)

SPONSOR: USJFCOM J9
In simulation federations, a number of players such as JSAF use CTDB data that is
typically a polygonal terrain surface and is constructed in a real world (curved earth) spatial
reference frame (SRF). In MC02 a critical federation member is JCATS, which typically uses a
surface derived from bilinear interpolation of gridded elevation data in augmented UTM space.
In order to achieve high levels of correlation, a series of developments in both the terrain
database production process and in the simulation environment were required. A set of data
products integrating the requirements for JCATS and CTDB correlation were produced, a
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regularly triangulated terrain surface for the CTDB and a series of elevation posts in the same
SRF for JCATS, and near perfect terrain correlation was achieved. Special methodologies were
developed to ensure that the representation of features in both data sets were as consistent as
possible, further enhancing interoperability. The special terrain was integrated with the larger
CTDB for the entire MC02 play box. A seamless database with its special high correlation insert
became the foundational data product for the federation. A series of surrogate DTED data was
produced from the combined terrain surface. This process ensured that terrain representation was
consistent across participants, and that users outside of JCATS and JSAF remain highly
correlated.
Digital Collection, Analysis, and Review System (DCARS)

SPONSOR: U.S. Army Electronic Proving Ground
DCARS is a collection, fusion, and delivery system of data coming from simulations, C4I
systems, and live systems. Its purpose is to provide near real-time availability of data from target
systems and analysis tools to compare and/or analyze them. Capabilities include normalizing
data, graphical and textual displays, and database ready files. DCARS roles include
exercise/event STARTEX condition confirmation, in process reviews, incident analysis, and post
event analysis.
High Level Architecture / Distributed Interactive Simulation Gateway

HLA is a standard framework that supports simulations composed of different simulation
components. Traditional simulation models often lack two desirable properties, reusability, and
interoperability. The HLA provides a common high level simulation architecture to facilitate the
interoperability of all types of models and simulations among themselves and with C4I systems.
The main purpose ofHLA is to provide interoperability between systems for the reuse of
existing simulations. HLA is composed of three parts: HLA rules, an HLA interface, and the
object model template. DIS gateway - A federate that provides an interface to DIS simulation
components, especially interfaces to C4I systems such as MLST3.
High Level Architecture Results

HLA is a federation data collection, playback, and analysis system. Further, it is a
comprehensive data management system used to collect, store and understand federation data. It
provides all the functionality included in the standard HLA data collection tool (DCT), plus
interfaces to additional database vendors and playback support. HLA provides a very
comprehensive playback capability for the federation. It can create playback tracks that contain
only the data wanted to support integration testing, analysis, and demonstrations. HLA easily
switches between tracks that cover the periods, data types, and data with specific values needed
to support the playback requirements. It is also designed to offer federation analysis during
execution, and provides for a complete analysis capability.
Joint Medical Semi Automated Forces (JMEDSAF)

SPONSOR: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAW AR) / USJFCOM, J9
The joint medical operations-telemedicine (JMO-T) ACTD has enhanced the joint semi
automated forces (JSAF) simulation environment to include medical capabilities for a medical

mission planning and rehearsal capability. It is also referred to as JMEDSAF. A comprehensive

representation of Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy medical treatment behaviors, it provides
medical mission planning and rehearsal capabilities. It works at the component/Joint Task
Force/regional commander-level. Specific capabilities developed include:
Medical entities: hospital ships, a variety of medical treatment facilities, host nation
facilities, refugee/IDP camps, ambulances, helicopters, and individuals capable of being
wounded or sick.
Medical behaviors: combat injuries based on weapon/casualty type pairings and defined
medical patient codes, disease and non-battle injuries determined on percentage of population at
risk, medical facilities with staff, equipment, holding capacities, and evacuation assets. Casualty
evacuation based on patient condition, time to treat, and nearest facility with the appropriate
assets.
Medical C2 reporting: a medical C2 message interface to the medical command and
control systems -naval medical watchboard (NMW) and medical disease surveillance system
(MDSS). These systems use the simulation data to provide Annex Q reports (medical reports
section of an OP Order), disease trend analysis, and detailed patient information.
JMEDSAF has been previously demonstrated at Kernel Blitz '99 in conjunction with the
enhanced littoral battlefield (ELB) ACTD (April 1999), in the Pacific Warrior Exercise CPX
(November 1999), in Cobra Gold 2000 (May 2000), Cobra Gold 2001 (May 2001), and Cobra
Gold 2002 (May 2002).
Multi-Host Automation Remote Control & Instrumentation (MARC I)

SPONSOR: USJFCOM J9
MARCI is a highly automated system that uses a graphical user interface tool to manage
distributed simulation systems and resources, and enhance technical support capabilities. The
application allows non-technical operators to run and execute distributed simulations systems
with minimal technical support. MARCI starts and stops multiple applications automatically,
queries federates, and collects and records event data.
Key features of MARC I include the ability to start multiple applications on multiple
computers at multiple sites across the country from a single location, and to monitor the status of
each of those applications and computers. MARCI communicates with each machine across a
LAN or WAN, and is able to monitor network connectivity. Starting the software from a
centralized location guarantees the correct software and parameters are being used. MARCI
provides the ability to pause, save, resume, and restore the entire federation.
Run Time Infrastructure (RTI)

RTI 1.3NG is a full implementation ofRTI services based on competitive industry
designs and development. The Phase I RTI 1.3NG software design contract began immediately
following the HLA Baseline Definition in August 1996, and culminated in the award of a Phase
II RTI 1.3NG software development contract to SAIC in September 1997. STRICOM has been
the procurement agent for the design and development effort, and a technical advisory team,
which includes representatives from various DoD user organizations, is supporting this activity.
RTI 1.3NG supports HLA Specification 1.3.
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Validation and Verification (V& V)

The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory conducted V&V of the MC02
Joint Experimentation Federation in strict compliance with Department of Defense Instruction
5000.61 (final draft). The final V&V report was completed 19 July 2002 and is available at the
following website via this hyperlink. (Hyperlink to V&V report). The Director for Joint
Experimentation, United States Joint Forces Command accredited the Joint Experimentation
Federation for use in MC02 on 24 July 2002. (Hyperlink to Accreditation letter).
NEWPORT RI
AfC02 NAVY CHINA LAKE VSSGN
RPM
LEAPS
GCCS-M
CCD-16 LAWS/ADOCS LAWS/ADOCS GISR-C
EXECUnON GCCS-M GISRC
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ARFOR RC-
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EADSIM FIRESIM GIAC SNN
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WALTS CUSP GIAC GEM
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GIAC HLAlDISGW ARFOR - FT BRAGG Camp Lejune
GCCS-M JII-IMCN
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TRS XC4I AFFOR RC- Extended TAiS MCS
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MLST3 RPM RJMT OffuttAFB CGS TES-A
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STRED AWOC
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csscs
GALE LITE
ools & Standalone Models

4Is terns
AS OF: 30 May 02
Figure 279: MC02 Simulation Sites

(This Page Blank)
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Annex I - Sponsored Joint Initiatives
INTRODUCTION
The MC02 joint initiatives process was established to provide a systematic, objective
review and evaluation of proposed j oint initiatives submitted by various governmental and
Service sponsors. The process provided a multi-level review supplemented by interagency and
Service representation. The initiative approval process objectively compared each proposed
initiative to the overall experiment objectives and then measured its degree of applicability to the
joint environment. Initiatives that scored well on both counts were incorporated into MC02. The
joint initiatives process provided a two-way communication path between the individual
initiative sponsors and the MC02 experiment planning and integration teams.
An initiative proposed for incorporation in the experiment weathered three progressively
more difficult examinations. In addition, at each level the endorsing signature came from higher
in the experiment command chain. Phase I was the initial review conducted by subject matter
experts from the functional and experimentation communities. They screened submissions
against Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) objectives and MC02 joint environment objectives. As
part of Phase II, a "Council of Colonels" was formed to review the recommendation of the
operational and technical panels from Phase I. The colonels forwarded their findings and
recommendations to the third stage review (Phase III) - a general officer/flag officer panel.
Many Service proposed initiatives were not approved for joint integration due to their
singular, Service-oriented nature.
Joint Experimentation Initiatives Statistics:
144 total initiatives proposed by 24 separate organizations (combatant
commanders/Services/agencies) were reviewed
25 separate initiatives were recommended for integration into MC02, 20 of which were
incorporated as joint experimentation initiatives and 5 of which remained at the Service level
79 initiatives were not approved or were withdrawn after initial approval due to failure to
meet basic eligibility requirements (did not match objectives, funding, or initiative readiness
for experimentation)
The 20 joint experimentation initiatives included in MC02:

oTe Command and Control for Space, Information Operations Forces (C2 Space, 10 Forces)
oTe Global C2 System - Integrated Intelligence and Imagery (GCCS-B)
oTe Global Strike Task Force (GSTF)
oTe Collaboration Tool Suite (InfoWorkSpace 2.5 (IWS 2.5))
oTe Joint Automated Single Guard Solution (JASGS)
oTe Joint Automated Target Folders (JATF)
oTe Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System-Near Term (JEMPRS-NT)
oTe Joint Fires Initiative (JFI) Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS)
oTe Joint ISR Management Tools (nSR Tools)
oTe Joint Public Affairs Ops Group (JPAOG)
oTe JSOTF Reach-back/Special Operations Mission Planning Environment (SOMPE)
oTe Logistics Tools Suite (LTS)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1-1

oTe Maneuver Control System-Tactical Combat Operations (MCS-TCO)

oTe National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) Initiative
oTe Network Security Management Correlation & Display (NSM C&D)
oTe Theater Medical Integration Planning-Joint (TMIP-J)
oTe Unmanned Sensor Support to Special Reconnaissance (US support to SR)
oTe ONA Tool Suite
oTe Automatic Network Information Flow (ANIF)
oTe Joint Special Technology Operations (STO)
C2 of Space, 10 Forces
Description
In January 2001, US Space Command (USSPACECOM) and JFCOM co-sponsored a
seminar on how to transform Space/IO C2 into RDO. Space/IO C2 involves experimenting with
a space cell embedded in the Joint Force Headquarters with reach-back to USSP ACECOM for
planning, coordinating, and executing space control and space force enhancement. Additionally,
USSPACECOM will demonstrate its C2 for Computer Network Operations (CNO), defined as
Computer Network Defense and Computer Network Attack. Unified Command Plan 99 assigned
these two missions to USSPACECOM on 1 Oct 99 and 1 Oct 00, respectively, and the Command
has just completed development of a C2 structure to be used among the regional combatant
commanders, Services and agencies.
The USSPACECOM MC02 experimental hypothesis can be stated as follows:
If a space/IO C2 element is embedded in the JTF command structure with reach-back

capabilities to USSPACECOM for planning, coordinating and executing, then the JTF
commander will experience unity of effects, battlespace awareness, lethal and non-lethal
overmatch, knowledge superiority and force protection across the joint force through
coordinated, synchronized space/IO effort.
The value added for the joint force includes, but is not limited to:
Increases accountability to joint force commander
Increases representation of space/IO effects at JCB
Injects space/IO weapons and enablers into EBO
Synchronizes space/IO relationships across the joint force
Refines resident space/IO relationships across the joint force
Integrates theater campaign plan with global space/IO campaign plan

The MC02 experiment demonstrated the value added by the space and information
operations element (SlOE), both on the combatant commander's and on the CJTF staffs based
upon feedback from surveys received and senior mentor input. Space planners and operators
within the JTF staff were readily assessable, and Space play within the experiment was more
visible than it was in Unified Vision 2001. Players within the SlOE said that the SlOE chief, at
the combatant commander level, and the 10 supervisor, at the JTF level, ensured the integration
of all elements of 10, and they integrated component planners into this process. Although players
said that this integration took place, the SJFHQ and ISG groups said that all elements of 10 did
not really integrate despite the fact that an SlOE existed. Because the JTF commander
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recognized the importance ofIO as a force multiplier, and moved the 10 supervisor out of the
Information Superiority group into a principle staff position, 10 improved. Additionally, prior
planning by USSPACECOM ensured viable representation on the JCB which provided the
opportunity to elevate the consideration of space/CNO/IO effects, mostly due to the experiment,
to the same level as kinetic options offered by air, land and sea components.
Methodology
Users evaluated C2 of space/IO during MC02. Users were questioned regarding the
integration of space and information operations (USSPACECOM inserted an I8-person SlOE
into the JTF). In addition, USSPACECOM inputs were considered to better evaluate the utility of
C2 for space/IO. The combined analysis indicates the potential exists for providing significant
key enabler support to the SJFHQ.
Key experimentation issues were as listed:
Space/IO relationships within JTF HQ
Space/IO relationships with component commanders
Space/IO representation at Joint Coordination Board (replaces JTCB)
Synchronization of space/IO with other fires
Space/IO representation comparable to air/sea/land
Reach-back required for space/IO issues
USSPACECOM objectives for this experiment were to validate the SlOE concept in
support ofRDO and EBO in a collaborative environment, refine a way ahead for Pinnacle
Pathway, expand USSPACECOM visibility within the joint experimentation process, provide the
supported commander a focal point for space/IO, and centralize C2 for disparate
USSPACECOM elements. Additionally, it was important that USSPACECOM interests were
represented at the JCB and that space, and 10 were synchronized with traditional fires.
USSPACECOM wanted commanders to be presented space/IO effects equivalent to that of air,
land, and sea. MC02 explored a variation of the SlOE concept. Specialized expertise was
provided for synchronization at the JTF and JF ACC. Space/IO was focused on EBO to
accomplish RDO and JCB input was provided to synchronize effects.
Observations
The actual experiment demonstrated the value added by the SlOE, both on the combatant
commander's staff and on the CJTF staff. Space planners and operators within the JTF staffwere
readily assessable, and Space play within the experiment was more visible than it was in Unified
Vision 2001. The SlOE chief, at the combatant commander level, and the 10 supervisor, at the
JTF level, ensured the integration of STO, and 10, (PSYOPS, electronic warfare, physical
destruction, information assurance, and public affairs were the key 10 focus points during the
experiment), and they integrated component planners into this process as well (See Figure 280).
The JTF commander used 10 as one his main tools for EBO, and improved 10 as a result.
Additionally, prior planning by USSPACECOM ensured viable representation on the Joint
Coordination Board which provided the opportunity to elevate the consideration of space/IO
effects to the same level as kinetic options offered by air, land and sea components; this issue fell
short of the mark. MC02 provided a good step-off point for USSPACECOM forces, planning for
participation in future experiments.

The way ahead suggests a restructuring of SlOE support to the JTF based upon lessons
learned during MC02. Senior mentors and senior experiment officials agreed that 10 was a
combat multiplier that warrants exploration to Joint Information Operations Task Force (JIOTF)
status. Future planning for experiments must include more robust 10 play at all levels, up to and
including interagency. Although, despite the fact that experiment planners prior to MC02 did not
consider 10 a focal point, 10 became important early due to CJTF emphasis.
Combatant commander level 10 play was not developed. Early on in MC02 planning,
JFCOM made the decision to limit 10 play. Planners made this a funding decision, but the
experiment demonstrated that 10 is an integral and growing facet of current warfighting
capability. This resulted in a lack of fidelity in the 10 play at the combatant commander level.
The background to answer the JTF's 10 RFljust wasn't available and this resulted in ad hoc or
inadequate answers. The SJFHQ and ISG groups noted that 10 was broken in MC02.
Figure 280: Integration of Component planners

Despite this lack of 10 emphasis, Figure 281 shows that 60 percent of respondents
realized the synchronization of 10 effects that the SlOE provided. Future experimentation must
refine how 10 expertise and support is presented at the JTF and combatant commander levels.
Improving interfaces among the JTF, SlOE, and space/IO reach-back element to make it
more useful to the JTF
Comments provided pointed towards enhanced synchronization between ISR, IW, and
space-based systems within the SCIF and with combat operations. The embedded
USSPACECOM personnel brought relevant and needed expertise to the JTF staff, which allowed
1-4 FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONLY

increased consideration of space/IO effects. However, lack of experimental emphasis on

space/IO decreased the ability to achieve increased synchronization. For example, all space play
(limited) was performed at the JF ACC level. This limited visibility among the other components
of the JTF and the JTF staff. This begs the question of the role of space planners at the JTF level.
If the JF ACC has responsibility for space operations as well as air operations, then it is not
obvious that space planners embedded at the JTF level are necessary.
One result of the JF ACC' s assumption of all space activities (JF ASCC) was decreased
visibility of space at the JTF level. Despite continuous efforts, there was no space status
presentation within the JTF commander's update or the JCB. On the other hand, situational
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Stron gly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree
Figure 281: Space & 10 Personnel Increased the Consideration of Space Assets
at the JTF Level & Below
awareness for the CJTF on STO initiatives was excellent. The CJTF was briefed on a near daily
basis.
For 10, significant synchronization was achieved collaboratively because the 10 cell held
daily online sessions with all elements of 10 at the combatant commander, JTF and component
levels. This collaboration greatly increased awareness of plans and capabilities, but there was no
accepted means of command and control of these capabilities. While the 10 supervisor evolved
de facto to become a principal member of the JTF staff, and the CJTF gave a number of missions
to the 10 supervisor, he had no authority for command and control of the forces to accomplish
these missions. For example, PSYOPS - a component ofIO, was organized separately as a
component commander, and reported JPOTF actions to the CJTF and staff, somewhat
independently of the 10 supervisor (synchronization between JPOTF and 10 supervisor
increased as experiment progressed).
MC02 highlighted the need for an effective organizational construct for 10. Leveraging
full spectrum 10 to benefit the JTF may require a component commander (JIOTF) who has
responsibility for 10. In MC02, the 10 Supervisor had no authority or resources to accomplish
his mission. The concept of a JIOTF should be tested in both limited objective experiments
(LOEs), and large-scale joint experiments.
FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONLY 1-5

CNO was not actively played in the game. CNO planners embedded in the JTF staffwere
able to propose and begin planning potential CNO actions, but there was no ability to follow
through on the planning. There was no ability in the experiment to simulate the effects of a CNO
action, nor was there an ability to effectively simulate the coordination and approval process for
CNA.
When developing Effects-Based Operations within the JTF was the JTF
commander and his staff presented with valid space and planning factors for increased
unity of effects and battle space awareness?
The consensus here was "yes," space planners were readily accessible and well informed.
Most of the staff did not understand what Space brought to the fight. From an 10 standpoint, the
answer was a resounding "yes." The JTF 10 supervisor provided leadership and direction in the
integration of all aspects ofIO.
The SlOE-provided 10 supervisor gave the JTF commander a focal point for 10.
However, the organizational construct of having 10 embedded under the IS Group suppressed
this representation until the CJTF effectively lifted the 10 supervisor up to the JTF stafflevel. In
addition, the construct used a JPOTF component commander, which further diminished
synchronization. As space was much embedded under the JF ACC, the JF ACC provided the
focus for space, rather than the SlOE.
The SlOE director, located at the combatant commander level, provided a focal point for
both the combatant commander and the JTF commander for all STO activities.
Effectiveness of the space and 10 personnel embedded within the JTF HQ staff in
increasing the planning and execution of RDO
A majority of the comments provided indicated the space and information operations
personnel were very effective. Each cell lead stated that SlOE personnel were invaluable in
providing needed planning and execution input. They were accordant with the JF ACC.
Embedding the expertise of the SlOE personnel into the JTF was essential in the conduct
ofRDOIEBO in the 10 arena (including STO actions). The expertise provided by SlOE
personnel to the JTF staffwas essential. Whether deployment of this element is the correct long
term solution or not, in the near term it is the only way to get the subject matter expertise
embedded in the JTF staff. The necessity for up front planning for effective 10 application leads
one to the conclusion that significant 10 planning capability must be embedded in the SJFHQ
staff, either by deploying the support, or by assigning the people directly.
Placement of the JTF information operations supervisor and information

operations personnel under the IS group
Membership on the JCB provided an excellent opportunity to synchronize space/CNO/IO

with maneuver and fires. The JTF 10 supervisor was effective in representing 10 effects at the
JCB. However, as the staff worked to minimize time spent in JCB sessions, the level ofIO
visibility was again reduced. In addition, as the campaign progressed, the 10 supervisor was
increasingly co-opted to be the principal public affairs spokesperson.
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The SlOE director, as the combatant commander's principal space/IO coordinator,

supported the CJTF in the STO level equivalent to the JCB. Limitations of STO did not allow
effective collaboration of STO with the JCB; in an integrated operation, where only those cleared
for STO activities have the full picture and STO billets were limited, integration of STO and
non-STO activities was difficult.
It is not clear that 10 effects were integrated in the targeting process; the need for
horizontal integration between 10/CNO and other fires is critical. (It appears that this integration
took place to some extent within the JFACC, but not necessarily with the other components).
F inall y, the commander-centri c nature of thi s JTF dimini shed the rol e of staff, and their
voice in the JCB. This organizational construct provides further rationale for having 10
represented by a component or task force commander. JPOTF as a component command,
although representing only a small part of the 10 spectrum, received significant attention at both
the JCB and the daily commander's update, as well as the closed commander's huddle sessions
(to which staff were not invited). IfIO is a combat multiplier, it must be represented at the
combat commanders' table in a commander centric operation. In addition, membership on the
JCB provided an excellent opportunity to synchronize space/IO with maneuvers and fires.
Recommendations
The way ahead suggests a restructuring of SlOE support to the JTF. Senior mentors and
senior experiment officials agreed that 10 is a combat multiplier that warrants exploration to
JIOTF status. Future experiment planning must consider more robust information operations play
at all levels. Internally, USSPACECOM / USSTRATCOM should begin preparation at the HQ's
level and the component level for the next series of experiments.
Global C2 System Integrated Imagery and Intelligence (GCCS-I3)

Description
GCCS-I3, sponsored by the joint experimentation/C 41 team, is a tightly integrated set of
intelligence applications and tools intended to provide integrated intelligence support to the
GCCS COP. It provides surveillance and reconnaissance information and access to global
intelligence sources as well as data on the precise location of dispersed friendly forces. The
GCCS-I3 applications build the intelligence portion of the COP by integrating imagery with
intelligence reference data (modernized integrated database (MIDB), characteristics and
performance (C&P)) and with the tactical track picture. GCCS-I3 provides C2 users the
capability to receive process, display, and maintain current geo-locational information on threat
and neutral land, sea, and air forces integrated with intelligence, imagery, and environmental
data in multi-media formats.
GCCS-I3 gives users direct access to MIDB data, weapon systems' characteristic and
performance (C&P) information, and national and tactical imagery. GCCS-I3 also allows users
to integrate locally collected tactical imagery and other intelligence with national and theater-
produced intelligence. Intelligence information can be plotted directly on operational/tactical
displays in conjunction with continuously updating operational and operational-intelligence
information, thereby providing operators, planners, and intelligence analysts vastly improved
knowledge of the battlespace. Figure 282 depicts how GCCS-I3, as part of the MIDB replication
architecture, supports the component commands in disseminating relevant M&S intel
information.


Initial surveys and interviews conducted during MC02 indicated a lack of knowledge or
use of this initiative during MC02 exercise. Personnel with more significant knowledge or
experience indicated this warfighter tool was useful. Based upon the MC02 network setup and
user feedback, GCCS-13 was integral to joint warfighter operations and targeting functions
because it was the backbone to the j oint automated target folders database and j oint fires
initiative element. However, feedback from personal interviews during MC02 revealed a lack of
adequate training
MIDB Replication
and/or focus of user
Manager
applications of GCCS-
13, particularly with
regards to mission
needs.
Observation
and Methodology
Forty operators
and targeting personnel
evaluated GCCS-13.
Initial surveys
indicated either a lack
of knowledge or a lack
of usage of GCCS-13.
Later, a revised survey
sent to a selected list of
participants confirmed
this finding. Personal
Figure 282: MC02 MIDB Replication Architecture interviews also
indicated a lack of
adequate initiative training and a lack of understanding of the user applications. This was
emphasized particularly with GCCS-13 trainer user needs. One experienced user said GCCS-13
was very critical to joint warfighter operations and targeting because it provided the backbone to
the joint automated target folders database and joint fires initiative.
Those individuals with more significant knowledge or experience with GCCS-13
indicated it was useful and would benefit the warfighter effort as a whole. These same users still
experienced some problems with connectivity and information coordination among the different
warfighter components. The most crucial functional problems affecting the warfighter occurred
when imagery intelligence information could not be relayed to or properly coordinated between
different warfighter components in real-time. The sponsor technical lead pointed out that the lack
of adequate warfighter user training contributed to the majority of the respondents' "lack of
knowledge and understanding of the functionality of the initiative" and low confidence with
GCCS-13 in supporting the MC02 warfighter objectives.
GCCS-13 was evaluated against the key enablers of the SJFHQ. GCCS-13 provided the
means for the potential knowledge and IS aspect of SJFHQ by providing the tools to access
current military intelligence embodied in the local MIDB and updated by the functional
components.
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GCCS-I3's functional capabilities directly supports the components in rapidly setting

conditions for decisive Operations, assuring access into and through the battle space, and
conducting decisive Effects-Based Operations by being employed at the component commander,
JTF and component level to synchronize and update the process in developing/establishing target
sets.
With imagery technology available, GCCS-I3 provided a number of fused assessment
and battlespace visualization capabilities to the joint warfighter via the COP/CROP. The
initiative was intended to provide to warfighters the enhanced intelligence operations
infrastructure in support of the ONA and EBO. GCCS-I3 enhances the operational commander's
situational awareness and aids track management duties with a standard set of integrated, linked
tools, and services that maximize commonality and interoperability across the tactical, theater,
and national communities. The initiative supports and improves the decision process in target
nomination and the COP/CROP picture.
Establish
Info rmatio n/Knowledg e x
Superiority
Rapidly Set Conditions

for Decisive Operations x
Assure Access Into and

Through the x
8attlespace
Conduct Decisive
Effects-based x
Operations
Sustain the Force x
Furthermore, this initiative provides improved intelligence information flow, which is

essential to allow the commander to set the conditions necessary to achieve dominant maneuver
and precision engagement for RDO. All of the above observations were based primarily upon
subj ect matter expert insights and interviews.

The analysis and findings for the GCCS-I3 initiative have impacts on the JFCOM ONA
assessment area as well as the JISR tools, joint automated target folders (JATF), and the joint
fires initiative - Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JFI ADOCS) joint
initiatives. These impacts primarily relate to the performance of the tools employed in the
initiative. Performance regarding these tools may impact the findings of the other assessment
areas or joint initiatives.

Recommendations
Based on the inputs from the user surveys and personal interviews, there was not enough
conclusive data collected to accurately assess the impact GCCS-I3 had on the MC02 goals. No
correlation could be made in regards to technological deficiencies and the lack of both adequate
user training and/or understanding of implications of the GCCS-13 system.
It is recommended that all GCCS-I3 users be given more extensive training emphasizing
a greater understanding of user applications associated with the mission needs.
Global Strike Task Force (GSTF)

Description
GSTF CONOPS demonstration was an Air Force-sponsored joint initiative for MC02.
This demonstration was also part of the Air Force's Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment
(JEFX 02). GSTF was the only concept initiative for the MC02 experiment, and was the first
time that this concept was demonstrated in a large-scale environment. The hypothesis was that
GSTF CONOPS would help achieve all five of the MC02 objectives (Establish Information
Superiority, Set Conditions for Decisive Operations, Assure Access, Conduct EBO, and Sustain
the Force). Both live and constructive elements demonstrated GSTF capabilities to confront a
determined adversary in the 2007 timeframe. For MC02, the goal was to examine the Air Force's
concept in a j oint experimental environment to further refine the concept, demonstrate how the
concept can contribute to future joint operations, and to stimulate joint development efforts.
Information that is more specific can be found in the MC02 CONOPS for GSTF.
As one in a series of seven Air Force transformational task force CONOPS, GSTF
CONOPS employed joint power-projection capabilities to counter adversary anti-access systems
and create the conditions required to gain and maintain access to the battlespace for joint air and
space, land, and maritime forces, conducting RDO. GSTF CONOPS "first-wave" attack
capability affords US and coalition follow-on forces freedom from attack, as well as freedom to
attack. GSTF CONOPS leverages America's asymmetric technological advantages by balancing
the capabilities of stealth, standoff, precision, information, and space. Prior to the conflict, GSTF
CONOPS employed persistent, all-weather ISR elements, focused by the process of predictive
battlespace awareness (PBA). PBA monitors adversary actions, identify, locate and track targets
and threats, and develops and updates plans for countering anti-access strategies and capabilities.
At the start of operations, the GSTF CONOPS employed a relatively small number oflow
observable, standoff systems, supported by focused electronic, and information attack. The
GSTF CONOPS capabilities were designed to "kick down the door" by rapidly neutralizing
adversary anti-access capabilities, and at the same time, holding high value targets (HVT) at risk.
By neutralizing adversary anti-access capabilities and attacking HVTs, GSTF CONOPS allows
the CJTF to employ persistent follow-on forces and create war-winning effects. There were two
elements to the GSTF initiative: constructive and live fly. These included a live fly rehearsal on
July 26, constructive play July 28 - Aug 1, and live fly execution on July 29.

The Global Strike Task Force joint concept initiative successfully demonstrated the
capabilities required to overcome an anti-access strategy. As one framework for coordinating
joint forces, GSTF demonstrated the synergy that can be achieved when a Joint Task Force
addresses assured access in a coherent way. In addition, the results from this experiment indicate
1-10 FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONLY

that further development-in terms of CONOPS and TTP, education and training, procurement,
and leadership development-is warranted.
M&S Constructive Modeling

The constructive entities that participated included two Airborne Laser (ABL) aircraft,
two squadrons ofF-22s, as well as a full complement of USAF, US Navy, and Special
Operations Forces that are already fielded. Information that is more detailed can be found in the
constructive force list for GSTF. The original plan was for constructive GSTF to occur only two
days (28-29 July); however, as the scenario actually played out, anti-access activities occurred
beyond those two days. The reason for this was that pockets of anti-access activities continued to
be prosecuted through 1 August when JOA air access dominance was achieved. In practice,
GSTF operations would continue until the JTF commander said the air access dominance
objective had been met.
The same constraints that M&S placed on assessment of all other areas applied to
assessment of the GSTF CONOPS demonstration as well. Deciding which weapon systems
would be in place in 2007, and the specific capabilities of those systems, was difficult.
Live Flv
The live GSTF demonstration employed 30 platforms operating on or above the Nevada
Test and Training Ranges (NTTR) during a two-hour period (2000-2200Z) on July 29. All
sorties were flown from home station. In preparation for the GSTF live fly event, a live fly
rehearsal was conducted on July 26. Each flying period consisted of ATO sorties designated for
dynamic targeting as well as pre-planned fixed targets.
Analvsis Methodology
There were three categories of data collected: player questionnaires, results extracted
4
from M&S and C 1 systems, and subject matter expert and senior leader inputs.
The first category-player questionnaires-was the primary source of data used to
establish findings and draw conclusions. During the course of main execution, four web-based
questionnaires were administered, to four different groups of players. The first questionnaire was
directed at planners across the JTF, asking about planning considerations prior to the assured
access phase. The next set of questionnaires was administered to planners, operators, and
intelligence specialists after access had been achieved. The result of these questionnaires was
used to gain perspective on the contribution of the GSTF CONOPS to the RDO warfighting
challenges.
The second category of data was used to provide an objective basis for validating the
subjective inputs collected via questionnaires. The specific information to be collected was
framed in terms of three analytic questions, and a series of supporting tasks and sub-tasks.
Limitations of the federation of models and simulations and the experimental construct, and the
resulting problems with discovering "ground truth," hindered the ability to draw accurate
conclusions based on this source of data.
The final category provided a "sanity check" for the use of the other results. Based on
general observations, interviews, meeting minutes, and informal analyst discussions, senior
leader perspective was captured. These "senior leaders" primarily included the JTF and
component commanders and their principal staffs, and the experiment senior mentors (retired

general and flag officers.) In addition, specific subject matter experts were consulted and their
inputs were captured via web-based observations and analyst notes.
In addition to the three analytic questions for the GSTF assessment, preliminary analytic
work was completed identifying which of the warfighter challenges to Rapid Decisive
Operations GSTF CONOPS addresses.
Live Flv Results

In general, the results were very successful, as indicated in these highlights:
Both GSTF pushes executed as planned except for a five-minute Rolex on the first push
Four Red air were killed on each push without Blue losses
Five High-Speed Anti Radiation Missile (HARM) shots taken on first push; six taken on
second push
All preplanned targets hit
Three TSTs successfully prosecuted on second push
Analvsis Questions
Three analysis questions addressed critical assessment areas for the GSTF CONOPS.
Each of these questions is addressed in this section.
What assured access effects did the GSTF CONOPS demonstrate?
Created initial access. Only one type of aircraft was employed within enemy anti-access
threat areas during first 16 hours of the campaign. The aircrafts' mission was to perform sweeps
and to attack anti-access targets. According to the JFASCC, "We could not have done the
operation without it."
Created air dominance ("kicked down the door"). GSTF CONOPS enabled operations
such as the Stryker Brigade Combat Team insertion and Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) to
attack WME facilities and achieved air access dominance for the entire JOA by D+5.
Created war-winning effects, targeting HVTs. The successful targeting of such HVTs as
SA-20s, air defense HQs, CRCs, and airfields allowed follow-on operations to be employed and
helped cutoff the adversary's C2. Besides these high value air access targets, other HVTs where
prosecuted to achieve maritime access. Maritime access HVTs included CDCMs, small boat
storage and hovercraft facilities and mine ordnance depots. These maritime access HVTs
threatened military as well as commercial ships, producing severe political ramifications as
Freedom of Navigation (FON) suffered and natural resource prices increased. The successful
neutralization of these maritime access HVTs helped create maritime access.
What current and projected capabilities were required by the GSTF CONOPS to achieve
those effects?
The current version of the GSTF CONOPS specifies the current and projected
capabilities that are required to achieve the effects demonstrated by GSTF CONOPS during
MC02.
What other war-winning effects did the GSTF CONOPS demonstrate?

