Radical Right Populism

This paper examines the intricate relationship between populism, culture wars, and fundamental rights. It explores how the rise of populist movements and the intensification of culture wars reshape the interpretation and implementation of fundamental rights, often polarizing societal values and threatening democratic principles. By delving into the mechanisms underlying these phenomena, the paper highlights how populism amplifies ideological divides, leveraging culture wars to contest principles of equality, freedom of expression, and social justice. The study categorizes populism into economic, political, and cultural strands, analyzing their combined effects with culture wars on the discourse and practices of democracy. Using examples such as the rollback of reproductive rights in the United States and the use of nationalist narratives in Brazil and India, the paper underscores the tangible consequences of these dynamics. This exploration reveals the challenges these contentious forces pose to the principles of democracy, human rights, and social cohesion, as well as their influence on competing democratic models: liberal, majoritarian, and minoritarian.

The Spanish party system has recently undergone profound changes, marked by the rapid rise and decline of several political actors, such as Podemos and Ciudadanos, who challenged the imperfect two-party system that had characterised Spain since transition. This article examines how three major crisesthe global financial crisis, the Catalan secessionist challenge, and the COVID19 pandemic-, have impacted the social imaginary and created opportunities for new framing and electoral competition strategies. Our research reconstructs changes in the Spanish ideological landscape and the relative salience of political cleavages in each of these crises. We argue that they had asymmetric impacts on party politics. Antiestablishment and nationalist populist discourses were effectively used to harness and redirect public discontent against political opponents. Political parties adapted their ideology strategically. Initially, outsider parties took advantage of the drop of trust in public institutions challenging the two-party system, but in the long run, the mainstreaming of populist interpretative frames, paradoxically, ended up consolidating two antagonistic blocs and enabled the resurgence of the two major parties, the PP and PSOE, as undisputed leaders of each of them.

En este artículo se analiza la evolución del movimiento ultraderechista Casa-
Pound Italia desde su nacimiento hasta las elecciones generales de 2018. Para aclarar sus vínculos con el fascismo, se ha procedido a examinar a) las características del fascismo italiano del periodo anterior a la instauración del régimen mussoliniano, así como de su fase republicana; b) el contragolpe psicológico que sufrieron los neofascistas tras la derrota en la Segunda Guerra Mundial; c) los fenómenos de disidencia en el seno del neofascismo tradicional representado por el Movimento Sociale Italiano, detectando las influencias que más han marcado la ideología y la estructura
organizativa de CasaPound Italia, y d) las influencias de la nouvelle droite, así como de algunas organizaciones extraparlamentarias. Sucesivamente, se ha procedido a describir el nacimiento de la organización y su paso por la política activa en el contexto de crisis sistémica y reestructuración de la derecha que se produce entre 2008 y 2018.
Por último, se han proporcionado las principales pautas ideológicas de CasaPound Italia y analizado su programa político. Así, hemos demostrado tanto los vínculos de continuidad con una parte determinada del fascismo tradicional y del neofascismo de posguerra, como la evolución, en clave moderna, de aquellos aspectos que los mismos militantes de CasaPound Italia definen como fascismo del tercer milenio.

The Right-Wing Extremism Barometer is an online survey (CAWI), conducted from the end of April 2024 to the end of May 2024 by the Documentation Center of Austrian Resistance (DÖW) in Austria. The sample, which originates from an online access panel of the opinion research institute marketagent, comprises 2,198 people sampled to be representative of the Austrian resident population aged between 16 and 75 in terms of age, gender, federal state and education.The study aims to shed light on the prevalence of authoritarian, racist, antisemitic, and related attitudes in Austria, as well as the anti-democratic "potential" — beyond the current status quo of organized rightwing extremism — that actors encounter who have made such attitudes the basis of their political agenda. The study is to be repeated every two years in future to enable comparisons to be made over time.

