Edmund Husserl

Name-Theology is a central aspect of Jewish religion throughout its history, from the Biblical text where the Name dwells in the Temple to the Kabbalah's accounts of the Name as the fount of all existence. This article will argue that through the philosophical investigation of this tradition, we can find a new way of thinking the question of God's nature. While the Name YHWH is believed to come from the root HYH, ‘to be,’ this should not indicate a static being of God, outside space and time, unchanging and perfect. Rather the Israelite metaphysics demonstrated in the doctrine of God’s Name is presence-based, relational, yet ultimately transcendent. This different metaphysics requires some unpacking and extrapolation in order to find its implications for theology. I will argue that we find the fluidity and relation-dependent nature of God expressed by the unique nominal-theology of Jewish religion, as expressed in biblical concepts such as the Deuteronomic Name-Temple theology, the Angel of the Lord who bears God's Name, and the revelation of the Tetragrammaton to Moses. Through analysis of these traditions, incorporating the philosophical tools and concepts provided by modern Jewish philosophers such as Husserl, Rosenzweig, and Levinas, we find that Jewish tradition holds God ultimately in-relation to human beings, as suggested by the third person construction of the Name YHWH. While there is still an apparent internal aspect, which we may consider the first-person construction of God's Ehyeh, this is ultimately not to be understood as the static perfection of Greek philosophy, but retained as the dark ground of an unknowable internality; the simple a=a of Rosenzweig's theology. It will become apparent that much of this theological development is contained in nuce in Moses' revelation of Ex.3:14, God naming Himself Ehyeh, which Moses conjugates into YHWH.

The plot of Bartolone’s thought evolved through a fundamental series of theoretical experiences that find above all in Rosmini, a privileged interlocutor of his metaphysics of freedom. What emerges is a vision in which the plural knowledge of scientific and non-scientific activity,included in the structurality of their rational plot, finds their full unification only in the significant dimension of philosophizing. The finiteness of the research, its structurality, must find an explanation of its beginning and absolute and unconditioned ending. Thus the metaphysics of freedom gains absolute and unrestrained reality which in the ideal of structural understanding remains only presupposed and never fully acknowledged.

In Bartolone’s original thinking pathway, the theme of freedom is at the center of his meditation since his earliest works and over time it became a metaphysical current of freedom. In his vision, absolute freedom is the vertex of reality, which is mirrored in the ideal to which it radiates the whole significance of the absolute being. In the idea of being, transcendentally, man discovers the authentic dynamics of his own finite freedom, originally belonging to him, and reaches his selfconsciousness
in the transcendental contact with the idea of freedom. This ontology of freedom, together with the indeterminable characteristics of the
relationship with the individual conscience, gives a dramatic tone to the act of choosing in which freedom can be intellectualistically accepted or rejected.

Bu çalışma, Gettier Problemine fenomenolojik bir bakış açısı sunar. Gettier Problemi, geleneksel bilgi tanımının yeterli olmadığını sunarken, fenomenoloji, bilgiye erişmek için doğal tavrın geride bırakılması gerektiğini savunur. İnancın bilgiye dönüşebilmesi için, kişinin inancındaki psikolojik ve fizyolojik etmenler paranteze alınırsa daha sağlam bir gerekçelendirme yapılabilir. Bilgiye erişmedeki anlayışımızı sorgulamak, daha sağlam bir bilgi teorisine ulaşmamıza yardımcı olabilir.

The following article aims to outline the relationship between Hermes and Prometheus for Stiegler, that is, between hermeneutics and the philosophy of technology. In order to do this, I will use as a guiding thread an expression that Stiegler uses to describe the myth of Prometheus: a ‘quasi-existential analytic’. The analysis of this expression will require to look carefully at the comparison made by the French philosopher firstly with Heidegger and secondly with Derrida. This will ultimately serve to return directly to Stiegler, and in particular to his reading of the myth of Prometheus, in order to highlight the relationship between hermeneutics and the philosophy of technology.

"El alma nunca piensa sin fantasmas" es una expresión aristotélica tomada por Cornelius Castoriadis para titular un ensayo publicado en 1977. En él, el psicoanalista de origen griego traduce el concepto de fantasma que emplea Aristóteles. Varios años más tarde, el mismo enunciado es usado como subtítulo en el prefacio a la edición chilena de la novela "Imaginaria", de Kristopher Rodas, en la que se formula como una especie de advertencia al lector. Precedida de un éxito de ventas por Internet, "Imaginaria" es un viaje al interior de la mente de un niño que trata de escapar de su realidad. Cansado de estar triste todo el tiempo, decide olvidar. Sin embargo, sus amigos imaginarios le harán recordar su camino hacia la oscuridad. Es una novela con una profunda carga emocional, y toca temas como el suicidio, la depresión y el existencialismo.