Due to limitations of the experimental construct, not all areas of the anti-access scenario
were examined. For example, there was no consideration for possible threats to friendly forces
during the deployment phase. GSTF CONOPS may be helpful in countering this threat. This is
an area for further examination during future experiments, exercises, and wargames.
Support to Standing Joint Force Headquarters

GSTF CONOPS demonstrated the capability to support future JTFs in achieving four of
the five-warfighting objectives. The fifth objective - Sustain the Force - is an area for future
experimentation and wargaming relative to the GSTF CONOPS.
Table 47: GSTF provided support to the SJFHQ
Knowledge. Superiority
Rapidly Set Conditions for
Decisive rations
Assure Access into and
thro the
Based Operations
Establish Information / Knowledge Superiority

GSTF CONOPS forces must coordinate IW operations with appropriate national and
theater authorities to deny information to the enemy and achieve other offensive battlespace
effects. In the conduct of ISR missions, data and information from space-based, land-based, and
sea-based ISR forces and assets are integrated to achieve Information Superiority. Defensive IW
operations must be employed in the pre-conflict stages to protect and defend friendly information
and information systems. Offensive IW operations must also be employed to influence adversary
situational awareness and decision-making processes. If the enemy can be dissuaded, conflict
may be deterred. If conflict is not avoided, then IW operations can be used to shape the
battlespace for other joint operations.
Rapidlv Set Conditions for Decisive Operations

The ability to rapidly deploy and employ airpower globally to create war-winning effects
for the JFC is at the heart of the Air Force's core competencies. These inherent capabilities along
with airpower's flexibility helps enable the JFC to rapidly set conditions for decisive operations.
Assure Access into and through the Battlespace

The GSTF CONOPS will allow the JFC to employ joint power-projection forces to
counter adversary anti-access systems and create the conditions required to gain and maintain
access for follow-on joint forces. The GSTF CONOPS will also seek to exploit, neutralize,
disrupt, and/or destroy critical opposing capabilities in the initial stages of crisis or conflict to
more rapidly create war-winning effects and enable JFC objectives to be achieved.
Conduct Decisive Effects-Based Operations

The primary effect achieved by the GSTF operations was access. Without access, follow-
on operations would not have been possible, and national security objectives would have been
unattainable. With access, the GSTF forces continued to produce a variety of war-winning
effects such as air superiority, degraded adversary C2, and reduced threats from WMD. Planning
for the effects achieved by GSTF forces were the very first step in a well-executed Effects-Based
Operation.
Sustain the Force

The same capabilities that allow GSTF CONOPS to create access to the battlespace for
deployment and employment also enable maintaining access for joint activities required to
sustain the joint force.
DOTMLPF Findings:
Doctrine
The Services are independently pursuing concepts for confronting the "anti-access"
scenario. GSTF is the AF concept; the Navy and other Services have similar ideas. There is not a
single, integrated Joint Assured Access CONOPS to leverage those access capabilities, which
each Service brings to the fight. Establishing common terminology is key to developing cohesive
documentation and language references for staffing and operational clarity in execution.
Training
As evidenced by GSTF warfighter survey results (graphs), GSTF warfighter survey
results (comments) and the perception by some personnel is that GSTF is its own force rather
than a set of capabilities presented thru the AEF as part of the ASETF. A small minority of
personnel thought of GSTF in terms ofF-22s and B-2s only rather than a set of capabilities
required gaining and maintaining access to the battlespace. Overall, the Air Force and other
Services require more training on the GSTF concept.
Materiel
There is potential for near-term development efforts for technologies associated with
GSTF CONOPS. The requirement for the F-22, small diameter bomb (SDB), increased sensor
fusion (including non-traditional sensors), and multi-sensor command and control aircraft
(MC2A) must be further examined. Specifically, as noted by the JFACC, the F-22 was
instrumental in achieving initial access. In addition, non-traditional sensors also played a key
role.
Leadership
During MC02, senior leadership was aware of the contribution of the JFACC to
achieving access for the joint force. Future leaders-both within the Air Force as well as other
Services-must continue to develop an appreciation of the challenges associated with achieving
and maintaining access, as well as the contributions that each Service can make to this effort.
Way Ahead
ACC hosted a capabilities conference, August 21-23, that focused on the challenges for
operationalizing the GSTF CONOPS. The minutes of this conference point to the way ahead for
bridging the gap between capabilities and programming. APEO, in coordination with ACC/XPS,

will develop and submit a GSTF Information Paper based on the results of this experiment and
other activities related to GSTF CONOPS. The next version of the GSTF CONOPS is being
developed and will be published on the Air Force CONOPS web page when complete.
ACCIDRYF continues to conduct modeling and simulation that will further refine the
capabilities and force structure required for the GSTF CONOPS.
Successes
GSTF was successfully introduced to the joint community during this experiment. This
was the first time a Service concept was examined in this forum. Although more training is
required, the awareness of GSTF and the challenges associated with the anti-access scenario was
increased across the functional and joint communities. In addition, the GSTF TF CONOPS was
further refined.
Recommendations
Doctrine
The joint community must continue defining ajoint context for assured access.
Specifically, USJFCOM should develop an Assured Access CONOPS that clarifies the
contributions that each component makes. Moreover, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures must
be developed that specify the means of coordinating each component's assured access activities
in a way that supports this critical warfighting challenge.
Training
The Air Force must continue educating both its own personnel, as well as those in the
joint community, on the issue of access, and the specific contributions of the GSTF CONOPS.
Specifically, the AFC2TIG should
incorporate the GSTF CONOPS into
the curriculum of training courses for
AOC personnel.
Collaboration Tool (Info WorkSpace

(IWS) 2.5)
Description
Collaborative tools development
supports the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (ASD) response to congress
and OSD/JS issues on collaboration
interoperability between combatant
commanders, Services, agencies, and
coalition forces. This collaborative tool
is a pilot project, endorsed by OSD and
Figure 283: IWS Screen Capture the Joint Staff, that provides digital
communications across echelons, joint
mission areas and national boundaries for joint crisis action planning, deployment and targeting.
During MC02, the IWS collaborative tool suite was sponsored by USJFCOM and was
used to collaborate at all echelons of the experiment. The IWS tool suite proved itself a flexible
suite for war planners and warfighters.

Collaborative tools are engineered for distributed commands deployed to multiple

locations. The tools are intended to revolutionize the way command groups and individuals
perform day-to-day operations and ad hoc mission planning. A collaborative suite of
technologies allows an organization to reconstruct their dispersed environment into a virtual
model and operate in that model regardless of geographical dispersion. As displayed in figure
283, users have access to presentations, files, screens, whiteboards, and chat rooms simply by
joining a virtual conference center. Using the internal instant messaging or the COTS Microsoft
Instant Messenger, conferees can construct sidebar-meeting rooms to take a discussion off the
. .
mam seSSIOn.

In the network centric environment, the planners can expect to receive a significant
amount of data. Users gave the net a strong vote of confidence as 96 percent of the respondents
spoke favorably of the nets quality. Collaboration tools allowed data from a diverse group be
synthesized into information that could be used to support execution of current and future
mISSIOns.
Users demonstrated, through extensive use of and participation in collaboration, that the
SJFHQ would benefit from effectiveness of these tools. Additionally, collaborative tools would
contribute to the IS that combatant commanders, Services, agencies, and coalition forces require
during planning and execution phases ofRDO.
Methodology
IWS was evaluated by 487 users during MC02, spanning the entire spectrum of
participants. Additionally, interviews and subject matter expert insights were used in this
evaluation. Users were questioned regarding their use of IWS throughout the exercise. From the
positive responses provided by exercise participants, it is clear that future warfighters and
planners will benefit from a common collaborative tool suite. IWS has been evaluated to provide
significant support of the key enablers of the SJFHQ.
Observations
IWS 2.5 was evaluated against the following key enablers of the SJFHQ. IWS was
deemed to provide support in all of the key enablers of the SJFHQ. Based on the resources
available and user feedback, IWS supported the previously identified requirement for
Table 48: IWS evaluation
Establish information/ Knowledge

Superiority X
Rapidly Set Conditions for Decisive
Operations X
Assure Access Into and Through the
Battlespace X
Conduct Decisive Effects-Based
Operations X
Sustain the Force X

collaborative tools in the SJFHQ. The tool was thoroughly tested during MC02. Two separate
categories of reviewers evaluated collaborative functions during MC02, senior leaders, and
operators.
Senior leaders (mentors, commanders and senior planners), envisioning the potential of
collaborative planning, indicated collaborative tools were "combat multipliers" for operational
planners. The audio conference rooms with synchronized graphics and documentation allowed
them to envision critical coordination. In contrast to face-to-face meetings that took time to
arrange, collaborative tools, with file sharing, audio and desktop video reduced the risk of having
key leaders traveling to mission briefs and reduced the time latency associated with the delay of
having to get from the meeting site back to subordinate headquarters. There were three
comments that received agreement by the senior leader panel. The leaders concurred that
Service-centric tool development was unacceptable, that commanders shouldn't become tied to
their computer screens, and that a breakdown in the chain of command is a possible result of
collaboration among a wide audience.
Ifwe have no standards, then we have no collaboration. It was understood that as joint
forces begin to use collaborative tools, we couldn't afford for organizations (Services and
agencies) to use their own brand of collaborative tool-all must have been using the same jointly
certified and developed tool. The panel understood that in MC02 the same tool was used
everywhere and that contributed to the "universal" use of the product and its success.
Commanders cannot become tied to the tool-"HMMV hood meetings are important to
leaders." There was a concern voiced that a collaborator deep in the rear or outside the area of
operation could be caught up in the fight and influence decisions made by the mission
commander. Additionally,
0.8
leaders need to understand
that the tool should not 0.7
replace face-to-face 0.6

meeting opportunities, but 0.5
rather compliment them.
0.4
Finally, the tool needs to
be robust enough to travel 0.3
with the key leaders so that 0.2
continual collaborative 0.1
processes can occur.
In a collaboration- o
8 or More 4 to 7 1 to 3 None
centric environment, the
commander risks losing
Figure 284: Collaborative Sessions Opened
control. The large
audiences that are capable
with electronic collaboration tools means more people hear the "word" first hand. It also means
the time lag between order issuance and order receipt by operating forces is greatly reduced in
the fewer tellings. That rapid dissemination feature of collaborative tools, however, puts a burden
on the commander. Wrong information or incorrect decisions are much harder to counter as they
rapidly move from promulgation to execution in the electronic environment.
Comments suggest collaboration is indeed a significant tool to keep the team focused.
Commanders need to balance collaborative sessions with the staffs and coordination with the
"team." During MC02, users were questioned on the amount of time spent in informational
-FOR OFFICIAL lISE ONLY 1-17

versus collaborative sessions. Users indicated that they spent 48 percent of their time in
collaborative sessions and 43 percent of their time in informational briefings. Leaders indicated
that they balanced their time between collaborative sessions and information briefs.
Informational sessions on a collaborative infrastructure might be just as important as
collaborating on a plan. The central question is "will the quest for intelligence and information
find warfighters listening in on every broadcast conference instead of using the tool to
collaborate with other team members to execute the mission." For some, the desire to attend
every conference was significant. Follow up experiments should attempt to determine how user-
time spent getting information through meeting detracts from the mission focus and preparation.
The second category of reviewer was the operator. Operators vigorously used
collaboration during MC02. Four hundred eighty-seven participants were surveyed and their
responses showed significant use of collaborative tools during MC02.
In addition to the heavy use of collaboration during this experiment, it was also important
to determine how the user community internalized data. In the network-centric environment,
planners can expect to receive a significant amount of data as web-enabled tools put data at the
warfighters' fingertips. Users were asked specifically about the quality of both oral and visual
information. The
experimental tools 0.60
received a 96
percent approval 0.50
rating with respect
0.40
to quality (See
Figure 285).
0.30
Collaboration
clearly let data from
0.20
a diverse group to
be synergized into
0.10
information that
could be used to 0.00
support execution of Excellent Very Good Average Below Poor
current and future Average
mISSIOns.
The intense Figure 285: Rating of the Quality of Visual and Oral Information Users confident
use of collaboration in quality of information presented. Quick learning curve resulted in extensive
tools and the use.
synergizing of data into information lead to the question of value added to the SJFHQ and the
accomplishment of mission. MC02 users sent a strong and clear message with respect to a
collaborative tool suite. The message from 90 to 95 percent of the users is that collaborative tools
are effective. More important, this effectiveness supports the horizontal and vertical coordination
efforts necessary to synchronize the visualization of the battlefield via the CROP/COP.
Many responders in this category were caught up in the "button-ology" of IWS. Their
focus was how the tool functioned "today" and this focus blurred how they envisioned it would
work in the future. Strong configuration management and future developments in ajoint
collaborative tool suite will mitigate many of their concerns. Planners and developers should be
aware of the single thread that the minority voiced as a concern - training. Users continually
commented on how their level of training influenced their ongoing activities. Users who attended
1-18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL'Y

Spiral 3, and received training, indicated IWS was easier to use during this exercise. Users with
prior experience with IWS at their home command were trumpeting the benefits of collaboration.
Some users reported that once they became familiar with IWS, then they experienced
significantly fewer problems. As joint collaborative tool suites are fielded to the Services, their
common "look and feel" should significantly reduce the learning curve experienced with this
tool. In addition to training, server stability and network control were voiced by users as areas
needing improvement.
If COE standards are enforced, a common look and feel will emerge.
Effectiveness of IWS 2.5 Rating of IWS ability to help maintain CROP
70%
60%
60%
50%
50%
40%
40%
30%
30%
20%
20%
10% 10%
0% 0%
Very Effective Somel'Alat Somel'Alat Ineffective Very Effective Somewhat Somewhat Ineffective
effective ineffective effective ineffective
Figure 286 A & B: Effectiveness of IWS and its ability to help maintain CROP
The combined use of collaborative tools such as IWS, MSN messenger, and the SPPS
significantly enhanced the positive outcome of Millennium Challenge 2002, according to many
participants. Key leadership and users alike touted the benefits of rapidly collaborating with key
personnel to focus on the mission. All leaders and mentors reinforced the need for a joint
collaborative tool suite. Users demonstrated through extensive use of and participation in
collaboration that the SJFHQ would benefit from these tools. Collaborative tools strongly
support the functionality required by the SJFHQ.

As the primary collaborative tool for MC02, IWS can be linked to every other area
evaluated within this experiment.
DOTMLPF Linkage
IWS results support the DOTMLPF package by confirming that users found the CIE was
a transformational capability in comparison to current operations.
Recommendations
Many users were caught up in the "button-ology" ofIWS. Their focus was how the tool
functioned "today" and this focus blurred how they envisioned it would work in the future.
Strong configuration management and future developments in a j oint collaborative tool suite will
mitigate many of the "button-ology" concerns. Planners and developers should also be aware of
the single thread that the minority voiced as a concern-training. Users continually commented
on how their level of training influenced their ongoing activities. In addition to training, server
stability and network control are also areas that need improvement.

Users reported the IWS was very effective to somewhat effective as a collaborative tool
in support ofRDO and the CROP. The collaborative tool must include the following capabilities
found in IWS during MC02:
Online Detection & Instant Messaging - instant messenger capability enables users to
locate people connected to the system, chat with them, and/or invite them to join a virtual
conference.
Virtual Work Space - complete virtual meeting facility where users can meet and
collaborate, store projects and review archives. The majority of users indicate that they used
eight or more collaborative sessions.
Collaboration Tools -includes a full range of collaboration tools such as multi-party
message chat, multi-party audio conferencing, video web casting, advanced white boarding
capability, application casting and shared viewing, persistent storage of meeting minutes, online
voting and polling, and much more. Users reported IWS quality of visual and oral information
being between excellent and very good.
Video Conferencing - provides support of standards-based video conferencing (IP H.323
and ISDN H.320) and offering "one-click" access to video meetings in addition to the full suite
of collaboration features.
Joint Automated Single Guard Solution (JASGS)

Description
JASGS, sponsored by the Joint C41SR Battle Center, is a composite multi-level security (MLS)
solution that offers the unified commander and Joint Task Force staff a single, common interface
to share
information among J ASGS Architecture
security domains
in accordance with Sensor (Track)
Input
existing policy,
procedures, and
standards. It offers
a shared view of
multi -level
security data
including
unformatted data
and general
military
intelligence
(GMI). When
operational, the
SJFHQ can expect
to use JASGS to
exchange properly
marked
information among
US SCI (JWICS), Figure 287: JASGS Architecture
US Secret (SIPRNET) and multi-national Secret environments through a single, common web-

enabled interface (See Figure 287). As the DoD emphasis on web-centric operations grows,
JASGS will be positioned to enhance our security posture.
JASGS has two primary information exchange capabilities between multiple security
domains. The first capability is the movement of releasable information prepared by users on the
JWICS network and passed through the trusted web guard to the MLS web server located on a
closed u.s. Secret network. This capability enables information to be posted to the MLS web
server and provides users the ability to access and view directory structures based upon their
authorized level of access. The second capability (unclassified to Secret) was provided during the
exercise by the inter-domain transfer system. It was a separate initiative not included as a
component JASGS, but may be included some time in the future. This system was previously
assessed by the JBC and was used to support the ONA analysts during MC02.

JASGS was a demonstration project for MC02. This initiative was also previously
assessed by the JBC in August 2000. Therefore, no assertions can be made based upon the MC02
survey results on JASGS as the technology and capability was not sufficiently exercised during
the experiment. Connecting JWICS and NIPRNET to the operational SIPRNET could have been
overcome by simulation of each network throughout the exercise. JASGS may support a
previously identified requirement for multi-level security, but that requirement was not
thoroughly tested during MC02. In future operations, a SJFHQ can expect to deal with a variety
of "plug and play" units like JASGS, thus a simple and intuitive multi-level security platform is
needed to meet dynamic data exchange requirements. Indications are that JASGS supports an
identified requirement for multi-level security, but the level of support to these requirements was
not fully evaluated during MC02.
Methodology
JASGS was evaluated by seven users from the JTF. These users were questioned through
surveys about their use of JASGS. JBC resources were also surveyed to better evaluate the utility
of JASGS. The combined analysis indicates a potential for providing significant key enabler
support to the SJFHQ.
Observations
The proliferation of data on our three primary networks (NIPRNET, SIPRNET and
JWICS) requires seamless data exchange between these networks based upon the need to support
ONA. As we attempt to establish information and knowledge superiority, we need a mechanism
to move the data between systems to develop the entire COP and CROP picture. As we establish
a persistent collaborative environment across echelons of command, interagency participants,
and centers of excellence, the use of JASGS should enable formal and informal collaborative
sessions based upon capabilities inherent within this system.
JASGS is also poised to support the assured access into and through the battlespace
required by the SJFHQ. The initial phases of a "come as you are war" requires the warfighter to
have the ability to plug a JASGS configured laptop, personal digital assistant or other mobile
device into the global information grid, while ensuring synchronized security and force
protection. Findings presented in the final report prepared by the JBC indicate there is little
question that JASGS will provide a fast, efficient and effective mechanism to move data between
networks. However, the results ofMC02 cannot conclusively be used to determine the viability

of JASGS in an operational environment because planners elected not to inject JASGS play
throughout the experiment.
Of the seven people surveyed on the existence of requirements to move information from
an unclassified network to a Secret network, only two users indicated that they were qualified to
answer a requirements based question; therefore, no assertions can be made from the survey. The
survey results indicate only 50 percent of the users during MC02 believed there was a
requirement within their organization to move information between classified networks.
However, within the technical and functional communities with an interest in this type of
functionality, there is an intense, real-world interest in a JASGS-type product to support coalition
and joint warfighters. A possible explanation for the unfavorable survey results may be that
JASGS was not properly presented or used during MC02 (to include lack of sufficient training).
Injecting information at specific times of the experiment would have presented the small user
community with a reservoir of information that would force them to move data as appropriate.
The concern of connecting JWICS and NIPRNET to the operational SIPRNET could
have been overcome by simulation of each network throughout the exercise. A SIPRNET
enclave could have been designed and connected to the network. The enclave could have been
designed to meet all SIPRNET requirements and the designer could have put "SECRET
EXERCISE ONLY DATA" on that local area network. All data coming into and out of the
exercise SIPRNET enclave could have been examined for evaluation. This could have been
duplicated for an MC02 NIPRNET. Significant information and insight could have been gained
regarding how data is perceived and what is passed between networks. In future operations a
SJFHQ can expect to deal with a variety of "plug and play" units like JASGS, thus a simple and
intuitive multi-level security platform is needed to meet dynamic data exchange requirements.
Indications are that JASGS supports an identified requirement for multi-level security, but the
level of support to these requirements was not fully evaluated using JASGS during MC02.
Recommendations
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved the JASGS in August 2002 for
fielding to selected combatant commanders in FY03 and FY04, based on the results of a
functional assessment conducted by the JBC with warfighter participation. Accordingly, no
additional experimentation is recommended for the JASGS architecture.
Joint Automated Target Folders (JATF)

Description
Joint Automated Target Folders, JATF, is an immature tool, which was recently
developed for concept demonstration during MC02 and was sponsored by Joint Forces
Command. The JATF database is a dynamic repository of targeting information and products
that reside in a web-based environment accessible through a service member's commercial off-
the-shelf web browser. Using a trusted client relationship with the Services and combatant
commanders, the JATF can be dynamically updated in real time to reflect the most current data
on a threat target in the JOA. It is maintained centrally, but can be exported to distant and
isolated locations/headquarters as appropriate. This capability is a logical evolution in target
folder development given technological leaps forward in information technology.
JATF is a component of the joint targeting toolbox (JTT). The goal of the JATF is to
provide timely targeting information, situational awareness, demonstrate weapon target pairing,
and the value of horizontal coordination among and across components, NATO allies and

coalition forces during the prosecution of time sensitive targets (TSTs). JATF has the capability
to execute virtual target development with the targeting support products using the JATF
database, and to dynamically update the targeting JATF database, as target updates are required.
JATF will also provide the capability to use the JATF to collaborate with NATO allies
participating in coalition environments.
JATF database will interface with GCCS supporting the CROP at selected nodes, and
will communicate with the
Advanced Field Artillery
Tactical Data System
(AFATDS), the Theater Battle
Management Core System
(TBMCS), and the
ADOCSlLand Attack Warfare
System (LAWS) as normal.
Communications with AFATDS
and TBMCS will be via simple
mail transfer protocol (SMTP).
Figure 288 depicts the JATF
website.
Overall Assessment
Results
Findings based on the
Figure 288: Screen Capture of JATF results from the assessment
questionnaires completed by
operators follow:
JATF helped reduce the targeting cycle time
JATF had a positive impact on the JTF performing actions on developing COAs, maintaining
high-value targets, executing rapid targeting and re-targeting, receiving and providing target
information, modifying and adjusting planned missions, conducting dynamic planning, and
coordinating fires among Services
The need for a consistent database replication/overlays across the participating units is
emphasized. The COP display was not consistent among GCCS, AFATDS, TBMCS, ADOCS,
and LAWS.
Methodology
Users that dealt specifically with targeting evaluated the JATF. A series of survey
questions were submitted to the users for evaluation. Users were also interviewed. The JATF was
reviewed in light of the fact that it is an immature tool used for concept demonstration only.
Observations
JATF demonstrated the support of the SJFHQ key enablers as follows:
Established InformationlKnowledge Superiority by:
Providing target information to the COP
Conducting target planning, execution and assessment in a collaborative environment

Establishing a collaborative environment for target information
Rapidly Set Conditions for Decisive Operations by:

Providing target information in the conduct of effects-based planning
Synchronizing target information for joint actions
Assured Access into and through the battlespace by:

Providing target information to optimize positioning to maximize operational reach
Provide target information available for en-route planning C4
Provide target information for en-route force protection
Conduct Decisive Effects-based Operations by providing target information used in the:

Development of effects-based tasking orders
Reach-back capabilities to enhance the targeting process
Establish Information/Knowledge X
Superiority
Rapidly Set Conditions for Decisive X
Operations
Assure Access Into and Through the X
8attlespace
Conduct Decisive Effects-based X
Operations
Sustain the Force
Twenty-nine operators responded "yes"; 17 operators responded "no." This indicates that
the JATF developed for the MC02 experiment was better than average at reducing targeting
cycle time. Operators rated the functionality of JATF in each area listed.
Developing Courses of Action (COAs) - based on 33 responses
Maintaining High Value Targets (HVTs) - based on 31 responses
Executing rapid targeting and re-targeting - based on 32 responses
Receiving and providing target information - based on 39 responses
Modifying and adjusting planned missions - based on 24 responses
Conducting dynamic planning - based on 26 responses
Performing Command and Control (C2) of assigned units - based on 23 responses
Coordinating fires among Services-based on 26 responses
The operators that elaborated on the reasoning of their rating provided some comments.
Some of the highlights of those comments on JATF follow:

Positive feedback
Respondent comment:
"It helps us with our collection decks, supplementing what we are not always getting
from analysts. 1 think the tool has some use at least."
"Excellent tool in providing targeting information, however, it needs to use standardized
format to be used throughout all firing units and all of the information in the folders be
maintained current."
Needs for improvements

Respondent comment:
No apparent way to relay TSTs to JATF and to MIDB information.
No indication that the folder contained the latest of the target information.
There is a need for more JATF training/familiarity for the operator in support ofMC02
CONOPS. Due to the lack of training, a number of operators did not use JATF and this resulted
in incomplete target folders.
There is a need to standardize required target information to be included in the folder.
Lack of standards causes confusion, inconsistent data information from one folder to the other,
and in some cases, volumes of information including old data. Because of the dynamic insertion
of information, the picture being generated changes with time, and that causes confusion.
There is a need for JATF to have a backup process/system in case the server, which
contains all the JATF information, crashes.
Recommendations
A consistent database is needed across the participating units. A method is also needed to
Impact of JATF on ability of JTF to perform actions
1.00
0.90
0.80
Q)
0.70
01 0.60 CI Positive Impact
.llI
r:::
Q)
0.50 No Impact
~ 0.40 o Negative Impact
Q)
Il... 0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
Figure 289: Impact on JTF performance

relay TSTs to JATF and to MIDB information. Additionally, the JATF also needs some way of
indicating that the folder contains the latest information. There is also a need to standardize
required target information to be included in the folder. Lack of standards causes confusion,
inconsistent data information from one folder to the other, and in some cases, volumes
information including old data. Last of all, there is a need for JATF to have a backup
process/system in case the server, which contains all the JATF information, crashes.
Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System - Near Term (JEMPRS-NT)
Description
Joint Task Force commanders require a robust and secure command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence (C 41) information system to support mission
planning with component commanders while enroute to and from an area of operations.
The JEMPRS-NT program sponsored by the Joint C41SR Battle Center, identified,
integrated, and assessed technologies to support a mobile C41 information system. The JBC
leveraged lessons learned from JC2S, EMPRS/SECOMP-I, JCF-AWE, and JEFX initiatives and
put together commercial off-the-shelf products to provide secure voice, video, application
sharing, whiteboard and text chat, digital dashboard, e-mail and file transfer, web service, COP
and network access to C2 and intelligence systems.
JEMPRS-NT enables global collaboration using collaborative tools such as Defense
Figure 290: JEMPRS-NT
Collaborative Tool Suite (DCTS) or in the case ofMC02, InfoWorkSpace (IWS). It does this by

using specific commercial satellite service technologies that provide data rate acceleration and
bandwidth optimization techniques to increase communications.

JEMPRS-NT enabled the JTF commander to accomplish all necessary C2 tasks while
physically separated from his headquarters (See Figure 290). During MC02, the JTF commander
and staffused 13 workstations loaded with IWS collaborative tools, ADOCS, and e-mail to
maintain the battle rhythm. The commander and staff actively participated in the joint targeting
board (JTB), while maintaining good situational awareness transiting to and from the AOR. Each
flight aboard the special operations low level (SOLL-II) modified C-17lasted approximately five
hours. Communication link connectivity was lost a minimal number of times going to California
and coming back to Virginia due primarily to ISDN anomalies. The communications link was
quickly restored each time connectivity was lost. ADOCS and web browsing came back, even
eaSIer.
Methodology
Eighteen users evaluated JEMPRS-NT during MC02. These evaluators consisted of
operations, plans, intelligence, and knowledge management officers, as well as JEMPRS system
administrators. The JTF commander and staff used 13 workstations loaded with IWS
collaborative tools, ADOCS, and e-mail to maintain situational awareness, IS, collaborate, and
conduct j oint interactive planning in support of synchronized and integrated command and
control while in transit to a forward command post. This assessment was written using
warfighter surveys, comments, interviews, and personal observations. This assessment
methodology, although not scientific, showed that JEMPRS-NT supported all the key enablers of
the SJFHQ.
The SOLL-II C-17 was chosen because it has a specific commercial satellite antenna that
could be used to connect with the ground station at Suffolk, VA.
Observations
Over 60 percent of those surveyed said the capability to access the JTF collaboration
system using JEMPRS-NT, while enroute to an AOR was good or excellent. Less than 25
percent said this capability was adequate or less than adequate. One person mentioned they were
unable to access the JOC, but that was due to server problems and was not related to JEMPRS-
NT. Another commented that more workstations were needed and some staff members were only
able to listen in. It was explained that the number of workstations was limited in order to manage
bandwidth. If there were more workstations, there would have been reduced capabilities on each;
they would only have e-mail and web access and not collaborative tools.
Over two-thirds of the warfighters surveyed strongly agreed that enroute collaboration,
and transferring, sending, and receiving files between deploying personnel and the JTF rear via a
reach-back link was an important capability. The survey response to the current capability to
transfer/send/receive files was mixed due to the slow load time for graphic files/maps. This
problem can be solved by increasing bandwidth or to transfer smaller files.
Information access through hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) was a problem for some
users aboard the C-17. This could have been due in part to graphics posted on some pages
causing long download times. This may be an issue for the KMlKMO ROE. Some web pages
FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONLY 1-27

had graphics, which did not provide value-added information. Ninety-nine percent of the users
agreed (61 percent strongly agreed) that information through HTTP access was important.
Eighty-three percent of JEMPRS-NT users agreed (61 percent strongly agreed) that
access to COP, while the JTF is on the move, is important.
Most users agreed or strongly agreed that JEMPRS-NT should be fielded. It was
commented that this capability does not have to be installed on a C-17. Most any specific
commercial satellite equipped platform will do. One drawback, according to users, is
communication data rates. Thirty-seven percent rated the data rate partially adequate, 17 percent
said they were adequate, 28 percent rated the data rate as good, and only five percent said they
were excellent.
Most of the warfighters surveyed approved of the ability of JEMPRS-NT to perform the
required tasks-it was rated excellent by 17 percent, good by 44 percent, and adequate by 22
percent. In addition, most users agreed that the JEMPRS-NT flyaway kit supported situation
awareness, while the JTF battle staffwas enroute 61 percent said it was good, 17 percent said it
was excellent and only 11 percent said it was adequate.
JEMPRS-NT enabled the JTF to accomplish all necessary tasks during flight, which
supported all key enablers for the SJFHQ. JEMPRS-NT supports all the SJFHQ key enablers by
allowing the JTF commander and his battle staff to collaborate using voice, video, application
sharing, text chat, file transfer, and digital dashboard. This is accomplished over two encrypted
satellite links which gives the JTF commander freedom to plan missions with the regional
commander and component commanders from anywhere in the world. When the system was up
it approached excellent, but data speed is still an issue. During MC02, limited bandwidth
restricted use of all applications by all users aboard the C-17, although no other system can
provide this level of service in an airborne experiment at this time.
A final key observation that must be noted is that to collaborate, the JTF rear location
must have the same collaborative tools as the JEMPRS-NT flyaway kit. The JEMPRS-NT
flyaway kit must access DISN services through a gateway/ground station.
Table 50: JEMPRS-NT support for MC02 objectives measured
Establish Information/Knowledge
Superiority
x
Rapidly Set Conditions for
Decisive Operations
x
Assure Access Into and Through
the 8aUlespace
x
Conduct Decisive Effects-based
Operations
x
Sustain the Force x
DOTMLPF Linkage
USJFCOM, working with other component commanders and Services as required, is
developing a DOTMLPF synchronization plan and the interface should be fielded after JITC
certification tests.
1-28 FOR OFFICI AL I ISE ONLY

Recommendations
JEMPRS-NT leverages commercial off-the-shelf technology and is technically mature
enough to transition to a program management office (PMO). The Joint Task Force (JTF)
headquarters requires a collaborative mission planning capability between aircraft, ship, and
mobile ground forces while deploying to an AOR. JEMPRS-NT enables this using collaborative
tools, Command and Control, and intelligence systems across enhanced global reach-back links.
Joint Fires Initiative - Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JFI-ADOCS)

Description
Sponsored by the Naval Warfare Development Center and the Joint Precision Strike
Demonstration Office
The JFI ADOCS identified
technologies that demonstrate near term
potential for management of time sensitive
targeting within the JTF. JFI provides a
common tool set, architecture and automated
processes for the j oint force commander,
component commanders, and supporting tactical commanders to conduct operational and tactical
"fires" across the engagement spectrum from planning to execution for time-sensitive targeting.
The tool set used was the ADOCS for the Army, Air Force, and SOF. The Navy and the Marine
Corps used the LAWS. ADOCSILAWS integrates a broad range of command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C 4ISR) systems,
enabling horizontal and vertical integration of information and command and control actions.
ADOCS provides an integrated set of tools for data management and analysis, and
mission planning, coordination, and execution. It was originally developed for deployment at the
Army corps level, but has since migrated to both higher and lower echelons. ADOCS is a
distributed system supporting a wide number range of workstations that are typically located at
multiple echelons. This enables ADOCS to provide horizontal coordination within each echelon,
as well as vertical coordination among echelons.
The use of this system's functionalities allowed the MC02 team to engineer bridges to
Service systems such as TBMCS, AFATDS, GCCS 13, and MIDB, which helped automate the
TST process. The focus of effort was on TST management functionality. A code bridge was
established, that automatically connects the TBMCS dynamic target list (DTL) to the JDTL in
ADOCS. Another code bridge automatically connected AF ATDS mission manager to the
ADOCS mission manager. Fires mission information was passed from ADOCS to AFATOS.
Status of fire missions was then exchanged back to ADOCS from AFATOS. A JDTL also
established a common targeting knowledge base for engaging TSTs.
ADOCS and LAWS are synonymous terms because they are essentially the same system.
The ADOCSILAWS provides the joint warfighter a common set of situational awareness tools
and capabilities in the fires, targeting, weapons, operations, and intelligence disciplines.
The presentation tool of ADOCS demonstrated near-term potential to support the
combatant commander's requirement for an effective way to manage information and assess
emerging situations rapidly with a focus on optimizing decision-making through enhanced
situation awareness. The technology provided a common display toolset across the MC02
infrastructure to gain situation awareness across the combatant command, Joint Task Force
FOR OFFICIAL lISE ONLY 1-29

headquarters and component staffs. The assessment determined a successful architecture that
could be institutionalized as a common joint fires integration management tool or as a
presentation and situational awareness tool to support TST decisions.
The JFI mission is enhanced by the CROP toolsets, which provide the users with the
same information and the same results, ensuring consistent horizontal integration of information
across components.

