EU-NATO

Les temps où l’évocation de la défense européenne suscitait au mieux les sourires des eurosceptiques et au pire les critiques virulentes des atlantistes les plus militants sont révolus. Toutefois, pour l’observateur en dehors du cercle des initiés, cette défense européenne, bien que plus présente sur la scène sécuritaire internationale depuis l’activation de la coopération structurée permanente (mieux connue sous son acronyme anglais PESCO), reste source de confusion et d’incompréhension.
Deux éléments sont à l’origine de ce défaut de compréhension et des conclusions souvent erronées qui en découlent. Le premier résulte d’une comparaison simpliste entre le fonctionnement de l’OTAN et ’la mise en œuvre de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l’Union européenne. Le second est lié à la méconnaissance de l’évolution de notre environnement sécuritaire, du profil de la menace et des doctrines de guerre « hybride » de nos ennemis. Je reviendrai plus tard sur l’inadéquation du qualificatif « hybride », qui ne décrit qu’imparfaitement le type de menace à laquelle nous sommes exposés.
La première partie de mon argumentaire démontrera le caractère indispensable de l’intégration de la défense européenne pour apporter une contribution européenne plus substantielle à l’effort de défense, principalement dans le cadre de l’OTAN mais aussi au sein d’autres formats collaboratifs.
La seconde partie étudiera les mécanismes d’intégration qui sont à l’œuvre afin de doter l’Union européenne des structures nécessaires à la réalisation de son ambition sécuritaire qui découle de la Stratégie globale de 2016.
La troisième partie tentera de définir un nouveau paradigme de défense et d’anticiper les évolutions nécessaires dans l’architecture sécuritaire internationale afin d’évoluer d’une logique de défense collective vers celle d’une résilience intégrée.

A comprehensive analysis of the European Union's foreign policy over 40 years, this study describes how multilateralism has been used in the fields of peace, security, and military crisis management. Relying on detailed case studies, this new research looks at interventions in Macedonia, Bosnia, the Congo, and Chad—and assesses the EU’s cooperation with NATO and the United Nations during these emergencies.

This article explores the historical evolution of research on the “European Union (EU)–North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) relationship” since the 1950s and examines the numerous ways in which it has served as an important case study for applying and developing theory-guided and conceptual research on inter-organisational relations (IOR) in International Relations. After a dearth of policy-oriented research during the 1990s and early 2000s, a wide range of scholars have contributed to a “conceptual turn” in the study of EU–NATO relations during the last decade. This development, as this article will argue, not only signifies a stronger interest by scholars to understand the complex relationship between both organisations with the help of more theory-driven research, but also highlights that the EU–NATO relationship has become a “catalytic case study” in terms of inspiring conceptual experimentation and advancing efforts to theorise IOR more generally. The article provides for the first time a systematic stock-taking and analysis of the richness of concepts and theoretical debates related to EU–NATO relations research and offers scholars wider insights into the most promising approaches and analytical tools for understanding and theorising EU–NATO relations.

NATO-EU cooperation almost came to a halt after 2004. This article scrutinizes the evolution of NATO-EU cooperation and argues that the major problem with regard to this cooperation goes beyond the vetoes by Turkey and Cyprus. Rather, there is a deeper and historically embedded dynamic at play: the traditional divide between Europeanists and Transatlanticists and how this leads to a decoupling in NATO. An understanding on the part of the Europeanist Allies that they also have commitments towards NATO is needed.

Traditionally the EU has been a civilian power, leaving the conduct of its security issues in the hands of the North Atlantic Organisation. The end of the Cold War and the new millennium brought new security challenges making it harder and harder for the USA to play the role of the "world's gendarme" and to carry on its shoulders the burdens of the entire humanity, needing the help of its European allies, which demanded that their concerns to be taken serious, and to be consulted by their transatlantic counterpartners, the USA not being able to shape any further the transatlantic policies accroding to its own interest. This paper wants to initiate the reader in the European security architecture, emphasizing its relationship with the NATO, wondering if this "great experiment" called the European Union will be ever able to rise above its condition and to provide its own and its neighbourhood's security without any kind of foreign assistance.