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En el siguiente trabajo analizaremos el estatuto de la cosa en trabajos fundamentales de la Kehre heideggeriana: Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (1935-1936), Das Ding (1951) y Die Frage nach der Technik (1953) .A partir de interpretar sus caracterizaciones ontológicas de las cosas, los entes intramundanos en las relaciones respectivas del Dasein, buscaremos cotejar las bases comprensivas desde las que articula estas elaboraciones. Con ello nos proponemos demostrar de qué modo dichas bases se articulan en un concepto de alteridad, una modalidad de relación corporal y habitar del Dasein, respecto de las respectivas elaboraciones en la analítica de Sein und Zeit.

La ricerca teoretica di Pareyson è contrassegnata, lungo tutto l’arco del suo sviluppo, dall’importanza dell’esistenzialismo. Nel pieno della maturità, a metà degli anni ’60, Pareyson ha dedicato alcuni corsi a Kierkegaard, Pascal e Dostoevskij. L’importanza di questi lavori è data dalla possibilità di leggere, nei termini di una genuina filosofia della libertà, l’apporto esistenzialistico al capolavoro riconosciuto di Pareyson Verità e interpretazione. Emerge così quanto sia stata determinante la continua meditazione dei tre maestri della filosofia dell’esistenza per la proposta ermeneutica in quanto ontologia dell’inesauribile, ultimo approdo del suo personalismo ontologico. La prospettiva mostra anche la sua originalità rispetto all’ultimissima ontologia della libertà e ai problemi da essi aperti con l’innesto dell’ultimo Schelling e i rischi conseguenti di una caduta razionalistica del problema della libertà.

This book discusses the ethics of engaging with the paradigm of lived experience, particularly through an interest in the spatiotemporal constructs of such experiences via a comparative conceptual map across Husserlian phenomenology and Nishida’s moral philosophy. The overall commitment of the book is towards the vision of a ‘better life’ through insights into two themes, that of time and intimacy.

Durch eine eigene Lekture von Tillichs Werk will die vorliegende Arbeit zeigen, inwiefern Tillich zufolge das Sein jenes Prinzip der Positivitat ist, das das Sein affirmiert, und inwiefern das Nicht-Sein jenes Prinzip der Negativitat ist, das das Sein negiert, mithin auf Grundlage der Selbstaffirmation des Seins. Wir werden zeigen, dass die Positivitat (Sein) und die Negativitat (Nicht-Sein) das Gerust ausmachen, auf dem das gesamte System von Tillichs Denken begrundet ist, weil sie dessen idealistische Voraussetzungen bilden. Obwohl diese nicht en detail den Schwerpunkt der Arbeiten Tillichs ausmachen, sind sie hierin indirekt immer prasent. Das Hauptziel dieser Arbeit ist also, zu zeigen, dass die Dialektik der Positivitat des Seins und der Negativitat des Nicht-Seins implizit beinahe uberall in Tillichs Werk figuriert und unsere Aufgabe liegt darin, diese zu erlautern, wann immer es angebracht erscheint. Unsere Arbeit wird mittels unserer Lekture und Analyse zeigen, wo Positivita...

Patočka ülkemizde çok bilinen bir filozof değil. Sadece iki kitabı Türkçeye tercüme edilmiş. Üzerine yazılmış makale sayısı da çok azdır. Bu çalışmamızla Türk akademisinde Patočka'nın daha iyi tanıtılmasına vesile olmayı amaçlıyoruz. Bu bağlamda onun felsefesinde önemli bir yer tutan kriz düşüncesini irdeleyeceğiz. Patočka'nın kriz düşüncesinin önemli bileşenleri olan polemos, khorismos, sarsılmışların dayanışması gibi kavramları mercek altına alarak bu kavramlarda ifade edilen fikirleri yakalamaya çalışacağız. Elbette Patočka'nın öncüsü ve etkilendiği kişi Husserl'e değinmeden geçmemiz imkânsızdır. Husserl hem kriz düşüncesi bağlamında hem de genel olarak fenomenolojinin kurucu şahsı olduğu için Patočka'nın görüşlerini etkiler. Çalışmamızda Patočka'nın etkilendiği bir diğer isim Heidegger üzerinde de durmamız icap eder. Husserl'in işaret ettiği kriz, Heidegger'in çalışmalarıyla birlikte anlam değişir. Husserl'in işaret ettiği krizin mahiyetinin ne olduğu, Heidegger'le birlikte bu krizin nasıl bir mahiyet değiştiği çalışmamızda üzerinde duracağımız konulardan olacaktır. Patočka'nın felsefesinde krizin nasıl tanımlandığı ve onun kriz düşüncesinin Husserl ve Heidegger'den hangi açılardan farklı olduğunu irdeleyen çalışmamız, Patočka'nın temel kavramlarının yorumlamasını sunacaktır. Bu çalışmanın Patočka ilgili çalışmalar alanındaki boşluğu doldurmaya katkıda bulunacağını temenni ediyoruz.