This chapter focuses on Croatia and deals with the national conservative party of Domovinski Pokret/Homeland Movement (DP). In the latest European elections, the DP garnered a percentage of 8.82% (65,383 votes and 1 seat) and occupied the third spot after the ruling (centre-right) Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the 'Rivers of Justice' coalition spearheaded by the (centre-left) Social Democrat Party (SDP). I begin the present chapter by sketching a typology of the constituent segments along the broad spectrum of the European right wing and situate the DP within it. I then offer a summary of the DP's founding principles vis-à-vis further European integration and clarify the extent to which these principles were reflected in the party's stances and active engagement in the latest European elections. I then identify the main catalysts behind the DP leadership's success in mobilizing target groups and galvanizing electoral support for the party.

O presente ensaio aborda os impactos da razão de mundo neoliberal na sociedade e na democracia brasileira, bem como o papel que o ensino jurídico pode desempenhar tanto na emancipação do indivíduo, quanto para frear os intentos autoritários que circundam o Estado brasileiro e, consequentemente, trabalhar como força motriz do (re)ascender democrático. Para tanto, são investigadas as origens, características e consequências do neoliberalismo, seguida pela discussão acerca dos aspectos hodiernos da tendente precarização da educação jurídica. Ao final, conclui-se que somente um ensino jurídico crítico, humanista e plural, calcado no tripé de ensino, pesquisa e extensão, é que pode ser amplamente útil para a sociedade, na medida em que além de contemplar o direito fundamental à educação e, consequentemente, sustentar na formação do sujeito-cidadão, coletivo e comunitário, pode, ainda, auxiliar a solução dos problemas oriundos do não cumprimento das promessas da democracia, há tanto tempo já apontadas por Norberto Bobbio.

Aşırı sağın yükselişi arasında, partilerin bilhassa yerel seçimlerde, birtakım ülkelerde ise ulusal seçimlerde aldıkları oy oranlarındaki artış, aşırı sağ örgütler ile şiddet olaylarındaki artış, söylemin bilhassa merkez sağ partilerin söylemine, pekçok Avrupa ülkesinde göç, politikalarının sertleşmesine etkisi yer almaktadır. 2012'deki Fransa seçimlerinin ilk turunda aşırı sağ Ulusal Cephe'nin %18 oy oranıyla üçüncü parti olması, Hollanda'da iktidardaki sağ azınlık koalisyon hükûmetini dışarıdan destekleyen aşırı sağ Ö zgürlük Partisi (PVV)'nin ekonomik önlemler üzerinde uzlaşmaya varamayınca desteğini çekmesi sonucu 23 Nisan 2012'de hükûmetin düşmesi, aşırı sağın Avrupa siyasetinde artan etkisinin yansımalarıdır.

Political communication is the process used by political actors to
convey their political messages and influence society. This process
occurs through various communication tools and platforms, including
press releases, rallies, television broadcasts, social media, brochures,
and other communication channels. Political communication is
utilized by political leaders and institutions to announce and have the
public accept their policies, visions, goals, and values.
Fundamentally, political communication represents a crucial area
where political actors interact with society and where political
processes are shaped.

This review covers the body of literature relevant to the concepts and themes discussed in the PLEDGE project, Politics of Grievance and Democratic Governance (Grant Agreement No. 101132560; Project Website https://www.pledgeproject.eu/). The PLEDGE is a Horizon Europe-funded project focusing on the emotional dynamics of political grievances and their implications for democratic politics. The PLEDGE project that runs between 2024 and 2027 engages researchers, policymakers, and citizens in a collective effort to better understand citizens’ emotions, and develops practices and tools that promote emotionally responsive democratic governance and political communication, and foster pro-democratic forms of civic engagement. This work aims to compile the works produced in the last decade as well as the classical works that are related to the elaboration of the concepts discussed in PLEDGE research such as emotions, ressentiment, resentment, grievances, democratic governance, trust, mattering, nostalgia, heritage, populism, polarisation, radicalism, and spaces of encounter. The literature covered in the compilation mainly consists of works taken from politics, sociology, political psychology, anthropology, history, cultural studies, philosophy, and economics.

