Treaty of Versailles

The Paris Peace Conference put the First World War in the past. Signatures of individual peace treaties with defeated countries Germany, Austria, Hungary and their allies Bulgaria and Turkey put an end to one of the cruelest conflicts of all time, which is rightfully often referred to as the Great War. With its multifaceted repercussions, the First World War certainly represented one of the most crucial breaking points in the development of modern Europe. For many countries and nations, it was the actual start of the 20th century. However, it also signaled the end of a fairly brief dominance and the beginning of the fall of the old continent, which was brought forth as a result of the second global conflict, the Cold War between the superpowers, as well as the dissolution of the global empires of the European superpowers. The end of the Great War and its impact, including the unequivocally democratizing and socially revolutionary waves, was an attempt at a new, fundamentally changed organization of international life and its current established order. The Parisian aftermath radically transformed the composition of the face of Europe: as a result of the dissolution of the monarchies – the Ottoman Empire, the German Empire, Tsarist Russia and Austria-Hungary – and laid the foundation for a new European continent, which basically exists to this day in spite of changes caused by the Second World War.
… Read more
The Paris Peace Conference put the First World War in the past. Signatures of individual peace treaties with defeated countries Germany, Austria, Hungary and their allies Bulgaria and Turkey put an end to one of the cruelest conflicts of all time, which is rightfully often referred to as the Great War. With its multifaceted repercussions, the First World War certainly represented one of the most crucial breaking points in the development of modern Europe. For many countries and nations, it was the actual start of the 20th century. However, it also signaled the end of a fairly brief dominance and the beginning of the fall of the old continent, which was brought forth as a result of the second global conflict, the Cold War between the superpowers, as well as the dissolution of the global empires of the European superpowers. The end of the Great War and its impact, including the unequivocally democratizing and socially revolutionary waves, was an attempt at a new, fundamentally changed organization of international life and its current established order. The Parisian aftermath radically transformed the composition of the face of Europe: as a result of the dissolution of the monarchies – the Ottoman Empire, the German Empire, Tsarist Russia and Austria-Hungary – and laid the foundation for a new European continent, which basically exists to this day in spite of changes caused by the Second World War.
… Read more
The Paris Peace Conference put the First World War in the past. Signatures of individual peace treaties with defeated countries Germany, Austria, Hungary and their allies Bulgaria and Turkey put an end to one of the cruelest conflicts of all time, which is rightfully often referred to as the Great War. With its multifaceted repercussions, the First World War certainly represented one of the most crucial breaking points in the development of modern Europe. For many countries and nations, it was the actual start of the 20th century. However, it also signaled the end of a fairly brief dominance and the beginning of the fall of the old continent, which was brought forth as a result of the second global conflict, the Cold War between the superpowers, as well as the dissolution of the global empires of the European superpowers. The end of the Great War and its impact, including the unequivocally democratizing and socially revolutionary waves, was an attempt at a new, fundamentally changed organization of international life and its current established order. The Parisian aftermath radically transformed the composition of the face of Europe: as a result of the dissolution of the monarchies – the Ottoman Empire, the German Empire, Tsarist Russia and Austria-Hungary – and laid the foundation for a new European continent, which basically exists to this day in spite of changes caused by the Second World War.
… Read more
The Paris Peace Conference put the First World War in the past. Signatures of individual peace treaties with defeated countries Germany, Austria, Hungary and their allies Bulgaria and Turkey put an end to one of the cruelest conflicts of all time, which is rightfully often referred to as the Great War. With its multifaceted repercussions, the First World War certainly represented one of the most crucial breaking points in the development of modern Europe. For many countries and nations, it was the actual start of the 20th century. However, it also signaled the end of a fairly brief dominance and the beginning of the fall of the old continent, which was brought forth as a result of the second global conflict, the Cold War between the superpowers, as well as the dissolution of the global empires of the European superpowers. The end of the Great War and its impact, including the unequivocally democratizing and socially revolutionary waves, was an attempt at a new, fundamentally changed organization of international life and its current established order. The Parisian aftermath radically transformed the composition of the face of Europe: as a result of the dissolution of the monarchies – the Ottoman Empire, the German Empire, Tsarist Russia and Austria-Hungary – and laid the foundation for a new European continent, which basically exists to this day in spite of changes caused by the Second World War.

Da conferência da paz da Haia (1907) às negociações de paz de Paris (1919): Quando o Brasil emergiu para a diplomacia mundial?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
(www.pralmeida.org; http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

[Objetivo: texto de apoio a palestra; finalidade: Evento Embaixada Bélgica]
Palestra Terça-feira 28 de julho, 17h00 – 17h40 (BRT), no quadro do programa comemorativo do centenário da visita do rei Albert ao Brasil (1920), organizado pela embaixada da Bélgica.

Sumário:
1. Os conceitos de diplomacia mundial, internacional, global ou multilateral
2. Como o Brasil emerge para a diplomacia mundial, ou multilateral
3. A passagem do Brasil da política regional para a política internacional
4. O Brasil na conferência da paz da Haia (1907)
5. Rui Barbosa defende a neutralidade da Bélgica na Grande Guerra (1916)
6. O Brasil nas negociações de paz de Paris (1919)
7. Encontros entre o presidente Epitácio Pessoa e o Rei Albert

1. Os conceitos de diplomacia mundial, internacional, global ou multilateral Existem vários sentidos, já consolidados, ao conceito de diplomacia mundial, que pelo seu adjetivo seria algo equivalente a internacional, ou global, embora esse termo seja mais recente. Mas o conceito pode também querer dizer diplomacia multilateral, ou seja, a de organismos internacionais, que podem ser intergovernamentais, de tipo setorial, mas podem também ser de âmbito universal, continental ou regional, ou no sentido plurilateral. No primeiro sentido, isto é, mundial, significaria uma diplomacia nacional capaz de cobrir todo ou a maior parte do planeta, ou um conjunto significativo de atores relevantes, países, Estados, economias relevantes do ponto de vista das relações internacionais, da dinâmica dos intercâmbios globais, ou tocando aos temas mais sensíveis da comunidade internacional, ou mundial, que tem a ver com a paz (ou a guerra), a segurança, as relações de comércio, de investimentos, de transações financeiras, de movimentos de pessoas, tanto quanto de bens intangíveis (cultura, arte, conhecimento, cooperação), e suas respectivas instituições de suporte. Num contexto mais tradicional desse primeiro conceito ele tem a ver com a ação das grandes potências, os chamados poderes hegemônicos, as antigas nações coloniais ou imperiais, ou seja, os grandes atores, definidos pela sua capacidade de projetar poder externamente com base em seus recursos intrínsecos.
(...)

