Peter Winch

This paper argues that Wittgenstein opposed theories of meaning, and did so for good reasons. Theories of meaning, in the sense discussed here, are attempts to explain what makes it the case that certain sounds, shapes, or movements are meaningful linguistic expressions. It is widely believed that Wittgenstein made fundamental contributions to this explanatory project. I argue, by contrast, that in both his early and later work, Wittgenstein endorsed a disjunctivist conception of language which rejects the assumption underlying the question that such theories seek to answer—namely, the assumption that the notion of a meaningful linguistic expression admits of non-circular analysis. Moreover, I give two arguments in favor of the view I ascribe to Wittgenstein: one based on later Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning skepticism, and one based on considerations concerning the identity of linguistic expressions.

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’).  To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless.  And often one is left guessing.

Theories of practice, this chapter argues, are best understood as attempts to overcome the opposition between the two principal alternatives in the philosophy of the social sciences: a subjective description of our experience of agency, and an objective, determinist, social theory. Emphasizing the Heideggerian and Wittgensteinian roots of this practical turn, it analyzes the contribution of leading exponents of practice theory, including Bourdieu, Dreyfus, Winch, Kuhn and Bloor, and critics, such as Gellner and Turner. It concludes that practice theory's protean character--its aim of combining close description and rigorous theory--is responsible both for its appeal and its liabilities.

Síntesis esquemática de la etnografía del antropólogo Evans-Pritchard en base a su estudio de la cultura Azande publicado en 1927.
Incluye discusión con Peter Winch.


Esquema personal e ingenuo a partir de la lectura del texto complementado con apuntes de clase. Obviar faltas ortográficas.

Diciembre 2016.

Peter Winch, D.Z. Phillips and Lars Hertzberg have all understood Jesus' parable of the Good Samaritan as dealing with the proper attitude of any person to his or her fellow human beings.  Reading the parable against the background of Talmudic literature, I argue that the parable actually addresses ethical issues involving the notion of membership in a community, and the duties which community members owe to each other.

A cursory attempt to look at the sociolinguistic behaviorism and its well entrenched connections to the logical positivist approach to social knowledge. The paper, while critical of the largely coterminous positivist camps, seeks to briefly combine a number of ideas also linked to Davidson's radical concept of triangulation in attempting a find more fertile ground for the social philosophy of the mind and the epistemic connections therein.

Alasdair MacIntyre is often cited for his contributions to moral philosophy. However, in this paper I argue that his reputation should be rehabilitated as a theorist who has realized an essentially critical conception of social science that moves beyond the old dogma of value neutrality. The paper argues this in two parts. In the first, historical part, I narrate how MacIntyre’s unique conception of a critical social science arose out of debates with Peter Winch. Winch was a key figure in the interpretive turn, but MacIntyre found his defense of value neutrality untenable. MacIntyre thus responded by developing a social science every bit as interpretive as Winch’s, but also inherently critical and normative. In the second, contemporary part, I suggest how MacIntyre’s social science generates criticism of major approaches to political inquiry today, including mainstream political science, Quentin Skinner’s Cambridge School, and Michel Foucault’s post-structuralism.

For many years, John Dupre has offered powerful arguments for an anti-reductionist, pluralist naturalism in the Philosophy of Science. Dupre has grounded his position in the fact that reductionist positions, especially physicalism, are simply unsupported by scientific practice and findings. In a recent paper, Dupre has taken his pluralist naturalism one step further, arguing against what Wittgenstein seems to claim at Philosophical Investigations §18, namely that there is an in principle difference between the language of science and ordinary language. Dupre argues against this that there is no sharp difference between the natural and the social sciences, and, moreover, that there is no in-principle difference between the languages of the natural and social sciences on the one hand and ordinary language on the other.  By drawing on aspects of ordinary language that Dupre neglects, I will argue here that Dupre misses a philosophically important, even though not metaphysical, distinction between the natural and social sciences, a distinction that can be seen in the way each he mischaracterizes ordinary language.