During the MC02 scenarios, the operators were successful in their ability to maintain and
distribute timely, accurate, and relevant integrated pictures of JTF units, locations, and status for
the JFI missions. The operators succeeded in creating and maintaining a shared awareness and
collaboration to synchronize our forces. This supports the operational tempo and enables the
force to mitigate surprises by the adversary. Therefore, the JFI, as a concept, was proven to
enable the creation of a common picture, based upon the toolset (ADOCS and the
InfoWorkSpace collaborative tool in this instance), using common information formats (ADOCS
displayed u.s. Message Text Format and TACFIRE formats), codified by a common set of JFI
tactics, techniques, and procedures. This is vital to our telling of the story and moving the
"concept" of JFI forward in future events and out to the warfighting commanders.
Methodology
Fifty-five users and SMEs evaluated JFI during MC02. The survey respondents included
targeting personnel from the each of the components and the JTF targeting staff. A series of
different questions were periodically submitted to the users for evaluation to obtain responses
that measured the maturing perspectives of the users as familiarity and functionality increased
during the operational tempo. This methodology also supports the design of future training for
the operators based upon the feedback received on surveys. The users were asked questions
related to key JFI functions and capabilities. Specifically, the users were asked about
collaboration/coordination capabilities, target handoff capabilities, situational awareness,
ATO/ACO requirements and the effectiveness ofCONOPS/TTPs for successful mission
execution. The findings presented below are based upon actual user feedback.
Observations
Figure 291 provides a snapshot of the functional elements that are consolidated onto one
operational screen. It emphasizes the importance of generating a dynamic common picture for
TST collaboration and coordination.
The following paragraphs summarize the major findings obtained from user feedback.
Future JFI tools should include the following functions:
Alerts of duplicate targeting
Rapid access and exchange of target info
Easy to use displays and functions
Accurate and timely identification of available strike assets
Future JFI tools should support situational awareness with the following functions:
Display of Red and Blue forces
Create, share and display overlays
Display maps for coordination

Visualization of terrain (2D, 3D)

Display imagery for TST
Display fire-coordination measures
Battle Coordination Intelligence Joint/Integrated Tasking
Tactical Fire Army Aviation Special Air Interdiction

Direction Operations CAS
Figure 291: The JFI communications grid ensures critical information is shared with the people who
need to know, when they need to know it.
Operators recognized the need to include all the functionalities in the situational
awareness set of capabilities to support TST coordination. The neutral responders either did not
use the tool or were not sure of the benefits. When assessing terrain visualization, some operators
doubted the significance of the 2D or 3D utility in the successful coordination and execution of
TST operations.
JFI concepts of operation and tactics, techniques, and procedures. More than 60 percent
of the operators agreed that the JFI concept of operations and TTPs were adequate to support
real-world j oint operations.
The operators who disagreed did so based upon lack of knowledge or training regarding
the CONOPS/TTPs or a concern that the TTPs were not sufficiently mature for real-world
operations.
Eighty percent of the responders did not believe that TST cross-component coordination
and decision-making complicated the mission (See Figure 292). However, 20 percent believed
there is a need to improve the concept of operations and TTPs. Specifically, the TTPs need to
delineate clearly between critical targets and time-sensitive targets and how they are prosecuted.

Operators indicated that there should be an acceptance of a j oint standard for

CONOPS/TTPs. They also indicated that the CONOPSI TTPs contributed to mission success.
90%
80%
70%
60% l1li Strongly agree
50% l1li Agree
40% D Disagree
30% l1li Strongly disagree
20%
10%
0%
Adequate to Adopt CONOPS / Yes No
support current! TTPs as a Joint (Did CONOPS I TTP com plicate
real world joint Standard T STcoord?)
ops
Figure 292: Effectiveness of JFI Concept of Operations and TTPs
JFI demonstrated that it could support the key enablers of the SJFHQ in the following
areas based upon warfighter observations. Within each area, users identified the JFI elements as
significant in their contribution to Rapid Decisive Operations.
Table 51: JFI support for MC02 objectives measured
Establish Information X
Knowledge Superiority
Rapidly Set Conditions for X
Decisive Operations
Assure Access Into and X
Through the BaUiespace
Conduct Decisive Effects-Based X
Operations
Sustain the Force X
Establish information and knowledge superiority:

Displays the GCCS database portion of the Common Operational Picture
Develop the "Relevant" information portion of the CROP regarding TST
Conduct Planning, execution, and Assessment in a Collaborative Environment
Establish a persistent collaborative environment across echelons of commands, interagency
participants, and centers of excellence enabling formal and informal collaborative sessions

Rapidly set conditions for decisive operations:

Show position of combat-configured j oint forces for decisive operations
Manage cross-domain processes
Protect the joint force (including support systems and capabilities)
Synchronize application of joint actions
Conduct decisive effects-based operations:

Assess the contribution of actions to the desired end-state based on the measures of
performance
Conduct j oint tactical actions
Support EBO with precision-strike capabilities
Use reach-back capabilities to enhance the targeting process
Conduct precision engagement collaborative planning
Integrate kinetic, non-kinetic, lethal and non-lethal weapons to shape the battlespace
Conduct precision engagements against time-sensitive targets
Achieve coordinated DoD and non-DoD actions
In addition to MC02, findings from other experiments and venues support ADOCS or
ADOCS-like capabilities in support ofRDO.
The Information Superiority - Command and Control Workshop II final report states:
"The time sensitive targeting problem is one of the most difficult challenges we face today. To
be successful the TST process must merge planning and execution. The commander must
carefully monitor the battlespace to constantly coordinate among possibly conflicting priorities
that could impact the planned and desired effects."
Fleet Battle Experiment-D found: "The LAWS-ADOCS network improved cross-Service
coordination and situational awareness resulting in improved CSOF execution."
A finding from Fleet Battle Experiment-H observed: "Synchronization must be accounted
for within the planning process and facilitated by a planning tool that rapidly aggregates,
modifies and integrates the individual warfare commander's plans to digitally identify and assist
in rectifying conflicts, while synchronizing multi-mission platforms and [melding] multiple plans
[into] a single plan." It further stated: "Engagements and the dynamic target list needed to be
coordinated or integrated. A list of deliberate targets not engaged due to TST tasking was
required to simplify re-strike planning. This process should be automated within the web-based
too and/or JFMCC planning tool to ensure visibility of those targets not engaged due to plan
modifications, coming as a result of time critical targeting operations."
The Coherent Joint Fires Report observed: "The coordination and engagement process
for immediate targets is fragmented across the joint force. Streamlining an operational
architecture oriented toward immediate targets will facilitate the efficient integration of
targeting-including relevant aspects of j oint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB)-
and engagement of this type of target."
The Center for Army Lessons Learned identified a lesson learned from Afghanistan:
"Strategic, operational, and tactical targeting responsibilities and concerns may overlap and must
be coordinated." The ADOCS answers the need for coordination.
FOR OFFICIl'"L USE ONI,Y 1-33

Ajoint TST coordination tool must have the ability to access and visualize the air tasking
orders (ATO) and airspace control orders (ACO). The operators who expressed strong agreement
highlighted the importance of the ability to sort and display the ATO.
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
1m portance of access and 1m portance of access and
visualization of ATO visualization of ACO
Figure 293: Importance of Acceptance and Visualization

The analysis and findings for the JFI initiative have impacts on the assessment of IWS
2.5, GCCS-D, JISR tools, and JATF joint initiatives. These impacts primarily relate to the
performance of the tools employed in the initiative. Performance regarding these tools may
impact the findings of the other assessment areas or joint initiatives.
DOTMLPF Linkage
The analysis conducted on JFI supports the DOTMLPF package by providing direct input
regarding the importance of training and materiel in the success of performing Rapid Decisive
Operations.
Recommendations
Based upon the major findings obtained from the user feedback, the following
recommendations are given:
Future JFI tools should include the following functions:
Alerts of duplicate targeting
Rapid access and exchange of target info
Easy to use displays/functions
Accurate/timely identification of available strike assets
Future JFI tools should include effective target-handoff
Support rapid execution of TST

Support automated handoff to Service systems
Future JFI tools should support situational awareness with the following functions:
Display of Red and Blue forces
Create, share and display overlays
Display maps for coordination
Visualization of terrain (2D, 3D)
Display imagery for TST
Display fire-coordination measures
Consolidated CRs
Feasibility I
Accessibility
Analysis
Figure 294: JISR Tool

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissancel Collection Management
Description
The JISR module, sponsored by the joint experimentation/C 41 team, is a network-centric
approach to the management of available ISR platforms and sensors to better support the quick-
paced demands of effects-based operations. JISR module supports ISR planning through
collaboratively developing an "effects-based" ISR collection plan and ISR synchronization
matrix. JISR module supports ISR execution through collaboratively executing the ISR plan and
adjust resources (dynamic re-tasking) as necessary (See Figure 294).

JISR module, still an immature tool, was developed to enable the JISR concept. JISR
tools are "somewhat effective" in displaying ICSAS visualization information, in operating in
ADOCS, SPPS, and IWS environment, as well as in the use ofMIDB/ADOCS data. JISR tools
enhanced JISR planning.
Methodology
Surveys were distributed to 149 personnel on the JISR module. All people surveyed were
directly involved with the joint intelligence support element (JISE). This assessment was written
using warfighter surveys, comments, interviews, and personal observations. This assessment

methodology, although not scientific, showed that JISR module supported key enablers of the
SJFHQ.
Observations
Most operators assessed JISR tools to be "somewhat effective" in displaying ICSAS
visualization information, in operating in ADOCS, SPPS, and IWS environment, as well as in the
use ofMIDB/ADOCS data and most operators rated JISR tools as enhancing JISR planning.
Establish Information/Knowledge x
Superiority
Rapidly Set Conditions for Decisive x
Operations
Assure Access Into and Through the x
8attlespace
Conduct Decisive Effects-based x
Operations
Sustain the Force x

The following are JISR module's relationship to MC02 objectives and key enablers of the
SJFHQ:
Established InformationlKnowledge Superiority by:
Providing ISR assets situational awareness
Managing collection of ISR information
In conducting ISR requirements definition and ISR asset allocation in a collaborative
environment
Rapidly Set Conditions for Decisive Operations by:

Deploying and integrating JISR system
Managing cross-domain ISR collection processes
Assured Access Into and Through the Battle space by:

Integrating ISR capabilities
ICSAS indicates that JISR tool was somewhat effective in displaying Integrated
Collection Situational Awareness System (ICSAS) visualization information for collection
management (51 operators responded) (See Figure 295). The capability to visualization of ISR
missions and sensors coverage is shown in figure 296 as a screen capture.
ADOCS indicates that JISR was somewhat effective in operating in ADOCS
environment by providing a centralized location for registering ISR collection requirements (66
operators responded).
1-36 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V

SPPS indicates that JISR was somewhat effective in the MC02 SharePoint Portal Server
environment, including share documents, manage documents, exchange files, collaborate, and
search; 69 operators responded. The MC02 SPPS provides the gateway to the supporting
information environment. The portal is the vehicle by which the user accesses and stores
information products and applications supporting the JTF. Critical databases and tools required
by JISR participants
Evaluation of the Effectiveness of JISR Tools
include the RFI tool,
the Blue ISR database,
0.70 ONA IS, and joint
P
e 0.60 automated target
folders (JATFs). It is
c 0.50 also, where critical
e
n 0.40 plans, orders, reports,
t 0.30 o Somewhat Ineffective and briefings are
a posted. An ISR page
9 0.20
e has been created
0.10 within the ISG to
provide ready access
to the Blue ISR
database, the EBCP,
Figure 295: Effectiveness of JISR tools the ISR
synchronizati on
matrix, and reference materials.
IWS indicates that JISR was somewhat effective in operating in the IWS environment (66
operators responded). IWS
provides the primary secure
(SECRET NOFORN-level)
virtual workspace for JTF
collaborative planning and
execution. Instant
messaging, white boarding,
screen sharing, and text
chat are among the array of
collaboration tools included
in IWS. JISR activity took
place in two primary
locations on IWS: the
JCMC and the JOC.
IWS indicates that
JISR was somewhat
effective in the use of
modernized integrated
database (MIDB)/ADOCS
data (60 operators
responded). JISR allows Figure 296: Visualization of ISR Missions and Sensors
users to identify new or

modify existing requirements, where users can select fixed sites from the MIDB.
There were 66 operator responses to the request to rate how much JISR tools enhanced
JISR planning; 43 responded, "enhanced"; 23 responded "degraded. "
Effectiveness of JISR Tools to enhance

JISR nlannin2:
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0%
Effective Ineffective
Figure 297: Enhancement of JISR Planning
Operators that elaborated on the reasoning of their rating provided some comments on the
JISR module such as:
JISR has good potential to provide for effective ISR assets situational awareness
JISR provided a good tool for joint collaboration for ISR assets requirements coordination
JISR provided a good tool for joint collaboration for ISR assets allocation coordination
JISR allows for submittal ofISR requirements "ad hoc" to the assets managers using the
spreadsheet export function
This capability used to be a cumbersome procedure using excel spreadsheet and e-mail
Lack of effective training, due mostly to a lack of time to gain required skills/knowledge of
capabilities, and to receive relevant training in support ofMC02 operational concepts
JISR should provide for filtering or sorting of ISR requests based on "effects" and tasking of
ISR assets that directly relates to the PEL
JISR could be improved by having the capability to perform predictive modeling
Indicates total ISR coverage over period of time
Shows all airborne sensor positions, sensor coverage
Indicates what has already been imaged
Indicates what images would be lost if ISR assets are moved
Provides for dynamic re-task of sensors for any platforms

The analysis and findings for the JISRM initiative have impacts on the JFCOM ONA
assessment area as well as the IWS 2.5, GCCS-D, and JFI (ADOCS) joint initiatives. These
impacts primarily relate to the performance of the tools employed in the initiative. Performance
regarding these tools may impact the findings of the other assessment areas or joint initiatives.
1-38 FOR OFFICIl'"L USE ONI,V

DOTMLPF Linkage
The analysis conducted on JISR supports the DOTMLPF package by providing direct
input regarding the importance of training and materiel in the success of performing Rapid
Decisive Operations.
Recommendations
Based upon the major findings obtained from the user feedback, the following
recommendations are that JISR tools must include the following functions:
Operate within the following environment:
ADOCS
SPPS
IWS
Web Portal
Common Operational Picture
Distributed Planning and Situational Awareness
Display ICSAS visualization information
Interface seamlessly with MIDB data
Provide effective ISR assets situation awareness
Provide collaboration for ISR assets allocation coordination
Provide "ad hoc" ISR requirement submittal
Provide sorting of ISR requests based on "effects" and tasking of ISR assets that relates
directly to the PEL
JISR tools must develop the capability to perform predictive modeling that:
Indicates total ISR coverage over period of time
Shows all airborne sensor positions, sensor coverage
Indicates what has already been imaged
Indicates what images would be lost if ISR assets are moved
Provides for dynamic re-task of sensors for any platforms
Joint Public Affairs Operations Group (JPAOG)

Description
The JP AOG is an experimental concept designed to be a standing rapid deployment joint
public affairs team. Its mission is to plan, coordinate and employ a series of small, mobile teams
of public affairs specialists. These teams will provide both forward deployed public affairs
resources as well as a reach-back support in response to theater or unified combatant commander
tasking. This joint force team will also provide command and control of public affairs units and
elements from pre-deployment through entry phases of j oint operations prior to the establishment
of a formal joint information bureau or inter-agency information service.
Communication is global and nearly instantaneous. Tools and tactics for working with
media professionals are global and nearly instantaneous as well. The satellite video and data
communication system central to the JP AOG experiment is an example of an off-the-shelf
technology that can provide immediate information to international media and the global public.
MC02 provides the far-reaching environment for the JP AOG experiment. The group deploys a
rapid, flexible, and transformational communication tool suite to the warfighting commander. It
provides three critical assets for operational success:
F OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1-39

Public affairs expertise

Communication situational awareness
Ability to design and transmit communication products
The JPAOG provides a self-contained public affairs unit, ready to deploy with the first
wave of combatants rather than waiting until the traditional follow-on-forces style of the past.
The 31-person team connects news knowledge to the battle space. The Joint Public Affairs
Collection Team, deploying with satellite communication tools, provides real-time reach-back
from remote locations. They provide an environment for reporters to interview commanders and
their spokesmen in the combat zone, as well as providing near real-time information presence in
an operational environment to counter propaganda and disinformation tactics of the adversary.
Military public affairs tasks for 2007 are just what current doctrine predicts: trusted
counsel to leaders, global influence, and deterrence as well as improved morale and readiness for
our own and coalition troops. Commanders will gain immediate public affairs strategies for the
information battle space through JP AOG. JP AOG can counter enemy propaganda and
disinformation by credibly communicating with combatants in real-time. JP AOG can interact
with troops so they feel supported and proud of their achievements. JP AOG connects the
information battle space with the combatant commander for rapid, credible service to
international media and the global public.
The JP AOG experiment tested the operational design and mission effectiveness during a
simulated conflict simulation. The value of conducting its operation during MC02 was to seek
validation and information regarding the enhancement of communication opportunities during
transformation experiments conducted by each Service. By creating both a forward deployed
team as well as a Joint Task Force element, the JPAOG sought to prove the value of
augmentation to the joint force commander (JFC). Support included public affairs staff
augmentation to the commander's personal staff, JIB manning, improved combat camera
coordination, and remote operations using newly developed, portable video teleconferencing and
data transmission technology (See Figure 298).
The JP AOG team is designed to remain engaged until redeployed - 60 to 90 days after
initial deployment. It adds value, providing early entry public affairs capability in an operational
environment and complements a SJFHQ element sent to augment a designated joint force
commander. Early insertion provides timely, proactive information flow to counter adversary
propaganda and other information warfare tactics. By having real-time access to public affairs
staff, media representatives and opinion leaders have access to the battlespace and its leadership.
When not deployed, JPAOG members will be assigned to the Joint Training, Analysis
and Simulation Center (JTASC), USJFCOM, to conduct j oint public affairs training in live
exercises and simulated environments. An alternate plan would be to establish a JP AOG at the
headquarters of each combatant commander for deployment within the AOR -in conjunction
with the deployment of a JFC because of hostilities.
As currently envisioned, the core JP AOG organization, with 31 projected billets, will
include a director (0-6), training officer deputy (0-5), and an administrative assistant (E-7). Four
liaison functions will support them-media analysis, plans, information operations, and public
information. Additionally, a four-person contractor team would support logistics,
communications, computers and media channel integration. A four-person joint task force
augmentation team would include a JTF director (0-4/5) two media officers (0-3) and an
administrative assistant (E-7). Complementing this leadership team would be a JIB establishment

team often people. It would be led by a JIB team chief (0-3/4) with a plans officer (0-3), two
media officers (0-3), an administrative assistant (E-7), four public affairs specialists [two print,
two visual] (E-7), a technical support specialist (E-6) and two deployable active duty teams of
seven people per team. The deployable teams would consist of a team chief (0-4/5), NCOIC (E-
7), technical support specialist (0-3), media officer (0-3/4), plans officer (0-3), and two PA
specialists (E-5/6). Two additional teams may be staffed from within the USJFCOM Joint
Reserve Unit.
The core JP AOG organization would be supplemented by a combat camera cell
(consisting of three people - one digital photographer and a two-person video crew). The total
JP AOG unit staffing is estimated to be 31 active duty military personnel, plus combat camera
personnel. The unit will be scalable and flexible which could result in the deployment of smaller
units or individuals.

BATTLE TASK 1: Provide Senior Leader media availability via remote VTC into OSD
press event
Contemplated Scenario: A combat leader from a remote location is interviewed via the
remote VTC/data system with no hardstand infrastructure. This task would optimally be
accomplished by connecting into the Pentagon press briefing room. Constraints: Uses remote
VTC/data system, dual INMARSAT and vehicle power from "In the box"; VTC is "2-way"
allowing the leader to receive and answer questions in real time; "B-roll" is provided for the use
of the audience to be played on demand. B-roll transferred via Remote VTC/data system.
Implementation: After six months coordination with the OASDIP A media operations
staff at the Pentagon, an access line was dropped into the DoD media briefing room. Suffolk
technical support staff also coordinated a backup VTC facility in case the desired location was
unable to be configured during the experiment period.
The remote
team coordinated
with Marine public
affairs staff at the
SCLA and provided
a spokesperson to
the Washington
press corps for a
live, real time
interview.
The remote
team provided
prepared video clips
during the VTC to
augment the
presentation; they
were made available
to the media
representatives via a
spare remote system Figure 298: JPAOG Reach-back Capabilities

that had been transported and managed by a member of the support staff.
Implications: While the Pentagon conducts VTCs on a daily basis as well as interviews
with senior leadership from command locations (such as Gen Franks from CENTCOM
headquarters during Operation Enduring Freedom), we believe this is the first time that tactical
communications from a simulated battle space has been accomplished. The opportunity to break
into the news cycle with real-time event-driven information will now give military leaders the
ability to provide first impressions on events as well as the first explanation of a military
operation rather than the first reaction.
BATTLE TASK 2: Conduct coordination and planning of public affairs assets for media
operations
Contemplated Scenario: Remote team or teams conduct a secure VTC to coordinate
media operations in support of the exercise. Constraints: A minimum of two locations is needed.
One site via INMARSAT; third location is desirable. Use Microsoft Net Meeting as a
collaborative tool. Net Meeting is included with the Remote VTC/data system Units.
Implementation: Due to access of secure Iridium satellite telephones, the choice was
made to use this tool rather than the more text intensive Net Meeting. In addition, due to the cost
ofINMARSAT time and limited resources to pay for such time, the decision was made to save
airtime for live video teleconferencing experiences rather than using the time for text-based chat.
Implications: If the remote forward teams were deployed in a foreign environment, or
access to an outdoor phone was not possible or practical, the Net Meeting tool would be ideal for
coordination and continued interaction. However, access to the Internet and e-mail and/or Instant
Messenger might prove just as useful in point-to-point coordination. Multiple coordination
among JTF, unified command and specified command, would make a collaborative tool like Net
Meeting the ideal choice.
BATTLE TASK 3: Conduct service member availability via satellite link from a remote
location to a local media outlet
Contemplated Scenario: Remote team identifies a service member and arranges with
member's local TV affiliate or affiliates for live stand up for a feel good, love from the field type
of interview. Optimally, JPAOG would like to hold a similar event back in Tidewater area.
Constraints: Minimum of one service member could be multiple, held in a field environment
with questions and answers.
Implementation: During the overall experiment, two units (one out of Ft. Lewis, W A, and
the other from Ft. Bragg, NC) wanted to clarify stories that had run about their units to their
hometown newspapers. The VTC was arranged with the Ft. Lewis station though the media
representative chose not to attend. The Ft. Bragg media did not decide to use the opportunity
either.
Implications: The ability to redirect a story after an accident or incident is a premiere
rationale for the immediacy ofVTC capability organic to the remote team. Additionally, the
ability to counter propaganda and disinformation is also significant. The fact that the team was
nd
able to send night-vision footage of the 82 Airborne Div airdrop clearly showed the difficulty
soldiers were having in sensing the ground. Having that available to answer questions by media
provides credible back up to the reassurances offered verbally.

BATTLE TASK 4: Participate in an experiment VTC from the battlefield (secure

transmission)
Contemplated Scenario: An event triggers the need for direct coordination with OSD, the
JTF, and other participants as available. The JPAOG PACT Team will provide on-the-spot
coverage in order to cut through the "fog of war" and provide higher clarity. Constraints: Can be
MSEL driven; must be secure; involves OSD or OSD representatives from a location other than
Suffolk
Implementation: Ability to conduct live interviews to the exercise location became very
powerful for promoting its use to distinguished guests and military leaders who visited. With the
generous support of the USJFCOM Chief of Staff, the team at Suffolk was able to project images
from the remote VTC equipment onto a large flat panel display. This allowed for guests to talk
with the team and learn more about the operational value of the system. Due to a defective
handset on one of the INMARSAT devices, the team was unable to connect during the visit of
the SECDEF and the ASDIP A.
Implications: One comment by a visiting general was that such equipment would then
lead to micromanagement by senior leadership at the Pentagon or second-guessing by media and
other opinion leaders with access to the connections. The counter, provided by another general
officer visiting, was that "they already do; this just gives us a chance to do it faster, better and
with more intent."
BATTLE TASK 5: Provide video report back to JTF of an experiment event involving
media
Contemplated Scenario: An event, involving the media, occurs, that the PACT reports in
real-time or near-real-time coverage. Constraints: Could be MSEL driven-Examples:
Member of the media releases a factually inaccurate story. PACT provides live video to
discount the story
Media member is injured in an incident with an encounter with opposition forces,
A VTC is conducted involving the media representative and the JTF P A to ensure what
should be publicly released and to ensure media representative of JTF concern and caring for
the media
Media is granted coverage of military operations in a remote area, in order to ensure the story
is pushed out
The JPAOG PACT is tasked with supporting the media (on a reimbursable basis)
Story can be fed into WNN as a live or recent feed
Use remote VTC and "b-roll"
Live voice-using video shot earlier
Similar to combat camera live footage from other areas but with live voice over
JP AOG could cover events, and provide for the use of WNN
Implementation: The constraint was not taken because the decision to make the JPAOG
experiment parallel rather than integrated into the overall exercise made it impossible to respond
to MSELs. The JTF Public Affairs Team, however, did interact with the JPAOG and responded
to exercise events in ways that could have used the equipment and capability of the system. The
remote team, in cooperation with JCCC, participated in nearly every physical training range.
They provided video footage of the rapid air delivery of the Army's Stryker vehicles. The team
adapted the NTC Vulture team's coverage of a mass airdrop at NTC. They participated with the
FOR OFFICIAl, lISE ONLY 1-43

Navy SEALs and the experimental HSV off the coast of California. The Marine's urban warfare
event was covered, participated in along with media to get their feedback of the remote VTC
system's capabilities as well as providing a live interview with their commander to the Pentagon
press corps.
Implications: The participation of the remote team would have provided a great deal
more "realism" to the simulations as well as providing more understanding of the interaction
between "physically" present events and "virtually" present ones. The system provides a unique
way to create proximity to distant events so that more can participate as if they were more
physically involved in the overall event.
BATTLE TASK 6: Provide live battlefield coverage ofa recent event

Contemplated Scenario: Provide a story from the sight of a recent action for use in WNN
or other media outlet depending on the event. Constraints: Could be MSEL-driven; could
include an interview with a local unit member or commander who participated in the action,
provided from the actual battlefield.
Implementation: The constraint was not used for the reason mentioned above. However,
live coverage of events involving all Services provided members at the JTASC an opportunity to
see and talk with those so linked. Since a live feed was connected to the JTASC unclassified
exhibit area, many visiting leaders, as well as military leadership, had the opportunity to witness
the value of such a tool.
Implications: Since it was not connected to the overall video and/or media system for the
experiment, the value of the footage was more archival and "proof of concept" rather than
providing a sense of immediacy and presence to the "virtually" distant participants.
There was also no "reverse coverage" with the simulators.
BATTLE TASK 7: Update story or report to website via satellite link

Contemplated Scenario: From a remote location demonstrate reach-back by updating a
web page with info; should be kept small to minimize bandwidth use. Constraint: Could be
classified on an unclassified site.
Implementation: Inability to gain access to the military website through the gateway due
to constraints on the firewall from DISA. While it was technically feasible to do, the permissions
to access through this secure gateway were too difficult to do in the time allowed.
Implication: Peacetime security environment will not be appropriate in a combat one.
BATTLE TASK 8: Provide coverage of a DV event

Contemplated Scenario: Provide video report of a DV event or arrival; could be used for
any media outlet. Could be real world, EXERCISE, or both. Constraint: May be MSEL-driven
Implementation: The constraint was not taken because the decision to make the JPAOG
experiment parallel rather than integrated into the overall exercise made it impossible to respond
to MSELs. Video reports were created in QuickTime for DV events and arrivals that were later
replayed for other guests, as well as provided to the in-house WNN producer. The remote team
participated in nearly every physical training range. They provided video footage of the rapid air
delivery of the Army's Stryker vehicles. The team adapted coverage of the NTC Vulture team's
coverage of a mass airdrop at NTC. They participated with the Navy SEALs and the
experimental HSV off the coast of California. The Marine's urban warfare event was covered by

media, who participated by giving their feedback on the remote VTC system's capabilities as
well as providing a live interview with their commander to the Pentagon press corps.
Implications: The power of immediate information about a particular operations or action
will provide critical authority to senior leadership during news media interaction. This will be
compounded by the insertion of propaganda and/or disinformation about the activities by the
adversary in order to weaken or misrepresent our actions. The ability to be able to interact with
trusted public affairs staff in the field as well as having that counsel for on-camera spokespersons
provides commanders with the ability to exercise the information arm of national power in an
unprecedented way-far beyond just having a camera present such as those provided by JCCC.
BATTLE TASK 9: Use JPAOG communications capability to push ComCam or other

video back to JTF or JPAOG
Contemplated Scenario: Use another organization's equipment and material and transfer
via the remote VTC/data system and INMARSAT back to JTF for editing or distribution.
Constraints. Test interoperability of equipment and personnel. Transfer video or other product to
a target location at the JTF (Team 2) via INMARSAT.
Implementation: During the load out of equipment for the forward deployment of the
JTF, a camera crew from JCCC filmed inside a C-17. The footage was then edited, transferred
into a file, and sent via INMARSAT to another location within 90 minutes of start of filming.
The team was also able to test the ability to transfer video footage and digital still imagery.
Hypothesis was that different formats would transfer at different speeds, however, results
found all formats transferred at same speed ofINMARSAT connection rather than due to file
format. The rate was averaged at 1MB per minute of content. The speed was then due to the size
of the files and the compression of the particular file format. Thus, MPEG transferred faster than
JPEG and QuickTime transferred faster than Media Player.
We also discovered that different headquarters have made particular choices on
multimedia formats that affected our ability to send files for their review. In MC02, our test of
sending packaged compressed video to ASDIP A were limited not only by the size of e-mail
attachments and the security filters of such file formats through its firewall but all by the fact that
they had chosen to use the less compressed file formats of JPEG and Media Player rather than
MPEG and QuickTime.
Implications: The ability to be able to capture events that might contain classified or
sensitive features could still be accomplished by JCCC in their operational, archival function.
But having a remote public affairs team in place, provides for release at the source, editing closer
to the experience being covered so that operational features and/or force protection issues are
clearly known prior to being sent in a protected manner to the headquarters for the commander's
use in conducting the information arm of military power. The choice of multimedia file formats
made unilaterally by a computer systems engineer needs to be integrated across the Services in
order to facilitate uniform transfer of multimedia assets in a timely and useful manner.
Collaboration: While the visual information plan (VIP) provided from the JCC ran to
nine pages and covered the efforts of over 60 lenses at allocations, the remote VTC team did not
work from a similar video and interactive framework. The ability to better balance the value of
the JCCC for media consumption as well as command and internal information might have been
better accomplished through closer collaboration and integration. As the JCCC crews better
understood the remote team, their imagery was used more often instead of creating similar
products by the remote team. This allowed the P A staff to provide editing, positioning and

"pitching" of the material for use within the experiment as well as to media interested in visuals
about the overall exercise.
BATTLE TASK 10: Provide a task order or tasking from the JTF PA to the JPAOG
P ACT using satellite phone to transfer satellite link data or taskings
Contemplated Scenario: Plan and coordinate the providing of a tasking from TF P A or
designee to the PACT. Could be a transfer of an order, memo, or a VTC using shared data.
Constraints. Tests coordination abilities from higher to lower-does the PACT team set up its
INMARSAT and Remote VTC/data system at regular intervals, and on demand? Tests ability to
share, collaborate, and transfer data from a ground site to a remote location via INMARSAT.
Implementation: The remote JP AOG team found that radio and print journalists were not
as concerned with being able to "see" their interviewees as much as television media. When an
accident occurred during MC02 because of the night drop of paratroopers, the Ft. Bragg print
media conducted the interview with the company representative over the satellite phone. This
met their needs, saved valuable satellite connection time, and provided a timely, accurate,
relevant, and useful support of media representatives.
Implications: The ability to interact with MSEL injects could have been enhanced
through this technology. However, planners need to determine, in advance, any MSEL-driven
activity by the JP AOG to ensure complete separation from real-world news media and
information documentation of live-exercises activities. A complete communication plan will also
benefit from this technology as it seeks to balance coverage of an event with a continuous and
varied stream of information, images, and interaction for use by media representatives and
opinion leaders.
BATTLE TASK 11: Provide an interview opportunity for shipboard interviews to be

conducted by Navy staff and/or Army/Marine components being carried
Contemplated Scenario: Plan and coordinate a VTC with members of the Army Stryker
unit as they participated with the Navy HSV or with staff aboard the MC02 flagship, USS
Coronado. Constraints: Test the ability of the remote team INMARSAT equipment in proximity
to ship systems; test the ability to use shipboard INMARSAT equipment as a substitute for the
remote system's set; test the ability to use the remote VTC system while underway.
Implementation: The remote JP AOG team provided several opportunities to fulfill this
battle task. They covered the aerial and marine insertion of a SEAL team aboard the Joint
Venture high-speed vessel as well as provided an interview opportunity aboard the USS
Coronado-the experiment's command ship. The Joint Venture piece was recorded and
produced aboard for later transmission while the Coronado sought to broadcast the interview.
Implications: The ability to use INMARSAT antennas with the shipboard systems will
assist the integration of technologies as well as not interfering with resident systems. Further
research is required in order to be certain of the particular vessel's communication setup, the
technical requirements needed to connect to them, as well as the value of having more mobile
INMARSAT antenna choices.
Methodology
Users evaluated the JPAOG experiment during MC02. A series of three questions were
periodically submitted to the users for their evaluation of the experiment. In addition to the status
report questionnaire, other sources were used to better evaluate the utility of the JP AOG in
1-46 FOR OFFICIAL USE ON.,V

supporting the needs of the combatant commander's information needs. Using this methodology,
the JP AOG has been evaluated to provide significant support for the key leadership of the MC02
staff.
Observations
The key findings include the ability to provide:
Real-time access to combatant and operational leadership
High-quality video, audio and still imagery in near real time to potential media outlets and
combatant commanders
Redirection or further clarification on an operational event for interested publics after an
adverse incident
Access to the information battlespace for leadership at all levels of command from the field
to the Pentagon briefing room
Dramatic operational interest in the equipment by other military professionals who value
time-sensitive two-way communication processes
Opportunity to further test the concept and processes in real-world training and exercise
environment is underway. Improvement opportunities:
The name of the experiment is easily misunderstood as a component of the psychological
operations mission area, as in JPOTF and 4th POG
The need to market the group as a building block tool set is key; creating a workable team
name as well as an operational framework that could work easily in Service contexts would
help to create early adoption and integration
Need to create an integrated communication plan that would have outlined the images,
information and interaction that would promote the themes and messages of the experiment's
information goals and objectives. Instead, the event continued to be run in a traditional way
with media interest creating the images, events and stories rather than having an intentional
outcome for these products that could be easily adapted and customized for media use
Table 53: JPAOG Battle Tasks for MC02
Provide Senior Leader media availability via x

remote VTC into OSD press event
Conduct coordination and planning of Public x
Affairs assets for media operations
Conduct service member availability via X
satellite link from a remote location to a local
media outlet
Participate in an experiment VTC from the X
battlefield (secure transmission)
Provide video report back to JTF of an X
experiment event involving media
Provide live battlefield coverage of a recent X
event
Update story or report to website via satellite x
link
FOR OFFICIl'"L USE ONI,V 1-47

Provide coverage of a DV event X

Use JPAOG communications capability to X
push Combat Camera or other video back to
JTF or JPAOG
Provide a task order or tasking from the JTF X
PA to the JPAOG PACT using satellite
phone to transfer satellite link data or
taskings.