This article surveys the occupation of the formerly German-leased territory around the Jiaozhou Bay with Qingdao as its capital city by the Japanese during and after the First World War. It first describes the initial ultimatum of the Japanese to the Germans to turn over the territory, which today is the peninsular part of China's Shandong province. It then goes further into the siege and ensuing occupation by the Japanese, which lasted throughout the First World War and another four years longer, until 1922. To conclude, the article describes the eventual turning over of the territory by the Japanese back to China.

At the tender age of five, Jeanne Antoinette Poisson was told by a fortune-teller that she would one day reign over the heart of the King. Since that moment, her entire existence became dedicated to preparing for what she considered her destiny. In this historical- fiction novel that is heavily based on historical documentation, Madame de Pompadour recounts the education and experiences of her youth that led to her relationship with Louis XV, and the social and political restrictions that she overcame both as a bourgeois in Paris and later in Versailles. Despite the intrigues and betrayals of the courtiers who despised having a commoner fulfill the of cial Court title of mistress to the King of France, her relentless love and devotion served to maintain Madame de Pompadour as the official favorite of Louis XV for twenty years, during which time she became one of the most powerful and influential political figures and patron of the arts in all of France.

Gustav Stresemann, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and German Foreign Minister of the 1920s, is well-known for the international cooperation of the Weimar Republic with Europe’s great powers. He simultaneously pursued a peaceful modification of the eastern boundaries of Germany, while accepting the reality of the Versailles system. This paper analyses the change in Germanys relations with her eastern neighbours, as well as Stresemann’s intentions to achieve border revisions and to support German minorities abroad. It is especially exciting to consider the purposes of the German approach to the Soviet Union in Stresemann’s program, and if this could have been used to force concessions from the West. The study also sheds light on why Stresemann overestimated the revisionist potential of the ocarno Treaties, and on the remaining possibilities of border revisions that existed at the end of his six-year tenure as Foreign Minister.

This book deepens the study of the law of treaties by offering specific solutions to current legal problems. It provides a high-level theoretical and practical approach, touching upon all major current issues of the law of treaties. It is noteworthy that each subject-matter discussed in this work was thoroughly analyzed and supported by a rigorous methodology, including the use of the most accurate terminology and a well-reasoned explanation of each of the issues addressed in accordance with the most authoritative legal scholarly writings. This work is also a helpful reference for governmental and diplomatic officials, legal practitioners and the legal academia at large in trying to understand how international acts are negotiated and adopted, what the rules are for the formulation of reservations and introduction of amendments to conventional texts, how a State is definitely deemed to be bound by an international act or treaty, which the effects are of a treaty that came into force and how treaties should be applied at the international level, etc.

The history of Kurds and Kurdistan is a long way made up of persecutions, contentions and deportations from the 16 th century to the present. The Kurds, divided into four different nations (Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria), founded into World War I the chance to carry forward their claims, above all the idea and the desire to be an independent state after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Fourteen Points by American President Woodrow Wilson seemed to be the perfect international law framework to became a separate state; in 1920 the Treaty of Sèvres seemed to inherit this spirit, drawing into articles 62,63 and 64 of section III the future of Kurdistan. Unfortunately, only three years later, the Treaty of Lausanne revoked, de jure, the idea of a free Kurdistan, forcing Kurdish people to lie as minority into four different states.

The Treaty of Versailles was an extremely harsh document that demanded exorbitant reparations from the German people for a war they did not start.  The result of the harsh treatment of Germany in the peace terms gave rise to Adolf Hitler and National Socialism.

France sought to pin the entire war squarely on the shoulders of the German people.  The aim was to turn Germany into an agrarian society that would never again be able to wage war.  What the treaty accomplished was to incite anger and frustration in the German people that led to the rise of their “savior”, Adolf Hitler.

The head of the German delegation, Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, stated a confession of sole guilt on the part of Germany for the war, coming out of his mouth would be like telling a lie.  While admitting that Germany bore a responsibility for the war, he noted that there were other poisonous situations that had been developing in Europe some 50 years prior to the outbreak of the World War which contributed to the conflict.  He also pointed out that the assassination of Archduke Franz Josef, the heir to the Austria-Hungarian throne, was not the sole cause of the conflict. 

We can argue that the implementation of the Treaty of Versailles was one of the worst incidents in international relations.  It gave rise to an era of nationalism and hatred in Germany that could have been avoided.  Most of the Entente leaders allowed personal feelings of hate and anger to override logic and critical thinking.  Had they adhered to  Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, Germany would have had much less strife and economic woe. The lack of foresight by leaders such as Georges Clemenceau led to the eventual rise of Adolf Hitler. 

The Treaty of Versailles demanded much from Germany, not only acknowledgment of guilt for starting the war, but an enormous monetary reparation that could not be repaid for decades.  The clauses of the Treaty as well as the concessions and military restrictions it imposed forced Germany to an almost agrarian status.  Couple that with sentiments of the German military and citizenry against those thought responsible for the loss, and you have an explosive situation; a powder keg just waiting to be ignited.

Резюме Статья посвящена процессу разработки и принятия Конституции Латвии 1922 года. В статье предпринимается также попытка выявить влияние запад-ноевропейского опыта и политических событий, а именно Гражданской войны в России 1918-1922 годов на генезис конституционных положений. В статье отмечается, что к 1920 году три варианта государственного устройства могли быть реализованы в Латвии-консервативно-аристократический под немецким влиянием, советский и национально-демократический, в основу которого легла модель западноевропейской парламентской демократии. Ослабление латышской социал-демократии под влиянием Гражданской войны в России привело к тому, что при разработке конституции основополагающей стала ориентация на запад-ноевропейскую модель конституционного строительства. Одним из самых спорных вопросов при разработке проекта конституции стал вопрос о правах президента. Основная дискусстя велась между аграрной партией, выступавшей за сильного президента избираемого на основе всенарод-ных выборов, и социал-демократической партией, выступавшей за слабую прези-дентскую власть и совмещение должностей президента и спикера парламента. В результате победила точка зрения социал-демократов, так что президент по кон-ституции 1922 года избирался не народом, а парламентом и только на три года. Ключевые слова� Конституция Латвии 1922 г., социал-демократия, парла-ментская демократия, Гражданская война в России, права президента. Сведения об авторе Плат Тильман-доктор исторических наук, университет Грайфсвальда, Гер-мания. E-mail� tilmanplath@yahoo.de.

