International Responsibility

Moelle's book is a welcome addition to a number of relatively recent studies on the responsibility of international organizations and collective security. 1 With globalization and an increasing number of stakeholders in international relations, international organizations have gained various new competencies, including in relation to collective security. 2 Their work and the manner in which they co-operate among themselves has also become much more complex. These include classic peacekeeping operations, hybrid peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations, and occasionally the full-fledged administration of territories. 3

The book is a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of all relevant aspects of the EU accession to the ECHR.

Książka jest przekrojowym omówieniem wszystkich istotnych kwestii związanych z przystąpieniem Unii Europejskiej do Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka. Akcesja UE do EKPCz to projekt już ponad czterdziestoletni, który wciąż nie doszedł do skutku, mimo długoletnich przygotowań. Ma ona wreszcie ustanowić formalną prawną więź pomiędzy najważniejszą i najbardziej zaawansowaną organizacją międzynarodową na kontynencie europejskim a najskuteczniejszym instrumentem ochrony praw człowieka na świecie. Akcesja to od 2009 roku prawny obowiązek UE, jednak jej realizacja wciąż napotykała przeszkody. Obecnie, kiedy przygotowywany jest nowy projekt umowy, na mocy której Unia ma stać się stroną Konwencji, temat ten jest aktualny jak nigdy dotąd. Jego doniosłość daleko wykracza poza zagadnienia prawa unijnego i prawa konwencyjnego. Przystąpienie organizacji międzynarodowej do EKPCz, zaprojektowanej dla państw, stwarza niespotykane dotąd problemy. Porusza wątki z zakresu prawa międzynarodowego i konstytucyjnego, dotyka zagadnień pluralizmu prawnego i multicentryczności systemu prawa, komplikuje system
ochrony praw człowieka w Europie. Każe na nowo przemyśleć relacje pomiędzy źródłami prawa i interpretującymi je sądami w jednej europejskiej przestrzeni prawnej. Celem niniejszej książki jest uporządkowanie tych złożonych problemów i odpowiedź na pojawiające się pytania co do natury i kształtu akcesji. W tym celu wykorzystano bogaty dorobek doktryny w sześciu językach, jak również rozległy wybór orzecznictwa.

Whether the European Union accedes to the European Convention on Human Rights is not a foregone conclusion, or at least not to the extent that it used to be in the period 2010-2014. Even though the accession remains a self-imposed obligation of the EU (Art. 6 (2) TUE), difficulties with gearing the Convention system to the EU’s specificity, especially after the convoluted Opinion 2/13 of the CJEU, might finally turn out too
overwhelming for the Union – which currently needs to address much more urgent issues. Yet apart from the symbolic dimension of the accession (which still might rekindle some pro-European enthusiasm), this act, even viewed only from the theoretical point of view, offers a surprisingly innovative perspective of relations between international organisations and control systems of international human rights conventions. Among these relations issues related to international responsibility – and shared responsibility in particular – come to the fore. Attributing responsibility to the EU and/or its Member States after the accession is something of an uncharted territory. There exist general rules of law of international responsibility, there is case law of the ECtHR (and of the EComHR), but the exact norms governing attributing
responsibility and co-responsibility in the case of the EU are not yet fully determined. Nevertheless, they might be of considerable importance for future development of law of international responsibility of IOs.

Cet ouvrage est la publication de ma thèse de doctorat soutenue le 12 décembre 2013 à l'Université Paris II (Panthéon-Assas)

Résumé:
La réparation internationale de dommages individuels est un sujet assez nouveau et peu réglementé en droit des gens. Chapitre manquant du droit de la responsabilité internationale de l’État tel qu’il a été codifié par la Commission du droit international des Nations Unies dans les Articles sur la responsabilité de l’État pour fait internationalement illicite, la responsabilité internationale de l’État à l’égard de l’individu trouve dans la jurisprudence de la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme un environnement salutaire à son développement. Jouissant d’une compétence large en matière de réparations conférée par l’article 63§1 de la Convention américaine des droits de l’homme, la Cour interaméricaine a développé une jurisprudence très riche et originale qui fournit un ensemble coordonné de règles et principes permettant de dégager un régime juridique de la réparation de dommages individuels dans le cadre de rapports transétatiques. L’étude du régime de réparations interaméricain permet d’identifier que ses spécificités – liées à la nature transétatique du rapport de responsabilité et à la nature grave des violations qu’on retrouve dans le contentieux régional – n’impliquent pas un détournement des règles classiques de la responsabilité internationale mais plutôt leur complétion: le régime juridique de la réparation qui se dégage de la jurisprudence de la Cour interaméricaine contribue définitivement à combler les lacunes du droit des gens ayant trait à la discipline de la réparation internationale de dommages soufferts par des personnes privées.

Title and Abstract: Reparation of damages in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The international reparation of damages suffered by individuals is a relatively new subject that hasn´t received the amount of attention it deserves from international law. The international responsibility of the State towards individuals is indeed a topic missing from the Articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts adopted in 2001 by the United Nations International Law Commission, which was mainly featured to discipline the responsibility of a State towards another State. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights might considerably contribute to filling this important gap in the law of international responsibility. Taking advantage of its large competence to order reparation measures according to article 63§1 of the American Convention of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court has developed a substantial and original jurisprudence leading to the establishment of a legal regime on the reparation of individual damages on the basis of the international responsibility of the State. From the study of the inter-american regime on reparations, it can be inferred that its specificities – deriving from the particular character of the State responsibility towards the individual and from the seriousness of the human rights violations brought to the Court – do not lead to a diversion from the general rules on State responsibility, but rather to their completion: the legal regime of reparation that comes out from the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court definitely contributes in filling the lacunas of international law with regards to the discipline of the international reparation of damages caused to private persons.