El objetivo de este texto es problematizar la relación entre autoritarismo social y derechización de masas que actualmente se experimenta en Argentina y Chile. En el primer caso a propósito del triunfo electoral de Javier Milei, en 2023; y, en el segundo, en virtud del persistente rechazo colectivo al que fue reducido el proceso reconstituyente del Estado. En este sentido, analizando la centralidad que adquiere para ambos fenómenos la disputa por las mediaciones meta-económicas de la vida en sociedad, la finalidad que se persigue es la de visibilizar que ni uno ni otro se agotan en un determinismo de tipo economicista. Recuperando la noción clásica de autoritarismo social formulada por la filosofía política de la teoría crítica, la hipótesis de trabajo aquí defendida sostiene que, aunque las variables económicas son fundamentales para comprender la emergencia, el fortalecimiento y la consolidación de este autoritarismo y de esta derechización (sobre todo en tiempos de crisis estructural del capitalismo histórico), para uno y otra, las tensiones presentes en los campos de la cultura, la identidad, el estatus, el prestigio y el privilegio resultan igual o más importantes que el problema estrictamente económico.

This article analyses the international queer politics of development by examining UK aid addressing lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans, plus (LGBT+) inclusion in the context of COVID-19 and right-wing government-using this case to propose a multi-dimensional critical framework for understanding when states fund LGBT+ development. The UK's first LGBT+ themed international development project was Strong in Diversity-Bold on Inclusion, from 2019, planned to work in five African cities. Partner organisations included HIVOS, Coalition of African Lesbians, AMSHeR, Kaleidoscope Trust, Article 19, Synergia, Workplace Pride and three universities. Drawing on the author's participation, the article analyses changing government policy regarding the project. In the context of Brexit and COVID-19, the 'co-creation' phase ended without phase 2 funding. Suggesting a gap between perspectives emphasising homonationalism (or homocapitalism) and inconsistent transnational resourcing for LGBT+ development, the article advocates a multi-dimensional critical framework engaging risk, governmentality, crisis and authoritarian populism.

Il n'y a pas si longtemps, l'extrême droite évoquait le « bruit des bottes », le son menaçant des soldats en marche, symbole d'un pouvoir oppressif et de la menace d'une violence accrue. Aujourd’hui, l’extrême droite ne fait plus peur puisque la dédiabolisation de ces partis les a rendus acceptables.

Scholarship on social movements, racism, and nationalism increasingly falls under the purview of "extremism studies" and its subfield "far-right studies." Prominent extremism scholars have developed generalist theories purportedly explaining far-right politics and power dynamics (or "mainstreaming") across liberal societies. They define "far-right" as "illiberal" politics promoting dehumanization, exclusion, and inequality. Their theory of mainstreaming suggests that "the" far-right is a coherent entity that "enters" mainstream institutions or discourse from the outside. For these scholars, strengthening liberal-civic principles prevents far-right political power (mainstreaming). I call these approaches "grand theory templates," which I critique for simplistic interpretations of power and for overlooking critical theory scholarship showing how liberalism accommodates far-right politics. Using the Canadian nationalist movement as a case study, I show how liberal chauvinism can be crucial to empowering right-wing populist movements. My data include over 40 hours of participant-observation at 20 right-wing events and 35 interviews with 42 current leaders and members of on-the-ground nationalist groups. Right-wing nationalists foregrounded liberal-civic ideas, such as "security," "rights," "objectivity," and "tolerance," to advance anti-Muslim sentiment and populist conspiracism. My findings suggest that far-right movements can gain power by embracing liberalism's ambiguity and contradictions. In other words, mastering liberal messaging can be essential to the growth of far-right movements, challenging any easy dismissal of these politics as "illiberal." Altogether, "top-down" grand theory templates oversimplify political distinctions and power, compromising research design and analysis. I advocate for more granular and "bottom-up" inductive approaches that prioritize sociological traditions over theories recently popularized by extremism scholars.