L’objet de ces pages est d’évoquer la trajectoire qui a conduit Jacques Bardoux (1874-1959) à s’intéresser aux questions européennes de son temps et d’examiner si ce dernier a su développer des points de vue originaux avant que ne se mette en place la construction économique et politique actuelle.

This paper includes:
- contributions of Friedrich Ebert and Gustav Stresemann for the Weimar Republic
- data of the specific events and years from 1918 - 1929
- comparison of their contributions, failures and successes
- slight changes to points from the textbook
This paper is adapted from OCR, GCSE Modern World History, Third Edition History textbook

Анализ англо-французских отношений в военно-политической сфере от Версальского договора 1919 г. до начала Мирового экономического кризиса в 1929 г. на базе британских и французских государственных, военных и дипломатических документов и иных типов источников.

Summary of the Ph.D. dissertation. Analysis of the Anglo-French relations in the political an military spheres during the period from the ratification of the Versailles Treaty in 1920 to the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929 (as usually is assumed).

The reparation demands against Germany as settled in the Treaty of Versailles affected the German population economically and morally. Understanding their ramifications was due, at the latest, after accounting for the National Socialism in the Third Reich. But how were the reparations perceived and discussed in the public of the allied powers? The present essay will respond to this by reference of journalistic sources from Great Britain right after the signing of the treaty: Were the conditions of the peace treaty, and its forced acceptance, deemed appropriate? It was the declared aim of the European victors to render Germany guilty of starting the war and impotent to wage another, which is in line with the dominant perspective of the Allies’ press coverage. However, some of the more left-leaning press interpreted the measures of expelling and isolating Germany from the international community of nations as a possible danger in the making.

История международных отношений в Европе в межвоенный период, несмотря на увеличивающийся хронологический разрыв с современностью, продолжает привлекать значительное внимание исследователей, а также вызывать общественно-политические дискуссии в социуме. При наличии существенного количества российских работ по проблематике Версальского порядка, опубликованных за последние 25 лет, полноценные историографические исследования остаются относительно редкими, что отражает, среди прочего, дефицит саморефлексии отечественного сообщества историков. В данной статье, основанной на синтезе методов историографического анализа и социологии, был проанализирован спектр наиболее характерных оценок проблемы стабильности Версальского порядка в российской историографии с 1991 по 2016 годы. Выявив данные оценки на основе наиболее популярных и авторитетных работ, с одной стороны, и новаторских работ, с другой, автор рассмотрел их в трех «срезах»: основные дискуссионные вопросы; преемственность / новизна по сравнению с работами историков советского периода; краткое сопоставление с ситуацией в зарубежной литературе. Проведенное исследование выявило отсутствие монолитности российской историографии по проблеме стабильности Версальского порядка, значительную роль преемственности в оценках ею ключевых событий межвоенного периода (во главе с Мюнхенским соглашением 1938 г. и советско-германским договором о ненападении 1939 г.) при наличии и новых оценок по ряду важных сюжетов. «Поколенческий» фактор, факторы политической «нагрузки» и самопозиционирования историками были выделены в качестве основных при объяснении преемственности суждений, в то время как расширение источниковой базы и методологии, увеличение контактов с зарубежной историографией и политологией – в качестве обстоятельств, способствовавших их изменениям и трансформации. Автором были также намечены перспективные пути дальнейшего изучения истории Версальского порядка в Европе.
Though the time lapse is growing, history of international relations in Europe during the inter-war period remains both an attractive topic for scholars, as a potential and actual source of different social and political discussions. Sheer number of the Russian researches centered on the Versailles order problematic is growing during the last 25 years, but the full-value historiographical essays remain scarce, situation which reflects, inter alia, a deficit of self-reflection made by community of the Russian historians. This article basing on the mix of historiographical and sociological methods analyses the most characteristic scholar interpretations of the problem of Versailles order stability published between 1991 and 2016. The procedure was as follows. First, the above-mentioned interpretations and estimates were extracted from both the authoritative and path-breaking works. Second, they were analysed under the three main topics: the main points of discussions, continuity / originality as compared to the Soviet historiography, brief comparison to the leading interpretations of the Western scholars. After the research was made, it became evident that the Russian historiography of the Versailles order is not monolithic. Both tendencies, first, continuity as regards the Soviet period opinions (especially as regards such events as Munich agreement and Soviet-German non-aggression pact) and, second, novelty were detected. The continuity of interpretations can be attributed to such reasons as “generation-factor”, political “weight” of some historiographical problems, and peculiarities of self-positioning by many Russian historians. Amongst the circumstances responsible for promoting changes, the more wide-access to archival and published sources, new research methods, intensification of contacts with the Western historiography and political science were designated as the most important. In the end of the article author proposed some perspective, in his opinion, ways of further research.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, a rising generation of British colonial administrators profoundly altered British usage of American history in imperial debates. In the process, they influenced both South African history and wider British imperial thought. Prior usage of the Revolution and Early Republic in such debates focused on the United States as a cautionary tale, warning against future ‘lost colonies’. Aided by the publication of F.S. Oliver’s Alexander Hamilton (1906), administrators in South Africa used Hamilton and George Washington, the Federalist Papers, and the drafting of the Constitution as an Anglo-exceptionalist model of modern self-government. In doing so they applied the lessons of the Early Republic to South Africa, thereby contributing to the formation of the Union of 1910. They then brought their reconception of the United States, and their belief in the need for ‘imperial federation’, back to the metropole. There they fostered growing diplomatic ties with the U.S. while recasting British political history in-light-of the example of American federation. This process of inter-imperial exchange culminated shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles when they publicly presented the Boer Generals Botha and Smuts as Washington and Hamilton reborn in the Round Table journal.