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters initiative most closely integrates with the JP AOG
experiment. The JPAOG validates the SJFHQ concept by providing a mobile, scalable team of
technical and leadership experts as a resource to the supported combatant commander. However,
the need to have integration with such a force is critical to both organizations' success. The
commander of the JP AOG should be a resource to the SJFHQ organization in order to determine
appropriate training and equipping needs of both. It will also provide the leadership using the
SJFHQ with the additional resources of the JP AOG especially in the early hours of an operation
by having the information, images, and interaction for the field that its remote forward team
provides.
The JEMPRS-NT experiment is a technical integration tool that could extend its
command and control capability with linkage to the JPAOG. Not only is it already using similar
technology and communication systems, but it also provides better situational awareness for the
commander using such systems to have public affairs information available at the same time as
those generated for intelligence, command, and control.
DOTMLPF Linkage
The value of experiments such as those of Millennium Challenge require further testing,
validation and extension as a result of the lessons learned. The ability to field a mobile,
interactive public affairs team provided vivid evidence of its value to commanders and civilian
leaders who participated with its use. However, the battle tasks conducted yielded valuable
lessons not anticipated during preparations or the preceding Spiral exercises. Further equipment
testing is required, better integration with command and control systems will better extend the
value of all such teams. Transforming current public affairs, civil military operations, and
information operations as well as determining the implications to military broadcasting,
psychological operations, and diplomatic operations is essential. The DOTMLPF process
provides a mechanism to accomplish these and others as they seek to better deploy forces for
military success.
Recommendations
The need to market the group as a building block tool set is key; creating a workable
team name as well as an operational framework that could work easily in Service contexts would
help to create early adoption and integration.
Need to create an integrated communication plan that would have outlined the images,
information and interaction that would promote the themes and messages of the experiment's
1-48 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V

information goals and objectives. Instead, the event continued to be run in a traditional way with
media interest creating the images, events and stories rather than having an intentional outcome
for these products that could be easily adapted and customized for media use.
JSOTF Reach-back Special Operations Mission Planning Environment (SOMPE)

This joint initiative has been expanded in scope since its original submission to USJFCOM.
Therefore, the initiative name has been changed from JSOTF/JCPT to that reflected above.
Description
In a contingency operation, the JSOTF and/or Theater Special Operations Center (TSOC)
will require expertise, data, or tools from rear locations to accomplish its mission under RDO
tenets. The JSOTF reach-backiSOMPE initiative considers the JSOTF' s use of reach-back to
support the targeting process, develop effects-based tasking orders, and use distributed planning
tools. It also focuses on the use of reach-back to support collaboration with out-of-area
organizations and centers of excellence.
A reach-back capability (See Figure 299)
will allow the JSOTF commander to
reduce his forward footprint by the use of
a support facility located outside the
crisis area. The reach-back facility will
consist of subject matter experts, staff
members, and interagency
representatives with access to circuits and
networks connected to regional, national,
and local sources of operational and
intelligence data. The intent is for the
reach-back facility to provide battlespace
awareness to the warfighter with requisite Figure 299: JSOTF Reach-back/SOMPE
accuracy and timeliness, collecting data
and information from multiple sources, and processing, fusing, transmitting, placing in context,
and presenting it in ways that facilitate rapid and accurate decision-making, collaborative
planning, and target engagement. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
sponsors this initiative.

The MC02 experiment demonstrated the JSOTF reach-backiSOMPE concept by
providing capabilities in two specific areas. The JSOTF used reach-back capabilities to enhance
the targeting process. Additionally, the JSOTF was able to develop effects-based tasking orders
using reach-back and collaboration. The collaborative tools employed during MC02 significantly
enhanced the overall effectiveness of the JSOTF staff, both vertically and horizontally. It
allowed for the virtual real time interaction between all components and activities supporting the
experiment.
Some distributed planning tools were effectively used via reach-back. The reach-back
capability in MC02 was only partially effective in representing the full range of access to
information, expertise, and tools. The notional nature of the exercise scenario negated
contributions by outside agencies and organizations. Likewise, the full range of tools available to

a SOF Mission Support Center (MSC), were not available in MC02. These factors also prevented
an accurate assessment of potential reductions in a SOF forward footprint.
Methodology
The MC02 assessment methodology for this initiative employed the use of questionnaires
and observations by dedicated Subj ect Matter Experts (SMEs). The questionnaires consisted of a
series of 57 questions that were submitted to over 1000 SOF participants in the JSOTF and sub-
components such as the ARSOTF, JF ACC/SOLE, and the NSWTG. Questionnaires considered
measures relating to information and tool availability through reach-back; the performance of
targeting systems and planning tools accessed via reach-back; the performance of the mission
planning process via reach-back; and the reliability and adequacy of reach-back communications.
They also provided areas for participant comments. The questionnaires were submitted three
times during the experiment.
Questionnaire responses were supplemented by SME observations. These observations
were conducted both actively and passively. In an active mode, the SME's conducted small
group interviews with participants addressing questionnaire issues. These interviews produced
valuable, candid assessments from a users' perspective. In addition to the interviews, passive
observations of activities were made throughout the experiment period.
Using this methodology, the JSOTF reach-backiSOMPE initiative has been evaluated as
supportive of Rapid Decisive Operations.
Observations
Overall, participant responses to the JSOTF reach-backiSOMPE questionnaires reflected
a high confidence in the JSOTF/Theater SOC "reach-back" capability. A significant number of
participants adopted a neutral position on this objective. However, the majority of participants
evaluated SOF reach-back as 'Somewhat' or 'Very Effective.'
Warfighter Challenge One evaluated the reach-back capabilities to enhance the targeting
process addressing capabilities primarily relating to targeting information and tools. Although a
significant number of participants were neutral on this subject, 60 percent of the remaining
warfighters rated reach-back targeting support as 'Somewhat' or 'Very Effective.' As
improvements, participants suggested reduction of the number of web pages, and providing
situational awareness and collaborative tools to the forward operating base (FOB) level.
The SMEs noted that the JSOTF used ADOCS to support TST. Accordingly, target
nomination, validation, authentication, and approval were supported virtually. The MC02 CROP
CONOPS was drafted as the guidance for MC02. These procedures included TTPs for the COP.
The JSOTF adopted some of the standard TTPs and established other TTPs to manage Blue and
red force track data associated with SOF operations. In some cases, the TTPs met specific local
requirements, and in some cases, the TTPs used were ineffective in managing or distributing
information/knowledge to applicable organizations. Some of the ineffectiveness could be
attributed to system architecture and technical, interoperability issues. The reliability of the
CROP/COP increased daily. Because of technical and procedural issues, the JSOTF often had to
confirm that units were correctly located. This was attributed to multiple reporting sources. The
resolve to these issues are a clearly defined CONOPS and associated TTPs.
The second warfighter challenge concentrated on the JSOTF staff's ability to develop
effects-based tasking orders using reach-back and collaboration. Performance measures
associated with this challenge pertained to mission analysis and COA development,
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joint/multinational and interagency coordination, and distribution of battles pace views. An

additional measure of performance addressed the possibility of reducing the forward footprint
(personnel adequacy) in light of reach-back capabilities. Participant rating of this challenge was
split between confident and not confident. After eliminating the "Neutral" position, 51 percent
opted for a less than confident position regarding the use of reach-back for mission analysis,
coordination, and distribution. Comments associated with this challenge indicated a belief that
the forward "footprint" should not be reduced.
SME observations noted that collaboration via IWS and Netmeeting provided real time
coordination, planning, rehearsal, and execution. Accordingly, modifications and changes to
existing plans and orders were facilitated as part of the mission analysis phase of the process.
Although a primary focus of the experiment was to evaluate the use of collaborative and
distributed planning systems, the operational impact oflosing these systems (i.e. through
computer network attack) during a campaign was not considered.
Warfighter Challenge Three specifically evaluated the effectiveness of distributed
planning tools used for reach-back. Several detailed measures of performance addressing
planning tools in terms of their quality, adequacy, timeliness, and general contributions to the
planning process were addressed. Nearly 70 percent of the non-neutral responses gave a high
confidence rating to the distributed planning tools employed in reach-back. The remaining low
confidence ratings were attributed to a need to consolidate tools, the new ETO process, and
problems with the new tools introduced from the JFHQ.
SMEs noted that IWS was primarily used between the JSOTF and the JTF to effect
coordination, mission rehearsals, and daily meetings supporting functional processes.
Netmeeting was used throughout between the JSOTF and component forces in support of a
continuing dialogue sharing critical information, updates, ad hoc situation reports, and in support
of execution checklist items. Chats were facilitated via NetmeetingTM, private sessions on the
IWS and the MIRC. The JSOTF Web Information Center (WIC) was employed to provide
situational awareness to JSOTF components. The WIC allows the JSOTF and assigned forces to
post and retrieve ("push and pull") operational and administrative data supporting the mission.
Components also built their own WIC supporting internal awareness at each echelon. The WIC
provided an effective tool for request for information (RFI) management and tracking. The RFI
manager indicated that because of the participation at the DoD, National and Agency level, all
RFls were satisfied within the available collaborative network infrastructure. This, coupled with
the availability of the ONA demonstrated an advantage of real time coordination and availability
via collaboration and distributed planning tools.
In addition to questionnaires, a SOF SME, specifically assigned to this initiative provided
the following observations:
The original intent during planning for MC02 execution was for the JSOTF to use an
established Mission Support Center (MSC), at a distant location. Since this plan could not be
executed, an alternative MSC was established at SOCJFCOM in Norfolk, VA. Approximately 70
percent of the MSC capability was replicated. While the network and system configuration the
JSOTF was able to achieve, was consistent with the architecture being employed at the JTF
level, several SOF specific planning tools were not included. In addition, since the JSOTF and
MSC were in the same location and had access to the same tools and data, the reach-back facility
was not serving to support a forward JSOTF headquarters.
F OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I-51

Since MC02 was conducted at the collateral Secret classification level, assessment and
evaluation of the gathering, fusion, sanitization and dissemination of SCI material to collateral
networks was not observed.
One of the objectives of the reach-back assessment was to ascertain ifit would/could
reduce a forward tactical footprint. Based on the reduced reach-back capability observed in
MC02, it was difficult to quantify how much of an actual tactical footprint could be reduced.
However, a previous MSC risk assessment estimated a 67 percent reduction in the deployed
force's forward footprint could be achieved using the MSC and reach-back. Until adequate
doctrinal changes are considered and TTPs are developed, reduction of a deployed force using
the JSOTF reach-back concept may not be as significant as that demonstrated during the MSC
assessment.
Table 54: The JSOTF reach-back/SOMPE evaluation in relation to the RDO
Superiority X
Operations X
Assure Access Into and Through
the 8aUlespace X
Operations X
Sustain the Force X

The analysis and findings for the JSOTF reach-backiSOMPE initiative have impacts on
the JFCOM ONA assessment area as well as the IWS 2.5, GCCS-I3 and JFI (ADOCS) joint
initiatives. These impacts primarily relate to the performance of tools employed in the initiative.
Performance information regarding these tools may impact the findings of the other assessment
areas or joint initiatives.
DOTMLPF Linkage
This assessment does not support any pending DOTMLPF change recommendation
packages. However, with the validation of the JSOTF reach-backiSOMPE concept, to include
Collaborative Environment and Collaborative Tools, some significant changes to doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) will likely
evolve.
Recommendations
The following recommendations were derived from SOF participant comments and SME
observations.
Doctrine: Develop doctrine to address the collaborative process.
Organization: Organizational impact should be none.
Training: Establish policy and plans for joint training.
Materiel: Expedite the materiel technology insertions and POM initiatives.

Leadership: Cultural changes associated with the collaborative environment require

senior leaders to possess familiarity and functionality with the collaborative processes that
enhance warfighter capability.
Personnel: Skill sets and duties must be realigned and integrated into personnel
development systems in time to provide long-term sustainability. Facilities: The reach-back
concept may require additional facilities.
JSOTF reach-back facilities should be established at the regional TSOC locations. A

JSOTF reach-back provides the capability to collect process and disseminate an uninterrupted
flow of specific information to forward deployed SOF forces. In concert with ongoing efforts to
provide each regional combatant commander with a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ),
placement of a JSOTF reach-back at regional locations, is appropriate. The regional concept will
allow for planners and technical specialists who are subject matter experts in Special Operations
and their regional area of expertise, the ability to collect, process, distill and disseminate timely
and useful information and participate in planning and collaboration activities.
Doctrinal and TTP issues need to be addressed by HQ USSOCOM with regard to
implementation and utilization of reach-back facilities. Final communications architecture
requirements to support each facility need to be identified, ensuring interoperability and
integration with ongoing DoD initiatives in support of JTF level collaboration and mission
planning requirements. The reach-back initiative should be incorporated under the HQ Mission
Planning Environment effort. The JSOTF reach-backiSOMPE concept and infrastructure
proposal must be included in the Mission Planning Environment ORD, and approved by the
Special Operations Command Requirement Evaluation Board (SOCREB). This will ensure that
material solutions and acquisitions are consistent with DoD programs in which we are currently
leveraging, in addition to deployed configuration management considerations and requirements.
USSOCOM needs to continue to stay engaged with ongoing DoD efforts with regard to
collaborative tool enhancements. Additional efforts and initiatives need to be pursued to
integrate unique Mission Planning tools and applications within the collaborative environment.
This effort will allow growth of the collaborative environment beyond that of situational
awareness and facilitate actual real time route planning, course of action development, and real
time effects-based operational planning.
Logistics Tool Suite (LTS)

Description
The L TS, sponsored by Joint Experimentation/Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence (C 41) Team, is a compilation of existing and experimental tools that
enables planners to collaborate, using common and shared information, on logistical issues in
support of rapid deployment and sustainment objectives. Joint logistics tools also provide
decision support assistance in log planning and execution. The tools suite provides a near-real-
time collaborative operations and logistics capability, that supports planning and rapid re-
planning within a web-based environment using interactive map graphics, tables, charts,
schedules, text documents and video applications. It gives the ability to develop, assess, monitor,
and visually display logistics support.

The Joint logistics tools were useful. The tools support "sustaining the force."
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I-53

Methodology
Fifty-three logistics personnel evaluated LTS during MC02. Users were surveyed
regarding their use of the logistics tools. In addition to the surveys, interviews and subject matter
expert opinions were also considered to better evaluate the utility of the LTS. The analysis
indicates logistics tools have potential for providing significant key enabler support to the
SJFHQ. This assessment primarily focused on whether or not the individual tools were useful to
the warfighter.
Observations
Usefulness of ocss CINClJTF V\eb PortalLDgistics Tools Operators were queried on the
importance of each of the joint
45
40 logistics tools. The responses received
35
~:IJ are reflected in figures 300-302.
iil25
D.20
'0 15 Web portal logistics tool
=It 10
5 positive feedback
o en en Overall, the global
~o
w
w ~ ()
Cl o
...., if transportation network exercise system
en
Cl (GES) was a very valuable tool.
Displaying both the manifests and the
Figure 300: Tools were useful to the warfighter schedules was very useful, particularly
in populating the POD portions of the
watchboard and researching the contents of downed aircraft and delayed ships. Global status of
resources and training was useful in determining the characteristics of units.
The Log CROP and the j oint total asset visibility (JTAV) feature provided sufficient
visibility of assets to enable JFC to
U!efUneg; eX Jdnt lDgiltics Tools divert PREPO and inbound supplies to
satisfy needs elsewhere in the JOA.
45 The use of NIMA was very
4)
35 beneficial when researching the
~:IJ ol.l3efLJ capabilities of low use island airfields.
02)
&.20 The topographic chief worked closely
'015
=It 10 with NIMA to collectively provide
5 critical data packages for component
o
.tirt Bee &JS:<irmrt forces and analysis packages for JTF
Pssessmrt Bttlelxxk VISi::iily decision-making.
The port and airfield
Figure 301: Logistics Tools were Useful collaborative environment (PACE)
provided very good imagery and
metadata on ports and airfields and was very useful in getting information on Airports of
Departure (APODs) and Seaports of Departure (SPODs).
Web portal logistics tool need for improvement

In regards to the use of j oint force deployment planning procedures, it was noted that
JOPES is an antiquated system. To facilitate scheduling and force deployment, a flexible
tool/system is required to allow rapid force selection with CS/CSS elements linked with easy

data manipulation to allow for force packaging and includes a sustainment generator to create the
combat force packages.
JTAV needs the capability to reflect the asset status of user defined grouping of units. Of
the people that used the joint logistics tools, a majority reported that the tools were useful. This
covered the areas of capability assessment, the joint electronic battlebook, sustainment visibility,
and the force browser. The joint logistics decision support tools (JLDSTs) were very beneficial
and appreciated by JTF log planners and operators. They provided necessary data to refine the
JTF concept of support. A JTF logistics planner made a comment that "logisticians would be lost
without JLDSTs." A significant observation emphasized that training on and familiarity of
systems is and will be, key to operational sufficiency in j oint logistics tools. Other observations
included:
Capability assessment is a superb tool, which is very user friendly and flexible; incorporate
into GCSS
Joint electronic battlebook (JEB) should be expanded to include all military units, not just
logistics units
Sustainment visibility was used as a backup to JTAV and GCSS access to JTAV
Force Browser was the most used tool in MC02 and was superb in analyzing the contents of
the TPFDD as it developed
Usefulness of Tool s Tool usefulness positive

feedback
60
The log watchboard provided
50
good situational awareness to the JTF
-ao 40 DUseful
although there has been initial
&. 30 _Little/NoUse
difficulty with components updating
'0 20 DDid Not Use
'It: some of the required fields. There
10
were numerous concerns on the data
o
~
z
w
(j) posted on whether it was current.
.~ D...
Q
OJ
o ro 0 &j More fidelity is required on engineer
::J
--' iii U (j)
o
"- information. The joint flow and
analysis system for transportation
Figure 302: Tools were useful to the warfighter
(JF AST) was a good planning tool for
TPFDD validation. Integrated
consumable item support (lCIS) was rated as a superb tool that gave great visibility over
projected Service usage of POL products tailored to the TPFDD.
Tool usefulness needs improvement

Build a link between JF AST and ELIST so that JRSOI can also be assessed during the
feasibility analysis.
As with all the tools, the training was minimal.
The extended deployment planning beyond Spiral 3 precluded the intended use of the
sustainment generator (SUSGEN). However, the concept was a good one and could have enabled
logisticians to better evaluate the sustainment burden for lift that the JTF and COCOM had to
plan. Logisticians could have also avoided a lot of the TPFDD analysis and modification to
support the sustainment function later in the game had SUSGEN been run to set aside X amount
FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONI,V I-55

of lift requirements in short tons/measurement; tons for sustainment replenishment by each

Service by supply class.
ICIS should be improved by adding the capability to manually adjust the operations
tempo and logistics factors used to determine requirements.
Joint force capability register needs further refinement in the search capability. Possibly,
add a ULN listing for referencing like items.

All of the tools addressed in this section are discussed in some form in other areas of this
report.
Recommendations
A flexible tool/system is required, beyond the JOPES system, that will permit quick force
selection with CS/CSS elements linked with easy data manipulation to allow for force packaging,
and including a sustainment generator to create the combat force packages.
JTAV needs the capability to reflect the asset status of user defined grouping of units.
A link needs to be built between JF AST and ELIST so that JRSOI can also be assessed
during the feasibility analysis.
The extended deployment planning beyond Spiral 3 precluded the intended use of the
sustainment generator (SUSGEN). However, the concept was a good one and could have enabled
logisticians to better evaluate the sustainment burden for lift that the JTF and COCOM had to
plan.
In future experiments, the sustainment generator (SUSGEN) needs to set aside X amount
of lift for each of the components by supply class in order to avoid a lot of the TPFDD analysis
and modification to support the sustainment function.
ICIS needs to be improved to add the ability to manually adjust the operations tempo and
logistics factors used to determine requirements.
Joint force capability register needs further refinement in the search capability. Possibly,
add a ULN listing for referencing like items.
Maneuver Control System - Tactical Combat Operations (MCS-TCO) Interface

Description
Army battalion through corps and Marine Corps regiment commanders need
interoperable command and control systems to share situational awareness information when
fighting in close proximity to one another. Currently, situational awareness information is routed
through higher headquarters and back down to the respective Services' systems. The ability to
transfer situational awareness data horizontally between these forces would greatly reduce time
delays. In addition, real-time C2 information sharing between Army and Marine Corps units is
critical to prevent fratricide and to enable RDO from the battalion and two echelons above. The
MCS-TCO interface allows the two C2 systems to interoperate, enabling horizontal sharing of
situational awareness information.
The maneuver control system is the central C2 system of record for Army maneuver
elements at battalion through corps echelons. It consists of a network of computer workstations
that integrate information from subordinate maneuver units with those from other army battle
command system (ABCS) battlefield functional areas to create ajoint common database referred
to as the common tactical picture (CTP). Tactical information products such as situation maps

and reports allow the display and manipulation of this information. MCS also provides a means
to create, coordinate, and disseminate operational plans and orders. Its role in communicating
battle plans, orders, and enemy and friendly situations reports makes it a key component of the
Army's ongoing effort to digitize the battlefield. MCS can be deployed in two standard
configurations; MCS workstation (WS) (UNIX-based) and MCS light (Windows-based). MCS
WS is the backbone of the MCS system and is used to display and pass near real-time situational
awareness and houses the system database. MCS Light (laptop) is primarily used as a planning
tool at the battalion level and above for overlays and targeting. MCS Light can be employed in a
stand-alone configuration or integrated into the MCS network.
The Marine Corps C2 system of record is the TCO system. TCO performs C2 functions
by building situational awareness through the compilation of data inputs from other MAGTF C41
systems. TCO provides operational commanders with the capability to receive and display select
information. The functional application involved in the Marine Corps TCO architecture is the
command and control personal computer (C2PC) (Windows-based) module on the
intelligence/operations workstation (lOW). C2PC is a client application that displays tactical
track data in the TCO system. This application is the battle staff's primary planning and
execution application for display and management for the COP. C2PC supports collaboration,
course of action development, and near-real time display of friendly and threat forces on the
battlefield.
To enable interoperability, ASD (C31) tasked the Services to plan, develop, and build an
interface between the C2 systems. The two Services have developed an interface that shares
eight Variable Message Formats (VMF) (free text, basic weather, SPOT/SALUTE report,
position report, threat warning, field orders, overlay message, and NBC report) in an effort to
provide ground situational awareness to the maneuvering commander. The underlying
technology of the MCS-TCO interface is the common message processor (CMP). The CMP is
designed to support and enhance the interoperability of DoD and associated civilian messaging
systems operating in limited bandwidth environments. To date, both Services have established
three configurations for employing the systems/interface: a LAN environment, an enhanced
position location reporting system (EPLRS) network, and an EPLRS gateway configuration.

The C2PC and MCS light successfully exchanged the eight VMF messages based upon
the Joint Battle Center assessment. Both systems successfully transmitted and received all
message types, to include rendering symbology on a map background as derived from the K5.17
(overlay) and K5.01 (position report) messages. Several operational issues and minor technical
deficiencies were identified and documented. Most of these issues will require doctrinal
solutions or development oftechnicallprocedural work-arounds. All of the stated initiatives
intended functionalities passed and worked as advertised. Both systems are currently used by the
respective Services.
Methodology
This assessment was written using data collected from surveys, comments, and
interviews from warfighters and SMEs. Nine system users were surveyed to evaluate the MCS-
TCO interface for warfighter utility. Although it was not scientific, this methodology showed
that the MCS-TCO interface enabled the SJFHQ to conduct decisive EBO.

Observations
The USJFCOM has helped to define the joint requirements for the MCS-TCO interface,
which are specified in a memorandum of agreement between the US Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command
(MCCDC). The Army battalion through corps and Marine Corps regiment commanders needed
to improve their situational awareness when in close proximity to one another. This assessment
focused on the utility of exchanging situational awareness data, unit symbology, text messages,
threat warnings, and force orders between Army and Marine Corps C2 systems.
The interoperability of the two systems enabled the leaders of the Army Stryker platoon
and the Marine Corps infantry battalion to make tactical decisions using additional situational
C2PC VS.9
Generator - Powers
All Pre-Ii1CCS
equipment
MCS C2PC VS.9 GW Revised 8-15-02
Figure 303: UCAX MCS TCO Architecture

awareness information. This additional information can be used to conduct precision engagement
against a time sensitive target.
Both the MCS and TCO are systems of record. The MCS-TCO interface is technically
mature enough to exchange critical situational awareness data in near-real time. JI&I are
assessing the interface for further development to achieve minimum implementation of VMF
standards between the Services' C2 systems and to automate data transfer. This includes
exchange of all 133 VMF message types.

MCS-TCO interface testing for MC02 was conducted during the Marine Corps Urban
Combined Arms Exercise 2002 (UCAX02). The MCS WS and C2PC used the EPLRS and a
LAN to exchange data (See Figure 303).
During MC02, the MCS-TCO integration team successfully established a link between
MCS and FBCB2. EPLRS served as the transmission media for passing the VMF messages
between the Army and USMC C2 systems with the USMC functioning as the network control
station (NCS). To make the Army EPLRS radios active in the USMC network, RSID's from the
Strykers were added to the USMC NCS. The EPLRS network also included two Army-provided
relay stations with the added capability of establishing a gateway between Army and USMC
independent EPLRS networks if needed.
The Marine Corps Testing Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA) provided an infantry
battalion with two C2PC systems with the MCS-TCO software. This ensured C2PC systems in
the main Combat Operations Center (COC) and "jump" COC where capable of receiving VMF
messages.
The primary systems were installed, operated, and maintained in a LAN configuration
inside the USMC preliminary first-in command and control system (PRE FICCS) command
center. The PRE FICCS was provided as a central location that would serve information between
the operational forces involved in the UCAX. A CTP was successfully shared between the Army
Stryker platoon and the Marine Corps infantry battalion. Eighty-nine percent ofMCS-TCO users
rated the ability to establish connectivity between the two systems very good or excellent. No
problems were reported with the LAN connection. The ability to accept situational awareness
data between MCS and TCO was rated very good or excellent by 89 percent of those surveyed.
Some warfighters suggested further developing the interface to enable updating situational
awareness messages automatically. Both systems were able to display MIL-STD 2525B
symbology.
Other significant MCS-TCO observations focused on improving future systems and are
listed as follows: This is based upon user feedback and subject matter expert opinions.
This interface has no impact on the SJFHQ but does have joint warfighting implications.
The warfighter utility of the MCS-TCO interface was assessed against the following key
enablers of the SJFHQ. Based upon the significance of the MCS interfacing with the TCO it was
deemed that this initiative supports EBO. The system was also rated as potentially supports

establishing information/knowledge superiority, and assuring access into and through the
battlespace. It was rated as such because further development of the system to achieve minimum
implementation ofVMF standards between the Services' C2 systems and to automate data
transfer is ongoing. Furthermore, this assessment focused on the utility of exchanging situational
awareness data, unit symbology, text messages, threat warnings, and force orders between Army
and Marine Corps C2 systems.
DOTMLPF Linkage
USJFCOM is working with program managers to develop a DOTMLPF change
recommendation package. The CMP software is planned for incorporation in future versions of
both Army and Marine Corps systems.
Recommendations
The additional information obtained from MCS-TCO can be used to conduct precision
engagement against a time-sensitive target.
Table 55: UCAX MCS-TCO interface measured as an enabler of MC02 objectives
Su
x
Operations
x
ce
x
Operations x
Sustain the Force x
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) Initiative
This initiative (formerly referred to as National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
Crisis Action Response Team (CART has been expanded since its original submission to
USJFCOM. Consequently, the initiative name has been changed to that reflected above.
Description
The NIMA initiative, sponsored by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, consists
of a web site supported by a server holding a variety of geospatial intelligence databases that are
accessible via query by the warfighter searching for specific data/products. Multiple workstations
connected within the lab provide the geospatial analysts the ability to create or modify products
to meet custom requests for support. The site is connected via NIMA' s internal networks to other
NIMA production centers with additional resources to produce and forward products for further
dissemination to the warfighter. A battle captain is responsible for managing the operation and
allocation of production resources to meet request for information (RFI) requests. The following

illustration depicts NIMA's interface capability within the support and warfighter level
components via the imagery/geospatial portal servers.
NIMA provides much of the geospatial intelligence that enables the CROP concept
reality to support RDO in a collaborative environment. Within the framework of j oint operational
warfighting, the dynamics ofRDO and EBO will demand constant updating of the CROP. The
capabilities ofNIMA enhance the validity of the CROP's depiction of the battle space picture.
CART affords the Joint Task Force commander web-enabled access to data, products, tools, and
NIMA SMEs. NIMA enhances the joint force's battlespace visualization and situational
awareness in conducting EBO and allows real-time interaction between the JTF staff and NIMA
in planning and conducting RDO. The ONA requires constant updating with the most current
geospatial intelligence. While much of this updating will be automated and obtained from
various systems such as GCCS, reach-back to NIMA provides the capability for analyst-to-
analyst collaboration in the generation of products such as support to the ONA.

