Islamic republic of Iran

In the past decade, relations between Israel and China have become closer, following a decision in Jerusalem to diversify and expand Israel’s ties with emerging powers and countries that do not belong to the European Union and are less identified with the American coalition. The visit to Israel by China’s vice president is evidence of the warming of relations between the two countries.

The Social and Economical Bases of Evolution in the Hegemonic Political Discourses of the Islamic Republic of Iran


مبانی اجتماعی و اقتصادی تحول در گفتمان های سیاسی مسلط در جمهوری اسلامی ایران

Abstract:
Iran's revolution was a prelude to the rise of a modern system in the world's contemporary political history. This new system emerged without having any sample or version. This article in addition to identifying the sub-discourses of this system, is trying to find the roots of their rise and fall. In fact this research has focused on this question that what is the main reason of the hegemonic discourses' becoming and evolution in the political system of Iran's Islamic Republic area? The research's hypothesis, to answer this question, searches the root of these becoming and evolutions in the social and economical fields and shows that the society's social and economical evolutions, cause the evolutions in its political discourses. From the other hand, it shows that in the shade of the international interactions, these processes have been affected and reinforced. The research's hypothesis has been investigated in the framework of Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe's discourse theory with some roots of Fairclough's discursive reading.



Key words:
Hegemonic political discourse, Islamic Revolution, Islamic Republic, social bases, economical bases

چارچوبی تبیینی برای تحلیل گفتمان سیاست¬خارجی امام خمینی
(ایدئولوژی، استراتژی و دیپلماسی)


Abstract:
After the Islamic revolution and the rise of the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran over the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, a new wave of ideas and opinions entered Iran's foreign policy domain and the international relations structure. The principles and concepts of this revolution and the newly emerged political system are generally affected by Imam Khomeini's thought and action as its ideologue and leader. This article questions the semiotic structure and articulatory system of Imam Khomeini’s foreign policy is about giving a descriptive framework for analyzing it. According to the hypothesis, from the writers' viewpoint, the articulating system of his foreign policy discourse is describeable in a three-dimentional framework of ideology, strategy and diplomacy. Ideology beholds some principles and belief-related standards that generally nurture from Islam's revolutionary-critical source. Strategy involves the security-based calculations and the hardware policy. Moreover, diplomacy includes the accepted diagrams of conversation and negotiation for achieving national interests. The results of this discourse are represented in propositions that are based on concepts of the revolutionary-critical, pragmatic-realist, and prudent-modernist Islam.


Key words:
The Foreign Policy of the I.R of Iran, Ideology, Strategy, Diplomacy, Imam Khomeini.

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2347798920901876?journalCode=cmea

Abstract

Since 2011, numerous peace initiatives have been initiated out by several actors to end the Syrian civil war in a peaceful way. This article presents the “Astana Peace Process” brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran in early 2017 as a case study of a mediation and examines its predecessors to understand the reasons for the failures of those attempts and develops an assessment of the Astana peace process itself. To gain a better understanding of the Astana peace process, this article incorporates the efforts of main actors, their approaches, and the context of the war. In doing so, the article begins by describing the background of the civil war and then uses traditional concepts in mediation theory to elucidate the limitations of the unsuccessful attempts. Next, it investigates how the Astana peace process was different and the driving factors that encouraged the states to engage in this process and argues that Astana peace process’s overall effectiveness is likely to remain limited due to the conflicting interests of the mediators.

An open letter signed by more than 200 Iranians living inside and outside Iran, asks E.U. officials to end their efforts in assisting the Iranian government, after Donald Trump imposed a second round of sanctions on Iran earlier this month. The letter, which was sent to the European Unionʼs headquarters, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ambassadors of various countries, and other individuals and organizations, is still gathering signatures.

In 2016, Kambiz Fattahi released an explosive exposé of how the Carter Administration had communications with Ayatollah Khomeini during his exile in Paris. While receiving little press attention at the time, the article pointed towards an attempt by the Ayatollah to receive American support and by the Carter Administration to work towards a peaceful transition in Iran that benefited its interests. This essay will, considering there is a severe lack of information about the event, attempt to describe the circumstances around the Paris Communications.