My contribution to the nuclear debate presents 3 possible concepts for complexity evolution, which make understood that what is at a stake right now is the evolution of complexity. The use of missiles in any war scenario has very little, and if any very bad effects on reality, which I strongly recommend to not to look for.

The official results of the conference were published under the following document, which you can find at the ETH Zürich file archive: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154318/MD_Draft%20Report_16102012.pdf

The official report does not resolve the dilemma that was discussed in Brussels. It reveals a one-sided and partial perspective and does not uncover the risks at which Europe was. The debate was stronger than the report tells and the report fails to describe the Russian position adequately as well as the reality of the debate. The US-American assurance, that the missile defense shield set up by NATO is not offensive and does not mean a threat to Russia  is a discussable statement. Quoting Vershbow as main speaker is nice, but the way this report puts facts and presents opinions is debatable.

A report about the real terms of discussion cannot be published.

La mise en œuvre différée, en 2017, de la Coopération structurée permanente (PESCO) donne une nouvelle dimension à l'intégration de la défense de l'Union européenne. 25 États membres se sont engagés à accroître leurs dépenses de défense et à intensifier leur collaboration par des projets communs dans les domaines opérationnel et capacitaire. Six des quarante-six projets de la CSP ont pour ambition de développer des capacités maritimes. Vingt-deux des vingt-cinq participants sont, par ailleurs, Alliés au sein de l'OTAN, qui dispose aussi de son propre processus de planification de défense (NDPP), par lequel elle définit les capacités nécessaires à la réalisation de ses missions.
Dans un contexte sécuritaire en rapide évolution, caractérisé par une diversification des menaces, les États européens sont sollicités de toutes parts pour mettre à disposition leurs capacités militaires. Que ce soit pour leurs missions au sein de l’OTAN, dans le cadre de la Politique de Sécurité et de Défense commune (PSDC) de l’UE, dans le cadre des Nations unies ou pour la participation à des coalitions, les États ne disposent que d’un seul ensemble de forces pour honorer tous leurs engagements. Comme ce sont les États — et non les organisations dont ils sont membres — qui décident souverainement de leurs plans de développement capacitaires, l’objet du présent travail est de répondre à la question :  Les projets capacitaires maritimes de la coopération structurée permanente répondent-ils aux besoins capacitaires de l’UE et de l’OTAN ?

Today the power and influence of the EU is growing in the UN. On the othe hand, UN provides legitimacy and authority for the EU military operations. However, is it necessary to obtain permission and command from the UN in case of threat against peace or can the EU manages a military operation without any UN resolution? This issue continues to cause debates over legal basis for the EU rapid reaction forces. In this study is argued the question of “how act the UN and the EU in state of emergency” explaining the EU’s military revolution. In addition to this, in which scope and in accordance with which rules is EU operations managed, and
which targets does the EU want to reach in world politics in future whereby Europe’s military reform, is emphasized. In this regard, aim and extent of UN operations are expressed. Basic principles of EU and UN peacekeeping operations which is in scope of UN Charter and legal basis for this operations are analyzed.

Keywords: Military Intervention, EU Military Operations, UN Charter, Peacekeeping, Crisis Management.

