Referendums

El diseño y la práctica de los referéndums latinoamericanos. Reseña del libro: “El diablo está en los detalles. Referéndum y poder político en América Latina” de Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla y Yanina Welp (coordinadores). Lima, Fondo Editorial Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

The fruit of a referendum should be political clarity. The people have spoken; the state will act in accordance with their wishes. Yet the Brexit referendum had the opposite effect. After a majority of the UK electorate who voted in the referendum indicated a preference to leave rather than remain in the European Union, the representative government fell into divisive conflict over what policy should be adopted as a response to the expression of popular will. This is the antithesis of the clarity that a referendum should produce. Why has this happened? This Essay argues that, beyond the political and social complexities of Brexit, the subsequent instability can be traced to the humble realities of referendum question design. The referendum pitted a concrete proposal with clear legal consequences (Remain) against a question of principle with no explicit indication of subsequent government action (Leave). In doing so, the Brexit referendum deviated from well-established principles of referendum design by presenting voters with two non-comparable alternatives. Damningly for post-referendum governance, the result of the referendum offered the government little clear legal guidance, but rather simply constrained its policy-making flexibility. Such a referendum outcome forces representative government to exercise general policy-making discretion, but with a constrained palette of policy options which specifically exclude the first-choice preference of many voters. This Essay uses classical tools of political science to interpret this confusion in democratic governance, and draw forth general lessons regarding the interaction between referendum design and representative politics. Specifically, it applies spatial modelling of political competition to identify how flawed referendum design upsets the relationship between representatives and voters.

2. Abstract Referendums on electoral systems are relatively rare. In most countries changes to the electoral system are enacted through the legislatures. The British referendum in May 2011 is thus one of the rare examples. In this article it is shown that the apparently idiosyncratic factors in the referendum were consistent with general trends identified in other referendums.

In der politischen Debatte rund um die eidgenössische Volksinitiative "Für mehr Transparenz in der Politikfinanzierung (Transparenz-Initiative)" wird die direkte Demokratie entweder als Anlass oder als Hürde für weitergehende Offenlegungspflichten präsentiert. Dieser Aufsatz untersucht, ob die direktdemokratischen Instrumente für oder gegen mehr Transparenz im Bereich der Politikfinanzierung sprechen. Ein besonderes Augenmerk wird dabei auf die verfassungsmässige Garantie der freien Willensbildung und der unverfälschten Stimmabgabe gerichtet (Art. 34 Abs. 2 BV), die bei direktdemokratischen Entscheidungsprozessen Anwendung findet. Der Beitrag zeigt auf, dass die zeitgenössische Lehre und Rechtsprechung zurückhaltend bleiben, was Informationspflichten der Behörden im Rahmen von Abstimmungen angeht. Wie im Beitrag argumentiert wird, drängt sich eine Auslegung von Art. 34 Abs. 2 BV auf, welche die Integrität direktdemokratischer Prozesse umfassender schützt. Um seiner Schutzpflicht nachzukommen, muss der Staat den Stimmberechtigten sämtliche entscheidrelevanten Informationen zur Verfügung stellen. Dies umfasst auch Informationen zu möglichen finanziellen Abhängigkeiten der politischen Akteure und somit zu Grossspenden, die in Abstimmungskampagnen fliessen. Der Beitrag kommt zum Schluss, dass Art. 34 Abs. 2 BV keine verfassungsrechtliche ____________________ * Die Autorin dankt Chiara Valsangiacomo und den Teilnehmenden am DemocracyNet Research Workshop vom 7.9.2020 sowie Raphaela Cueni, Lukas Schaub und Stefan Schlegel für hilfreiche Hinweise und Ergänzungen. Den Anstoss zum Verfassen dieses Artikels bildete die Jahrestagung der Schweizer Sektion der Internationalen Juristenkommission zum Thema "Parteien und Politikfinanzierung" (Bern, 4.9.2020), an der die Autorin als Podiumsgast teilgenommen hat.

Scotland is not the only sub-state unit in Europe where relevant political actors make claims for independence. To generate insights on these independence demands, we compare the drivers, arguments and popular support for secession in Scotland, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Flanders. We argue that national identity, party politics and the economy are behind the independence requests, and the exact articulation of these elements varies from case to case. Currently, the most salient of these demands are the ones from Catalonia; Basque demands for self-determination are less prominent than in the past, whereas the demand for a vote on independence is much less articulated in Flanders. Although the Scottish independence referendum has set a precedent for solving independence disputes, we argue that the possibilities of exporting the Scottish referendum experience to other realities are limited.