Democracy has never been more popular. It is successfully practiced today in a myriad of different ways by people across virtually every cultural, religious or socio-economic context. The forty-five essays collected in this companion suggest that the global popularity of democracy derives in part from its breadth and depth in the common history of human civilization. The chapters include exceptional accounts of democracy in ancient Greece and Rome, modern Europe and America, among peoples’ movements and national revolutions, and its triumph since the end of the Cold War. However, this book also includes alternative accounts of democracy’s history: its origins in prehistoric societies and early city-states, under-acknowledged contributions from China, Africa and the Islamic world, its familiarity to various Indigenous Australians and Native Americans, the various challenges it faces today in South America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia, the latest democratic developments in light of globalization and new technologies, and potential future pathways to a more democratic world. Understanding where democracy comes from, where its greatest successes and most dismal failures lie, is central to democracy’s project of inventing ways to address the need of people everywhere to live in peace, freedom and with a say in the decisions that affect their lives.

The Peace Treaties of 1919 retain a prominent place within the study of International Relations (IR).The theoretical significance of Versailles for IR can hardly be overstated. For much rests on the question of whether the post-war settlement was problematic due to its liberal nature or in spite of it. Yet, explanations as to why Versailles diplomacy was so problematic vary significantly. What were the central factors affecting policymaking at Versailles? And what does Paris Peace diplomacy tell IR theory about modern foreign policymaking processes? This article provides a critique of standard IR interpretations of Wilsonian diplomacy at Versailles, illustrating how realist and liberals’ uncritical acceptance of Wilson as the quintessential ‘idealist-liberal’ statesman glosses over a core contradiction at the heart of Wilsonian diplomacy: the wielding of power politics to transcend power politics. In doing so, it examines the effects of the Bolshevik Revolution as a paradigm-rupturing event transforming the nature and dynamics of the First World War and the post-war settlement. This traces
the unique sociological patterns of uneven and combined development thrown up by the war and the geopolitical problems this created for Wilson and the Allies in forging a new
international order.

"The paper is in Greek, the Power Point Presentation may be followed by English Speakers also.
As the title insinuates I analyze the rood causes of the Deportations of Jewish Greeks from Bulgarian occupied territories of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace of Northern Greece to  Treblinka and briefly touch on the deportations of almost 50000 Jewish Greeks from Thessaloniki to Auschwitz-Birkenau by the Germans.  The definition of Holocaust is Given.  I quantize the Memory and define the unit of Memory.  I compare on the memory scale for the various cities."

When the Great War broke out in 1914, the field of academia in geography was divided into local and national schools, connected together through publications, scientific debates and international meetings.
This PhD in cultural and comparative history aims at showing that the three main “communities” in the field (namely Germany, France and the United States of America) were affected by the war violence, and that they took an active part in many aspects of “war cultures” in the fighting countries. Indeed, the youngest ones fought, some others did some research for the army (above all in German and American war geology), some others wrote committed books (about German and Russian atrocities, war goals, political and
military geography) and geographers of the Home fronts played an important role in cultural diplomacy – every specialist in Earth Sciences mobilized in various ways. They were even to be used as experts, specially during the 1919 peace negotiations. As teachers, scholars, intellectuals and citizens, these men and women went through a very brutal and intense period as far as the shaping of their professional identity is concerned, for they had to reconcile “modern geography” with applied geography. The results proved to be quite disappointing for them: political mobilization, at first enthusiastic, soon turned sour; and their expertise
could appear useless as it failed to help political leaders to frame a new map of the world based on scientific grounds.
Despite these frustrations and limits, the First World War seems to be a turning point in the shaping of the collective identity of academic geography: its demobilization took a long time, and remained unfinished as long as violence and alliances persisted.

Lorsque la Grande Guerre éclate en 1914, le champ mondial de la géographie universitaire est structuré en écoles locales et nationales, liées par des publications, des débats scientifiques et des rassemblements au niveau international.
Cette étude d’histoire comparée montre que les trois principales communautés de la discipline (Allemagne, France, Etats-Unis) sont ébranlées par la violence du conflit et participent aux multiples cultures de guerre des pays belligérants. Entre combats pour les plus jeunes, travail pour les armées, notamment dans la géologie de guerre allemande et états-unienne, engagement (autour des atrocités allemandes et russes, des buts de guerre, de la géographie militaire et politique) et diplomatie culturelle chez les géographes des fronts domestiques, les spécialistes des sciences de la terre se mobilisent de façons diverses et occupent un rôle inédit d’experts, en particulier dans les discussions autour des négociations de paix, entre 1917 et 1919. Enseignants, savants, intellectuels et citoyens, ils connaissent donc une phase brutale mais intense de leur identité professionnelle, devant concilier la « géographie moderne » avec une nouvelle géographie appliquée. Le résultat est décevant, tant dans la mobilisation politique et militaire, vécue avec enthousiasme, puis avec malaise, que dans l’expertise, insatisfaisante et peu
efficace auprès des autorités chargées de redessiner la carte de l’Europe et du monde. Malgré ces limites, la Première Guerre mondiale constitue un moment fort dans l’identité collective de la géographie universitaire, lente à se démobiliser et marquée par la persistance des alliances et de la violence de guerre.

Γεωγραφικές και ιστορικές ιδιαιτερότητες σημάδεψαν διαφορετικά τις διαδικασίες που οδήγησαν στην εξόντωση στα πλαίσια, πάντα, της Τελικής Λύσης του Ιουδαϊκού Προβλήματος από το Γερμανικό Ράιχ.  Οι γενεσιουργές αιτίες του Ολοκαυτώματος των Εβραίων Ελλήνων στην Ανατολική Μακεδονία και Θράκη ανάγονται χρονικά στον 19ο αιώνα.  Οι Βαλκανικές ιδιαιτερότητες των κρατών – εθνών και η υστέρηση αυτών στη δομή ενός σύγχρονου κράτους βασισμένο στα ατομικά δικαιώματα και όχι σε θρησκευτικές – εθνικές πλειονότητες διευκόλυναν, ακούσια, ενέργειες οι οποίες είχαν ως κατάληξη τη γενοκτονία του Εβραίου, του «άλλου».


Geographical and Historical particularities impacted differently the processes that lead to the annihilation (of the Jewish inhabitants in occupied lands in World War II) within the framework, always, of the Final Solution of the Jewish Problem by the Deutsches [German] Reich. The causae causans of the Holocaust of the Jewish Greeks in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace can be traced (dated back to) at the last quarter of the 19th Century. The Balkan particularities of the nation – states and their lag in building a modern state with a constitution, and dedicated aim to that, based on civil rights and not on group rights such as religious ethnic majorities were instrumental in facilitating, even though unwittingly, acts that resulted in the genocide of the Jew of the “other”.