Trata-se de estabelecer um perspectivismo fenomenológico em sentido forte, a partir do qual a
noção de perspectiva vale como condição necessária, mas também suficiente da aparição. Isso será realizado
por meio de um diálogo crítico com a tradição e com a elaboração de um novo ferramental teórico, que
segue uma linha de pesquisa já aberta nos últimos anos. Primeiro, com o resgate da teoria da doação por
perfis (Husserl) e posterior crítica da relação entre perfil e coisa mesma como fundada e dependente de uma
noção fundante de “perspectiva”. Mostraremos que ela não atua mais como parte de um todo (pars pro
toto), mas como parte total (pars totalis). Segundo, pela reconstrução do conceito de noema, junto do
debate que enseja — Gurwitsch e Merleau-Ponty diante das leituras ditas “fregeanas” da noção — e
posterior desconstrução de seu “núcleo” invariante a partir do qual as perspectivas se vinculariam. Se a coisa
é ela também uma “perspectiva”, há que se vincular as perspectivas de outro modo, através das suas
“margens” e não pelo “centro” daquilo que aparece. Nesta intencionalidade lateral e perspectivista, que
propomos a partir da noção de “horizontalidade”, delineada no fim deste projeto, o horizonte pode ser
compreendido como total: os fenômenos não “têm” horizontes, mas “são” horizontes. Estes dois passos
permitirão passar da reabilitação da i) perspectiva ao ii) perspectivismo em chave fenomenológica. Por fim,
interrogamos qual a “subjetividade” implicada nesta teoria, que faz da perspectiva propriamente “vivida” e
distinta das versões nas quais a posição do sujeito é derivada de uma dinâmica inconsciente, pulsional ou
afetiva da perspectiva (sobretudo contra o perspectivismo defendido por Deleuze).

一般对马克思的平等思想解读都局限在《哥达纲领批判》中，不涉及到马克思早期思想转变，并基于历史唯物主义将平等视作观念论的产物。但实际上，马克思早在《论犹太人问题》中就存在平等思想，并在对鲍威尔的深刻批判中深化了其平等思想。马克思不仅将平等视作共产主义思想重要的理论范畴，而且马克思认为平等是社会现实的需求体现。因此，对于马克思而言，平等不再是观念论的产物，而是人类解放的现实诉求。(Generally, the interpretation of Marx's thought of equality is limited to the Critique of the Gotha Program, which does not involve the change of Marx's early thought, and regards equality as the product of conception based on historical materialism. But in fact, Marx had the thought of equality as early as in "On the Jews", and deepened his thought of equality in his profound criticism of Powell. Marx not only regarded equality as an important theoretical category of communist thought, but also believed that equality is the embodiment of the needs of social reality. Therefore, for Marx, equality is no longer the product of ideology, but the realistic demand of human liberation.)

En los últimos 20 años se ha desarrollado progresivamente la tesis de que la esquizofrenia puede ser entendida como un trastorno de la ipseidad. Esta es la ‘escuela de Copenhague’. Pese a su productividad, esta tesis ha oscurecido la importancia de aspectos corporales e intersubjetivos que son cruciales para una comprensión fenomenológica más completa de la esquizofrenia. Si bien abunda evidencia empírica que indica la relevancia de los aspectos corporales e intersubjetivos del trastorno, hace falta una fenomenología filosófica que muestre como y en qué sentido la ipseidad, corporeidad e intersubjetividad están interconectadas. El artículo hace un análisis filosófico de la ipseidad, la afectividad, la corporalidad y la intersubjetividad en un sentido fenomenológico-filosófico. Se argumenta que la subjetividad no puede concebirse como una ipseidad completamente autosuficiente e interior. La subjetividad está atravesada por la corporalidad y por tanto por una dualidad entre interiorid...