This thesis is a critical and comparative study of four commentators on the later Wittgenstein's rule following considerations. As such its primary aim is exegetical, and ultimately the thesis seeks to arrive at an enriched understanding of Wittgenstein's work through the distillation of the four commentators into what, it is hoped, can be said to approach a definitive interpretation, freed of their individual frailties.

The thesis commences by explicating the position of Kripke's Wittgenstein. He draws our attention to the 'sceptical problem' of how we are to resolve the apparently paradoxical situation that whilst we seem to use language meaningfully, there is no fact about us that constitutes our meaning one thing as opposed to something else, and consequently the possibility of our actually meaning anything seems to evaporate. Kripke interprets Wittgenstein as accepting the validity of the sceptical problem, but seeking to establish that the force of the problem is radically diminished because the justification which it has shown to be unobtainable is actually unnecessary for rule following to take place.

McDowell tries to show that Kripke is mistaken when he views Wittgenstein as endorsing scepticism in this way, because he sees Kripke as failing to appreciate a section of Philosophical Investigations which suggests that one ought to reject the sceptical paradox by correcting the misunderstanding which gives rise to it. McDowell reads Wittgenstein's claim as being that we mistakenly think we are caught in a dilemma which requires us either to endorse the sceptical paradox or to subscribe to a mythological picture of rule following; whereas, so the thought goes, we must reject the entire dilemma.

Although McDowell's criticism of Kripke is essentially correct, he is motivated to that criticism by an incorrect reading of Wittgenstein. Central to this misinterpretation is his failure to note Wittgenstein's belief that universal scepticism is nonsensical. Winch does much to flesh out the nature of Wittgenstein's claim here, although he makes the mistake of attributing to Kripke that position which the latter finds in Philosophical Investigations. Despite inheriting this error from Winch, Diamond nonetheless improves on his attempt to characterize the shortcomings of Kripke's reading as an interpretation of Wittgenstein, enabling the thesis to reach a conclusion about Wittgenstein's understanding of rule following.

Tabla de contenidos.

Prólogo, Jordi Ferrer Beltrán

I. EL CONCEPTO DE DERECHO, 30 Y 50 AÑOS DESPUÉS
1. Reconsiderando El concepto de derecho, Leslie Green
2. Releyendo a Hart, Riccardo Guastini

II. EL LIBRO Y SU METODOLOGÍA
3. El concepto de derecho puesto en un determinado contexto, Agustín Squella Narducci
Comentario de Daniela Accatino Scagliotti
4. Vigencia y honestidad de la teoría hartiana del derecho, David Quintero Fuentes
Comentario de Lorena Ramírez Ludeña
5. Dos críticas metodológicas a la teoría de Hart, María Cristina Redondo
Comentario de Fernando Quintana Bravo

III. NORMATIVIDAD Y ASPECTO INTERNO DE LAS REGLAS
6. El punto de vista interno de H.L.A. Hart (y Peter Winch): giros, comunidades y pluralidades, Salvador Millaleo Hernández
Comentario de Alejandro Nava Tovar
7. El derecho desde la perspectiva del aceptante: un debate a partir de Herbert Hart, Paula Gaido
Comentario de Juan Ormeño Karzulovic
8. Reglas sociales, formas de vida y juegos de lenguaje, Sebastián Figueroa Rubio
Comentario de Maribel Narváez Mora

IV. VARIEDAD DE REGLAS Y RAZONAMIENTO JURÍDICO
9. H.L.A. Hart según MacCormick: ¿Existe una relación necesaria entre El concepto de derecho, en tanto tarea descriptiva, y la teoría del razonamiento legal?, José Julio León
Comentario de Ernesto Riffo Elgueta
10. Los derechos subjetivos en El concepto de derecho de Hart, María Beatriz Arriagada Cáceres
Comentario de Alberto Coddou Mc Manus
11. Reglas primarias de obligación Las "reglas del derecho penal" en El concepto de derecho, Juan Pablo Mañalich Raffo
Comentario de Esteban Pereira Fredes

This is not a polished work but notes on some works by Peter Winch (especially The Idea of a Social Science and "Understanding a Primitive Society") and Ludwig Wittgenstein (especially the Lecture on Ethics, the Philosophical Investigations, and the Remarks on Frazer).