Turkey’s relationships with the West, particularly its relationship with Western security institutions, are
today more important than ever. As the United States fights two wars in the region and attempts to rebuild its
reputation in Europe and the Middle East, Turkey is once again central to America’s plans. Yet, this crucial ally is
little understood by U.S. policy makers. Turkey has a long relationship with Euro-Atlantic security institutions,
specifically NATO and the various European institutions, culminating in today’s European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP).
The following study poses the following questions of relevance to those interested in theory and policy. Why
do the government and people of Turkey participate in these institutions? What long-term policy objectives do makers
of policy in Turkey wish to advance through its participation in these institutions? What are the different ways that
Turkey leverages its participation to advance its goals? Specifically, how does Turkey use its participation in
European security institutions to advance its positions on issues such as European Union membership, defense
modernization, and its ongoing internal and external areas of conflict? How does Turkey’s Ottoman legacy affect
these relationships and how has this historical background shaped today’s events?
This thesis also sets out to answer whether Turkey is successful in its participation; in other words, does its
participation allow Turkey to advance its goals better? How do current trends in Europe affect Turkey’s participation
in these institutions?

The USA’s support for Turkey, which is on the European Union path, has showed itself not only as “intense diplomacy from be hind a curtain” but also as incessant opposition against Turkey’s isolation from defence organizations like European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and West European Union (WEU). While the European Union aims to stand on its own feet in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in case of Turkey’s EU membership there will be a “transatlantic connection” on the orbit of the USA-England-Turkey in the EU. Without doubt it makes EU anxious as they are trying to create an “European Rapid Reaction Force” (ERRF) which is independent from NATO. Taking into consideration the idea that there is a silent and secret rivalry between the EU and the USA in the present; the USA wish to see Turkey as a “Trojan horse” together with England in the EU.
Keywords:
ESDI, NATO, strategic partnership, security, defence, Turkey’s EU
Membership, the USA’s role.

In this study, the evolution of the NATO-EU relationship from the Cold War years to present day is examined and this relationship is comprehensively analysed politically, economically and militarily. This analysis consists fundamentally of major problems like the Libya crisis, which enhanced tensions among the EU, NATO, the USA and Turkey. Furthermore, the question of EU’s autonomy from NATO, NATO allies military spendings, NATO’s “Smart Defence” initiative and Turkey’s role in the NATO-EU strategic partnership are examined. The study begins with a historical overview that brings attention to new opportunities and risks in transatlantic relations in the next part. In the last analysis,
emphasis is given to targets which the EU want to reach in world politics in the future including Europe’s military reform, the limits of NATO-EU relations and the search for a new balance of power in the Euro-Atlantic security chain. The article concludes that searching for a balance between “NATO’s primacy against the EU” and “EU autonomy” in the Euro-Atlantic partnership continue and the Cyprus issue is not the only obstacle which limits NATO-EU relations.
Keywords:
USA, France, NATO, Military Intervention, EU, Turkey

This report discusses the emergent trend of inter-organizational security cooperation in international peace operations. It takes a closer look at bilateral collaboration among the ‘big four’ security organizations of today – the UN, NATO, the EU and the AU – identifying evolutionary phases and underlying motives for such cooperation as well as lessons learned from the field thus far. Three general observations can be made. First, it seems clear that, once initiated, inter-organizational security partnerships are rarely reversed. A tentative conclusion may therefore be that the evolution of inter-organizational cooperation involves a certain degree of path-dependency. Secondly, the motives for inter-organizational security cooperation can be of both a materialist and an ideational nature. Materialist motives like organizational survival, neutralizing competition and resource dependence are all important rationales for international security organizations to enter into collaboration with one another. In addition, ideational motives such as legitimization, shared values and organizational learning seem to help in justifying and validating such relationships. Thirdly, lessons learned from inter-organizational security cooperation in the field so far include the need to clarify the content and
duration of mission mandates; establish better practices for communication and information-sharing; ensure respect for one another’s organizational identities, values and working procedures; and increase the willingness to adjust to one another prior to, during, and in the aftermath of cooperation in the field.