En el presente artículo, señalaremos que la determinación husserliana de lo vivo incluye tanto momentos genéticos como generativos, los cuales funcionan en paralelo y que no pueden ser ignorados. A partir del análisis de las propuestas de Steinbock y de Walton sobre la tensión que existe entre el método generativo y el genético, mostraremos que la determinación del mundo humano contiene elementos biológicos que son indispensables de considerar y que, por lo tanto, la generatividad debe incluirlo. De este modo, sostendremos que el ser humano pertenece a un doble contexto biogenerativo que lo pone en relación con otros seres a quienes identifica como vivientes. Finalmente, tomando en consideración las reflexiones tardías de Husserl, concluiremos señalando que el mundo de la vida no puede ser el mundo puramente humano, pues los seres vivos también están incluidos en él de manera constitutiva.

Palabras clave: génesis, generatividad, biología, mundo de la vida

Der vorliegende Beitrag nimmt die Diagnose zunehmender gesellschaftlicher Polarisierung zum
Anlass, über die Herausforderung und Möglichkeiten einer ‚agonalen Didaktik‘ nachzudenken, die
Bildungs- und Subjektivierungsprozesse im Sinne des transformatorischen Lernens beschreiben,
verstehen und anregen will. Dazu werden bildungs- und erziehungswissenschaftliche Positionen
und fachdidaktische Implikationen exemplarisch vorgestellt und zusammengeführt.
Taking diagnoses of increasing societal polarisation as its starting point, this article charts challenges
and potentials of a form of agonistic education that describes, understands and models
processes of (trans-)formation based on pedagogical, philosophical and educational theories.

The paper in czech language presents a key characteristic of Islam, i.e., inner intent (ar. niyya). With the adjective "right" intention appears in all important areas of Islam (ethics, law, sufism, ...). This study will try to introduce this term (niyya) and its meaning in the context of a textual analysis of some of the classical sources of Islam (Qur'an, hadith, history of thought, sufism). Although the study relies on key monographs in Western languages (f.e. I. de Francesco), the collection of texts analysed is itself based on the original Arabic.

The contribution investigates the influence of Avenarius and Mach’s empiriocriticism on Husserl’s phenomenology. Despite his critical reservations, Husserl acknowledges the role of both in anticipating his phenomenological method and appreciates their critique of materialistic metaphysics and the prevailing physicalism in psychology. Phenomenology and empiriocriticism share the goal of a science of conscious experience, free from reductionism and capable of preserving the specificity of its object. Husserl adopts Mach’s analyses of the living body and spatial sensations, developing a phenomenology
of kinesthesia in which transcendental consciousness, body, and world are fully integrated. This approach influences his theory of constitution, aimed at overcoming Cartesian dualism and adequately accounting for the subject’s rootedness in the world.

This paper provides an interpretation of two paragraphs from Heidegger's 1925-26 lectures on the question of "truth". First, I will consider Heidegger's criticism of Lotze's notion of "ideality"; then, I will focus on Heidegger's claim that Husserl was "fascinated" by such a Lotzean notion (especially if understood as "universality"). In the first section I will describe Heidegger's ontological approach to the distinction between reality and ideality. In the second section I will explain why, in Heidegger's view, Lotze's understanding of the notions of "reality" and "ideality", construed as different forms of Wirklichkeit, depends on some uncritical presumptions. In the third section, I will evaluate the consequences of Lotze's perspective on the notions of ideality and truth, so as to turn my attention to Husserl's Prolegomena and his allegedly adoption of Lotze's notion of "ideality" as universality. Accordingly, I will suggest that Heidegger's criticism is limited not only to Husserl's Prolegomena but to his phenomenology as a whole. Finally, I will discuss the problem of universality from the point of view of Heidegger's existential analytic. By referring to a 1925 lecture, I will suggest that Heidegger's rejection of Husserl's "reduction" is to be read in light of his criticism of the notion of "ideality".

Wie bekannt hat Scheler den Begriff der "phänomenologischen Reduktion" ausdrücklich von Husserl übernommen1, dennoch behauptet in der letzten Schaffensperiode ebenso deutlich, den Terminus "Phänomenologie" vermeiden zu wollen2, und tatsächlich verwendet er entweder den Ausdruck "phänomenologische Reduktion" in Anführungszeichen oder den Begriff "Techne der Reduktion"3. Die These, die ich zu entwickeln versuchen werde, ist, daß es bei Scheler nicht nur eine einzige Theorie der Reduktion gibt und daß, ebenso wie verschiedene Realitätstheorien zu unterscheiden sind, ebenso viele Versuche zu erkennen sind, die das Thema der Reduktion behandeln. Diese Versuche sind in großen Zügen auf zwei "Varianten" zurückzuführen: Die erste Variante ist jene, die wir alle kennen und die Scheler selbst in seiner mittleren Schaffensperiode als "phänomenologische Reduktion" bezeichnet. Die zweite Variante der Reduktion wird von ihm nicht eindeutig bestimmt, und es ist auch schwierig, dafür eine Bezeichnung zu finden. Auf jeden Fall verbindet sie Scheler mit Begriffen wie Sublimierung, Ekstase, Askese, "moralischer Aufschwung", etc.. Um sie von der ersten Variante zu unterscheiden werde ich sie "kathartische Reduktion" nennen, wobei das Wort "Katharsis" im Sinne von Platon gemeint ist. Trotz dieses Reichtums an Motiven ist der Schelersche Reduktionsbegriff oft nur durch jenen Husserls interpretiert worden, als ob der letztere das notwendige interpretative Paradigma wäre. So hätte Scheler den Reduktionsbegriff aus dem `Logische Untersuchungen' übernommen, aber ohne die Änderungen zu beachten, die mit `Ideen I' dazugekommen sind. Demzufolge denkt man, daß die Schelersche "phänomenologische" Reduktion auf das begrenzt bleibt, was Husserl in `Ideen I' als "eidetische Reduktion" bezeichnet, ohne die Ebene zu erreichen, die in der

