Private military contractors

En el contexto posterior a la Guerra de los Siete Años (1756-1763), la política defensiva de la Monarquía Hispánica en América experimentaba un proceso de cambio en el que la defensa colonial se basaba, cada vez más, en el envío de tropas peninsulares, incluyendo dentro de estas las de los regimientos de nación o extranjeros. A este respecto, si bien los cuerpos italianos, valones e irlandeses formaron parte del incremento del Ejército de Reemplazo, las limitaciones tradicionales de las capitulaciones de los cuerpos suizos hicieron que estos últimos no entraran dentro de ese esquema. No obstante, hubo un intento diplomático para cambiar esa limitación: el proyecto de tropa suiza para las Indias de 1766-1767. Aunque finalmente fallido, reviste gran interés por varias razones: plantea las posibilidades de mejora del empleo de tropas mercenarias en un contexto de dificultades y mayores costes para el reclutamiento de extranjeros; muestra una posibilidad desconocida en la estrategia atlántica de Carlos III y la diplomacia hispano-suiza del Setecientos; supone un intento de ruptura del paradigma de “proteger” América frente a todo lo “extranjero” y, al mismo tiempo, de terminar con las diferencias normativas de los regimientos suizos del ejército borbónico todavía persistentes en la segunda mitad del XVIII.

After the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), the defensive policy of the Hispanic Monarchy in America was experiencing a process of change, in which colonial defense was based, increasingly, on sending peninsular troops to the continent, including within this the foreign regiments. In this regard, although the Italian, Walloon and Irish corps were part of the Ejército de Reemplazo, the traditional limitations of the capitulations of the Swiss regiments meant that the they would not fit into that scheme. However, there was a diplomatic attempt to change this limitation: the Swiss troop project for America (1766-1767). Although finally unsuccessful, this project is of great interest for several reasons: it raises the possibilities of improving the employment of mercenary troops in a context of difficulties and higher costs for recruiting foreigners; it shows an unknown possibility regarding the change in the Atlantic strategy of Carlos III and the Spanish-Swiss diplomacy of the 18th century; it is an attempt to break the paradigm of “protecting” America against everything “foreign” and  to eliminate the differences among the Swiss regiments of the Spanish army that still persisted in the second half of the 18th century.

Amidst arguments that the nature of war has changed, notably by Kaldor (2006), Keegan (2004), Münkler (2005), and Van Creveld (2008), Private Military Companies (PMCs) have received increasing media and scholarly attention over the past decade. South Africa is no stranger to the media storm evoked by Blackwater USA during the recent conflict in Iraq Executive Outcomes (hereafter referred to as EO) caused a comparable controversy during the 1990s, first through their involvement in Angola after the withdrawal of the SADF, and later through their contract in Sierra Leone. At the time, PMCs were still a relatively new phenomenon, and thus research was scarce and it was difficult to discuss EO properly in the context of PMCs rather than as mercenaries. In the wake of the war in Iraq, the rapid growth of research into the PMC phenomenon has however provided a wealth of information that facilitates a better understanding of EO’s role in the post-Cold War conflict environment. This article...

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The thesis examines the politics surrounding the regulation of PMSCs, which exempts companies from criminal responsibility. In addition to using secondary sources of data, the interdisciplinary analysis made use of international critical legal scholars’ application of Article 38 of the ICJ statute. The findings of the research pointed out that the international community’s conflicting political interests, particularly the divergent interests of Western and non-Western states, are the primary explanation why PMSCs are allowed to operate with impunity. The thesis further disclosed that although there is a general consensus regarding the existence of international law requiring states (hiring or territorial) to regulate the operations of PMSCs and that failure to do so results in the attribution of the PMSC’s conduct to those states, the implementation of this law is inconsistent and seldom contradictory. Furthermore, it proved that home states should have been obliged by international law to regulate the operations of their PMSCs in order to effectively regulate PMSCs and put an end to the pervasive impunity they currently enjoy. The thesis claimed that in the unlikely event that an internationally binding agreement regulating PMSCs materializes, these companies will continue to violate human rights and operate with impunity.