RESUMEN
Tal como postula el Realismo Periférico, el orden interestatal no es anárquico (en el sentido usado por Waltz) sino imperfectamente jerárquico. Los Estados no poseen las mismas funciones. Hay Estados que mandan (son los que establecen las reglas del juego, y también los que las quiebran con mayor frecuencia), Estados que obedecen (la gran mayoría, incluso los altamente desarrollados sin capacidad militar apocalíptica), y Estados que se rebelan (parias o canallas). En esta breve compilación de tres ensayos, pasamos revista a las jerarquías interestatales que sentaron las reglas de juego después de las dos guerras mundiales y al terminar la Guerra Fría. Secundariamente, se analizan también los mecanismos jerárquicos que gobernaron en la etapa anterior, que culminó con el Congreso de Viena de 1815.
La conclusión normativa más importante es que existe, en las jerarquías vigentes en el último siglo, un exceso de “strategic restraint” que ha hecho al mundo cada vez más inseguro. El desafío presentado por un Estado rebelde como Corea del Norte quizá debería ser neutralizado con el uso de armas atómicas, de manera de usar el oligopolio nuclear para preservar al oligopolio nuclear. Como dijo Bertrand Russell en 1945, puede ser que sea “la última oportunidad de la humanidad.”
ABSTRACT
Peripheral Realism postulates that the interstate system is not “anarchic” (in the Waltzian sense) but imperfectly hierarchic. States do not have the same functions. There are states that rule (the ones with rule-making capabilities, which are the first to break their own rules), states that obey (the majority of states, including highly developed ones without apocalyptic military capabilities) and states that rebel (rogue or pariah states). In this brief anthology of three essays, we examine the interstate hierarchies that set the rules after the two world wars and during the events leading to the end of the Cold War, 1989-91. Secondarily, we also take a peek at the hierarchical mechanisms that governed in a previous historical period, culminating with the Congress of Vienna of 1815.
The most important normative conclusion is that in the hierarchies prevailing in the last century there has been an excess of strategic constraint that has made the world increasingly insecure. It well may be that the challenge posed by a rebel state like North Korea should be neutralized with the use of nuclear weapons, in such a way as to use the atomic oligopoly in order to preserve the atomic oligopoly. As Bertrand Russell put it back in 1945, it may be “humanity’s last chance”.

Sanayi Devrimi ile küresel bir pazara dönüşen dünya, sömürgeci devletler için paylaşılması gereken bir pastaya dönüşmüştür. Kıta Avrupa’sının ortasında Alman İmparatorluğu 19. Yüzyıl sonlarına doğru yükselen bir güç olarak ortaya çıkarken, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu siyasal, ekonomik, askeri ve hukuki sistemlerini batı merkezli olarak revize ederek modernleşmeye ve ayakta kalmaya çalışmıştır. Sömürge rekabetinin devletleri kutuplaştırması İtilaf ve İttifak Devletleri bloklarını oluşturmuştur. Böylelikle Birinci Dünya Savaşı 19. ve 20. Yüzyıl’daki küresel kutuplaşmanın bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nın sona erip, mütareke metinlerinin kabulünden sonra Paris Barış Konferansı’yla İtilaf Devletleri’nin kontrolünde barış antlaşmalarının imza süreci başlatılmıştır. Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nın galip devletleri, mağlup devletlere siyasal, ekonomik, hukuki, askeri ve sosyolojik açılardan çıkarları doğrultusunda barış antlaşmaları dikte etmişlerdir. Söz konusu antlaşmaların küresel çapta bir barış oluşturmaktan ziyade İkinci Dünya Savaşı’na neden oldukları genel anlamda kabul edilmektedir. Paris Barış Konferansı’ndan çıkan ilk antlaşma olan Versailles Barış Antlaşması 28 Haziran 1919’da, son antlaşma olan Sevres Barış Antlaşması ise 10 Ağustos 1920 tarihinde imzalanmıştır. Sevres ve Versailles antlaşmaları iki farklı medeniyetin 20. yüzyıl içinde yer alma çabalarının sonuçsuz kalmasının bir ürünüdür. İtilaf Devletleri’nin Sevres Barış Antlaşması ile “Doğu Sorunu”na, Versailles Barış Antlaşması ile de “Batı Sorunu”na çözüm getirmeye çalıştığı ifade edilebilir. Bu bağlamda siyasal birliğini geç tamamlayan Alman İmparatorluğu ile modernleşme çabası ile ayakta kalmaya çalışan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Birinci Dünya Savaşı’na giden süreçleri dikkatle değerlendirilmelidir. Bu çalışma ile Sevres ve Versalilles Antlaşmaları’nın orijinal metinleri üzerinden ve sürece dair temel eserler kullanılarak, söz konusu barış antlaşmalarının karşılaştırmalı olarak yapılacak olan tahlili aracılığıyla antlaşmaların farkları, benzerlikleri, adilliği ve sonuçları sorgulanacaktır.

O envolvimento do Brasil nas duas Guerras Mundiais é o tema desta tese. A leitura contínua dos dois eventos, como um só tempo histórico, tem como marco cronológico inicial os anos de 1914 a 1919 — início da Primeira Guerra Mundial e negociações do Tratado de Paz de Versalhes, respectivamente —, e atravessa o período que se inicia em 1930, no governo de Getúlio Vargas — entendido como sendo uma quebra historiográfica e início de um novo perfil de Estado no Brasil —, até acabar no ano de 1945, quando ocorreram as Conferências que estabeleceram a ordem pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial. A questão central que propomos trata dos elementos motivacionais diretos e indiretos do envolvimento brasileiro nas duas Guerras Mundiais. Dentre esses elementos, é possível propor uma fronteira decisória entre a dimensão interna e a dimensão externa da política nacional em 1917 e 1942, datas marcadas pelas declarações de guerra do Brasil.  Analisamos três variáveis relacionadas com o envolvimento do Brasil nas duas Guerras Mundiais: Variáveis independentes — os ataques a navios mercantes e de transporte de passageiros, por submarinos alemães, e os bloqueios impostos ao comércio; Variáveis dependentes — o inimigo simbólico construído em torno da figura dos alemães nos dois eventos, a relação geopolítica com os vizinhos e a aproximação com os Estados Unidos; e Variáveis intervenientes — as Guerras no sentido estrito e a ressignificação do sistema internacional no sentido mais amplo.  A tese que defendemos é de que os governos brasileiros viram nas duas Guerras Mundiais a oportunidade de inserir o país nas transformações sistêmicas e reivindicar para o Brasil um papel mais relevante.  Entendemos que esse processo se deu de forma contínua, com a ação dividida igualmente entre a dimensão externa, na percepção das ressignificações do sistema internacional, e a dimensão interna, por meio da reificação da identidade nacional. Esta tese contou com bolsa do Programa de Doutorado Sanduíche no Exterior da Capes.