Is There Such a Thing as Populism? calls into question our common under standing of populism. Taken on their own, commonplace references to the people, leaders, or elites are more like dog whistles or false positives of populism than part of a serious attempt to address the phenomenon. Scho lars asked themselves, "What is populism?" without realizing that this assumed there was such a thing and that we just needed to figure out what it meant. That was a mistake. Benjamin Arditi proposes that we put this cer tainty on hold and start from a different premise, asking, "Is there such a thing as populism?" This doesn't rule out its existence or take it for granted. Structured as a set of polemical interventions and theoretical proposals, Arditi addresses key theoretical, methodological, and comparative questions in the study of populism. These include the limitations of formal definitions of populism, the importance of context and the conjuncture, polemics, the situated gaze, and issues concerning strategic relations and governing from below. Five subject experts, Nadia Urbinati, José Luis Villacañas, Carlos de la Torre, Anthoula Malkopoulou, and Anthony Spanakos, react to Arditi's theses in captivating conversations on how to study populism and the way in which populism has been used in contemporary comparative analysis. Refreshingly different and thought-provoking, Is There Such a Thing as Populism? is the ideal departure for the exploration of this diverse and fas cinating political movement.

The quest for legitimacy has traditionally been intrinsic to the political phenomenon of populism, while (de-)legitimation struggles are increasingly relevant once populist leaderships take government control. However, the rich literatures on populism and legitimacy have hardly interacted and, therefore, analysis of populists’ international (de)legitimation strategies has been scarce. This chapter addresses the ways in which incorporating theoretical frameworks on legitimacy and (de)legitimation into the ideational approach can contribute to better understand the drivers, patterns, and impact of the global rise of contemporary populist leaderships, suggesting new avenues for research on the potential international mitigation of populism.

The purpose of the research is to identify the peculiarities of the Russian political radicalism through the prism of its affiliation and formation under the presidency of Vladimir Putin (2012-2024). The methodology of the research is based on an integrated approach, as well as the use of a special computer method of complex analysis (CNA), as well as special historical methods
(historical typological and historical systemic), with the help of which the authors managed to
elucidate the peculiarities of the Russian political radicalism formation during the specified period.
The scientific novelty consists in the identification of the ideological component of the Russian political
radicalism through the use of an innovative computer methodology. The Conclusions. The Russian
political radicalism is a multi-layered phenomenon that has been shaped by historical, social, economic
and political factors. During the period of 2012 – 2024, V. Putin’s ideological discourse has been
undergoing a “conservative turn”, defined as “Russia’s special path”. The results of the study have
shown that this ideology during this period is not an exclusively internal phenomenon of this country.
The Russian right-wing radicalism has been formed not simply by borrowing ideas from the West, but
on the basis of the existing connection between Russia and Western countries. The connection could be
traced not only by means of organisations that had influence but also due to the influence of thinkers,
theorists, ideologues, and adherents of various movements of the extreme right-wing radicalism and
religious political radicalism. The most influential have been a group of extreme right-wing thinkers
among them. It should be noted that Aleksandr Dugin and Russian billionaire Konstantin Malofeev have
been among the active promoters of Western ideas of the right-wing radicalism in Russia. Therefore, the
myth should be debunked regarding the statement of the Russian government and the Russian elite that
the Russian right-wing radicalism has been exclusively Russian. In this case, it is more decent to appeal
to the claim made by Putin and some Western representatives of the far right that Russia is the West –
but the West that they believe has been lost due to the overwhelming influence of the liberal and leftist
values. Putin’s ideology (2012 – 2024) has been a distorted, Russianised model of political radicalism
based on a combination of authoritarianism, patriotism, anti-Western sentiment, conservatism, state
capitalism and military force. This ideology has allowed V. Putin and his entourage to ensure control
over the country and pursue an aggressive foreign policy, posing a serious threat to the integrity of the
international relations system. A striking example is the Russo-Ukrainian War, which broke out in 2014
and continues to this day. This war has posed a serious threat to the collapse of the European project
and the emergence of the Kremlin’s Eurasian anti-liberal project in its place.
Funding.