The use of mercenaries in conflict exploded in the 1960s during the spate of post-colonial conflicts, particularly in Africa, as European powers drew back from their former imperial possessions. The trend continued in the 1990s as post-Cold War chaos began to engulf many regions and competent military professionals were sought out by all manner of actors seeking advantage in conflicts. The post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan saw Western powers turn to powerful and well-connected military contractors to bolster their efforts to fight, police and organise restive populations and the terrorists and insurgents that took advantage of the situation. This paper traces the evolution of such mercenary and private, non-state armed entities over the last five decades, and examines the impact they had on the conflicts where they were present.

On 30 September 2014 the long-awaited Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the US and the post-2014 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Afghanistan and NATO were signed, ending a process that dragged on for almost two years. While the media often stress that the agreements allow the US and NATO to continue their military presence in the country, the two agreements actually define the legal rights and obligations of the foreign forces in Afghanistan post 2014. The two agreements, although not dramatically different from their predecessors, reflect to a certain extent the character of the new military mission and the changing relations between Afghanistan and the international community supporting the country.

The rise of Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs) in military or civilian missions stands as an important change in the dynamics of the security and defence world, as they change how operations can be conducted, especially for armed forces. Dating back to the Middle Ages with mercenaries, they have taken different forms throughout history. Nowadays, they deliver a large span of services (from indirect support in logistics or military counselling to taking part directly in combat). This shows how they adapted to the most modern types of conflict thanks to their business structure and flexibility in various scenarios.

On the one hand, PMCs participate in combats, from troops through training or instruction programmes, having a strong impact on the development of conflicts. On the other hand, PSCs dedicate themselves to tasks related to security and guard duties like protection of facilities or personnel in at-risk zones. While they both provide services to governments, PMCs are employed in training military forces and taking part in conflict zones, and PSCs are used primarily for non-combat missions such as personnel protection abroad and site security. However, by the nature of their work, both PMCs and PSCs may be engaged in violent scenarios. Therefore, it is also generally accepted to refer to them as Private Military and Security companies (PMSCs).

The employment of additional resources to the national armies is a phenomenon which requires a comprehensive regulation on a national and international level. It is necessary, however, to draw a line between PMCs and PSCs, even if the lack of regulation and the similarity of tasks unite them. If the classification of PMSCs personnel in concrete category under the Geneva Conventions seems complex, the distinction between soldiers and civilians nevertheless still has to be made to understand what they can and cannot do in conflicts, eventually having an incidence on the rules of engagement they have to follow and the protection they could be granted or not.

This paper will present their blurred status in law and their duties in missions led by European Member States, taking a look at the existing legislation and tools to hold them responsible for their actions. Analysing the relevant dispositions of International Law, this paper will try to clarify the risks and potential downfalls of employing such companies for domains normally part of State responsibilities solely. Furthermore, this paper will analyse the complex and fragmented legal framework governing these companies and their employment both on a European and national level, delving into the distinction of competencies between the EU and the national sovereignty of Member States, according to their own regulation on the matter.

This will also be done through practical studies of the use of PMSCs in the Balkans region in the 1990s and in the Afghan conflict in the 21st century. Moreover, the paper will tackle the urgent necessity to strengthen the rules and norms that limit the actions of PMSCs to make sure that human rights and ethical boundaries are respected while they pursue their contracts.

Abstract: The article analyses the tactics of the rebellion of Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Wagner Group of 23–24 June 2023. Referring to the concept of communicative tactics, the article argues for the thesis that Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion was a strategy to provide a platform to express his expectations and negotiate with political power. This suggests viewing the rebellion as an act of communication and the rebels as rational actors. The article addresses the issue of tactics, rarely discussed in rebellion studies. The aim of the text is to answer the question of the mechanisms regulating the course of the revolt of J. Prigozhin and the Wagner Group militants. At a more detailed level, the article reconstructs the ways in which J. Prigozhin used two tactics characteristic of military mutinies treated as manifestations of tactical communication: making accusations public and formulating threats to use force.