Initial responses to surveys issued within MC02 execution indicated a lack of knowledge
or understanding of the initiative, a lack of awareness that NIMA provided the support data
during planning and execution. The use of artificial or 'hybrid' geographic imagery terrain and
the M&S systems used to run the MC02 experiment models contributed to limitations of the use
ofNIMA expertise and capabilities throughout MC02. The NIMA mapping product tools proved
crucial in the operations of all M&S systems, as well as providing direct links to the ONA, joint
automated target folders, and ATOs. No graphs are provided because a majority of the targeted
audience responded, "don't know" in every functional area questioned. This caused the results to
be based primarily upon interviews and subject matter expert inputs.
Table 56: NIMA Initiative measured against MC02 objectives
Superiority X
Operations X
B~~~~ X
Operations X
Sustain the Force X
Methodology
One hundred thirty-nine people were surveyed. In addition to the surveys, interviews and
subject matter expert opinions were also considered. Using this methodology, the NIMA
initiative has been evaluated to provide significant support of the key enablers of the SJFHQ.
Observations
NIMA support was evaluated against the following key enablers of the SJFHQ. As the
main imagery/geospatiallink from its production centers to the joint warfighters at the combatant

commander, JTF and component levels, NIMA provides them the critical information, directly
establishing IS to the warfighter. By demonstrating this key functional capability as the crucial
geospatial imagery link, it was determined that NIMA functional capabilities directly support the
SJFHQ areas ofRDO, required visual battlespace access, decisive EBO for all component
command centers.
Normal NIMA interaction is limited within the JTF. During MC02, the geospatial
expertise was located in the plans group and consisted of two people, including the JTF engineer.
Both individuals provided positive comments regarding the support provided by NIMA.
Though the two-person staff was the primary developer and briefer of geospatial products
used by all event participants, there was a definite non-awareness that NIMA provided the
support data during planning and execution. This was evidenced by the overwhelming user
survey responses of "don't know" to any of the NIMA functionality questions. Two MC02 event
limitations impacted NIMA support to the exercise. The first was the artificial or 'hybrid' terrain,
which limits the amount of support that NIMA can provide to a JTF. NIMA has extensive
geospatial intelligence databases; however, they are based on 'real' terrain and over the course of
MC02, complete hybrid geography usage limited the level ofNIMA support. The M&S systems
used to run the MC02 experiment models were the second limitation. These systems were used
to maintain, ground truth in the event, and replicate live collections. Since there were few "live"
collection requirements, expertise was limited in support of responses to JTF collection
requirements or in support of targeting and BDA.
The sponsor initiative technical lead pointed out that even ifNIMA had insight into these
function requirements, NIMA would not have been able to provide adequate geospatial I&W
support to the JTF because the OPFOR was allowed to conduct their activity in an 'intelligence
vacuum'. The' surprise' element to the event participants gave a false impression of the type of
geospatial intelligence support that NIMA can provide to a JTF.
NIMA provided a special mapping product that was used as the 'underpinning' tool for
all M&S systems, as well as the CROP before the start ofMC02 execution. Without this special
product, visualization of the battle space would have been extremely difficult for the event
participants. During the execution ofMC02 NIMA posted many actual imagery products within
the home page in response to requests made by JTF and component participants. NIMA also
provided adequate provisions for ONA, joint automated target folders, ATOs, and geospatial
intelligence expertise direct links throughout the MC02 experiment.

Performance regarding the NIMA initiative may impact the findings of the other
assessment areas or joint initiatives.
Recommendations
Although the NIMA initiative reflected positive feedback provided by the few
participants who actually used the site, full NIMA functional capabilities were not completely
put to the test due to the limitations of the MC02 experiment. As an unproven technological
initiative in MC02, NIMA was able to expose the participants to a number of geospatial
visualization tools that should be useful to support current and future warfighter operations.
Feedback provided on these tools should enable NIMA sponsors to better identify and support
future geospatial requirements. Future military efforts involving NIMA need to expose the
functional capabilities of geospatial intelligence to the different levels of joint warfighters.
1-62 FOR OFFICIAL I ISE ONLY

Network Security Management Correlation and Display Systems (NSM C&D)

Description
Computer network defense (CND) is one of the critical enablers for implementing RDO
in the 2007 timeframe. MC02 provided the CIE for evaluating the effectiveness of the CND
CONOPS envisioned during the network security management correlation and display (NSM
C&D) demonstration by the Joint C 4ISR Battle Center (JBC).
The NSM C&D system had previously rr.=========================================::=~
been assessed by JBC and is recommended for
deployment. See JBC's Network Security
Management Correlation and Display
Assessment Report # 32-05 dated Feb 2002 on
JBC's SIPRNET web site.
The NSM C&D system provides the
Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) with an
enterprise network security management
system implemented at the SJFHQ. The system
monitors the Service components' and JTF's
intrusion detection, firewall and other Figure 304: Screen Capture of NSM C&D
information assurance (IA) sensors. It provides
near-real-time "attack sensing and warning" and recommended responses to computer network
intrusions and attacks. NSM C&D incorporates a near-future commercial enterprise security
management product called Cyber Wolf. The software used during MC02 was a beta copy of
Cyber Wolf version 2.0 to be released by Symantec in November 2002. Cyber Wolf creates a
standard, secure, and interoperable interface for Service and JTF information assurance sensors.
Cyber Wolf increases the effectiveness of analysts by correlating, prioritizing, organizing, and
displaying results from many thousands of alerts. Cyber Wolf's web-based graphical user
interface enabled analytic collaboration and response coordination with supporting, remotely
located CND Service Provider organizations such as a DISA Regional Computer Emergency
Response Teams (RCERT). Additionally, it facilitated network security event reporting through
its interface to the Remedy Action Request System trouble ticketing system, which is the
principal fault management and reporting application used in the Joint Defense Information
Infrastructure Control System - Deployed (JDIICS-D), in the Defense Information Systems
Agency's (DISA) Integrated Network Management System (INMS), and in the forthcoming
Joint Network Management System (JNMS).
During MC02, Cyber Wolf was implemented at the Joint Command Control Center
(JCCC) to monitor intrusion detection, firewall and other IA sensors throughout the enterprise to
provide the IA and CND aspects of the CIE to the CJTF (See Figure 304). As part of the MSEL,
a "Purple team" infiltrated the joint force networks and attacked designated target machines. The
term "Purple team" was coined to differentiate the team's directed and scripted attacks against
specific targets from the non-predictable attacks of a standard Red team against any weaknesses
a Red team would have detected. The CONOPS for CND was evaluated for its ability to detect
and counter the Purple team intrusions and exploits. The Purple team activities were intentionally
designed not to degrade the RDO experimentation.
FOR OFFICIl'"L USE ONI,V 1-63


The JBC resources were considered to better evaluate the utility ofMSM C&D. Planners
elected not to inject NSM C&D throughout all aspects of the experiment because of the
interference it would have caused. Initiative administrators conducted some testing during the
setup and initial days ofMC02 showing that CND CONOPS were a success.
Methodology
A Cyber Wolf device expert that reported alert data to the Cyber Wolf manager
monitored each IA sensor deployed in support of the NSM C&D demonstration. The Cyber Wolf
manager in turn correlated the alerts and identified potential security incidents. The CND
analysts reviewed
the incidents and
Computer Network Defense (CND) related data, and
recommended
Network Security
Determine Criticality
Resolution
Direction
responses to the
Management Recommendation JCCC network
security manager.
OPS Director The CND analyst
,----------~ CND Watch Off f----~
Crisis JNCO ~------' created incident
Non-Crisis I Inputs as time permits
reports through
OPS Director>------, JCIICS-D's
CND Collaborative Session
CND Remedy interface.
JNCO & CND Watch
Analyst
Officer Briefing to:
Upon
Crisis release of incident
KMO Lead
10 Supervisor data into JDIICS-
CNDWatch IS Lead
Network Officer Ops Director (as required)
D, the JCCC
Security and network security
Manager Joint Network Network Security Manager,
Control Officer Non-Crisis JTF CND Officers, manager conferred
Service CND AOs,
and RCERT AOs
with the CND
analyst concerning
the possible
Figure 305: Logical flow for the CONOPS decision making for CND
implications and
to discuss
response recommendations. The network security manager then released an instant message to
the JCCC joint network control officer (JNCO), knowledge management officer (KMO), and
information operations (10) watch officer to support collaboration within the JCCC. The network
security manager accessed Cyber Wolf through his workstation to support collaboration within
the JCCC. Figure 305 provides the logical flow for the CONOPS decision making for CND.
Following notification by the JCCC network security manager, the JNCO initiated a
collaborative session with the other relevant officers (including the network security manager,
the JTF 10 watch officer, the appropriate KMOs, and JTF-CNO liaison officer) to review the
severity of the attack and the recommended response. The JNCO then authorized the CND
response and informed the CJTF as appropriate.
Two forms of injects were generated during the demonstration; Purple Team injects and
simulator derived injects. The Purple Team conducted attacks through the JTF network against
designated target machines. In order to simulate intrusions on the Service components' networks,
1-64 F OR OFFICIAL TISE ONLY

the Cyber Wolf simulator was employed to inj ect alerts as if they had originated from the sensors
and devices on the Service components' networks. Four such scenarios were run. The network
intrusion detection sensors (IDS), firewall logs, and operating system logs (SYSLOGS) were
monitored by Cyber Wolf, which provided near-real-time correlation of the alerts and identified
potential attacks according to their level of criticality.
Superiority x
Operations x
Battlespace x
Conduct Decisive Effects-Based
Operations x
Sustain the Force x
Observations
The CND CONOPS was successfully exercised during MC02.
Incident Notification:
During the experiment, the joint network operations officer was inundated with e-mails;
could easily overlook the notifications. Thus, procedures were changed during MC02 to provide
the incident notification via instant messaging. Instant messaging proved to be timely and
effective.
Collaboration View:
An IWS chat room was used to host the collaborative sessions initiated to discuss
detected network intrusions and recommendations for response. The web-browser view of the
Cyber Wolf incident display served as a key source of visual information to support the
collaboration. The collaboration sessions proved to be quite useful.
Reference Information:
As a proof of concept, Cyber Wolf provided a system-generated response
recommendation for each incident ticket it generated. This proved to be very helpful to the
analyst. The response recommendation is provided with the first instance of an incident's
recognition and is updated as the severity of the incident changes throughout the progress of the
attack.
Trans-Service reporting criteria:

Two of the computer network attack injects served to highlight the differences in
reporting criteria among the Services.
RCERT reach-back support:

Cyber Wolf s secure web-enabled access greatly facilitates reach-back CND analytical
and advisory support from the DISA Theater RCERT.
Depth of Sensor Information Available:

Cyber Wolf creates standardized, truncated, encrypted TCP-IP messages for each of the
monitored devices/logs to efficiently and securely communicate the intrusion alert data across
the enterprise network. This provided sufficient input to enable near-real-time correlation of
computer network attack incidents to effectively identify attacks with minimal impact on the
network communications bandwidth. However, in order to conduct in-depth retrospective and
follow-up forensic analysis, additional packet payload data captured by the sensors would be
required.
Intrusions invisible to network intrusion detection sensors:

For insider attacks and for attacks from the outside that did not trigger the attack
signatures in the network intrusion detection systems, the log files provided the only indication
of the attacks. This served to reinforce the importance of providing a correlation capability to
read and alert in near real time based upon log file entries.
Recommendations
Network status display:
Deploy IDIICS-D in all future exercises as the network management system. It is
designated as the interim j oint network management system. It contains the prescribed tools to
monitor the health and status of network devices and to provide a trouble ticket reporting,
tracking, and fault management capability. Implement the Cyber Wolf interface to JDIICS-D's
HP Open View Network Node Manager application and Remedy ARS application. Include HP
Open View NNM web-enabled displays as a part of the collaborative sessions for discussing the
impacts of computer network attacks against the JTF enterprise network.
Incident Notification:
Implement instant messaging on IDIICS-D and its replacement system, the joint network
management system (JNMS), as the principal means of notifying designated watch/response
nodes (i.e., the JNCO, CND watch officer, Service CND action officers, and the DISA RCERT
action officers).
Collaboration View:
Incorporate collaboration with the relevant participants as a standard tool at the JTF to
support CND/network security incident response decision-making.
Reference Information:
Implement response recommendations as a standard feature in Cyber Wolf and augment
its knowledge table to reflect the user organization's desired responses for the enterprise network
being monitored.
Trans-Service Reporting Criteria:

JTF -CNO standardize DoD incident reporting criteria across the combatant commands
and Services in concert with CJCSM 6510 reporting requirements.

RCERT reach-back Support:

Enable secure remote web access to Cyber Wolf with appropriate permission levels to
facilitate DISA Theater RCERT analysts' online collaborative analysis and advisory support to
deployed JFHQ CND analysts and staff.
Depth of Sensor Information Available:

Employ Cyber Wolf on the JTF enterprise network for near-real-time identification of
computer network attacks. Develop a capability within Cyber Wolf that could enable the analyst
to interrogate the sensor logs to obtain selected drill-down data for those incidents declared by
Cyber Wolf and identified by the Cyber Wolf analyst as requiring additional forensic
investigation.
Intrusions invisible to network intrusion detection sensors:

Use Cyber Wolf to monitor the firewalls, routers, host-based intrusion detections
systems, operating systems, and network-based intrusion detection systems implemented
throughout the deployed enterprise network to increase the effectiveness of the IA defense-in-
depth strategy.
Theater Medical Information Program - Joint (TMIP-J)

Description
The Theater Medical Information Program - Joint (TMIP-J), sponsored by U.S. Joint
Forces Command, was introduced as a tool to develop and demonstrate the medical portion of
the CROP and to experiment with tools to better enable the warfighter to receive the expected
level of care throughout the JOA. Expanded distance and limited footprint require the use of
technology and enhanced monitoring to provide the best available health service support. The
goal of TMIP-J is to move the right medical capabilities to support deployed forces at the right
time and right place.
TMIP-J integrates medical information systems to capture the medical record data while
linking care from the theater of conflict to a sustaining base for enhanced medical care. It allows
medical and health sciences environment surveillance to minimize casualties and help maintain a
healthy force. TMIP-J also improves medical intelligence gathering and potential threat
mitigation on chemical and biological threats and attacks.
There are three tools used for the automated medical record data capture and medical
intelligence gathering. Global expeditionary medical system (GEMS) is a hand-held palm pilot-
like, paperless, data linked tool for the front line medic to record and track individual patient
assessments and is used by the Air Force. Shipboard non-tactical automated medical system
(SAMS) is a paperless, hand-held tool used extensively on ships to record and track individual
encounter data and medical readiness status. It is also used to reorder medical supplies for
maritime commands and is used by the Navy. Medical communications for combat casualty care
(MC4) is a hand-held tool, providing commanders with timely medical situational awareness.
The MC4 provides casualty/patient tracking; trend analysis of health care encounters, medical
command and control, medical surveillance, medical treatment, and medical logistics data across
all levels of care. MC4 is used by the Army.
TMIP-J provides an integrated, automated theater medical information system addressing
the functional areas of:

Command and control (including medical capabilities assessment/sustainability analysis, and

medical surveillance)
Medical logistics (including assemblage management and blood product management)
Health care delivery (including medical threat, surveillance and health care delivery)

TMIP-J did not playa substantial role in MC02. Medical personnel were asked about the
effectiveness of TMIP-J in its functional areas. Actual patients in the experiment did not match
the patients in TMIP-J. However, TMIP-J was able to integrate medical information systems to
capture the medical record data by using scripted data, which was based upon medical personnel
feedback. TMIP-J is a powerful tool and with more substantial testing, has the potential to
provide significant key enabler support to a SJFHQ in the future.
Table 58: Theater Medical Information Program - Joint measured against MC02 objectives
Establish Information/Knowledge Superiority X

Rapidly Set Conditions for Decisive X
Operations
Assure Access Into and Through the X
8attlespace
Conduct Decisive Effects-based Operations X
Sustain the Force X
Methodology
Eight professional medical personnel evaluated TMIP-J during MC02. These users were
surveyed regarding their use of TMIP-J tools. In addition to the surveys, interviews and subject
matter expert opinions were also considered to better evaluate the utility of the TMIP-J. The
analysis indicates TMIP-J's potential for providing significant key enabler support to the SJFHQ.
This assessment primarily focused on the warfighter's rating of the effectiveness of each
functional area of TMIP-J.
Observations
TMIP-J was rated as possessing the capability to potentially provide significant key
enabler support to the SJFHQ. This was because TMIP-J did not playa substantial role in MC02.
If the experiment were expanded to include a medical scenario with actual patients, then the
assessment would be able to be expanded. Subject matter experts indicated that TMIP-J has the
potential, when it is properly designed, tested, and fielded to provide valuable information for
clinicians and statisticians to detect trends, provide visibility to the Service and provide health
service support status, which may be used by the JTF Surgeon.
Findings based on the results from the assessment questionnaires obtained from the eight
medical personnel are shown in Figure 306. All of the functionalities were rated the same across
the board despite the fact that TMIP-J was not successful in tracking patients.
The expectations of the TMIP-J initiative were not all realized during the execution, even
though TMIP-J was rated as being effective in each functional area by medical personnel

queried. The JTF surgeon and staff chose not to use TMIP-J because of its immaturity and
inability to provide any useful information supporting the medical operations.
The ability to assess whether Service play solidified the TMIP-Service is needed to
support TMIP-J was not available since the Service boxes did not have their Service specific
patient encounter modules (e.g. CHCS II for Army, GEMS for AF, SAMS for USN and USMC).
Additionally, there was not enough data to look at patient data trends. Observations indicated
that the information from previous Spirals should have been run in joint medical semi-automated
forces (JMedSAF) and transferred to the TMIP-J.
TMIP-J was able to integrate medical information systems to capture the medical record
Effectiveness of TMIP
0.60
0.50
~ 0.40 Iill1lIVery Effective

S .Somewhat Effective
ai 0.30
oSomewhat Ineffective
~
~ 0.20 o Ineffective
0.10
0.00
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Figure 306: Effectiveness of TMIP

data using scripted data. However, there were discrepancies in the casualty reports. This was
primarily due to lack of SOP and early coordination between the exercise controllers at JTASC
and the lack of manning roster management. Medical support and execution did not benefit from
the application of the SJFHQ concept. Respondents stated that there were no medical planners or
medical intelligence representatives on the SJFHQ and someone should have been there. Survey
respondents also indicated that the SJFHQ had limited "reach-back" capability to support request
for medical intelligence and planning. This issue was magnified because the JTF surgeon's staff
had to start from scratch in their medical planning process.
The lack of early planning and knowledge of what assets were already in theater slowed
the delivery of focused medical support services. Survey respondents offered several scenarios in
order to demonstrate this slow down. For example, a blood supply unit was not placed on the
TPFDD, resulting in the creation of a "make-shift" BSU-like unit in the host nation hospital,
which severely limited support. In another example, dedicated assets for medical evacuation
(Army Air ambulance company) had an arrival date ofC+37, well after the warfighters main
FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONI,Y 1-69

effort was over. The late arrival of the air ambulance company made it necessary for the Services
to use organic assets for casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) within the JOA. These lift-of-
opportunity assets may be few and hard to obtain during an actual contingency.
Overall, there was a lack of medical information. Pre-hostility patient data was not
available to flow into TMIP-J at the beginning of MC02 execution. A work around was created
to feed information to the JTF surgeon and staff on the medical portal. This work-around was
created because the funding was not available to provide the TMIP-J boxes to all medical
personnel within the JTF. As with all of the other logistics tools, additional in-depth training is
recommended. The lack of sufficient training could directly be attributed to the observation that
information in MEDSITREPS was never consistently sent forward to response cells.

None
Recommendations
The experimentation should be expanded to link actual patients to patients in the TMIP-J.
More data is also needed in order to look at patient data trending outcomes. The level 1 medical
facilities should be simulated in future experiments in order to generate casualty numbers that are
realistic and linked to the manning rosters. This data should then be tied into the combat
scenario. Additional information should also be scripted in order to show the evacuation,
additional visits/patient encounters. In addition to the above, more data should be made available
to assess disease and non-battle injuries and incidents of potential disease outbreaks.
Unmanned Sensor (US)

This initiative ((formerly referred to as
unattended ground sensor (UGS) support to special
reconnaissance (SR) ofTBM)) has been expanded since
its original submission to JFCOM. The initiative now
incorporates both UGS and UAV support to special
reconnaissance. Consequently, the initiative name has
been changed to that reflected above.
Figure 307: Unattended Ground
Description Sensors
The US initiative incorporates the use ofUGS
and UAV's to support Special Operations Forces (SOF) performance of SR missions. Both types
of unattended sensors were employed and assessed in MC02. The UGS portion of the initiative
concentrated on two suites of unattended ground sensors (UGS) and remote sensor and camera
controller (RSC2) relays to help locate, classify, and identify TBM targets for immediate strike.
Simple sensors (See Figure 308) used to track targets and cue camera systems are emplaced
along the roads approaching a key intersection or named area of interest (NAI). These sensors
transmit their alert data to a nearby remote sensor and camera controller (RSC2). The RSC2 is
collocated with a common electro-optical sensor (CEOS) remotely operated digital camera. The
RSC2 serves as a relay and controller, transmitting sensor alert data to a distant station, tracking
the transit of targets through the sensor field.
Based on prior programming, when cued, the RSC2 initiates the CEOS image capture. It
can be remotely reprogrammed in response to mission changes. The UGS can be employed in

two architectures. In the primary architecture (referred to as free wave (FW), the UGS alerts and
imagery are transmitted to a nearby mission support site (MSS) which, in turn passes target
identification and location information (via voice) to the JSOTF or JOAC for action. In the
second architecture, referred to as Firestarter (FS), the UGS alerts and imagery are transmitted
directly to the TST cell in the JF ACC. This downlink uses analog phone lines for display on a
laptop C2PC portal system.
Figure 308: UGS Architecture

The UAVs examined in this experiment were the fixed-wing Pointer, and the larger
rotary wing Maverick (See Figure 309). Pointer is a man-portable, hand-launched, electric, low-
cost, fixed wing reconnaissance UAV. Its payload consists of either a high-resolution color
camera (daylight) or an inferred thermal imager (night) for real-time, high-resolution video
imagery. Maverick will be an A160 Hummingbird, which is a developmental rotary wing UAV
that is currently undergoing ground testing. A surrogate, the "Maverick," is a Robinson R-22
sport helicopter configured as a UAV to test flight-control systems. Maverick, powered by a
commercial piston engine, weighs about 4,000 pounds and has a payload capacity of more than
300 pounds.
Payloads include EOIIR imaging and SAR sensors. The UAV employment architecture is
as shown. Pointer was launched and
controlled by a SOF SR team near the
objective, while Maverick was launched
from a Special Forces mission support site
(MSS) located away from the objective.
Generally, Maverick was launched first to
fly an advanced reconnaissance of the
area, providing images used in developing
the R&S plan. Once deployed, Maverick
provided security for the launch and Figure 309: UAV's used in MC02
recovery of Pointer. Pointer was launched

once the area was secure. Video outputs from Pointer were passed to both the SR team as well as
the MSS. Still frames from both UAV's were passed to a naval vessel (with a JSOTF forward) as
well as the SOF forward operating base (FOB).
Both elements of the US initiative were used to support SOF SR missions. The UGS
sensors were primarily employed to support TBM SR, while the UAV'S supported WME SR.
The United States Special Operations Command sponsored the US initiative.

The US initiative provided a proof of concept for UGS and UAF enhancement of SOF
ground team SR mission. Sensor information was passed to JSOTF & JAOC TCT decision
makers. The unattended sensors provided "eyes on target" information throughout TST process.
Both UGS dissemination architectures for the RSC2 system worked, allowing tracking
and image capture of multiple targets. High value targets transiting the areas of interest (AOls)
were identified and expeditiously reported to higher HQ, in most cases in less than five minutes.
This capability demonstrated the utility ofUGS to support SR.
MC02 provided an opportunity to identify procedural as well as technical issues in the
employment ofUGS and the RSC2 architecture. It also allowed for an analysis of the systems
tactical utility as viewed from the operational users' perspective.
Using UAV's SOF teams passed real time information to operational level headquarters
as part of SOF SR missions.
MC02 demonstrated the advantages of both UAV platforms operating individually as
well as in tandem.
Figure 310: UAV Employment Architecture
Methodology
SMEs deployed from HQ USSOCOM to observe the UGS and UAV activities. They
conducted interviews with technical representatives of the systems, Special Forces participants
1-72 FOR OFFICIl'",L lISE ONLY

who employed the systems, and recipients of sensor products. A second USSOCOM SME also
spent three days evaluating the intelligence potential ofUGS and passed findings to the primary
SME. Using this methodology, US have been evaluated as supporting SOF SR.
Observations
US observations are based upon participant interviews supplemented by SME findings.
The UGS portion of the initiative began with the emplacement ofEMIDSlMlDS
magnetic, seismic, and passive infrared (PIR) sensors along road intersections at two AO!. SOF
operating detachments conducted placement of the sensors-alpha personnel under stealth
conditions. Both architectures for the RSC2 UGS system worked, allowing tracking and image
capture of multiple targets (See Figure 310).
The FW architecture quickly provided images and sensor alerts to the SF team in the field
MSS (within one minute of target transit), allowing the team to rapidly transmit voice alerts to
the rear. An added bonus provided by the team in the field was the ability in some cases to
visually follow targets after they left the sensor field, continuing to report, direct strikes, and
provide BDA. The voice reporting chain (through the JSOTF) appeared somewhat cumbersome
and slow. The team found itself attempting to report and respond to multiple headquarters
(JSOTF, FOB and JAOC) while simultaneously directing aircraft overhead. This proved
daunting and in many cases, after an initial report, the team ended up communicating exclusively
with inbound aircraft attacking the TBM.
The FS architecture provided images and sensor alerts directly to a workstation in the
JAOC SOLE. This architecture was slightly slower than FW, but allowed insertion of the alerts
and images, once received, into the MC02 C3 network. The workstation was originally
scheduled to be adjacent to the SOF LNOs at the TST/TCT cell on the combat operations floor
of the JAOC, rather than in the SOLE. Reporting was limited to sensor system feeds and
corresponding pictures, with no follow-on ability to visually track targets once they exited the
sensor field.
Most elements of the UGS/RSC2 system, including the EMIDSIMIDS sensors, RSC2,
CEOS day cameras, and FS communications link, performed as advertised. The FW link and
display software required some troubleshooting and should be further refined to make them more
robust and user friendly.
Feedback was generally positive and supportive of the use of the system for SR.
Strengths included ease of system emplacement, sensors simple and effective, and programmable
software. Weaknesses were noted in the display/communication software being challenging to
operate and troubleshoot, FW communications link being "sensitive," and the inability to
automatically transfer sensor data onto SIPRNET.
The risk to the SOF team is reduced since they do not have to remain in the denied area
to monitor the sensor field. The team, however, is also not available to follow up on reports, so
identification of additional ISR assets to track identified high value targets once they leave the
sensor field is desirable.
In the UAV portion of this initiative, Maverick flew an advanced reconnaissance of the
area providing images used in developing the R&S plan. Once deployed, Maverick provided
security for the launch and recovery of Pointer. Pointer was launched once the area was secure.
The SR team performed launch and control of the UAV. Although not necessary, the team
practiced hand-off of Pointer control from person to person. Photos from Pointer were captured
and sent to a LNO onboard the naval vessel via commercial SAT phone and UHF COMSAT

back up. From the LNO's location, images were sent to the unit planning the mission. As a side
benefit, the photos were shared with the MEF onboard the ship. Coordination and mission
selection between the two UAV's were demonstrated.
As part of naval special operations participation in MC02, the Pointer UAV was also
flown from aboard a second vessel to conduct reconnaissance of an offset target. . The Pathfinder
ACTD team successfully launched the Pointer UAV from the ship and landed/recovered it
ashore repeatedly over a two-day period, recording videos of these flights from the ground
control unit onboard for inclusion in MC02.
MC02 proved useful in refining the TTPs for the employment of Pointer and Maverick
and identified areas for further exploration. Because the maneuver area was significantly
confined, the potential for compromise of the ODA by enemy forces during a launch of the
Pointer UAV was significant. The ODA's security was tremendously increased by employing
Maverick early and focusing on key avenues of approach to the ODA's launch and recovery
sites. This overwatch capability, combined with communications and the means to engage threats
if necessary, could provide a positive impact on future SOF reconnaissance missions. MC02
demonstrated the advantages of both platforms operating individually as well as in tandem.
During some missions, Pointer conducted an area reconnaissance followed by the employment of
Maverick on targets spotted by Pointer that needed greater clarity. This required, however, direct
communications between the ODA employing the Pointer and the C2 node for Maverick. This
was accomplished through commercial means for the exercise.
The UAV communications architecture for MC02 was a unique solution for exercise-use
-only. While a derivative of this architecture may become the solution for the "hub" that ties
Pathfinder systems together, it was intended only as a baseline solution. The indigenous primary,
secondary, and contingency means of military radio communication between the ODA, FOB,
and the Special Forces liaison element (SFLE) failed during portions of the experiment. The
communications node (COMMNODE) provided the only means of steady communication until
tactical satellite (TACSAT) communications were established well into the experiment.
Although originally designed as a means of passing images, it became the primary means of
communicating message traffic between the elements. Tasking received to obtain images of
certain target areas was quickly processed and targets were programmed within hours. However,
real-time coverage would have been possible if the SFLE had real time direct communications
with the FOB and Maverick C2 nodes.
The ODA had a unique task organization for some of its Pointer missions. Rather than
co-locating the GCU with the remote video terminal (RVT), the ODA in some cases split these
off. This provided for increased security for uploading and downloading images while the GCU
continued to provide terminal guidance. In other cases, the launch team was initially co-located
with the GCU and RVT elements, and then the latter was split off to a remote site or put in a
mounted roving mode. Additionally, the ODA exercised the hand-off capability of Pointer on
several occasions, launching it from one site and handing control off to another. They
successfully conducted several iterations with distances between sites of up to five KMs under
both day and night conditions.
Currently, command and control of the Maverick UAV is separated using two trailers for
the flight control system and the mission commander. There is presently additional engineer
equipment in the flight trailer to monitor the systems that will not be present upon delivery. This
separate arrangement was found to be adequate, but not ideal for command and control of the
system. There is adequate space for the mission commander between the pilot and copilot. A
1-74 FOR OFFICIAl, lISE ONLY

second separate viewing capability would be beneficial for other observers, thus allowing the
crew to concentrate on the Maverick flight. However, separating the mission commander from
the crew does not allow for proper C2 of the system.
Table 59: Evaluation of US support to special reconnaissance
Establish Information/Knowledge x
Superiority
Rapidly Set Conditions for Decisive x
Operations
Assure Access Into and Through the x
8attlespace
Conduct Decisive Effects-based x
Operations
Sustain the Force x
While the differences in cost and complexity between Maverick and Pointer UAVs are
understood, there are currently no SOF personnel trained to operate the Maverick UAV. A
combat controller participated in MC02 as the mission commander for all flights. His leadership,
experience, and skill in tower procedures and airspace management significantly enhanced
Maverick operations. Training SOF personnel to fly Maverick is the next logical step in this
program.

This assessment does not impact other assessed j oint initiatives or assessment areas.
DOTMLPF Linkage
The US initiative does not support any pending DOTMLPF change recommendation
packages.
Recommendations
Unmanned Sensor recommendations are based on participant comments and SME
findings.
MC02 provided an opportunity to demonstrate the potential utility ofUGS systems to a
SOF element conducting SR and to the JTF with direct sensor data feed into the ISR fusion
element. Clearly, these tools can be useful, extending the reach of the SR element over distance
and time, while reducing risk to the operator, as well as providing near real-time sensor data for
ISR fusion.
In the UGS FW reporting architecture, communications procedures between the deployed
team and higher HQ must be fully coordinated. Streamline reporting will avoid layers that create
delays unacceptable in a TST/TCT mission. The team cannot simultaneously report and respond
to multiple command levels within TST/TCT timelines. In addition to establishing efficient
reporting systems, command relationships should be clearly established to support mission
accomplishment. Clear mission guidance to the deploying team, based on thorough IPB and pre-
designated target strike decisions, is required to maximize mission value.
In the UGS FS reporting architecture, OPCON/TACOM of this asset must be delineated
along with procedures to process the data by the controlling authority. Eventually, an effective

processing of the resulting data evolved. Additionally, the lack of an automatic means of
inputting the unclassified sensor data onto SIPRNET and into the TCT process delayed the near
real-time capability of the system. To alleviate this current limitation, the output of this
architecture can be monitored by a series of "Client" displays located at dispersed nodes if
desired and planned. For example, the JSOTF HQ monitored the display for two days of the
MC02live fly, however, its integration into the TCT decision process is unknown.
MC02 served to help develop and refine UGS employment TTPs with input from the
operators. At the front end, selection of appropriate targets for these limited assets is critical. A
thorough IPB must be conducted, factoring in the strengths, limitations, and capabilities of the
UGS system. UGS are best used at critical choke points with relatively light traffic. Another
critical requirement is detailed coordination of communications to the correct
organization/individual, including frequencies, call signs, and cryptography (whether using the
FW or FS architecture). Reports must flow directly to the appropriate decision-making HQ to
preclude delays. Pre-mission training should be thorough and include detailed rehearsals. Ideally,
users should become familiar with the UGS system prior to deployment, through its integration
into training and exercise programs. SMEs can be used to further refine expertise on the system
during isolation or prior to employment. The monitor site should be established prior to sensor
field emplacement, so that system communications links can be tested and confirmed as the
sensors and RSC2 are emplaced. Sensor field emplacement team can be split to work the target
site, minimizing time on target. Camera aim at night remains a challenging emplacement task,
requiring careful planning and rehearsal.
While the current operational UGS prototypes can be further improved, the capability
they provide, even now, is significant. As these systems mature, they should have a significant
impact on how SOF and the JTF can more effectively conduct SR. Specific operator
recommendations are:
Reduce size/weight, and increase endurance
Consider alternative power sources
Integrate night camera and night sighting for day camera
Add pan/tilt camera control capability
Provide a guard that allows automatic transfer of unclassified sensor data onto SIPRNET
Establish a common system configuration for US systems to include a tactical
communications link between elements employing UAVs, and UGS
Develop a training plan and determine prerequisites for selection of military personnel for
training on operating U A V s
Conduct additional experiments to explore TTPs for the employment ofUAVs and other
reconnaissance assets
Operational Network Assessment Tool Suite

Description
The ONA tool suite, sponsored by the joint experimentation/C 41 team, is a suite of tools
providing information collection, storage, processing, sharing, and display functions supporting
the OSD, the combatant commander, the CJTF, and warfighters in accomplishing EBO. The
following applications: Genoa, Analyst Notebook and ArcView/ArcIMS, and a USJFCOM
organically developed ONA database were chosen to make up the suite for the initial MC02
functionality testing.
1-76 FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONI,V

The ONA views a potential adversary as an interdependent system of systems, all of

which contribute to some degree toward his will and capability to pursue a course of action
inimical to US interests. The ONA supports the EBO concept, which requires that all levels,
strategic to tactical, collaborate to plan and execute synchronized operations to produce a desired
effect upon the adversary's capability to conduct operations. The ONA goes far beyond
traditional intelligence assessments. ONA is an action-oriented process that provides a
continuous stream of knowledge from adversary vulnerabilities to effects to tasks. As such, ONA
represents a philosophy that drives a process to produce a product. The process builds situational
awareness and understanding. The product supports plans and execution of operations.
A number of tools were evaluated or developed to support ONA implementation. Genoa,
Analyst Notebook, and ArcView/ArcIMS were selected for investigation based on their expected
functionality. To maintain commonality with the SJFHQ, SharePoint Portal Server was used as a
knowledge portal. Finally, the ONA database, developed in-house by JFCOM, was specifically
designed to mirror and support the ONA and EBO processes.
Three analytical tools were chosen from a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARP A) developed Genoa tool suite. The entire suite, consisting of 17 components, was
designed to provide enhanced decision support. The three selected tools were:
SEAS - Structured Evidential Analysis System
CIM2 - Critical Intent Model
SIAM - Situational Influence Assessment Module
These tools were primarily used very early, prior to MC02 execution in support of pre-
crisis development of the ONA assessment. (Many of the Spiral 3 and execution survey
respondents were never exposed to these tools.) According to expert statements, the tools were
useful for understanding and building the baseline ONA, but were not extensively used during
the execution phase due to complexity, time and manpower requirements.
The ONA database for MC02 evolved focusing on the nation, region, and situation within
the combatant commander's AOR for the experiment within an exercise. The ONA database was
the most extensively used of the ONA tool suite. This tool provides a structure that mimics the
ONA process. This is something that has never been accomplished before MC02. The ONA
database was developed and tailored to meet the specific needs and architecture of the ONA
process. Two principle modules made up the ONA database: the knowledge base and planning
support. Requirements to capture effects, nodes, actions, resources, secondary effects and their
link associations and rationale guided the ONA knowledge base module. Support to effects-
based planning drove the development of the EBO planning support module. These two modules
were used extensively throughout the preparations and execution of the event.
Analyst Notebook (data visualization and analysis) and ArcView/lMS (geospatial/graphic
data generation) were used early on and throughout, particularly by the system of systems
analysis (SOSA) cell. Both these tools are manpower intensive as well, however, the
visualization products were powerful in presenting information to the staff and commander.
SPPS provided a web-like portal that supported the net assessment executive summary
and ONA matrix with a drill-down ability to capture greater detail. It provided the links to
PMESII summaries, focus of DIME actions, as well as links to regional country assessments.
Red views using the same PMESIIIDIME construct were also presented. The web approach
provided summaries while allowing users to drill down to the level of fidelity desired. An in-
depth view of the SPPS can be viewed in the CIE section of this report.