This paper aims to identify the main points that Peter Winch makes, or reminders that he offers, about understanding ourselves and others, and to make the best possible sense of what he has to say on the subject. It would no doubt be possible to construct a theory out of these ideas, but I try to avoid giving the impression that Winch does so. Instead, the most Wittgensteinian approach to the subject is, as Winch does, to describe, remind, and thereby clarify, without putting forward any kind of debatable or questionable hypothesis. What follows is an attempt to sketch this description and its development from The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy through "Understanding a Primitive Society" to "Can We Understand Ourselves?" Winch's work brings out the fact that understanding people is importantly connected to both wisdom and practical being in tune with others, but identical with neither.

No one in the developed world with any access to mass-media could be unaware of the conditions under which animals are treated in being raised for slaughter for meat on an industrial scale. That all this involves enormous suffering on the part of the animals concerned can hardly be denied; the facts here are not at all in dispute. That so many of us seem impervious to these facts, are so unmoved by them, is surely puzzling. Puzzling in part of course because some among us are struck, struck dumb even, in horror at the sheer magnitude of the unending yet everyday cruelty perpetrated by human beings on other animals; the kind of horror, for instance, that both wounds and isolates the writer Elizabeth Costello in John Coetzee's The Life of Animals. 1 How can these facts amount for so many other people to so little? In this paper I offer an explanation why. We clearly miss something concerning our moral relations with animals, but I suggest it is not a fact, specifically not the fact that they suffer. We might begin to understand this, I argue, when we consider that our moral relations with each other are not founded on the fact that we suffer.

The following dialogue 1 provides an account of Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) and its relation to sociological theory and empirical research. Moreover, it attempts to pre-empt possible misconstruals by dealing with a number of standard objections that have been raised against OLP. On a different level, the dialogue is intended to register some of the difficulties in the encounter between someone who is committed to theoretical sociological practices and one who wants to call these practices into question, proposing at the same time a stance some sociological agendas (for example, a critical theory one) have preconceptions about. Such preconceptions do not usually depend on careful scrutiny of OLP but rather on influential misunderstandings. Nevertheless, objections based on such misunderstandings need to be considered for the following three reasons: (a) they are in fact widespread, (b) social scientists, who I am mainly addressing in this book, are more susceptible to them since there is not much by way of application of OLP in the social sciences, and (c) it is my purpose to display and thus problematise the typical level of (rather superficial) engagement with OLP. Dealing with objections early on will hopefully help readers to move beyond them in the remainder of the book. The thematic structure of the dialogue is as follows:

At the end of his influential article “Understanding a Primitive Society” (1964), Peter Winch suggests that sexual relations, together with birth and death, are not to be considered as events or experiences in the world, but rather as having a more fundamental role in shaping what we make sense of as human life and morality. In this article, I discuss some senses in which sexual relations, perceived as such a “limiting notion”, can be said to “determine the ‘ethical space’ within which the possibilities of good and evil in human life can be exercised” (Winch 1964, 322). I argue first that sexual relations, understood in a broad sense to include both sexual desire and the possibility of forming intimate relationships, as well as an understanding of ourselves as in some way sexed or gendered, interestingly differ from the other limiting notions of birth and death, in that they by necessity involve us in (desired, imagined or actualized) encounters with other human beings. Through a discussion of Maggie Nelson’s The Argonauts (2015), I then consider the ethical character of such encounters, to show how varying and conflicting conceptions about sexual morality, and to some extent, politics, in our present society, reveal forms of disagreement that go deep with us.

Throughout his career, Wes Sharrock has, following in the footsteps of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter Winch and Harold Garfinkel, sought to argue against accounts of the identity of an action which are the products of a social theory, a specific methodology or what Garfinkel termed formal analysis. In contrast, much of contemporary social science and social theory is grounded in a belief that ordinary or competent members of societies are unreliable authorities on the identity of their own and others' actions because they are subject to systems of sociological refraction. The idea being that ordinary members of society are systematically misled as to the identity of their actions and those of their peers because they-or their perceptions of actions-are subject to the refractive properties of (for example) ideology, or folk theories of action, and so on. In this paper, I subject to analysis this core commitment of much social science and social theory.