Abstrakt: Artykuł analizuje taktyki buntu rosyjskiego oligarchy Jewgienija Prigożyna i Grupy Wagnera z 23–24 czerwca 2023 r. Odwołując się do koncepcji taktyki komunikacyjnej, artykuł przedstawia argumenty na rzecz tezy, że bunt J. Prigożyna był mechanizmem, który miał zapewnić platformę do wyrażania oczekiwań oraz płaszczyznę negocjacji z władzą polityczną. W tej perspektywie bunt jest postrzegany jako akt komunikacji, a buntownicy jako racjonalni aktorzy. W artykule poruszona jest też kwestia taktyki, rzadko podejmowana w badaniach nad buntami. Celem tekstu jest odpowiedź na pytanie o mechanizmy regulujące przebieg buntu J. Prigożyna i bojowników Grupy Wagnera. Na poziomie bardziej szczegółowym artykuł rekonstruuje sposoby wykorzystania przez J. Prigożyna dwóch taktyk charakterystycznych dla buntów wojskowych traktowanych jako przejawy taktycznej komunikacji: upubliczniania oskarżeń oraz formułowania gróźb użycia siły.

Esen, B. (2015) ‘Has Turkey turned back to the ‘90s?’, Daily Sabah, 21.08.2015.

A state has the right to fight a terror organization that is killing civilians and public officers on a daily basis. Nobody can expect a sovereign state to allow so-
called "self-administered" liberated zones, where the state cannot operate. It is not just a right, but also a responsibility to ensure the safety of their citizens for the state. Since June, 56 public officers have been killed by the PKK. No democratic state can be expected to tolerate this. The line here is drawn on the question of whether the state apparatus is obeying the law and respecting the rule of law while fighting terror. We all have the moral obligation to oppose a state that uses illegitimate counter-terror tactics, and if the Republic of Turkey turns into such a state, we should do it firmly. But despite several problems, this is not the case in Turkey - the Turkish state is far from repeating the 1990s, and no conscientious commentator can say that Turkey is applying illegitimate practices of counter-terrorism. If the PKK attacks a policeman, while he is protecting a HDP (Peoples' Democratic Party) building, (in other words, while he is protecting Kurdish party members), as happened last week, this shows that we are far from the '90s... Yes, moral superiority was on the Kurd's side during the '90s. But today moral superiority and legal justification is clearly on the side of the state...

En la ultima decada hemos asistido al rapido y constante crecimiento de un nuevo actor en la escena internacional que ha modificado sustancialmente el rostro de la guerra, pero ha sido solo y a traves de ciertos acontecimientos de los que se han hecho eco los medios de comunicacion y que han conseguido captar la atencion de la opinion publica cuando su relevancia y presencia se ha convertido en una constante, suscitando uno de los debates mas polemicos en torno a la privatizacion de la guerra y sus implicaciones en los proceso de democratizacion, el respeto a los Derechos Humanos, la necesidad de una revision de las normas y tratados que afectan al Derecho Internacional Humanitario y su impacto en las relaciones civico-militares. Nos referimos a las Companias Militares Privadas de Seguridad. Estas companias, expresion ultima de las politicas neoliberales y beneficiarias de los procesos de globalizacion, han jugado un papel inequivoco en los conflictos surgidos tras el ocaso de la Gu...

Prywatne przedsiębiorstwa wojskowe (PMC — ang. Private Military Company) i działający w nich prywatni kontraktorzy wojskowi są coraz częstszym elementem współczesnych konfliktów zbrojnych zarówno o charakterze międzynarodowym, jak i niemiędzynarodowym. Większa obecność powoduje liczne wyzwania dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego. Jednym z problemów jest aspekt dotyczący odpowiedzialności prawnomiędzynarodowej na poziomie PMC jako osoby prawnej i na poziomie osoby fizycznej jako prywatnego kontraktora wojskowego. Dlatego celem artykułu jest dokonanie analizy dotyczącej potencjalnej odpowiedzialności wymienionych podmiotów oraz wykazanie problemów praktycznych związanych z jej egzekwowaniem.