The ONA tools were used to support the process illustrated in figure 311 generating the
Effects Tasking Order (ETO):

The ONA concept, recognized by the experiment participants as a benefit for military
operations, demonstrated very strong potential in MC02. By providing a more thorough
understanding of the adversary, ONA made a positive contribution to the Blue Force during the
experiment and demonstrated that with further concept refinement and development of critical
enablers, it could provide the knowledge foundation supporting EBO.
There was not a common understanding of ONA among experiment participants, which
in turn led to varying expectations for its intent, scope, content, and utility. Training conducted
before the event failed to adequately educate all participants on the ONA concept and as a result,
there was an unrealistic tion of what ONA was to . de for t h e '
CJTF's Situational
Awareness
Figure 311: CJTF's Situational Awareness

Based on limited understanding of the concept and limited exposure, the use of complex
ONA tools during execution was also problematic. The tools developed to access ONA database
and use the planning features were not intuitive and proved difficult for most participants to use.
The ONA Tool was especially enhanced through the IWS collaborative capability; enabling as
many as 50 simultaneous users on a shared view to collaborate on effects, nodes, actions and
resources as well as their link associations in the planning tool. The ONA tools provided
valuable shared view and insight into the AO and adversary's infrastructure, but not explicit
situation awareness. The tools were not intuitive enough to be learned quickly and required
considerable training. Though favorably received and tested in this experiment, many comments
were provided for improving these tools. The overarching theme was for enhanced automation,

simplifying the ONA tools into one, and interfacing with other C41SR systems like the ADOCS
display, so that the ONA tool suite is more robust with more embedded, updated, information.
Methodology
Seventy users evaluated the ONA suite of tools. Two surveys sought comments on the
ease of operation, functionality, and effectiveness as they support ONA's EBO objectives and
the key enablers for
RDO. In addition to
60%
surveys, interviews
50%
and subj ect matter
expert insights were
40% also used.
Observations
30% An in-depth
analysis of how the
20% ONA tool suite
(Genoa, Analyst
10%
Notebook, and
0%
ArcView/lMS)
Excellent Very Good Average Below Poor supports the key
Average enablers of the
SJFHQ cannot be
Figure 312: Ease of use and functionality for understanding and situational given due to the
awareness lack of user
feedback in this area. The ONA tool suite developed the pre-crisis view of the adversary's
strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, interdependencies, and environment. This would point
towards establishing information for rapid planning and conducting EBO. Furthermore, one
could argue that developing the pre-crisis view would set the conditions for decisive operations
and establish
Information
45%
Superiority.
40%
Figure 312
35%
indicates that the
30%
ease of operation
25% and functionality
20% of the ONA Tool
15% Suite for
10% providing
5% understanding and
0% Situational
Excellent Very Good Average Below Poor Awareness were
Average favorably
received by a
Figure 313: ONA database effectiveness as a collaborative, updated information majority of the
tool was considered very good to average by participants respondents.
Approximately 80
FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY 1-79

percent of the respondents rated the ONA tool suite "average" to "very good" (39 of 49). The
below average and poor responses indicated that it was a complex system to manipulate and find
data. There were also indications that the system needs a better' search capability,
and the means for updating the database.
Figure 313
50% shows that 39 of 48
45%
40%
placed a rating of
35% "average" to "very
30% good" on the
25%
effectiveness of the
20%
15% ONA Database as a
10% collaborative,
5% updated
0%
E xc e lie n t Very Good Average Below Poor
information tool.
Avera e The ONA database
Figure 314: Analyst Notebook effectiveness providing visualization for analysis of offered an
the adversary's political infrastructure extensive
reporting function
where all aspects of the ONA database content were available as user selectable fields for
generating reports. However, the actual intelligence and the database did not match in some
instances based strictly upon comments received by the surveys.
While there were disconnects, it is useful and necessary to clarify what the differences
were, why that was the case, and the probable source for them. ONA is about in-depth
understanding of the adversary to identify the relationships required for effects-based operations.
The number and disposition of tanks, aircraft, or artillery shells is only of cursory interest to
ONA, but an integral part of JIPB. ONA is not designed to supplant JIPB; they are
complementary. The ONA was necessarily constructed from real world information due to high
fidelity requirements.
Figure 314 shows that respondents reported 19 of 23 times that the Analyst Notebook
was "average" to "very good" for providing visualization for of the adversary's political
infrastructure.
60% However, users
need the ability to
50%
step out to a URL
40% from Analyst
30% Notebook.
Figure 315
20%
shows that the
10% ArcView response
0% rate was 15 of 19
Excellent Very Good Average Below Poor 'average' to 'very
Average good' for
functionality,
Figure 315: ArcView/lMS functionality in providing geospatial information for providing
planning and situational awareness geospatial
information for

planning and situation awareness.

Many of the Spiral 3 and execution survey respondents were not exposed to these tools.
According to expert statements, the tools were used to build up ONA, but were not extensively
used during the execution phase. The tools are primarily used for initial planning. Comments
were summarized based upon the insight gained by users that had exposure to the tools.
Overall, the ONA tool suite provided background understanding for a developing
situation. Planners indicated that the tools were used to refine node-action-resource linkages in
collaboration sessions. However, the ONA tool suite should be more visually intuitive. More
training needs to be provided along with a better search engine.

The ONA tool suite assessment may have an impact upon the ONA concept and the CIE
sections of this report. These impacts primarily relate to the performance of the tools employed
in the initiative. Performance regarding these tools may impact the findings in the other
assessment areas or joint initiatives. Other key tools in the ONA arsenal such as SPPS and IWS
are covered in other sections of this report.
Recommendations
All recommendations are based upon the user and subject matter expert input. Overall,
the recommendations support that major enhancements and integration with other C41SR systems
are required for the ONA tool suite. This capability would probably come in some other COTS
products. Some of the described capabilities and features were 3D graphics, ability to graphically
depict locations easily, and greater availability of metadata and file indexing. The data accuracy
and metatags also need to be improved. The search and report features need to be more flexible,
allowing the user to define the search in free form and select fields to view each record.
The tools could be improved visually by creating the ability to graphically and distinctly
depict locations easily. The ONA and "picture" displays need same target names and geo-
locational data as well. A 3D graphic portrayal for key node relationships between PMESII
systems should also be included. The ONA tool suite should also have a multiple link capability
for effects/nodes/actions/resources. The tools should be linked to target and other planning,
collection, effects, and assessment tools. They should have greater data accuracy, metadata
availability, and file indexing. Additionally, users need the capability to link to a URL from
within tools like Analyst Notebook.
Automated Information Network Flow (ANIF)

Description
The automated network information flow, sponsored by the Joint C41SR Battle Center, is
an integration of several emerging advanced technologies that can enable the warfighters to take
advantage of the data transfer capabilities of new internetworking technologies while at the same
time retaining the information prioritization feature of older legacy technologies. ANIF
concentrates on identifying selected technologies that can provide the SJFHQ with the ability to
install networks that are capable of providing the users with end-to-end prioritized quality of
service (QoS) and give the commander's information managers the ability to dynamically
reapportion bandwidth (See Figure 316). As the DoD emphasis on network operations continues
to increase, ANIF will be positioned to enhance our network bandwidth management and QoS
reliability. ANIF is a JBC project based on combatant commander survey responses from the

United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) representatives. This high priority requirement supports SJFHQ requirements.
A conceptual network schema follows:

ANIF was not an assessed initiative and three of the technologies that comprise ANIF
were not used during MC02. Planners elected to integrate only limited ANIF play throughout the
exercise. The Joint Battle Center resources were considered to better evaluate the utility of
ANIF.
Figure 316: ANIF screen capture

Methodology
Use of information from the JBC ANIF assessment report and a write-up on the one
technology actually used during MC02 is presented to better inform the reader on the initiative
capability.
Observations
One of the four ANIF technologies was used during the initial MC02 exercise setup in
order to cause the least amount of disruption to the experimental construct. Throughout MC02,
the Linkway 2000 modem provided reliable service. Using the Linkway 2000, the bandwidth
over the satellite path was dynamically apportioned based on QoS assigned to the specific traffic
type. The network manager could change the priority of time sensitive traffic and the amount of
bandwidth over the network. The Linkway 2000 also provided capabilities that enabled the RF
media portion of the network (OSI Layer 1) to support the overall objective of end-to-end QoS.
By dynamically managing the bandwidth over the RF path and providing ATM QoS and IP QoS
(differentiated service) interfaces, the modem supported the warfighters' need for a robust and
1-82 FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY

efficient prioritized network. The Linkway 2000 reduced the overall network latency by
providing a single satellite hop versus the current dual hop scenario. Employment of dynamic
Reed Solomon/Virterbi forward error correction schema improved the overall data throughput of
the network. Additional warfighters benefits provided by the ANIF network are listed below:
Allowed warfighters the ability to share satellite resources dynamically between many sites
Allows asymmetric links to provide maximum bandwidth efficiency
Allows user groups to be established within a network to effectively prioritize individual
sites as necessary
Supports multiple protocols within a site in order to efficiently support all types of traffic and
applications
Allows single-hop satellite communications from multiple sites, providing more efficient
communications for tactical units using time sensitive applications
Greatly reduces the expense and equipment necessary for a traditional "hub and spoke"
satellite network
By using the bandwidth on demand capability of Linkway, each location could

communicate with all of the other Linkway equipped sites with reduced delay, and improved
bursting capability using only one carrier. Traditional satellite networks would need to use more
modems and extra carriers to provide a comparable connectivity. The ability to control the
network and prioritization of bandwidth between the sites was very apparent. The use of multiple
carriers and user groups allows for a very versatile network that can support a large number of
requirements from many users.
The addition of the packet encryption did not affect application of the Linkway's
dynamic bandwidth reallocation or RF layer QoS capabilities. This also validated the idea that
QoS enabled applications can be supported on networks using modern inline network encrypted
devices.
Throughout both the JBC assessment and MC02, the ANIF technologies demonstrated the
flexibility and capability to control different types of information flow operating in a limited
bandwidth network. The assessment validated that a specific type of traffic can be supported on a
congested network when QoS features are applied properly. The assessment clearly indicated by
carefully applying QoS policies in the network, it not only improved the quality of traffic flow,
but also improved the overall performance of the network.
Recommendations
ANIF has already received approval from the JROC to proceed as a near-term fielding
solution for the warfighter. JFCOM is currently working with combatant commanders to develop
an ANIF fielding strategy tailored to their requirements.
Special Technology Operations (STO) Initiative

Description
The introduction of STO activity into MC02 occurred late in Spiral development-
following Spiral 1. Based on opportunities provided via the Joint Expeditionary Force
Experiment 2002 (JEFX02) and resource availability, the decision was made to proceed with
limited objectives to analyze both the ability to conduct STO activities in experimentation and
development for future operations. The objectives for this initiative were categorized based on
operational focus to manage classified and compartmentalized objectives for oversight and

reporting within security constraints. This effort allowed the Service-level objectives that were
already in development within JEFX02 to be bridged with the Joint Staff objectives through the
MC02 Joint Task Force (JTF) structure. This bridging allowed an end-to-end assessment to be
conducted, as a supplement to results, while providing experimentation observations on STO
incorporation into experimentation venues. In particular, an examination of the STO processes,
policies, and operations links nontraditional methodologies and programs to traditional
operations in the future.
Due to STO classification challenges, limited experimentation objectives were
established to ensure oversight of program access and data for the programs was maintained. The
end-to-end study accompanying the three levels of effort was to capture the associated issues and
potential findings important to adequately evaluate experimentation demands for Services,
combatant commanders, DoD, and interagency participation in highly classified operations.
MC02 SCOPE OF INTEGRATION

The STO initiative was separated into three focus levels:
-Air Force Level: JEFX02 support through the Air Force Command and Control Training
and Innovation Group (AFC2TIG) focused on execution of STO package options to be approved
by national authority played at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) level and processed through the
JTF staff in MC02.
-MC02 at JTF staff focused on procedural issues and configuration impacts associated
with actions as the SJFHQ transitions into a JTF for operations.
-JCS level focused on examining the decision-making of national authorities for STO
operations, particularly the potential need for procedural and policy changes to improve the
interoperability of STO programs among the Services and other United States Government
(USG) agencies in an RDO environment.
MC02 STO integration occurred during Spiral 2 with injection of activities commencing
in Spiral 3. To incorporate STO activities into scenario timelines, script modifications were
provided to MC02 JECG and MSEL teams to synchronize activities for Spiral 3.

Assessments were based on two categories of objectives: experimentation framework and
operations.
Experimentation Framework Objectives:
Identify staff positions and security levels required to manage STO oversight for concept and
experimentation development
Requirement for senior mentor roles and missions in STO experimentation
Permanent staff STO billets by staff positions
Requirement for surge capability for experimentation manning
Evaluate the requirement for JFCOM access to multi-service STO programs to support
experimentation development and execution (both interim and permanent billet access)
Policy and procedure modifications required granting interim access for experimentation
venues
Oversight for billet management and granting authority for access

Establish list of modifications to facilities to support STO experimentation, including

sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) requirements, mobile equipment, and
communi cati on infrastructure
Development of assessment formats and protocols for multi -level reporting (collateral to
compartmentalized) DOTMLPF packages and information papers.
Incorporate assessment formats and surveys into JFCOM automated systems and plans.
Standard archive plan for reports and data to enable cross-reference between different
security levels
Examine timelines for STO integration to experiment venues by Spiral development
Operations Objectives:
Identify transition issues associated with end-to-end STO operations in a RDO environment
based on establishment of a SJFHQ structure
Discern STO activities required prior to JTF activation and associated timeline
Identify handoff and parallel actions required to transition from deliberate planning to crisis
action planning
Need for reconfiguration of Service specific programs to group or tier programs into access
levels to facilitate future joint STO operations
Review decision-making of national authorities for STO execution to identify potential
procedural and policy changes to improve interoperability in a collaborative environment in
SJFHQ and JTF configurations
Identify SJFHQ core competency required for STO activities and combatant commander and
theater specific competencies and activities required for contingency planning in pre-JTF
status.
Mission qualification training, including levels and understanding of JOPES
Identification of deliverables by echelon (one up and one down)
Define STO organization, manning, and equipment requirements to enable full integration of
STO activities in theater effects-based planning and operations.
Development of OPLAN annex and matrix to correlate Service/program with potential effect
by obj ective (matrix Service/program/level of single and combined effects)
Identify battle rhythm issues associated with synchronization of Program Element (PE) and
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process with contingency planning in a
collaborative environment
Methodology
More than 20 users, consisting of STO, 10, and space subject matter experts evaluated
STO. A series of qualitative questions were periodically submitted to the users for evaluation. In
addition to the questionnaires, interviews and summary reports on observations and lessons
learned were used to better evaluate the utility of STO in supporting the JTF organization. Using
this methodology, STO was evaluated to provide significant support to the key enablers of the
SJFHQ.
Findings
STO was evaluated against the following key enablers of the SJFHQ.
TOPIC: Integrating all Services STO operations into JTF operations

Operational Application: Ensures the JTF commander has full visibility into these
programs and allows integration of these operations into the commanders plan.
Operational Utility
Near-term. The majority of experiments, exercises, and war games today do not exercise
this process from the component to the combatant commander, or cross component, for
integration and interoperability. It was operationalized for the first time in an experiment in the
context ofMC02. Given the time constraints and the late arrival of the concept, only the Air
Force presented STO capabilities for use by the joint force commander for planning and
execution during MC02. The success of the concept was based on the solid foundation provided
by the Air Force in JEFX02. Other Services were offered the opportunity to participate, but they
had not baselined the capability within their Service exercise/experiment. This caused the
integration of STO activities to be only vertical vice horizontal across all the Service
components. Additional effort was required to further baseline these activities and define the
level of interaction required of the SJFHQ for this process to succeed in MC02.
Other Services will need to be encouraged to participate to expand the scope of these
operations and provide future JTF and component commanders training and experimentation
venues in preparation to achieve full capability for real-world events. Joint concepts of
operations for integrating these activities exist, but require consensus among Services and
oversight from the Joint Staff to provide STO capabilities to JTF commanders.
JFCOM envisioned the SJFHQ making constant strides to synchronize their efforts with
the components' planning process. This lack of maturity in synchronization of collateral efforts
between the JTF and components could have further exacerbated the ability to synchronize STO.
However, the foresight of the JFACC and JFCOM minimized the STO expectations in MC02,
thereby mitigating much of the complexity. Hesitancy is advised at this point to avoid the
proclivity of the JTF commander to husband these capabilities. This could both defeat the
intended potential while placing them in the high-demand low-density domain. What is preferred
is a pre-approved toolbox of these applications, which will require extensive collaboration within
the military and other elements of national power. The full application of STO will require even
greater rigor in synchronization, which could have a positive impact on integrating other
planning and execution efforts. It was only in MC02 that the JTF had a battle rhythm. Battle
rhythm synchronization is always difficult due to time zones, and location of commanders and
facilities. However, the STO battle rhythm is one of the best tools for allowing the JTF
commander to think beyond 96 hours. The ad hoc use of STO operations is not prudent

stewardship; coordination must occur to properly exercise these capabilities. This "chessboard
mentality" leads beyond current operations and future plans into planning. The JTF commander
and his components are provided the additional benefit of "centralized JTF control" and
"decentralized component execution."
An integrated effort to facilitate awareness, assessment, integration, synchronization,
policy, doctrine development, apportionment, planning, and execution of STO is essential. To
continue STO participation injoint experiments and exercises, USJFCOM will require
permanent facilities and a cadre of trained and experienced STO personnel. This cadre would
then serve as the cornerstone for the lengthy, detailed preparation to enter an event with these
capabilities. JTF STO validation by JFCOM can only be secured with the requisite cleared and
trained personnel in place.
Long Term. The strong STO baseline used by the Air Force in JEFXlMC02 can be used
for expansion to other Services. Upon consensus of the Services to participate in the planning
and execution of these applications, it becomes apparent that these activities support effects-
based operations. STO by its nature is joint, forcing integration. There is agreed upon
documentation available once other Service buy-in is achieved. The level of collaboration
required to conduct and obtain clearance for these activities will require formatting and extensive
ongoing interaction with the potential participants. Language in the Defense Planning Guidance
directing the integration of these activities will be required to insure policy matches STO
capabilities. Rules of engagement, centered on military activity, will require the full
understanding and parti ci pati on by other el ements of nati onal power. Due to the nature of these
activities and the crossing of military boundaries, clear relationships within the combatant
commander's purview and the JTF commander's realm need to be developed. Roles and
responsibilities of the combatant commander and the CJTF, functional component commanders,
the SJFHQ and their respective staffs are not yet well understood and will need clarification.
Technical Feasibility. Secure space within each of the components participating in the
STO operation is a prerequisite. Portable equipment is available to process the planning and
execution of these capabilities. Communications security (COMSEC) and operations security
(OPSEC) issues can be minimized by the dedicated and deployable secure facility. Commonality
of clearance requirements and difficulty getting people cleared will remain an issue. Training
between the JTF and components is critical and cannot be overemphasized. Timely and accurate
information for this activity is even more important than in collateral activities. The complexity
of the assessment of these activities is by its nature effects-based and therefore even more
obtrusive to the casual assessment process. To best facilitate these activities, not only is a robust
ONA-beyond predictive battlespace awareness-required, but equally important is a dedicated
SOSA so that these valuable resources will not be wasted on less important objectives. Although
STO operations are about effects-based operations, vice message traffic generation, full Service
participation will require greater bandwidth. Because STO is about effects-based operations, it
becomes a matter of applications vice platforms, which require constant and secure
communication between commanders at all levels.
Affordability is based mainly on having the right billets identified and manned for the use
of this application. Training in OPSEC and COMSEC procedures must be sufficient to apply the
capabilities with the greatest hope for success and integration.

Other Observations and Findings:

Need for modifications in access for key personnel supporting experimentation Goint and
Service level) on an on-going basis
Senior mentor access is highly desired to ensure the insight of former senior leaders from
multi -service backgrounds
Reconfiguration of Service specific programs into tier/group programs to improve
accessibility for joint collaboration among Service programs with like tier/group designation
(similar to AF approach)
Impact of SJFHQ on overall STO processes for future operations
Increased, but selective access for SJFHQ personnel to Service specific programs for early
engagement in RDO environment, particularly in the pre-conflict phase
Establishment of adequate SCIF facilities and mobile equipment to support experimentation
and field use of STO programs
Development of a collaborative environment with ability to transfer data between classified
and unclassified systems through two-way guard technology applications

STO integration and synchronization with several 10 and space efforts is essential for
seamless operations. Those areas within MC02 were limited in scope and interaction.
DOTMLPF Linkage
Modifications to JCS 3-13 and 10 guidance (DoD 3600.1) should consider assessments
from MC02. STO experimentation results are related to SJFHQ, EBO, JFI and TCT, JISR, and
ATO development efforts within JFCOM. Similar relationships for 10 also exist within JEFX02
efforts with the GSTF and predictive battlespace awareness initiatives. Within the Navy's Fleet
Battle Experiment-Juliet (FBE-J), the need for 10 synchronization and development has also
been annotated.
Recommendations
Modify program access to STO across Services
Expand use ofIJSTO system for joint access to Service programs
Establish 10 as a key area in ALS and special operations
Establish a collaborative environment with STO operations, to include application of guard
technology transfers for both high to low and low to high data develop measures of
effectiveness for incorporation into planning and execution processes, to enable intelligence
preparation of the battlefield and BDA assessment.
Formalize training and leadership development for 10 and STO operations for officer and
enlisted personnel.

Annex J - Participating Organizations

AgencieslLabs and Organizations involved MC02 and Service Experiments
12TH AIR FORCE

422ND TEST SQUADRON -- P ART OF AIR WARFARE CENTER
46TH TEST SQUADRON
605TH TEST SQUADRON -- PART OF AIR WARFARE CENTER
8TH AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE AGENCY FOR MODELING AND SIMULATION (AF AMS)
AIR FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISANCE CENTER
(AFC2ISRC/INIDOILG/SC/AFEO)
AIR FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL TRAINING AND INNOVATION GROUP (AFC2TIG)
AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (AFCA)
AIR FORCE DOCTRINE CENTER (AFDC)
AIR FORCE OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION CENTER (AFOTEC)
AIR FORCE/XI (AIR STAFF)
AIR MANEUVER BATTLE LAB, FT. RUCKER, AL
ARMY FORCES COMMAND (FORSCOM)
ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS BATTLE LAB, FT BRAGG, NC
ARMY TEST & EVALUATION COMMAND (ATEC)
ARMY TRADOC COMBINED ARMES CENTER (CAC)
ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION ((ASN (RDA)
CHENG))
AWFC (AIR WARFARE CENTER)
BATTLE COMMAND - BATTLE LAB, FT. LEAVENWORTH, KS
BATTLE COMMAND BATTLE LAB, FT. GORDON, GA
BATTLE COMMAND BATTLE LAB, FT. HUACHUCA, AZ -- "PROVIDES VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL
INTEGRATION FOR INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT TO
INFORMATION OPERATIONS"
BATTLE LAB INTEGRATION, TECHNOLOGY & CONCEPTS DIRECTORATE, FT. MONROE, VA
CENTRAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT FACILITY (CTSF), FT HOOD, TX
COMBATANT COMMANDER INTEROPERABILITY PROGRAM OFFICE (CIPO)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTLE LAB, FT. LEE, VA
COMBINED AIR OPERATIONS CENTER EXPERIMENTAL (CAOC-X)
COMMAND AND CONTROL BATTLELAB
COMMANDER, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION FORCE (COMOPTEVFOR)
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA)
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DEPTH & SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK BATTLE LAB, FT. SILL, OK
DISMOUNTED BATTLESPACE BATTLE LAB, FT. BENNING, GA
FLEET COMBAT TRAINING CENTER PACIFIC (FCTCP AC)
FLEET INFORMATION WARFARE CENTER (FIWC)
HEADQUARTERS AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (HQ AMCIDOP)
HEADQUARTERS ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS CENTER (HQ ESC)
HQ ACCIDOJ/XPS/INXIINY/SC (HEADQUARTERS AIR COMBAT COMMAND)
HQ AIR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (AlA)
JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE RECONNAISANCE JOINT TEST
AND EVALUATION (JC2ISR JTE)
JOINT INTEROPERABILITY TEST COMMAND (JITC)
JOINT VENTURE DIRECTORATE
MANEUVER SUPPORT BATTLE LAB, FT. LEONARD WOOD, MO
MARINE CORPS W ARFIGHTING LAB (MCWL)
MOUNTED MANEUVER BATTLESPACE LAB, FT. KNOX, KY
NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION (NDIA)
NATIONAL IMAGRY AND MAPPING AGENCY (NIMA)
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE - OPERATIONAL SUPPORT OFFICE (NRO-OSO)
NATIONAL SIMULATIONS CENTER (NSC)
NAV AL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND (NAV AIR)
NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER (NA WC)
NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE
NAVAL POST GRADUATE SCHOOL
NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND (NA VSEA)
NAVAL STRIKE AIR WARFARE CENTER (NSA WC)
NAVAL SURF ACE WARFARE/WEAPONS CENTER (NSWC)
NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER (NUWC)
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NAVY PACIFIC METOROCCEN (NAVP ACMETOCEN)
NAVY RESEARCH LABORATORY (NRL)
NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (NWDC)
OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH (ONR)
OPERATIONAL TESTING COMMAND (OTC)
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE - COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS - TACTICAL (pEO
C3T)
PROJECT DIRECTOR, COMBAT TERRAIN INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CTIS)
PROJECT MANAGER, FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW (FBCB2)
PROJECT MANAGER, GROUND COMBAT COMMAND AND CONTROL (GCC2)
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PROJECT MANAGER, INTELLIGENCE FUSION AND EFCCS
PROJECT MANAGER, TACTICAL RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (TRCS)
PROJECT MANAGER, TOC/AIR & MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
(TOc/AMDCCS)
PROJECT MANAGER, W ARFIGHTER INFORMATION NETWORK - TACTICAL (WIN-T)
SAN DIEGO FLEET AIR!AREA CONTROL & SURVEILLANCE FACILITY SAN DIEGO (F ACSF AC)
SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE BATTLE LAB, HUNTSVILLE, AL AND COLORADO SPRINGS, CO
SPACE WARFARE CENTER
SPACE WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND (SPAWARSYSCOM)
SURF ACE WARFARE DEVELOPMENT GROUP (SWDG)
THEATER AIR COMMAND AND CONTROL SIMULATION FACILITY (T ACCSF)
TRADOC ANAL YSIS COMMAND - (TRAC)
TRADOC PROGRAM INTEGRATION OFFICE ARMY BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM (TPIO-ABCS):
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Annex K - Experiment Lessons Learned

Lessons learned presented here are in the Joint Universal Lessons Learned format for
standardization.
Title: OPFOR Rules of Engagement (ROE)
Observation: OPFOR rules of engagement (ROE) and personas of OPFOR senior

leadership were not well defined prior to execution resulting in differing views on
allowable game play.
Discussion: OPFOR rules of engagement were not agreed upon prior to execution.
This caused conflicting views between Blue, Red, and the JECG as to what could and
could not be executed during the experiment. This impacted the OPFOR's ability to
execute certain planned events (night attacks, anti-access) while also adding artificiality
to the game scenario. A second key issue with ROE was the disagreement on the
personas of the senior OPFOR leadership. The OPFOR senior players acted in a manner
that theBlue and JECG thought was consistent with the expectations of a different
adversary than that defined for the experiment.
Lessons Learned: Blue and Red ROE and character personas need to be discussed
and agreed upon prior to execution to minimize differences in views of game play and
impacts/effects of Blue actions on the adversary
Recommendation: Hold JECG and OPFOR focus sessions prior to execution to

discuss allowable ROE and game play so all players understand the rules coming into the
experiment.
Title: OPFOR Reaction Time
Observation: The OPFOR was not able to adversely influence the deployment of
Blue assets into the JOA.
Discussion: All TPFDD flow into the area was scheduled with no simulation
modeling to allow interdiction.
Lessons Learned: Time jump from C to C+ 16 did not provide the OPFOR the
ability to react to Blue deployment. The JTF Blue-Red cell did not have sufficient time
available to monitor indicators in order to predict OPFOR actions.
Recommendation: Find some method to simulate the iterative TPFDD planning

process. Start with a full up, unconstrained flow of the TPFDD plan. Then have a high
level model degrade the TPFDD flow. Allow for the recalculation of the TPFDD, and run
it through the TPFDD computer.
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Title: Video Media Objectivity
Observation: The simulated media outlet, World New Network (WNN), did not
appear to be objective in representing both the Blue and OPFOR views in the experiment.
Most of the focus tended to be representative of Blue actions, intentions, and effects, not
on OPFOR actions, intent, and effects.
Discussion: The WNN was envisioned by the experimental design group to

represent both the Blue and OPFOR views on events and actions. Although this initially
appeared to be the direction of the media, it became one-sided about half-way through the
experiment and tended to focus on Blue actions and Blue expected effects. In some cases
this caused incorrect reports on effects against the OPFOR (what was reported as effects
was not what was observed by the OPFOR as effects). The WNN focus tended to target a
u.s. audience, not a world audience. Had there been a cell that represented third party
interests (European nations, regional nations, public opinions), the effects of the WNN
broadcasts may have been recognized as counter to Blue interests.
Lessons Learned: Media needs to meet the needs of both the Blue and OPFOR
Recommendation: Ensure WNN is representative of both sides in an experiment.