s. 91] 1. "Udatnym rymem opisując boje, / do których miecza nie trzeba ni zbroje". Popularność dzieła W dobie staropolskiej Szachy Kochanowskiego cieszyły się sporym zainteresowaniem. Utwór najpierw trzykrotnie wydała oficyna Macieja Wirzbięty: około roku 1564 1 oraz w 1573 (il. 1) 2 [s. 92] i 1585 3 , a następnie z tej ostatniej edycji Jan Januszowski przedrukował tekst w autorskiej antologii Jan Kochanowski, która w latach 1586-1639 miała łącznie dwanaście wydań 4 . W ciągu ośmiu dekad poemat ukazał się drukiem piętnaście razy. W tym czasie powszechnie wymieniano go wśród najpoczytniejszych dzieł czarnoleskiego twórcy 5 . Już wydawca zbiorowego tomu tak zachwalał dorobek autora: [s. 93] Ten tedy wielki i zacny poeta polski [...] zostawił po sobie choć niewiele, jednak tyle, ile wszytkim dosyć [...]. Zostawił Treny [...]. Nuż insze rzeczy: Odprawę posłów greckich, Dryas Zamchana, Zgodę, Satyr, Szachy. Aza w tych nie nalazł kożdy, co by godnie pochwalić mógł? 6 Zbiór Jan Kochanowski, wznawiany zwykle w tym samym czasie, co przedruki Fraszek, Fragmentów i Psałterza Dawidowego, sprawił, że na przełomie XVI i XVII w. dorobek poety czytano zwykle jako całość. Znamienne, iż osobny ton Szachów nie został w niej zagłuszony świetnością 1

This article traces the development of Edmund Husserl’s approach to the concept of the ego through the different stages of the evolution of his phenomenological project. The aim is to delineate Husserl’s shifting
viewpoints from a Humean to a Kantian perspective, particularly focusing on the transition toward a Kantian transcendental approach. Through an analysis of Husserl’s engagement with Kant’s texts, especially on transcendental apperception, the study reveals how Husserl’s encounters with Kantian philosophy informed his conceptualization of the ego. It further examines the “empty character” of the ego, contrasting Husserl’s and Kant’s strategies to address Humean skepticism and their differing solutions for integrating the egological dimension into subjective experience: The transcendence-in-immanence of the ego for Husserl, the I as analytical form of thoughts for Kant.

Stream of Consciousness: The Hard Problem________________________Abstract:
Stream of consciousness is one of the main topics of psychology, as well as in new fields that have emerged in parallel with scientific developments such as cognitive sciences, cognitive psychology, neuroscience, cognitive neuroscience, neuropsychology, and especially in  interdisciplinary fields of mind, consciousness, cognition research and philosophy (information theory) and phenomenology. The phenomenon of stream of consciousness is, of course, related to the problem of “consciousness”. Consciousness is seen as an unsolved problem with questions that have not been fully clarified (why does it exist, how did it emerge evolutionarily, etc.), which science calls the "hard problem". The term "hard problem" used in relation to consciousness also applies to the stream of consciousness. The main question of this article is whether the entire content of consciousness at any given moment can be expressed through language and, more importantly, whether it can be written. We will try to find an answer to this question by reviewing old and recent research and examples from literature that will help us think about this in different fields and find an answer.
Özet
Bilinç akışı, günümüze kadar psikoloji alanının yanı sıra, bilişsel bilimler, bilişsel psikoloji, sinirbilim, bilişsel sinirbilim, nöropsikoloji gibi bilimsel gelişmelere paralel olarak ortaya çıkan yeni alanlar ve özellikle de disiplinlerarası alanlarda zihin, bilinç, biliş araştırmalarının ve felsefenin (bilgi kuramı), fenomenolojinin gelişimiyle birlikte de fenomenolojinin başlıca konularından biri.
Bilinç akışı olgusu, elbette “bilinç” sorunuyla bağlantılı. Bilimin “zor problem” olarak adlandırdığı, tam olarak açıklığa kavuşturulamamış sorularla (neden var, evrimsel olarak nasıl ortaya çıktı vb) henüz çözülmemiş bir sorun olarak görülmekte bilinç. Bilinçle ilgili olarak kullanılan “zor problem” nitelemesi, bilinç akışı için de geçerli. Bu yazının temel sorusu ise herhangi bir anda bilincin tüm içeriğinin, dil yoluyla ifade edilebilir olup olmadığı, daha önemlisi yazılabilir olup olmadığı. Bu soruya, farklı alanlarda bunu düşünmemize ve bir yanıt bulmamıza yardımcı olacak  eski ve yeni tarihli araştırmaları gözden geçirerek ve edebiyattan örneklerle yanıt bulmaya çalışacağız.