Private Military Companies (PMCs) and the private military contractors operating within them are an increasingly common feature of contemporary international and non-international armed conflicts. The increased presence raises numerous challenges for international security. One of the problems is the aspect concerning international legal responsibility at the level of the PMC as a legal entity and at the level of the individual as a private military contractor. Therefore, this article aims to analyse the actors' potential responsibility and demonstrate the practical problems related to their enforcement.

This paper deals with the definition and implications of globalism generally and for African interests in particular. Its focus is on globalism as a cluster of social, economic, and political forces contesting for the controlling paradigm of international relations and international ...

Kriege hatten in der griechischen Antike einen entscheidenden Einfluss auf die Akkumulation und den Verlust von Reichtum, ihre ökonomische Bedeutung war enorm. Dies hat sich in der Forschung jedoch nicht niedergeschlagen: In den wirtschaftsgeschichtlichen Grundsatzdebatten standen Militär und Krieg im Schatten anderer Themen, und in der militärgeschichtlichen Forschung wurde lange Zeit die ökonomische Komponente der Kriege ignoriert, da das Interesse den Waffen, Formationen und Kampftaktiken sowie der Lokalisierung und Rekonstruktion berühmter Schlachten galt. Finley forderte 1984 vehement Untersuchungen zur wirtschaftlichen Dimension antiker Kriege, Garlan legte 1989 einige Analysen vor-beide entwickelten ihre Ansichten aus einer nichtdogmatischen marxistischen Perspektive. 1 Inzwischen sind zahlreiche Untersuchungen zu den Kosten der Kriege, der Bedeutung des Söldnerberufes, der materiellen Motivation von kriegführenden Soldaten, Poleis und Monarchen sowie zu den Auswirkungen von Kriegen auf die Ökonomie erschienen. In den Standardwerken zur antiken Wirtschaft spielen Militär und Krieg aber immer noch eine Nebenrolle, eine umfassende Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Krieges im antiken Griechenland steht noch aus.

Gendered harms include: sexual and gender-based violence, particularly against indigenous women and women human rights defenders; human trafficking; gender-based discrimination in employment; evictions, especially in conflict-affected areas; denial of access to land, food or water, and loss of livelihood due to intimidation; denial of adequate healthcare for pregnant women, those with small children and trans women in private migrant detention facilities. These harms often intersect with racialized, ethnicity-based and other hierarchical harms.

It is well documented that the private military and security industry has the capacity to do great gendered harms to both those it encounters and those it employs.1 Significantly, it is also a sector where a variety of human rights-based approaches, instruments and mechanisms have emerged beyond the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).2 The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) addresses gender, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and explicitly requires private military and security companies (PMSCs) to integrate a gender perspective in their practices.3 Through an examination of publicly available documents and policies required for PMSCs certified as complying with the ICoC, this piece evaluates whether PMSCs do in fact integrate a gender perspective into their human rights policies and grievance procedures (see Table 1).4 Our study of certified PMSCs demonstrates that despite increased attention to the pot...

While there has been much focus elsewhere on PMSC-specific regulatory projects, as business actors, there is no reason to suggest that PMSCs are, or indeed ought to be, excluded from the scope of broader Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives. This report identifies and evaluates the international CSR initiatives which may encompass PMSC behaviour. It describes some historical CSR initiatives at the UN but focuses, in particular, on the recent work of the UN's Global Compact, the OECD and European Union. It concludes that both the Global Compact and OECD offer viable soft law options for regulating PSMC behaviour.

Minor dissertation toward the completion of M(phil) in Criminal Justice University of Cape Town 2013 Minor dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfillment of part of the requirements for the M(phil) in Criminal Justice in approved courses and a minor dissertation. The other part of the requirement for this qualification was the completion of a programme of courses. I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the submission of M(phil) in Criminal Justice minor dissertations, including those relating to length and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, and that this dissertation/ research paper conforms to those regulations.

Minor dissertation toward the completion of M(phil) in Criminal Justice University of Cape Town 2013 Minor dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfillment of part of the requirements for the M(phil) in Criminal Justice in approved courses and a minor dissertation. The other part of the requirement for this qualification was the completion of a programme of courses. I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the submission of M(phil) in Criminal Justice minor dissertations, including those relating to length and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, and that this dissertation/ research paper conforms to those regulations.