ئەم وتارە لێکۆڵینەوەیەکە لەسەر پەرتووکەکانی خوێندنی قۆناغەکانی ١ بۆ ١٢ ی کۆماری ئیسلامی ئێران. ئەم وتارە لە کێشەکانی زمان، ڕەگەز، ئیتنیسیتە و ناسیۆنالیزمی ئایینی لە پەرتووکەکانی خوێندندا دەکۆڵێتەوە بۆ ئەوەی تیشک بخاتە سەر ئەوەی کە چۆن دەوڵەت لە ئێران هەوڵ دەدات بۆ ئەوەی کومەڵگەکان لە ڕێگەی سیستمی پەروەردەوە بکاتە فارس-شیعە. پەرتووکە فەرمییەکانی خوێندن کۆمەڵگەی حاکم )فارسەکان( وەک تاکە بکەری مێژوو وێنا دەکەن. دەوڵەت هەر جۆرە گێڕانەوەیەکی جێگرەوەی )نافەرمی(دیکەی پێ خیانەتە. ئەم وتارە لێکۆڵینەوەیەکی قووڵە لەسەر ئەوەی کە پەرتووکە سەپێنراوەکانی خوێندنی دەوڵەتی ئێران، جێگەی وان و زانستی دۆخمەند و چوارچێوەیەک کە لەو پەرتووکانە بەدەست دێت، چۆن شیکردنەوەیەکی ئاشکرا و ڕوون بەدەستەوە دەدات و بنەمای خەتە دابەشکەرەکانی ئیتنۆ-زمانی پێکهاتەی هەبوو ڕوون دەکاتەوە و هەروەها نیشان دەدات کە ئیسلامخوازی وەکوو مەنتیقی سنوورداری حاکم کە لە پەرتووکەکانی خوێندندا چێنراوە، دەێیتە هۆی فراوانبوونی بیرۆکە و مێژوونووسیی ڕەگەزپەرستی.

How one-man Khomeini, created a radical Islamic dictatorship, the Bloody purges of thousands of Iranian people, the governmental structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the various governmental directorates, how officials are placed into power and removed, the matrix of Islamic Theocratic Totalitarian state of Tehran. Khomeini’s theocratic government principle of guardianship of the jurisprudent was kept hidden until after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

This study seeks to determine how the Islamic Republic of Iran (‘the IRI’) has survived despite the multitude of forces seeking its ouster and vulnerability of prior twentieth century Iranian governments to regime change.  The IRI’s survival has puzzled many analysts especially due to the regime’s reported domestic unpopularity.  That the IRI has survived longer than any other twentieth century Iranian regime is even more unusual when compared to its predecessors.  Pre-1979 Iranian regimes enjoyed foreign support and fell when those external forces became hostile in 1921, 1941 and 1953 or wavered in 1979.  In contrast, the IRI has not only lacked substantial foreign support but has faced formidable external challengers like the United States.
Two relationships effectively explain the IRI’s survival.  The first is between the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (‘IRGC’).  This ensures that the regime has the enforcers to quell domestic unrest and project power internationally to weaken actors seeking regime change.  The nature of this relationship prevents a military takeover, as the IRGC’s ideology requires the pre-eminence of the Supreme Leader.  The second is between the regime and the general public (particularly the poor).  This ensures that the regime does not face mass dissatisfaction, as the last Shah did in 1979. 
The IRI has balanced repression, populism, pragmatism, and popular legitimacy (frequently with elections) and appeasement.  Further, the Islamic Republic began with an advantage: regimes resulting from mass revolutions are traditionally difficult for foreign powers to overthrow due to the regime’s dedication and popular support. 
After the Shah’s overthrow, the clerics contended with numerous armed post-revolutionary factions.  As a result of superior popular support, unifying the country behind anti-Americanism and the war effort against Iraq’s invasion, the clerical regime won the post-revolutionary struggle against its domestic armed opponents.
After the war with Iraq and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s death, the IRI moderated its policies while promoting socio-economic populism to prevent mass discontent.  The new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, addressed his legitimacy shortcomings by turning to the IRGC.  Although no longer an IRGC member upon his appointment as Supreme Leader, Khamenei had positive personal relationships with IRGC officials due to his supervision of the organization in its early days. 
Internationally, the IRI projected power and exploited American foreign policy blunders to forge a geopolitical situation that made it prohibitively costly for foreign powers to topple the Islamic Republic.  Further, the Iranian landmass is difficult to invade due to its unique and formidable geography.  Additionally, the IRI, by fostering relations with militias throughout the Middle East (e.g. the Lebanese Hezbollah), has created asymmetric trip wires that would cause intense instability against an invading power throughout the Middle East.  An overt military action against the IRI then, would not only result in the invader facing an intensely difficult campaign on Iranian soil but also a series of pro-Iranian guerrilla campaigns outside Iranian territory.