This article situates the largest political party in the world, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, within the literature on the populist radical right. After providing a brief overview of Hindutva ideology and organizations, with a particular focus on the BJP, it analyzes how nativism, populism, and authoritarianism are key defining elements in both theory and practice for the BJP. It further examines two important ideological tenets that go beyond these three defining attributes of the (European) populist radical right-anti-colonialism and neoliberalism-which lend towards the success of the BJP. Since holding a majority in national government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the BJP has been able to implement its vision of creating a Hindustan, or Hindu ethnostate. Like other populist radical right parties in power, the BJP is more radical in deeds than in words, but the future of the party without Modi's leadership is uncertain.

The study of populism’s international links has grown significantly. Yet, there are gaps in conceptualizing potential implications for the international order. Our study contributes to filling this gap by asking: if a ‘populist international order’ (PIO) were to emerge, and populists could envision the world close(r) to their liking, what would this order look like? We pursue answers through a plausibility probe of three deductively-derived normative pillars: 1) cooperation under a PIO is characterized by more fractured, mostly symbolic, small-scale multilateralism; 2) a PIO relies on a narrow, selective embrace of the rule of law, to be respected only when seen as representing the wishes of the ‘real people’; and 3) the commitment to pluralism in ‘international society’ is replaced by an anti-pluralist, monolithic notion of popular sovereignty as the primary behavioural driver. Our analysis is based on contemporary populist leadership from Latin America: Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and Mexico’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador. We examine how these populists have addressed our proposed PIO pillars in different ways and shaped their world-order visions in relation to them. The lessons derived from this study can contribute to bridging gaps regarding the effects of global populism in International Relations, including prospects of mitigating the systemic impact of populism on the international order.

Populist radical right (PRR) parties tend to stress their differences from other parties. Yet at the same time, PRR parties have increasingly sought to integrate into party systems across the globe. In seeking to understand the way that PRR parties negotiate this paradoxical situation, the literature tends to focus on their policy offerings or discourse. We, on the contrary, investigate an underestimated aspect of their political communication: their visuals. Namely, we focus on the question of if and how PRR parties communicate their similarities or differences from other parties via the color profiles of their logos, given that color is a key way that political parties can signal (a) their ideological commitments (via hue) and (b) their approach to "valence" considerations (via saturation). We expect PRR parties' attempts to signal their integration into party systems to be mainly sought via saturation, as a proxy for valence perceptions related to parties' seriousness and competence, while we expect them to signal their difference from other parties via hue, given the incentive for PRR parties to communicate their ideological distance from non-populist parties as a marker of distinctiveness in the political market. We test our research questions by analyzing parties' logos across 35 democracies in recent elections. Results largely confirm our expectations, demonstrating the utility of focusing on the visual aspects of PRR parties' political communication. Interestingly, the results do not replicate if we focus on populist parties beyond the PRR party family.

Euroscepticism is one of the most important issue in European Union, as well as outside. Even in EU member states like Hungary and Poland Eurosceptic political party are widely recognized by the society. Actually, anti-European narratives arose after Syria war, it was a period when lot of migrant moved to EU in case to find better life.
Outside European Union, Eurosceptic movement is very notable. In the paper, I consider general message box of anti-European political party in Georgia. They are still existed in political spectrum and follow Russian narratives. The paper is based on general theoretical frame of right-wing movements in 21st century. There is usage of secondary literature prepared by Gas Muda and colleagues help us to find answers for the particular questions: What is a far-right movement and how it is reflected in Georgian political spectrum?
In case to answer following questions, there is consideration to use case study using internet resources. Including political campaign of radical political party in Georgia. Their message box is widely considered in this paper, in case to attach it with theoretical frames. Latest research implemented by NDI, will help to understand how Eurosceptic narratives is popular within Georgian society.
Key words: Populism. Euroscepticism, election, behavior