Consider the possibility of having two opposing news networks.
Title: Experiment Play Classification Level
Observation: The overall classification of the experiment was SECRET. However

there were systems employed on the Blue side that required SCI access for operators.
Discussion: Use of systems requiring SCI access created problems in discussing

battle damage assessment, since few personnel had SCI access. Consideration should be
given on the use of such highly classified systems with regard to the limited audience
available to discuss the operation of these systems. If these systems will be used in an
experiment, then their employment should be adjudicated within a controlled group and
published to the Blue and OPFOR.
Lessons Learned: Use of highly classified sysetms creates problems with

adjudicating and discussing effects in Effects Based Operations.
Recommendation: Either limit actions to those at the exercise classification level

or ensure effects on highly classified actions are adjudicated in a controlled group with
representatives on both the Blue and OPFOR sides.
Title: Third Party Grey Cell
Observation: MC02 required use of all elements of DIME (Diplomatic,

Information, Military, and Economic). To fully understand and play those elements of
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national power, a Grey cell may be required that plays the role of third party entities
(Blue allies, regional governments, world public opinion, US. public opinion).
Discussion: Experimenting on use of all elements of national power requires

determining effects on world opinion to include the US. populace, world populace,
foreign allies, and other foreign governments. The effects Blue and OPFOR have on
these third party entities should be played in order to fully understand the cause and
effect of diplomatic, information, and economic actions. For example, Blue's actions in
MC02 resulted in natural resources price jumps and stock market drops that effected the
entire world. The pressures on Blue to resolve the situation would be great and third party
actions or injects would add realism to the scenario.
Lessons Learned: Need to incorporate third party injects into the exeriment to
fully play the cause and effects of DIME actions. Set up Grey cell to allow assessment of
Blue and Red D, I, E actions on other regional actors.
Recommendation: Establish a Grey cell that acts as an independent group that

injects third party effects and reactions to Blue and OPFOR events.
Title: Simulation-Live Event Tie-in
Observation: As sequenced, early live events tied in with the simulation models
disrupted the JTF planning process.
Discussion: The early tie-in of live events such as the airborne drop caused a
multitude of unrealistic events to occur in order for the JTF to prepare the battlefield
properly. Since sufficient time was not available to prepare the battlefield, OPFOR was
directed to reposition lADS assets or turn them off so that the airborne drop could occur
in a benign environment. There was not sufficient time available for the JTF to properly
set the conditions. Similarly, this caused inadequate time to be available for the JTF to
apply all possible diplomatic, information, and economic elements of national power.
Lessons Learned: Live events should be tied-in to the scenario at a later time such
that all elements of national power can be employed and to allow the JTF sufficient time
to set the conditions for the live event to occur in proper context. Alternatively, live
events could be played, but disconnected from the scenario. Live events should not drive
the experiment; there were many actions, events, and outcomes that were not realistic to
capabilities and real world scenarios.
Recommendation: If experiment sponsors require live events, ensure the

placement of the live event in the timeline makes sense and does not negatively impact
the scenario. Alternatively, consider a two-phased experiment design: phase one highly
scripted and connected to pre-planned live operations; phase two unscripted and fought in
simulation only.
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Title: Red and Blue Daily MSEL Processes
Observation: Analysts did a great job talking through the Red and Blue MSEL
each morning during the Analysts Rally.
Discussion: This type of daily MSEL review provided the Analysts and SMEs a
focus for the day.
Lessons Learned: The review of the MSELs each morning added better
Situational Awareness for the analysts.
Recommendation: Continue this type of morning briefing in future

experimentation.
Title: Boil Down Conducted in the Form of Work Shops Process
Observation: The 'Boil Down' sessions conducted in the form of Work Shops at
the conclusion of the MC02 were excellent.
Discussion: The focused post-event discussions, i.e. 'Boil Down' sessions, were
used as a time to talk through the horizontal and vertical roles and relationship among the
HQ staff and the components.
Lessons Learned: The 'Boil-Down' sessions were a valuable additional data

source.
Recommendation: At the end of each experiment, schedule multiple 'Boil-Down'

seSSIOns.
Title: Analyst Use of the Collaborative Information Environment
Observation: Analysts full use of the collaborative tools facilitated the assessment
process.
Discussion: Analysts conducted all of their recurring meetings and coordination

efforts on the collaborative tools. This allowed for the quicker synthesis of the
experiment data and fully supported the execution needs. It allowed for a quicker
dissemination of daily insights, which in tum gave better situational awareness.
Lessons Learned: Analysis team use of the collaborative tool gave the team a high
level of situational awareness and enabled valuable dialogue between analysts at Suffolk
and dispersed SMEs and data collectors.
Recommendation: Continue to use the collaborative information environment

with analysts in all future experiments.
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Title: Post Experiment After Action Review
Observation: Post Experiment AAR was valuable.
Discussion: The post experiment AAR brought senior players into one location
for a final discussion on experiment insights. This proved to be a valuable source of
information for insights at the conclusion of the experiment. In past experiments only
daily and weekly AARs were conducted.
Lessons Learned: Post experiment AAR sessions were novel and allowed senior
players another venue to offer insights into the experiment. This became a valuable
additional data source for the analysts.
Recommendation: make post-experiment AARs a standard procedure.
Title: Surveys - Participant Overload
Observation: Experiment participants were "surveyed-out. "
Discussion: Participant survey data may contain a sizeable amount of "cheerless

compliance" in survey completion most likely due to several factors including a failure to
crosscheck surveys between analysts, the high demands on the staff to respond to the
commander's needs, and the intensity of the battle rhythm. These factors combined to
impact the quantity and quality of the participant responses.
Lessons Learned: Event planners must allow time for assessment reviews and
survey completion as part of the battle rhythm. Warfighting experiments require
participant participation in data collection.
Recommendation: Establish assessment and survey completion time in the battle

rhythm
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Annex L - Senior Concept Developer/Mentor Observations
MC02 Execution Senior Concept Developer Observations
Millennium Challenge 2002 OPFOR After Action Report

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Annex M - Service Input
This Annex lists the comments submitted by the Services: USMC - Marine Corps
Combat Development Command, USA - Training and Doctrine Command, USN - Navy Warfare
Development Command and USAF - Air Force Experimentation Office. These comments were
submitted by the Services after reviewing a draft of the MC02 final report. An accompanying
USJFCOM response is included where appropriate.
USMC - United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Assessment Area 3 - Assure Access into and through the battlespace. The USMC position has
been, and continues to be, that in the absence of a formal j oint validation of the MC02 federation
of models for the purpose of conducting tactical, operational, and weapon system effectiveness
analysis, modeling and simulation should not be used beyond the purpose of serving as a vehicle
to enhance training.
USJFCOM: The models and simulations used in MC02 went through an internal testing and
accreditation process. The tests provided sufficient data on the technical and functional
characteristics of the federation to allow its accreditation by USJFCOM and its use during MC02
execution. Additionally, the findings and recommendations contained in this report were based on
a combination of different data sources. These sources included responses to warfighter surveys,
SME surveys, and in-focus and azimuth-check sessions with senior leaders. The use of multiple
sources of data is described in the report.
Assessment Area 6 - Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). There remain issues
surrounding the SJFHQ. The relationship of the SJFHQ staff to the regional combatant
commander staff, it's role in day-to-day and operational planning, as well as manpower structure
to man the SJFHQ, continue to be issues of concern. Although supporting the concept of a
SJFHQ, the Marine Corps believes that there is no demonstrated requirement for growth injoint
manpower for the SJFHQ.
Assessment Area 7 - Operational Net Assessment (ONA). The USMC recognizes the capabilities
and limitations of ONA relative to MC02. The tremendous efforts on the part of the US Army to
develop the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process throughout the 1970's and 1980's
should not be lost during the refinement of the ONA concept. The Marine Corps effort to
develop the art ofwarfighting has been a transformation of its own. The Commander's
battlespace area evaluation (CBAE) within the Marine Corps planning process is the result of a
long study of warfighting and how to improve upon the older, IS-step planning model. While
ONA is designed to use existing intelligence products, these efforts should not be lost in the
quest to field ONA. The Marine Corps supports further experimentation with ONA and believe
there is great potential to apply the lessons learned from ONA in order to develop a more
effective IPB and CBAE process for the 21 8t century.
Assessment Area 8 - Effects Based Operations (EBO). The fundamental issue with EBO, since
its inception, has been identifying the "control" within the experiment and what EBO is meant to
accomplish. Effects have always been a fundamental part of mission analysis and course of
action development within our planning process. However, there is great potential to lose sight of
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CBAE analysis when focusing solely on effects during planning and execution. Without a
detailed analysis of critical vulnerabilities, and the tactical, operational, and strategic centers of
gravity, effects can be disjointed and not effectively synchronized. IfEBO is to be a key
transformational concept, it must show value added to the existing planning process through a
comparative experiment. The results of this experiment should demonstrate the viability ofEBO
and whether it should be adopted as a new method of warfighting, a modification of existing
methods, or indicative that existing methodologies remain most effective. The Marine Corps
recommends that the EBO concept be staffed among the Services, regional combatant
commanders, Joint Staff, and agencies in order to facilitate greater understanding and gain
approval.
USJFCOM: The EBO concept remains a concept under development. As such, it continues to be
the subject of experiments and is a focal point for discussion with the Services and combatant
commanders. This discussion and future experimentation will contribute to the refinement of the
EBO concept and ultimately the determination of its utility and viability.
Assessment Area 1 Challenges - Establish and Maintain Information Superiority.

USMC and USJFCOM concur in the relevance and importance of the Common Relevant
Operational Picture (CROP).
Assessment Area 2 Challenges - Rapidly Set Conditions for Decisive Operations. While the
USMC and USJFCOM are in agreement with this section, it must be understood that this has
always been and will continue to be an implied task for the warfighter. Lift, be it strategic or
intra-theater, will always be the limiting factor and will serve as a constraint during the planning
process.
Assessment Area 4 Challenges (conduct decisive Effects Based Operations), Assessment Area 5
Challenges (Sustain the Force), Assessment Area 9 Challenges (Collaborative Information
Environment), Assessment Area 10 Challenges (enhance interagency perspective within
SJFHQ), Assessment Area 11 Challenges (Joint Theater Logistics Management), Assessment
Area 12 Challenges (Joint Initiatives), and Assessment Area 13 Challenges (Joint Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance): Concur with overall assessment.
USA - Training and Doctrine Command
General Comments: The Army welcomed participation in Millennium Challenge 2002, the first
ever large-scale joint field experiment conducted by USJFCOM and the Services. The Army
Transformation Experiment 2002 (ATEx02) was the Army's experiment nested within MC02.
MC02 / ATEx02 highlighted the increased capabilities that the Army's new interim force, the
Stryker Brigade Combat Team, brings to the joint war fight as a highly mobile and lethal early
entry force coupled with the forced entry capability of the 82nd Airborne Division, providing the
JTF commander (US Army III Corps) with the increased capability of conducting operations that
are more rapid and decisive than before.
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While the Army generally concurs with the findings and recommendations contained in this
report, it does offer some additional insights and recommendations.
Finally, USJFCOM should not associate the term findings with results derived solely from
MC02. As a complex, multi-echelon, live-virtual-simulated field experiment there were many
confounding factors that constrain the validity of the results. At best, results from such an event
can be considered insights. They only rise to the level of a finding when collaborated across
multiple events/experiments.
USJFCOM: The text in the Executive Summary and Chapter 8 of the report has been modified to
emphasize that MC02 was the culmination of a series of precursor experiments. The MC02
experiment design was derived from these experiments that documented the performance of
concepts. Consequently, while the specific MC02 report findings and recommendations are
supported by and directly linked to MC02 data, they are part of a larger experimentation
campaign.
General Comments Deployment:

The Final Report does not outright address the intense competition for strategic lift before,
during, and after the operation. This is such an important issue that also has long-term funding
implications if the DoD is going to attempt to rectify some of the deficiencies observed at the
joint level in MC02. Without sufficient lift mediums, JFCOM is relegated to using a set of
constrained deployment options, processes, etc. as it attempts to improve the deployment
efficiency of our forces.
USJFCOM: The report recognizes the competition for strategic lift before, during, and after the
operation and in Assessment Area 2 Finding 1 states, "... the MC02 joint force deployment
planning procedures did not improve joint force planning or help develop the JTF TPFDD."
The Final Report does address that legacy deployment and sustainment systems used in MC02,
which limited the joint forces' ability to conduct RDO. Part of this problem, as the report
addresses, is attributed to the lack of "user-friendly" decision support tools for the deployment
planners in the combatant commands, at the JTF, and at TRANSCOM to conduct feasibility
screening of operational COAs as they are being drafted, track deployment of forces, and
manage the deployment of force effectively and efficiently. JOPES is a good example of a
system that needs to be revised-cumbersome to use. Similarly, the final report identifies a true
need for trained JOPES operators in all of the participating organizations in a j oint exercise.
The Final Report spends a great deal of time and paper addressing the roles, functions, and
locations of deployment personnel in the SJFHQ, JL TMC, and other" experimental"
organizations. In fact, JFCOM apparently formed an impromptu "deployment cell" in the
JTLMC to address pressing strategic lift issues at hand. The joint deployment process and all of
the personnel and information systems thereof are so critical to establishing the conditions for a
successful operation that the leadership needs to pay immediate attention to these areas. Without
technological improvements in information systems and personnel to operate them, JFCOM's
ability to effectively plan for and track deployment operations remains constrained. The final
report does recommend the continued development of the JFCR to improve the deployment
planning process.
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Assessment Area 1 Establish and Maintain Information Superiority (IS):

JFCOM findings indicate that the CJTF was able to attain a high state of situational awareness
(SA) as a result of operating in a Collaborative Information Environment (CIE). Supporting
evidence focuses primarily on the high utility of the IWS tool that enabled collaboration and on
the Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP), which is defined and operationalized as the
SPPS (the web portal used by the JTF to post and display relevant information) in the MC02
report. Situational awareness was assessed largely on the ability to communicate the
commander's intent and for the CJTF to receive feedback that his intent was understood and
resultant actions were consistent with this intent. " .. .if the JTF has an accurate, complete, and
timely picture of the commander's intent, then it has achieved a significant degree of situational
awareness. "
Recommendation: The Common Operational Picture (COP) should playa central role in
achieving IS and SA, with collaborative tools serving as enablers. The USJFCOM MC02 report
placed stronger emphasis on the CROP and IWS (collaboration tool) for achieving SA SA is
much more than having a common understanding of the commander's intent. The COP plays a
critical role in achieving SA and enhancing the quality of the collaboration process. While
situational awareness is enhanced through effective collaboration, the accurate and dynamic
updating of information on the COP is a key element of this collaboration. For the Army, the
COP provides the basis for achieving situational understanding that, in turn, allows the
commander to make decisions. The commander applies judgment to the COP to achieve
situational understanding that supports his decision-making. (FM 6-0) SA, as addressed in this
report, is too narrow in scope. SA is much more than disseminating and understanding the
commander's intent via collaborative tools.
USJFCOM: Text has been added to Chapter 7, Assessment Area 1 to reemphasize the
importance of the COP. The COP, which is incorporated into the collaborative information
environment, does playa critical role in achieving situational understanding. Of note, Assessment
Area 1, Recommendation 2 advocates resolving definitions for terms associated with information
superiority.
Assessment Area 5 - Sustain the Force:

"ISBs and host nation support were used efficiently to minimize the logistics footprint in the
JOA" The experimental construct for MC02 did not provide the logistics rigor to challenge the
Army's CSS concepts and doctrine for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). For example,
the exercise design never required the ARFOR to provide Army Support to Other Services
(ASOS), and the SBCT did not operate at full operational distances. ASOS and operational
distances would likely have a commensurate impact on the size of the logistics footprint in the
JOA, if the SBCT was tasked in accordance with its doctrinal design.
Recommendation: More work is required to draw conclusive insights on the CSS impacts on the
logistic footprint in Rapid Decisive Operations. Incorporate ASOS and operational distances in
future experiments.
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Assessment Area 9 - Collaborative Information Environment (CIE):

After reviewing the USJFCOM CROP White Paper and Chapters 3 and 7 of the USJFCOM
MC02 Final Report, the common definition of CROP and COP and the role they play in
achieving SA within the CIE is unclear. The SPPS is not an effective implementation of the
CROP, as defined: "The CROP presents timely, fused, accurate, assured, and relevant
information that can be tailored to meet the requirements of the j oint force."
Recommendation: JFCOM engage the services in further conceptual work to achieve common
definitions and understanding of CROP, COP, and knowledge management and their relationship
to/within the collaborative information environment. Concept development efforts should focus
initially on the intent/objectives of these concepts, followed by the development of processes
(such as knowledge management and COP management), and finally, on the selection of tools to
support these processes.
Annex C - Assessment Plan:

The JFCOM assessment effort was focused primarily on the JTF and the components. The
Services were primarily focused on the components and below. There was little sharing of data
and emerging insights between the two efforts. Given the more integrated nature of future joint
operations a similar integrated analysis process must be undertaken to fully understand the
implications of emerging joint warfighting concepts.
Recommendation: Additional work is required to develop methods and procedures to plan and
conduct synchronized and integrated j oint analysis during j oint experiments. During MC02,
JFCOM and the Services de-conflicted some of their efforts and shared LNOs, but never got to
an integrated j oint analysis effort. Such an effort should be JFCOM -led with full Service
participation and should include:
The development of a j oint taxonomy for experimentation

A process to create a joint analysis plan, driven by a methodology for identifying and
selecting j oint study issues
Initiatives to synchronize/integrate JFCOM and service data collection processes along with
policies for the sharing of data before, during, and post-experiment
Collaboration of emerging insights during the conduct of the experiment
A process for producing a j oint report rather than (or at least in addition to) separate JFCOM
and service reports
Continued refinement of JFCOM implementation of Model-Exercise-Model (M-E-M) and
synchronization with service experiment efforts. We must create a more collaborative
environment for the development of and sharing of data and insights about emerging joint
and service warfighting concepts.
Annex H - Model and Simulation Federation:

This annex does not provide sufficient lessons learned about the development and use of the
Joint Experiment Federation during MC02. This was a highly successful M&S effort from which
many valuable lessons were learned and should be recorded in the MC02 report.
Recommendation: This annex should outline M&S standards for experimentation that should be
developed so that future federations meet the analytic requirements of warfighting experiments.
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The Army, in response, offers as a starting point-the standards being developed under the AT-
CDEP:
Expand the use of analytic models in experimentation

Utilize certified/classified data
Refine the use of the model-exercise-model (M-E-M) paradigm injoint experimentation to
improve the fidelity and accuracy of the results
Document and enforce technical standards that enable envisioned plug-n-play capabilities
required to quickly modify M&S federations to meet the requirements of various experiment
objectives and execution types
Ensure federations are adequately tested to verify results being produced. Document results
of testing as part of experiment report so that strengths and limitations ofM&S tools are fully
understood by analysts and decision makers
Experiment federation capabilities should be expanded to incorporate aggregate models rather

than be purely entity-based federations. Balancing the use of aggregate and entity-based models
in future federations has many advantages:
Aggregate models can be used to establish an operational context within which tactical
activities occur. This operational context provides a baseline scenario across which multiple
tactical vignettes can be run and increases the consistency of the experimental design
Aggregate models can be used to control entity level simulations and provide higher echelons
of command and control. Employing automated decision-making within an aggregate model
provides an efficient mechanism to control large numbers of entities. This is especially useful
for controlling large numbers of opposing forces
Aggregate models can be used to provide and manage capabilities that are not available at the
tactical level (e.g. operational fires, sensor fields, etc.)
Aggregate models can provide the capability to assess the impact of tactical unit
actions/reactions in the context of a campaign. Additionally, including an aggregate model in
experiment federations allows the efficient capturing of results data. The aggregate model
can then be employed within an M-E-M framework to conduct specific post-exercise analysis
using data consistent with what actually occurred in the experiment
The employment of aggregate models to represent higher and adjacent elements that are not
the primary focus of the experiment can assist in reducing the overhead required to run an
experiment. Eliminates a portion of response cell requirements and reduces costs
USJFCOM: The development and description of modeling and simulation federation standards for
future experimentation is beyond the purview of the MC02 report.
Throughout the report, there is frequent mention of the "poor ISR models" limiting achievement
of some experiment objectives. Models that can effectively integrate live and simulated
environments and those that integrate Service models will look for the "lowest common
denominator." This is a result of the use of Higher Level Architecture (HLA), which ties models
together using common protocols versus using a synchronization protocol. ISR is quickly diluted
in this construct either by limiting the model classification level to Secret or by using non-ISR
specific models (e.g., EADSIM) or both.
M-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Recommendation: JFCOM work with the Services to improve JISR TTP and to develop joint
and Service models and in live/simulations integration. We need a common "road ahead."
Annex K - Experiment Lessons Learned:

Live events with experiments such as MC02 should not be disconnected from the scenario as one
of these lessons learned indicates. Synchronized and well-integrated live events infuse a degree
of realism and friction into purely simulated activities that can be leveraged to gain more
accurate feedback, rather than declaring this too hard and disconnecting live events from the
scenario, JFCOM and the services should be exploring exercise and experiment control
processes to more effectively integrate them into the experiment.
Recommendations:
Collaborative tools should be leveraged to integrate the analysis efforts of JFCOM and the
servIces.
The solution to JFCOM gaining more accurate data from experiment activities and remote
(i.e. service experiment) locations is not to send more J9 personnel to collect it. The solution
is to integrate data collection and analysis processes so that a more synchronized and
resource effective approach can be taken to collecting the data necessary to support joint,
JFCOM and service experiment objectives.
No mention was made in this section of the requirement to improve the synchronization and
integration of exercise control functions between JFCOM and the Services. The Army
operated experiment control groups/technical support cells at distributed locations (The
National Training Center, Ft Irwin, CA; Ft Bragg, NC; Camp Lejeune, NC; Nellis, AFB,
NV; and TASC, JFWC, Suffolk, VA) during the execution ofMC02. There was no direct
linkage from JFCOM to any of these cells. The Army M&S Control Group, a sub group of
the overall Army Experiment Control Group, did have JFCOM personnel and equipment to
ensure the viability of the Army Federation at NTC and the Star Wars Complex at NTC run
by operations group had JFCOM representatives, as well, and a ISW system, but that was the
extent of interaction and control.
USJFCOM: A more comprehensive set of lessons learned derived from all of the Services'
experimentation experiences can be discussed at future forums.
USN - Navy Warfare Development Command
General Comment: All background Navy information (participating commands, locations and
nodes etc.) is accurate and complete.
General Comment: There is balanced coverage of Service inputs and pictures of Navy
participation.
General Comment: Positive comments on SJFHQ, ONA, JFI, and CIE.ONA, JFI and CIE
concepts continue to be cornerstones of the JFCOM experimentation focus. Reinforces the need
to ensure Navy concept development and experimentation stays synchronized with this work.
FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONLY M-7

General Comment: Overall, the report is well written. Only significant Navy issue is how the
access part is portrayed (Assessment Area 3 - Assured Access Into and Through the
Battlespace). Concur with all general findings and recommendations.
Assured Access: There was accurate and balanced coverage of the opening salvo of hostilities by
CJTF-S (Red) on U.S. forces, particularly JFMCC. JFCOM points out the fact that the CROP
and M&S fidelity did not support tactical level actions and the JFMCC had done sufficient
detailed planning for the anti-access phase, but "there was an apparent failure at the JTF level to
assimilate and integrate the JFMCC JOA entry plan into a coherent JTF level plan." It was noted
that most ship casualties were from a combination of CDCMs, mines and swarm attacks. It was
also noted 11 ships were destroyed by enemy missile attacks, but 76% of offensive enemy
missiles were destroyed in flight.
What the report fails to point out is that Assured Access was never an objective or initiative of
the experiment. Additionally, the discussion of Assessment Area 3, Finding 6 ("Blue had
moderate success in providing operational air, space and missile defense") is not consistent with
the discussion of experiment design and simulation shortfalls in Assessment Area 1 (Establish
and Maintain Information Superiority), Finding 4 ("While operating in the collaborative
environment the JTF was able to minimize, but not prevent, surprise attacks by opposing
forces").
USJFCOM: Assured Access was not an initiative, but it was identified as a warfighting objective in
Chapter 3. The perceived inconsistency between Assessment Area 3 and the discussion of
shortfalls in Assessment Area 1 is addressed in the next comment.
In the Assured Access area of the report, nothing is mentioned about the federation of models
and intelligence white cell support that were used, which did not provide the level of intelligence
support (tactical indications & warning) that would be available in real world ops. Given a more
realistic tactical I&W capability, the Blue forces would probably have received indicators of the
Red preemptive attack. The finding in the Information Superiority area that "Because of these
(intelligence support & simulation) anomalies, few valid insights can be gained by trying to
deduce more out of these events." makes Finding 6 in the Assured Access area problematic.
USJFCOM: The discussion statement in Assessment Area 1 that includes ".. .few valid insights
can be gained ... " overstates the limitations discussed in Chapter 6 and has been deleted. Text
has been modified in Assessment Area 3 to state that the results (as are all results) are
presented in the context of the experimental limitations and assumptions as presented in Chapter
6.
USAF - Air Force Experimentation Office
Executive Summary: Critical. The statement in the Joint Fires Initiative (JFI) section of the
Executive Summary, "The JTF targeting cell could direct the most available and most
appropriate shooter to destroy the target without a cumbersome process of manually passing the
target information across components" implies that the JTF targeting cell exercised direct tactical
execution control over joint forces. The joint targeting process employed in MC02 provided for
M-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONIIY

the functional components, not the JTF targeting cell, to "direct" assigned forces to attack
targets. These attacks were coordinated through the deliberate or time critical targeting process.
As written, this statement does not reflect the way tactical control was exercised during MC02.
Neither the MC02 concepts, nor the agreed procedures called for the JTF staff to exercise direct
tactical control over joint forces. The functional components exercised tactical control over
assigned and attached forces.
Recommendation: Change the statement to read, "The common picture enabled the functional
components to quickly coordinate and task the most appropriate shooter to attack emerging, time
critical targets."
USJFCOM: Text in the Executive Summary of the report has been modified to clarify the JTF's
role in 'control over joint fires'. During MC02, the JTF targeting process operated in a 'by
exception only'mode, monitoring the actions of the components as described, intervening only if
deemed necessary. The intent, using the collaboration system, was to have all critical decision
makers aware of all information at all times, so no intervention decisions would be necessary.
While almost all missions were executed in this manner, the JTF commander did intervene in one
instance. Furthermore, functional components were critical members of the virtual JTF targeting
cell.
Executive Summary: Substantive. The sentence "The JISR concept increased the JTF's ability to
synchronize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, but the tools provided
require more development before fielding system" does not accurately reflect the intention of the
JISR effort.
Accuracy. There was no stated intent to develop a JISR tool from MC02. While lessons learned
from MC02 may influence the development such tools, this was not the focus of the JISR effort
at the time.
Recommendation: Remove or change reference to "tools provided require more development

before fielding the system."
USJFCOM: Text in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7, Assessment Area 13 of the report has been
modified to clarify the role of the tools that are associated with the JISR concept. While JISR tools
may not have been the original or primary focus of assessment of the JISR concept, their use and
potential value became relevant to the overall assessment of the JISR concept as the experiment
progressed.
Executive Summary/Assessment Area 7 (ONA): Substantive. The sentence "Its value was
somewhat mitigated by lack of clear concept definition and understanding" is missing the
importance of lack of data.
Accuracy. Incomplete data was another contributing factor in the ONA concept not providing
significant value added to planning process. The ONA assessment section (AA7) of the report
acknowledges the lack of "A concentrated ONA repository of analyzed and unanalyzed
information focused on a specific topic or geographical area did not exist."
F OR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V M-9

Recommendation: Add to the sentence stating the lack of data was also a major mitigating
factor.
USJFCOM: Text in Chapter 7, Assessment Area 7 of the report has been modified to address the
importance of incomplete data and its relevancy to assessing the ONA concept.
Executive Summary: Substantive. "The top priority of this challenge should be to develop a tool
that allows the JTF to visualize the interrelationship of the systems." Sentence fails to
acknowledge that "data," along with the tools, is a major requirement of ONA.
Accuracy. We contend that the TTPs required to generate and maintain data must precede tool
development as a top priority in the ONA effort.
Recommendation: Change sentence to read that the data should be the top priority or just as
important as improving the visualization piece.
USJFCOM: Text in the Executive Summary has been modified to address the importance of
generating and maintaining data and its relationship to ONA tool development.
Assessment Area 13: Substantive. Document needs to define scope of JISR that was
experimented during the MC02 event.
Clarity. Need to provide those unfamiliar to MC02 the limited scope of JISR experimentation.
That is, many believe JISR covers the whole gamut of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance to include intelligence production, analysis, TPED, etc. However, the JISR
concept used in this experiment was narrowly focused on collection management, ISR
operations, etc.
Recommendation: Clarify the JISR activities that were addressed during MC02.
USJFCOM: Text has been inserted in Chapter 3 that defines the experimental scope of the JISR
concept.
Assessment Area 4, Finding 2, Recommendation 16: Administrative. The paragraph beginning

"Overall the majority of respondents said the use of ADOCS as a common targeting toolset had
great potential." The last sentence reads, "Due to the potential ADOCS showed during this
experiment, it should be fielded as a targeting tool."
ADOCS is transitioning through FlOP to the service systems of record. The word interim should
be submitted to keep the recommendations consistent throughout the report. See (in other areas)
where it states again that ADOCS is being fielded as an interim TST toolset
Recommendation: The word "interim" should be added so the sentence reads, "Due to the
potential ADOCS showed during this experiment, it should be fielded as an interim targeting
tool."
USJFCOM: In Chapter 7, Assessment Area 4, the word "interim" has been added when
referencing the fielding of ADOCS. Recommendation 16 includes the word "interim."
M-10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V

Annex N -Index
A C
AAR ............................ 114, 123, 176,250, 5 CC .................... 208, 249, 250, 298, 299, 395
ADOCSiii,20, 110, 113, 118, 119, 122, 123, CIE ... ii, iii, v, vi, viii, 14, 15, 19, 46, 50, 52,
124, 127, 129, 131, 132, 134, 135, 141, 53,55,56,57,58,60,61,64,66,67,69,
148,150,167,206,294,299,330,331, 70,71,72,74,77,78,79,80,85,86,90,
351,356,363,364,365,366,367,376, 95, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 117, 118,
378,387,440,444, 1, 17, 10, 19,36,41, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 131,
1,9,23,27,29,30,33,35,36,37,38,39, 132, 133, 135, 137, 140, 141, 146, 148,
50, 52, 79 149,151,158,159,160,162,163,172,
After Action Review 76, 163,241,242,400, 173,181,197,199,205,208,222,226,
415,427,8,3,5 227,228,229,230,231,232,296,330,
Air Tasking Order ..................... 18, 5, 34, 88 331,332,333,334,337,338,341,342,
AJC2 .............................................. 164, 1, 11 343,346,348,349,354,355,357,359,
Army Transformation Experiment .... 175, 18 363,374,375,377,378,382,385,386,
Assessment ...................................... 351,352 387,388,389,390,391,392,393,394,
Assured Access .... 10, 67, 86, 105, 159, 182, 399,402,403,404,411,412,413,421,
231,351,433,435,437,1,14,15,24,36 443,3,9,15,19,2,3,5,25,27,28,19,
ATEX ...................................................... 175 63, 77, 81
ATO 35,37,38,39, 113, 114, 115, 116, 121, COA ... 17, 21, 70, 74, 76, 79, 103, 137, 158,
125, 129, 131, 143, 149, 167,356, 18,30, 173,174,195,203,209,213,221,222,
5,6, 11,30,34,61,62, 88 269,290,291,323,324,330,331,332,
Azimuth Check. .. 75,90, 109, 125, 132, 163, 333,334,335,336,337,338,340,342,
241,256,329,335,400 343,347,348,352,390,392,424,4,25,
26,27,28,50
B COEI97, 201, 205, 213, 231, 232, 340, 2, 19
Baseline Collective Assessment ............... 164 Collaboration .... 79, 105, 110, 113, 117, 118,
Battle rhythm ............................................. 86 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 133, 141, 145,
Battlespace89, 213, 275, 10, 16,40,42, 5, 9, 167,350,359,376,382,383,384,391,
10,13,16,24,28,32,36,52,60,61,65, 439,442,446,1,15,16,17,18,20,45,
68, 75, 86, 87, 88 65,66
BCA ......................................................... 164 Collaborative .. ii, iii, 14,62,67, 85, 86, 119,
BCCWG. 162, 185, 186, 197,205,207,208, 122,148,159,172,184,230,344,349,
209,226,227,229,231,234 351,354,360,377,392,399,400,402,
BDA ..... 35,37,38, 109, 110, 112, 113, 121, 431,434,446,3,9,15,19,20,2,3,6,10,
122, 123, 124, 125, 134, 135, 142, 144, 11, 12,28,30,31,34,39, 15, 16, 17,26,
145,146,150,211,245,246,247,254, 30,32,52,54,4
255,300,338,345,346,350, 1, 18, 19, Collaborative Information Environment .... ii,
36,4,62,73,88 iii, 14,62,67, 74, 86, 113, 148, 159,230,
Blue Forces .................. 9,23, 80, 365, 14, 15 351,354,377,399,400,402,434,435,
BluelRed Cell ............................ 209,210,27 446,9,15,19,2,3,6,28,31,4
Bomb Damage Assessment ......................... 2 Combat Assessment .............................. 3,28
Branches .......................................... 113, 114 Command and Control ... 24,25, 53, 62, 163,
BRC ......................... 209, 210, 226, 227, 346 164,167,206,233,238,355,358,370,
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY N-l