This thesis applies the concept of religious (national) identity to the cases of Saudi Arabia, Iran and their proxy allies-state and non-state actors-in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. The aim was to show that in the Middle East, Sunni and Shiite affiliations matter in the relationship between the regional powers and respective proxies, as opposing to realist statement that alliances, conflicts and political developments are only governed by pragmatic power interests. Additionally, the work examines whether religious national identities have impact on the dynamics of proxy conflicts. Overall, the objective was to establish comprehensive image of how ideational/constructivist and pragmatic/realist factors work in combination to influence alliances, enmities and conflicts in the Middle East. Using qualitative methods of research, religious (national) identities of Saudi Arabia, Iran and their allies in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen were constructed so as to create ideational and realist points of departure, and then interlinked to show how convergence of religious identities helps in creating durable alliances if used in targeted manner as a strategic tool which can help safeguard national interests. The work shows notable differences in the use of this tool between Saudi Arabia and Iran, suggesting that it may influence foreign policy successes and failures. Additionally, support of religious convergence between Saudi Arabia, Iran and their respective proxies has direct impact on the dynamic of conflicts and political developments, as "sectarianization" affects formerly secular causes.

To grasp the Iranian government’s poverty policies and to comprehend the soaring poverty in the country, it is essential to view poverty as a regime security objective. By conducting a critical analysis on 333 texts issued by the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, during 1989-2015, Khamenei’s poverty discourse has been studied through investigating how he defines, describes and frames poverty. The research illuminates Khamenei’s acknowledgement of poverty as a regime security concern, declaring the poor as the regime’s soldiers and wealthier people as unreliable. Khamenei’s poverty discourse encourages policies that force people towards a poverty threshold outlined by him, a line that guarantees basic needs for survival but neglects education and other matters that are significant for human development. Close similarities between how Khamenei defines poverty and how the government determines the official poverty line can also be
found in this research.

Martin Heidegger criticizes the loss of the truth for the being in the Western world as a result of technological development. He defines a discourse of authenticity, which seeks for vitality in tradition. Heidegger announces the end of metaphysics, which he defines as tendency that objectifies other people. Instead, Heidegger proposes overcoming of metaphysics through a return to what ancient Greeks had once done – simply letting other people unconceal and manifest themselves, without turning them into an object of thought.
Ahmad Fardid is the first commentator of Heidegger in Iran. Fardid is the author of the term “occidentosis”, with which he names the alienation of Iranians from their roots and the loss of subjectivity vis-à-vis the West.
Jalal Al-e Ahmad`s essay “Occidentosis: a Plague from the West” (1962) is an essay, whose social value is at global level. It traces a pathway for the search of a local, nativist modernity in Iran and unveils dissatisfaction with the role the West prescribes to the countries of the Third World – of an exploited periphery.
Ali Shariati turns Islam into a religion for mobilization of masses, and into an effort for return to the roots, which he sees not a step back to the past, but as a leap forward to a modernity that resonates with the Iranian essence. Shariati criticizes the “materialist cosmos”, where “man turns into an object”, while he sees in Islam “a fundamental bond, an existential relation (between man and the world). That is how the Iranian thinker copies literally ideas from Heidegger, who feels in his own times that withdrawal of religion from public life leaves men defenseless before the logic of the world of machine, in which the being is subordinated to the will for a greater power over man and life.
After the victory of the Islamic revolution, whose promise is to reconnect Iranians with their true essence, Reza Davari echoing Heidegger pleads for a return to the covenant with God (the Absolute, the Truth), from which the Iranian had departed in the times of occidentosis. This return takes place through negating the earthly subjectivity (the ego) and craves for turning man into a realizer of celestial subjectivity.
According to Bijan Abdolkarimi the huge influence of Heidegger in Iran is due to two basic reasons: he is the strongest and the most profound critic of West and at the same time he defends tradition.