In this contribution, I address the problem of memory and the epistemological issues introduced in contemporary debate by electronic memory with its impact on biological memory. I will propose a phenomenological revision of the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) framework, as the field in which current debate on E-memory is being developed. My aim is to understand how and to what extent E-memory supplements biological memory, under what conditions and with what effects. I will show that the phenomenological approach is able to usefully complement the hypothesis of extended cognition in some of its problematic aspects, with specific regard to the Parity Principle (PP) and the equivalence between biological and external memory introduced by Clark & Chalmers (1998).

How does unconscious matter become conscious? How does our physical part, which lacks consciousness, have such a subjective quality? This is the explanatory gap in the problem of consciousness or the hard problem of consciousness which comes from a physicalist (eliminativist physicalism) point of view. From the opposite point of view, i.e. dualism, the mind-body problem has led to the problem of consciousness and the explanation of how our unconscious physical (matter) part (substance) is related to our conscious mental part (substance). If the problem of consciousness is the result of such views (eliminativism and dualism), is it possible to adopt a different perspective so that the problem does not arise at all? Or find a solution for it (maximum answer) or at least determine the right way to solve the problem (minimum answer)? The current research goes to this issue by adopting subjectivism and holism to make its subjective holism theory. Therefore, it gives a positive (maximum and minimum) answer to the above questions.

This article examines the theory of mind proposed by the esteemed Islamic philosopher, Mulla Sadra, through a phenomenological lens. We specifically focus on how Mulla Sadra’s framework addresses the question of the individual human mind and its intricate relationship with the body. While Mulla Sadra presents concepts that resonate with some of Husserl’s ‘monadological-phenomenological’ reflections, we argue that strict adherence to phenomenological methodology precludes acceptance of the metaphysical implications he draws concerning the individual mind’s connection to the totality of existence, including a presumed divine reality. Nonetheless, our comparative analysis with Mulla Sadra’s thought illuminates key aspects of Husserlian monadology and highlights the limitations of a rigorously phenomenological approach to purely metaphysical inquiries.

After a series of autobiographical testimonies there is no doubt about the philosophical importance of Franz Brentano in Martin Heidegger's thought. In his letter to William J. Richardson of April 1962, Heidegger pointed out the importance of the early reading of Brentano's doctoral thesis, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, of 1862, at the beginning of his jour-ney towards the question of being. From this indication, specialized research has reconstructed in various ways the philosophical links of the young Heidegger with Brentano. However, after the publication of the texts of the lessons and seminars in the Gesamtausgabe, the question arises: how did Heidegger read Brentano's corpus, and is it possible to see the link between Heidegger and Brentano in any other way, beyond the aforementioned autobiographical testimonies? In this paper we try to reconstruct the philosophical presence of Franz Brentano in the lessons of Freiburg and Marburg between 1919 and 1927. It is a question of observing that, beyond Heidegger's auto-biographical testimonies, the figure of Brentano occupies a place of great importance in the method-ical and thematic articulation of the conception of the phenomenological ontology.

L’œuvre de Jean-Luc Nancy se tisse autour du concept d’existence, modifié ou plutôt explicité comme co-existence. Nancy effectue sur l’existence l’opération que Heidegger menait à propos de l’être-au-monde ; en effet, comme Heidegger pouvait dire qu’il n’y a pas d’abord un sujet, puis un monde, puis la question de savoir comment le premier accède au second, Nancy affirme, à propos du Mitsein, de l’être-avec, de la socialité au sens le plus pur et le plus éminent, qu’il n’y a pas d’abord un sujet, un moi, puis un autre moi, puis la question de savoir comment l’un accède à l’autre, et comment ils peuvent communiquer ensemble. Il faut partir de « nous », et du sens que « nous » sommes, donc d’une « analytique coexistentiale ».