The Brexit vote has sparked renewed criticism of the UK’s ad hoc constitutional arrangements, particularly in relation to the status of popular sovereignty. While the people is politically recognised as “sovereign” through the apparent unassailability of its referendum verdict, this sovereignty has no legal foundation or form – thus giving it an elusive, indefinite character. In turn, legal commentators have argued that the lack of a clear conceptual framework for constitutional referendums aggravated the political crisis that followed the vote, and that the uncertain nature and authority of referendums represents a distinct source of constitutional crisis in its own right. In this paper, I consider how this “constitutionalist critique” of the Brexit referendum, and its ad hoc constitutional framework, reflects a particular conception of liberal constitutionalism as a bulwark against the hazards and vicissitudes of unstructured popular sovereignty. I will argue that this perspective overestimates the capacity of constitutional law to regulate expressions of popular sovereignty via referendums, that it misconceives the character and claim of popular sovereignty more generally, and that it reflects certain characteristics of liberal legalism in its stance towards politics and political contingency.

In this study, I set out to explore the role media plays in reinforcing national identity and belonging. Through this study I aim to contribute to the wealth of literature on the sociology of nationalism, particularly in relation to media. I decided to conduct a media analysis of newspaper coverage on the recent Independence Referendum in Scotland. My main focus in this study was to explore how newspaper coverage re-presented national identity in Scotland, and how these identities tied into the referendum debates. I aim to highlight in this paper, the pivotal role that newspaper discourse plays in reproducing and reinforcing distinct national identities.
I offer a main hypothesis in this thesis which serves to challenge ideas and theories around nationalism in Scotland. This research uncovers some of the complexity of the media and nationalism in Scotland. A number of studies of Scottish media, maintain that Scotland’s media can assume the label of ‘semi-autonomous’. These studies maintain that the media in Scotland offer distinct national flaggings that differ from the media in the rest of the United Kingdom. However this study argues this may be the case during ‘average’ or ‘normal’ periods of media coverage, but during this event the Scottish media served to promote and reproduce British national identity. This study shows how three discourse strategies were adopted in newspaper coverage to reproduce belonging to the British nation, which I have labelled as follows: The Constructive Strategies of ‘Our Patriotism’, The Perpetuation Strategies of the ‘Nationalist Threat’ and The Detachment and Distance of Newspaper Coverage. Each of the three linguistic strategies were used frequently and routinely in the coverage analysed, and each on its own, and as a collective served to further promote identification with the British nation. These findings prompt a rethinking of the role that media plays in nation building, particularly in relation to stateless-nations such as Scotland.  The findings of this study help to open doors for the potential of further understanding why Scotland decided to vote No in the referendum, and help to forge a way for a better understanding of media, nationalism and stateless nations.

While the power to legislate is generally lodged with the Congress, the Philippine Constitution ensures that the people retain their lawmaking power through the system of initiative and referendum.  It expressly provides that the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution or pass national and local law through the system of initiative and referendum. Pursuant to this mandate, Congress passed into law R.A. No. 6735 (also known as the People’s Initiative and Referendum Act) and R.A. No. 7160 (also known as the Local Government Code of the Philippines), which seek to operationalize the constitutional mandate that empowers the people to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, any law or constitutional amendment through the system of initiative and referendum. Yet, implementing a system of initiative in a political environment that is still learning its concept and implications is not easy. Despite the lapse of more than 25 years, the Philippines has yet to enact a national law or amend the constitution through initiative. Referendum is more successful but mostly in the local levels. The experience of the Philippines demonstrates that it will take time for the people to fully utilize it as a tool for pushing for laws that genuinely serve their interest.

En el presente documento se analiza la figura de la revocación del
mandato como mecanismo de control político de democracia directa, su
regulación en México y las razones por las que el Pleno de la Suprema
Corte de Justicia de la Nación optó por declararla inconstitucional.
Asimismo, se proponen directrices para incorporarla en el orden jurídico
mexicano, de las cuales se obtiene una propuesta de reforma a la
Constitución Federal.