This article sets out an analytical international-theoretical perspective drawing upon events in the former Soviet areas during first half of the 1990s. The argument develops in four parts. An introduction establishes the purpose of the project and justifies it. The next part of the article inspects the intellectual genealogy the marriage of neorealism to neoliberalism under the tent of rational choice theory. It traces objections to that betrothal back to the depsychologization of logic nearly a century ago by Bertrand Russell, and insists rather on the role of cognition and consciousness in world politics. The third part of the article focuses on the former Soviet area, so as to develop the theoretical and practical significance of the sphere of finance in particular. It demonstrates the surprising agreement on some basic issues between a major neorealist application of regime theory (Krasner) and a particular variant of historical materialism (Cox). It also illustrates the practical utility of this synthetic approach for national interest analysis, and it justifies the epistemological basis for this. The last section of the article sketches avenues for the further development of this approach and provides an answer to the question why recent variants of neorealism have inexcusably neglected the national interest as an analytical category. The reply to that question sketches a basis for considering geography and demography to be the first principles of the study of international politics; it likewise establishes the place of the international financial sphere in such a theoretical framework.

A considerable literature has emerged in the last two decades
concerning what I shall call the 'Ratiorlalitatstreit'. As with the Methodenstreit, the issues are set by radically differing conceptions of the
purpose and nature of social science. The locus classicus of the Rationalitiitstreit is Peter Winch's essay 'Understanding a Primitive Society'.
The key issue in the debate concerns how beliefs at variance with those which Western science endorses are to be viewed. The principals in the debate tend to divide between those, such as Winch, who hold that any attempt to evaluate another's beliefs apart from that person's scheme of things is a 'category mistake', and those, such as Martin Hollis, who champion a belief in 'the epistemological unity of mankind'. But the debate, as it develops, reveals some surprising and, or so I shall argue, odd philosophic twists, e.g., that conceptions of rationality are assumed to be varied but scientific rationality is spoken of as if it connoted some univocal
account of standards of rational inquiry. Indeed, much of the 'our standards
or theirs' debate proceeds as if we clearly knew just what is meant
by the phrase 'the logic of science'. That is a mistake.

This article offers a reassessment of the main import of Peter Winch’s philosophy of the social sciences. Critics argue that Winch presented a flawed methodology for the social sciences, while his supporters deny that Winch’s work is about methodology at all. Contrary to both, the author argues that Winch deals with fundamental questions about methodology, and that there is something substantial to learn from his account. Winch engages methodological questions without being committed to social ontology. Instead, Winch’s work on methodology is best described as a descriptive metaphysics of social inquiry. This alternative reading clarifies the close link between Winch’s argument for the autonomy of the social sciences and R. G. Collingwood’s philosophy of history.

Williams suggests that general confusions about the nature of practical thinking lie behind images of the necessarily ‘impersonal’ / ‘impartialist’ character of morality, in both its Kantian and consequentialist forms. He argues that thought, not simply about what I should do, but about what another should do is essentially first-personal in that its perspective is that of “What I would do if I were you”. But there are difficulties, deriving from instability in the contrast between the self and her circumstances, in any attempt along these lines to defend a claim of the form: ‘Practical thought is radically first-personal’. Further, this idea may turn out to be in direct conflict with ideas sometimes articulated in the suggestion that it is essentially ‘personal’. The strand of Cartesianism that involves giving priority to the first-person case introduces significant distortion. Thought about what another should do is a form of practical deliberation that needs understanding in its own terms: it should not be represented as simply a reflection of the ‘purer’ case of first person deliberation. But further, emphasis on the supposedly ‘first-personal’ character of practical deliberation can lead to distortion in the latter case too. We do better to say that reflection on what I should do is, in many cases, essentially ‘impersonal’: not in the Kantian sense that it is thought about what anyone ought to do, but, rather, in the sense that it is not thought about what anyone ought to do. Neither the thinker nor her characteristics need enter into either her reasoning or her conclusion – any more than they characteristically do in thought about what is the case.