Studies provided regular commentary for the Australian and overseas media. On 17 April Melanesian and Australian scholars in the School led a well-attended seminar to discuss the events and their implications. Most of the papers presented here derive from that seminar, and from earlier media commentary. They are not intended as a full examination of the events of March-June 1997-several such examinations are forthcoming-but rather as a series of contemporary reflections, partly updated. Standish, Regan, May, Dinnen and Nelson are longtime observers of Papua New Guinea politics who have all spent considerable periods of residence in Papua New Guinea. Mandie-Filer is a Papua New Guinean scholar, currently at the Australian National University, who was in Papua New Guinea in March. Saovana-Spriggs is also a Papua New Guinean, who followed events in March-June from her present home in Canberra. Kabutaulaka is a Solomon Islands scholar who, like Saovana-Spriggs, has taken a particular interest in the political forces unleashed by the Bougainville conflict. The brief reflections presented here are preceded by a detailed chronology of the Sandline Affair and followed by appendices comprising selected documents and texts central to the events covered in this volume. vii The Editors wish to express their appreciation to the Department of Political and Social Change, the National Centre for Development Studies and the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project of the Australian National University for their financial assistance with the production of this collection. Special thanks are due to Allison Ley, Beverley Fraser, Claire Smith and Bill Standish for their fine editorial work. Sean Dorney and Mary-Louise O'Callaghan have also contributed as visitors to the Department. We are also grateful to Tikka Wilson and Dayaneetha De Silva for their pagemaking efforts and to Maree Tait, editor of the Pacific Policy Paper series. The editors would also like to thank Mary-Louise O'Callaghan and The Australian for permission to reproduce her two articles. viii

Současná regulace lobbingu v EU (EP a EK), v podobě formální dokumentace, vykazuje pohledem projektu mezinárodních standardů nevládních organizací značné rezervy. Systém je dle tohoto projektu nejsilnější z hlediska svého vymezení či transparentnosti, a naopak nejslabší v oblasti kontroly, sankcí a integrity. Zjištěná reflexe zcela odpovídá základním parametrům unijního, dobrovolného a sebe-regulačního systému. Celkové výsledky výzkumu ukazují, že Komise alespoň částečně splňuje více jak polovinu stanovených standardů. Parlament naopak méně než polovinu. Obě instituce tak vykazují velký prostor pro posílení regulace zejména v oblastech integrity, participace a přístupu. Mezi zásadní problémy unijní regulace patří především: neucelenost, dobrovolný rejstřík transparentnosti, nedostatek poskytovaných údajů v rejstříku, absence nezávislého dozorového orgánu a přísnějších sankcí či benevolentního používání instrumentu legislativní stopy.

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Contemporary development assistance often takes the form of subcontracted statebuilding. Foreign donors hire for-profit firms to provide services and to improve or create institutions in developing countries, particularly those experiencing internal conflict. This arrangement creates two counterproductive dynamics: first, it introduces agency problems between donors, recipient states, subcontractors, and citizens; and second, it undermines the long-run development of domestic bureaucratic capacity by creating disincentives for the host government to invest. These dynamics hinder, rather than foster, the legitimacy of state institutions. This paper summarizes trends in external support to state-building since the 1970s and illustrates subcontracted state-building with examples from Colombia.

The warfare is evolving and it is confirmed by last conflicts in which Russia was involved. They were asymmetric in nature and their objectives, developments, consequences in broader sense and end states have been a matter of research by many scholars. The nature of those conflicts is causing concerns and a question if there were randomly run or just perfectly synchronized operations? If so, should a hybrid war be considered a way of strategy and its objectives seen through the prism of the Russia’s interests? The answer to this question can be obtained after the evaluation of the theory and practice employed by the Russian Federation in the concept of hybrid war. This is the purpose of this article. The results of the research are presented by solving the following problem: What does the concept of the new generation warfare mean?

The causes of all the problems with the American invasion of Iraq have been often misidentified: the war did not begin with lies and deception, but overconfidence about American abilities, inadequately understood intelligence, and a failure to plan for the challenges America would face in post-Saddam Iraq. Lack of cooperation and coordination among the principal policymakers only aggravated these shortcomings.