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are generally lauded for their potential to increase economic growth and foster private investment by introducing business-friendly institutions such as competitive tax and regulatory frameworks. However, a new generation of special zones are also being used to introduce new democratic institutions into poorly governed countries. The economic success of Singapore, Hong Kong, and the SEZs of China and the United Arab Emirates inspired Honduran policymakers to amend the country's Constitution in 2013 to allow for the creation of special Zones for Employment and Economic Development (ZEDEs), a new political subdivision of the State of Honduras with a constitutionally granted autonomy to adopt their own governance structure and laws. In Latin America, however, special jurisdictions are bound by specific international law commitments to democratic governance and respect for human rights. This paper provides an overview of the democratic governance framework adopted by Próspera, the first Honduran ZEDE, while comparing it to the mechanisms for political participation available under the national legal system of Honduras. It further explores the ZEDE regime's potential to foster democratic change by introducing to Honduras more effective legal mechanisms for Hondurans to exercise their civil and political rights through semi-autonomous local governments.

Résumé
La fameuse note de Hans Corell sur l’exploitation des ressources naturelles du Sahara est devenue, en l’espace de quelques années, la doxa « juridique » pour un certain nombre d’acteurs internationaux (Etats, ONG, etc.). Mais ce qui étonne le plus, c’est qu’elle a été reprise à son compte par la Cour de Justice de l’Union Européenne au prix d’un excès de pouvoir manifeste.  Pourtant, c’est un texte qui manque de substance car fait de formules péremptoires qui ne laissent pas de place à l’analyse et à l’argumentation juridique. Plus grave, il tourne le dos aux principes et règles du Droit International, en particulier ceux relatifs à la fin du statut de territoire non autonome et à la consultation des populations dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du droit à l’autodétermination. Il tourne également le dos à l’évolution de la position des Nations Unies dans le conflit  du Sahara, conflit dont il occulte des éléments fondamentaux que le passage du temps a complexifiés.
Bien qu’elle n’ait jamais été entérinée par le Président du Conseil de Sécurité qui l’avait demandée, la note de Corell est devenue une doxa juridique dans l’affaire du Sahara par le biais de réseaux sociaux, qui font l’opinion publique: think tanks, ONG, centres d’études, lobbyistes, et un matraquage médiatique intensif et répété. Ces réseaux mettent à profit « l’ère du vide » où la pertinence d’un écrit juridique dépend moins de sa valeur intrinsèque que de la dose de matraquage dont il fait l’objet auprès de l’opinion publique.

""During the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, the second largest country in Europe came close to a violent break-up similar to that in neighboring Moldova, which witnessed a violent secession of the Transdniestria region. Numerous elections, including the hotly contested 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine, and surveys of public opinion showed significant regional divisions in these post-Soviet countries. Western parts of Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the Muslim Crimean Tatars, were vocal supporters of independence, nationalist, and pro-Western parties and politicians. In contrast, Eastern regions, as well as the Orthodox Turkic-speaking Gagauz, consistently expressed pro-Russian and pro-Communist political orientations. Which factors ? historical legacies, religion, economy, ethnicity, or political leadership ? could explain these divisions? Why was Ukraine able to avoid a violent break-up, in contrast to Moldova?
This is the first book to offer a systematic and comparative analysis of the regional political divisions in post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. The study examines voting behavior and political attitudes in two groups of regions: those which were under Russian, Ottoman, and Soviet rule; and those which were under Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak rule until World War I or World War II. This book attributes the regional political divisions to the differences in historical experience. This study helps us to better understand regional cleavages and conflicts, not only in Ukraine and Moldova, but also in other cleft countries.""

This article reviews the Constitution Unit’s Interim Report of the Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland. After placing referendums in the context of political history and theory, the paper critically analyses the report’s discussion of when a referendum is likely to be called. Following this, the paper reviews  the rules regulating referendums. The paper focuses especially on  online campaigning. It is  shown that online campaigning (through social media) contributed to disinformation in previous referendums in Britain. Both Ireland and the United Kingdom should follow the lead of Estonia, Iceland, Latvia and Portugal, and introduce restrictions on social media campaigning—or, explain why not.