Penelitian ini mengeksplorasi evolusi kognitif manusia dari keadaan primordial emosional menuju pemikiran logis yang matang. Diawali dengan analisis "Wawasan Primasi pencarian Individu Kepada Esensi," studi ini menyelidiki perkembangan anak melalui lensa psikoanalisis, menekankan perjalanan unik setiap individu dalam mencari makna. Selanjutnya, penelitian membahas transformasi impresi emosional yang berakar pada kepercayaan budaya menjadi sistem pemahaman logis, menggambarkan proses kompleks ini sebagai refleksi pergeseran masyarakat dari sistem kepercayaan berbasis mitos ke pemahaman ilmiah.

This course sets forth your independent research in intercultural philosophy. If you have some basic knowledge in European continental philosophy and Chinese philosophy and are looking forward to learning the implications of the intercultural dialogue between these big traditions, the course demonstrates how intercultural philosophy can be applied as a powerful way of philosophizing with real case studies. In the course you will acquire the necessary tool kits for initiating your own research in the field.

Scholars trace phenomenology as a philosophical movement back to the early twentieth century. The origins of the phenomenological movement are mostly credited to two German philosophers: the "founding father" of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, and his successor, Martin Heidegger. The pair were instrumental in creating the framework for today's inductive qualitative phenomenological research designs. However, the roots of phenomenology spread further than these two German philosophers. This article describes the thoughts of the two phenomenological giants as well as the earlier influences on the emergence of phenomenology, stemming back to ancient Greece. Though not all-encompassing, this historical overview offers a richer and deeper look into the emergence of phenomenology as a philosophical tradition.

A. M. Turing argued that there was "little point in trying to make a 'thinking machine' more human by dressing it up in ... artificial flesh." We should, instead, draw "a fairly sharp line between the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man" (434). For over fifty years, drawing this line has meant disregarding the role flesh plays in our intellectual capacities. Correspondingly, intelligence has been defined in terms of the algorithms that both men and machines can perform. I would like to raise some doubts about this paradigm in artificial intelligence research. Intelligence, I believe, does not just involve the working of algorithms. It is founded on flesh's ability to move itself, to feel itself, and to engage in the body projects that accompanied our learning a language. This implies that to copy intelligence-i.e., to produce an artificial version of it-the flesh that forms its basis must also be reproduced. I. I shall begin with some general remarks about the role of the body in our awareness of the world. This awareness has a "first-person character." It is always awareness from a particular point of view-a "here" that no one else shares. Behind this is the fact of embodiment, i.e., the fact that different bodies cannot occupy the same space and, hence, cannot share the same "here." Embodiment also underlies the particular foreground-background structure of experience. The view I have of some object is surrounded by a horizon or connected series of views that I

In this paper, presented during the ATMOS and PEA Conference: "Atmospheres of Objects, Places and Events" for the PRIN-PNRR Project: “Atmospheres (ATMOS): What They Are and How They are Grasped” held in the University of Genoa (18-21 November 2024), I try inquiring Griffero's atmospherology from a phenomenology of person perspective. In particular, my aim is to understand to what extent personhood is developed in an externalist theory of emotion, which atmospherology is. Finally I will lay the foundations for a correlatonist theory of emotions, which aligns the transcendentalist view of emotions (Husserl) with the externalist/all-out one (Schmitz, Griffero), affirming the need of shifting the prototypical-centric concept of atmospheres in a spurious-centric one where it is ultimately up to subject uptaking what atmospheres solicit, thus asserting their motivated-agency.

This paper examines whether classical extensional mereology is adequate for formalizing the whole-parts relation in quantum chemical systems. Although other philosophers have argued that classical extensional and summative mereology does not adequately formalize whole-parts relation within organic wholes and social wholes, such critiques often assume that summative mereology is appropriate for formalizing the whole-parts relation in inorganic wholes such as atoms and molecules. However, my discussion of atoms and molecules as they are conceptualized in quantum chemistry will establish that standard mereology cannot adequately fulfill this task, since the properties and behavior of such wholes are context-dependent and cannot simply be reduced to the summative properties of their parts. To the extent that philosophers of chemistry have called for the development of an alternative mereology for quantum chemical systems, this paper ends by proposing behavioral mereology as a promising step in that direction. According to behavioral mereology, considerations of what constitutes a part of a whole is dependent upon the observable behavior displayed by these entities. Thus, relationality and context-dependence are stipulated from the outset and this makes behavioral mereology particularly well-suited as a mereology of quantum chemical wholes. The question of which mereology is appropriate for formalizing the whole-parts relation in quantum chemical systems is relevant to contemporary philosophy of chemistry, since this issue is related to the more general questions of the reducibility of chemical wholes to their parts and of the reducibility of chemistry to physics, which have been of central importance within the philosophy of chemistry for several decades. More generally, this paper puts contemporary discussions of mereology within the philosophy of chemistry into a broader historical and philosophical context. In doing so, this paper also bridges the gap between formal mereology, conceived as a branch of formal ontology, and "applied" mereology, conceived as a branch of philosophy of science.