To avoid mass mobilization, Moscow has called on Russian regions to start forming “volunteer battalions” to assist and even act in place of the regular armed forces.
Battalions have formed in the North Caucasus, a region that suffered disproportionately high losses at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, which led to protests and the spread of anti-Moscow rhetoric in 2022.
Using residents of the North Caucasus as cannon fodder in Ukraine, Moscow demonstrates little respect for the ethnically non-Russian regions and their peoples.

Russia is struggling to attract more volunteers to fight in Ukraine, and Moscow has increasingly turned to the outer regions for recruitment.
Such an approach has raised ethnic tensions in some regions where the volunteers are largely non-ethnic Russians, while other regions have become the darlings of Russian propagandists.
Growing combat losses and Moscow’s neglect of non-ethnic Russians are creating the foundation for greater anti-Kremlin sentiments in Siberia.

This article analyses the 2015 intervention of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP International Ltd), a South African private military company (PMC), against Boko Haram, the Islamic terrorist group in Nigeria. The origins of PMCs are highlighted before an in-depth analysis of the mercenary intervention against Boko Haram is performed, with an eye on previous major PMC interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, the paper emphasises the unprecedented use of PMCs against Islamic extremist groups but on the other reveals that PMC interventions have not changed much. Finally, the article assesses STTEP's intervention in light of the current debate on private security involving those who advocate its use and regulation and those who question the legitimacy of PMCs as a tool of conflict resolution.

Research and theorizing on state crime has come to play an important role in the fields of criminology and criminal justice for understanding the worst of crimes: those of powerful state agencies and agents. Since William Chambliss’ (1989) ASC presidential address, scholars of state crime have made advances in theoretical modeling and analyzing core enactment and etiological factors of crimes of the state (e.g., Barak 1991; Friedrichs 1998; Grabosky 1989; Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998; Kramer and Michalowski 2005; Kramer et al. 2005; Michalowski and Kramer 2006; Mullins and Rothe 2008a, b; Pearce 1976; Ross 1995, 2000; Rothe 2009; Rothe and Mullins 2006, 2008). Nonetheless, the We wish to thank all of those that contributed to our discussions and thoughts during the American Society of Criminology Roundtable on State Crime I and II, November 2007. D. L. Rothe Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA J. I. Ross (&) Division of Criminology, Criminal Justice & Forensic Studies, Universit...

The concept of state-corporate crime has been invoked and applied quite widely for more than 20 years now. We acknowledge the value of this concept but here address some of its conceptual limitations, especially in relation to crimes of large-scale investment and commercial banks, government-sponsored enterprises and international financial institutions. If the concept of state-corporate crime calls attention to the character and consequences of significant forms of crimes of the powerful, it tends to exclude attention to other forms of such crime. This article also addresses Steve Tombs' critique of state-corporate crime as it applies to what are here characterized as crimes of globalization. It considers the conundrum involved in a tension between achieving theoretical sophistication and in promoting effective responses to crimes of the powerful. It is a core premise of the analysis set forth here that in a rapidly changing, increasingly globalized twenty-first-century world, ...

- The Russian private military company (PMC) Española grew out of a subculture of soccer hooliganism in Russia.
- Española’s connection to soccer has important implications for using sports to recruit private soldiers for Russia’s war against Ukraine—a trend that has shown signs of spreading beyond soccer to hockey.
- The Russian PMC could use soccer to forge ties with fans outside Russia in the Balkans, Central Europe, and beyond.

One just has to switch on the news to realize that mercenaries and private military companies live a life of their own and shape headlines.
Chaos and mayhem dominate the streets of Haiti after Colombian mercenaries killed the president. Russia's Wagner Group played a key role in the invasion of Ukraine and at one point appeared to revolt against President Vladimir Putin. This is just to name a few recent histories shaping events.
The irony is that the latest phase in the evolution of mercenaries and private military entities first emerged in the Middle East, a region racked by wars and conflict in which states like the United States, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Turkey backed armed to the teeth, non-state actors of different stripes.