Απογοητευμένη η κυπριακή ηγεσία της εποχής από τις επανειλημμένες αρνητικές απαντήσεις της Βρετανίας στο αίτημα των Ελλήνων Κυπρίων για αυτοδιάθεση, το οποίο ήταν σύμφωνο με τον Χάρτη των Ηνωμένων Εθνών, αποφάσισε να λάβει πιο δυναμικά μέτρα. Μετά από την ταραχώδη δεκαετία του ’40, που σημαδεύτηκε από τον Β’ Παγκόσμιο πόλεμο και τον Ελληνικό Εμφύλιο πόλεμο, η Εκκλησία αναδυόταν αναδιοργανωμένη για να συνεχίσει τον ενωτικό αγώνα που είχε σταματήσει με τα Οκτωβριανά του 1931.
Η συνέχιση της αρνητικής στάσης των Βρετανών δεν άφηνε πλέον περιθώρια για μια ειρηνική κινητοποίηση και άνοιξε το δρόμο για την ένοπλη αναμέτρηση.

Αυτό το χρονολόγιο αποτελεί ένα πρώτο εγχείρημα καταγραφής των πιο σημαντικών γεγονότων, που έλαβαν χώρα στο χρονικό διάστημα ανάμεσα σε δύο ορόσημα: την εξαγγελία του δημοψηφίσματος για το σχέδιο συμφωνίας που πρότειναν οι "θεσμοί" και εξειδικεύθηκε σε δύο έγγραφα με τίτλους «Reforms for the completion of the Current Program and Beyond» και «Preliminary Debt sustainability analysis», αντίστοιχα, και την πραγματοποίησή του την 5η Ιουλίου 2015. Πρόκειται για μια ιδιαίτερα πυκνή -από την άποψη του ιστορικού χρόνου- περίοδο, η οποία αξίζει να αποτυπωθεί με τρόπο περιεκτικό και ευσύνοπτο, ώστε να χρησιμοποιηθεί ως εργαλείο από τους σύγχρονους και μελλοντικούς θεράποντες την ελληνική πολιτική και συνταγματική ιστορία.

Abstract: 29 countries in the world have introduced same-sex marriage. 22 have done so by legislation, four by judicial decision, two by a combination of judicial decision and legislation, and one by popular referendum. The Irish same-sex marriage referendum of 2015 has been criticised for putting minority rights to a popular vote. This criticism largely misunderstands the legal and social context of the Irish referendum, however. A necessary component of constitutional amendment, the referendum required campaigners to build a robust democratic consensus in favour of same-sex marriage, strongly entrenching minority rights. These benefits would likely not have arisen, however, if a referendum had been a choice on the part of political actors rather than a legal necessity. It is therefore unlikely that the Irish experience, whatever its merits, can be straightforwardly translated to other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the Irish referendum campaign yields some lessons for other activist campaigns for same-sex marriage. In particular, the story-telling of gay people—and the responses of their fellow citizens—may have been more significant than the articulation of more public values, such as equality.

During the long history of European unification, several referendums have taken place and most of them proved to be rather historic. Some European demoi-but certainly not all of them-were occasionally given the chance to map their own route through the processes of European enlargement and integration. They have decided upon their own integration, upon other States' membership or even upon treaty ratifications. They have even rejected-in France and the Netherlands-the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. More recently, in Greece, they rejected a working document concerning a European 'rescue plan' in the midst of the Euro-crisis while, in 2016, the United Kingdom voted upon its own future in the Union. The present chapter analyses the European institutions' reactions to these national referendums on European issues, especially when people gave a seemingly 'wrong' answer (from a European-integration point of view). Reversing the 'no' votes and reviewing a posteriori national referendums through divers processes often led by unelected technocrats has become a common place in modern Europe, given that even the Treaty of Lisbon itself probably suffers from this kind of democratic-legitimacy deficit. Finally, the chapter examines more broadly the question of direct-democracy mechanisms within the Union questioning the non-existence of any kind of pan-European referendum. While most scholars and politicians are still questioning the existence of a European demos, the present study insists more on the absence of those mechanisms which would allow this demos to be heard; to officially declare its will and determine its own fate. The modern European crisis is, thus, seen as only a sign of a much broader crisis of identity and democratic legitimacy taking place within the European Union. As long as the Union keeps ignoring its own demos-and sometimes even the rare national referendums on European questions-there is no future for either European common identity or democracy.