The involvement of Brazil in the two World Wars is the theme of this thesis. The continuous perception of the two events as a single historical time has as an initial chronological landmark the years from 1914 to 1919 (beginning of World War I and negotiations of the Versailles Peace Treaty respectively). The continuous perception goes through the period began in 1930, in Getulio Vargas administration (understood as a historiographic break and the beginning of a new state profile in Brazil), until ending in the year 1945, when the Conferences that established the order after World War II took place. The central issue we propose deals with the direct and indirect motivational elements of Brazilian involvement in the two World Wars. Among these elements, it is possible to propose a decisional boundary between the internal dimension and the external dimension of national politics in 1917 and 1942, dates marked by the declarations of war of Brazil. We analyze three variables related to Brazil's involvement in the two World Wars: As independent variables, the attacks on merchant ships and passenger ships by German submarines and the blockades imposed on trade. As dependent variables, the symbolic enemy built around the figure of the Germans in the two events, the geopolitical relation with the neighbors and the approach with the United States. Finally, as intervening variables, the Wars in the strict sense and the resignification of the international system in the broadest sense. The thesis we defend is that the Brazilian governments saw in the two World Wars the opportunity to insert the country in the systemic transformations and to claim for Brazil a more relevant role. We understand that this process has taken place continuously, with the action equally divided between the external dimension (the perception of the re-significances of the international system) and the internal dimension (through the reification of the national identity). The Capes' Sandwich Program Abroad funded this thesis.

Perhaps no President, with the possible exception of Thomas Jefferson, has been so variously interpreted, analyzed, and scrutinized as Thomas Woodrow Wilson. The question is whether Wilson was either naïve or a hypocrite in having one policy for the Western Hemisphere and another for the rest of the world. His invocation of the concept of self-determination in his Fourteen Points and his statements about World War I being a “war to make the world safe for democracy” seem to be contradicted by his military interventions in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti and by the fact that several nationalities demanding recognition were excluded from the peace conference at Versailles, including the Armenians, the Kurds, the Annamites (Vietnamese), and the Irish. Wilson’s stated principle of “open covenants of peace openly arrived at” was contradicted by the fact that Britain and France had secretly decided to divide the Ottoman Empire and German between themselves. His statement that the he wanted to see a “Peace without Victory” was contradicted by the fact that Germany was not only stripped of its colonies, but forced to pay heavy reparations to the victors. The League of Nations, like the United Nations of today, was created to maintain the post-bellum status quo, by defining as “aggression” any attempt to overturn the national borders drawn by the victors. The mandate system within the League of Nations, which was supposed to lead to independence for colonialized peoples, became just a mask for continued control by European powers.

Furthermore, secret agreements that divided Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire between Britain and France created the artificial mandates (later independent countries) of Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq that divided Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and  enclaves for Maronite Christians in Lebanon and a “Jewish homeland” in Palestine. Left out was a promised independent nation for the Kurds. These arbitrarily boundaries are part of the problem preventing self-determination by peaceful means in the Middle East today.

True, Wilson made several mistakes that resulted in these failures. For example, his attaching the League of Nations to the Treaty of Versailles resulted in the U.S. Senate rejecting both. Also, his unwillingness to invite members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to American delegation to the peace conference at Versailles alienated some possible Republican allies in the League to Enforce Peace (LEP), including former Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, who were not opposed to the League of Nations providing it was dominated by the Allies. On the other hand, in fairness to Wilson, he did not have the same leverage that the United States had after World War II to influence the terms of the peace treaty. America had joined the war late, and the bulk of the fighting was done by Britain and France. Italy, which switched sides during the war, was allowed to share in the spoils. And Wilson was unwilling for the United States to accept mandates for the Kurds and Armenians, which led to disasters that haunt the world to the present day.

It has been noted that the plebiscites that were conducted in eastern Europe after World War I proved how easy it was to fix the outcome of such attempts at self-determination. While it’s true that these elections were not true indications of the will of the people as has been the case in other plebiscites before and after. But because elections can and have been fixed, this doesn’t mean that such elections shouldn’t be conducted under proper international supervision. If anything, the problem is to define democracy in terms of a parliamentary or a representative form of government. Such governments can also be colonial powers that subjugate other colonial people, as was the case with Britain and France then and Israel today.

Make no mistake about it, Wilson was an imperialist, but his imperialism toward Latin America was very much in keeping with the Monroe Doctrine and the concept that the historian William Appleman Williams has called “imperial anti-colonialism.” Wilson was the embodiments of our two founding principles: first that the United States was destined to become democratic empire and second that the country was founded on the principle of self-determination in opposition to European colonialism. These two principles led to the rationalization that the intervention by the United States in the affairs of Latin America was a form of protection against European countries reoccupying Latin America in the name of collection of debts owed to them. In other words, this intervention was a form of paternalism, in keeping with Wilson’s idea that not all people were ready to govern themselves at the moment. This is what he meant when he said “I am going to teach the South American republics to elect good men.”

But Wilson was also the product of his time and his region. As a man born and raised in the South in the second half of the nineteenth century, then president of the elitist Princeton University that excluded black students, then the governor of New Jersey who sought to reform the system of political bossism associated with the Irish in Jersey City and who supported the eugenics movement in the state, and finally as the President of the United States who opposed woman’s suffrage and supported segregation, Wilson was a representative of the conservative leanings of the Progressive Movement in the United States between 1900 and 1920. It is ironic that today people who formerly identified themselves as Liberals now called themselves Progressives.

In the final analysis, Woodrow Wilson’s vision for the future and his failure to achieve it are more relevant to understanding the causes of the Second World War and the present War on Terrorism than ever before.