Bu makalenin amacı, NATO-AB işbirliği ve Türkiye’nin Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası’na katılımı ile ilgili açmazı değerlendirmektir. Makalenin ileri sürdüğü argüman, bu açmazını derinleştiren iki önemli faktör olduğudur. Bunlardan ilki NATO bünyesindeki Avrupacı ayrışmadır. İkinci faktör ise, AB’nin Türkiye’nin adaylık süreci çerçevesinde geliştirmiş olduğu asimetrik tutumu NATOAB işbirliği konularında da sergilemeye çalışmasıdır. Makalenin vardığı sonuç; NATO-AB-Türkiye üçgeninde yaşanan açmazın bir an önce çözülmesi gerektiği, ancak, yaşanan sorunların çözümü için sadece Türkiye’yi adres göstermenin doğru olmadığıdır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: NATO-AB İşbirliği, Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (OGSP), Avrupacı ayrışma, Türkiye

The aim of this article is to evaluate the stalemate in NATO-EU cooperation and in the involvement of Turkey in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Its major argument is that there are two factors that deepen this stalemate. The first one is the Europeanist decoupling in NATO. The second one is that the Union tries to pursue the asymmetrical relationship that it has with Turkey within the framework of the country’s EU candidacy in the realm of NATO-EU relations. The article concludes that this stalemate should be resolved as soon as possible, nevertheless, it would not be reasonable to point to Turkey, only, for finding a solution to the problem.
Key Words: NATO-EU Cooperation, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Europeanist decoupling, Turkey

The EU’s new defense strategy runs the risk of adopting a bleak worldview while suggesting measures that are inadequate to address such a world of dangers. Moreover it threatens to undermine the EU's unique identity and its real contribution to European security. A much better investment would be to strengthen Europe’s capabilities within NATO

Today, an Intermarium could stretch from Narva in the north to Batumi in the south. Significant parts of the populations and the majority of foreign affairs experts of the countries between the Baltic and Black seas view Putin’s Russia today as the biggest risk, a clear threat, and a dangerous enemy. Inside NATO, the political mainstreams of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania especially regard Russia as a major security problem. The same can be said of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova outside NATO. These states could thus form the core of an East-Central European-South Caucasian defense coalition. Further European countries within, or close to, the “land between the seas” — from the Scandinavian to the Western Balkan nations — might, for historical or other reasons, be willing to support, join, or associate themselves with such an alliance. With regard to its legal set-up, the above-mentioned 2010 Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support between Turkey and Azerbaijan could play the role of a model treaty for a security arrangement between certain eastern NATO states on the one side, and some post-Soviet non-NATO countries on the other. As in Article 2 of the ratified Turkish-Azeri alliance, the exact modus of action, in case of an aggression, could be left open to each Intermarium country. The pact could simply state an obligation that, if confronted with an attack, the parties would “mutually assist each other” and that the “means and extent of this assistance” would be agreed upon ad hoc, once a military infringement has happened.

The EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) was launched in the 1990s as a quest for “autonomy.” Fifteen years of efforts failed to deliver that objective. The coherence of the EU member states in their security dealings with the US was always vulnerable to the potentially incompatible objectives of the UK and France. But as EU leaders post-Brexit re-launch the CSDP, as the 2016 European Global Strategy rediscovers the virtues of “strategic autonomy,” and as the world juggles with a US president who appears to question the basis of the Atlantic Alliance, it is time to radically re-think the relations between the EU and NATO. This paper argues that, in the longer term, it is through the strengthening of the EU-NATO relationship that EU strategic autonomy will become possible, and that a consolidation of the transatlantic bond will emerge.

The aim of this article is to discuss all aspects of NATO’s approach to global partners, as well as how the Alliance’s new partnership policy can affect relations with these countries. This article examines the implications of the change in US foreign policy for NATO and it asserts that the impact of the financial crisis on defence budgets of NATO member states and the shifting American strategic focus to the Asia Pacific region will also force NATO to focus on finding new global partners from this region where there is no possibility for Alliance expansion in the short to medium term. Clearly, in an age of austerity, and with its new partnership policy, NATO aims to focus more on developing its relations with global partners.