This article examines determinants of persistent regional political cleavages in post-Communist Ukraine. The question is how significant the role of culture is compared to ethnic, economic, and religious factors in the regional divisions. This study employs correlation, factor, and regression analyses of regional support for the Communist/pro-Russian parties and presidential candidates and pro-nationalist/pro-independence parties and candidates in all national elections held from 1991 to 2006, the vote for the preservation of the Soviet Union in the March 1991 referendum, and the vote for the independence of Ukraine in the December 1991 referendum. This study shows that the pattern of these regional differences remained relatively stable from 1991 to 2006. Historical experience has a major effect on regional electoral behavior in post-Communist Ukraine. The legacy of Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak rule is positively associated with the pro-nationalist and pro-independence vote; the same historical legacy has a negative effect on support for pro-Communist and pro-Russian parties and presidential candidates and on the vote for the preservation of the Soviet Union.

Etymologically, democracy means the "rule of the people", yet in most countries (Switzerland is a partial exception to the rule, See Kobach (1992)), the role of the populus is limited to periodic elections. Britain is not an exception. To be sure, there are several arcane provisions for citizen involvement in Britain at the local level 1 , but at the national level, citizens" opportunity to vote directly on policy issues is limited as referendums have been comparatively rare.

Estructuralmente, el Reino de España se encuentra hoy en una situación en la que su modelo de distribución del poder, sometido a una enorme presión por parte de la población de ciertas zonas del Estado, que parecen conformar ya la mayoría de la ciudadanía al menos en Cataluña, no tiene visos de ser modificado fácilmente en esa dirección gracias a la asimetría de las preferencias y la desproporcionada capacidad de bloqueo de otras zonas del país. No parece, pues, fácil lograr una solución que estabilice satisfactoriamente la situación a medio plazo -más allá de medidas coyunturales o cambios a corto plazo que puedan alejar el riesgo sólo por un tiempo limitado- y, en ausencia de esas necesarias reformas, el 'proceso de desconexión catalán' está llamado a continuar. Paradójicamente, será así en gran parte gracias a la rigidez de la interpretación dominante en nuestra doctrina y al nulo intento por ofrecer soluciones de composición de los intereses en conflicto dentro del actual marco constitucional. La combinación de una interpretación que rechaza todas las soluciones planteadas para ello, de la reforma estatutaria (2006-2010) a la realización de un referéndum acordado (2012-2013) o al desarrollo de un proceso participativo consultivo (2014) con la extrema dificultad en la práctica de lograr la flexibilización introduciendo cambios constitucionales en la línea necesaria para minimizar el conflicto es una bomba de relojería política que permite augurar un incremento de la tensión, al no ser capaz el Derecho público de cumplir satisfactoriamente con su función de facilitar la resolución de este tipo conflictos. Ante un previsible choque, con placas tectónicas que se desplazan lenta pero inexorablemente en direcciones opuestas, la función de estas reglas o de una reforma constitucional, inteligentemente empleadas, debiera ser permitir liberar presiones y no contribuir a acumularlas. No da la sensación de que lo estemos haciendo demasiado bien en España.

Die Staaten sind zu klein geworden, um globalen Herausforderungen wie die sozialverträgliche Gestaltung des Weltmarktes, Frieden und die Erhaltung der naturlichen Lebensgrundlagen im Alleingang begegnen zu können. Nur eine grenzûberschreitende {transnationale) Politik kann der
globalen Ökonomie soziale und ökologische Grenzen setzen. Dies wirft jedoch sofort die Frage nach der demokratischen Legitimation einer solchen Politik auf denn auf der transnationalen Ebene gibt es bisher kaum eine demokratische Öffentlichkeit, geschweige denn verfasste demokratische Beieiligungsrechte der Bürgerinnen und Bürger.

Am Beispiel der Europäischen Union klären die 28 Autorinnen und Autoren aus 12 Ländern, ob und unter welchen Umständen sich der dernokratische Anspruch auf Burgerinnen- und Bürgerbeteiligung auf transnationaler Ebene aufrecht erhalten und politisch umsetzen lässt. Die Entwürfe dieses Buches sollen lmpulse geben für eine weitergehende Diskussion der Chancen und Probleme der transnationalen Demokratie und jenen eine Handlungsperspektive eröffnen, die manchmal an ihrer Ohnrnacht zu verzweifeln drohen.
Transnationale Demokratie ist noch keine Wirklichkeit, aber eine Wirklichkeit im Entstehen, die es kritisch zu begleiten und engagiert zu befördern gilt.