Due to Imam’s special attention to education sector and wise educational policies, literacy rate was dramatically improved and special opportunities were initiated at primary and higher educational levels. Iran accomplished great scientific and academic achievements under the wise leadership of Imam Khomeini and became the most literate country in the Middle-East and became a role model for the whole Muslim Ummah. Imam’s motto of education for all was seriously adopted and free education with great quality was provided in all well-developed or less developed parts of the country.

After the First World War, Yemen, which left the Ottoman Empire and declared its independence, witnessed a civil war between 1962-1968. A new civil war has been going on in the country since 2011. In the past Yemen, known as "happy Arabia" (Arabia Felix), where its people lived in prosperity and peace; today, continues to exist in chaos and far from these long-forgotten adjectives. The interventions of different states in Yemen, which is in a strategic geography that controls the Gulf of Aden, the Babülmandeb Strait, the Red Sea and the south of the Suez Canal, caused the country to have a fragile structure and the state administration to remain weak. Although the northern and southern regions of the country were united, the internal conflicts that came with the weakness of the government led the Houthis to capture Sana'a. Internal actors, who follow different agendas within themselves and play both political and social roles in Yemen, receive the support of external actors in line with their goals and interests in these wars. For instance, while Iran apparently resorts to soft power elements during these struggles, behind the scenes Iran resorts to hard power through the Houthis. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, made an unprecedented move in the traditional foreign policy understanding in this power struggle and took its place on the stage by directly using the elements of hard power with the "Storm of Decisiveness" held in 2015. In this study, it is discussed that how external actors (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Iran), which involved to Yemen's internal conflicts, change the course of conflicts and what effect they have on internal actors.

Birinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra Osmanlı Devleti’nden ayrılıp bağımsızlığını ilan eden Yemen, 1962-1968 yılları arasında bir iç savaşa sahne olmuştur. Ülkede 2011’den itibaren devam eden yeni bir iç savaş yaşanmaktadır. Geçmişte halkının refah ve huzur içinde yaşadığı, “mutlu Arabistan” (Arabia Felix) olarak anılan Yemen, günümüzde bu sıfatlardan çok uzak, kaos içinde varlığını sürdürmektedir. Aden Körfezi’ni, Babülmendeb Boğazı’nı, Kızıldeniz’i ve Süveyş Kanalı’nın güneyini control eden stratejik bir coğrafyada bulunan Yemen’e farklı devletlerin kendi çıkarları için yapmış oldukları müdahaleler, ülkenin kırılgan bir yapıya sahip olmasına ve devlet yönetiminin zayıf kalmasına sebep olmuştur. Her ne kadar ülkenin kuzey ve güney bölgeleri birleşmiş olsa da hükümet zayıflığı ile gelen iç çatışmalar Husiler’in Sana’yı ele geçirmesine yol açmıştır. Yemen’de kendi içinde farklı gündemler takip eden ve gerek siyasi gerekse toplumsal rol oynayan iç aktörler, bu savaşlarda hedef ve çıkar ortaklığı doğrultusunda dış aktörlerin desteğini almaktadırlar. Örneğin, İran bu mücadeleler sırasında görünürde yumuşak güç unsurlarına başvururken, perde gerisinden Husiler vasıtasıyla sert güce başvurmaktadır. Suudi Arabistan ise bu güç mücadelesinde geleneksel dış politika anlayışında görülmemiş bir hamle yaparak 2015 yılında düzenlenen “Kararlılık Fırtınası” ile doğrudan sert güç unsurlarını kullanarak sahnede yerini almıştır. Bu çalışmada, Yemen’deki iç çatışmalara müdahil olan dış aktörlerin, (Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Suudi Arabistan ve İran) çatışmaların seyrini nasıl değiştirdiği ve iç aktörler üzerinde nasıl bir tesire sebep olduğu ele alınmıştır.

در بخش نخست این مقاله به زمینه‌های بازآفرینی و نیز فرض‌های محتمل در بروز شکلی از بدکرداری سیاسی پرداخته شد که می‌توان آنرا ماکیاولیسم خمینی‌مآب نامید. این پاره به بازاندیشی برخی از مفاهیم در اندیشه سیاسی ماکیاولی می‌پردازد و نمونه‌های بدفهمی و مسخ آنرا برمی‌سنجد و در پایان به اهمیت آفرینش یا تعمیق گونه‌ای ایمان‌ورزی به آرمان "خیر جمعی" و نیز بایستگی پاسداشت از واپسین گنجینه ایمانی ایرانیان اشاره می‌کند.