Departing from the observation that traditionally the law of State responsibility has hardly interacted with the law of territory, the article examines how these two fields of international law may relate in the case of State action in contested areas, be they terrestrial or marine. Assessing recent international practice, particularly the case law of the International Court of Justice and arbitral tribunals, and differentiating between land and maritime disputes, it identifies the primary obligations incumbent upon States when acting in contested areas – relating to State sovereignty and sovereign rights, ius ad bellum, ius in bello, procedural obligations pending the final settlement of the dispute – and it examines the consequences of the breach of those primary norms, in terms of secondary obligations, as well as third States’ duties and obligations. The legal framework specifically created for disputed maritime areas by Art. 74 para. 3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Art. 83 para. 3 UNCLOS, including its implications for land disputes, is specifically analysed. The authors submit that, at a time of increasingly pro-active policies and robust actions taken by States in contested areas, more attention should be devoted to the extent to which the law of State responsibility, especially with regard to relevant forms of reparation, has to adapt to the content and scope of primary norms applicable to that specific context.

The present case is one of the first in which a court was squarely confronted with the problem of determining whether the separate legal personality of an international organization is consistent with the possibility of members being held responsible for the conduct of the organization. The House of Lords denied that, as a general rule, members are responsible, concurrently and subsidiarily, for the wrongful conduct of the organization. Its judgment showed the uncertainties surrounding this legal question and marked the beginning of an intense debate which is still ongoing.

As widely known, Libyan authorities have been committing gross human rights violations to the detriment of migrants coming from abroad and arrested in their territory. According to international law, Libya is directly responsible for such violations. The present essay argues that Italy is responsible for complicity in the gross human rights violations perpetrated in Libya. It further suggests that also the EU is probably responsible for complicity in the same context. In particular, Italy has adopted a policy of borders outsourcing to Libya with the aim of controlling and reducing irregular migration. The EU has been supporting such policy. The responsibility of Italy and the EU for complicity is assessed in light of the relevant international norms, as basically codified in the UN ILC Drafts on State Responsibility (2001) and on International Organisations Responsibility (2011) for Internationally Wrongful Acts.

Actuellement l'arbitrage demeure, dans la plupart des cas, le seul mécanisme envisageable pour le règlement obligatoire des différends entre organisations internationales et etats (au d'autres organisations internationales). en même temps, il représente un mécanisme dont peuvent disposer les individus victimes d'un préjudice causé par une organisation internationale. Compte tenu de la prolifération des situations dans lesquelles les organisations internationales entreprennent des activités opérationnelles ou normatives susceptibles d'entraîner la violation d'obligations de droit international ou découlant d'un droit étatique, on peut estimer que l'arbitrage jouera, à l'avenir, un rôle de plus en plus important dans la mise en oeuvre de leur responsabilité.

Kitap, Uluslararası Sorumluluk Hukuku kurallarını, devletlerin uygulamaları, çeşitli olaylara ilişkin uluslararası yargı kararları ve bu konudaki en önemli hukuki çalışma olan Birleşmiş Milletler Uluslararası Hukuk Komisyonu’nun ortaya koyduğu kurallar çerçevesinde ele almaktadır. Eser, halen aranmakla birlikte baskısı çoktandır tükendiği ve on yaşını geçtiği için  tam metin pdf olarak paylaşılmıştır. Eserin yazarı  tarafından Uluslararası Sorumluluk Hukuku hakkında yeni bir kitap üzerinde çalışılmaktadır.

Kitabın Arka Kapağından:
Sorumluluğa ilişkin kurallar her hukuk dalının etkinliği ve gerçek hayattaki gücü için en önemli kurallar olmakla beraber, Devletlerin her birinin egemen ve bir diğerine hukuken eşit kişiler oldukları uluslararası hukukta, hiçbir hukuk dalında olmadığı kadar hayati öneme sahiptir.
Eser, Ondokuzuncu yüzyıldan günümüze kadar oluşmuş uluslararası sorumluluk kurallarını ortaya koymaktadır. Özellikle Birleşmiş Milletler Uluslararası Hukuk Komisyonu'nun konu ile ilgili son 60 yıllık çalışması ayrıntıları ile eserde ele alınmaktadır.
Bir Devletin uluslararası hukukta sorumluluğuna yol açan olay nedir?
Hangi davranışlar yüzünden Devletin sorumluluğu ileri sürülebilir?
Bu sorumluluğu kimler ileri sürebilir?
Uluslararası topluluğun geneli bir Devletin sorumluluğunu ileri sürebilir mi?
Sorumluluğun sonuçları nelerdir?
Sorumlu Devletin yükümlülükleri nelerdir?
Yükümlülüklerini yerine getirmesi için uluslararası hukuka uygun olarak, sorumlu Devlete karşı alınabilecek tedbirler nelerdir ve bunlara kimler başvurabilir?
Uluslararası hukukun sıradan ihlâlleri ile, insanlığın vicdanını en çok rahatsız eden ihlâller arasında sorumluluk bakımından bir fark bulunmakta mıdır ve bunların çiğnenmesine karşı alınabilecek hukuki önlemler nelerdir?
Eser bu ve benzeri bir çok soruya cevap ararken hukukçulara olduğu kadar bu konularla ilgilenen her okuyucuya da hitap etmeye çalışmaktadır.