Mit Beiträgen von Elisabeth Bongert (Harnburg), Rolf Büchi (Helsinki), Gianni D'Amato/Siegfried Schieder (Potsdam/Berlìn), Roland Erne (Paris/Berlin), Tiìman Evers (Kassel), Andreas Gross (Zurich), Sergej Henke (Potsdam), Stefan Honecker (Ludwigshafen), Kurt Hübner
(Berlin), Pascal Jacobs (Enschede), lreneusz Pawel Karolewki (Warschau/Potsdam), Bruno Kaufmann (Göteborg), Heinz KIeger (Potsdam), Anton Koostra (Enschede), Pekka Kosonen (Helsinki), Alexander Langer (Bozen), Erika Lazarova (Sofia), Christian Lequesne (Paris), Borris Mayer (Trier), Joyce McMillan (Edinburgh), Ute Passow (Berlin), Birgit Pickel (Kapstadt), Stefan Pöder (Lana), Heidi Rebsamen
(Luzern/Berlin), Christoph Scherrer (Berlin), Theo Schiller (Marburg), Urs Wälterlin (Sydney).

El presente texto propone una aproximación etnopolítica al referéndum
para la aprobación del Estatuto de la Autonomía Guaraní Charagua Iyambae, celebrado el 20 de septiembre de 2015 en Charagua, un municipio chaqueño de mayoría guaraní perteneciente al departamento de Santa Cruz.

According to some, we are now living in the ‘Age of the Referendum’. But the rise of the referendum is fraught with worry it will usher in a crude populism which will obliterate constitutional constraints and lead – ironically - to executive dominance, authoritarianism and deep forms of democratic decay. Therefore, whilst referendums hold out the promise of constitutional self-government, we need to be mindful of the pitfalls and problems they bring in their wake.

In exploring the potential—and the pitfalls—of a democratic constitutionalist vision, Ireland offers a promising testing ground. On the surface, one might think that Ireland’s referendum process would fall victim to many of the common concerns about referendums. In initiation and formulation, the process is open to elite capture because the government gets to propose and formulate the referendum proposal which is put to the people. The process is purely majoritarian; 50% plus one of the voters on referendum day can approve any change. Any change can be proposed, however radical. Minority rights have been put to referendum vote. Ireland’s rules and regulation of campaign advertising and debate are loose and scant and seem unlikely to combat disinformation.

Yet, when examined closely, Ireland stands as a counterpoint to many of the criticisms and fears which surround referendums. Elite dominance, though formally prevalent, is offset by a substantial role for civil society in initiation and campaigning. Bare majority vote is supplemented by widespread participation and deliberation, which appears to be nuanced and robust, whilst minority rights have been vindicated when voted on. The process has not been subject to political exploitation for sweeping or abusive constitutional change. Though the record is far from perfect, referendums work reasonably well in Ireland, commanding high levels of popular participation and engagement, which go well beyond the mere act of ratifying or rejecting a referendum proposal at the ballot box and extend to widespread, relatively well-informed and committed popular deliberation. During a constitutional referendum in Ireland, a national conversation takes place about what people want their Constitution to mean. As such, Ireland is a crucial case-study in exploring the promise - and perils - of constitutional referendums.

Today visual factors are effective on the formation of image. In this context, the role of photograph is also quite dominant. The photographs that show many visual appearances of leaders as their clothing preferences and body language can set an agenda on media and affect
the perception of voters. Owing to the social media tools which contribute visibility, leaders can share their messages easily and fast and their public can know them well. The popular phrase “A picture is worth a thousand of words.” can tell the importance of the photograph. In this study the role of photograph on political leaders’ image was studied by semiotic analysis. For this purpose,
the photograps which were shared on the official social media accounts of Recep Tayyip Erdogan (President of the Republic of Turkey), Binali Yıldırım (Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey), Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (Leader of the Republican People's Party) and Devlet Bahçeli
(Leader of the Nationalist Movement Party) were analyzed between the dates of 16 February and 15 April 2017. As a result of the study, the image of the leaders are determined as hopeful, reliable, trustworthy, serious, determined, social, respectful of diversity, authoritative, strong, sincere, friendly, energetic, assertive, self confident.

We provide the first systematic documentation and analysis of a generation gap in direct democracy outcomes across a wide range of topics using postelection survey data covering more than 300 Swiss referenda and four decades. We find that older voters are more likely to resist reform projects, particularly those that are associated with the political left. We separate age and cohort effects without imposing functional form constraints using a panel rank regression approach. The aging effect on political orientation is robust for controlling for arbitrary cohort effects and appears to be driven by expected utility maximization and not by habituation-induced status-quo bias. Our results suggest that population aging raises the hurdle for investment-like reform projects with positive net present values, long-run benefits and short-run costs in direct polls.