Knygoje pateikta lietuvinikų politinių nuostatų raidos glausta analizė XVIII - XX amžių dokumentuose bei to laikotarpio žemėlapiuose, vaizduojančiuose Mažąją Lietuvą. Vertinama žemėlapių įvairovė, ypatumai ir valstybių vykdytos politikos atspindys juose. XVIII - XX amžiai pasirinkti todėl, nes tame laikotarpyje galutinai susiformavo lietuvininkų politinės nuostatos, dėl kurių įgyvendinimo jie dar tebekovoja.
Kadangi Mažąją Lietuvą valdė vokiečiai, tai lietuvininkų politinės nuostatos buvo jų vienokiu ar kitokiu būdu veikiamos ir įtakojamos. Neįmanoma atsekti ir suvokti lietuvininkų politinių nuostatų raidos negretinant jos su Prūsija, Vokietijos ir kitų didžiųjų Europos imperijų ir valstybių vykdyta politika. Todėl darbe pateikiama ir tų valstybių vykdytos politikos glausta apžvalga.

ISBN 978-9955-759-66-9

Historiography and popular works on the origins of the Second World War in the UK often tend to concentrate on the Franco-British policy of appeasement, with particular stress on the Munich agreements. The Soviet Union appears late in this narrative, after the German invasion, with brief mentions of the Molotov - Von Ribbentrop Pact and the ensuing economic cooperation. In particular, the failed negotiations between France and Great Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, in the summer of 1939, are seldom discussed in
depth. Their study should ideally include not only the negotiations themselves but the wider mutual views, mistrust, conflicts of interests, and differing perceptions of how to confront a rising Germany. Ideally, future historical
scholarship should provide a more integrated view of the run up to the war, seeking to explain why London and Moscow failed to join forces despite perceiving the threat from Berlin. This paper examines this issue and provides an overview of the background to the failure and the mutual views and strategies which ultimately prevented the agreement.

Erschienen in:
1) Orbis Linguarum, Bd. 27/2004.
http://www.atut.ig.pl/files/orbis-linguarum-vol.-27.pdf
2) Lipinski, Cezary / Bialek, Edward (ed.), „Verzeih(t), oh Meister, ruhm- und glanzumgeben ...“. Beiträge polnischer und deutscher Literaturwissenschaftler, Dresden 2009.
https://d-nb.info/995538611/04

Knygoje analizuojamas žemėlapiuose pažymėtas Lietuvos teritorinis suskirstymas. Jis detaliau pradėtas žymėti tik XVII amžiuje bei tebebraižomas ir dabar. Administracinis suskirstymas atsipindi tolaikmečio politinę, socialinę ir kitokią valstybės sanklodą, jos santykius su gretimomis valstybėmis. Administracinis suskirstymas yra vienas iš valdžios svertų valdant valstybę ar imperiją. Administracinių teritorinių vienetų dydžių bei centrų parinkimas, jų svarbos valstybės valdyme nustatymas nulemia viso regiono įvairiapusę plėtrą ir ateities perspektyvą. Per amžius žemėlapiuose pažymėtas Lietuvos administracinis teritorinis suskirstymas savaip atspindi sudėtingos jos istorijos ypatumus.

ISBN 978-9955-759-18-8

Предлагаемая монография – наиболее доскональное исследование ключевых проблем европейской безопасности в 1920-е гг. в отечественной историографии. Опираясь на комплекс архивных и опубликованных документов, характеризующих внешнеполитические стратегии Великобритании, Франции, Германии, США и СССР, автор дает панораму основных проблем и достижений в процессе адаптации ведущих стран к последствиям Первой мировой войны. Совмещая анализ в русле дипломатической, стратегической и политэкономической истории, И.Э. Магадеев рассматривает трансформацию международной обстановки в Европе как смену двух режимов безопасности – Версальского и Локарнского, отличавшихся друг от друга по принципам функционирования и по заложенным в них моделям стабилизации. Подчеркивая центральное значение «германского вопроса» и уделяя значительное внимание эволюции отношений в англо-франко-германском «треугольнике», автор вместе с тем демонстрирует огромную роль американского и советского «факторов» в развитии процессов стабилизации в Европе. Фундированный анализ развития стратегий ведущих европейских стран и США, характера и особенностей их взаимодействия в многополярном мире, отчасти напоминавшем современный, призван сделать предлагаемую книгу познавательной как для специалистов-международников, так и для более широкого круга читателей. Приближающиеся столетние юбилеи многих описываемых в книге событий дополнительным образом актуализируют их научное изучение.
This book offers the most detailed historical research of the European security in the 1920s which exists in the Russian historiography. Basing on the wide range of the archival and published sources, author presents the main elements of the foreign policy and strategy of the key “Great powers” – UK, France, Germany, USA and USSR, – analyzed in the context of WWI consequences. Using the methodology and apparatus of the different historiographical paths and conceptions from the international relations theory, Iskander E. Magadeev proposes to see the transformations during the 1920s as the shift from the Versailles to Locarno security regime. They differed in principles of the functioning and were based on the different models of European stabilization. Underlying the chief importance of the “German question” and plunging in the analysis of the Anglo-German-French “triangle”, author didn’t forget in the same time about the huge role that USA and USSR played in the development of the strategic and diplomatic situation in Europe. Rich analysis of the strategies of the different powers which interacted in the complicated and multi-polar world, the former bearing some similarities with that of the beginning of XXI century, aims to make this book interesting and thought-provoking both for the specialists in the field and for the more broad audience. The centenaries of the main historical events researched in this book make the task of their scholar interpretation more urgent.

Colonial claims appear to be a minor issue in the light of the subjects dealt with by the Peace Conference. In 1919, Africa and the fate of its populations seemed far removed from the European battlefields.
The prevailing impression was that the colonial question would be resolved quickly and pragmatically on the basis of the military victories of the powers concerned. For Belgium, the objective was to obtain the mandate over Ruanda-Urundi.
The present contribution, which is essentially based on the archives of the Ministries of Foreign and Colonies, as well as on the papers and writings left by Octave Louwers and Pierre Orts, attempts to approach the Belgian claim from the country's colonial specificities. In this sense, it is appropriate to return to the climate of the early years of the Belgian Congo before dwelling on the colonial war aims and to examine their evolution.