Öz
Bu çalışma uluslararası sorumluluk esasları çerçevesinde onarım yöntemlerinden biri olan tazminatın devletlerarası zararlar açısından incelemesini yapmaktadır. Çalışma bu bağlamda devletlerin uluslararası haksız fiilleri neticesinde meydana gelen zararlardan yalnızca devletlerin maruz kaldığı zararlar kapsamında bir incelemedir. Bu kapsamda, öncelikle uluslararası sorumluluk hukuku rejiminde zararın onarımı, onarım yükümlülüğü ve onarım yöntemleri incelenmiştir. Onarım yükümlülüğünün mahiyeti, kapsamı ve sonuçlarından bahsedildikten sonra tazminata tabi zararın kapsamı ve zarar türleri belirtilmiştir. Anılan hususlar, tazminatın hesaplanmasını, tazminat miktarını ve hatta tazminatın şeklini doğrudan etkilemektedir. Ayrıca tazminat ile onarılacak zararın mahiyetinin ve miktarının belirlenmesi tazminatın hesaplanması aşamasının ön sürecidir. Bunun devamında eldeki çalışmada tazminatın uluslararası hukuka özgü̈ niteliği ve tazminat miktarının hesaplanmasında başvurulan ilke ve esaslar belirtilip incelenmiştir. Vurgulamak gerekir ki bu çalışmanın kapsamına devletlerin uluslararası haksız fiillerinden kaynaklanan ve yalnızca başka devlet ve devletlere yönelik zararlar girmektedir. Dolayısıyla uluslararası örgütlere, gerçek veya hükmî şahıslara yönelik zararlar ile uluslararası hukuka uygun birtakım faaliyetlerden kaynaklanan zararların onarılması bu incelemenin kapsamı dışındadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Uluslararası Hukukta Tazminat, Uluslararası Hukukta Zarar, Uluslararası Sorumluluk Hukuku, Uluslararası Hukukta Zararın Onarımı, Devletlerarası Zarar, Devletlerarası Tazminat
Abstract
This study examines compensation for inter-state damages in the context of the law on international responsibility. In this context, this study examines only inter-state damages from all harmful consequences caused by the internationally wrongful act of the State. First of all, the concept of reparation, state’s obligation to reparation and method of reparation in the international responsibility law regime will be examined. Then, the obligation to reparation and its legal consequences will be expressed. Types of damage falling within the scope of the obligation to reparation will be explained. This determination directly affects the calculation of compensation, the amount of it and even the form of it. In addition, determining the feature and amount of the damage to be repaired with compensation is the preliminary process of the calculation of compensation. Besides, the unique form of compensation in international law and the principles applied in the calculation of compensation will be specified and examined. It should be noted that the scope of this study is the inter-state damages arising from the internationally wrongful act of the states. Therefore, the reparation of damages to international organizations and natural/legal persons; also, damages resulting from certain activities not prohibited by international law are out of the scope of this study.
Keywords
Compensation in International Law, Damage in International law, Law of International Responsibility, Reparation in International law, Inter-state damage, Interstate Compensation

State as a counter-claimant in international investment arbitration. Main obstacles to the reaffirmation of states in international investment law.

Franck Latty, « L’Etat demandeur (reconventionnel) dans les procédures arbitrales : le gymkhana de la réaffirmation de l’Etat », in Tarek EL GHADBAN, Charles-Maurice MAZUY, Alexandre SENEGACNIK (dir.), La protection des investissements étrangers, vers une réaffirmation de l'Etat ? – The Protection of Foreign Investments : A Reaffirmation of the State?, Paris, Pedone, 2018, pp. 161-178

O texto tem como objetivo analisar os principais impactos da Convenção Interamericana sobre o Desaparecimento Forçado de Pessoas na ordem jurídica brasileira, uma vez que esse tratado internacional foi ratificado e recentemente internalizado pelo Estado brasileiro no ano de 2016. Primeiramente se analisa o surgimento da Convenção, sua estrutura e principais aspectos; em seguida aborda-se a definição do desaparecimento forçado conforme estabelecida pela Convenção e por outros tratados que versam sobre a temática; cuida-se do desaparecimento forçado de pessoas como múltiplas e odiosas violações de direitos humanos e como crime internacional, bem como a sua configuração, em determinados casos, como crime de lesa humanidade; e, por fim, trata das principais implicações domésticas desses instrumentos para o Estado brasileiro.

This study aims to analyze the main impacts of the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons in the Brazilian legal system, since this international treaty was ratified and recently internalized by the Brazilian State in 2016. First, it analyzes the emergence of the Convention, its structure and main aspects; then the definition of forced disappearance as established by the Convention and other treaties dealing with the issue is addressed; takes care of the forced disappearance of persons as multiple and odious violations of human rights and as an international crime, as well as their configuration, in certain cases, as a crime against humanity; and, finally, it deals with the main domestic implications of these instruments for the Brazilian State.