Western decision-makers should signal to the new East-Central European NATO and EU member countries that they can, and should, engage in cross-border multilateral coalition building with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. There is an urgent need for institutional structures that will make Eastern Europe’s grey zone, between Russia and the West, less grey.

Con base en el análisis de la política de Francia dentro de la OTAN tras el fin de la Guerra Fría, este libro aborda cuestiones más generales relacionadas con las dificultades para consolidar un pilar europeo de defensa dentro de la Unión Europea, las contradicciones de la política exterior francesa en el contexto europeo y mundial, y las tensiones y mutaciones de la alianza atlántica durante coyunturas como la reunificación alemana, la primera guerra del golfo, y los conflictos en la ex-Yugoslavia de 1991-1995 y de Kosovo en 1999. Aún cuando el libro abarca el periodo 1989-2000 con mayor detenimiento, el epílogo aborda las implicancias para la OTAN (y para Francia) de los atentados del 11 de septiembre de 2001, así como las tensiones transatlánticas ocurridas durante la segunda intervención norteamericana en Irak en 2003, tras la negativa abierta de Francia y Alemania de avalar dicha intervención en el seno de la ONU y de la propia OTAN.

Prólogo: "El final de la Guerra Fría trajo consigo el desconcierto, el abuso de la fuerza, la proliferación de los conflictos regionales y la exacerbación de los viejos nacionalismos; lo que parecía haber sido, fugazmente, el modelo perfecto, la adopción de la forma norteamericana de ver la democracia, parecía no adaptarse a todos los pueblos ni corresponder a todas las circunstancias. Por otro lado, en la medida que el comercio y el libre tránsito de los servicios y mercaderías, se afianzaban en acuerdos económicos regionales, la idea de la soberanía se replanteaba constantemente. Ese es el mundo nuevo.
En medio de este escenario, Francia tuvo un comportamiento digno de análisis. Francia, en el concierto europeo, ofreció una contrapropuesta a la anulación de la soberanía que la política estadounidense requería como un presupuesto para sus acciones extensivas sobre el orbe; al mismo tiempo, se convirtió, junto con Alemania, en la principal promotora de la Unión Europea.
Carlos Maldonado aborda este aspecto con precisión y perspectiva. Su análisis sobre la relación de Francia con la OTAN presenta no sólo un estudio de política y relaciones internacionales en el mundo contemporáneo, sino que constituye en el fondo un análisis de la forma en que la política, adecuada y formadora de la nueva realidad, está asumiendo los conflictos al interior y fuera del Estado."

Threats from Africa undermine the security of Europe. The European Union and NATO have 22 member countries in common, namely most of EU member states. The fundamental role of the Atlantic Alliance is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, non-state actors and hybrid threats emerged as the major challenges to international security. NATO is evolving in response to new strategic reality, and terrorism and weak states are among the most pressing challenges the Alliance faces. NATO is playing an increasingly important role in crisis management and peacekeeping. Since the African Union was established in 2001 as the successor to the Organization of African Unity, it faces difficulties in achieving the African ownership in peace and security. The chronic lack of funding and of appropriate military resources, makes the African Union depending on external aid-NATO provides military support, while the EU provides money. NATO cooperates with the AU since 2005, and all NATO-AU activities are coordinated with the EU. The NATO-EU partnership is complementar and mutual, and is based on common values and strategic interests, and should be strengthened to secure the European southern border, and to guarantee security in the Mediterranean region. Therefore, stronger and permanent NATO-EU partnership in Africa would be desirable. This brief paper investigates the ties between these three organizations, and suggests some recommendations to improve the 'trilateral' relationship to ensure security to their member states.

The meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales was convened to confront a set of challenges which emerged in its close neighbourhood and to ask tough questions about the Alliance’s capabilities to adjust to a rapidly changing security environment.
The results of the summit in Newport could not satisfy many expectations with regard to the current problems, challenges
and dangers provoked by dysfunctional state and nonstate
actors located in direct proximity to the North Atlantic area. The Wales Summit’s outcomes provoked mixed reactions, positively reverberating in some European capitals but also echoing long-standing reservations and concerns about NATO’s real position in the Euro-Atlantic world.
In this paper I would rather focus on the internal prerequisites, determinants and dynamics which have shaped NATO’s policies and actions in the post-Lisbon
strategic framework. I will advance the thesis that Euro-Atlanticsecurity policy is determined to a large extent by NATO’s functional adaptation capabilities, which in recent years were significantly reduced by internal fissions and external burdens. As a result, the role of NATO has been diminishing due to its incapability to adopt and launch a comprehensive proactive security strategy. The Wales Summit gave, for the first time in a long while, an appropriate response to the new security challenges facing the Alliance, especially to military threats generated by state and non-state actors on its eastern flank. It did not dispel controversy over the identity and credibility of the Alliance yet made it important to search for a new posture responding to accumulated challenges and threats.

The emergence of a security and defence policy of the European Union (EU) and the questions it raises for the relationship between the Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have always been closely linked to the question of the ‘identity’ of the EU on the international stage. To (ab)use René Descartes’ famous axiom: Union bears arms, therefore it is – arma fero, ergo sum. The EU-NATO relationship is therefore particularly well suited for scrutinizing the Union’s ‘international identity’ through the interaction with another international organization. This paper argues that notwithstanding the mutual reaffirmations of importance between the two organisations, the European Union has not only come to incorporate security and defence policy into its ambit of competences, but has put itself on a track to become a fully-fledged security policy actor, arguably surpassing NATO. At the same time, the relevance of NATO has declined, and it is left with the choice either to branch out or accept a residual yet not insignificant role in transatlantic relations. These contrary organizational histories left a strong legal imprint, which allows for a number of observations of the Union’s international identity, albeit not through NATO, but rather through the hallmarks of its own legal order and its relations with NATO.

Les effets de la fin assez brusque de l’unipolarité, conjugués à l’accélération des changements climatiques, ont accru d’une manière significative l’importance de la région de l’Arctique en tant qu’enjeu stratégique.  Bien entendu, les politiques des organisations internationales et supranationales dotées de vocations sécuritaires, telles l’OTAN et l’UE, expriment les intérêts collectifs de leurs États membres, et des citoyens de ceux-là, à l’égard des enjeux engagés. Mais les politiques publiques, dans les cas étudiés ici – ceux justement de l’UE et de l’OTAN, visent aussi à améliorer les systèmes de gouvernance régionale multilatérale déjà existants dans cette zone géopolitique.  Cette communication fait l’analyse des initiatives récentes de l’UE et de l’OTAN en ce qui concerne la région de l'Arctique afin d’en faire sortir les points de convergence et de divergence. À l’examen de l'énoncé « l’Union européenne et la région arctique », rendu public le 20 novembre 2008 par la Commission européenne, et des discussions au sein de l’OTAN portant sur les défis de la sécurité au Grand Nord, notamment à la Conférence de Reykjavik fin janvier 2009, l'on cherche à identifier les voies probables de collaboration et de synchronie entre l’UE et l’OTAN à leurs frontières nordiques.  Dans un deuxième temps, et pour conclure l’analyse, les nouveaux défis pour la PESD et les différends possibles entre l’OTAN et l’UE, occasionnés par l’émergence de la région de l’Arctique en tant que zone de mouvance géopolitique, seront soulignés de façon à éclaircir les contours futurs des relations transatlantiques « à l’aube d’un monde pluripolaire ».

For the observer outside the circle of the initiated, European defence remains a source of confusion and misunderstanding. Two factors explain this lack of understanding and erroneous conclusions it leads to. The first results from a simplistic comparison between NATO and the European Union; the second is related to the lack of knowledge of the evolution of the threat profile and the hybrid war doctrines of our enemies.