Mussolini’s attempt to create a Mediterranean Empire was based on the Ancient Roman Empire The legacy of Rome was double-edged as can be seen in the symbols. The title he took for himself Il Duce originated in Latin word dux (which referred to provincial military commanders), the later the root of the title of nobility “duke.” The straight arm salute that became the signature of both Mussolini’s Fascism and Adolf Hitler’s Nazism was, in fact, originally the salute of the Roman legions. The fasces (the cylindrical bundle of wooden rods tied together with a red band around an axe carried by attendants and body guards before a Consul or high Magistrate on official occasions as a symbol of their authority) was the personal emblem adopted by Mussolini and the basis of the name “Fascists” for Mussolini’s followers. And yet, the symbol of the fasces as a symbol of Roman republicanism also appears on either side of the podium in the chambers of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Italy’s efforts to created protectorates and colonies along the coasts of the Adriatic, Mediterranean, and the Red seas did not originate with Mussolini. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Italy participated with other European powers in the so-called “Scramble for Africa” (that is, carving up Africa into colonies). Britain and Italy divided between themselves British Somaliland and Italian Somalia on the eastern coast of Africa’s Horn. Under secret Anglo-Italian protocols in the 1882 Triple Alliance, Italy was given a sphere of influence over Abyssinia (Ethiopia today). In 1912 Italy obtained Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan and renamed it Libya after a war with the Ottoman Empire. At the same time Italy took control of the Dodecanese Islands off the coast of Turkey, even though their population was primarily Greek. As a young man Mussolini was an opponent of the war in Libya as an “imperialist war.”

World War I transformed Mussolini from anti-imperialist socialist to an imperialistic nationalist. When the war began in August 1914 Italy tried to remain neutral, despite the fact that it had been a member with Austria-Hungary and Germany in the Triple Alliance.  Mussolini advocated joining the Allied Alliance with Britain and France. He saw in the war an opportunity to reunite Italian irredentists (literally “unredeemed”) living in Austria-Hungary with their motherland. Under secret the Treaty of London in 1915 the British and French promised Italy a stretch of the Dalmatian coast of Croatia and a large part of Croatia’s Istrian Peninsula on the east side of the Adriatic Sea, the port of Vlorë (Valona) in Albania, a protectorate over central Albania, the Dodecanese islands off the coast of Turkey, and parts of the Ottoman Empire. Italian nationalists wanted more than had been promised by the secret Treaty of London, most notably the port city of Fiume (Rijeka, Croatia today). The only part of Italy’s demands that was settled was the part of Austria-Hungary south of the Brenner Pass, the South Tyrol or Alto-Adige (which was primarily German-speaking), and the Trentino (which was predominantly Italian-speaking).

Mussolini rose to power on the demand that Fiume must be annexed by Italy. Fiume was Austria-Hungary’s only outlet to the Adriatic Sea. It had a slightly majority of Italians, a minority of Croats, and a small number of Hungarians. However, if the suburbs were included, the Croats were a slight majority. Mussolini argued that Italy also should continue to administer Albania and that Trieste, which had recently been annexed by Italy needed to be cleaned up of socialist and Slavic elements. He believed that Jews and Communists were in league with each other.

To achieve the destiny of the Italian nation, Mussolini abandoned his earlier pacifism to embrace militarism and war in order to create a Mediterannean Empire. The Dodecanese Islands were conquered from the Turks in 1912, and Mussolini wanted to use the island of Rhodes as a naval station for Italian expansion in the Near East. Italy also took Libya from the Turks in 1912, but resistance to Italian rule continued with an uprising between 1914 and 1917. By 1929 almost all of Libya was again under Italian control.

But Mussolini’s ambition went beyond the Mediterranean to East Africa. Abyssinia (Ethiopia today) was admitted to the League of Nations in 1925 with the support of Italy, mainly to check British advances in East Africa. In 1928 Italy signed a treaty of friendship with the Emperor Haile Selasie of Abyssinia (Ethiopia, today), but Mussolini considered this a step toward creating an Italian protectorate there. In 1935 Italy began its invasion of Ethiopia. The League of Nations condemned the invasion and imposed economic sanctions on Italy. In May 1936 the Italian army occupied Addis Ababa, and in December Mussolini announced that all of Ethiopia was pacified, even though opposition was growing and spreading into Eritrea.

In July 1936 the fascist general Francisco Franco launched a rebellion against the left-wing republican government of Spain. In November 1936 Mussolini announced that Germany and Italy were joined in an “Axis.” But Franco petitioned Mussolini for aid, and in February 1937 Italy sent about 50,000 Italian troops to Spain. Under the so-called Easter Accord of April 1938, Italy agreed to withdraw its forces from Spain providing Britain recognized Italian rule in Ethiopia. In March 1939 Franco and his forces took control of Madrid.

In November 1936 Mussolini announced that Italy was joining Germany in the so-called “Axis.” But it remained unclear whether this meant that Italy would join Germany in military efforts. This was followed by the so-called Pact of Steel in May 1939 in which Italy agreed to fight together with Germany in a future war. But when World War II began in September 1939 between Germany, Britain, and France, Italy did not enter the war immediately. Mussolini feared that if Italy had entered the war right away, it would have been attacked by Britain and France, but Italy was not militarily ready for war. In April 1940 Hitler launched his attack on Norway, which was followed in May by Germany’s invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. This convinced Mussolini that Italy had to enter the war of the side of Germany since Germany had such overwhelming air and ground supremacy. In June 1940 Italy entered the Second World War against Britain and France, in June 1941 it declared war on the USSR, and in December it declared war on the United States. This decision proved disastrous to Italy, which lost its colonies in Libya and Ethiopia, and to Mussolini, who lost his position of power and then his life at the hands of Italian partisans.

The most distressing aspect of Mussolini’s rule of Fascist Italy was the cult of personality he created about himself, the militarism that he celebrated, the racial superiority he embraced of the Aryan and Mediterranean peoples over the Slavic and African peoples, and the anti-Semitism he engendered. Mussolini’s attempt to create a Neo-Roman Empire is particularly relevant today in 2016 with the prospect of Donald A. Trump becoming the Republic Party nominee for the Presidency of the United States. Trump’s own cult of personality, his appeal to working-class white men, his male chauvinism, his xenophobia, his nativism, his racism, and his slogan to “Make America Great Again” are all reminiscent of the potential of a neo-fascist movement in the United States.

The legacy of Versailles is a rather well-defined and thoroughly researched area in the discipline of History. But what did the Treaty of Versailles and the events surrounding the peace conference give to the discipline of International Relations? In order to answer this question, the article first examines the place of Versailles in the foundational myths of the discipline. After that, in the second part, it briefly reviews the most persistent and influential ideas in IR which have emerged during the construction of the new world order of the time, putting a special emphasis on the concept of national self-determination as the “new master principle” of the international society after Versailles.