O estudo investiga a possibilidade de responsabilização internacional dos Estados por epidemias ou pandemias transnacionais, em especial o caso da Covid-19 que teve início na República Popular da China. O artigo analisa os regulamentos sanitários internacionais conjuntamente à Constituição da Organização Mundial de Saúde, para o fim de verificar sua obrigatoriedade aos Estados-partes. Posteriormente, analisa a jurisprudência da Corte Internacional de Justiça e a possibilidade de demandar a China perante este tribunal internacional, por não ter informado a sociedade internacional em tempo hábil e acarretado a pandemia da Covid-19 no mundo.

The world we live in is unjust and the existing political institutions fail to adequately address the current injustices. In this paper, I will discuss the role and the responsibilities of individual citizens in affluent countries 1 in the face of global structural injustice (GSI): How, if at all, should such individual agents, morally, respond to GSI? This is a challenging question because it links the smallest unit of agency, single persons, with complex moral challenges of an extremely large scale. Different from attempts to determine the role and moral responsibility of individuals through specific acts and concrete duties, I will propose that a theoretical discussion of global individual responsibility should proceed in terms of an individual-and subsequently potentially collective shared-"ethos." An ethos is understood as an attitude based on normative commitments that pervasively influence the multiple ways in which individual agents think and feel, talk and act. Proposing and defending the view that the moral responsibility of individuals in the face of GSI consists in fostering an ethos of cosmopolitan responsibility corresponds with the entanglement of individuals in the distinctive moral wrong of GSI. It highlights how individuals can contribute to overcoming structural injustice through targeting its relational origins. However, even a cosmopolitan ethos held by many individuals alone will not be sufficient to end GSI. What is ultimately needed is significant institutional reform.

The law of treaties and the law of responsibility have been studied in depth; nevertheless, the relationship between these two areas of international law is to some extent controversial.
It has been maintained that the law of treaties, as codified in the Vienna Convention of 1969, could be regarded as a self-contained regime,and that the ordinary rules on State responsibility would not apply, for instance, in case of treaty breach. This perspective does not fully explain the relationship between the two branches of international law we aredealing with. While the Vienna Convention regime does not exhaust the legal consequences of a breach of treaty, it includes various rules that work as “sanctions” (i.e. that help to ensure cessation of a wrongful act and reparation). The International Law Commission has expressly defined as such some provisions concerning invalidity, suspension and termination of treaties. The aim of the present book is to verify whether these coercive rules are coherent with the law of responsibility.
A problem in this respect does not arise in general, since many aspectsof the law of treaties are regulated by specific principles (e.g. good faith,freedom of consent, stability of treaty relations), which do not operate as sweepingly in the law of responsibility. However, a need for coordination
does arise for those provisions on invalidity, suspension and termination of treaties that have a coercive function in the context of the Vienna Convention. More specifically, it should be assessed whether these rules comply with the principles applicable in the law of responsibility,on issues such as: the notion of “injured State” adopted by Article 42 of the I.L.C. Draft; the rule according to which countermeasures may
be adopted only towards a State responsible for the wrongful act; the role of States other than an injured State as regards violations of erga omnes obligations; the limits to countermeasures identified by Article 50 of the Draft; and, last but not least, proportionality. These rules usually concern situations in which an issue of responsibility arises between parties to a treaty. In some instances, also the relationship between the contracting parties and third parties may come into play.
Chapter I analyses the provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention which entitle contracting parties to invoke the invalidity of a treaty the conclusion or performance of which implies a wrongful act: fraud, corruption,coercion of a representative of a State, coercion of a State by the threat or use of force, conflict with peremptory norms.
Chapter II deals with situations in which responsibility issues arise because of the non-performance of a treaty.
Chapter III deals with the relationship between international responsibility issues and suspension or termination of treaties because of impossibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances.
The author concludes that the coercive rules included
in the law of treaties are on the whole respectful of the legal principles applying in the field of responsibility.
Some aspects of the two sets of rules show certain discrepancies. These discrepancies may sometimes be explained by the fact that the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention do not have an exclusively coercive function. In other instances, the incoherence is only apparent,and the differences in the two legal subsystems are functional to
a more effective protection of the fundamental interests of international society. Further doubts may be resolved through interpretation. With regard to protection of collective interests, the Vienna Convention does not fully reflect the rules developed in the context of responsibility.
More specifically, jus standi to invoke the invalidity of treaties conflicting with imperative norms should be recognized also in cases where the Convention applies, by reading it in conformity with the I.L.C. Draft so as to ensure the overall harmony of the international legal order.

In its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, the International
Law Commission included Article 17 in order to regulate instances in
which binding decisions and authorizations were made by international organizations
that bound or applied in respect of their member States. Given that courts
have struggled in vain to come up with a uniform approach applicable in
such situations, one would expect that Article 17 would have been a cause for celebration.
Commentators,
however, lamented the inclusion of the provision, arguing
that it cannot function effectively because it forms part of the problematic
Chapter IV that regulates scenarios of indirect responsibility. The article rejects
this approach. For the first time, it offers an integrated normative analysis of
all Chapter IV provisions, and calls on the reader to rethink indirect responsibility
in a way that advances and promotes coherence in the law of international responsibility.
The paper adopts a contextual approach, and suggests that this understanding
of Article 17 offers courts a twofold opportunity: first, the ability to
effectively tackle cases that have troubled them to date; and second, to initiate a
change in the way in which States and international organizations interact in the
international arena.