As regras do jogo Cláudio Henrique de Castro A democracia é um método de formação das decisões políticas, isto é, o conjunto de regras do jogo. Para isso se realizar é necessária uma Constituição que estruture e limite os poderes. A América Latina, é o berço do colonialismo europeu, de sucessivas ditaduras civis e militares, das leis que, historicamente, ajustam-se aos poderes de plantão, que se impõem pelas armas. A endemia das ditaduras e os seus apoiadores financeiros seguem pulsando no continente. O resultado disso é o baixo índice de confiança nas instituições políticas e a elevada corrupção. Haveria um movimento pendular, de retrocesso e de avanço nas instituições democráticas, ora valorizando direitos humanos, pluralidade política e participação popular ora restringindo os espaços de democracia e, principalmente, apropriando-se das riquezas dos países. Por isso, as ditaduras criam reduzidas faixas de milionários e amplos contingentes de miseráveis:-aprofundam-se as desigualdades e se naturalizam as barbáries. Por outro lado, a democracia seria o contrário disso, mas governos, teoricamente democráticos, se não contidos em seus ímpetos, também caminham para o autoritarismo. Há dois novos elementos neste jogo: a força das redes sociais e a distribuição para milhões de pessoas das mentiras em massa (fake news). Temos como confiar em notícias recebidas pelas redes? Há um instituto oficial ou instrumentos de checagem, em tempo real, para desmentir ou confirmar tais informações? Em caso de distribuição para milhões de usuários, seus autores são punidos? E as redes respondem por isso ou seguem impunes? O poder judiciário consegue reprimir tal difusão? Uma vez que é estabelecida a "verdade" na mente das pessoas, por meio das mentiras em massa, esse convencimento pode ser alterado para seu estado anterior? Tudo isso, num cenário latino-americano das tradicionais alterações das regras do jogo. Por meio de mudanças silenciosas e graduais no jogo institucional, um poder vai se sobrepondo aos outros, sempre em nome da democracia ou da solução de alguma "crise". Temos as expressões recentes disto no hiperpresidencialismo, no hiperlegislativo e no hiperjudiciário. Afinal, como se estabelece e consolida-se a democracia? Por meio do controle e do respeito das regras do jogo.

This monograph integrates a wide range of different literatures, including theoretical approaches to the study of ethnopolitics and ethno-nationalism, geopolitics, European integration and Euroscepticism, populism and the populist and radical right, and postauthoritarian/totalitarian transformation. In the following chapters of this book, the objective of the empirical discussion is to test the validity and relevance of this multidimensional theoretical framework against the political and sociocultural realities in the countries and societies studied. This aim is additionally facilitated by situating this empirical and theoretical debate into three stages in the evolution of ethnopolitics across Central and Eastern Europe: namely, the phases of securitisation (1990s), optimism (2000s), and fluctuation (2010s until present day). One significant contribution of this monograph is to position the functions of new trends such as Euroscepticism and nativism into the existing theoretical models for the study of ethnopolitics and highlight how they can combine with ethno-nationalism. For instance, this monograph introduces and analyses the concept of geopolitical Euroscepticism. It elaborates how ethno-nationalism can interact with Euroscepticism inside the context of geopolitical concerns and insecurities in the Western Balkans and the Baltic States. This aspect acquires a greater significance as part of the broader endeavour to assess how the process of European integration can (or cannot) change political mores and values (at elite and public levels) and the opposition that it faces from a multitude of Eurosceptic political actors. This is equally valid regarding the intersections between ethnonationalism and nativism. As illustrated in the empirical discussion, certain political actors in the country cases studied converge on the belief that membership to state and nation must be defined by ancestry and be coterminous. Such core-beliefs are not exclusively the domain of the populist and radical right but have also been propagated by mainstream political actors along the lines of the necessity to ensure national survival (e.g. the Estonian and Latvian cases). Therefore, one more theoretical contribution of this monograph is to: (a) clarify the longer trajectories behind such deep-seated convictions; (b) assess how they can facilitate, if not legitimise, the formulation of new nativist platforms against a new wave of immigration by the populist and radical right. Empirical discussion hints that this process can become highly subject to the particularities of national (as well as regional and local) settings. This means that one