The main goal of this study is to contribute to the academic debate concerning EU-NATO relations and to consider the main sources of difficulties in their relationship. In particular, this analysis takes into account the possible role of the strategic documents of both organisations in future cooperation. Consequently, the first part of the article concentrates on dilemmas related to EU-NATO relations referred to in the existing literature. The second part contains an analysis of the development of these relations, while the third describes the presumptive impact of the NATO Strategic Concept and the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy on cooperation between the two organisations. The conclusion underlines that the process of implementing the strategic documents should have positive effects on EU-NATO relations. However, the question arises whether and how this process is continued.

NATO Defence College Occasional Paper No 15, May 2006.

U K Defence Forum Reviews Editor Roger Green notes that this publication comprises the twelve papers presented at a seminar on NATO and EU post-conflict reconstruction operations in November 2005.  Three of the papers were commentaries on specific operations in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan whilst the remainder provide perspectives on such operations generally by NATO, the EU and the US. 
The main point that comes across from these papers is the lack of planned cooperation between NATO and the EU.

Помимо продолжения сегодняшнего состояния невключенности в значимые международные структуры безопасности, у Украины есть пять альтернативных сценариев: «финляндизация», вступление в ЕС, присоединение к НАТО, отдельный договор с США, создание коалиции «Междуморья».

In a January 2016 national survey of Israelis’ attitudes toward Europe and the European Union (EU), 45 percent of those surveyed supported the idea that Israel should join NATO as a full member, simply because NATO countries would help Israel defend itself.  Yet, despite this wide public support of Israeli membership in the Alliance, NATO has never obtained a central place in Israeli foreign policy, security, political, and social discourse. One of the reasons for this lack of centrality has to do with Israeli perceptions of the Alliance, the three most salient of which are explored in this article. By providing empirical findings concerning the attitudes of Israeli public opinion, and the political and military elites, this article offers insights into the overall assessment on the part of key Israeli stakeholders of NATO’s global and regional actorness.