Endereço para correspondência RESUMO O artigo aborda a relação entre as obras literárias e as obras filosóficas ou técnicas de Sartre. Um dos aspectos essenciais no conjunto da produção intelectual do existencialista foi a proposição de uma nova psicologia, concebida em outra ótica, que não os tradicionais modelo psicanalítico e empírico. "Psicanálise existencial" é a designação dada por Sartre ao método dessa psicologia, aplicado por ele em biografias de escritores famosos. Alguns de seus romances também foram concebidos no horizonte de sua psicanálise existencial, na medida em que realizam uma "radiografia psicológica" de seus personagens. As realizações nesse campo trazem contribuições consistentes para novas perspectivas para a psicologia clínica. È o caso do romance La Nausée, objeto principal de nossa análise, no qual realiza uma espécie de processo psicoterapêutico com seu principal personagem, Roquentin, trazendo importantes indicações de como deve ser uma clínica sartriana.

Endereço para correspondência RESUMO O artigo aborda a relação entre as obras literárias e as obras filosóficas ou técnicas de Sartre. Um dos aspectos essenciais no conjunto da produção intelectual do existencialista foi a proposição de uma nova psicologia, concebida em outra ótica, que não os tradicionais modelo psicanalítico e empírico. "Psicanálise existencial" é a designação dada por Sartre ao método dessa psicologia, aplicado por ele em biografias de escritores famosos. Alguns de seus romances também foram concebidos no horizonte de sua psicanálise existencial, na medida em que realizam uma "radiografia psicológica" de seus personagens. As realizações nesse campo trazem contribuições consistentes para novas perspectivas para a psicologia clínica. È o caso do romance La Nausée, objeto principal de nossa análise, no qual realiza uma espécie de processo psicoterapêutico com seu principal personagem, Roquentin, trazendo importantes indicações de como deve ser uma clínica sartriana.

Given the recent debates between Giorgi, van Manen, Smith, Morley, and Zahavi with regard to whether or not Husserl's reflective method - with its epoché and reductions - makes sense as a foundation for empirical psychological research, I decided to revisit the methodology of my 1984 doctoral dissertation on "Psychodiagnostic Seeing" and articulate it here in a more pedagogical manner, taking the reader through the intricacies of the phenomenological method as applied to the study of clinical intution. Husserl's method of intentional analysis, also known as "noetico-noematic analysis", is defined and presented here in connection with Gurwistch's discussion of Husserl's constitutive phenomenology and Spiegelberg's elaboration of the three dimension of all phenomenological research: intuition, analysis,  and description. A brief excerpt from the findings of my dissertation (Churchill, 1984b) is presented to illustrate the method. The article aims to demonstrate that there is, in fact and in practice, a viable application of Husserl's method for psychologically focused qualitative research.

El presente trabajo se propone destacar el valor que tiene para Levinas el análisis sobre la sensación que Kant lleva a cabo en la Estética trascendental kantiana como ámbito de una realidad más acá del orden objetivante del entendimiento. Dicho análisis se realizará  a partir de tres sentimientos : la exigencia moral, la orientación corporal y la esperanza ante la muerte.

Thank you for agreeing to this interview, Richard. I think it would be helpful to the readers of the journal, if you first said a bit about how you would characterize the trajectory of your thought as a whole concerning your recent book Touch (2021), your titular essay in Anacarnation (2022), and then your novel Salvage (2023).

Dossier con cuatro trabajos desarrollados por alumnos de licenciatura durante año y medio de trabajo aula-taller:
1.- Daniel Pineda Pérez, "La tipificación como un sistema organizativo".
2.- Juan Pablo Bernabé Arévalo, "El recuerdo y la constitución de la personalidad".
3.-Yeudhi Celeste Díaz Guzmán, "La empatía como aparición del otro".
4.-Bryan Adolfo Solís Sánchez, "La expectativa".
Con presentación del editor y director de los trabajos.