Recently, June 2024, I participated in an online workshop on Conservative Public History international forum. It revealed that, what we are experiencing in Australia, is the same across the planet: "Across the world right-wing popular political movements are harnessing the past as a means for attacking and challenging liberal consensus." It is neo-conservative propaganda, that we see in the writing of J.D. Vance, and not the ideas of traditional conservatism. Propaganda, first and last.

This paper explains the recent events in the confirmation of J.D. Vance as the (American) Republican nominee for Vice-President; explaining in terms of intelligent ideas, and not propaganda.

This contribution slightly "diverges" from the thematic scope of this volume in that it does not concentrate on a set of actors typically considered among "non-state actors" as such. Instead, the chapter casts its focus on the political parties of the national conservative, radical, and more extremist right in Croatia, identifying the factors that explain why they form an idiosyncratic party scene, especially as regards their position in the field of foreign policy. In the latter context, parties of the Croatian far right are critical of the EU and NATO but not necessarily pro-Russiaa constellation relevant to understand with a view to the East-West dimension of the inquiry in this volume.

This coalition was dissolved on the basis of corruption charges. For further information on this issue, see: https://estonianworld.com/security/a-political-crisis-in-est onia-prime-minister-juri-ratas-resigns/?fbclid=IwAR2WqmbF8fJFP458Y9zB1YEWB1He F4M5xbQsCYlzhvH_al4HIkRgBkFXMhM. Accessed 21 January 2021; https://news.err. ee/1608072376/q-a-estonia-s-government-has-resigned-what-happens-next. Accessed 22 January 2021.

Contrairement aux sondages annonçant une majorité relative ou absolue du RN au 2e tour des législatives, les Français ont contredit ces pronostics. Au soir du second tour des législatives, ce dimanche 7 juillet 2024, le Nouveau Front populaire, coalition de la gauche, arrive en tête devant les macronistes d'Ensemble! mais n'obtient qu'une majorité relative à l'Assemblée nationale. Le RN de Jordan Bardella est en 3e position. Je reconnais m'être attendu et même résigné à la victoire du RN et je partage donc la surprise et le soulagement de beaucoup de citoyens français de voir l'échec du RN au 2e tour, d'autant plus que les médias nous avaient annoncé un triomphe éclatant des néo-fascistes. Leur montée en puissance continue et le RN sera malgré sa déroute le groupe le plus puissant et nombreux dans la nouvelle Assemblée nationale. L'absence de majorité et la force comparable des trois blocs, NFP/Ens/RN va rendre difficile la gouvernance du pays.Quoiqu'il en soit, le front républicain a tenu et à la surprise générale a barré la route au RN et aux « chiottistes ».

this paper analyse the situation after the recent election of natinal assembly in France.The danger of the establishment of a far-right government was temporarily removed, but the French people, did not hide their leaning to the far- right and kept the sword of Damocles raised above the head of the French political society. Let's answer the question that many friends ask: Does the French political chess scene allow the extreme right to win or not?

Fascism as a concept enjoys a plethora of definitions, usages and variants which lead to the problems of social science to have a generic theory of fascism. This paper aims to explore the differences between the two fascist variants of the interwar period in Europe, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany to reflect on the question of whether exploration of these differences may contribute to social science's quest to theorize fascism. Though the two fascist regimes differ widely in terms of totalitarianism, ideology, nation and race, state and party relationships, the extent of resistance and the existence of multiple power centers, and finally, the use of total terror; exploration of different fascisms, rather than negating the possibility of having a generic definition of fascism, allows us to explore some of the central characteristics of fascism: its flexibility and resilience.