این نوشته به مواجهه بنیانگذار جمهوری اسلامی ایران با هم‌لباسان‌ش می‌پردازد و در ادامه درنگی می‌کند بر چگونگی صف‌آرایی او در برابر علمای هم‌طرازی که با خودش یا افکارش سر ناسازگاری داشتند و نتیجه می‌گیرد که سیاست‌ورزیِ برآمده از سنت توانست عالمان سنتیِ سیاست‌گریز را به انقیاد رژیم انقلابی درآورد.

Ethnic politics is a serious domestic challenge in Iran. Non-Persian communities are mobilizing to claim their rights and to demand representation in a system that activists claim is biased against minorities and the peripheral regions. Yet the inner workings of contemporary Iranian ethnic politics are largely understudied. This article explores recent evolutions in the role that ethnicity, regionalism and tribalism plays in Iranian domestic politics. It focuses on how these interconnected factors figured in the 2013 presidential and local council elections in Iran in a particular province that has a history of ethnic tensions. Incidentally, these elections brought Hassan Rouhani, a moderate cleric, to power as president. Among his electoral promises was to end the securitization of the minority issue. This article illustrates some of the barriers to a transformative ethnic politics – barriers that political leaders will have to overcome to enact real change.

This essay identifies an historically-enduring Iranian insistence on self-sufficiency-which can be summed up, in a superordinate manner, as the idea that the world needs Iran more than Iran needs the world. Economically, this insistence is reflected in a (rhetorical) quest for self-reliance in production; politically, it tends to be articulated in an instinctive anti-(neo)colonial, often defiant stance vis-à-vis the world; and culturally , it is often expressed as a claim to civilizational grandeur, indeed uniqueness. The origins of this conceit have to be sought in antecedents combining economic perceptions with cultural assumptions that long precede Western imperialism and modern nationalism. These, in turn, are grounded in patterns of thought that reflect specific pre-modern physical and geopolitical conditions which go back to pre-Islamic notions of paradisiacal abundance as much as to economic realities encapsulated by Aristotle's idea(l) of the self-sufficient household. I also argue that the notion evolved over time even as it retained its moral core. What was an instinctive dismissal of the outside world as dispensable, after 1800 became a self-conscious stance against foreign encroachment , real or imagined. In the course of the twentieth century, a quest for material autarky coupled with an insistence on cultural exceptionalism became an integral part of modern Iranian nationalism.

Washington politicians and the press have cultivated, among Americans, the impression that Iran is a “theocracy” with no democratic institutions. Ignorance grew during the Bush
administration as the conflict in Iraq escalated, and the administration continuously looked to blame Iran for US failures. Larry Diamond, a scholar at the Hoover Institution who
advised the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (CPA), told the Inter Press Service that the Mahdi Army of young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and other Shi`a militias (which, at the moment are giving Coalition forces a very hard time in Iraq) were being armed and financed by Iran with the aim of imposing “another Iranian-style theocracy.” Diamond’s comments were reiterated by another Coalition provisional authority advisor, Michael Rubin. Th e
story was echoed by influential New York Times conservative columnists William Safire and David Brooks, further compounding the misinformation and continued to be a running theme in the US press on into the Obama administration, particularly in the New York Times as reflected in the reporting of Michael R. Gordon. Th e claim is simply untrue. No official body in Iran is supporting al-Sadr and the idea that al-Sadr could ever dream of imposing an “Iranian-style theocracy” is absurd. Nevertheless, the impression that Iran has nothing even resembling democratic institutions makes the neoconservative claims more believable to many Americans, who know nothing of Iran and who are fearful of Islamic attacks on Western culture.

An accurate picture of Iranian electoral institutions helps in assessing both their strengths and weaknesses, and puts aside the notion that Iran is some kind of theocratic dictatorship. Consequently, I present here a sketch of the Iranian electoral procedure, the main governmental institutional bodies in Iran, and some of the underlying dynamics of political life in Iran today.