As the International Law Association highlights “[power] entails accountability, that is the duty to account for its exercise.” Against this background, the article focuses on the question of accountability of the European Union (EU) border agency Frontex for potential human rights violations that may occur in the course of its operations. The article aims to challenge the Frontex’ stance that solely states would bear responsibility for any wrongful act. Rather, it is argued here, Frontex may incur responsibility, alongside a wrongdoing state. Shared responsibility or responsibility for complicity that may arise in such circumstances would reflect intertwined acts and powers of various actors involved in Frontex’ operations.

In addition to the direct effects of war on the environment, there's a lot of indirect effects that during the war will never show. This causes irreparable damage to the environment as a clear violation of customary international law that is recognized. In the field of policy issues related to major incidents environmental pollution affected. The participation of voluntary organizations and non-governmental, environmental education in the armed forces during peacetime, proper management of protected areas and non-interference environments with military activity fields, military waste management, review and evaluation of post-war affected areas, commitment to international law, the possibility of complaints and compensation in international tribunals, humanitarian aid environment and the interaction between warring neighbors environmental Protection Agency and the armed forces, the most important strategies for coping with the environmental crisis caused by the war.

Il presente volume è stato preliminarmente sottoposto a un processo di referaggio anonimo, nel rispetto dell'anonimato sia degli autori, sia dei curatori, sia dei revisori (double blind peer review). La valutazione è stata affidata a due esperti del tema trattato, designati dal Direttore del Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell'Università di Torino. Entrambi i revisori hanno formulato un giudizio positivo sull'opportunità di pubblicare il presente volume. © 2017 Ledizioni LediPublishing Via Alamanni, 11 -20141 Milano -Italy www.ledizioni.it info@ledizioni.it La responsabilità degli Stati e delle organizzazioni internazionali: nuove fattispecie e problemi di attribuzione e di accertamento, a cura di Andrea Spagnolo e Stefano Saluzzo Prima edizione: dicembre 2017 ISBN 9788867056651 Progetto grafico: ufficio grafico Ledizioni Informazioni sul catalogo e sulle ristampe dell'editore: www.ledizioni.it Le riproduzioni a uso differente da quello personale potranno avvenire, per un numero di pagine non superiore al 15% del presente volume, solo a seguito di specifica autorizzazione rilasciata da Ledizioni. Indice Premessa di Andrea Spagnolo e Stefano Saluzzo 13 PARTE PRIMA. La responsabilità degli Stati e delle organizzazioni internazionali alla prova di nuovi scenari 17 Simone cArreA La disciplina dell'illecito internazionale alla prova dell'evoluzione tecnologica: il cyber espionage 19 mArco longobArdo L'obbligo di verificare l'obiettivo e le conseguenze di un attacco ai sensi del diritto internazionale umanitario e nuove forme di intelligence: profili di responsabilità internazionale 37 mArio gervASi Le regole della responsabilità internazionale degli Stati dinanzi alla sfida del cambiamento climatico 61 giuliA vicini Illecito internazionale e diritto dei rifugiati: la responsabilità dei Paesi di origine e dei Paesi di asilo 89 giorgiA bevilAcquA Obblighi positivi degli Stati e ineffettività della tutela delle vittime di tratta di esseri umani 109 mAuro gAtti L'obbligo di proteggere le persone dalle calamità nell'Unione europea 127 lorenzo gASbArri In difesa del Consiglio di sicurezza: violazioni dei diritti umani e lotta al terrorismo 143 PARTE SECONDA. L'attribuzione delle condotte in contesti di interazione pubblico-privato e di cooperazione internazionale 163 giAn mAriA fArnelli Nuove tendenze in materia di attribuzione e responsabilità per l'illecito internazionale derivante da violazione dei diritti umani durante operazioni di contrasto alla violenza marittima da parte di privati 165 federicA violi L'attribuzione della condotta dei c.d. ʽsovereign investors'. Rilievi critici 185 mArio ventrone Responsabilità degli Stati per condotta delle organizzazioni internazionali 207 federicA fAvuzzA Responsabilità per violazioni dei diritti umani derivanti dalla cooperazione tra organizzazioni internazionali: spunti di riflessione in materia di attribuzione 225 eugenio cArli L'illecito internazionale nella prassi delle missioni di Politica di Sicurezza e Difesa Comune dell'Unione europea 249 vito todeSchini Il controllo sulle forze multinazionali nelle operazioni di pace: attribuzione della condotta e identificazione delle parti belligeranti 277 PARTE TERZA. Accertamento dell'illecito internazionale, standard probatori e istanze di riparazione 299 Alberto miglio Autonomia dell'ordinamento dell'Unione europea e risoluzione delle controversie in materia di investimenti 301 giuliA lAndi Alla prova dei fatti. Tendenze interpretative e standard della prova per l'attribuzione allo stato di condotte individuali nella recente giurisprudenza delle corti internazionali 335 AleSSAndro StiAno Lo standard di prova nell'attribuzione degli attacchi informatici 357 AleSSAndro bufAlini La riparazione per gravi violazioni dei diritti umani e del diritto umanitario tra rinuncia dello Stato e diritto individuale 375 eleonorA brAncA La dimensione nazionale dell'illecito internazionale: questioni di applicazione diretta della norma internazionale nei rapporti tra Stato ed individui 393 Elenco degli autori 415 mario ventrone Responsabilità degli Stati per condotta delle organizzazioni internazionali SommArio: 1. Introduzione. -2. Responsabilità di uno Stato in connessione con la condotta di un'organizzazione internazionale. -2.1. Aiuto o assistenza. -2.2. Direzione e controllo. -2.3 Coercizione. -2.4 Elusione degli obblighi internazionali. -3. Condotta illecita di un'organizzazione internazionale e responsabilità degli Stati membri: osservazioni de iure condendo.