The text deals with the role of particular examples in our understanding, especially in the encounters with unfamiliar cases that may require us to expand our concepts. I try to show that Peter Winch's reflections on the nature of understanding can provide the foundations for such an account. Understanding consists in a response informed by a background network of particular canonical examples. It is against this background that the distinction between appropriate differentiated reactions and misplaced ones makes sense. To accommodate applications of known concepts (such as love, or humour) to unfamiliar cases, particular examples are needed that invite the recipient in a certain direction of understanding, while providing a "closure" against arbitrary mis-or re-interpretations. This capacity has to do with a capacity or incapacity to convey the sense of seriousness of an example dealing with the lives of the persons (or characters) concerned.

The four strands are (a) the ‘austere’ conception of nonsense; (b) the view that a perfectly acceptable sentence of the language can be nonsense if it is uttered in unsuitable circumstances; (c) the view that rules of grammar are nonsense if construed as universal truths about the world; (d) the view that one cannot ‘mean a nonsense’.  (I think that this last has to be ascribed to Wittgenstein, though it is surprisingly difficult to find knock-down textual evidence for it.)  I argue that (c) is the odd man out and is not easily reconciled with the others.

It is widely assumed that the mid Twentieth century saw the emergence of two powerful relativist theories that posed a significant threat to the prospects of the social sciences. This assumption underpins the further widely-held assumption that these challenges have been rebutted. These assumptions are only half true.

I have to begin by admitting that I have very little knowledge of the work of Walter Benjamin and am unfamiliar with his theory of language. This being the case, I have found it difficult to get a firm grasp on many of the ideas put forward in this paper, and so my response must be limited to a few points that do appear to touch on themes of common interest. Therefore some of the questions I raise should not necessarily be seen as antagonistic to the theories that have been put forward, but more as an attempt to comprehend what is being said in terms of my own understanding and hence, unavoidably, from the position of my own research interests.

Far from being non-realism or antirealism, Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion shows the meaning of practices within which the whole weight is in the picture that God speaks. 'The authority of the community of believers determines what is the word of God' does not contradict 'God himself determines what is the word of God.' As is shown by an example of Peter Winch, the distinction between inside and outside perspectives on religious practices is already given in those practices themselves. Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion does justice to the independent reality of God, without the adjustments proposed by

Wittgenstein’s puzzle states that whatever the quantity and quality of data that social scientists would collect about facts or actions, their descriptions will never allow for «understanding» the true meaning of these facts or actions as they are detached from the «forms of life» within which they emerge. Wittgenstein’s claim rests on a strong version of understanding which leads to conceive of forms of life as unintelligible to people who are unfamiliar with them. I contend that this conception is wrong as the alleged unavailability of others’ experience is a defective idea. I first discuss the incompleteness of Wittgenstein’s notion of forms of life, then outline how an analytical approach based on the sociological notion of situation would return its social dimension to this notion.

The paper examines the debate between Peter Winch and Alasdair MacIntyre on the principles of social science as that debate emerged in relation to Evans-Pritchard’s anthropological writings. The double jubilee of sixty years after Winch’s The Idea of a Social Science and ten years after There is No Such Thing as a Social Science by Hutchinson, Read and Sharrock, entices to approach the debate as a paradigmatic one. For the first time in the British intellectual tradition, philosophical intuitions and anthropological descriptions brought about a collision between two models of understanding. The paper thus deals with the following questions: how did Evans-Pritchard’s idea of anthropology influence the debate; what were the arguments advanced by the two parties; and what can one say about the grammar of “rationality” and the grammar of “understanding” in MacIntyre’s discussion and, to a still larger degree, in the one by Winch.
The approach of Evans-Pritchard is outlined in the paper by correlating his idea of the task of anthropology with his procedure for describing and explaining; by doing so, I argue for “rationality’s” dependence on the conceptual decision process. The distinction between describing and explaining leads to my examination of the specific ways in which rationality and understanding function in the respective approaches of MacIntyre and Winch. This, in turn, causes me to revisit the grammar of rationality and understanding in the light of Winch’s views on the nature of language, language games, and forms of life, which, toward the end of the paper, results in my arguing against the attempts to classify Winch’s philosophy as a subset of relativism.