2018 yılında NATO Zirvesi sonrası ABD Başkanı Trump Rusya'ya 1987 yılında kabul edilen Orta Menzilli Nükleer Kuvvetler Antlaşmasını (INF) defalarca ihlal ettiği gerekçesiyle iki aylık süre verince uluslararası toplumda büyük yankı uyandırdı. Altı ay içinde şayet Rusya ile yeni bir antlaşma yapılmazsa ABD, INF'den çekileceğini duyurdu. Buna mukabil Rusya'da ilgili antlaşmayı askıya aldığını ve ABD'nin NATO Füze Kalkanı projesiyle INF'i ihlal ettiğini savunmaktadır. Soğuk Savaş düzeninde iki kutuptan birini temsil eden SSCB'nin halefi olan Rusya'nın füze kalkanı projesine yaklaşımı AB'nin güvenliği noktasından son derece kritik bir meseledir. Aslında NATO Füze Kalkanı projesinin geçmişi 1980'li yıllarda Ronald Regan döneminde ABD Ulusal Füze Savunma Sistemine dayanmaktadır. Küresel siyasette devletlerin en büyük kaygılarının başında uluslararası güvenlik gelmektedir. Dünyanın en önemli süper güçlerinden ABD bile bir köy şeklini almış modern dünyada tek başına güvenliğini tesis etmekte aciz kaldığından bu proje daha sonra revize edilerek 2010'da NATO Lizbon toplantısında EPAA projesi (Avrupa için Aşamalı Uyarlanabilirlik Yaklaşımı) olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bu makalede birincil kaynaklara dayanarak analitik, eleştirel, yorumlamacı ve karşılaştırmalı yöntem takip edilip öncelikle Füze Kalkanı Projesi fikrinin nasıl ve neden ortaya çıktığı üzerinde durulacaktır. Teknik olarak sistemin ne olduğu ve nasıl işlediği hakkında temel bilgiler özetlenecektir. Daha sonra Türkiye'nin tarihsel olarak kadim bağları olan İran ile ilişkilerinde Füze Kalkanı sisteminin nelere sebep olacağına işaret edilecektir. AB'nin güvenliğini tesiste özellikle büyük öneme sahip bu projenin gerçekleşmesinde Türkiye'nin İran ile sahip olduğu yumuşak gücü ve diplomasisine dikkat çekilmektedir. Son olarak Füze Kalkanı projesi sürecinde Rusya'yla ilişkide Türkiye'nin sahip olduğu stratejik role yer verilecektir.
The Security of EU and the Role of Turkey: NATO Missile Shield System
After the NATO Summit in 2018, it was shocked in the international community when US President Trump gave a two-month period to Russia by blaming it to violate the Medium-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) which was adopted in 1987 by two countries. In six months, the US declared that it would withdraw from the INF if no new treaty was signed with Russia. In contrast, Russia suspended the treaty due to of claiming that US infringes it with the NATO Missile Shield project. The Russia’s approaches as an USSR’s successor to the missile shield project representing one of the two poles in the Cold War order are extremely critical issue in respect of the EU's security. Indeed, the history of the NATO Missile Shield project was based on the US National Missile Defense System in the 1980s under Ronald Regan. International security is the main concern of the states in global politics. Since US despite of being one of the super powers cannot be enough to protect its security in the modern world transforming a village this project was subsequently revised and adopted as the EPAA (Progressive Adaptation Approach for Europe) project in the Lisbon summit of NATO. In this article fallowing analytical, critical, interpretative and comparing method based on the first resources firstly, how and why the idea of the Missile Shield Project emerged will be elaborated. Technically, basic information about what the system is and how it works will be summarized. Then it will be pointed out the efficient and results of the missile shield system in regards of Turkey’s relationship with Iran which has deep historical ties. It’ll be paid attention to Turkey’s soft power and diplomacy with Iran to realize the project which has great significance to provide security of EU.  Finally, it will focus on the strategic role of Turkey with Russia in the course of Missile Shield project.

The EU and NATO announced the start of their ‘strategic partnership’ with the Declaration on the ESDP in 2002. Through this strategic partnership, the two organizations aim to achieve their high-priority goals in the context of security and defence. Although the EU-NATO partnership is crucial for security, peace and stability in the world; a genuine strategic partnership between the EU and NATO has not yet been achieved because of different ‘obstacles’. The purpose of this work is to analyse how and to what extent the Cyprus conflict has limited this strategic partnership. The limitations caused by the conflict on the EU-NATO strategic partnership have been elaborated by analysing the current developments at the political and military-strategic levels and on the ground. Additionally, some case studies such as Kosovo and Afghanistan have been used to see the impact of the conflict on the EU-NATO cooperation. The conclusion of this study consists of some recommendations for possible measures that need to be taken by all the related parties in order to bring the on-going conflict on the island to an end and to achieve a fully-fledged strategic partnership.

Armenia—Russia’s closest ally in the South Caucasus—appears intent on revitalizing its partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This agenda turned explicit on February 27–28, when Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan paid a visit to Brussels. Besides holding several important meetings with high-level European Union officials, including EU President Donald Tusk and High Representative Federica Mogherini, Sargsyan spoke in person with the North Atlantic Alliance’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.

Background Policy Paper for the Arab Geopolitics 2021 high-level conference organised by the NATO Defence College Foundation on 21 October 2021. This brief policy paper gives an overview of the geopolitical developments in the Middle East and North Africa after the Abraham Accords, which marked the beginning of a series of initiatives to normalise ties between former foes in the Arab world. It also digs into the geopolitical implications of the current turmoil the Sahel, where authoritarian powers are taking advantage of the multiple misunderstandings between local actors and the West.