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione. -2. Può la Banca mondiale violare i diritti umani? -2.1 Obblighi nella fase di scelta degli Stati beneficiari. -2.2 Obblighi nella fase del project cycle. -2.3 Responsabilità della Banca mondiale in connessione con la condotta dello Stato beneficiario. -3. Il ruolo dell'Inspection Panel. -4. Conclusioni.

Most of the present rules of international law regulate the behavior of States. Within States, however, there are other entities such as corporations, non–governmental organizations, individuals, international governmental organizations and armed opposition groups that are regulated by different national and international regimes. In this regard, non–State armed opposition groups present particular challenges to international law due to their dominant presence and participation in armed conflicts. Armed opposition groups are one of the most important actors in international humanitarian law today. Yet, taking into consideration that they a priori have certain international humanitarian obligations to fulfill, it remains unclear what the implications are when they, as a group, commit violations. Among these uncertainties, is that there is no formally recognized mechanism to attribute such breaches to the relevant non – state armed opposition group as such. In fact, unlike States, they have no organs. Similarly, there is also no consensus on circumstance that could preclude the wrongfulness of these breaches for armed opposition groups. By challenging the State–centric system of public international law, this article analyses the possible application of certain rules contained in the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) to violations of international humanitarian law by armed opposition groups.

This chapter tackles some aspects of the international responsibility of
2 the European Union and of its member States in the field of international investment  law. Its main aim is assessing whether EU Investment Agreements are contributing to the emergence in this policy field of a lex specialis under themeaning of Article 64 of the DARIO, concerning the responsibility of the Union. Post-Lisbon Investment
Agreements do not contain a clause on the attribution of conduct or responsibility. They just provide for a procedural mechanism empowering the Union to determine “in-house” who—between the Union and the concerned member State—should act as the sole respondent after a specific dispute has arisen. The author examines the connection existing between the identification of the respondent and allocation of
international responsibility, by also discussing the apportionment model uphold by Regulation (EU) No 912/2014. He concludes that EU Investment Agreements are unlikely to contribute to the consolidation of a rule of responsibility applicable to the EU and derogating from the rules applicable to the generality of international organizations.

The grounds of attribution of conduct as codified in the International Law Commission's ('ILC') Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts ('ARSIWA')fail to capture different dimensions of the use of force by non-state actors. The conflicts in Syria, Ukraine or Yemen demonstrate the difficulty in applying the conceptual architecture of the ARSIWA to complex situations, such as those involving multiple actors and varying degrees of involvement in the wrongful acts. This article proposes to redraw the boundaries between the concepts of a de facto organ of a state, the effective/overall control thresholds for the attribution of non-state actors' conduct, and complicity as an additional ground of attribution of conduct in international law.

This article addresses the possibility of state responsibility for transnational epidemics or pandemics, especially focusing on COVID-19 as a case study, a pandemic originated in the People’s Republic of China. To that end, this article analyzes this issue grounded on international health regulations together with the Constitution of the World Health Organization to be able to assess whether these rules are binding on the Member States. Furthermore, this article analyzes case laws from the International Court of Justice, and the feasibility of filing legal procedures against China before this U.N. Court for not informing the international society in due course about an impending COVID-19 pandemic.

Ongoing discussions among international lawyers on defences in state responsibility have close analogies with debates in two other fields: debates in general legal theory on defeasibility in law, and debates in criminal law theory (and philosophy) on the elements of criminal responsibility. The similarities are not surprising. But it is striking how little cross-fertilisation there seems to have been, for jurisprudence and criminal law scholars have developed a number of points and distinctions that international law theorists should find very useful. This essay illustrates these claims. Section 1 looks at defences from the point of view of general legal theory, and Section 2 does the same from the point of view of criminal law theory, recommending specific solutions to particular problems. Section 3 then shows how these contributions can help to answer some persistent questions surrounding defences in the law of state responsibility.

Published in the European Business Law Review vol 28 (2017)  The present paper addresses the problem of determining who, between the EU and its member states must bear international responsibility for the treatment afforded to a foreign investor. The main issue in this respect appears to be whether, under international law, the way in which competences are distributed between the organization and member states may be a criterion for the allocation of international responsibility. It is submitted that the view that international responsibility should correspond to competence is not generally accepted in international practice. The existence of a special rule of attribution applicable to the EU is also doubtful. Whatever the solution to be given to such problem under general international law, however, the allocation of international responsibility between the EU and its member states will mainly depend on the legal regime established by future investment treaties, or by trade agreements with investment chapters, that the EU will conclude with third states. In this respect, by leaving to the EU the decision as to who will act as the respondent, the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism established under the draft text of CETA will permit to the EU to foster a competence-based approach to the problem of allocating international responsibility.