One of the central questions of the 2009 Iranian Presidential Election crisis has been the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This article argues that what we are witnessing goes beyond the institution of the IRGC to the unmasking of a new faction in Iranian politics, which has been overtly (through elections) and covertly (through penetration of state institutions and the economy) transforming power in the Islamic Republic of Iran since at least 2003.

Asaf HÜSEYİN (1989), İran'da Devrim ve Karşı Devrim (Çev. Taha Cevdet) (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 365 s.) Değerlendiren: Aysun AYAZ 1 Asaf Hüseyin'in İran'da Devrim ve Karşı Devrim isimli eseri İran İslam Devrimi'ni anlamlandırmak için önemli eserlerden biridir. Esere önem katan birçok faktör olmakla birlikte, en önemli faktörlerden biri, eserin 1988 gibi Devrimin etkisinin hala yankılandığı dönemde yazılmış olmasıdır. Yazar devrim önderleriyle görüşme fırsatı bulmuş ve İran'lı halkın nabzını tutabilmiştir. "1982 senesinde İran'a gidip Humeyni, Muntazari, Meşkini, Gilani, Edrebili, Huccetul-İslam Hamaney ve diğer devrim liderleriyle görüşme fırsatım oldu. Bir yandan devrim liderlerinin görüşlerinin bir yumağını toplarken bir yandan da halkın içerisinde kalıp, İranlıların İslam'a bakış açılarını tespit ettim."(sy.10) Bu çalışmada yazar, İran İslam Devrimi'nin siyasi hatlarını ve siyasi realitelerini oldukları halleriyle ele alıp yeniden yorumlamış ve bir harita çıkarmaya çalışmıştır. Yazarın ortaya koyduğu siyasi haritalar, İran'ın bugünkü politik sürecini anlamamız için dahi kullanılabilecek anahtar kavramlardır. Devrim öncesi İran'ın siyasi gerçekleri ve siyasi grupların oluşumu ayrıntılı şekilde ele alınmıştır. " Batılı fikir yapısını benimsemiş kimselerin İslamiyet, zenginlerin fakirler, Sünnilerin Şiiler, Marksistlerin Ulema için düşündüklerini tespit ederek, mevcut görüntüyü bir de karşı tarafın gözüyle görüp, fırçasıyla resmetmek pek zor olmadı."(sy.11) Eserin giriş kısmında 20.yüzyılda İslam dünyası içinde büyük değişiklikler olduğu ve bunun Osmanlı Devleti'nin yıkılmasıyla başladığı ifade edilmiştir. Osmanlı devletinden ayrılan devletler bir süre sömürgeci devletlerden kurtulma mücadelesi verdikten sonra özgür olmuş ama bu süreçte sömürgeciliğin farklı bir boyutu tarafından sorunlar yaşamaya başlamışlardır. Sömürgeciliğin yeni boyutunda, ülkeler içinde sömürgeci güçlere hizmet eden yerel güçler oluşturulmuş ve yerel güçler ile sömürgeci güçler arasında birbirini destekleyen bir yapı 1 İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, Yüksek Lisans Tez Öğrencisi

Since the early twentieth century, Iranians have lived through several critical moments with significant socioeconomic and religiopolitical consequences for the nation and beyond. These include, though not limited to, the Constitutional Revolution (1905–11); Oil Nationalization Movement (1952–53) led by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh; 1979 Revolution (1978–79); and 2009 post-presidential election uprisings—the so-called Green Movement, not to mention the recent protests in several towns and cities against economic disparity and corruption (late Dec. 2017 and early Jan. 2017–2018). Never merely about the internal conditions, these movements have always been linked with and responded to the interference of, or anxieties about the role of, foreign powers. This chapter elucidates how Iranians’ sense of indignity at living under tyranny, their concern about national sovereignty, socioeconomic disparity, and the lack of political voice have motivated their resistance. The mytho-historical referent of Karbala, intertwined with modern liberal discourses, nationalist sentiments, and the leftist notion of social justice have simultaneously fueled these movements and led to internal conflicts. Nevertheless, the dreams of a better tomorrow or the desire for freedom from tyranny linger on, anticipating new awakenings.