This article analyses the factors conducive to recognizing independence referendums. After a tour d'horizon of the history of referendums on creating new states and a summary of the legal position the chapter argues that independence votes are most likely to be implemented when this in the interest of the three Western Powers on the UN Security council. While there is a statistically significant correlation between the support for independence (the yes-vote) and international recognition, this is much lower than the 100 per cent association between support of the three permanent Western Powers on the Security Council and international recognition. Countries may cite legal, democratic and philosophical principles but the statistical and historical facts suggest that these are of secondary importance when it comes to recognising states after independence referendums. " Covenants without the Sword are but words " Thomas Hobbes

Much like the war being over by Christmas, so the 'European question' is always about to be settled for a generation. So it was in 1975, in a simpler Britain, with one seat of government, two major parties, and three television channels, but a Britain that was beginning to unravel. The national nightmare initiated by the second has occasioned this full reconsideration of the first referendum on Britain's membership of 'Europe'.

" In 1920s Germany, radio became a factor in election campaigning. But the state soon stepped in to make public broadcasting services strictly nonpartisan. This made any election news coverage extremely problematic, while growing government control opened ways for certain political interests to slip in. Campaigns spots on radio and more political coverage came again toward Weimar's end, but that effectively eased transition from an independent radio structure to full government control by Nazi propagandists after 1933.

Also available at http://www.politik-kommunikation.de/ressorts/artikel/wahlrauschen-im-roehren-radio

In den 1920ern wurde das Radio zum Faktor im Wahlkampf. In Weimar aber sollte der Staatsfunk strikt überparteilich sein.
Schlagwörter: Radio, Reichstag, Rundfunk, Rundfunkordnung, USA, Volksbegehren, Volksentscheid, Wahlen, Wahlkampf, Weimarer Republik, Young-Plan
Organisationen: Berliner Funk-Stunde, Deutsche Stunde in Bayern, DNVP, Drahtloser Dienst AG (Dradag), DVP, KPD, Norag (Nordische Rundfunk AG), NSDAP, Reichspost, SPD, Stahlhelm, Telefunken, Zentrum
Personen: Hans Bredow, Calvin Coolidge, Konrad Dussel, Paul Fleischer, Karl Führer, Paul von Hindenburg, Adolf Hitler, Alfred Hugenberg, Wilhelm Marx, Franz von Papen, Heinz Pohle, Joseph Räuscher, Ernst Thälmann, Carl Severing, Ernst Scholz
Publikationen: Badische Presse, Berliner Funk-Stunde, Deutsche Stunde in Bayern, Drahtloser Dienst AG (Dradag)"

Right-wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal democracy functions with calls for greater direct democracy. But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article, survey data is used to examine, first, whether right-wing populist candidates in Australia, Canada and New Zealand were more supportive of direct democracy than candidates of other parties. Second, the views of right-wing populist voters about the functioning of democracy and direct democracy are investigated. While right-wing populist candidates turned out to be far more likely to support direct democracy, right-wing populist supporters did not mirror the candidates. Although these were among the most dissatisfied with how democracy worked, they did not necessarily favour referendums more than other voters. The findings have implications both for how we conceive of the relationship between populism and direct democracy and the remedies proposed for redressing populist discontent.

The Brexit vote has sparked renewed criticism of the UK’s ad hoc constitutional arrangements. While the people is recognized as “sovereign” through the unassailability of its referendum verdict, this sovereignty has no legal foundation or form – giving it an elusive, indefinite character. In turn, legal commentators have argued that the lack of a clear conceptual framework for constitutional referendums aggravated the political crisis that followed the vote, and that the uncertain nature and authority of referendums represents a distinct source of constitutional crisis in its own right. In this paper, I consider how this “constitutionalist critique” of the Brexit referendum, and its ad hoc constitutional framework, reflects a particular conception of liberal constitutionalism as a bulwark against the hazards and vicissitudes of unstructured popular sovereignty. I will argue that this perspective overestimates the capacity of constitutional law to regulate expressions of popular sovereignty via referendums, that it misconceives the character and claim of popular sovereignty more generally, and that it reflects certain characteristics of liberal legalism in its stance towards politics and political contingency.