The present article aims to analyze two different, albeit related, criticisms addressed to the general approach followed by the International Law Commission in its work of codification of the rules on the responsibility of international organizations. The first relies on the consideration of the great diversity among international organizations and of the ensuing difficulty of identifying a set of rules of responsibility which apply to every organization. The other criticism raises the question of whether a set of general rules of responsibility may be regarded as an adequate way of making international organizations more accountable. This article will show that these criticisms appear excessive. It is submitted that, to the extent that the Articles adopted on 2011 provide a first attempt to delineate a comprehensive legal framework for regulating the question of the responsibility of international organizations, they fill an important gap and may contribute to generate a greater awareness of the limitations incumbent on international organizations and of the consequences stemming from an overstepping of such limitations. RESUMO O presente artigo tem por objetivo analisar duas diferentes, ainda que relacionadas, críticas dirigidas à abordagem geral seguida pela Comissão de Direito Internacional no seu trabalho de codificação das regras relativas à responsabilidade das organizações internacionais. A primeira crítica baseia-se na consideração da grande diversidade entre as organizações internacionais e da dificuldade que se seguiu de identificação de um conjunto de regras de responsabilidade que se aplicam a todas as organizações. A outra crítica levanta a questão de saber se um conjunto de regras gerais da responsabilidade pode ser considerado como uma forma adequada de tornar as organizações internacionais mais responsáveis. Este artigo irá mostrar que estas críticas parecem excessivas. Alega-se que, na medida em que as disposições adotadas em 2011 fornecem uma primeira tentativa de delinear um quadro jurídico abrangente para regular a questão da responsabilidade 1 PhD, University of Milan. Professor of International Law, University of Macerata.

This paper examines the legal nature of the ‘rules of international organizations’ as defined by the International Law Commission in its works on the law of treaties and on international responsibility. Part 1 introduces the debate with an example concern- ing the nature of un Security Council anti-terrorism resolutions. Part 2 challenges the four theories of the rules envisaged by scholarship. Part 3 is an attempt to examine the characteristics of the legal system produced by international organizations taking ad- vantage of analytical jurisprudence, developing a theory of their legal nature defined as ‘dual legality’. Part 4 concludes by appraising the effects of the dual legality looking at the law of treaties, international responsibility and invalidity for ultra vires acts.

The present article aims to analyze two different, albeit related, criticisms
addressed to the general approach followed by the International Law Commission in its work of codification of the rules on the responsibility of international organizations. The first relies on the consideration of the great diversity among international organizations and of the ensuing difficulty of identifying a set of rules of responsibility which apply to every organization. The other criticism raises the question of whether a set of general rules of responsibility may be regarded as an adequate way of making international organizations more accountable. This article will show that these criticisms appear excessive. It is submitted that, to the extent that the Articles adopted on 2011 provide a first attempt to delineate a comprehensive legal framework for regulating the question of the responsibility of international organizations, they fill an important gap and may contribute to generate a greater awareness of the limitations incumbent on international organizations and of the consequences stemming from an overstepping of such limitations.

This article explores whether domestic courts can deny jurisdictional immunity of a state as a countermeasure. The article offers a survey of state practice that, according to some scholars, would support this argument, demonstrating that the corresponding practice is scarce, and that relevant domestic legislation denying jurisdictional immunity is not adopted as a countermeasure. Typically, countermeasures are adopted by political organs, which are responsible for the state's international relations and which can assess what is a lawful response to a violation of international law. Domestic courts are not entitled to adopt countermeasures without the involvement of the executive organs that are competent for the international relations of the state. This article demonstrates that a domestic court's denial of sovereign immunity as a countermeasure is unlawful without a prior determination of the government, and it is highly impractical when that determination is provided.

This paper contributes to the research project on the OSCE Legal Framework led by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. It deals with the OSCE’s international responsibility by distinguishing three different but correlated phenomena: (1) its capacity to develop a legal system; (2) its possession of legal personality, whether international or domestic, does not compromise the existence of the institution as such; and (3) how its inter- national responsibility is dependent upon the fact that the OSCE is either considered as founded by an instrument of international law or by an act of creation not based on international law. The introduction sets the scene describing the work of the International Law Commission. Section 2 further discusses the interaction between legal personality and the development of an ‘original’ or ‘derivative’ legal system. Section 3 then discusses four possibilities: (1) the OSCE possesses a derivative legal system and does not have international legal personality; (2) the OSCE possesses a derivative legal system and does have international legal personality; (3) the OSCE possesses an original legal system and does not have international legal personality; and (4) the OSCE possesses an original legal system and does have international legal personality. This paper does not define once and for all what the OSCE is and how its legal responsibility is to be assessed, but instead discusses the potential consequences that different legal constructions would have on its responsibility. The paper contributes to the law of international organizations analyzing how their international responsibility is affected by the adoption of one or another concept of legal system.

Alors que le monde commémore la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale et le centenaire du traité de Versailles, la question des conditions du rétablissement d’une paix juste et durable continue de se poser avec insistance. À rebours de l’idée classique selon laquelle le traité de paix est le produit exclusivement politique d’un simple rapport de forces, la présente étude propose d’identifier les règles juridiques qui fondent et limitent les prétentions respectives de chacun des belligérants à l’issue d’un conflit. L’analyse de la pratique historique des États fait ainsi apparaître un régime complexe, résultant de l’articulation des exigences simultanées et potentiellement contradictoires de différents corps de règles. L’intégrité de la volonté étatique, garantie par le droit des traités, doit alors composer avec les obligations que le droit de la responsabilité internationale et le droit de la sécurité collective font peser sur les parties. À la lumière de cette situation extrême que constitue la fin de guerre, l’étude du traité de paix éclaire de façon plus générale la structure même des différends internationaux et des conditions de leur résolution.