Many commentators on the revolutionary events of 1978-79 in Iran have interpreted them as indicating a strong upswing in Shi'a Islamic orthodoxy.interpreted them as indicating a strong upswing in Shi'a Islamic orthodoxy. Although Iran's identity as an Islamic state is not in question, both Iranian and foreign observers over the years have regularly reported the Iranian
population to be somewhat lax in both knowledge of doctrine and adherence to strict Islamic practice. The religious fervor which characterized the revolution seems to constitute a significant change in the basic religious orientation of the Iranian people. The leaders of the postrevolutionary
Islamic Republic were committed to effecting such a change in the population. They viewed the prerevolutionary period as one of corruption, led by a corrupt shah-thus accounting for previous laxity in religious observance.

In the discussion which follows the apparent shift in religious orientation in Iran is seen neither as a question of corruption and purity nor as one of decline and revival. Iranian religious behavior and belief is viewed as oriented by a set of symbolic principles which underlie not only religious practice, but also many other aspects of Iranian social, economic, and political life.  This symbolic substratum, rather than orthodox Shi'a doctrine, provided the inspiration and strength underlying the fervor of the original revolution.

This book chapter examines the use of the trope, or master symbol, of Imam Husayn (Hossein) and his martyrdom in modern Iranian politics, pointing out that the popular appeal of the commemoration of Husayn's martyrdom derives in part from its power to embody many elements that are characteristic of core themes in Iranian life. In the post -revolution period the trope of martyrdom evolved as a definitive proof of the legitimacy of the regime.

In this bachelor's thesis I enquire into the factors that expose a country to the risk of civil war. In the first part of my work I present the major positions in the scientific debate on civil war causation and illustrate controversies arising from different interpretations of key variables. In the second part I apply my findings to the Islamic Republic of Iran elaborating on the risk factors in the light of the so-called “feasibility hypothesis.”

La tesi – redatta in lingua inglese – indaga i fattori che mettono un Paese a rischio di guerra civile e si articola in due parti. Nella prima parte si presentano i principali orientamenti emersi nel dibattito scientifico sull'origine delle guerre civili e si approfondiscono i principali fattori causali che emergono da un'analisi econometrica, prospettandone le difficoltà interpretative. Nella seconda parte del lavoro, si procede all'applicazione della cosiddetta “ipotesi sulla fattibilità” a un caso di studio, la Repubblica Islamica dell'Iran, discutendone opportunità e rischi.

I would like to deeply express my gratitude to the many people that have helped me throughout my MA program. First, I would like to thank all of my professors for what they have taught me throughout the past three years. I would like to especially thank my thesis advisor, professor Walid Kazziha, as I am forever grateful for his guidance, assistance and patience. I would also to thank my readers, Professor Ibrahim El Nur and Professor Maye Kassem for their valuable insight and feedback on my thesis and I am forever indebted for their contribution. I am also grateful for the assistance provided by Ms. Yomna Amr as without her help I would have not completed my masters. I would also like to acknowledge the help provided by my classmates, co-workers and all of my close friends. I would like to thank Basma El Etreby and Dina Khalil for always being there for me in tough times. I would also like to thank my former boss Dr. Dina Omar for her encouragement during my masters program for her...

This research examines the politicization of women’s clothing under the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republican of Iran from the 1930s-1990s. It distinctively focuses on the governments’ use of women’s clothing to define their idea of Iranian nationalism and how their sumptuary policies affected women’s lives. It assesses the motives behind the sumptuary laws for each regime, and argues that both governments situated women as symbols of national health and honor, and used them as visualizations for the success of their platforms. Despite different interpretations of morality, this research suggests that both governments created these laws to “purify” their “corrupt” nation, using the same rhetoric. Paradoxically, this led to a sexualized culture that exists today in Tehran. It analyzes a wealth of primary sources including women’s magazines, political cartoons, poetry, newspapers, extant clothing, photographs, legislation, autobiographies, speeches, passports, Revolutionary-era books written by Iranian intellectuals, and oral interviews.

Since 1989, the internal dynamics of change in Iran, rooted in a panoply of socioeconomic, cultural, institutional, demographic, and behavioral factors, have led to a noticeable transition in both societal and governmental structures of power, as well as the way in which many Iranians have come to deal with the changing conditions of their society. This is all exacerbated by the global trend of communication and information expansion, as Iran has increasingly become the site of the burgeoning demands for women’s rights, individual freedoms, and festering tensions and conflicts over cultural politics. These realities, among other things, have rendered Iran a country of unprecedented—and at time paradoxical—changes. This book explains how and why.