Colaboração para o  Dossiê "Democracia, Cidadania e Política: defesas democráticas e formas disruptivas da democracia", versando sobre o sentido histórico da ascensão de movimentos de direita radical no cenário global. Entrevista realizada pelos professores José Renato Ferraz da Silveira e George Leonardo Seabra Coelho.

Stockholm Studies in Romance Languages (SSIRL) is a peer-reviewed series of monographs and edited volumes published by Stockholm University Press. SSIRL strives to provide a broad forum for research on Romance Languages of all periods, including both linguistics and literature. In terms of subjects and methods, the journal covers language structure, variation and meaning, spoken and written genres, as well as literary scholarship in a broad sense. It is the ambition of SSIRL to place equally high demands on the academic quality of the manuscripts it accepts as those applied by refereed international journals and academic publishers of a similar orientation.

Alex Mahoudeau acaba de publicar su obra, titulada La panique woke. Anatomie d'une offensive réactionnaire, en la editorial Textuel. Desde la introducción, el autor indica que el término woke encuentra su origen en una forma de lengua inglesa practicada por [personas negras] en Estados Unidos, el African American Vernacular English, en el cual significa estar despierto […] El término es ampliamente empleado en un sentido social o político a partir del siglo xix (Mahoudeau 2022: 9-10).

Man was created simple but reinvented himself away from his main purpose of having a good relationship with his Creator and fellow humans. This logically stems from his attitude to creating a false doctrines, idolatry and inhumanity. His notion of creating an occult world is not only destroying his physical well being, but his emotional as well. These occult groups are widely portrayed in their ideologies of a new world order, a world assumed to be illuminated by false doctrines of elites, promoting wars, nuclear weapons, paedophilic behaviours, rituals amidst others. These occult groups include the illuminati, Free Masons, Ku Klux Klan, Aye, Eye, Order of Skulls and Bones etc.

The article presents the results of the analysis of the functions of National Bank of Ukraine and the Bank of England through the prism of the challenges imposed by the dynamic nature of the society and globalization processes. The article highlights the different approach used by two different countries (Ukraine and the U.K.) while implementing the same provisions of the Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 On payment services in the international market into the domestic law. By the research it is proved that in order to guarantee the financial stability and at the same time provide the function of a supervisor, the central bank of a particular country does not need to have unlimited discretionary powers. In lieu of that, balanced system consisting of a range of fully and or partially independent from each other financial institutions and authorities shall cooperate and co-function under understandable and transparent rules. The article partly underlines the dichotomy between the principles set by the European requirements in particular by the Directive (EU) 2015/2366 and the way in which the same is being implemented in Ukraine. The Bill «On payment services» 4364 dated 12.11.2020 contains the provisions empowering the National Bank of Ukraine to act as a regulator and supervisor of financial payments market and simultaneously as a participant on the same market. Moreover, the broad discretionary powers of the central bank in Ukraine entails also some legislative functions. Such broad and even discriminatory powers which the National Bank of Ukraine might have are not in line with the European principles in particular and the rule of the separation of powers in general. The distinction between the functions of the monetary regulator and supervisor of the financial payment institutions which the different institutions have in the UK proves that it is possible to reach a balance and to equilibrate the influence of the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance and their relevant subordinate bodies in order to protect the financial stability and the sound state of the economy of the country.

The Bible speaks of alcohol as a good gift from God, but that we are not to get drunk. It also speaks of wine in general terms as a bringer of joy. Alcohol was also used for medicinal purposes in Biblical times, too. The Bible teaches that it is ok to drink alcohol as long as we are aware of its effects. It instructs us that the drinking of alcohol is not prohibited but anyone who choose to drink alcohol must do so carefully and moderately.