372,382,440, 1,3, 11, 15, 17, 18,21,22, Deployment .... iii, vii, 20, 21, 74, 76, 78, 79,
23,27,2, 11,37,39, 12, 7, 1, 14,24,28, 85, 86, 87, 154, 158, 159, 190,226,235,
29,33,56,57,59,67,84,1,2,3 236,414,415,420,421,422,423,427,
Command Group ...... 14, 162,201,206,233, 428,429,431,435,436,16,23,28,15
234,395,403 Desired Effects ............................................ 5
Common Operational Picture ..... 354,393,4, DIE ... 87, 110, 135, 136, 148, 150, 151,299,
19,28,42,18,32,39 348, 19
Common Relevant Operational Picture ...... 9, DIME .... 16, 18,26,90,91,92,95, 105, 108,
153,256,264,4, 11, 19,42, 5 110, Ill, 112, 136,239,243,245,267,
Compel ............................................ 267, 294 271,272,278,282,294,302,303,312,
CONEMP ................................ 166,168,233 313,336,337,339,340,341,345,352,
CONOPS 16,20, 76, 78, 134, 150, 154, 159, 408,411, 5, 10, 13,2, 16,24,26,27, 18,
166,167,200,232,415,437,19,3,4,5, 77,2,3
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,25,30,31,32, 50, DOTMLPF .70, 86, 105, 148, 149, 159,231,
63,64,65,86 264,265,352,393,394,411,435,440,
CONPLAN ..... 135, 137, 167, 168, 176,345, 446,20,1,2,4,9,14,19,28,34,39,48,
420,4 52,60,75,85,88
Contingency Plan .................................... 409 DST ................................... 414,415,416,33
COP ...... 1, 14,20,40,44,45,62,63,64,90,
122, 141, 167,205,354,355,356,358, E
359,363,364,365,366,367,368,369, EA. .. 17, 18,24,90, 122, 138, 167, 192,204,
370,375,378,385,393,4,19,6,8,28, 211,345,350,351,4,20
29,34,36,42,6,1,7,9,21,23,26,27,57 EAC 113, 122, 123, 125, 136, 144, 150,207,
COSCOM ........................................... 7, 196 210,211,226,227,319,337,338,339,
Critical Enablers ...................... 242, 257, 258 340,341,342,343,345,346,347,348,
CROP ... 9, 11, 14, 17,20,22, 53, 55, 58, 62, 350,20,28
63,64,67,68, 80, 90, 119, 153, 155, 156, EBOii, iv, v, vi, 9, 10, 11, 16, 18,22,26,62,
159, 167, 168, 173,221,228,330,331, 68,81,85,86,90,98, 105, 106, 108, 110,
347,349,350,354,356,357,358,359, Ill, 112, 113, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125,
363,370,377,378,379,380,381,382, 135, 136, 138, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151,
389,397,414,416,417,418,419,432, 158, 159, 163, 165, 167, 172, 173, 177,
434,447,4, 11, 19,3,6, 8, 10, 14, 16,21, 179, 182, 183, 184, 186,230,231,232,
25,28,29,30,34,37,39,1,5,1,9,19, 239,242,248,256,258,265,267,268,
21,23,30,32,50,60,62,67 296,302,329,335,336,345,350,352,
383,385,389,394,399,407,412,429,
D
434,6,20,1,2,3,5,6,7,9,12,18,19,
Database.40, 41, 44, 85, 158,241,268,276, 20,25,1,2,3,4,6,9,10,33,35,57,59,
277,307,308,310,311,375,434, 19,20, 60,61,76,77,79,88
24,25,34,6,7,8,29,37 EBP ... 16, 17,21,22,90, 125, 167, 186, 198,
Database Login ........ 241,307,308,310,311 329,330,331,332,336,338,339,340,
Decision Cycle .......................................... 14 342,351,6
Decision Support Tools 11, 85, 87,414,436, Education ......................... 232,264,330,352
55 Effects Assessment ..... 17,90, Ill, 121, 122,
Defeat .......................................... 267, 294, 5 123, 125, 136, 144, 145, 150, 167,210,
Deficiency Analysis ...... .. ............ 125, 150, 5 211,214,216,230,329,430,20,28
Deploy ................................. 76, 154,415,66
N-2 F OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Effects Assessment Cell. 121, 125, 144, 145, 407,408,409,410,411,2,31,32,63,64,

210,211,430 67
Effects Packages .............................. 112, 137 lAC. 13, 16, 18, 19, 178, 190, 197,201,202,
Effects Tasking Order ...... 13, 287, 333, 343, 205,206,213,231,232,233,315,341,
400,6,9,21,4,78 385,400,401,404,406,407,409,410,
Effects-Based Operations .... iv, 9, 10, 16, 60, 411, 10,23,25,27, 1
68,80, 108, 148, 159,230,329,351,6, IMO ............................. 69, 172,389,393,22
20, 1,2,6, 18,25, 14,6,9, 13, 16,32,35, Influence .................... 267,294, 303, 336, 77
57,65 Information Management Officer ............. 22
Effects-Based Planning ...... 16,90, 185, 198, Information Operations ..... .iii, vi, 2, 93, 112,
329,332,6 142, 147, 167, 173, 174, 191, 192, 195,
Electronic Warfare ............................ 7,23,3 212,213,399,440,7,9,12,14,22,23,7,
Enhanced Decision-Making .................... 288 20,39, 14, 15, 16,4, 1,2,3,4,6,64, 1
ETO ...... 13,20,21, 110, 113, 114, 115, 120, Information Operations Cell .................... 212
121, 122, 124, 129, 130, 131, 136, 140, Information Superiority 9, 14, 15, 52, 53, 54,
149,150,179,196,202,203,204,212, 62,66,67, 147, 150, 162, 166, 182, 185,
216,217,218,221,223,224,230,247, 189,192,204,206,230,233,236,302,
287,288,289,296,303,314,315,322, 414,445,446,9,22,14,12,2,6,8,10,
323,333,340,343,344,346,348,350, 27,33
400,424,425,429,6,12,21,18,21,24, Information Superiority Group. 14, 150, 162,
27,28,30,34,35,51,78 192,204,206,233,251,302,345,445,
EW ................................... 143, 204, 212, 7, 3 446,9,2,6
Information Workspace ............................... 9
F InformationlKnowledge Management Group
Force Protection ...................... 202,226,235 ....................................................... 20~ 11
Forward Headquarters ............. 165, 187, 188 Infrastructure .... 31,39, 85, 14,26, 12, 18, 1,
FRAGO ........... 60,61, 115, 131, 140,296, 8 16,63
Interagency iv, 2, 13, 18, 19,23,26, 86, 136,
G 148, 159, 165, 178, 190,242,339,347,
351,361,377,389,399,400,403,406,
General Officer.. ............................ 21,439, 1 411,412,413,434,9, 10,2,3, 5, 6, 23,
GO ......................... .. ...... ... ....... 206,232,234 27,30,31,1,4,7,32
Interagency Community .. iv, 13,361,377,9,
H
10,27
High Payoff Target List.. ................... 116, 18 IO ... vi, vii, 93, 105, 106, 109, 112, 115, 117,
High Speed Vessel .. 11, 23, 76, 153, 157,22 118, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 151,
HNS ................................................... 83,197 167, 174, 186, 191, 192, 194, 195, 198,
Host Nation Support ... 86,99, 159, 197,226, 202,203,204,206,212,213,219,221,
434 222,233,236,237,297,313,340,342,
HPTL. ................................................ 116, 18 344,346,348,350,392,440,7,9,14,22,
HSV 4, 11, 76, 77, 83, 96, 153, 157, 167,22, 20,21,39,18,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,64,85,88
12,43,44,46 IOC .......................................... 212,213,227
IS9, 52, 58, 85,117,123,142,144,145,
I 150, 158, 181, 192, 193, 194, 199,204,
IA.. 85, 86, 87, 136, 158, 159,227,340,371, 206,222,227,230,231,236,385,402,
399,400,401,402,403,404,405,406, 424,9,22
FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONI,V N-3

ISB. .......... 9, 75, 77, 79, 87, 156,415, 15,34 JFI.ii,22, 108, 110, 131, 132, 148, 150,440,
ISG. 112, 123, 162, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 23, 10,36, 1,9,29,30,31,32,34,35,38,
195,202,203,204,205,206,210,216, 52, 88
219,230,235,236,319,445,446,2,4,37 JFLCC .... 1, 5, 8,23,24,25,61,96,97, 113,
ISR.vi, 10,22,24,34,48,62,68,91,95,98, 114, 115, 118, 126, 130, 131, 143, 147,
99, 100, 101, 106, 110, 121, 122, 123, 149, 157, 185, 198, 199,298,310,311,
124, 131, 144, 145, 148, 150, 192,203, 350,354,356,366,368,371,372,383,
204,213,216,219,230,236,237,343, 392,418,422,429,433,11,23,5,8
350,402,439,441,442,443,444,445, JFMCC 1,4, 8,20,23, 59, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98,
446,447,3,7,10,16,35,36,40,41,42, 103, 114, 115, 116, 118, 121, 130, 131,
5,6, 1, 5, 10, 13,35,36,37,38,39, 73, 75 137, 138, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147,
IWS ... .iii, 54, 56, 57, 58, 62, 64, 65, 69, 113, 153, 157,255,275,297,310,311,330,
117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 127, 354,356,365,369,370,371,373,375,
129, 131, 132, 135, 141, 148, 167, 173, 376,429, 11,23, 5, 8, 3, 33
214,215,228,294,330,356,357,359, JIACG ..... ii, iv, vii, 8, 16, 18, 19,68,90,99,
360,361,369,376,377,378,379,381, 108, Ill, 129, 135, 136, 143, 148, 149,
382,384,387,388,390,399,403,404, 150,190,206,230,231,232,233,242,
407,416,418,439,444,9,34,41,1,15, 256,312,313,314,317,318,319,320,
16,18,19,20,26,27,34,35,36,37,38, 321,322,336,337,339,340,399,400,
39,51,52,65,78,81 401,402,403,404,405,406,407,408,
409,410,411,412,23,3,26,31,32, 17
J JIM .......................................................... 343
J419, 160, 196,214,226,420,421,422, JIPB 98, 297, 314, 316, 334, 335, 10,26,33,
425,427,3 80
JCB ... 58, 114, 116, 119, 122, 126, 137, 140, JIPTL. ................................ 114, 116, 125, 18
211,213,214,215,217,221,224,227, JISC ........... 58, 218, 219, 220, 226, 227, 345
288,297,346,349,350,377,378,5,6,7 JISE ... 204, 211, 216, 226, 346, 350,442, 35
JCBWG ........................................... 215,227 JL Tools ........................... 159, 418, 433, 434
JCMC ................ 167, 216, 227, 443, 444, 37 JLMC .. 19, 76, 154, 173, 174,414,415,418,
mCAT .75, 89, 90, 109, 163,312,313,314, 419,420,421,422,426,427,428,429,
315,316,317,318,319,320,321,322, 430,432,435,3
323,324,325,326,327,399,23 JOA. .... 48, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85,
JECG 2, 8, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 54, 59, 68, 86,87,90,91,92,93,94,95,99,101,
76, 82, 83, Ill, 146, 154, 166, 190, 193, 103, 104, 106, 112, 113, 119, 122, 126,
296,348,429,441,23,2,3,4,5,9,10, 130, 137, 138, 141, 148, 153, 154, 155,
11, 17, 1,3,4, 84, 1 156, 157, 158, 159, 176, 197,203,313,
JEMPRS-NT. .... ii, 57, 71, 377, 378, 440, 11, 339,344,351,356,397,414,415,416,
37,1,26,27,28,48 420,422,434,435,10,6,14,16,17,18,
JF ACC ...... 2, 6, 8, 23, 24, 44, 94, 96, 97, 98, 20,21,22,24,33,34, 10, 12, 16, 11, 12,
114, 116, 118, 122, 125, 126, 129, 130, 22,54,67,70,1
131, 132, 144, 147, 198,218,255,354, JOC. 203,213,220,223,227,319,323,346,
371, 372, 375, 384, 391, 429, 11,23, 5, 8, 347,348,350,351,369,392,421,423,
39, 10, 5, 6, 7, 14, 50, 71, 86 425,429,442,444,27,37
JFE. .................... 98, 117, 131,218,349,442 Joint ColI ecti on Management Cell .......... 216
JFEWG .................................... 217, 218, 227 Joint Coordination Board ... 56,60,213,214,
215,288,377,2,3,4
N-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Joint Coordination Board Working Group JSOTF ....... 2, 8,23,24,96,97,98, 113, 115,
............................................................. 215 116, 126, 130, 131, 137, 139, 141, 149,
Joint Experiment Control Group 8, 415, 1,3, 199,250,255,335,354,371,372,376,
10, 1 392,422,440,24,5,8,12,39,1,49,50,
Joint Fires Element .................................. 217 51, 52, 53, 71, 72, 73
Joint Fires Element Working Group ....... 217 JTA 106, 137, 141, 142, 146, 147, 11,24,20
Joint Fires Initiative .. ii, v, 22, 108, 124, 126, JTAV .. 11, 20, 85,431,433,436,24, 54, 55,
131, 148,440,23, 10,36, 1, 8, 9, 29 56
Joint Force Targeting ...................... 122, 173
Joint Information Superiority Center ..... 218, K
345 KIMP .. 65,69, 166, 168, 172, 193,205,233,
Joint Integrated Tasking Order ................ 149 378,379,380,382,385,386,389,390,
Joint Integration Matrix ................... 343, 344 392,393
Joint Intelligence Support Element ... 226, 35 KM ..... 69, 70, 192, 193, 199,204,205,206,
J oint Intelligence, Surveillance, 212,237,376,378,379,380,382,385,
Reconnaissance ............................. 230, 88 386,390,391,392,395,424,425,27
Joint Interagency Coordination Group .. ii, iv, KMG ....... 162, 189, 191, 193,202,204,205,
149,317,399,400,23,3,31,32 206,237
Joint Logistics Management Center... 19, 76, Knowledge Base ...... 241,245,264,265,434
414,415,420,425,3 Knowledge Information Management Plan
Joint Operations Area ................................ 76 ............................................... 65,205,379
Joint Operations Center.. .. 18, 166,219,220, Knowledge Management.. .... 14, 48, 69, 159,
235,369,421,442,41 162, 166, 167, 172, 185, 189,202,205,
Joint Planning Center ... 18,20,21, 174,202, 206,233,237,302,359,376,379,385,
221,336,421,423 386,389,414,27,64
Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
.................................................. vi, 2,8,23 L
Joint Special Operations Task Force ..... 2,24
Joint Standard Operating Procedures ...... 166 LARBI9, 20, 21, 80, 86,159,224,225,227,
Joint Tactical Actions. 100, 112, 142, 11, 12, 230,414,420,422,425,426,427,428,
20 429,434,436,3
Joint Total Asset Visibility ... 11, 20,85,431, LNO 163, 196,206,227,228,229,391,403,
24, 54 404, 73
JOPES. 85, 87,202,203,423,424,430,431, LOG ......................................................... 167
435,436,54,56 Log CROP 20,75,80,81,86, 153, 154, 155,
JPC ..... 20,21, 143, 174, 198,202,213,221, 156, 157, 159, 160,264,357,414,416,
222,227,314,315,317,318,319,323, 417,418,420,425,430,434,54
330,336,337,338,339,340,341,342, Logistic Action Response Board ... 19, 423, 3
343,345,346,347,348,350,421,423, Logistics .ii, v, 11, 19,20,21,24,68, 76, 77,
428,435,436 79, 80, 85, 86, 87, 96, 129, 153, 154, 155,
JPOTF ... 2, 8,23,25,96,97, 198,23, 5, 8, 5, 159, 162, 167, 173, 191, 192, 196, 198,
6,7,47 202,205,206,224,225,230,233,377,
JSOP ..... 20, 76, 78, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168, 380,382,395,414,415,416,417,418,
170, 171, 172,203,205,233,414,416, 419,420,421,422,423,424,425,426,
420,423,424,429,435,436,24,15,22, 428,429,430,435,436,439,8,24,2,3,
23,33 6, 10, 16,21,22,32,33,35,36, 10, 12, 1,
53,54,55,68
FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONI,V N-5

Logistics Action Response Board .... 80, 159, 324,325,326,329,330,331,333,334,

224,225,414,426 335,336,337,338,339,345,350,352,
Logistics Support Group 162, 191,414,424, 385,389,393,395,396,399,401,411,
425 412,418,434,439, 7, 13, 14,25, 1,2,3,
5,6,9,10,12,18,24,25,26,27,30,34,
M 35,38, 1, 11, 12, 15,2,9,37,38,51,52,
M&S ... 33,34,37,41,44,45, 75, 89, 91, 98, 61,62,76,77,78,79,80,81,87
108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 122, 123, 124, ONA Current Summary .................. 252, 282
125,131,144,150,151,312,338,345, ONA Database 252, 263, 267, 268, 269, 270,
371,419,431,24, 10, 1,4,6,9, 11,61,62 276,282,302,305,395,79,80
Maritime Tasking Order.. .................. 114, 25 ONA Knowledge Base ... 241,242,244,245,
METOC ............................................. 204, 25 254,260,262,264,273,276,282,294,
Mission Analysis ............................... 403, 25 302,304,434
MOE ... 17, 122,342, 345, 346, 348, 350, 12, ONA Matrix ... 241,252,267,282,302,304,
41, 88 395,396
MOP ............................ 17,345,346,350, 12 ONA Products ................................. 241,267
MTOl13, 114, 115, 116, 121, 125, 129, 131, ONA References ..... 241,252,267,282,395
144, 149, 167,25 ONA Today .... 241,252,261,267,282,304,
307,308,310,311
N ONA TooL ...... 439, 10, 2, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81
Operational Combat Assessment ... 108, 11 0,
N-A-E Link ..................................... 276, 277 123
Nodes ................. 268, 276, 279, 296, 303, 81 Operational Net Assessment .. ii, v, 2, 15,67,
148,158,166,167,230,239,297,299,
o 314,351,5,13,25,1,2,6,23,35,39,40,
Observation .... 58, 62, 64, 65, 66, 69, 84, 85, 1
104,146,158,244,246,247,250,256, Operational-Level ...................................... 13
261,263,264,296,297,298,299,350, Operations Group ... 2, 14, 19, 162, 178, 196,
378,382,384,385,386,389,409,410, 203,206,233,414,420,422,425,435,3,
435,445,1,2,3,4,5 38,39
ONA ... ii, v, 2, 13, 15, 16, 17,26, 50, 67, 68, Operations Order ....................................... 14
81,85,90,98,106,108,110,113,117, Operations Security ................................... 87
118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 126, 127, 135, OPFORvii, viii, 9, 26, 34, 36, 38, 44, 48,81,
136, 144, 148, 149, 150, 156, 158, 166, 82, 83, 88, 93, 95, 98, 99, 102, 108, Ill,
167, 168, 175, 176, 179, 182, 183, 184, 112, 116, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 135,
192,197,200,202,203,204,216,217, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144,
230,231,232,236,239,240,241,242, 145,146,156,205,274,275,279,316,
243,244,245,246,247,248,249,250, 317,318,325,343,348,365,25,3,4,5,
251,252,253,254,255,256,257,258, 6, 1,2,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
259,260,261,262,263,264,265,266, 18,6,62, 1,2,3, 1
267,268,269,270,271,272,273,274, OPORD ............................. .. .............. 221, 14
275,276,277,278,279,280,281,282, OPSEC ...................................... 104, 204, 87
283,284,285,286,287,288,289,290,
291,292,293,294,296,297,298,299, P
300,301,302,303,304,305,306,307, PAO .... ....... 143, 192, 196, 197,201,212,11
308,309,310,311,312,313,314,315,
316,317,318,319,320,321,322,323,
N-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,V

PEL. ...... 21,60, 74, 113, 114, 115, 116, 120, Redviii, ix, 20, 26, 28, 35, 36, 38, 44, 83, 93,
121, 124, 125, 150,217,218,286,287, 95, 100, 123, 125, 138, 144, 145, 157,
288,291,322,333,334,338,350,352, 235,243,251,267,271,272,273,274,
425,445,26,18,24,26,38,39 289,290,301,302,303,308,310,312,
PG ... 162, 189, 191, 192, 194, 196, 198,202, 315,316,317,318,322,323,325,326,
203,204,206,220,230,235,236 337,338,343,347,350,386,395,396,
Planning Tool ................................ 12, 39, 49 446,24,27,4,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9,11,14,
Plans Group 14, 78, 150, 162, 175, 192, 196, 17, 18,3,4, 12,30,35,63, 77, 1,3,4
202,206,233,263,302,414,415,422, Regional Combatant Command ...... 242, 254
424,425,429,436,39,62 Regional Combatant Commander ........... 254
PME ............ iv, 149,245,256,264,265,266 Request For Information ........................... 51
PMESII. 16, 17,26,90,91,95,98, 100, 101, Resources .......... 85, 147,268,294,9,54,81
110, 112, 120, 148,239,240,243,245, RFI69,175,313,390,391,395,422,425,2,
252,267,271,272,273,274,279,282, 4,37,51,60
294,301,302,303,312,313,315,316, Rhythm ................ 172, 362, 376, 384, 22, 33
317,318,336,337,339,340,341,352, ROE 105, 106, 113, 114, 125, 157,220,222,
13, 14,2,6, 17, 18, 19,23,24,26,27, 18, 223,227, 19,30,9, 10, 17, 18,27, 1
77 ROEWG .......................................... 223, 224
Political-Military .... ....... .. ...... .. ...... .. .... 19,32
POLMIL .................................................. 166 S
Predictive Analysis .................. 113, 123, 150 SA ... 113, 179, 180, 184, 192, 193, 199,201,
PREPO 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 54 204,207,208,211,220,221,229,230,
Prioritized Effects List21, 60, 213, 287, 333, 231,236,247,348,349,351,392,410,
26 414,416,425,26,12,28,50,56,57,58,
Professional Military Education ................. iv 59, 79, 80
Psychological Operations ......... vi, vii, 25, 14 SCD 146,241,247,250,251,256,259,264,
PSYOP ... 112, 142, 143, 167,204,212,297, 296,297,298,299,312,400,401,404,
14,20 407,408,410
SCI ............................. 146, 233, 40, 20, 52,2
R Senior Concept Developer/Mentor.. ............ 1
Rapid Decisive Operations ...... ii, vi, 76, 153, Senior Concept Developers ..... viii, 114, 141,
154, 164, 167,404,415,439, 5, 15,26, 1, 163,164,401,441,444,445
2,34,1,12,32,34,39,50,63 Sensitive Compartmented Information26, 85
RCC ................................................. 230,242 Sequels .................................... 113, 114, 137
RDOii, iii, iv, vi, vii, 1,9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, Shared Point Portal Server ...................... 379
16,18,21,22,26,47,52,60,66,67,72, Situation Awareness .................................. 44
76,77,81,87,90,91,92,93,95,101, Situational Awareness ...... 55, 124, 135, 141,
102, 105, 106, Ill, 115, 135, 136, 137, 148,26,8,14,37,41,36,39,56,78,79,4
147, 153, 154, 155, 158, 160, 164, 165, SJA .................................. 196, 197,201,224
166,179,209,239,340,405,406,407, SJFHQ ..... ii, iv, 1, 13, 14, 16,20,23,26,67,
415,421,422,423,439,447,6,11,13, 72, 76, 78, 85, 87, 149, 150, 154, 158,
15,26, 1,2,3,4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169,
16,21,22,23,33,34, 1,9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 170,172,174,175,176,177,178,179,
16, 17, 18, 1,2,3,6,9, 10, 11, 19,33,49, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188,
52,56,60,61,63,79,84,85,88 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196,
197,198,199,200,201,202,203,204,
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONJ~ Y N-7

205,206,207,209,210,211,212,214, 301,330,336,340,380,384,403,423,
218,222,224,226,227,228,229,230, 426,431,432,444,1,4,1,3,4,6,18,55,
231,232,233,234,235,242,261,263, 56, 77, 81, 84
264,270,275,284,296,297,302,310, SPPS iii, v, 20, 69, 75, 89, 90, 109, 113, 123,
311,335,351,376,380,388,392,393, 127, 141, 148, 167, 191,229,252,282,
399,402,411,412,414,415,421,422, 294,302,304,306,307,308,309,310,
423,424,425,428,434,435,436,446, 330,331,357,370,376,377,379,381,
447, 1,2, 7, 11, 14, 15,27, 1,2,3, 5, 9, 382,386,387,388,389,390,397,399,
12,22,23,36,38, 1,2,3,4,6, 8, 13, 16, 418,444, 15,27,41, 19,35,36,37,39,
18,19,20,21,22,23,27,28,32,36,40, 77, 81
48,53,54,57,59,61,63,68,77,79,81, SQL ......................................... 241,267,310
84, 85, 86, 87, 88 Standing Joint Force Headquarters .. ii, 1,67,
SME63, 65, 89, 90, 100, 101, 105, 109, 115, 76,154,162,164,206,233,302,351,
117, 121, 131, 134, 136, 138, 139, 142, 400,415,27,1,2,22,8,13,27,36,48,
144, 145, 157, 163, 168, 170, 173, 174, 53,57,63
175,176,177,179,180,181,182,184, STO 109, 112, 142, 146, 151,202,235,440,
186, 187, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 27,2,3,5,6,7,83,84,85,86,87,88
197,198,200,202,203,204,205,207, Strategic Airlift ........................................ 203
208,209,211,212,214,216,217,219, Strategic Lift .............. .. .... 162, 424, 428, 429
220,221,223,224,225,226,227,228, Strategic-Level .......................................... 15
232,250,251,256,259,290,296,297, STRATLIFT .................... 203, 206, 233, 235
298,299,312,329,332,336,338,339, Structured Query Language ............ 241,267
340,341,342,343,344,345,347,348, Subject Matter Experts. 26, 76, 89,109,133,
359,397,399,417,418,425,426,441, 185,334,441, 11, 12,38, 1, 50
27,8,4,50,51,52,57,72,73,75
SOF .... 4, 24, 28, 43, 44, 100, 121, 126, 127, T
130,138,190,204,236,249,250,12,19, Tacti cal-Level ............................................ 16
39,4,8,29,50,51,52,53,70,71,72,73, Target Folders .... 440,20,21, 12, 18, 1, 8, 9,
74, 75, 76 22,37,61,62
SOSA.. v, 136,202,204,211,239,251,263, TBM28,45, 93, 99, 104, 125, 126, 139, 150,
268,269,276,281,301,346,350,77,87 27,12,39,12,16,1,70,72,73
SOSA Cell ............................................... 239 Time Sensitive Target ...... 22, 108, 130, 148,
Special Operations Forces ................... 23, 70 223,224,28,36,22,29,33
Special Technical Operations ............ 109, 27 Time Sensitive Targets ...... 130, 148,224,22
Spiral 233, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 177, 180,245, TPFDD ..... 21, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 95, 99,
4, 84 106,203,221,421,423,424,428,429,
Spiral 3 ... 1, 33, 38, 41, 59, 79, 94, 116, 144, 430,431,432,433,435, 16,28, 15, 10,
149, 163, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 55, 56, 69, 1
173,175,176,177,178,179,180,181, Training 1,2, 8, 31, 33, 36, 85, 86, 159, 166,
183, 185, 186, 187, 188, 191, 194, 195, 167,231,232,239,242,257,258,260,
196, 197, 198,207,210,212,213,214, 264,281,282,284,285,294,298,328,
215,216,218,219,220,222,223,224, 337,367,384,385,435, 17, 19,20,21,
225,228,241,243,245,247,252,253, 24,25,27,3,2,11,14,15,40,52,54,57,
257,258,260,261,262,263,267,268, 75, 78, 84, 87, 1
269,272,273,274,275,276,277,281, Transition .................. .. ...... 34,226,267,401
283,287,289,290,291,293,294,297,
N-8 FOR OFFICIl'",L USE ONI,V

TST ....... 22, 58, 59, 108, 110, 115, 116, 117, V
118, 119, 124, 125, 126, 130, 131, 132,
Visualization. 244, 246, 250, 337, 23, 26, 36,
133, 134, 135, 150,224,227,442,445,
30,34,35,37
16,28, 18, 19,29,30,31,33,34,35, 50,
Vulnerabilities ............................. 396, 14, 12
71, 72, 73, 75
TST Cell .......................................... 131, 224 W
TTP ..... 20,76, 110, 130, 133, 150, 159, 172,
206,392,412,413 423 429 435 436 Warfighting Challenge53, 55, 61, 75, 76, 90,
28,33, 11, 53 ' , , , , 91,92,95, 109, 110 III 112 153 154
164,243,267,286,288,329,357,358,'
U 359,400,415,435,441, 5, 6, 7, 9, 14, 15,
16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,27,
UJTL. ...... 163, 165, 172, 173, 179, 190,201,
28,30,31,32,33,40
203,205,208,213,220,222,223,226,
White Cell ................. 242 386 387 388 10
229,312,435,5,8,14
WME ..... ix, 26, 28, 111, 114, 123, 125, 126,
Universal Joint Task List.. ... 163, 1, 5, 14,41
137, 140, 146,341,348,376,447,3, 10,
Update 56, 58,214,217,246,251,260,275,
13, 14, 16, 12, 72
373,7,44,47
USS CORONADO ....... 1, 4,8,34,163,187,
188,353,354,356,377,388, 1
FOR OFFICIl'.. L USE ONLY N-9

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N-IO FOR OFFICIAL USE ONIIY

Annex 0 - Distribution List
Aerospace Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Center

Aerospace Defense Command
Air Force Command and Control Training and Innovation Group
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
Battle Lab Support Element (MCCS-FBB)
Central Intelligence Agency
Commandant, Air War College
Commandant, Army War College
Commandant, Joint Forces Staff College
Commandant, National Defense University
Commandant, Naval War College
Commandant, US. Coast Guard
Commander, 82nd Airborne Division
Commander, Carrier Group Eight
Commander, Carrier Group Three
Commander, III Corps
Commander, Joint Communications Support Element
Commander, Joint Interoperability Test Command
Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
Commander, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division
Commander, Second Fleet
Commander, Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command
Commander, Third Fleet
Commander, Training and Doctrine Command
Commander, US. Analysis and Experimentation Planning Group
Commander, US. Army Forces Command
Commander, US. Atlantic Fleet
Commander, U. S. Central Command
Commander, U. S. European Command
Commander, US. Forces Korea
Commander, US. Marine Corps Forces Atlantic
Commander, US. Marine Corps Forces Pacific
Commander, U. S. Northern Command
Commander, US. Pacific Command
Commander, US. Pacific Fleet
Commander, US. Southern Command
Commander, US. Special Operations Command
Commander, US. Strategic Command
Commander, US. Transportation Command
Commander, US Joint Forces Command Intelligence Directorate (J2)
Commander, US Joint Forces Command Operations, Plans, Logistics, and Engineering
Directorate (B/J4)

Commander, US Joint Forces Command Strategy and Analysis Directorate (J5)

Commander, US Joint Forces Command, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer
Systems Directorate (J6)
Commander, US Joint Forces Command Joint Training Directorate (17)
Commander, US Joint Forces Command Joint Requirements and Integration Directorate (J8)
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Commanding General, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
Defense Advanced Research Proj ects Agency
Defense and Information Systems Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Plans, Policy, and Operations (N3/N5)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Advanced Systems and Concepts
Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program
Director, National Security Agency
Director, U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center
Headquarters Air Combat Command
Headquarters Air Force Wargaming and Experimentation Division
Headquarters Department of the Army
Headquarters Twelfth Air Force
Joint C41SR Battle Center
Joint Forces Intelligence Command
Joint Frequency Management Office, Atlantic
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
Joint Warfare Analysis Center
Joint Warfighting Center
National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Guard Bureau
National Imagery and Mapping Agency
National Reconnaissance Office
Naval Surface Warfare Center
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research, Development, and Acquisition
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Naval Research
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Advanced Systems & Concepts
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Defense Research and Engineering
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Deputy director Theater Assessments & Planning
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Operational Net Assessment
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, PA&E
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Policy
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Science & Technology
0-2 FOR OFFICIl'",L lISE ONLY

President, Institute for Defense Analyses

Program Executive Officer Theater Surface Combatants
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
U. S. State Department

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experim ents and operati ons. We have

Edmund P. G iambastiani, Adm iral, USN

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY III

IV FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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VI FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Joint lnteragency Coordination Group

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY V l1

Operational Net Assessment

Joint Theater Logistics Management

V111 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IX

x FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONbY Xl

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY X lii

ASSESSMENT AREA 1 - ESTABUSH AND MAINTAIN INFORMAliON

ASSESSMENT AREA a- RAPIDLY SET CONDITIONS FOR DECISIVE

Finding 3: The CIE was effective in synchronizing deployment flow ................................... 79

XI V FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ASSESSMENT AREA 3- ASSURE ACCESS INTO AND THROUGH THE

Finding 4: Blue pl'ovided sufficient forces, capabilities, and positioning of sensors

ASSESSMENT AREA 4 - CONDUCT DECISIVE EFFECTSBASED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY xv

ASSESSMENT AREA S-SUSTAIN THE FORCE ........................................ 1S3

Finding 3: Immature development and insufficient integration ofthe Theater Medical

ASSESSMENT AREA 6 - STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

ASSESSMENT AREA 7 - OPERATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT (ONA) 239

XV I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Finding 6: Lack of understanding of the philosophical intent, relationship to traditional

ASSESSMENT AREA 8 - EFFECTSBASED OPERATIONS lEBO):

ASSESSMENT AREA 9 - COLlABORATIVE INFORMATION

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY XV ll

sustained surge capacity to 25 Mb/s. This order of bandwidth usage is much

Finding 6: Interoperability problems prevented effective COP database management... 374

ASSESSMENT AREA 10 - ENHANCE INTERAGENCY PERSPECTIVE

Finding 4: The .JlACG composition should be based on the combatant commander's

ASSESSMENT AREA 11 - JOINT THEATER LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT

XV ll! FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ASSESSMENT AREA 12 - JOINT INniAliVES ........................................... 439

ASSESSMENT AREA 13 - JOINT IN1EWGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND

Findin g I: J1SR improved integration of ISR with operations............................................ 442

Findin g 2: JISR improved IS R support to operations.......................................................... 442

Findin g 4: A lack of collection management experience detracted from J1SR integration .

Findin g 6: No clear definin g system to establish priorities was available to Collection

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY XI X

ASSESSMENT AREA 1 - ESTABUSH AND MAINTAIN INFORMATION

3. USJFCOM , conduct a manpower study on a JTF supported by a SJFHQ and operating

ASSESSMENT AREA a- RAPIDLY SET CONDITIONS FOR DECISIVE

xx FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ASSESSMENT AREA l - ASSURE ACCESS INTO AND THROUGH THE

3. JFCOM, investigate the establishment of an ]0 group or task force to integrate]O into

4. JFCOM , conduct furthel' concept development, experimentation and analysis on J"RSOI

5. JFCOM , conduct further experimentation on the tailoring of forces from the

8. JFCOM, research new metrics for assessment of non-kinetic attacks on non-traditional

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY XXI