The interaction of multiple actors if European Border and Coast Guard Operations leads to a nexus of responsibilities, both individual and collective, positive and negative, direct or indirect, that is hard to disentangle. The connections between the responsibility of member states and that of the agency often lead to a non-singular answer to the question of the one responsible, which is not accommodated by the existing paradigm of legal accountability. Thus, this paper suggests a different approach to accountability, named ‘systemic accountability’, arguing from the perspective of justice, the rule of law, and strategic litigation.

Las Empresas Militares y de Seguridad Privadas (en adelante EMSP) representan un desafío contemporáneo al Derecho internacional, ya que conforme pasa el tiempo se hace más usual que los Estados deleguen tareas que tradicionalmente eran llevadas a cabo por sus fuerzas armadas a las EMSP. Sin embargo, al no existir un cuerpo normativo internacional específico que regule las actividades de dichas empresas, resulta difícil determinar responsables. Asimismo, esta carencia de normas específicas en el ámbito internacional, genera diversos cuestionamientos en cuanto a la atribución de responsabilidad. En primer lugar, al ser las EMSP entidades privadas, surge la pregunta de si es posible o no la atribución de responsabilidad internacional a los Estados que se involucran con ellas (tanto al Estado que contrata, al Estado en donde se desarrollan las actividades y al Estado del cual la empresa es nacional). En el caso en que sí fuera posible la atribución de responsabilidad, ¿habría un límite en la atribución de la responsabilidad o por el contrario estaríamos ante una responsabilidad absoluta? En segundo lugar, si las personas empleadas por las EMSP cometen violaciones al Derecho internacional humanitario (DIH), Derecho penal internacional (DPI), y/o derechos humanos, ¿hasta dónde se podría atribuir tal responsabilidad penal internacional?, ¿acaso se podría extrapolar y aplicar la teoría de responsabilidad del superior del DPI? De ser ese el caso, ¿se podría atribuir responsabilidad penal internacional al gerente y/o a la junta de directores de esas empresas? En tercer lugar, con respecto a la EMSP como persona jurídica, ¿podría imponérsele algún tipo de responsabilidad internacional? La adjudicación de la responsabilidad penal internacional de la persona jurídica fue analizada y descartada por el Estatuto de Roma, optándose por sólo juzgar a individuos. Sin embargo, hoy en día podemos visualizar una nueva tendencia en torno a la atribución de responsabilidad penal internacional de las personas jurídicas. Por ello, la siguiente investigación considera necesario realizar un análisis global del problema, acudiendo a varias ramas del Derecho internacional, como el Derecho internacional público, el DIH, el DPI y los derechos humanos. De esa manera, la presente tesis tiene como objetivo probar que ante la existencia de zonas grises en torno a la regulación de la actuación de las EMSP, en particular ante la atribución de responsabilidades por la comisión de violaciones al DIH, DPI y derechos humanos, se pueden acudir a diferentes formas de atribución de responsabilidad para llenar las lagunas existentes.

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa. − 2. Considerazioni generali circa la configurabilità quale contromisura dell'esercizio della giurisdizione nei confronti di Stati e organizzazioni internazionali o dei loro organi. − 2.1. Esercizio della giurisdizione da parte dello Stato di nazionalità delle vittime oppure di uno Stato non individualmente leso. − 3. Condizioni per la legittimità della contromisura: obiezione alla tesi secondo cui alcune regole in materia di immunità non potrebbero essere violate a titolo di contromisura. − 3.1. Adempimenti preventivi all'esercizio della giurisdizione: ruolo dei giudici e delle autorità di governo nell'adozione di contromisure. − 3.2. Natura non irreversibile della contromisura. − 3.3. Proporzionalità: effetto perturbatore del rifiuto di accordare le immunità. − 3.4. Categorie di obblighi, in relazione alla cui violazione è ipotizzabile il diniego delle immunità come contromisura proporzionata. − 4. Il caso delle immunità da misure di esecuzione. − 5. Normative interne che ricollegano a talune violazioni del diritto internazionale il disconoscimento delle immunità dalla giurisdizione. − 5.1. L'Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act statunitense. − 5.2. Il Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act canadese. − 5.3. La expropriation exception statunitense. − 6. Considerazioni critiche relative alla prassi in questione. − 7. Festina lente, ovvero sul ruolo della contromisura nello sviluppo progressivo del diritto internazionale.

O presente artigo visa proporcionar o cruzamento entre o WTO Law e os princípios de direito internacional público que norteiam as normas de cunho cogente (jus cogens) e o direito da responsabilidade das Organizações Internacionais, com enfoque nas possíveis conseqüências juridicas decorrentes da adoção de contramedidas no âmbito do sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC.

Despite their exponential growth in number and activities, there is not an established legal concept of an international organization. This book tackles the topic by examining the nature of the legal systems developed by international organizations. It is the first comprehensive study of the concepts by which international organizations' legal systems are commonly understood: functionalism, constitutionalism, exceptionalism, and informalism. Its purpose is threefold: to trace the historical origins of the different concepts of an international organization, to describe four groups under which these different notions can be aligned, and to propose a theory which defines international organizations as 'dual entities'. The concept of an international organization is defined by looking at the nature of the legal systems they develop. The notion of 'dual legal nature' describes how organizations create particular legal systems that derive from international law. This situation affects the law they produce, which is international and internal at the same time. The effects of the dual legal nature are considered by analysing international responsibility, the law of treaties, and the validity of organizations' acts.