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness?  If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity?  How do people react to being accused of talking nonsense themselves?  Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life?  In dream-reports perhaps?  Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs?  Or in certain jokes and hoaxes?  Are contradictions felt to be meaningless?  I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties.  First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others.  Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.

(I am sorry if Part Three seems rather fragmentary - a handful of questions left over from previous sections.  It really needs some kind of conclusion to draw the threads together, but for the moment inspiration eludes me.)

RESUMEN
Este trabajo examina la centralidad de la acción en las disciplinas sociales y las implicaciones de este con el fin de saber si las disciplinas sociales pueden ser llamadas científicas. Se examinan y rechazan diversas razones que califican las disciplinas sociales de científicas: 1) la afirmación de que las disciplinas sociales son reducibles a las ciencias naturales; 2) la alegación, de Donald Davidson de que las razones de la acción deben interpretarse en términos causales; 3) la afirmación de que las disciplinas sociales emplean o deberían emplear las methodologías de las ciencias naturales. La cuestíon del progreso en las disciplinas sociales es examinada críticamente. ¿ Deben adoptar los métodos de las ciencias naturales los académicos que trabajan en sociología, economía, política, geografía humana y filosofía a la aparente falta de progreso en las disciplinas sociales? Mi repuesta es negativa y comparto los puntos de vista de John Dupré contra Hutchinson, Read y Sharrock al afirmar que las disciplinas sociales pueden considerarse científicas ya que existe algo como ciencia social.

PALABRAS CLAVE
Acción, ciencias sociales, reduccionismo, progreso, causalidad.

A largo de todo su desarrollo, pero particularmente al intentar en sus ultimos escritos reformular sus problemas en terminos herrneneuticos, la filósofa Simone Weil se enfrentó al problema de la diversidad del sentido. En este trabajo nos propondremos, en primer lugar, mostrar de qué modo la necesidad de hacer frente a este problema deriva de una matriz de tipo fenomenológico-hermenéutica presente en su pensamiento. Veremos de qué modo debió la fenomenologia contemporánea tratar el mismo problema a partir de la investigación del enigmático aparecer de lo "extraño", investigación de la que Husserl mismo sentó las bases al analizar la experiencia de la alteridad humana en sus Meditaciones cartesianas. Intentaremos por último, de este modo dialógico, y considerando paralelamente a algunos referentes de la discusión filosófica contemporánea en torno al relativismo cultural, marcar algunas direcciones en que es posible investigar su superación. Estas apuntan fundamentalmente hacia el reconocimiento de un estrato elemental común de la experiencia en el que existe, en virtud del nacimiento, la sexualidad, la muerte, una comunicación y una comunidad carnal que, sin pasar por alto las particularidades y diferencias intersubjetivas, funda a la vez toda comprension de lo extraño,

The article discusses A.R. Louch's book 'Explanation and Human Action'. In particular, it focuses on Louch's highly original and controversial account of what he terms 'moral explanation' and its drastic implications for work carried out under the banner of the social and human sciences.

The received view of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that it fails as an interpretation because, inter alia, it ignores or overlooks what Wittgenstein has to say in the second paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201. In this paper, I demonstrate that the paragraph in question is in fact fully accommodated within Kripke's reading, and cannot therefore be reasonably utilised to object to it.

In part one I characterise the objection; in part two I explain why it fails; in part three I suggest why commentators might have been motivated to offer it; and in part four I claim that two commentators who have offered it also imply otherwise.

This article offers a reassessment of the main import of Peter Winch’s philosophy of the social sciences. Critics argue that Winch presented a flawed methodology for the social sciences, while his supporters deny that Winch’s work is about methodology at all. Contrary to both, the author argues that Winch deals with fundamental questions about methodology, and that there is something substantial to learn from his account. Winch engages methodological questions without being committed to social ontology. Instead, Winch’s work on methodology is best described as a descriptive metaphysics of social inquiry. This alternative reading clarifies the close link between Winch’s argument for the autonomy of the social sciences and R. G. Collingwood’s philosophy of history.